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Few have perceived that Durkheim enter~ained two dis­
tinct ~chemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic Suicide. 
• 
I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical 
axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline 
generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight 
that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of ex­
• treme modern cUltural sanctions. Absence/presence, too lit­
tle/too much--these are the key analytical axes arourid which 
Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved. 
Resting on his image of human nature (homo duplex) as 
• inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema concerns 
the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the pre-so­
cial ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second schema, 
which shifted the original burden of insatiability from the 
• organic half of human nature to modern culture, concerns the 
presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize individualism 
and d.rives for "progress and perfection." Only selected parts 
of the first schema have been perceived and pursued so far by
• soc iologists. 
In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen 
as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both ano­
mie and egoisme proceed from common sources; they differ in 
• their prime mode of expression .. Anomie is active; egoisme 
passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress 
and perfection" are turned against the external world, we see 
•
 
•
 
• 
, anomie--the "infinity of desi~esl'--and the collapse of the 
will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic a­
rena. This ethos,is supported by w~at I shall call the "Anglo 
Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these twin 
sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatia­
bility are turned inward against the self, we witness ego­
• 
isme--the "infinity of dreamsl'--and the collapse of the will 
and imagination in frustration and exhaustion seen in sui­
cides of artists, poets, and intellectuals. This ~thos of 
angst a~d the "journey into th~ interior," in which suicide 
• 
becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call the 
"Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition." 
! Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some 
of our highest aspirations are then linked with Weber's work 
• in the sociology of religion and culture. As aQ "infinity of desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural tradition, 
anomie is interpr~ted as the secularized outcome of Protes­
tant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As an "in­
• finity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant contempor­
ary cultural tradition, egoisme is interpreted as the secu­
larized outcome of Protestant· "inner-light," II inner-worldly 
mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest callings
• and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral anarchy" 
and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern world. 
Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human finitude" and health 
as the "golden mean,'" lead us to recognize, then, that when 
• our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also become, iron­
ically,our special vices. 
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• 
INTRODUCTION
• Few have perceived that Durkheim entertained two dis­
tinct schemas of anomie and egoisme in his classic Suicide. 
I shall demonstrate that Durkheim shifted on his analytical 
• 
axes from the notion that the absence of moral discipline 
generates modern suicides, to the more significant insight 
that anomie and egoisme are generated by the presence of ex­
treme modern cultural sanctions. Absence/presence, too lit­
• 
tle/too much--these are the key analytical axes around which 
Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolved. 
Resting on his doctrine of human nature (homo duplex) 
as inherently egoistic and insatiable, the first schema con­
• 
cerns the absence of legitimate moral constraint over the 
pre-social ego in the modern transitional crisis. The second 
schema, which shifted the original burden of insatiability 
from the organic half of human nature to modern culture, con­
• 
cerns the presence of cultural sanctions which absolutize in­
dividualism and drives for "progress and perfection." Only 
selected parts of the first schema have been perceived and 
pursued so far by sociologists. 
• 
In the second schema, all four suicidal types are seen 
as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both ano­
mie andegoisme proceed here from common sources: they differ 
I 
in their prime mode of expression. Anomie is active: egoisme 
• passive. When extreme individualism and drives for "progress 
and perfection" are turned against the external world, we 
see anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of 
the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic 
• 
arena. This ethos is supported by what I shall call the "An­
glo Utilitarian Cultural Tradition." Further, when these 
twin sanctions for absolute individualism and legitimate in­
•
 
,
 
• 
• 
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satiability are turned inward against the self, ~~nessI 
e.s.QJ~the "infinity of dreams "--and the collapse of the 
will and imaginatio~~strationand exhaustion seen in 
• 
suicides of artists, poets, and intellectuals. This ethos 
of angst and the "journey into the interior," in which sui­
cide becomes a vocation, is sanctioned by what I shall call 
the "Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition." 
Finally, these ironic and destructive outcomes of some 
of our highest aspirations may then be linked with Weber's 
work in the sociology of religion and culture. As an "infin­
• ity of desires" sanctioned by a dominant modern cultural 
• 
tradition, anomie is interpreted as the secularized outcome 
of Protestant "inner-light," "inner-worldly asceticism." As 
an "infinity of dreams" sanctioned by another dominant con­
temporary cultural tradition, egoisme is interpreted as the 
secularized outcome of Protestant "inner-light," "inner­
worldly mysticism." These twin expressions of our highest 
• 
callings and heroic ideals are chronic forms of the "moral 
anarchy" and "diseases of the infinite" plaguing the modern 
world. Durkhej..m's ~al philosophy of "human finitude" and 
health as the "golden mean," lead us to recognize, then, that 
•
, = 
when our virtues are pushed to extremes, they also besome,
,.­
ironically, our special vices. 
I first heard of Emile Durkheim and anomie as an un­
dergraduate sociology major. But it was not until graduate
• school that, among my readings into Marx, Weber, Durkheim 
and others, I first encountered Suicide. Having rejected the 
positivist scientific ethos, reading Durkheim was, at first, 
an unpleasant experience. As with many others, all I could 
• see at first were pages and pages of statistics, strident 
positivist declarations, extreme sociologism, hypostatizing 
social realism, a conservative world-view, and so on; after 
all, to Durkheim wasn't society all and the individual noth­
_. ­
ing? Besides, the very presentation of the book itself repel­• 
led me the cover was blood red, I was interested in neither 
despair nor suicide, Simpson's psychoanalytically-oriented 
•
 
•
 
• 
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preface set me off, the table of contents was relegated to 
the back of the book, and so on! I was ready to believe the 
worst I had heard about Durkheim. Little did I then know 
that I would corne to dwell in this book and this man's mind 
for the next seven years! 
• 
During several rereadings, an interesting shift in my 
perception of Suicide and Durkheim began to emerge. The sta­
tistics seemed to fade from view, and Durkheim's moral philo­
sophy carne into focus. It seemed as if, in 1969, I had dis­
• 
covered something different, almost a different Suicide than 
commonly reported, a book within a book. Especially compel­
ling to me was Durkheim's anatomy of the "moral anarchy" of 
the modern world--the destructive "diseases of the infinite," 
•
 
ending in ecocide or suicide, which I sawall about me. Here,
 
•
 
then, Durkheim offered profound insights in my search for the
 
origin and ground of many of the negative aspects of the mod­

ern world. At the time, I hardly suspected that my search for
 
a fundamental, non-Marxian or Freudian, critique of the mod­

ern world would lead me deep into Durkheim~ nor did I antici­
pate that my attempts to tell others of the potential signi­
• 
ficance of my discovery would necessarily involve a long 
struggle to free myself and others of deeply rooted stereo­
types of Durkheim, a struggle that would remake me in the 
process. And, although I had earlier liked Weber much more 
than Durkheim, the experience of corning to have two polestars 
• 
stimulated effort to bring their work together, especially 
their profound and ironic anatomies of the modern world-­
~uicide and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of caPital-'~ 
l.sm. 
•
 
With these two classics as guides, in about 1971 I em­

barked upon an arduous journey on two parallel paths--inten­
sive reading of Durkheim's other works, major and minor, on 
the one hand, and on the other intensive search through the 
• 
i\
secondary literature on Durkheim and anomie. I sought there 
several insights: a new way of conceptualizing Durkheim's 
f 
notions of anomie and egoisme, indeed, of reconstructing his ' 
.~ 
•
 
•
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whole typology of suicide, and more generally, to attempt to 
• grasp the foundational or "nuclear structure" which informed 
all of Durkheim's life-work. In this task I was fortunate to 
begin my systematic reflection during a great renaissance of 
of interest in Durkheim: almost weekly new books and articles 
• poured forth from the presses. Durkheim was "in the air" 
everywhere it seemed: such convergence of interest was exhil­
irating for this scholarly apprentice. 
And, while learning much from Parsong and other stan­
• dard accounts stemming from the first great revival of inter­
est in Durkheim during the 1930's, I found, to my dismay, 
that many did not recognize what I thought to be a signifi­
cant discovery: moreover, my own incorporation through "osmos­
• is" of certain premises rooted in the secondary literature 
was actually leading me astray. For I was, like so many oth­
ers, simply taking over unfounded images from the secondary 
literature at the same time as I was struggling to interpret
• Durkheim directly. Hence, reliance on questionable secondary 
accounts in my first faltering attempts to conceptualize 
Durkheim's schema of suicide faced me with the difficult task 
of learning to unlearn popular stereotypes.
• In my struggle to free myself from two pervasive secon­
dary accounts--Merton's version of anomie and Parsons' ver­
.. "------------_.
sion of Durkheim--I found help in many places, especially in 
the works of two contemporary British sociologists, Anth~~y 
Giddens and Steven Lukes. With their assistance I began to• ::::=---­
move toward more faithful exegesis, and, thus, to begin to 
reconstruct not only Durkheim's suicide typology, but also 
the paradigmatic structure informing all his work. While my
• conceptual breakthrough in 1972 to the present formulation 
of Durkheim's two schemas of suicide was largely independent, 
I gratefully acknowledge that I learned invaluable lessons 
from these and other insightful observers.
• However, I soon discovered that as I tried to relate 
my discovery to others, many sociologists held stubbornly 
to certain established stereotypes. For example, when I men­
•
 
•
 
•
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tioned Durkheim, they thought of Parsons' famous account in
 
The structure of Social Action, and when I spoke of anomie,
 
•
 
it was Merton's essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which
 
seemed automatically to come to mind. While remaining valua­

ble in a number of ways, these accounts had become like bar­

nacles clinging to the past; they had become, unfortunately,
 
obstacles to deeper insight and scientific progress. I had, 
therefore, to dislodge these and other obstacles from my 
path. 
• In truth, our dilemma went deeper. For I discovered 
that anomie had become a protean concept. As with so many 
other paradigmatic notions, like alienation or "The Protes­
tant Ethos," anomie had come to mean so many different things 
•
 
to so many differ~P1e that it had lost specific meaning.
 
Then I realized that the transformation of Durkheim's con­

cepts into amorphous, protean notions capable of meaning al­

most anything was an instance of a wider, typical process.
 
•	 - -------­
• 
Somehow, as if by some iron law, we manage to forget (eg. 
Maine's Ancient Law), or distort (eg. Weber's Protestant 
Ethic ••• and Durkheim's Suicide) many of the very paradigms 
which constitute our basic intellectual capital (see also 
• 
Glock and Hammond, 1973:409). Indeed, I fear that the pro­
found works of our founding fathers--whose charisma we are 
so quick to cash in on--are more often cited than read, more 
often ab~orbed through secondary or even textbookish ac­
counts than	 wrestled with in the original, more often read 
fragmentari1y than in the context of the pioneer's life­
work and life-context, and more often simply misconstrued, 
•
 
usurped, or selectively altered than understood or legiti­

matelyextended (see McCloskey, 1974). Indeed, in the ser­
ies of interpretations which come to constitute any tradi­
tion, there is the same sort of drift and displacement of 
•
 
goals and meanings which characterize the typical life-his­

tory of any institution. Inevitably, a hidden law of cul­
tural entropy seems at work, for later generations stray 
•
 
• 
• 
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from the full meaning and intention of the original break­
through. Without undue irony, might we not call this sadly 
• 
inevitable sociocultural process the "routinization of 
charisma-on-deposit"? 
Hence, the necessity of periodic renewals or renais­
sances are built into this on-going process, which affects 
• 
sociology as well as society-at-Iarge. Specifically, I 
found that Durkheim's sociological charisma, stemming from 
Suicide and other works, had become routinized, distorted, 
emptied of meaning, on the one hand, and on the other his 
doctrine and anomie in particular were beset by conflicting 
interpretations. Thus, I came to find myself in the peculiar 
position of one who, having started by rejecting Durkheim 
and much of the sociological tradition, came to return to
• \
this tradition in order to recover lost meanings. And, of 
course, the reappropriation of meaning is a continuous pro­
cess. 
•
 
Faced with a paradigm in crisis, and the need to re­

•
 
turn to the source of the tradition, what specific strategy
 
could I evolve for recovering lost meanings and reconciling
 
conflicting interpretations? I was like a miner of a vein
 
of gold who had been granted a share in a vast common land­

•
 
claim. Here, one was faced with a welter of conflicting
 
claims; further, some refined ore proved to be valuable,
 
yet there was much dross and pilings to be cleared away.
 
In this way I took up mining full-time, and this mining was
 
• 
systematic exegesis; like mining raw ore, it was the hard­
est work I've ever done. 
I began to sink shafts both vertically and horizon­
tally into some of the richest deposits. My strategy, then, 
• 
was this: to perform, first, a systematic exegesis of the 
basic strata underlying all of Durkheim's work, and then 
perform a systematic exegeis of Durkheim's sociology of 
suicide. Exegesis, then, involved, first, an in-depth 
"stratigraphy," and then a systematic "topography." Accord­
ingly, my strategy is to systematically compare and contrast 
•
 
---------------------
•
 
•
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an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's foundational
 
paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" informing all his work
 
•
 
with a systematic exegesis of his special sociology of sui­

cide. Hence, this dissertation will alternate between Durk­

heim's general sociology (the "nuclear structure" of his
 
work, see Book One), and his specific sociology of suicide
 
•
 
(see Book Two). Further, in the first part of Book Three,
 
we shall review shifts in Durkheim's basic premises, and then
 
bring these two movements of thought together in Part II of
 
Book Three by reconstructing Durkheim's schema of suicide.
 
•
 
My intention here is to provide the systematic, de­

tailed, comprehensive documentation needed to reach a clear­

er understanding of Durkheim's work, and to enable us to re­

solve conflicting claims about the significance of his work. \
 
My hope has been to write the definitive work on Durkheim's 
schemas of anomic and egoismic suicide. Patient, systematic 
- -" -­
• 
exegesis, then, is the main reason for the extraordinary 
length and denseness of this dissertation; in a real sense, 
• 
Durkheim himself directed this effort. Further, since dis­
sertations, being self-financed, are free from the normal 
pressures of publishing, I realized that only in this format 
could I hope to provide full documentation for my claims. 
The demise of monographs and the tyranny of the ten-page 
article led me to seize upon this unique opportunity for 
painstaking scholarship. 
• 
At the same time, the length of this dissertation is 
• 
also a function of the difficulty of the task facing us. 
For the real scholarly burden was bequeathed us by Durkheim 
himself--for it was he who left us vast tracts of material, 
some of which remain largely unexplored territory to this 
day, while other parts remain largely misunderstood. We do 
not yet know Durkheim well enough; far too often our claims 
on his work (eg. concerning anomie) are unjustified; more­
•
 
over, we need a way of resolving conflicting claims and re­

covering lost meanings. 
• 
•
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•
 
One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to
 
set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those
 
•
 
who might wish to systematically review the evidence and en­

ter the debate in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of
 
science--the special method by which we rise above the di­

visiveness of partisan rhetoric and endemic conflict to the
 
•
 
unities of dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigor­

ous standards of logic and evidence can we hope to success­

fully resolve the cacophany of competing claims or refuta­

tions (eg. see Appendix). Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963),
 
•
 
the growth of science is fundamentally structured in terms
 
of claims and refutations, ascending through ever-more rig­

orous agreed-upon rules or canons for resolving conflict.
 
Without such norms, the ascent of science is impossible. The
 
•
 
very cumulative nature of science itself, in contrast to
 
other cultural forms, lies precisely in these mutually a­

greed-upon norms--namely, that all parties to the debate
 
agree on constantly "raising the ante" to ever-higher lev­

• 
els of precision and comprehensiveness of evidence and log­
ical principle. 
In this spirit, I suggest several cautions at the 
outset. The following conventional errors in interpreting 
•
 
Durkheim's typology of suicide simply will no longer do:
 
they should be set aside once and for all. Anomie cannot ,­

simply be equated with "normlessness" (whatever that means,
 
precisely), nor with structural-cultural "malintegration,"
 
nor with "strain in the relational system of society," nor 
with 'alienation" or a feeling of lostness, generalized des­
pair, or a host of other negative "states of mind." Anomie 
• 
cannot be simply collapsed into such broad categories as 
"social disorganization," "lack of structural integration," 
or even "lack of social participation." (On all this, see 
Appendix) • 
• 
In addition, egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered 
virtuous, ala Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot justifiably 
bell d' ..co apse 1nto one category, nor can anom1e and ego1sme be 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
I.
 
•
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accurately located as two extremes on two continuums of in­
tegration--structural and normative. Nor can altruisme and 
fatalisme be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical 
referents. 
Such partial accounts mislead because they slight 
both Durkheim's doctrine of human nature as homo duplex, 
and his image of historical development. In all these ver­
sions, Durkheim's image of man as homo duplex--portraying 
the source of insatiable and egoistic passions as the organ­
ic ego, and his critical assessment of the broad, world­
historical processes transforming the basic relations be­
tween society, culture, and person--simply drop from view. 
In short, no transforming historical process, and no egoism 
and insatiability, no anomie or egoisme! 
General criteria for more adequate reinterpretation 
of Durkheim's underlying schema of suicide include the fol­
lowing: 
(1) Specify the source of egoism and insatiability-­
what are the origins of these destructive forces? 
Further, Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duelex 
--presuming the inherent egoism and insatiahil1ty 
of the pre-social ego--should be critically review­
ed~ 
(2)	 Durkheim's evolutionary framework--reconstructed 
typologies should be based upon his social evolu­
tionary framework, not abstracted or formalistic 
schemas. Specifically, new typologies should con­
tain comparisons of the dominant "ideal types" of 
morality, and the types of suicide associated with 
them, at the two ends of history. 
(3)	 All four types--successful reconstructions should 
attempt to resolve the current impasse of "reduc­
tions" and "rescues" (see Part II, appendix) by 
simulta neously inter-relating the four types, yet 
maintaining their distinctness. In other words, a 
new typology should reveal both a fundamental unity 
and an empirical-historical diversity~ in short, 
the four types must be distinct, yet related. 
(4)	 Durkheim's critical or polemical thrust--new typol­
ogies should includelDurkheim's critical or polem­
ical thrust. Specifically, any adequate recon­
struction should be rooted in his polemic against 
opposing cultural traditions dominant in the modern 
world. 
•
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•
 
When beset by disorder, negation, breakdown, loss,
 
we seek enlightenment as to their source and meaning. Our
 
fundamental explanations of how things come to fall apart-­

in short, of how evil and suffering come to reign--once were
 
called "theodicies," a term I wish to retrieve for this dis­

sertation. What, then, was Durkheim's basic theodicy?
 
•
 
The problem of locating the source of egoism and in­

satiability--le mal ~'infini--is central to Durkheim's sche­

mas of suicide. In his first schema, Durkheim grounded ego­

istic individualism and insatiable desires in the pre-social
 
half of human nature--the organic ego. Indeed, this doctrine 
of the dualism of human nature (homo duplex)--the generic \ 
opposition between ego and person, between sensual appetites 
and moral rules, between percepts and concepts--lies at the 
• 
very heart of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology 
of religion and morality, and his sociology of knowledge. 
However, I propose that Durkheim's early image of the 
eruption of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through 
• J
 
the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was 
a mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, his­
torically, and culturally (see Part I, Book Three). Indeed, 
•
 
Durkheim himself later shifted away from the "anomie" ego
 
to the "alogic" ego; thus, instead of assigning the presence 
of self-destructive desires to the generic ego, Durkheim 
came to merely impute to it the inherent absence of univer­
•
 
salizable moral rules and rational concepts. Moreover, as
 
• 
we shall discover in Book Two, at various points Durkheim 
also suggested that egoism and insatiability derive as much 
from the presence of modern cultural sanctions as from the " 
absence of traditional moral controls over the pre-social 
ego in the modern world. This reversal of the presence/ab­
sence polarity is crucial to reformulation of the first 
schema of suicide. 
•
 
Which theodicy, then, shall we pursue? Shall we ac­

cept the notion, as I have done, that anchors our vices in 
deformed virtues? Or shall we, as Durkheim's first schema 
•
 
•
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does, anchor our vices primarily in the organic ego? In this 
case, shall we then implicitly accept the underlying release/
• control continuum (eg. see P. Rieff, 1966)? Shall we then al­
so accept the telling of history as either the growth or re­
cession of repressive moral controls over the ego? If so, 
shall we then take up our stand in terms of the resulting
• symbolic alignments--namely, advocating release of the natu­
ral harmonies of the ego means liberal, while control becomes 
conservative and archaic? As for myself, since I am inclined 
neither to demonize nor apotheosize the organic ego, I cannot
• stand on either the liberal or the conservative end of this 
traditional continuum. 
Rather, I shall follow Durkheim's occasional insight 
that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or de­
• flected form of a virtue." I propose, therefore, that it is, 
fundamentally, not our lapse from rules--not our lowest ani­
mal instincts--which leads us into trouble; it is not the 
lowest in us but the highest in us which leads to our own
• undoing. Perhaps my own conscientiousness in following out 
all the twists and turns in Durkheim's changing schemas 
might serve as a case in point. The structure of my argu­
•
 
ment, then, like Weber's in The Protestant Ethic ••• is i­

ronic. My essential theodicy is that our virtues, when push­
• 
ed to extreme, metamorphose or invert themselves and become 
our leading vices. In one sense, then, this dissertation may 
be read as a systematic search through Durkheim's work for 
evidence of a largely unnoticed but powerful break away from 
• 
the release/control tradition of thought to a fully socio­
cultural position, and a profoundly dialectical, ironic, or 
dramatic insight into the structure of human action based 
on another, older tradition of the "golden mean." 
For the ultimate key to anomie and egoisme lies not, 
as in the first schema, in the release of the inherently 
insatiable appetites of the organic ego in the mOder..n tran- ~ \\ •
.. 
•
 
sitional crisis. Rather, it is found, as Parsons, ~e~h, ~l~ 
and others have repeatedly observed, not in the recession 
_. 
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of medieval systems of moral control but rather in the in­
ternalization of new and different systems of moral author­
• ity in the Protestant Era. Hence, the modern crisis, repre­
sented by egoisme and anomie, is not so much the result of
 
the release of the floods of passion inherent in the organic
 
ego as the ironic or unanticipated consequences of the de­

• formation of extreme systems of moral control.
 
Let me briefly explain the logical structure of the
 
two schemas presented here.
 
• Now, a systematic search through the vast literature
 
on anomie (see Appendix) reveals many different ways of
 
schematically arranging Durkheim's typology of suicide. How­

ever, each schema rests on reinterpretation of one of sever­

• al of Durkheim's underlying premises. Since I shall system­

atically criticize each of the major reconstructed typolo­ \
 
gies (see Appendix), let me first indicate the underlying
 
logical structure of the two schemas of suicide which anchor
 
• and inform this dissertation.
 
Perhaps the simplest articulation of Durkheim's first
 
typology is the following schema:
 
• Figure 1. 
Suicidal 
Type 
• Although a 
Contemporary Crisis/Mechanical Solidarity 
egoisme / altruisme 
anomie / fatalisme 
heuristic point of departure for us as well as 
• 
for Durkheim, such a schema is evidently incomplete. One 
wishes to know, for example, what are the mediating causes 
of suicide and of our crisis? Hence, one is forced to in­
troduce several other analytical dimensions. I have not fol­
lowed the usual procedure of distinguishing between integra­
tion and regulation, as I believe this distinction to be 
• 
misleading by itself without the underlying image of man as 
homo duplex. 
Now, I have arranged my schemas in a different format 
•
 
---- -------------
---
'.
I 
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than commonly utilized; I feel no c~mpulsion to utilize a 
simple four-fold table, for instance. Rather, I prefer to
• attempt to precisely distinguish the multiple mediations and 
sub-categories in several dimensions. Thus, the overall 
structure of the schemas is a series of descending polar 
axes which overlap, and through several mediations, generate
• the four suicidal types. In one sense, then, the hermeneuti­
cal task is, through systematic exegesis, to infer back from 
the four types to their underlying logical structure (a pro­
cedure which Durkheim himself said he used in Suicide).
• Hence, we shall outline a series of compounding polarities 
until we reach the four suicidal types. 
For example, in Durkheim's first schema the first and 
most basic axis is Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex paired
• with sociocultural evolution. Thus, as graphically presented 
in Figure 2, Axis Ia represents the generic desires of the 
organic ego on the vertical dimension coupled with sociocul­
tural evolution on the horizontal dimension. In turn, the
• second Axis subdivides into two more sets of polar categor­
ies--namely, Axis IIa represents Control or Release of the 
generic desires of the organic ego, while Axis lIb splits 
into Mechanical Solidarity and the Contemporary Transitional
• Crisis as the two poles on the continuum of sociocultural 
evolution. At the same level, the Future represents a new 
kind of org~nic solidarity reached through the national en­
franchisement of corporations (see Part II, Book Two), which 
results in harmony restored through the "golden mean;" it•
. 
represents the cessation or overcoming of anomic and egois­

tic passions. A third, and fina~ mediating level is added
 
under Control and Release--namely, active/passive orienta­

• tions, which may be mirrored on the corresponding horizontal
 
dimension by collective versus self, or outside versus in­

side, orientations.
 
To sum up, we arrive at altruisme when the generic

• desires of the organic ego in mechanical solidarity are
 
controlled and redirected in an active, collective manner;
 
•
 
• 
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fatalisme in a passive, inward turning manner. Further, in 
•
 
the first schema, anomie occurs when the generic desires of
 
'.
 
the organic ego are released in the modern transitional cri.­

sis; egoisme is the same situation except that it is expres­

sed in a passive, introverted manner. The other two possible
 
categories are, of course, historically null.
 
In the same manner, in my reconstruction of Durkheim's 
•
 
second schema of suicide, the first and most basic axis com­

bines the generic power of cultural sanctions with sociocul­

tural evolution. On the second axis, IIa represents Mechani­

•
 
cal Solidarity (traditional societies), while lIb represents
 
the Modern Transitional Crisis (pre-Organic Solidarity).
 
AxisII£represents the cornmon cultural content of Mechanical
 
Solidarity--namely, Absolutizing Collectivism and the Tradi­

•
 
tional Social Schedule of Satisfaction, which, when expres­

sed in active and passive forms, generates, finally, altru­

isme and fatalisrne, respectively. Correspondingly, Axis lIb
 
--the Modern Transitional Crisis--is followed by Axis IIIb
 
where the cornmon cultural content of the modern era--Abso­
lutizing Individualism and Legitimized Insatiability--is 
mediated successively through different cultural traditions 
•
 
reaching different suicidal expressions in anomie and ego­

isme (see Figure 3.) 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
Figure 2. Durkheim's 
Axis lIb. 
Mechanical 
Solidarity 
Axis lb. 
Sociocultural 
Evolution 
Contemporary
 
Transitional
 
Crisis
 
The Future: 
Organic 
Solidarity 
via 
Corporations 
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First Schema 
Axis Ia. Homo Duplex 
(generic desires of 
organic ego) 
Axis IIa. 
Control Release 
Axis IlIa. 
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Figure 3. Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions 
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How shall we explain the origins of, and continuing 
sanctions for, an~ie and egoisme in the modern world? It
• was this haunting question which first drove:me to attempt 
to anchor these modern forms of suicide in these series of 
mediating contexts; for I was dissatisfied with other's 
schemas and my own first formulations. Indeed, my attempts'
• to anchor anomie and egoisme in better explanatory contexts \ 
went through at least three distinct stages. 
Once having recognized that anomie and egoisme were \ 
culturally sanctioned, and having seen absolute individual-I
• ism and insatiability as keys to these types, I first began I 
to try to anchor anomie and egoisme in the modern world 
conceived as a unitary period. This is a common procedure: 
to portray the structure of the modern world as radically
• different from preceding eras, and to couch these differen­
ces in terms of such basic shifts as those from community 
to society, the attenuation of the social bond, and the re­
sulting atomism, pluralism, market capitalism, rationalis­
• tic science, destructive technology, and so forth. 
However, while true to a certain extent, all of these 
revolutionary shifts failed to truly illuminate, for by an­
choring change in a unitary period, it seemed all one need
• do was to locate the crucial shifts in time, and once one 
entered the door, all changed. Such an explanation was too 
global, it lacked specificity. Further, it was not really 
sociocultural, for it was hard to locate groups-in-process,
• to determine their shifting rhetorical claims and counter­
claims. And, besides, it was too close to Durkheim's first 
schema, since these shifts were primarily viewed as nega­
tive devolutions.
• A second approach which emerged out of my dissatis­
faction with the period approach was to pursue specific 
themes over time. Thus, I came to pose the basic problem 
in terms of the sociocultural origins, development, and im­
• pact of: (a) Individualism, nominalism, atomism, etc., and 
(b) Ideas of progress, time, future orientations, etc., and 
•
 
I 
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• 
(c) Drives toward perfection, infinite striving toward the 
ideal, and so on. The notion here was to try to compare and 
•
 
contrast these ideas with the second schema of anomie and
 
egoisme, and then attempt to trace the historical genealo­

gies connecting earlier notions to modern ideas and moral
 
sanctions. I began to canvass Western history and, then, in­

•
 
deed, all of human history for similar notions of, and sanc­

tions for, individualism and drives for progress and perfec­

tion. While it was fascinating reading many great thinkers,
 
this tracing of different notions of the Self and the mean­

•
 
ing of the Individual, and of time, infinity, drives for
 
progress and perfection, and so on, soon confused rather
 
than clarified the issue; the specific outlines of my own
 
project began to fade. The limitation of all such thematic
 
•
 
or history of ideas approaches then became evident--they
 
simply lacked sufficient sociocultural anchors. While better
 
than the simple unitary approach in that one pursued speci­

fic themes across time periods, nonetheless, this interpre­

tive perspective suffered from a certain disembodied, ab­
stracted character. Were these real traditions, for in­
stance, or merely "s treams" of thought in which people in­
•
 
dependently assumed similar positions, without dialogue or
 
•
 
reference? Were these traditions merely verbal construc­

tions of the investigator? And, most importantly, were these
 
ideas or streams of morality and thought related to the ac­

tual rhetorical contexts, the lived frames of reference,
 
• 
the actual "logics-in-use" of different groups at different 
times? 
Thereafter, an interesting dialectic emerged. On the 
one hand, my drive to anchor anomie and egoisme in their 
generative contexts led me to seek a new level of cultural 
and historical specificity--namely, cultural traditions. 
Because it combines the notion of culture as a symbolic 
• 
meaning and directive system of a group and the notion of 
tradition and historical process, the synthetic interpre­
tive perspective of cultural traditions reaches both the 
•
 
,
 
• 
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•
 
necessary level of cultural-historical specificity and of­

fers a new and generalizable perspective for the human sci­

ences.
 
•
 
Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is
 
the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, devel­

opment, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing indivi­

•
 
dualism and legitimized insatiabilities in the modern world,
 
we look to the interface between religion and culture. Here
 
we ask: what are the prime terms of translation between mod­

ern religions and contemporary culture and psyche, especial­

ly anomie and egoisme? Thus, we shall explore whether, and
 
to what extent, various ethical sanctions coming from Pro­

testantism have become sedimented at the heart of modern
 
structures of conscience and consciousness?
 
•
 
Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One we
 
shall link the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism
 
with two contemporary cultural traditions. In Book Two, we
 
shall explore the problematic relations between Protestant­

ism and suicide. In Book Three we shall connect anomie and 
egoisme as absolutized forms of individualism and legitimi­
zed insatiabilities to two dominant modern cultural tradi­
• 
tions. Thus, having argued that Durkheim's four types of 
• 
suicide must be addressed in historical terms, we cannot 
leave the foundations of anomie and egoisme floating in his­
torical space. How, then, did it come to be that anomie and 
egoisme were (are) culturally sanctioned? What are the mor­
• 
al, spiritual, and intellectual foundations of the Utilitar­
ian Ethos and the Romantic Ethos? 
Having linked anomie and egoisme in the second schema 
to modern cultural traditions, at the very end of this dis­
sertation we shall briefly move to link modern cultural 
traditions, in turn, to religions--to two versions of the 
Protestant Ethos; that is, anomie to the secularization of 
•
 
Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheran­

ism. In short, we shall finally propose the following es­
sential cultural-historical linkages. As the active extern­
•
 
• 
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alization of absolute individualism and legitimate insatia­

bility, anomie is connected with the Anglo Utilitarian Cul­

• tural Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Cal­

vinistic Ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original
 
and continuing source. Further, as the "infinity of dreams"
 
seen, for instance, in the modern artists' anguished "jour­

• ney into the interior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic­

Idealistic Cultural Tradition as its prime carrier, and,
 
then, ultimately, with the Lutheran's and spiritual radicals'
 
ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its original and contin­

• uing source.
 
•
 
Finally, it may be of interest to note the signifi­

cance of one other shift which the modern cultural sanction­

ing of anomie and egoisme necessitates in Durkheim's proces­

sual image of breakdown and breakthrough. Now, clearly in 
the first schema (see Book Two), Durkheim conceived suicide 
• 
as a process involving, first, the breakdown of traditional 
social control, and second, the breakthrough of the direc­
tionless and proportionless passions of the pre-social ego. 
Even here the structural factor which most sociologists 
have taken as the decisive element of a sociological explan­
•
 
ation of suicide--namely, the breakdown of social integra­

tion or regulation--was not considered by Durkheim himself 
to be the critical factor. Rather, social breakdown acted 
merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of the in­ , I 
satiable and self-centered passions of the organic ego.
•
" 
• 
Hence, in his first schema, Durkheim's central concern was 
not so much the breakdown of norms as with the breakthrough 
of an "infinity of dreams and desires." The weakening hold 
of the collective discipline of traditional norms acted 
here merely as the releasing and sustaining condition of 
this egocentric insatiability. In sum, in the first schema 
Durkheim posited a two-step process, in which the breakdown 
•
 
of moral control preceded a breakthrough or release of the
 
insatiable desires of the organic ego. 
However, in the second schema, the sequence of this 
• 
•
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•
 
two-step process is reversed. Because "every form of suicide
 
is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue,"
 
and, therefor~, because of the cultural sanctioning of abso­

•
 
lute individualism and the "longing for infinity" in the
 
modern world, we shall posit, first, a breakthrough in the
 
dominant systems of morality, and then a breakdown of those
 
structures. For example, first we see appearing the Weberian
 
•
 
notion of the "New Model Man," the "visible saints" of as­

cetic and mystical Protestantism breaking forth from the
 
medieval cloister to master self, society, and world for
 
God's greater glory. Indeed, it was this unprecedented, mas­

•
 
sive, and sustained breakthrough to "inner-light," "inner­

worldly mysticisms and asceticisms" which produced the mod­

ern moral cosmos. Only after the secularization of these new
 
moral sanctions do we encounter, as an unanticipated and ex­

•
 
•
 
treme consequence, Durkheim's isolated and seemingly "amoral
 
action" on a large scale in anomie and egoisme. Hence, the
 
theodicy underlying Durkheim's first schema is limited only
 
tq the latter, derivative process. Thus, the shift in the
 
absence/presence polarity in locating egoism and insatiabil­

ity implies, correspondingly, a reversal in the two-step
 
process causing anomie and egoisme. Specifically, since the
 
•
 
moral positions underlying anomie and egoisme are culturally
 
sanctioned, in the second schema we posit, first, a moral
 
breakthrough and then, second, a breakdown or deformation of
 
this new system of moral direction. In sum, absence/pres­

ence, breakdown/breakthrough--it is Durkheim's double shift 
on these key rhetorical axes which constitutes the inner 
tension of this dissertation. 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
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Before we begin, it is important to point out what lies 
beyond the scope of even this massive dissertation. Despite 
their evident interest, the reader will not find the following 
topics addressed here: 
(a) an exploration of the roots, especially the Greek 
classical roots, of Durkheim's notion of anomie, nor of the 
classical-Christian notion of limits, of human finitude, of 
gradation and balance, or of the "golden mean" (but see for 
the latter H. Hadyn, 1950). 
(b) a review of all of Durkheim's work, a summary of all 
his major books, for instance, or even an in-depth treatment 
of his whole methodological and substantive doctrine; it must 
be emphasized that even in Book One ! shall treat only of 
those central parts of Durkheim's substantive doctrine that 
relate to the schemas of suicide; 
(c) detailed tracing of all the intellectual or cultural 
influences on Durkheim's work or life; this is far too complex 
a problem to be addressed here (but see Lukes, 1973); 
(d) detailed investigation of the phenomenon of suicide 
per se, nor background on suicide studies, nor concern with 
the tradition of moral statistics; 
(e) systematic explorations of the psychodynamics of ano­
mie and egoisme; 
(f) systematic histories of the development of the modern 
cultural traditions sanctioning anomie and egoisme. 
Further, the reader is alerted to the following dis­
tinctions. iVhen I use the word egoism, I shall refer to the 
organic ego, but when it use the term egoisme I shall refer 
to Durkheim's suicidal type. Moreover, to recall their dis­
tinctive connotations, I have retained the French expressions 
to refer to Durkheim's four suicidal types--namely, altruisme 
and fatalisme, anomie and egoisme. 
In addition, the reader is alerted to the following 
conventions adopted here. Asterisks at the end of a quote 
mean that I have added underlining to emphasize significant 
parts of a passage. 
• 
--xliii-­
•
 
•
 
• 
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•
 
•
 
Moreover, to simplify citation, the following abbre­
viations of the titles of Durkheim's major works shall be a­
dopted: S for Suicide, DL for The Division of Labor in Socie­
ty, EF for The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, R for 
The Rules of Sociological Method, ME for Moral Education, PC 
for Primitive Classification, SP for Sociology and Philoso­
phy, PECM for Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Soc for 
Socialism, PE for "Two Laws of Penal Evolution," and DHN for 
"The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions." Other 
articles and notes by Durkheim are indicated by year of publi­
cation, and may be found entered in this format under the ap­
propriate bibliography entry. Footnotes are recorded in terms 
of their sequence on each page (eg. #2, page 200), and will 
be found at the end of each book. 
Finally, a few words of appreciation for those who 
helped me on my way. First, the kindness of my departmental 
chair at Seattle University, Father James G. Goodwin, S.J., 
and the small grant to help defray the costs of reproducing 
this manuscript are greatly appreciated. In addition, I 
should like to acknowledge the support and guidance offered 
by three of my late teachers and friends. From Benjamin Nel­
son I first learned to appreciate the full power and signifi­
cance of Weber's and Durkheim's life-work; also I found in 
Nelson's own work a learned and compelling example of an in­
depth interpretation of the evolution of Western society, 
culture, and psyche. After I had begun my research into Durk­
heim, I was grateful for the warm support and mature guidance 
extended to this neophyte Durkheimian by two old masters-­
Harry Alpert and Jack Foskett. Even though they shall not be 
here to see this task completed, their help and trust was 
invaluable. I also wish to thank the other members of my com­
mittee, Dick Hill and Stan Pierson from History, for their 
support and helpful suggestions. 
In my dissertation director, Ben Johnson, I was for­
tunate to find a good and wise man, blessed with insight, 
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al support and confidence in me. He is one of three people
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• 
BOOK ONE 
• THE "NUCLEAH STRUCTURE" OF DURKHEIM'S WORK 
• 
"Si vous voulez murir votre TJens~e, attachez-vous 
a l'etude scrupuleuse d'un grand maitre; demontez 
syst~me dans ses rouages les plus secrets." 
(Emile Durkheim) 
Synopsis. We shall explore the foundational or "nuclear 
structure" informing all of Durkheim's substantive work in 
• two phases. In the first section, we shall focus on his key 
generic premises, while in the second section we shall fo­
cus on his key genetic-evolutionary premises. Our explora­
tion will be sequential in that each succeeding chapter will 
• amplify the central thrust of the preceding one. Hence, we 
shall progressively develop the generic sociocultural foun­
dation and the evolutionary trajectory informing all of 
Durkheim's work, especially as these relate to his schernas 
• of suicide. 
In Part I, we shall first briefly explore Durkheim's 
penchant for addressing problems in terms of polarities, 
and his attempts to overcome such dichotomies through the
• dialectical mediums of sociocultural process and evolution­
ary progress. In Chapter Two, we shall unfold the basic di­
chotomy informing Durkheim's sociologies of morality, know­
ledge and religion--namely, homo duplex. Here Durkheim op­
• posed the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego 
to the moral rules and intellectual concepts coming from 
society. Thus, Durkheim identified the moral and logical 
with the social. However, not only shall we offer a few pre­
• liminary criticisms of Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo 
duplex (amplified in Part I, Book Three), but we also note 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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that Durkheim later shifted from the anomic to the alogic 
ego. This shift opens the way for the move from schema number 
one to schema number two--that is, the ego can then no longer 
be considered the negative source of the destructive "infini­
ty of dreams and desires" seen in anomie and egoisme. 
In Chapter Three we shall explore the most important 
half of Durkheim's homo duplex dichotomy--the sociocultural 
construction of the person in terms of structures of con­
cience and consciousness. In Durkheim's basic sociocultural 
theory, the logics of moral decision and the moralities of 
intellectual judgment are always and everywhere intertwined. 
Next, we shall explore in detail how Durkheim specifi­
cally anchored the emerging relations between structures of 
conscience and consciousness by linking them to the fundamen­
tal structure and process of collectivities. Thus, in Chap­
ter Four, we shall explore Durkheim's causal model which al­
ways anchored social facts in social processes. Here Durk­
heim posited a two-story causal model in which superstructur­
al collectively representational (symbolic) processes were 
intimately linked with substructural social morphological 
processes. The prime link between the "material lower-story" 
and the "ideal upper-story" was "moral or dynamic density." 
Our attention here shall be directed primarily toward the 
collectively representational level, because in his later 
work Durkheim's thought moved increasingly toward symbolic 
processes and the autonomization of collective representa­
tions. 
Some key sequential linkages by which collective sym­
bols emerge out of social morphological process include: 
(I)	 Social morphological implosions moralize organic 
egos in creating societies and persons~ 
(2)	 Cultural implosions thereby lift man above the con­
fines of the organic ego~ social energies lift us 
into the realm of freedom, of moral rules and in­
tellectual concepts; 
(3)	 Symbols act as visible, public collective represen­
tations of group self-consciousness. Due to the mor­
al intensities which created them, some symbols be­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
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come "sacralized"--invested with obligatory respect 
and desirability; 
(4)	 Because moral intensities inevitably fade and "sa­
cred symbols" become depreciated, periodic renewals 
are necessary to reaffirm the social bond and to re­
vitalize the structures of conscience and conscious­
ness; 
(5)	 The marked contrast between these two alternating 
phases of sociocultural life creates the opposition 
between the "sacred" and the "profane." These basic 
oppositions create tension in the sociocultural and 
phenomenological fields, and life becomes progres­
sively energized and organized by these two poles; 
(6)	 Inevitably the organizing tension between sacred 
and profane is extended to all spheres of reality 
and levels of experience. The world is cosmicized 
through a compounding series of symbolic equations. 
Phenomenological analogies serve as bridges trans­
forming empirical diversity into moral and concep­
tual unity; 
(7)	 Tension is resolved, and the powers of imagination 
and will reorganized and released, through a crucial 
transformation of the oppositions into a new and 
higher synthetic unity. Thus, sociocultural process 
in its symbolic dimension has an inherently dialec­
tical or dramatic structure. 
In Part II, we shall explore four key facets of Durk­
heim's genetic-evolutionary theory. It is important, however, 
to first understand how it was that Durkheim's causal model 
led him to always return to the simplest case, the clearest 
example of necessary connection between the "material" and 
"ideal" halves of society. For in fusing his generic and 
genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and de­
velopment of human society and culture, Durkheirn sought to 
discover a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, for 
a crucial experiment in which there would be a one-to-one 
correspondence between symbolic forms and social forms, be­
tween the social morphological substratum and the social 
physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collective 
symbols are deeply fused with the fundamental structures of 
the group, Durkheim believed he had discovered the "monocel­
lular" form of sociocultural life, the template, from which 
all complex sociocultural forms evolved. As Lukes observes, 
•
 
•
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Durkheim held it as axiomatic that there is an identity be­
• 
tween sociocultural simplicity and evolutionary priority. 
Hence, only in terms of the most "elementary" forms did Durk­
heim believe that he could surely discover generic socio­
cultural processes directly and unmistakably fused with gen­
• 
etic-evolutionary processes. 
In Chapter Five, then, we shall explore Durkheim's 
guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of social life. For 
all of his work was grounded in this genetic and evolution­
• 
ary framework. The trunk of the tree corresponds to the in­
variant conditions of social and cultural life, while the 
branches represent different types of societies. Durkheim's 
metaphor thus combined both evolutionary continuity (the 
• 
roots and the trunk) and discontinuity and diversity (the 
branches and fruits). 
In Chapter Six we shall explore Durkheim's seminal no­
tion that the primitive sacral complex served as the prime 
• 
evolutionary womb of society and culture. Elementary cultural 
forms are: (a) socio-centric, and (b) governed by sacro-magi­
cal rationales and ritual etiquettes. Thus, the first founda­
tions of legitimate moral and intellectual authority are 
• grounded in the group and its religion; in the beginning, 
they are all fused together. The double historical signifi­
cance of the primitive sacral complex is that it both served 
as the creative womb of human culture and as an obstacle to 
• 
progressive cultural evolution. Thus, the transition from 
simple, sacral societies to complex, secular societies forms 
the mainline of Durkheim's evolutionary concerns. 
In Chapter Seven, we shall explore Durkheim's neglect­
• 
ed sociology of civilizational process. For as societies e­
volve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems. The 
close parallel on the macro-evolutionary level between social 
morphological differentiation and symbolic differentiation 
• 
implies the transition from concrete to abstract symbolism, 
from parochial or tribal to universal representations, from 
the fused embeddedness of symbols in the primitive sacral 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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complex to the differentiated autonomy of symbols, institu­
tional spheres, and persons. The inner key to the progres­
sive evolution of societies and their symbolic guidance sys­
tems is the link between widening structures of fraterniza­
tion and rationalization in the grounds of moral and intel­
lectual discourse. In sum, civilizations emerge through the 
progressive extension of social bonds which, in turn, require 
universalizable symbolic forms. 
Finally, in Chapter Eight we shall explore Durkheim's 
notion of the evolution of the person through history. Durk­
heim portrayed the individual as part of two opposite social 
conditions at the two ends of history. In primitive socie­
ties, the individual's sense of self is submerged in the 
group, and permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective 
conscience. Now, there are two different, yet complementary, 
lines Durkheim pursued to explain the emergence of the indi­
vidual out of archaic "mechanical solidarity." Early in his 
career, Durkheim equated societal differentiation with indi­
viduation. Thus, he asserted that the division of labor pro­
gressively frees the individual from the constraints of the 
repressive conscience collective. Here Durkheim was central­
ly concerned with the de-collectivization of structures of 
moral and intellectual responsibility. However, at this ear­
ly stage Durkheim neglected to distinguish between individua­
tion and personalization. 
By contrast, in his later work Durkheim took care to 
distinguish between these two processes, and emphasized the 
symbolic construction of the notion of the person. Hence, 
we discover here a double dialectic in the evolution of the 
person through history between individuation (de-collectivi­
zation and autonomization through separation) and phenomeno­
logical deepening and centering through more powerful cul­
tural sanctions. Thus, for example, far from being embedded 
in generic human nature, the modern cult of the morally au­
tonomous and intellectually responsible person is rather a 
critically significant sociocultural and historical construc­
•
 
I
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tion. 
Finally, the emergence of the person through history 
finds its culmination in Durkheim's own religion of la per­
sonne humain, and in the Anglo and Romantic traditions' moral 
subsidy of the autonomous ego. At the same time, however 
(and this forms the link to the shifting schemas of suicide), 
acknowledgment of the extraordinarily strong modern cultural 
sanctions for individualism leads us to recognize that, like 
all cults which absolutize their prime values, this one, too, 
may ironically culminate in self-destructive extremes. 
•
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CHAPTER ONE 
• DICHOTOMIES AND DIALECTICS 
•
 
Durkheim tried to avoid making a narrow doctrin­

aire choice between allegedly incompatible opposites.
 
Rather, he strove to attain a new synthesis, a unity
 
of opposites, a coincidentia oppositoru~whichwould
 
provide a new level of analytic insight (Robert Bellah,
 
1973:xxi). 
• 
Perhaps the most characteristic and revealing hallmark 
of Durkheim's doctrine is the series of "root dichotomies" 
permeating his thought. This compounding system of "binary 
oppositions" provided Durkheim with key analytical anchors 
as he progressively unfolded his thought. Correspondingly, 
they may serve us as interpretive keys in our attempt to
• systematically comprehend the substantive "nuclear struct­
ure" of Durkheim's thought. 
•
 
Although various observers over the years have noted
 
one or more aspects of these crucial underlying polarities,
 
certainly Steven Lukes (1971, 1973) was the first to system­

atically present and analyze many of these dichotomies as 
key analytical series anchoring Durkheim's system of socio­
•
 
logy. Some of the more significant pairs in Durkheim's com­

pounding binary system include: society/individual, object­
•
 
ive/subjective, sociology/psychology, universals/variables,
 
normal/pathological, science/mysticism, necessary/contingent,
 
person/ego, concepts/sensations, moral rules/sensual appet­

ites, sacred/profane, and so on and so forth.
 
•
 
There is no need here to explore the details of this
 
interrelated series of "root dichotomies," as Lukes calls
 
them, for he has already fruitfully explored several of the
 
more basic pairs. It is enough for our present purposes to
 
simply ackno~edge this ever-proliferating series of polarities. 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
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Lukes also explores various ambiguities and shifts in many of 
the more central polarities. Further, it is important to note 
that the contents of these dichotomous sets are not perfectly 
parallel, since the phenomena addressed by each differs. How­
ever, in each case the dichotomizing logic remains the same; 
and once one perceives the root logic operative in Durkheim's 
theorizing, it can easily be recognized that many of these 
d~chotomous pairs unfolded one out of the other. 
However, it is not sufficient to merely explore the ex­
istence of various Durkheimian dichotomies, nor even to re­
cognize the inner logic of his initial interpretive proce­
dure. For the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought is 
inevitably distorted if portrayed simply as rhetorical or fa­
tally dichotomizing, for it was inherently dialectical as 
well. Poggi remarks, for example, how Durkheim always wished 
to move beyond the very oppositions which he himself had 
constructed: 
On close examination, these points seldom turn out to 
be tenable as dichotomies ... in the sense that the 
two elements do not lie on the same plane. Instead, 
one of them stands over the other and "envelops" it . 
... In my view, these unacknowledged breakdowns of pur­
portedly crucial dichotomies express the urgency of 
Durkheim's moral passion for unity •.. (1972:252). 
While everyone has observed Durkheim's polemical points of 
departure, few have emphasized that Durkheim's penchant for 
root dichotomies served merely to heighten the dramatic con­
trasts between traditional antinomies which he then attemp­
ted to reconcile in terms of a higher (positivistic and so­
ciologistic) synthesis. It is almost as if Durkheim drew 
such sharp distinctions primarily to heighten the drama of 
his equally characteristic attempt to dialectically resolve 
these traditional opposites. 
Fortunately, the current renaissance of Durkheim stu­
dies has recovered a sense of his higher dialectical ambi­
tions. In 1960, for instance, Hayward described the inner 
tensions in Durkheim's sociological thought in this way: 
Durkheim's social ohilosophy ..• has been described 
as "Kantianism reassessed and supplemented by Com­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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tianism." Whilst ... it would be more accurate to char­
acterize it as an attempt to conciliate the neo-posi­
tivism and sociologism of Comte's predecessor, Saint­
Simon, with the neo-criticism and "juridism" of Kant's 
disciple, Renouvier, this affirmation is valuable in 
indicating the tension within Durkheim's doctrine be­
tween determinist and libertarian, holist and person­
alist, transcendental and immanentist tendencies which, 
throughout his work, he endeavored to resolve into a 
harmonious synthesis through the unrelenting applica­
tion of "conscience," i.e. a combination of analytical 
reason and imperative ethic (1960:19). 
Bellah (1973) also reveals a keen sense of the extent to which 
Durkheim strove constantly to transcend perennial polarities 
such as those between materialism and idealism, empiricism and 
rationalism, the individual and society,Gemeinschaft and Gesel­
Ischaft, and so on. Wallwork especially has emphasized the dia­
lectical character of Durkheim's thought. 
A second characteristic of Durkheim's method is the 
dialectical manner in which he approaches virtually 
every major philosophical and theoretical issue. As 
Henri Peyre rightly observes, "Durkheim was a master 
of dialectics" .... Durkheim invariably sets forth an­
tithetical views that are brilliantly criticized and 
seemingly discarded until they are joined, in a modi­
fied form, in his own unique synthesis .... Durkheim's 
frequent use of the dialectical method has unfortun­
ately passed unnoticed by most of his American inter­
preters (1972: 5-6). 
Wallwork also offers the following examples of some of the 
dialectical tensions inherent in Durkheim's thought, and thus, 
its paradoxical character. 
The paradoxical quality of Durkheim's social and polit­
ical thought derives from these and other dialectical 
resolutions. Man is of infinite worth, but this value 
is not inherent within him; it is but a supreme fiction 
created by society. Man is totally dependent upon so­
ciety for the qualities that make him human, yet so­
ciety has increasingly freed him from group tyranny. 
Man has become an "autonomus center of activity," yet 
secondary group restrictions, by preventing anomie, 
actually increase his liberty. Patriotism is a funda­
mental duty, yet patriotism must be counterbalanced 
by humanistic ends. For the ambiguities, lacuna, and 
errors in some of these paradoxical formulations, Durk­
heim has been justly criticized, but it is no longer 
justifiable to attribute to him conservative doctrines 
unqualified by the liberal, and occasionally radical, 
elements in his thought (1972:119; see also 136). 
•
 
•
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Finally, LaCapra also noted Durkheim's dialectical 
•
 
passion for transcending traditional polarities.
 
• 
The truly basic philosophical tension in the thought 
of Durkheim was related to his rationalism. It invol­
ved his partial failure to transcend classical ration­
alism. Durkheim's thought was caught up in a tension 
between the narrowly analytical and the dialectical 
heritages transmitted to him through Renouvier .... One 
• 
might simplistically label the narrowly analytical ten­
dency of his thought a Cartesianized and socialied 
neo-Kantianism. The most obvious influence of neo-Kant­
ianism was in his passion for dualistic antinomies. The 
more profound influence, which led into his dialectical 
attempt to reconcile or at least relate antinomies, was 
his ultimate affirmation of a philosophy of finitude 
based upon a normative sense of limits (1972:8). 
LaCapra also remarks that: 
• 
Durkheim's broader rationalist dream was to transcend 
partisan ideological struggles and to forge a dialecti­
cal reonciliation of conservative, radical, and liberal 
traditions of thought (1972:18). 
• 
Like Marx, Durkheim tried to integrate a critique of 
political economy, German speculative philosophy, and 
the French socialist tradition in a comprehensive theory 
of the genesis and functioning of modern society 
(1972:23) . 
In sum, Durkheim's mode of conceptualizing always pro­
ceeded in a two-phase process. First, he set up mutually ex­
• clusive dichotomies, seemingly a radical contrasting of op­
posing claims to primacy in human action. It is this image 
of Durkheim as always radically polarizing primacy and vir­
tue to his own chosen side of his own dichotomy which so 
• often offends readers enjoying their first taste of one of 
his great works. Inevitably, however, deeper exegesis re­
veals that Durkheim always attempted to resolve the inherent 
oppositions which he himself had so sharply posed. Durkheim l. 
always sought, in positivistic and sociologistic terms, to• 
dialectically transcend traditional antinomies by generating J 
a new over-arching synthesis which all parties to the debate 
could embrace. Recognition of this two-step process of rad­
• ical dichotomization and polemics on multiple rhetorical 
fronts, and then resolution of these polarities in terms of 
an evolutionarily-won synthesis is a key to understanning 
•
 
•
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• 
Durkheim's conceptual and methodological structure and, in 
turn, his prime dialectical ambitions. 
•
 
Without this necessary perception of the entire pro­

cess of the normal "logics-in-use" in Durkheim's thought,
 
various elements can be lifted out of context, leaving each
 
•
 
man to "quote Scriptures" to his own purpose. As Lukes (1973)
 
notes, there are many different and even contradictory "Durk­

heims" floating around in sociological space. As with ~leber,
 
or indeed, with any great thinker, one may choose to empha­

•
 
size one aspect of Durkheim's thought at the expense of ano­

ther, and one may find on almost any page convincing refuta­

tion from Durkheim himself against any such simple or narrow
 
portrait. Perhaps this multiplicity o~ simu1tdneous inter­

•
 
ests and perspectives can be seen to constitute one key to
 
both great thinkers and the uncertain fate of their para­

digms. In turn, the same multiplicity can help to explain
 
the subsequent diffusion, separation, and "routinization of
 
charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey,· 1974). For, often as not, 
by virtue of their ability to encompass ever-more diverse 
'.
 
phenomena, paradigms almost necessarily become protean mod­

els, capable of eliciting myriad meanings. Might we not 
call this phase of the eternal dialectic of "merger and di­
vision" (Kenneth Burke, 1945) the "proteanization of para­
digms"? 
• 
• 
• 
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•
 
CHAPTER TWO 
•
 
HOMO DUPLEX: DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF THE
 
DUALISM OF HUMAN NATURE 
• 
The soul and the body, sensation and reason, ego­
istic appetites and moral will are opposed and, at 
the same time, mutually related, just as the sacred 
and the profane, which are forbidden to one another, 
nonetheless are forever intermingled ~Durkheim, in 
(Lukes, 1973:22). 
Preface. Almost the entire range of Durkheim's underlying
• series of "roo~ dichotomies"--especially polarities such as 
society/individual, person/ego, moral rules/sensual appetites, 
conc~pts/sensations, public/private, sacred/profane--are sum­
med up in Durkheim's central image of the dualism of human na­
• ture. Steven Lukes rightly observes: 
This central, but ... multiple, dichotomy between the 
social and the individual is, in a sense, the keystone 
of Durkheim's entire system of thought. In particular, 
it can be seen as crucial to his sociology of morality,
• his sociology of knowledge, and his sociology of reli­
gion, since it underlies the distinctions he drew be­

tween moral rules and sensual appetites, between con­

cepts and sensations, and between the sacred and the
 
profane (1973:22).
 
•
 
Indeed, it can hardly be overemphasized that the image of man
 
•
 
as homo duplex lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's socio­

logies of morality, knowledge, and religion. As we shall dis­

cover, without this distinction between ego and person, and the
 
characterization of the former as inherently egocentric, pas­

sionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim's theory of anomie and 
the need for constant moral discipline makes little sense. 
Since in Book Three we shall extensively criticize Durkheim's 
•
 
doctrine of homo duplex, I merely wish here to document in out­

line the nature and development of this crucial doctrine . 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
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As a modern positivist moral philosopher working socio­
logically, Durkheim embraced the old image of man as homo du­
plex, but with a fundamentally new twist. Traditional Western 
and especially Christian moral philosophy portrayed man in 
his generic essence as representing a unique union between 
the opposing realms of matter and spirit--humankind was the 
link between heaven and earth. In Durkheim's system of posi­
tivist symbolic equations, this relation became translated 
as: ego is to person as body was to soul. Thus, Durkheim ful­
filled his commitments to both positivism and moral philoso­
phy by insisting that while man was, indeed, "double," it is 
society as the prime source of discipline and goals, of le­
getimate moral authority, impersonal public concepts, univer­
salizable rules, on the one hand, and the inherently egocen­
tric and privatized passions of the amoral, presocial indi­
vidual on the other, which constitute the two basic poles of 
human existence. 
We need not wander far to discover the cultural source 
from which Durkheim drew this doctrine of the duality of hu­
man nature. For Durkheim's own deep positivist cultural com­
mitments led him here to embrace and extend traditional Car­
tesian dualisms splitting into separate spheres self and 
world, mind and body, spirit and mechanism, and so on. Wall­
work has noted of ~his origin of Durkheim's doctrine: " ... 
the world of opjective facts was set against the realm of i­
deas and ideals, and matter was contrasted with spirit. These 
conflicts were essentially continuations of Cartesian dual­
ism" (1972:9). LaCapra also noted the Cartesian influence, 
adding that of Durkheim's neo-Kantian "passion for dualistic 
antinomies" (1972:8~ see also 285). 
The influence of Cartesianism was most obvious in Durk­
heim's reliance upon the antinomy between mind and mat­
ter. This antinomy was expressed in the idea of homo du­
plex--the dual nature of man--which was interpreted bY­
Durkheim in terms of the opposition between the organic 
and the social (1972:9) . 
Lukes also emphasizes the mutual reinforcement of Cartesian 
and neo-Kantian thought in the late nineteenth century as it 
•
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•
 
•
 
•
 
infl uence1 Durkheim' s "passion for dichotomies." 
Durkheim's conception of human nature as dual invol­
ved ..• two parallel oppositions: between sensual ap­
petites and moral rules, and between sensations and 
concepts. The Kantian nature of this conception is un­
mistakable and corresponded to the predominant philo­
sophical ideas of the time, which he had absorbed, 
first through the major formative influence of Renou­
vier, and later from the more specifically epistemo­
logical thinking of Hamelin (1973:435). 
Through the fusion of Cartesian and neo-Kantian philosophical 
currents in his day, Durkheim's penchant for "root dichotomies" 
was deepened and reinforced. Finally, in a curious way, Durk­
heim's original Cartesian dualism was reinforced by the opposi­
tions between individual and society embraced by Utilitarians 
and Romantics (eg. from Rousseau on) alike. But as we shall dis­
cover, this negative polemical reinforcement of the split be­
tween individual and society embraced by his opponents led to 
the undoing of Durkheim's first schema of suicide (see Book 
Three) . 
It is rather strange that this absolutely critical an­
chor of Durkheim's theories has been so often slighted in secon­
dary accounts over the years. Besides Wallwork and LaCapra, 
Peristiany (1953:viii), Giddens (197lb:22l), Coser (1971:136), 
~uglas (1967:343-4), Lukes (1973:432-3), and Nisbet (1974: 
229) have recently begun to glimpse the centrality and signi­
ficance of this doctrine in Durkheim's work. However, one se­
condary account, perhaps slighted because it is out of print, 
puts the image of man as homo duplex at the very heart of Durk­
heim's doctrine. I refer, of course, to Edward Tiryakian's 
useful summary of Durkheim's seminal article "The Dualism of 
Human Nature and Its Social Conditions," in the former's Socio­
logism and Existentialism (1962). In sum, even though Durk­
heim's aforementioned article was translated and published in 
Kurt Wolff's 1960 collection of articles on Durkheim, and Ti­
ryakian usefully summarized Durkheim's thesis, it is still not 
generally perceived that the image of man as homo duplex is 
absolutely central to Durkheim's system. This blindness and 
discontinuity in terms of scientific development is most dis­
tressing. 
•
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If consideration of the ways in which various influences 
fused in Durkheim's central doctrine of the duality of human 
• nature is complex, when these multiple origins are coupled 
with Durkheim's ever-proliferating series of parallel dichot­
omies, we must stand ready to acknowledge not only the deep­
ening ramifications of his complex argument, but also various 
• shifts in the grounds of his argument. Thus, one may legiti­
mately begin, for instance, by asking: but why should the in­
dividual be necessarily considered amoral? And why should so­
ciety be portrayed as the sole source of goodness, authority,
• and reason? One answer might be: because, in direct contrast 
to preceding metaphysical theories which endowed the indivi­
dual with cosmic or divine "essential" qualities, Durkheim in­
sisted that only "existential" or "positive" sources be admit­
• ted as relevant evidence. Further, in contrast to the dominant 
individualistic or nominalist theories o£ his day, Durkheim 
stripped the lone abstracted individual not only of existen­
tial priority, but also of corresponding qualities such as the 
• "inner light" of Reason, moral authority, and so on. Given his 
own negative incorporation of the hypothetical isolated ego-­
circumscribed by its own private passions--it is no wonder that 
Durkheim felt justified in assigning all the positive (in both 
• senses) qualities to human society and culture. Thus, to Durk­
heim, society is the only moral phenomenon in nat~re~ the in­
dividual ego is basically amoral. Morality, conversely, is pre­
eminently social; that is, not only is ita social construction,
• but it pertains primarily to social obligation. 
In any case, while highly complex and synthetic arguments 
such as Durkheim's offer intrinsic fascination simply because 
of their rhetorical appeal, we should not be surprised that 
• such a "brittle synthesis," as Giddens (l97lb:222) terms it, 
by virtue of the inherently incompatible elements, represents 
a constant temptation to logical and empirical error (see Book 
Three). Despite his dialectical ingenuity, the binds Durkheim 
• unwittingly placed himself in unfortunately led him too far for 
us to fully embrace his doctrine. Indeed, given his commitments, 
,
 
•
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and his aspiration to transcend all previous oppositions root­
ed in opposing cultural traditions, perhaps he had little 
• choice. As for us, forewarned is forearmed. 
Indeed, as~~et out on this journey to recapture the 
full depths of Durkheim's doctrine of the duality of human na­
ture, it is important to recognize that there is a crucial dif­
• 
,
ference between the early and late installments of his views. 
\Vhile egocentricity represented a constant negative factor in 
both Durkheim's early and later notions of the duality of hu­
man nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or alogical
• factor differed in these versions. In his early formulation, 
Durkheim grounded insatiability--the very absence of determin­
ate form and natural limit {the sine qua non-of morality)--in­
the dark desires of the unsocialized ego. However, toward the 
• end of his life Durkheim apparently grew more pessimistic, and 
attributed the source of the endemic incapacity of man to gain 
inner peace and satisfaction to the warring halves of human na­
ture. In addition, in the early image, the insatiable and ego­
• centric passions represent a darkly destructive, even chaotic, 
energetically expansive force, while in the later version the 
purely idiosyncratic ego represents an inward-turning, purely 
privatized existence, that can only be pulled from its local­
• ized orbit by the intense impersonal forces of society and cul­
ture. In the first installment of this crucial doctrine, the 
a-nomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contradict­ r 
ion of all morality" (DL:431); in other words, the nomos of
• society and culture was actively opposed by the anti-nomian 
forces erupting up from the biological and psychological levels. 
In the later formulation, the relatively passive a-nomie or 
a-logic of the pre-socialized ego was opposed not so much to
• nomos as to a universalizable logos. Although Durkheim's doc­
trine of "human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972) and his philosophy 
of health and well-being as the "golden mean" are closely rela­
ted themes, we shall consider them later in the second part
• of Book Three. Let us now turn to consider the first install­
ment of Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human nature. 
•
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A. The Multiplicity of Meanings of the "Individual" in 
Durkheim'~ System of Sociology 
• Preface. At the outset, it is important to recognize some of 
the potential ambiguities emerging from the mounting resonances 
between Durkheim's root dichotomies and his seminal image of 
the dualism of human nature. These resonances are compounded
• because Durkheim's thought moved here on both the generic and 
genetic-evolutionary levels, and because he assigned both posi­
tive and negative features to each half of the dichotomy on eaCh 
of these levels. Further, we shall discover critical shifts in
• the grounds of argument, especially in regard to the question 
of the source of the seemingly constitutional inability of man­
kind to attain inner peace and lasting satisfaction. While he 
originally grounded insatiability in the pre-socialized ego, •
• Durkheim later argued that the suffering inherent in the human 
condition derives instead from the impossibility of simultan­
eously satisfying both halves of human nature. Whereas the ear­
lier notion required over-coming the darkly destructive pas­
• sions of the isolated ego, Durkheim's later doctrine grew in­
creasingly pessimistic, viewing the warring halves of human 
nature as the endemic dis-ease of the human condition. Let us 
now attempt to briefly sort out some of these important dis­
• tinctions between different Durkheimian meanings of that cru­
cial term the "Individual." 
1. Generic Versus Genetic-Evolutionary Meanings of the 
• "Individual" 
• 
We might begin by recalling that the long-standing cri­
tique of Durkheim as a kind of Platonizing metaphysician of so­
ciety--an extreme hypostatizing social realist--persists in the 
still popular rendering of Durkheim as stridently anti-indivi­
dualist. However, as Anthony Giddens rightly insists in his ex­
cellent article "The Individual in the Writings of Emile Durk­
• 
heim" : 
most secondary interpreters of Durkheim have fail­
ed to connect his analytical discussion 'and rejection) 
of individualism as a methodological approach to social 
•
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theory with his developmental conception of the emer­
gence of individualism as a morality brought into be­
• 
ing by the growth of the differentiated division of 
labor (1971b:210). 
This is a very important distinctioniindeed, the misleading, 
but still pervasive, image of Durkheim as anti-individualist 
must now give way to more subtly inflected distinctions drawn 
• between the various meanings assigned by Durkheim to the term 
"individual" on both the generic and genetic-evolutionary le­
vels. Let us now briefly explore these different connotations. 
Steven Lukes provides the following useful guide to 
• untangling the multiplicity of meanings of "individual": By the 'individual,' Durkheim meant sometimes the 
(pre-social) individual seen as a biologically given, 
organic unit, sometimes the (abstract) individual seen 
as possessing certain invariant properties (eg. Util­
•
 
itarian or economic man), sometimes the (extra-social)
 
individual isolated from human association, and some­
times the real, concrete individual person, living in 
society--not to mention a further sense in which the 
'individual' refers to a socially-determined concep­
tion of the human person in general (as in the 'reli­
•
 
gion of the individual,' which is the 'product of so­

ciety itself,' in which the 'individual' becomes a 
sacred object (1973 :21-2) .
 
III his valuable 1971(b) article, Giddens adds that Durkheim
 
placed two different valuations 'Jnthe "individual"on two dif­

• ferent levels. On the abstract, ~eneric, universal level, Durk­

heim regarded the pre-socialized individual (eg. the child)
 
as the negative carrier of insatiable and egoistic passions,
 
or, at the very least, as the locus of privatized passions.

• On the same level, he portrayed society, by contrast, as the
 
source of moral discipline, legitimate authority, reason, con­

cepts, universalizable rules, and so on. However, on the his­

torical level, Durkheim portrayed the individual as part of
 
• two opposite social conditions at the two ends of human his­

tory. In primitive societies, the individual's sense of self
 
is necessarily submerged in the group; it is permeated by the
 
fused sacral-magical collective conscience. In evolutionary

• terms, therefore, what we witness is the progressive awaken­

ing of the structures of conscience and consciousness, of the 
emergence of the individual, or rather the person, through his­
•
 
....------------------------­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--19-­
tory. Individual autonomy progressively emerges through soci­
etal differentiation. Far from being embedded in generic hu­
man nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and in­
tellectually responsible person is a crucial historical and 
social construction. But how could the individual be at one 
and the same time considered basically amoral and the evolu­
tionary object and expression of a higher morality? 
No real paradox arises, however, since Durkheirn's phi­
losophical notion of the pre-socialized human ego was couch­
ed on the generic organic level, while, on the contrary, his 
notion of moral individualism as a sociocultural emergent 
was cast on the evolutionary level (see Chapter Eight of this 
Book). The first image represents a generic and destructive 
given,while the second concerns the construction of the au­
tonomous conscience and consciousness as the preeminent value 
of the modern world. In short, the difference is between the 
generic ego and the emergent person. Late in life, Durkheim 
insisted on the importance of this distinction: 
We say our individuality, and not our personality. 
Although the two words are often used synonymously, 
they must be distinguished with the greatest possi­
ble care, for the personality is made up essentially 
of supra-individual elements (DHN:339-340). 
Although Durkheim himself failed to adequately clarify this 
distinction early in his career (eg. in The Rules), in 1912 
he took great care in The Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life to separate the two meanings. 
it is not at all true that we are more personal 
as we become more individualized. The two terms are 
in no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more 
than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, \ 
yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially 
individual; yet we are more personal the more we are 
freed from our senses and able to think and act with 
concepts. So those who insist upon all the social ele­
ments of the individual do not mean by that to deny or 
debase the personality. They merely refuse to confuse 
it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8). 
Durkheim's discovery of the evolving dialectic between uni­
versali zation in the grounds of rr.oral and cognitive discourse 
•
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and the	 emergence of the autonomous person (see E. Leites, 
1974) is of the greatest importance. Clearly,	 the distinction 
between	 ego and person is fundamental for the human sciences; 
yet the	 precise origin, nature, and significance of this root 
contrast remains to be articulated. Leaving analysis of Durk­
heim's theory of the emergence of the moralized person through 
history	 till the end of this Book, let us now explore further 
the	 many meanings of the "individual" on the generic level. 
2.	 The Conflation of Meanings of the "Individual" on the 
Generic Level 
As noted, Durkheim's philosophically derived image of 
human nature paralleled his growing series of root dichotomies, 
thus leading him to progressively 'I:onflate," as Lukes terms it, 
at least the following contrasts: 
(1)	 Between the socially dete~minecand the organically 
or biologically given; 
(2)	 Between factors specific to particular societies, 
and abstracted or postulated features of "human 
nature ;" 
(3)	 Between factors that are general within a given so­
ciety or group and those that are particular to one 
or several individuals; 
(4)	 Between the experience and behavior of associated 
individuals, as opposed to those of isolated in­
dividuals; 
(5)	 Between socially prescribed obligations and spon­
taneous desires and behavior; 
(6)	 Between factors corning from "outside" the indivi­
dual and those generated within his consciousness; 
(7)	 Between thoughts and actions directed towards social 
or public objects and those which are purely person­
al and private; 
(8)	 Between altruistic and egocentric behavior (Lukes, 
1973:20) . 
Certainly, one of critical points here is the extent to 
which these and other similar properties=an be legitimately con­
sidered parallel. In terms of the emergence of this ever-proli­
ferating series of dichotomous distinctions, however, I tend to 
think that they both proceeded from Durkheim's primal opposi­
•
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tion between the egoistic and socialized halves of human na­
ture, and also later fed back and reinforced the potency of 
this prime opposition. Certainly, it is true that although 
Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo duplex served him as a po­
tent symbolic anchor from early on, it was not until toward 
the end of his career that Durkheim attempted to sum up this 
basic antinomy in his important 1914 paper "The Dualism of 
Human Nature and Its Social Conditions." 
Now, the dual or ambivalent nature of such protean 
terms as "individual" and "society" partially accounts for 
this proliferating series of more or less parallel dichoto-­
mies, for such terms combine increasing generality of mean­
ing and specificity of application. Whenever we encounter such 
persistent efforts to progressively unfold parallel properties 
in ever-more diverse situations, we may detect the workings of 
a subterranean unifying metaphor. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding 
metaphor early in his career was that of order and chaos, or 
more exactly, the analogous set was society is to the indivi­
dual as order is to chaos. As often happens, the very process 
of unfolding new applications of this guiding analogy leads, 
however, by the very nature of the diverse properties encoun­
tered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or metaphor­
ical "load." Toward the end of his career, Durkheim's guiding 
root opposition seemed to shift slightly, but significantly, 
on its metaphorical axes from order versus chaos, to universal­
ity versus particularity; or in other words, from nomos versus 
anomos, to logos versus alogos. 
Finally, we should note the significance of Durkheim's 
rhetorical inversion of the high valuation placed on the lone 
abstract individual posited by his polemical opponents, inclu­
ding Utilitarians, rationalists, and Romantic-Idealists alike. 
In one sense, this inversion must be considered a clever but 
ultimately misconceived rhetorical device, since he thereby ad­
mitted in the backdoor some of the very elements against which 
he had so resolutely taken up arms in the first place. Nonethe­
less, in a second and more powerful meaning, Durkheim's dis­
tinctions represented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens 
•
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provides an important clue to the deeper significance of Durk­
heim's distinctions between the generic ego and the sociocul­
turally and historically constructed person, when he insists: 
"Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach "liberal 
individualism" regarded as a conception of the characteristics 
of the modern social order, from I methodological individualism ,n 
(197lb:2l0; see also Lukes 1968,1969, 1973). The deeper in­
tellectual and cultural ramifications of Durkheim's revolution 
in thought become clearer here if we recall that for centur­
ies the progressive mainlines of European thouqht had tacitly 
presumed there to be necessary inner logical, ethical, and his­
torical connections between so-called "methodological indivi­
dualism" and atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism), and 
its supposed epistemological correlates of pragmatic or utili­
tarian empiricism, individual political freedom and liberal 
democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man." 
Durkheim's insistence, however, on a negative image of 
the isolated ego, and his transference of the source of moral 
goodness to society, coupled with his corresponding postulate 
that moral individualism, far from being a generic human uni­
versal, is rather a sociocultural historical construction, 
snapped apart the taci~ but deeply rooted,prevailing presup­
position of certain necessary iinks between logical nominal­
ism and moral and political autonomy. Durkheim thus severed 
the inner symbolic links between these doctrines in mediating 
between preceding cultural traditions by rejecting certain 
points and incorporating others in a revised form in a new 
and hopefully more compelling model. A bold and new powerful 
doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the still per­
vasive pres~tion of the necessity of the inner symbolic links 
which Durkheim dissolved, has still to be understood in its 
full significance. I repeat: Durkheim demonstrated the possi­
bility of derivation of autonomous or moralized individualism 
from "realistic" or "socially organic" premises. As Parsons 
(1949) recognized, this was Durkheim's revolution in the epis­
temology and methodology of the social sciences. 
•
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However, it is imperative that we place Durkheim's dia­
• 
lectical achievement against the background of his rhetorical 
failure--I mean his unfortunate incorporation of crucial pre­
mises of his polemical opponents (see especially Part I, Book I ~,t,.~t 
Three). Giddens summarizes these important trade-offs: / 
• 
... although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from 
• 
methodological individualism is much more subtle and 
profound than what has been assumed by many of his 
critics, what results is a brittle synthesis, and es­
sentially an unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and 
the very serious deficiencies which run throughout his 
works, however, have to be understood in the light of 
this attempt. As so often happens with a writer whose 
works are strongly polemical in tone, ultimately he 
was unable to abandon certain of the very premises of 
which he was most critical in the writings of his op­
ponents (1971b:222).
• It shall be our task, in part, to explore the making and un­
making of Durkheim's "brittle synthesis." 
• 
B. Insatiability Versus Moral Discipline: Durkheim's Early 
Version of His Doctrine of the Dualism of Human Nature 
Durkheim's early version of the dualism of human nature 
focussed on the presumption that the unsocialized ego--that 
organic bundle of drives energizing each organism--was inher­
• ently passionate and even insatiable. The need for moral dis­
cipline which could only be provided through sociocultural 
rules was a constant background reference throughout Durk­
I· 
I 
I heim's major early works such as The Division of Labor, Sui­
~. cide, and the lectures later published as Moral Education. 
Since we shall consider his related, and very significant 
notions of "human finitude ll and the "golden mean" later (see 
Book Three), let us move immediately to consider his early
• notions of man as homo duplex. 
Perhaps one of the earliest expressions in Durkheim's 
work of the traditional formula that "man is double" appeared 
in Suicide. Typically, as a moral philosopher, Durkheim began
• by observing that human needs and desires must somehow be pro­
portioned to what is objectively possible if happiness is to 
be attainable. 
•
 
•
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In the order of existence, no good is measureless. 
A biological quality can only fulfill the purposes 
it is meant to serve on condition that it does not 
transgress certain limits. 80 too it is with social 
phenomena (8:217). 
No living thing can be happy or even exist unless 
his needs are sufficiently proportioned to his 
means If his needsrequire more than can be grant­
ed they will be under continual friction or can 
only function painfully. Movements incapable of pro­
duction without pain tend not to be reproduced (8:246). 
Durkheim then observed that the organic needs of ani­
mals are ecologically and physiologically limited--that is, 
such needs are constrained and formed both by the amount of 
resources available in any given environment, and by the inher­
ent limitations in processing capacity and physiological magni­
tudes of any given organism. 
In the animal ..• this equilibrium is established 
with automatic spontaneity because the animal depends 
on purely material conditions. All the organism needs 
is that the vital supplies of substance and energy con­
stantly employed in the vital process should be period­
ically renewed by equivalent quantities; that replace­
ment be equivalent to use. When the void in resources 
created by existence is filled, the animal, satisfied, 
asks nothing further. Its power of reflection is not 
sufficiently developed to imagine other ends than those 
implicit in its physical nature (8:246). 
Thus, Durkheim argued that animals live in a state of (more or 
less) automatic balance in terms of their own built-in limita­
tions and in relation to the possible resources or "carrying 
capacity" of their supporting habitat. 
But Durkheim argued that man is governed by no such sim­
ple, built-in internal limitations or ecological equilibrium. 
Why? Because, over and above the obvious biological continui­
ties, the relations of human beings to their environment are 
socially and culturally defined, and thus, Durkheim supposed, 
without natural built-in limits. In other words, while biologi­
cal needs in man are limited as with the lower forms, socio­
culturally generated desires--unique to man-as-man--enjoy no 
such natural restraints. 
This is not the case with man, because most of his needs 
are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree. 
•
 
•
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.•• Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies 
nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection
• 
suggests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends 
craving fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admit­
tedly sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot 
pass. But how to determine the quantity of well-being, 
comfort, or luxury legitimately to be craved by a hu­
man being? Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his
• 
physiological constitution which sets a limit to such 
tendencies. The functioning of individual life does 
not require them to cease at once point rather than 
another; the proof being that they have constantly in­
creased since the beginnings of history, receiving 
more and more complete satisfaction, yet with no weak­
• 
ening of average health (S:247). 
Therefore, man must construct his own schedule of satisfac­
tion for wants; thus, every society is constantly engaged in 
negotiating ~ variable ratio, in terms of available resources 
• 
and the legitimacy of wants, between organically generated 
needs (eg. food) and socioculturally generated desires (eg. 
honor, or the demands of charisma). 
• 
Above all, how to establish their proper variations 
with different conditions of life, occupations, rela­
tive importance of services, etc.? In no society are 
• 
they equally satisfied on the different stages of the 
social hierarchy. Yet, human nature is substantially the 
same among all men, in its essential qualities. It is 
not human nature which can assign the variable limits 
necessary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so far 
as they depend on the individual alone .. Irrespective '\ 
of any external regulatory force, our Q.aPacity for 
feeling is in itself an insatiable and bottomless a­
byss (S: 247) . ,'-'--­
• 
Given his notion of the pre-socialized human ego as 
not only egocentric but insatiable, Durkheim proceeeded to 
establish the constant need for regulation of these generic 
egoistic and undisciplined passions. Thus, Durkheim's ini­
• 
tial dichotomy presumed, on the one hand, the egocentric 
passions of unsocialized human nature, and on the other, 
the moral discipline provided only by society. Alone, or de­
socialized--that is, demoralized--the individual ego reverts 
• 
back to generic type, and,ultimatel~destroys itself in the 
fruitless passions so often seen in human action. 
•
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But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, 
it can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlim­
ited desires are insatiable by definition, and insa­
tiability is rightly considered a sign of morbidity. 
Being unlimited, they constantly and infinitely sur­
pass the means at their command; they cannot be quen­
ched. Inextinguishable thirst is constantly renewed 
torture. It has been claimed, indeed, that human act­
ivity naturally aspires beyond assignable limits, and 
sets itself unattainable goals. But how can such an 
undetermined state be any more reconciled with the 
conditions of mental life than with the demands of 
physical life? (S:247-8). 
Having set up the specter of the undetermined and undisciplin­
ed pre-social human ego, Durkheimwas clearly setting up his 
critically important derivation of morality from society. The 
first requirement of such socially constructed rules, then, is 
discipline of these potentially insatiable desires. 
... Passions must first be limited. Only then can they 
be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But 
since the individual has no way of limiting them, this 
must be done by some force exterior to him. A regula­
tive force must play the same role for moral needs 
which the organism plays for physical needs. This means 
that the force can only be moral. The awakening of con­
science interrupted the state of equilibrium of the ani­
mal's dormant existence; only conscience, therefore, 
can furnish the means to re-establish it (S:248). 
In a later comment, Durkheim likened che innate insatiability 
of the presocialized ego to the energies expressed in the in­
herent expansiveness of gases. Energy, whether physical, or­
ganic, or sociocultural, Durkheim suggested, indefinitely 
expands its radius of movement. 
Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily 
tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body 
of gas, provided no other matter resists its expan­
sion, fills the immensity of space, so all energy-­
whether physical or moral--tends to extend itself with­
out limit so long as nothing intervenes to stop it. 
Hence the need for regulatory organs, which constrain 
the total complex of our vital forces within appropri­
ate limits. The nervous system has this function for 
our physical being. This system actuates the organs 
and allocates whatever energy is required by each of 
them. But the moral life escapes the physical system. 
Neither our brain nor any ganglion can assign limits 
to our intellectual aspirations or to our wills. For 
mental life, especially in its more developed forms, 
transcends the organism.... Sensations and physical 
•
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appetites express only the conditions of the body, 
not ideas and complex sentiments. Only a power that 
is equally spiritual is able to exert influence upon 
spiritual forces. This spiritual power resides in the 
authority inherent in moral rules (ME:40-41). 
Durkheim was building here, from first principles, the 
role of society as the necessary counter-balance to the in­
cessant expansion of the energy of the pre-socialized ego. 
And like moral philosophers of old, Durkheim insisted on 
grounding his argument on the level of man's generic species 
essence; that is, man-as-man, in contrast to the lower biolo­
gical forms, is characterized by the "awakened reflection" 
and growth of conscience and consciousness, the striving for 
ideals beyond mere survival, which marks the intense new so­
ciocultural life of this new and powerful species. We shall 
soon explore in greater detail how Durkheim constructed his 
notion of the social bases of morality. For now, let us sim­
ply observe that by first theoretically grounding his argu­
ment on the level of society and culture as evolutionary e­
mergents, Durkheim implied that these potentially insatiable 
desires are not to be understood merely in terms of psycho­
biological needs. Rather, the "awakening of conscience" which 
defines ~an signifies that these ~ generic desires are ~ 
socioculturally generated. No other conclusion is logically 
possible, since man is, by evolutionary essence, the socio­
cultural animal. The implications of the fundamental princi­
ples of Durkheim's philosophical anthropology are numerous 
and profound, not only in altering his own theses but also 
many of our own today. For example, the unsocialized child 
cannot hereafter legitimately be considered just an animal 
like any other, for a new level of biological achievement-­
the sociocultural--has been achieved by man. By its generic 
species essence, the infant can only be considered a human 
animal. Certainly, it would be absurd to presume that even 
man's closest animal relation could, with provision of the 
most elaborate socialization procedures, ever become a human 
being among other human beings. What we sometimes forget 
•
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when we repeat the old formula that man's inheritance is dou­
ble, is the critical fact that the sociocultural level in man 
feeds back down and alters his psychobiological make-up; in 
short, higher levels do influence lower levels. Even in terms 
of his biological constitution, man is not simply an organ­
ism like any other organism, for even his organic form and 
process have been socioculturally altered. In sum, much of 
man's biological inheritance has been socioculturally con­
structed. Indeed, the old formula that "man makes himself" 
has deeper dimensions than suspected. Further, this theoret­
ically profound argument is reinforced by Durkheim's insis­
tence that these new desires represent "moral forces," and 
thus, must consequently be opposed by moral forces. As Durk­
heim later insisted, even the features of our immorality are 
the expression of our system of morality (eg. see PECM:119). 
This same principle was the source of a number of Durkheim's 
more stimulating propositions, including the normality of 
crime; and we shall use it as a key guide which to later in­
troduce some surprises into Durkheim's own schemas. 
Given these negative and positive poles, let us next 
explore how Durkheim proposed that the original destructive 
or anomic energies of the pre-social ego are contained and 
redirected by society as the fount of moral discipline. Here 
we see Durkheim suggesting almost a simple one-to-one cor­
respondence between the negative qualities of this pre-social 
ego, and the positive qualities of morality. Proceeding from 
his initial metaphor of the indefinite expansion of the ra­
dius of the energy of the pre-socialized ego, in Moral Edu­
cation Durkheim first pictured morality as "like so many 
moulds with limiting boundaries into which we must pour our 
behavior" (ME:26). Since the energies of the organic ego 
have no determinate form of their own, they can only attain 
human form and shape through acceptance of definite and con­
stant rules of social conduct. "The function of morality is, 
in the first place, to determine conduct, to fix it, to e­
liminate the element of individual arbitrariness .., moral­
•
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ity is basically a constant thing" (ME:27). According to Durk­
heim, the first thing that the unsocialized child must be 
taught is that regularity of conduct required not only for 
survival, but for continued social interaction. 
Insofar as our inclinations, instincts, and desires 
lack any counterbalance, insofar as our conduct hangs 
on the relative intensity of uncontrolled dispositions, 
these dispositions are gusts of wind, erratic stop­
start affairs characteristic of children and primi­
tives, which as they endlessly split the will against 
itself, dissipate it on the winds of caprice and pre­
clude its gaining the unity and continuity that are 
the essential preconditions of personality. It is pre­
cisely in this development of self-mastery that we 
build up moral discipline (ME:46). 
In contrast to the potentially infinite passions of the isola­
ted organic ego, the very first defining characteristic of mo­
rality, as socially constructed, is regularity, stability, in 
a word, definition. 
But Durkheim then emphasized that there is more to moral­
ity than simply the stability and regularity of life provided 
by social norms, by cultural rules and meanings. A related as­
pect of morality is focus on attainable goals. 
Morality is basically a discipline. All discipline has 
a double objective: to promote a certain regularity in 
people's conduct, and to provide them with determinate 
goals that at the same time limit their horizons (ME:47). 
As we shall discover later, and as Giddens (197Ib:225-6) em­
phasizes, both aspects of assigning goals to the ego are cru­
cial--goals need to be both clearly definable and attainable. 
But if the individual ego is unable to either regularize its 
own energies, or to rise above its own egocentricity to devote 
its own energies to the attainment of defined goals, whence 
derives these devotions? Why should we do violence to our 
own natures? 
Surely power or constraint alone is not sufficient. 
In Weberian terms, the distinction Durkheim next draws is 
couched in terms of the source of legitimate moral authority. 
As always, underlying Durkheim's notion of legitimate author­
ity is the notion of the sacred. Ultimately, the only force 
able to pull the ego out of its passionate self-centered ~ro-
•
 
I 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--30-­
fane) orbit is the moral or spiritual power embodied in the 
respect for the sacred as the source of all legitimate moral 
authority. I repeat: when Durkheim spoke here of constraint, 
he meant it not in the sense of physical forces, but rather 
in terms of the respect due to the foundations of legitimate 
moral authority (Parsons missed this distinction). 
By authority we must understand that influence which 
imposed upon us all the moral power that we acknow­
ledge as superior to us (ME:29). 
Morality is a system of commandments (ME:31). 
Thus, regularity and deference to the inherent moral and con­
ceptual superiority of collective processes constitute the 
first major characteristic of morality to Durkheim--namely, 
discipline. 
At the root of the moral life there is, besides the 
preference for regularity, the notion of moral author­
ity. Furthermore, these two aspects of morality are 
closely linked, their unity deriving from a more com­
plex idea that embraces them both. This is the concept 
of discipline. Discipline regularizes conduct. It im­
plies repetitive behavior under determinate conditions. 
But discipline does not emerge without authority--a 
regulating authority .... The fundamental element of 
morality is the spirit of discipline (ME:31). 
There is an additional element constituting morality 
besides discipline and obligatory respect--namely, desira­
bility. Durkheim later elaborated this element in his arti­
cle "The Determination of Mordl Facts." \Vhile Parsons (1949) 
tried to claim that this notion of desirability--of wishing 
to achieve the good--represented a key breakthrough in Durk­
heim's moral theory, we do not agree, since we now see that 
Durkheim's earlier notion of constraint did not refer pri­
marily to a crudely positivistic notion of external physical 
constraint. In fact, this distinction first appeared in The 
Division of Labor in the material that was suppressed in la­
ter editions, but which can be found in the appendix to 
Simpson's translation. In contrast to Parsons, Durkheim as­
sumed all along that internalized obligation referred to the 
sacredness of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. 
Hence, being drawn toward sacredness--its inherent desirabil­
•
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ity--follows just as much as obligation from its role as the 
source of legitimacy. Clearly, all these basic elements of mo­
rality--discipline, authority, obligation or duty, and desira­
bility--are intimately bound up together in Durkheim's basic 
moral theory. We shall also briefly explore some additional 
factors, such as attachment to social groups and personal au­
tonomy, which complete the basic outlines of Durkheim's theo­
ry of morality. However important a clearer presentation of 
Durkheim's moral theory may be, it is not here our present 
task. Rather, we must now return to further explore our ori­
ginal problem: why did Durkheim so emphasize discipline as the 
very key to morality? 
Only if we begin to perceive the depths and magnitude 
of Durkheim's assignment of negative and even dangerous traits 
to the pre-socialized ego, can we hope to understand how he 
could insist: "Discipline derives its taisond'etre from itself; 
it is good that man is disciplined" (ME: 32). Let us now 
follow Durkheim as he rhetorically asks: "What makes moral di­
scipline good?" In clear contrast to the Utilitarian and Roman­
tic moralists alike, Durkheim observed how his hard-line com­
ments may be seen by some as an affront to "widespread human 
sentiment." Since such sentiments may still be "widespread," 
we shall now briefly explore Durkheim's rhetorical attack on 
competing counter-principles, an exercise that is valuable be­
cause it clearly reveals how his position differed not only 
from his opponents, but also from many reigning tacit presup­
positions of our own day. 
To limit, to restrain--this is to deny, to impede the 
process of living and thus partially to destroy; and 
all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it 
be good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits 
that it cannnot overcome? If life is not good, what is 
there of worth in the world? To be is to act, to live, 
and any reduction of life is a diminution of being. 
Does not all constraint, by definition, do violence to 
the nature of things? It was just such reasoning that 
led Bentham to see in law an evil scarcely tolerable, 
which could only be reasonably justified when it was 
clearly indispensable (ME:35-6). 
Clearly, the Utilitarians' penchant for laissez faire and their 
unprecedented claim that unbridled egoism will inevitably lead, 
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by a natural identity of interests, to altruism, presumes the
 
investing of the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego with preci­

• sely all those virtues that Durkheim progressively stripped a­

way. Against this investment, Durkheim rhetoricized:
 
•
 
Must one view discipline simply as an external palpa­

ble police force, whose single raison d'etre is to
 
prevent certain behaviors and which, beyond such pre­

ventive action, has no other function? Or, on the con­

trary, may it not be, as our analysis leads us to sup­
pose, a means sui generis of moral education, having 
an intrinsic value which places its own special imprint 
upon moral character (ME:3?)? 
• 
To buttress his own case that'tliscipline in itself is 
• 
good," Durkheim proposed a series of positive functions played 
by moral disciplining of the pre-socialized organic ego. First, 
as Parsons later argued, social interaction cannot successfully , 
proceed without shared mutual expectations; thus, regularized 
communal norms provide the basic substructure of social life. 
At each point in time, it is necessary that the func­
tioning of the familial, vocational, and civic life 
• 
be assured; to this end, it is necessary that the per­
son be free from an incessant search for appropriate 
conduct. Norms must be established which determine 
what proper relationships are, and to which people 
conform. Deference to established norms is the stuff 
of our daily duties (ME:3?). 
•
 
In contrast, however, to Parsons (and note the way functional­

ism is linked with Utilitarian attitudes), Durkheim insisted 
that "Such an analysis and justification of discipline is 
scarcely sufficient. For we cannot account for an institution 
•
 
simply by demonstrating its social utility" (ME: 38) .
 
• 
Therefore, Durkheim next emphasized that the very nature 
of man--since he represents only a small part of the universe-­
can attain fulfillment only if this prior limitation is accep­
ted. In opposition to traditional religionists who portrayed 
man's nature and "the flesh" as inherently evil, Durkheim ar­
gued that the preference for asceticism which he shares with 
these religions is thus "not good in and of itself." Rather, 
•
 
all beings can only realize their true nature through accept­

ance of their prior particularity. 
If we believe that discipline is useful, indeed neces­
sary for the individual, it is because it seems to us 
•
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demanded by nature itself. It is the way in which 
nature realizes itself normally, not a way of 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
minimizing or destroying nature. Like everything 
else, man is a limited being: he is part of a whole. 
Physically, he is part of the universe: morally, he 
is part of society. Hence, he cannot, without viola­
ting his nature, try to supersede the limits imposed 
on him. Indeed, everything that is most basic in him 
partakes of this quality of partialness or particu­
larity. To say that one is a person is to say that 
he is distinct from all others: this distinction im­
plies limitation. If then, from our point of view, 
discipline is good, it is not that we regard the work 
of nature with a rebellious eye, or that we see here 
a diabolical scheme that must be foiled: but that 
man's nature cannot be itself except as it is disci­
plined. If we deem it essential that natural inclin­
ations be held within certain bounds, it is not be­
cause that nature seems to us bad, or because we deny 
the right to gratification: on the contrary, it is 
because otherwise such natural inclinations could have 
no hope of the satisfaction they merit (ME: 50-1). 
Now, clearly one of the factors distinguishing us fromother~ 
yet by which each of us completes our nature--is our own per­
sonality. Durkheim next argued that personality~an onlydevel­
op if the ego accepts the limiting boundaries distinguishing 
it from the rest of the world and from others. 
Discipline is thus useful, not only in the interests 
of society and as the indispensable means without 
which regular cooperation would be impossible, but 
for the welfare of the individual himself. By means 
of discipline we learn the control of desire without 
which man could not achieve happiness. Hence, it 
even contributes in large measure to the development 
of that which is of fundamental importance for each 
of us: our personality (ME:48). 
In terms of socialization and education, especially 
the moralizing of the ego--the first prerequisite is that the 
child be taught self-discipline. To Durkheim, self-discipline 
was the key precondition for the successful construction of 
the personality structure, and the subsequent welfare of the 
in~ividual. 
The capacity for constraining our inclinations, for 
restraining ourselves--the ability that we acquire 
in the school of moral discipline--is the indispen­
sable condition for the emergence of reflective, in­
dividual will. The rule, because it teaches us to re­
strain and master ourselves, is a means of emancipa­
tion and of freedom (ME:48). 
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It is important to emphasize that Durkheim did not attempt 
to justify mastering the inordinate desires of the "enemy 
within" in terms of the supposed evilness of man's nature. 
Nor did he consider the role of moral discipline in the ed­
ucational process as simply a "police action," designed to 
prevent the depredations of one freedom against another. 
Moral discipline not only buttresses the moral life 
..• it performs 'an important function in forming 
character and personality in general. In fact, the 
most essential element of character is this capa­
city for restraint--as they say, of inhibition-­
which allows us to contain our passions, our de­
sires, our habits, and subject them to law (ME:46). 
Now, the subjection and transformation of pre-social 
anomie into a sociocultural nomos is not merely the means for 
creating character, but more importantly, the acceptance of 
rules, meanings, and determinate horizons constitutes the very 
preconditions of human happiness, freedom, and even individual 
health. 
We should not see in the discipline to which we sub­
ject children a means of constraint necessary only 
when it seems indispensable for preventing culpable 
conduct. Discipline is in itself a factor sui generis 
of education. Through discipline and by means of it 
alone are we able to teach the child to rein in his 
desires, to set limits to his appetites of all kinds, 
to limit and, through limitation, to define the goals 
of his activity. This limitation is the condition of 
happiness and of moral health (ME:43-44). 
But how can the repression of individual desires be consider­
ed the way to freedom? Today our moral subsidization of the 
autonomous spontaneity of the unencumbered ego is so great 
that we have trouble even perceiving the structure of Durkheims 
argument. For isn't freedom itself defined as the release from 
all previous, especially irrational, constraints? On the con­
trary, in a seeming paradox Durkheim contended that freedom 
only emerges out of the school of self-discipline. 
Imagine a being liberated from all external restraint, 
a despot still more absolute than those of which his­
tory tells us, a despot that no external power can re­
strain or influence. By definition, the desires of such 
a being are irresistible. Shall we say, then, that he 
is all powerful? Certainly not, since he himself cannot 
resist his desires. They are masters of him, as of every­
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• 
thing else. He submits to them; he does not dominate 
them. In a word, when the inclinations are totally 
liberated, when nothing sets bounds to them, they 
themselves become tyrannical, and their first slave 
• 
is precisely the person who experiences them. What 
a sad picture this presents (ME: 44). 
Since we moderns have so often conceived of freedom and auto­
nomy in wholly negative terms, as a progressive shedding or 
•
 
disengagement from traditional claims on us, Durkheim's ironic
 
paradox grates on our sensibilities and moral fervor. But Durk­

heim continued extending the irony by insisting on the impo­

tency and self-destructiveness of ego-based desires.
 
•
 
A despot is like a child; he has a child's weaknesses
 
because he is not master of himself. Self-mastery is )
 
the first condition of all tru~ power, of all liberty
 
worthy of the name. One cannot be master of himself
 
when he has within him forces that, by definition, can­

not be mastered ...• Since there is nothing to restrain
 
them, they inevitably go to violent extremes, which are 
self-destroying (ME:45). 
Certainly, Durkheim's insights here run forcefully against the t 
mode~ethos ~_liberation is to be primarily found in con- ,\
• tinuou~~ease, instead of self-mastery. 
•
 
Not only freedom but happiness itself, Durkheim argued,
 
is attainable only if we learn to inhibit our inherent and po­

tentially insatiable egoistic desires. The very act of scaling
 
down these expansive energies enables them to gain the possi­
bility of satisfaction. 
The totality of moral regulations really forms about 
each person an imaginary wall, at the foot of which a
• 
multitude of human passions simply die without being 
able to go further. For the same reason--that they are 
contained--it becomes possible to satisfy them (ME:42). 
The irony continues, for the very constriction~fhorizonsthat 
would inevitably bring forth a mixture of indignation and path­
• os from representatives of our contemporary liberatingsu~cult­
ures, instead brings relief to human nature, Durkheim contend­
ed. He thus counseled us in the seemingly paradoxical puzzles 
of a very different therapeutic--that is, human happiness can
• only be attained to the extent to which the inherent passions 
of the pre-socialized ego can be constrained or disciplined to 
embrace only regular, determinate, alld achievable goals. 
•
 
p 
,
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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Rather than instilling the drive for individual ambition and 
fulfillment of our limitless human potential, the prime func­
tion of education, Durkheim argued, is to inculcate the spirit 
of restraint and realizable ambitions. 
Education must help the child understand that ... 
there are limits based on the nature of things, that 
is to say, in the nature of each of us. This has no­
thing to do with insidiously inculcating a spirit of 
resignation in the child; or curbing his legitimate 
ambitions; or preventing him from seeing the condi­
tions existing around him. Such proposals would con­
tradict the very principles of our social system. But 
he must be made to understand that the way to be hap­
py is to set proximate and realizable goalR~ cnrres­
ponding to the nature of each person, an~~o a~tempt 
to reach objectives by straining neurotically and un­
happily toward infinitely distant and consequently in­
a~essible goals .... We must make the child appreciate 
that he cannot rely for happiness upon unlimited power, 
knowledge, or wealth; but that it can be found in very 
diverse situations, that each of us has his sorrows as 
well as his joys, that the important thing is to dis­
cover a goal compatible with one's abilities, one which 
allows him to realize his nature without seeking to sur­
pass it in some manner, thrusting it violently an~arti­
fICIaITy~eyond its natural limits*(ME:49-50). --- ---­
Conversely, Durkheim argued that moral discipline is 
not only necessary for social functioning, to complete man's 
nature, to develop personality or character structure, for 
freedom and happiness, but moreover, discipline is essential 
for health (see also Book Three). Without constraint of the 
egocentric passions of one half of human nature, a con­
stitutional human dis-ease rages out of control. 
We have observed that discipline is often viewed as a 
violation of man's natural constitution, since it im­
pedes his unrestricted development. Is this contention 
sound? Quite to the contrary, an inability to restrict 
one's self within determinate limits is a sign of dis­
ease--with respect to all forms of human conduct and, 
even more generally, for all kinds of biological beha­
vior. With a certain amount of nourishment a normal man 
is no longer hungry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be 
satisfied (ME:38). 
Indeed, Durkheim argued, again and again, here and especially 
in Suicide, that the release from the constraints of moral dis­
cipline--or anomie--and the release of the insatiable passions 
harbored in the human ego--can only result in suffering. The 
•
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
inevitable consequence of the release of the affliction of 
"dis-eases of the infinite" is self-destruction. 
A need, a desire, freed from all restraints, and all 
rules, no longer geared to some determinate object­
ive and, through this same connection, limited and 
contained, can be nothing but a source of constant 
anguish for the person experiencing it. What grati­
fication indeed, can such a desire yield, since by 
definition it isincapable~f being satisfied? An in­
satiable thirst cannot be slaked*(ME:39-40). -- -­
Thus, the only true way for man to avoid the affliction of 
"insatiable thirst" and self-destruction--Durkheim's equiva­
lent of the metaphysical notions of evil and sin--is for the 
will to bEi!come disciplinedin the "school of duty"--that is, 
in social obligation. 
In order to have a full sense of self-realization, 
man, far from needing to see limitless horizons un­
rolling before him, in reality finds nothing as un­
happy as the indeterminate reach of such a prospect. 
Far from needing to feel that he confronts a career 
without any definite terminus, he can only be happy 
when involved in definite and specific tasks. This 
limitation by no means implies, however, that man 
must arrive at stme fixed position where ultimately 
he finds tranquillity. In intermittent steps one can 
pass from one special task to others equally specific, 
without drowning in the dissolving sense of limitless­
ness. The important thing is that behavior have a 
clear-cut objective, which may be grasped and which 
limits and determines it (ME:40). 
Durkheim completed his outline of his philosophy of "human 
finitude" and the need for limitation by suggesting that man 
too must submit to the natural law that "all life is complex 
equilibrium." 
In order to live, we have to confront the multiple 
requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital 
energy. The amount of energy that we can and should 
devote to achieving each particular goal is neces­
sarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of 
the strength at our disposal and the relative signi­
ficance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a 
complex equilibrium whose elements limit one another; 
this balance cannot be disrupted without producing un­
happiness or illness. Moreover, those activites in 
whose favor the equilibrium is disrupted become a 
source of pain to the person--and for the same rea­
son--the disproportionate development accorded to 
them (ME: 39) . 
--38-­
Thus, with his philosophy of "human finitude" Durkheim pro­
vides an explanation--a "theodicy" and a "therapeutic" if you 
f· will--of man's essential nature, the causes of the inevitable 
tensions renting his equilibrium, and causing human suffering, 
the way forward to happiness, and so on. Even as a positivist, 
Durkheim clearly stands in an honorable tradition of moral 
philosophy reaching all the way back to Aristotle and his 
Ethics. 
C. A Preliminary Critique 
It is not my purpose to engage here in a full-scale 
critique of Durkheim's sociological theory of moral reality. 
Further, I shall relegate many criticisms of Durkheim's doc­
• 
trine of the dualism of human nature as they 
our present concerns to Book Three. Instead, 
are relevant to 
I wish now to 
merely note the following points which may prove relevant to 
our subsequent explorations. Hopefully, this brief examina­
• 
tion of the basic outlines of Durkheim's early moral theory 
has revealed some of the many reasons why Durkheim considered 
discipline absolutely necessary to restrain the potentially 
insatiable and egocentric passions of the organic ego. How­
• 
ever, 
tique 
I feel compelled to lodge some objections. My first cri­
is directed at the very topic which Durkheim chose here 
for his own--namely, the grounds of moral obligation. 
Now, it is only by perceiving the role of the extreme­
• 
ly negative, even chaotic, reality of the insatiable passions 
of the pre-socialized human ego in posing dangers to the moral 
life, that I can even begin to understand why Durkheim assigned 
discipline the pre-eminent role in the moral life. Certainly, ~ 
• 
by this disproportionate emphasis, Durkheim 
another fundamental aspect which many moral 
larqely ignored 
theorists have 
postulated as the very foundation of morality--namely, equity 
or reciprocity. It was precisely at this point that the great 
• 
Piaget objected to Durkheim's moral theory, for he noted that 
Durkheim's notion of morality was largely hierarchical, as if 
rules were unilaterally handed down from on high to the child. 
•
 
• 
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Instead (for example, in The Moral Judgement of the Child, 
1965), Piaget distinguished two different forms of the con­
struction of morality--the hierarchical form, and the type of 
reciprocity negotiated between peers, especially among child­
ren playing games for example. Piaget, of course, was more in­
terested in the second type, while Durkheim was more interest­
ed in the first. Yet,is any account of the genesis of morality 
complete without discussion of both obligation and reciprocity? 
Indeed, we would do well to remember Durkheim's own dual em­
phasis on society as both the source and the object of moral 
rules; morality regulates social relations. 
This curious lapse in Durkheim's theoretical framework 
helps to explain why--cven when working within Durkheim's own 
positivistic frame of reference--he gave so little attention to 
the varied rationales underlying specific types of s:>cial obliga­
tions. In Durkheim's system we scarcely find mention of the 
reasons for the many moral rules and prohibitions which guide 
our lives--namely, the concern with the potential harm (whether 
__-_"__~ . •__ ~.__. --_. . . ~ .0-- ._ .~_" __. 
physical, mo~a.lL-Q.£_EPi-ritual)thatwe may do to others (whe­
ther-by';;ission or comrni-~-~i;n-)"by~ur actions (whether~_tI:e~ 
be consciousiy 'intende~-or_mereiy emerge as un';nticipated re­
sults) • 
Further, Durkheim's limitation of the object of morality 
to social groups slights the fact that moral rules and indivi­
dual duties are directed not only to society and self but even 
to the world. Here Durkheim was led astray by his later insis­
tence that the choice of physical objects with which to invest 
sacredness is largely arbitrary; on the contrary, I maintain 
that the choice of prime symbols is rarely arbitrary (eg. see 
Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols, 1973, or Victor Turner, The 
Forest of Symbols, 1967). If there be techno-logic, there also 
has to be symbol logic; and here the particular characteristics 
of the symbolic object in a symbolic process are often crucial. 
Moreover, how could we, within the confines of Durkheim's so­
ciologistical system, even begin to speak of an ecological con­
science, of the pressing need for a "wilderness ethic" (eg. 
see Aldo Leopold's A Sand County Almanac, 1966, or Christo­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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pher Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights 
For Natural Objects, 1974)1 
Clearly, Durkheim's ascetic obsession with repressing 
the inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recogni­
tion of potentially significant wider moral horizons. However, 
even given the magnitude and significance of this obsession 
in his system, Durkheim was still often not clear about the 
precise source of this important insatiable drive. Earlier I 
suggested that, given the logic of his theoretical grounding 
of his argument in man's evolutionary status as the sociocult­
ural animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and 
biology was hereafter subject to critical review by the fact 
that, by definition, man's sociocultural achievement had chang­
ed the very structure of his organic inheritance. In addition, 
it seemed clear that biological appetites were restrained nat­
urally--either by physiological limitation or by the upper lim­
its of carrying capacity of the supporting environment. Unfor­
tunately, however, Durkheim didn't seem to perceive these ful­
ler implications of his original evolutionary propositions: a 
pity for both him and for us. Had he done so,my task in eluci­
dating the possible extensions of this logic in terms of the 
wider implications of his Suicide schemas would have been great­
ly eased. In other words, if the potential for insatiability 
is derived from man's generic essence as the sociocultural ani­
mal, then it follows that we must look to the specific config­
urations of cultural values in any historical society for the 
specific expressions--whether realized, repressed, or redi­
rected--of this potential drive for infinity. For example, 
Durkheim unfortunately often speaks of the unsocialized child 
as almost an animal. And in much of Moral Education and Suicide 
Durkheim seemed to revert back to~~~ry position which his own 
theoretical logics had seemed to confute--namely, that the 
source of this key insatiability (his positivist analogy with 
old notions of evil and sin)--was biological, that is, expres­
sed primarily in terms of the sensual appetites. 
Thus, by a sort of covert operation in the underground 
of thought, Durkheim's posivitism led him here (however much he 
•
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• 
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• 
may have consciously rejected the identification) toward link­
ing in his system the source of human suffering to the "origi­
nal sin" (our organic inheritance) embodied in the inordinate 
desires exptessed through the sensual appetites (the "flesh"). 
The tension in human existence derives from the inherent con­
flict in the nature of man between these two separate lower 
and higher entities warring in each man's breast. However, 
Durkheim's early tragic vision did not include here the per­
haps more critical sources of tension and suffering in the hu­
man condition. I refer to the wrenching, exhaustin~ conflicts 
between competing value systems or moralities, especially when 
these compete for ascendancy within the same person. I believe 
social psychologists refer to this situation as "cognitive dis­
sonance." Certainly, Max Weber, Durkheim's contemporary, knew 
from tragic personal experience (eg. see Mitzman, 1971) the 
tensions introduced by the warring demons holding the "very 
fibers of our lives." The later Durkheim moved closer to this 
position, as we shall soon see. 
Now, one might attempt to rescue part of Durkheim's 
"brittle synthesis" by suggesting a distinction between his 
conflation of the human ego in terms of the concrete ego of 
the child, for instance, and the abstract generic essence of 
the nature of the human species. Nevertheless, Durkheim's lo­
gical troubles have only begun. For we have seen that Durkheim 
had insisted, when he came to theoretically ground man's nature 
in terms of his evolutionary achievement, that man is man not 
only because of those sociocultural achievements known as civ­
ilization" (eg. ME:325), but also because his generic species 
nature is based on a "newly awakened conscience," "spiritual 
forces," "moral and mental life," and so forth. How, then, 
can it be that this generic species essence (I use the term 
in the evolutionary, not the metaphysical, sense) of man-as­
man--even if expressed in the concrete pre-socialized ego of 
the child--could simultaneously be the source of both the amor­
ality of the non-social ego and the moral discipline 'of socie­
ty? If man is, by nature, social and cultural, then from what 
derives his essential amorality? His passionate insatiability? 
•
 
• 
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Given the thrust of Durkheim's evolutionary arguments, we have 
already ruled out of court man's animal nature {since our biolo­
gical needs and processes are naturally disciplined). The only 
'. 
candidate left is the old standby--the pre-socialized ego; but 
how can we reconcile the social and moral origins of the human 
individual--even the ego, evolutionarily considered--with its 
supposed insatiability? How can Durkheim legitimately have 
sought to maintain his stark dichotomy between the individual 
and the social, when he himself had insisted that the very 
foundations of the human individual-- as an 'awakened conscience" 
• 
a new reflective center--em~rges in evolutionary terms only 
• 
from sociocultural origins? In other words, is the ego more im­
portant here as the source of insatiable drives, or as repre­
senting the absence of moral rules and rational concepts? I 
believe the latter is more acceptable, and, indeed, that is 
the direction in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop. 
• 
Now, Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways; and in­
deed, in other places the opposition is much simpler and less 
paradoxical when he speaks as if the basically amoral passions 
• 
of the troublesome ego derived from the lower organic levels. 
In that case, the only logical conclusion is that the human ego 
is virtually identical with animal egos, with the biological 
ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself. There 
is, however, scant justification for pursuing such an abstact­
ed argument very far beyond its obvious applications, and thus, 
evident limitations. Certainly this alternative is not a socio­
• 
cultural explanation (see also Book Three). Therefore, we are 
left little choice but to conclude that Durkheim's thought on 
this absolutely crucial question of the source of insatiability 
--whether it be the pre-socialized organic ego or human socie­
• 
ty and culture itself--did, indeed, represent a "brittle syn­
thesis." Surely :nuch of the unsatisfactory "brittleness" of 
this first view is that it represented an unwarranted incorp­
oration--even with the rhetorical inversion--of a foreign ele­
• 
ment into Durkheim's thought (see Book Three). Further, the 
first solution represented a way of metaphorically translating 
and anchoring in his positivistic system some of the tradi­
•
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tional moral elements such as sin and evil which otherwise 
could not be acco~dated. 
Moreover, we need not really be surprised that, even 
as a pion~er sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts 
be explained socially, Durkheim's concurrent other role as a 
positivist moral philosopher constantly led him to surrepti­
tiously contravene the basic methodological rules that he him­
self had laid down as the foundation of his school. Indeed, few 
have noticed how inconsistent Durkheim was in regularly assign­
ing key dynamic elements of human action to the very abstract­
ion--the lone, isolated, pre-socialized ego--which he had so 
powerfully criticized in the "social contract" theorists. Here, 
Durkheim's logical flaw was that rather than portraying the 
child as a socially neutral entity, possessed of certain pro­
clivities and potentialities awaiting cultural imprinting, on 
the contrary, he constantly pictured human nature as the power­
ful source of negative and destructive passions. Besides the 
rhetorical mistake of accepting a basic image from his polem­
ical opponents, here reinforced by Cartesian metaphors rife in 
his own culture, Durkheim's dark doctrine of generic human na­
ture gets him into the serious bind, as it does to all social 
thinkers who unwittingly insist on basing society and culture 
on psychological or biological premises, of proposing that some 
of the most dynamic, generative, and significant sources of 
human action are to be derived primarily from lower, non-human, 
non-sociocultural levels. Besides running directly counter to 
his own notion of society and culture as evolutionary emergents, 
and social facts as sui generis phenomena that cannot be re­
duced to lower levels, and against my definition of man as the 
sociocultural animal, and further, against Parsons' (1949) and 
others' important thesis that the advance of social science 
depends on the progressive over-coming of "naturalistic" (i.e. 
physical, biological, psychological, geographical, etc.) re­
ductions by properly drawn sociocultural explanations, Durk­
heim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as 
darkly and destructively egoistic and insatiable implicitly 
reduces society and culture to the relatively passive role of 
•
 
• 
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con~raining or simply redirecting the really critical organic 
desires (see also Book Three for fuller development of these
• objections). 
Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here--I mean 
extending a key Cartesian logic deeply embedded in his own 
cultural tradition, and rhetorically inverting the high valua­
• tion of the generic individual so insistently proclaimed by his 
polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of pos­
itivist moral science--barred complete and unconditional em­
brace of the fully sociocultural position. The sociological
• position more fully consistent with Durkheim's own stated me­
thodological prescriptions is that society and culture should 
be considered, both in generic and evolutionary terms, as the 
crucially important generative and directive sources of the most
• significant aspects of human action. In sum, despite the evident 
cultural and polemical functions served by the early version 
of his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknow­

ledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of interpretive

• root dichotomies originally anchored in this same image, none­

•
 
theless, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher
 
intrudes too strongly here for us to follow him in his funda­

mental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as in­

herently insatiable.
 
• 
D. Durkheim'~ Tragic Vision of the Human Condition: His Later 
Notion of the Duality of Human Nature 
Preface. Although Durkheim's notion of the endemic antagonism 
between the individual ego and the socially constructed person 
represented a seminal dichotomy from early in his career, it 
• 
was not until much later that Durkheim came to expfcitly and 
• 
systematically formulate this notion as a constitutive founda­
tion of his doctrine. Those secondary observers who have missed 
the significance of this crucial split in man's nature running 
through his earlier works are not alone, for even Durkheim's 
critics in his own day failed to recognize this dichotomy as 
one of the driving forces behind his masterpiece The Elementary 
• --45-­
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Forms of the Religious Life. Yet, Durkheim announced in the 
introduction his intention to reformulate this old staple of 
traditional moral philosophy. 
According to the well-known formula, man is double. 
There are two beings in him: an individual being 
which has its foundation in the organism, and the 
circle of whose activities is therefore strictly 
limited, and a social being which represents the 
highest reality in the intellectual and moral order 
that we can know by observation--I mean society. 
This duality of our nature has its consequence in 
the practical order, the irreducibility of a moral 
ideal to a utilitarian motive, and in the order of 
thought, the irreducibility of reason to individual 
experience. In so far as he belongs to society, the 
individual transcends himself, both when he thinks 
and when he acts (EF:29). 
Again and again in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim utilized the 
old formula of homo duplex in highly innovative ways. For exam­
ple, in terms of the awakening of conscience and consciousness, 
and thus the emergence of the person in collective ritual,Durk­
heim explicitly referred to the duality of human nature. 
This is the objective foundation of the idea of the 
soul: those representations whose flow constitutes 
our interior life are of two different species which 
are irreducible one into another. Some concern them­
selves with the external and material world; others, 
with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral su­
periority over the first. So we are really made up of 
two beings facing in different and almost contrary di­
rections, one of whom exercises a real preeminence 
over the other. 
Such is the profound meaning of the antithesis which 
all men have more or less clearly conceived between 
the body and the soul, the material and the spiritual 
beings who coexist within us. Moralists and preachers 
have often maintained that no one can deny the reality 
of duty and its sacred character without falling into 
materialism. And it is true that if we have no idea 
of moral and religious imperatives, our psychical life 
will all be reduced to one level, all our states of 
consciousness will be on the same plane, and all feel­
ing of duality will vanish. To make this duality intel­
ligible, it is, of course, in no way necessary to ima­
gine a mysterious and unrepresentable substance, under 
the name of the soul, which is opposed to the body .... 
It remains true that our nature is double; there really 
is a particle of divinity in us because there is within 
us a particle of these great ideas which are the soul 
of the group (EF:298-9). 
•
 
• 
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Two years after publication of The Elementary Forms, 
Durkheim expressed surprise and chagrin that these underlying 
• 
root dichotomies had not been adequately understood as the cru­
cial foundation of that masterwork. The basic opposition with 
which Durkheim filled in the old formula of homo duplex was 
the contrast between the privatized physical sensations and 
• 
appetites, almost the autistic, inward-turning of the organic 
ego, on the one hand, and the publicly communicable collective 
representations expressed in terms of the increasingly univer­
salizable moral rules and rational concepts emerging from the 
• 
generic sociocultural process, and embedded in the core struct­
ures of conscience and consciousness constituting the person. 
The general failure of others to understand his crucial series 
of interpretive symbolic equations underlying the analytical 
• 
framework of The Elementary Forms led Durkheim to reemphasize 
and explicitly articulate them in two important later addresses. 
In 1913, Durkheim contributed to an important discussion, pub­
lished in the Bulletin de la Societe francaise de philosophie 
• 
(see Lukes, 1973:585), on "Le Probleme religieux et la dualite 
de la nature humaine." And in 1914, Durkheim published his 
article "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Conditions" 
(in Wolff, 1960). Since the latter paper is Durkheim's most 
• explicit statement of this doctrine, we shall focus on it here. 
As noted earlier, in the very process of extending his 
root i.nterpretive dichotomies, Durkheim's model tended to shift 
slightly but significantly on its rhetorical axes. First, insa­
tiability was no longer the simple product of the inherently• J
 inordinate desires of the human pre-socialized ego. Rather 
than acting as the demonic source of destructive desires, the 
organic ego came to be portrayed as merely privatized and cir­
• cumscribed by its own inherent limitations. Thus, it is most 
significant for our present purposes that Durkheim's concern 
shifted from emphasizing the presence of destructive drives 
in the pre-socialized generic ego, to the generic absence of 
• moral rules and universalizable concepts (see also Book Three) . 
The antagonism between the two halves of human nature 
was, of course, still present, and even intensified. For now, 
•
 
• 
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rather than the insatiability of the non-social half of human
 
nature being branded as the cause of man's endemic torment, it
 
• was instead the impossibility of simultaneously satisfying the
 
conflicting demands of both the physically privatized organic J
 
ego and the claims of society on the moralized and rationalized
 
person. Truly, it seemed man was "double," for the two beings

• in him represented different universes of being and valuing,
 
,.
 
of knowing and doing. "Torn between two masters"--it was this
 
old image of man's tormented lot which lay at the heart of Durk­

heim's deepening tragic vision. Now, every endemic conflict re­

quires that we finally take our stand, and choose which side
 
will prevail. In this light, Durkheim's later sociological work
 
can be seen, in the last analysis, as that of a positivist mo- ~
 
ral philosopher issuing a "priestly" call for the necessary and
 
• prolonged sacrifice of the ego, so that logos --universality
 
in morality and rationality in thought--might ultimately come
 
to prevail. Durkheim's call for a kind of modern stoic asceti­

cism embodied the essence of his own socivlogical system and
 
• that of the Durkheimian school. In the face of the spreading
 
aggressions and impending doom of Worla War I, Durkheim, as
 
the "high priest" of positivist moral sociology, issued final
 
calls for the sacrifice of the ego--or eros--and the enthrone­

• ment of reason--or logos.
 
1. Ego is to Person as Body is to Soul 
When he finally came to explicitly and systematically art­
• iculate his philosophical anthropology, Durkheim began by in­
sisting that "the constitutional duality of human nature"-­
especially in terms of the root opposition between the body 
and the soul--is a universal phenomenon. The antagonism be­
• tween physical and moral-rational principles is perennial, and 
always and everywhere these invidious dualisms between body and 
soul, between Geist and Welt, are inextricably bound up with 
the religious realms of the sacred and the profane. Inevitably,
• things connected with the sacred principle are invested with 
higher dignity, while things linked with the profane principle, 
by virtue of their diammetrically opposed nature to the divine, 
•
 
• 
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are reserved for general opprobrium. 
As a positivist moral philosopher, Durkheim attempted 
• to "save the phenomena" by translating these seemingly univer­
sal dualities of human nature into purely sociologistical form- l 
ulas. Durkheim insisted that any universal social or cultural 
phenomena cannot be illusory, that is, either mere ignorant ~ superstition or misplaced metaphysics. The universal must be 
I true--this was one of Durkheim's fundamental principles. There­
fore, since Durkheim presumed that symbols are real in their 
causes and effects, he proposed that the duality of human na­
• ture, especially in terms of the ubiquitous opposition between 
the body and the soul, can be deciphered as merely a symbolic 
projection of a constitutive experiential reality. Again and 
again, Durkheim sounded the same refrain. 
• A belief that is as universal and permanent as this cannot be purely illusory. There must be something 
in man that gives rise to this feeling that his na­
ture is dual, a feeling that men in all known civi­
lizations have experienced (DHN:326). 
• 
Against competing monistic images of man, which dismiss this 
• 
duality as illusory, Durkheim contended that, since this inner 
tension has been felt by all peoples in all times and places, 
it cannot thereby be legitimately dismissed simply as one of 
man's earlier aberrations. 
It is still true that at all times man has been dis­
quieted and malcontent. He has always felt that he is 
pulled apart, divided against himself; and the belief 
and practices to which, in all societies and all civi­
•
 
lizations, he has always attached the greatest value,
 
have as their object not to suppress these inevitable 
divisions but to attenuate their consequences, to give 
them meaning and purpose, to make them more bearable, 
and at the very least, to console man for their exist­
ence. We cannot admit that this universal and chronic 
•
 
state of malaise is the product of a simple aberration,
 
that man has been the creator of his own suffering, and 
• 
that he has stupidly persisted in it, although his na­
ture predisposed him to live harmoniously (DHN:330-1). 
Durkheim's deep sense that this duality is irretrieva­
bly embedded in the very nature of life can be seen in a re­
port of a doctoral examination in 1910. Lukes reports the fol­
lowing exchanges: 
•
 
I 
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•
 
•
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Durkheim: There is a sense in which "we" are subject 
to physical laws, and another in which "we" perform 
the moral law: we are double. 
Pradines (the candidate): I wanted to put an end to 
this dualism. 
Durkheim: You have not succeeded. Reason, you say, uni­
fies the tendencies in the moral law just as in the 
physical law it unifies natural phenomena, but do you 
not see that this antagonism is in us, in ourselves? 
What difficulty is there here? How can you imagine that 
a dialetical trick will unify this dualism, which all 
thinkers before you have expressed, each in his own 
language, some tracing the social to the perceptible, 
others opposing the rational to the individual, but 
all seeing one characteristic, the most profound of all 
moral characteristics. You who claim to have so keen an 
apprehension of complexity, how is it that you have not 
felt that there is always in us something which is ele­
vating, while another part of us draws us in an opposite 
direction? 
Pradines: It has seemed to me that classical rationalism 
was wrong not to put an end to this undeniable dualism. 
Durkheim: Such a solution is impossible. You have found 
in all systems an internal opposition. You have denoun­
ced this as a contradiction; you should have see that 
this contradiction is in life itself (Lukes, 1973:646). 
This last phrase--"the contradiction is in life itself"--aptly 
sums up Durkheim' s evolving tragic sense of the human condition 
Durkheim further suggested that "Psychological analysis 
has, in fact, confirmed the existence of this duality--it finds 
it at the very heart of our inner life" (DHN: 326). Durkheim 
found this psychological validation in the apparent constitu­
tional opposition between the physically rooted sensations 
and appetites, on the one hand, and conceptual thought and 
moral rules on the other. Although we have noted these dich­
otomies before, it is important to recognize how these opposi­
tions moved to the very center of Durkheim's later thought, 
while concern with the insatiability of the pre-socialized or­
ganic ego faded into the background. The physically rooted 
ego was no longer seen as insatiable, just fatally circumscri­
bed in its own private orbit. 
Our intelligence, like our activity, presents two 
very different forms: on the one hand, are sensa­
tions and sensory tendencies; on the other, concep­
tual thought and moral activity. Each of these two 
•
 
•
 
• 
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• 
• 
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parts of ourselves represents a separate pole of 
our being, and these two poles are not only dis­
tinct from one another, but are opposed to one ano­
ther. Our sensory appetites are necessarily egoistic: 
they have our individuality and it alone as their ob­
ject. When we satisfy our hunger, our thirst, and so 
on, without bringing any other tendency into play, it 
is ourselves and ourselves alone, that we satisfy. 
Conceptual thought and moral activity are, on the con­
trary, distinguished by the fact that the rules of con­
duct to which they conform can be universalized. There­
fore, by definition, they pursue impersonal ends. Mo­
rality begins with disinterest, with attachment to some­
thing other than ourselves. A sensation of color or 
sound is closely dependent on my individual organism, 
and I cannot detach the sensation from my organism. 
maddition, it is impossible for me to make my aware­
ness pass over into someone else ..•. Concepts, on the 
contrary, are always common to a plurality of men. They 
are constituted by means of words, and neither the vo­
cabulary nor the grammar of a language is the work or 
product of one particular person. They are rather the 
results of a collective elaboration, and they express 
the anonymous collectivity that employs them.••. Be­
cause they are held in common, concepts are the supreme 
instrument of all intellectual exchange. By means of 
them, minds communicate (DHN:327). 
To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites are neces­
sarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting particularity 
meant that they cannot, by definition, rise above their purely 
private sensational level. On the other hand, since concepts 
and moral rules are social both in their origin and object-­
that is, impersonal and collective--they tend to become uni­
versalized. Note that Durkheim here explicitly suggests that 
these lower level organic needs can be satisfied; yet, by vir­
tue of their purely physical base, such need-satisfactions re­
main egocentric and thus inherently private. 
Therefore, these two levels of our organism and our mo­
ral and intellectual life are opposed to one another as the in­
dividual ego is contrasted with the impersonal collective cul­
ture, and thus, as private is opposed to public. Since the two 
beings within us--ego and person (body and soul)--are simul­
taneously drawn in different directions, Durkheim maintained 
that man's inner life is irretrievably marked by a oscillation 
back and forth between these two opposing poles of our exist­
ence. Because our inner life has a "double center of gravity," 
•
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the perennial problem of resolving the competing claims of 
these beings and maintaining an integrated, coherent person­
ality structure is greatly intensified. 
These two aspects of our psychic life are, therefore, 
opposed to each other as the personal and the imper­
sonal. There is in us a being that represents every­
thing in relation to itself and from its own point of 
view; in everything that it does, this being has no 
other object but itself. There is another being in 
us, however, which knows things sub specie aeternitis, 
as if it were participating in some thought other than 
its own, and which, in its acts, tends to accomplish 
ends that suroass i.ts own. The old formula homo du­
plex is therefore verified by the facts. Far from-be­
rng-simple, our inner life has something that is like 
a double center of gravity. On the one hand, is our 
individuality--and more particularly, our body in 
which it is based; on the other is everything in us 
that expresses something other than ourselves (DHN:327-9). 
The outlines of Durkheim's later tragic vision of life 
thus emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to the earlier empha­
sis on insatiability, but now directed instead to the inevita­
ble discord between the two warring halves of our nature. Rather 
than portraying the ego and the person, the physical and the mo­
ral, the private and the public, the concrete and the universal 
halves of our beings, as necessarily complementary, Durkheim 
contended that these opposing forces wage an eternal struggle 
for ascendancy over our inner lives. To Durkheim, human reality 
is fundamentally conflictual. 
Not only are these two groups of states of conscious­
ness different in their origins and their properties, 
but there is a true antagonism between them. They mu­
tually contradict and deny each other. We cannot pur­
sue moral ends without causing a split within oursel­
ves, without offending the instincts and the penchants 
that are most deeply rooted in our bodies. There is no 
moral act that does not imply a sacrifice, for, as 
Kant has shown, the law of duty cannot be obeyed with­
out humiliating our individual sensitivity (DHN:328). 
Durkheim thus insisted that living up to the demands of moral 
and intellectual life requires constant sacrifice of egocentric, 
purely privatized organic desires. In effect, Durkheim argued 
that the life of man-in-society-and-culture is made possible 
only through constant repression of all that is implied in ego­
centricity. 
•
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As Durkheim deepened the tension in the inner life of 
man by insisting that the antinomy between the two halves of 
human nature is irreconcilable, he came round again to the 
problem of insatiability, though in a rather different way. 
Now, man's inner torment comes from his inability to simultan­
eously satisfy both the biological and cultural halves of his 
inheritance. 
This antinomy is so deep and so radical that it can 
never be completely resolved. How can we belong en­
tirely to ourselves, and entirely to others at one 
and the same time? The ego cannot be something com­
pletely other than itself, for if it were, it would 
vanish--this is what happens in ecstasy. In order to 
think we must be, we must have an individuality. On 
the other hand, however, the ego cannot be entirely 
and exclusively itself, for, if it were, it would be 
emptied of all content. If we must be in order to 
think, then we must have something to think about. 
To what would consciousness be reduced if it expres­
sed nothing but the body and its states? 
We cannot live without representing to ourselves the 
world around us and the objects of every sort which 
fill it. And because we represent it to ourselves, 
it enters into us and becomes part of us. Consequent­
ly, we value the world and are attached to it just as 
we are to ourselves. Something else in us besides our­
selves stimulates us to act (DHN:328). 
In his own way, Durkheim began to approach the old metaphysical 
problem of the relations between unity and plurality. For, if 
"in order to think we must be" (the Cartesian "cogito, ergo 
sum"), we must have an individuality that is directed both to 
ourselves and the external world. At the same time, however, 
Durkheim contended that because of the physical limitations 
of individual experience, we cannot raise ourselves indepen­
dently and spontaneously to the level of universal validity. 
Instead, the only path from the eros of the ego to the univer­
salizable logos of the collectivity is to transcend our iso­
lated and limited physical existence through the "hyper-spir­
itual" medium of society, culture, and history. As Durkheim 
had said earlier: "Only the universal is rational. The parti­
cular and the concrete baffle understanding." 
We understand only when we think in concepts. But 
sensory reality is not made to enter the framework 
of our concepts spontaneously and by itself. It 
•
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• 
resists, and, in order to make it conform, we have 
to do some violence to it, we have to submit it to 
sorts of laborious operations that alter it so that 
the mind can assimilate it. However, we never com­
pletely succeed in mastering our sensations and in 
translating them completely into intelligible terms. 
They take on a conceptual form only by losing that 
which is most concrete in them, that which causes 
them to speak to our sensory beings and to involve 
• 
it in action: and in so doing, they become something 
fixed and dead. Therefore, we cannot understand things 
without partially renouncing a feeling for life, and 
we cannot feel that life without renouncing the under­
standing of it (DHN:329). 
•
 
Shades of Simmel! We now discover that, according to Durkheim,
 
•
 
the deeper dimensions of the tragic paradox of the duality of
 
human nature come not merely from the need for higher human
 
levels to repress lower, non-human levels, but from the al­

most fatal double-bind that man finds himself in, especially
 
•
 
in terms of the mounting costs of this self-inflicted violence.
 
Inevitably, as we embark upon the journey from our own concrete
 
particularity to collective universality and rationality, the
 
necessarily increasing abstraction means that the feeling for
 
• 
the vital flow of life itself is lost. As with Simmel's view 
of the "tragedy of culture" and the "autonomization of forms" 
(in Wolff, 1950), sensational life is in continuous motion 
and process: but the abstract representations that are extern­
alized and lifted out of this continuous flow thereby become 
frozen, things "fixed and dead." The inner struggle between 
these two poles of being and becoming is couched here not so 
• 
much in terms of the Romantic notion of the inevitably and 
paradoxical duality between life (Spirit) and death (mechan­
ism), as in terms of the opposition between eros and logos. 
I repeat: the real source of Durkheim'~tr'agic vision of the 
•
 
human condition lies in an inescapable paradox: it is not sim­

•
 
ply~~~t collective and public side of man must do violence to
 
the organic eqo, but rather that in this necessary process
 
the original feeling for the flow and ebb of the life-process
 
itself is lost. Ultimately, both ego and person--or eros and
 
logos--stand clearly for eternally valuable and necessary, 
though eternally opposed, poles in the "double-bind" that is 
•
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human existence. 
To emphasize this feeling of the tragedy inherent in 
the human condition, Durkheim characteristically returned to 
one of its preeminent expressions in his own cultural tradi­
tions--namely, to Pascal's formula that man is both "angel 
and beast." Thus, Durkheim's original dualism takes on increas­
ingly diverse and profound overtones. To Durkheim, human real­
ity is fundamentally conflictual; man is caught, by his very 
constitution, in a tragic "double-bind." The duality in the 
inner life of man means that suffering is rooted in our very 
nature. 
This inner contradiction is one of the characteristics 
of our nature. According to Pascal's formula, man is 
both "angel and beast," and not exclusively one or 
the other. The result is that we are never completely 
in accord with ourselves for we cannot follow one of 
our natures without causing the other to suffer. Our 
joys can never be pure; there is always some pain mix­
ed with them; for we can never simultaneously satisfy 
the two beings that are within us (DHN:329). 
It is important to emphasize that, by this point, the key prob­
lem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was now rooted 
in the~ernal contradiction and inner division between the two 
halves of our nature, rather than in simply burdening one side 
--the organic--with the blame. The inability of man to attain 
inner peace and harmony is due to the fact that man is "double" 
and "divided against himself." Indeed, this image of reality as 
inherently conflictual--isn't this what is meant by a philoso­
phy of dualism? 
Granting that "we are double," that "we are the reali­
zation of an antinomy," that "man is divided against himself," 
that "man is a monster of contradictions" who "can never sat­
isfy himself," Durkheim then asked rhetorically: "But where 
do this duality and antinomy come from?" Now, Durkheim's drive 
to reformulate moral philosophy and action in purely positiv­
ist and sociologistical terms is clearly evident here when he 
insisted that, contrary to most contemporary sociologists (esp­
ecially those who consider themselves "positivists" and "pure 
social scientists"), it is the prime task of the science of 
man (or as Durkheim once called it anthroposociologie), to 
•
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• 
account for this wrenching dualism of human nature, the prime 
mover in human action. Durkheim first set aside both the oppo­
• 
sing monistic versions of the two dominant modern cultural 
traditions as eliminating the problem rather than meeting its 
complexities. Further, he dismissed the ontological argument, 
dating at least from Plato, which was the source of the notion 
• 
of homo duplex--namely, that two opposed worlds of being meet 
in man--spirit and matter, heaven and earth. To Durkheim, the 
old ontological metaphor recognized but did not explain the 
root origins of this opposition. Of course, it was just this 
type of metaphysical argument, embedded especially in the 
Catholic Cultural Tradition, which served as the source of 
much of the very moral philosophy which tacitly nourished 
•
 
Durkheim, and which also helped fuel the positivists' centur­

•
 
ies-long revolt. As he set aside the last major contender-­

the neo-Kantian position which simply assigned these two oppo­

sing activities to opposing human faculties--Durkheim made the
 
following crucial point. Contrary to all these contending po­

sitions, the "human spirit," far from being a generic given, 
must be considered a key sociocultural historical construc­
tion (see also the last chapter in this Book). 
• 
We have generally thought of man's mental nature as 
a sort of ultimate given which needs not to be accoun­
ted for. Thus we tend to believe that all has been 
said and done when we attach such and such a fact, 
whose causes we are seeking, to a human faculty. But 
why should the human spirit, which is--to put i brief­
• 
ly--only a system of phenomena, be outside and above 
explanation? We know that our organism is the product 
of a genesis; why should it be otherwise with our psy­
chic cons~itution (DHN:334)? 
We see enunciated here a critical substantive principle of 
• 
Durkheim's sociology (which we shall explore), one that would 
be developed later on by Marcel Mauss in his profound lecture 
"Une Categorie de l'esprit humain: la notion de personne, 
celIe de 'moi'" (translated by L. Krader, 1968). Sociocultural 
• 
analysis generally, and even philosophical discourse, would 
greatly improve if this critical principle were more widely 
understood. 
•
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After setting aside competing explanations, Durkheim 
moved to anchor the origins of ego and person in the univer­
sal opposition between the sacred and the profane. 
The duality of our nature is thus only a particular 
case of that division of all things into the sacred 
and the profane that is the foundation of all reli­
gions, and it must be explained on the basis of the 
same principles (DHN:335). 
Just as the profane can only be defined by contrast with the 
sacred, so too the organic ego is defined in 09Position to a 
category of the human spirit--the socioculturally constructed 
person. As religion is double, so also the two poles of moral 
and intellectual existence echo within each of us. 
It is not without reason, therefore, that man feels him­
self to be double: he actually is double. There are in 
him two classes of states of consciousness that differ 
from each other in origin and nature, and in the ends 
toward which they aim. One class merely expresses our 
organisms and the objects to which they are most direct­
ly related. Strictly individual, the states of conscious­
ness of this class connect us only with ourselves, and 
we can no more detach them from us than we can detach 
ourselves from our bodies. The states of consciousness 
of the other class, on the contrary, come to us from so­
ciety; they transfer society into us and connect us with 
something that surpasses us. Being collective, they are 
impersonal; they turn us toward ends that we hold in com­
mon with other men; it is through them and them alone 
that we can communicate with others. It is, therefore, 
quite true that we are made up of two parts, and are like 
two beings, which, although they are closely associated, 
are composed of very different elements and orient us in 
opposite directions ••.. In brief, this duality corresponds 
to the double existence that we lead concurrently: the 
one purely individual and rooted in our organisms, the 
other social and nothing but an extension of society. 
The origin of the antagonism that we have described is 
evident from the very nature of the elements involved in 
it. The conflicts .•. are between the sensations and the 
sensory appetites, on the one hand, and the intellectual 
and moral life, on the other; and it is evident that pas­
sions and egoistic tendencies derive from our individual 
constitutions, while our rational activity--whether theo­
retical or practical--is dependent on social causes (DHN: 
337-38). 
Finally, Durkheim returned to the theme of the suffering 
inherent in the duality of the human condition. Pain and pro­
• 
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longed inner anguish are the lot of mankind, split as we are 
between the forever conflicting claims of our physical and 
• 
moral selves. Durkheim's "social reality principle" insisted 
on an inevitable clash of social forces with the unencumbered 
ego. As with all split loyalties, the impossibility of simul­
taneously satisfying both halves of human nature is the cause 
of perpetual tension and man's endemic inner torment. 
• 
The painful character of the dualism of human nature 
is explained by this hypothesis. There is no doubt 
that if society were only the natural and spontaneous 
development of the individual, these two parts of our­
selves would harmonize and adjust to each other without 
clashing and without friction: the first part, since 
it is only the extension and, in a way, the complement j.
 of the second, would encounter no resistance from the
 latter. In fact, however, society has its own nature, and consequently, its requirements are quite different from those of our nature as individuals: the interests 
of the whole are not necessarily those of the part. 
Therefore, society cannot be formed or maintained with­
out our being required to make perpetual and costly sac­
rifice. Because society surpasses us, it obliges us to 
surpass ourselves~ and to surpass itself, a being must,
• 
to some degree, depart from its nature--a departure that 
does not take place without causing more or less painful 
tensions (DHN:338). 
Moreover, as society and culture grow increasingly complex ) 
and differentiated, and thus, the need for rationality and 
• universality in thought and action grows correspondingly, man's, 
"double-bind" deepens, and inner tensions increase. 
Human malaisecontinues to increase. The great religions 
of modern man are those which insist the most on the 
• 
existence of the contradictions in the midst of which 
we struggle. These continue to depict us as tormented 
and suffering, while only the crude cults of inferior 
societies breathe forth and inspire a joyful confidence. 
For what religions express is the experience through 
which humanity has lived, and it would be very surpri­
• 
sing if our nature became unified and harmonious when 
we feel that our discords are increasing (DHN:331-32). 
In many ways, Durkheim's tragic vision of life was close 
to Weber's, for both, in their most prophetic, pessimistic, and 
profound moments, saw that each of us must finally choose among
• the "inner demons holding the very fibers of our lives" which 
to devote our life-energies. The choice, never easy, always 
painful, must be made in full awareness both of the violence 
•
 
• 
--58-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
we do to the lesser, though more vital, half of our nature, 
and the growing historical necessity of such asceticism. Both 
Durkheim and Weber demanded that ego and eros give way to log­
os and the morally disciplined person if western civilization 
was to survive. 
We must do violence to certain of our strongest inclin­
ations. Therefore, since the role of the social being 
in our single selves will grow ever-more important as 
history moves ahead, it is wholly improbable that there 
will ever be an era in which man is require to resist 
himself to a lesser degree, an era in which we can live 
a life that is easier and less full of tension. To the 
contrary, all evidence compels us to expect our effort 
in the struggle between the two beings within us to in­
crease with the growth of civilization (DHN:339). 
A stark vision indeed--the inner anguish of the constitution­
al duality of human nature deepened by historical necessity. 
In the face of this "theodicy," it was precisely the stead­
fast refusal to endorse any of the myriad and competing 
"therapuetics" abroad in their own days which counseled 
"trascendence ll and diverse modes of "jumping out of your 
skin" which marks both Durkheim and Weber as moral realists, 
and ultimately as tragic figures. In one of those hidden i­
ronies of history, wherein the gods take revenge on those ti­
tans who challenge them, both Durkheim and Weber, from oppo­
sing sides of the first European catastrophe of the twentieth \ 
cer.tury, felt compelled, each in his own way, to issue calls 
for the values of logos--universality and rationality--and to 
stand steadfastly by their fates, and simply IImeet the demands 
of the day." Weber died within a year or so after the end of 
World War Ii Durkheim died in 1917, it has been said, of a 
broken heart. 
•
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CHAPTER THREE 
CONSCIENCE AND CONSCIOUSNESS
• 
• 
It is not at all true that between science on the one 
hand, and morals and religion on the other, there ex­
ists that sort of antinomy which has so frequently 
been admitted, for the two forms of human activity 
really come from one and same source (EF:494). 
The French word conscience is ambiguous, embracing 
the meanings of the two English words "conscience" 
and "consciousness." Thus, the "beliefs and senti­
ments" comprising the conscience collective are, on 
one hand, moral and religious, and, on the other,
• cognitive (Lukes, 1973:4). 
The intimate relations between rationales of conscience 
and the structures of consciousness constitute one of the 
most fundamental, and least recognized, of Durkheim's postu­
• lates. The very terms employed by Durkheim here reveal his deep­
est intentions, for the French word conscience, as with the 
Latin conscientia, conveys both the meanings of moral decision 
and intellectual understanding. This fruitful ambiguity is re­
• tained today in the two meanings of "right and wrong" in the 
cognitive and moral senses. Thus, although the terms conscience 
and consciousness are separated in English, in Durkheim's basic 
sociocultural theory the logics of moral decision and the lo­
• gics of intellectual understanding are always and everywhere 
intertwined. 
As we approach the significance of this fruitful ambi­
guity, we would do well to remember that Durkheim declared that
• society is itself a moral phenomena, or more precisely, socie­
ty is the only moral phenomenon. Correspondingly, morality 
is preeminently social. Moreover, these reciprocal relations ! 
• 
between morality and society are evolutionarily grounded. With 
these commitments in mind, we can begin to perceive the central­
ity in Durkheim's system of the crucial relation between social 
•
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forms and the forms of conscience and consciousness. Indeed,
 
the notions of conscience and consciousness as a closely in­

terrelated pair constitute key links in Durkheim's system be­

tween different historical societies and different phenomeno­

logies of the person, on the one hand, and Durkheim's corres­

ponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of mor­

ality, religion, and knowledge on the other. 
•
 
If we continue to translate away the fruitful ambiguity
 
of Durkheim's usage of that seminal French word conscience--I
 
mean its dual meanings of morality and cognition--we shall al­

•
 
so continue to forfeit the key to unlocking the seemingly par­

adoxical relations which Durkheim posited between his sociolo­

gy of religion, knowledge, and morality. Far too often we ap­

proach Primitive Classification or The Elementary Forms, for
 
•
 
example, in terms of a rather simple equation between social
 
structure and the basic forms of thought and religion. Whether
 
or not they agree, most observers seem to grasp Durkheim's no­

tion that the source of key collective representations embod­

•
 
ied in religious ritual and the categories of logical thought
 
are to be found originally in the social morphological struc­

ture of the human group. However, what perennially mystifies
 
is this: even granting their common origins, why should Durk­
•
 
heim so insistently intertwine his sociologies of religion, ~
 
morality, and knowledge? Once one begins, however, to perceive
 
the intimate interrelations between cognition and morality
 
suggested by the connotations of the French term employed by
 
Durkheim here, the paradox begins to evaporate. Alpert re­
minds us: "The Elementary Forms, it should not be forgotten, 
was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of Thought and 
of Religious Life" (1939:55). Wallwork has also noted that 
•
 
• " ... Durkheim associates epistemological and phenomenologi­

cal connotations with the collective conscience, which ena­

bles him to employ this concept in explaining moral obliga­

tion" (1972:37). In sum, in Durkheim's sociologistical sys­

tem, conscience--in terms of the moralities of thought--and
 
consciousness--in terms of the logics of action--often follow
 
•
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one from the other, while both, in turn, are linked with the 
underlying social morphological substratum of the human group.
• Indeed, Durkheim's central insight that the rationales 
of conscience and the structures of consciousness are always 
and everywhere intertwined constitutes, in my opinion, a high­
ly illuminating and significant tool for sociocultural analy- ~ 
sis. Even more, when seen in comparative and historical terms, 
Durkheim's rule suggests the following heuneneutical canon: 
in general, fundamental changes in the grounds of conscience 
often precede fundamental changes in the structures of con­
• sciousness. In short, tracing basic shifts in the grounds and 
structures of legitimate moral authority and intellectual de­ • 
cision move to the center stage of in-depth sociocultural in­
quiry.
• Strangely, none of those prominent sociologists who read 
Durkheim in the original French, and then published noteworthy 
accounts of his thought in English, were apparently able to 
successfully shake loose from the translators perennial diffi­
• culty. Neither Parsons (who chose to leave conscience untrans­
lated), nor Alpert, nor Foskett, nor Bellah, nor Nisbet, nor 
LaCapra, nor Poggi, nor Wallwork, nor Giddens, nor Lukes, cap­
italized on the crucial ambiguity of Durkheim's intertwined no­
• tions of conscience and consciousness to illuminate his system, 
and especially his closely interrelated sociologies of religion, 
morality, and knowledge. Even so perspicacious an observer as 
Steven Lukes, the foremost contemporary intellectual biographer
• of Durkheim, has apparently not yet perceived the crucial sig­
nificance of Durkheim's usage of this ambiguity. Lukes, as with 
many others, unfortunately treats this double meaning as simply 
yet another difficulty encountered in translation.
• There is the further difficulty of translation from French to English. Sometimes what is perfectly intel­
ligible in French cannot be directly translated into 
seemingly equivalent English words (such as conscience 
and "conscience") .... The French words mae out ~ dif­
• 
ferent conceptual structure from the Engll.sh; they make 
different discriminations, and carry different presup­
positions and connotations*(1973:3 . 
Perhaps because of the long-standing opposition between science 
•
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and religion, or the investment in the fact-value distinction, 
or perhaps because of the drive to establish sociology as an 
•
 
autonomous science, free from lingering ethical or philosophi­

cal entanglements, or for whatever reasons, none of these main­
line sociologists successfully brought our attention to the po­
• 
. tential significance of Durkheim's thesis of the intimate link­
ages between structures of conscience and consciousness. Rather, 
• 
from the point of view of their own special preoccupations, it 
has been a medieval historian turned sociologist, a famous 
psychologist of child development, and a cultural anthropolo­
gist, who, having turned to Durkheim for illumination, discover­
• 
ed there these crucial insights. Let us now briefly explore this 
curious turn of events. 
I first learned the significance of the intimately inter­
twined Durkheimian notions of conscience and consciousness from 
• 
a former medieval historian turned sociologist--name1y, Benjamin 
Nelson. Nelson has specialized in precisely these areas of un­
raveling the tangled relations between structures of conscience 
and consciousness, and, in turn, the significance of fundamental 
shifts in these structures as anchors of cultural complexs and 
civilizations, all seen incbmparative and historical perspective. 
Nelson, who was sensitized to the significance of these double 
connotations by his knowledge of their linkage in medieval cul­
ture, was led to Durkheim's insights through the medium of 
Jean Piaget. 
Following a maxim of Piaget based on Durkheim, I have 
• 
called the schemas the "moralities of thought" and the 
"logics of action." Since the Middle Ages, both of 
these structures have regularly rested upon a single 
hinge, namely, the notion of conscientia which had the 
combined sense in Latin and other languages of "con­
science" and "consciousness" (1972:105). 
•
 
In another, earlier work, Nelson also acknowledged:
 
I owe the phrase (the"moralities of thought and the lo­
gics of action") to Jean Piaget (1948) who derived it 
by extending a notion of Durkheim" "Logic is the moral­
ity of thought, morality is the logic of action" (1968: 
•
 
161) .
 
Indeed, Piaget's very turn of phrase here suggests the potency 
of Durkheim's insights, for normally we associate morality 
with action, and logic with thought. However, under Durkheim's 
• 
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influence, Piaget profoundly inverted these terms and spoke 
instead of the central "moralities of thought and logics of 
action" which lie at the very bases of society, culture, and 
personality. 
The anthropologist, Paul Bohannan, has rightly empha­
sized the theoretical potency of Durkheim's ambiguous language. 
From his anthropological perspective, Bohannan illuminates 
the several meanings of Durkheim' s key term con3cience in re­
lation to the notions of culture and generic sociocultural 
process. Of Durkheim, Bohannan remarks: 
..• Perhaps no social scientist ever used ambiguity 
with better effect .... It is plain that Durkheim meant 
at least three things by conscience, and it was this 
very triunity that allowed him to think with the con­
cept. The first ambiguity is inherent in the French 
language. English requires two words--"conscience" 
and "consciousness"--to translate conscience. That 
these two form a single concept in French means that, 
for all French sociologists, internalized sanctions 
are amalgamated •.. with awareness of the social mil­
ieu. This factor is not unique with Durkheim.••. Ra­
ther, attention must be paid to a more subtle ambi­
guity, one that cannot be untangled with reference 
to a dictionary. Conscience was used by Durkheim to 
mean the instrument of awareness, a meaning which is 
more or less equivalent to the English "consciousness." 
But the third and more important meaning of conscience 
is "that of which someone is (or many persons are) a­
ware" and the only suitable English term for this no­
tion is the anthropologists'term "culture." Thus, the 
French term conscience means three things: internali­
zed sanctions, awareness, and perceived culture (1960: 
78-79) . 
Bohannan then proceeds to make the crucial observation that 
Durkheim's simultaneously resonating conscience also implied 
both the noun and verb-like aspects of culture. This linkage 
between the notions of conscience and consciousness and cul­
tural process in terms of collective representations as both 
object and process is, I agree with Bohannan, a crucial per­
spective that must be recaptured by the human sciences. 
To read Durkheim's concepts of representation and 
conscience as interaction of a subject and an ob­
ject is to misunderstand them. Their vital charact­
eristic is a blending of subject and object into a 
single unit. In Durkheim's theory, something which 
•
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we view as an interaction between two processes is 
analyzed as a single process .... Durkheim focussed 
his attention on the verbal connection between them:
• 
the "knowing" or, as he called it, the process of 
representation .... This ambiguous assimilation of 
the knowing instrument and the known thing--of con­
sciousness and culture--into a single concept was 
vital to Durkheim's thought .... American and Eng­
lish interpretations of Durkheim ... have separa­
• 
ted the two substantive elements which Durkheim in­
tended to leave conjoined. In the separation, the 
processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared 
(l96 0: 79-80) . 
Bohannan's insights into the processual aspects of Durkheim's 
• 
theory of generic sociocultural process are critical to under­
standing how the latter related social morphological intensi­
ties to the emergence of collective representations as crystal­
lizations both of group self-awareness and normative discipline . 
• 
... the collective representation is both a thing 
perceived and a perceiving agent; one can say that 
it is a "perceiving." Seen in this way, the mass of 
collective representations--of "perceivings"--be­
comes the cOl.lective conscience (l960: 82) . 
•
 
Bohannan's argument that Durkheim's seemingly simple no­

tions of conscience and representation imply both verb and noun­
like dimensions is reinforced by Steven Lukes. Lukes notes two 
related ambiguities built into Durkheim's concept of represent­
ation collective which have great interpretive significance. 
In the first place, the concept representation refers 
both to the mode of thinking, conceiving, or perceiv­
ing, and to that which is thought, conceived, or per­
ceived. And second, the representation is collective 
both in its origin, determining its mode or form, and
• in its reference or object (it is also, of course, col­lective in being common to the members of a society or 
group). Thus, Durkheim wanted to say both that repre­
sentations collectives are socially generated and that 
they refer to, and are in some sense "about" society. 
(This duality is clearest in his sociology of religion
• and in his sociology of morality) (l973:6-7). 
Thus, Durkheim's fundamental sociocultural theory presents us 
with a series of fruitful ambiguities in relation to the semi­
nal terms--conscience, representation, and collective.Truly a 
• profound ambiguity, and a profound contribution to the building 
of the human sciences! 
•
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How difficult this process of recapturing the simul­
taneously intertwined meanings implied in Durkheim's usage of 
his paradigmatic terms can be gauged by the long odyssey of 
Durkheim's foremost American interpreter--Talcott Parsons. 
While Parsons wisely avoided the imputation of the "group mind" 
specter to Durkheim's term collective conscience (1949:309) by 
leaving it untranslated, nevertheless, he also tended to split 
the two meanings of conscience and assigned them to separate 
phases in Durkheim's intellectual development (eg. see 1949: 
309). After the great series of intellectual breakthroughs 
which Parsons imputes to Durkheim's development, conscience 
was said to take on a very different meaning. 
It involves a radical shift of emphasis from the ori­
ginal definition and context of use of the collective 
conscience. The latter concept originally referred to 
a body of beliefs and sentiments held in common; the 
collectiveness of it consisted in the "in commonness." 
Now the collectiveness consists in the nature of the 
reality exterior to the individual to which the indi­
vidual's "representations" refer. It is not a subject­
ive community of beliefs and sentiments which is the 
source of solidarity, but rational orientation to the 
same set of phenomena in the environment of action, an 
"objective" source of uniformities (1949:360). 
So intent was Parsons on forcing Durkheim into the mold 
of "Social System" thinking that it took over thirty years for 
him to begin to revise his notion of the split between the moral 
and cognitive meanings of Durkheim's seminal term conscience. 
In his 1973 article "Durkheim's Elementary Forms of the Reli­
gious Life Revisited," Parsons acknowledges, in contrast, to his 
earlier position, that the "cognitive and moral elements" im­
plied in Durkheim's usage of the term conscience belonged togeth­
er from the very beginning. "The essential thing is the inclu­
sion of both (cognitive and moral) references in the same form­
ula, not the shift in interest from the cognitive to the moral" 
(1973:164). Although still not directly perceiving the simple 
but fruitful ambiguity in the French meanings of conscience, 
which suggested Durkheim's fundamental insight that structures 
of conscience and consciousness are always and everywhere inti­
mately intertwined, Parsons acknowledged his earlier ambivalence 
•
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toward Durkheim's insistent linkage of his sociologies of 
religion, morality, and knowledge. 
I had not been fully aware of the extent to which the 
progression from the Cartesian conception of the fact­
icity of the milieu social to the idea of constraint 
by moral authority was not simply progress from a more 
to a less elementary theoretical perspective, but was 
the framework within which both conceptions carne to 
be combined in a unique manner. The realization that 
this is the case has, I think, been basically depen­
dent on the conception that much of Durkheim's thought 
was couched at the level of the general theory of act­
ion and not only of the social system (1973:163). 
It is revealing, however, that even as Parsons plods closer to 
this important insight, he still insists on placing it within 
his own very special framework. Parsons implies that this last 
great breakthrough in understanding Durkheim's doctrine could 
only have corne through his own convoluted theory of generic hu­
man action. But, as we have just discovered, several theorists 
before Parsons clearly recognized the great significance of 
Durkheim's multiple meanings of his crucial terms conscience, 
representation, and collective. Perhaps they made this import­
ant discovery because they simply attended to the multiple mean­
ings of the words in themselves, instead of allowing themselves 
to be sidetracked by Parsons' great (and greatly misleading) 
intellectual drama. 
Indeed, this episode serves as an object lesson in the 
history of science--namely, how the profundity of a great think­
ers' paradigms can be distorted by the powerfully wrought, and 
widely pervasive, intellectual drama of an influentially situa­
ted theorist (and intellectual broker) like Talcott Parsons. 
This irony is compounded here because the famous secondary inter­
preter entertained the best of intentions as a would-be rescuer 
of the original founding fathers' much-maligned theories. Fur­
ther, it demonstrates how even ardent followers of the pioneer 
could not perceive the full depths of the original doctrine, 
except through the colored-glasses of a prime secondary inter­
preter (see much of Lukes, 1973, for instance). Finally, it re­
veals how only a small hanif ul of relative "outsiders, II with 
little investment in the dominant perspective, boldly returned 
•
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• 
to the original source itself, and discovered there meanings 
which had long been slighted. 
• 
The ironies of history are such that it may not be 
possible, at this time (see McCloskey, 1976b) to fully judge 
the significance of the ways in which Parsons retarded or ad­
vanced the understanding of Durkheim's contributions to the 
human sciences. In any case, the preceding case-study reveals 
a typical sociocultural process--in any renaissance, new en­
ergies are generated and new paths blazed by those bold e­
•
 
nough to return to the full dimensions of the original sour­

ces themselves. And, in this case, Durkheim's intentions and 
potential significance are clearly indicated by the double 
meanings conveyed by the key terms conscience, representation, 
•
 
and collective.
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DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL: 
SUBSTRUCTURAL SOCIAL MORPHOLOGICAL PROCESSES AND SUPER­
STRUCTURAL COLLECTIVELY REPRESENTATIONAL PROCESSES 
Besides the social ways of being, there are the social 
ways of doing; besides the morphulogical phenomena, 
there are the functional or physiological phenomena 
(1960:362). 
Structure itself is encountered in becoming (1960:362). 
In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the ele­
mentary group which gave rise to ever-more compound 
groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the 
elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with 
one another, have formed the progressively more complex 
phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution 
(1960:374). 
One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying 
social phenomena .•. we take care not to leave them in 
the air, but always to relate them to a definite substra­
tum ••. a human group occupying a determinate portion of 
geographically representable space (1971:809). 
The progress of the division of labor is in direct ratio 
to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL:257). 
If we specialize, it is not to produce more, but it is 
to enable us to live in new conditions of existence that 
have been made for us (DL:275). 
With animals, the organism assmilates social facts to 
it, and, stripping them of their special nature, trans­
forms them into biological facts. Social life is mater­
ialized. In man, on the contrary, and particularly in 
higher societies, social causes substitute themselves 
for organic causes. The organism is spiritualized 
(DL:346-7). 
Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from 
being antagonistic to social action, it results from it . 
••. it is a conquest of society over nature. [Liberty] 
can realize itself progressively insofar as man raises 
himself above things and makes law for them, thus depri­
ving them of their fortuitous, absurd, amoral character; 
that is, insofar as he becomes a social being. For man 
can escape nature only by creating another world where 
he dominates nature. That world is society (DL:386-7). 
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Society is also of nature and yet dominates it. Not only 
do all the forces of the universe converge in society, 
but they also form a new synthesis which surpasses in 
richness, complexity, and power of action all that went 
into it. In a word, society is nature arrived at a higher 
point in its development, concentrating all its energies 
to surpass, as it were, itself (SP:97). 
Society ... is above all a composition of ideas, beliefs, 
and sentiments of all sorts which realize themselves 
through individuals .... Society is the field of an in-· 
tense intellectual and moral life with a wide range of in­
fluence. From the actions and reactions between its in­
dividuals arises an entirely new mental life which lifts 
our minds into a world of which we could not have the 
faintest idea had we lived in isolation (SP:59). 
If left to themselves, individual consciousnesses are 
closed to each other; they can communicate only by means 
of signs which express their internal states (EF:262). 
Collective representations •.. presuppose that minds act 
and react upon one another ...• They are the product of 
these actions and reactions (EF:263). 
Human sentiments are intensified when affirmed collec­
tively (EF:440). 
A society can neither create itself nor recreate itself 
without at the same time creating an ideal (EF:470). 
The principal social phenomena, religion, morality, law, 
economics and aesthetics, are nothing more than systems 
of values and hence of ideals. Sociology moves from the 
beginning in the field of the ideal (SP:96). 
For a society to become conscious of itself, and maintain 
at the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which 
it thus attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself 
(EF: 4 70) . 
••. collective representations .•. presuppose that minds 
act and react upon one another; they are the products of 
these actions and reactions which are themselves possible 
only through material intermediaries. These latter do not 
confine themselves to revealing the mental state with 
which they are associated; they aid in creating it 
(EF: 263) . 
•.. without symbols, social sentiments could have only a 
precarious existence ...• Social life, in all its aspects 
and in every period of its history, is made possible only 
through a vast symbolism (EF:263-4). 
The rite serves ••. to revivify the most essential ele­
ments of the collective consciousness. Through it, the 
group periodically renews the sentiments which it has of 
itself and of its unity (EF:420). 
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The ideas and sentiments that are elaborated by a collec­
tivity ••• are invested, by reason of their origin, with 
an ascendancy, and an authority that cause the particular 
individuals who think and believe in them to represent 
them in the form of moral forces that dominate and sus­
tain them (DHN:335). 
The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that 
they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole 
universe, known and unknown, into two classes which em­
brace all that exists, but which radically exclude each 
other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions 
protect and isolate; profane things, those to which these 
interdictions are applied and which must remain at a dis­
tance from the first. Religious beliefs are the represen­
tations which express the nature of sacred things and the 
relations which they sustain, either with each other or 
with profane things. Finally, rites are the rules of con­
duct which prescribe how a man should comport himself in 
the presence of these sacred objects. When a certain num­
ber of sacred things sustain relations of coordination or 
subordination with each other in such a way as to form a 
system having a certain unity .•• the totality of these 
beliefs and their corresponding rites constitutes a reli­
gion (EF:56). 
All known religions have been systems of ideas which tend 
to embrace the universality of things, and to give us a 
complete representation of the world (EF:165) • 
••• the men of the clan and the things which are classi­
fied in it form by their union a solid system, all of 
whose parts are united and vibrate sympatheitcally (EF:17~. 
Religions are the primitive way in which societies become 
conscious of themselves and their history. They are in the 
social order what sensation is in the individual 
(PECM:160). 
In the present day just as much as in the past, we see so­
ciety creating sacred things out of ordinary ones ~F:244). 
There is something eternal in religion which is destined 
to survive all the particular symbols in which religious 
thought has successively enveloped itself. There can be 
no society which does not feel the need of upholding and 
reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments 
and the collective ideas which makes its unity and its 
personality (EF:274-5). 
Collective thought transforms everything it touches. It 
fuses natural orders and combines contraries; it reverses 
.•. the natural hierarchy of being, it eliminates differ­
ences and differentiates between what is similar. In a 
word, it substitutes for the world revealed to us by the 
senses, a quite different world which is nothing other 
than the projection of the ideal it constructs (SP:94). 
•
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Preface. Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as a hy- \ 
postatizing or Platonizing "social realist," the central rule '1 
of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analysis of social 
facts in a social substratum. Indeed, Durkheim's dualistic pas­
sion extended to his causal model, for he always linked super­
• structural collectively representational (symbolic) processes 
with substructural social morphological processes. The prime 
link between the "material" lower-story and the "ideal" upper­
storyi"Ei'moral" or "dynamic density." When a "critical mass" was 
• reached, there occurred a social implosion, cultural energies 
were generated and released, and egos became moralized and 
transformed into persons. Conscience and consciousness are a­
wakened, and society, culture, and persons are born. Collect­
• ive representations symbolize group self-awareness. Such the­
ses form the core of Durkheim's central causal model. Now, 
while Durkheim's explanatory framework was processual through 
and through, since much of this section shall necessarily focus 
• on The Elementary Forms, we shall here be concerned mainly 
with micro-interactional processes, leaving Durkheim's very im­
portant macro-evolutionary concerns for succeeding chapters. 
Now, it has not been sufficiently emphasized that Durk­
• heim's key explanatory model combined, in a rather unique way, 
the two central divisions of sociology--I mean "social morpho­
logy" and "social physiology." Consciously utilizing organic 
metaphors, Durkheim described these two basic divisions in 
• the following terms: 
Besides the social ways of being, there are the social 
ways of doing; besides the morphological phenomena, 
there are the functional or physiological phenomena 
•
 
(1960:362) •
 
The composition of society consists in certain combin­

ations of people and things which by necessity are con­

•
 
nected in space. The explanatory analysis of this sub­

stratum, however, should not be confused with that of
 
the social life which builds on it. The way in which
 
society emerges fully formed is one thing; the manner
 
in which it acts is another. These are realities of
 
two kinds, so different that they cannot be treated 
by the same procedures but require separate investiga­
tions. Consequently, the study of the first forms a 
•
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special, though fundamental, branch of sociology. 
We have here a distinction that is analogous to that 
which can be observed in all the sciences of nature. 
Chemistry, the study of the manner in which bodies 
are formed, stands besides physics, the study of the 
phenomena that are enacted by various bodies. Next to 
physiology, which seeks the laws of life, stands ana­
tomy or morphology, which investigates the structure 
of living things, the manner of their formation, and 
the conditions controlling it (1960:360). 
In regard to each basic division of the sociological field, 
Durkheim attempted to specify rules for understanding both 
the peculiar constitution of each sphere of social life, and 
the relations of one to the other. 
In respect to morphology, sociology must seek the ele­
mentary group which gave rise to ever-more compound 
groupings; in respect to physiology, it must trace the 
elementary functional phenomena which, in combining with 
one another, have formed the progressively more complex 
phenomena that have developed in the course of evolution 
(1960:374). 
Against Comte's (and perhaps Saint-Simon's) somewhat 
similar designation of the main branches of sociological in­
quiry into "social statics" and "dynamics," Durkheim counter­
posed his own processual approach to the morphological and 
physiological aspects of society. 
This branch of sociology [social morphology] is ... not 
purely a science of statics. Consequently, we do not 
think it proper to use this word: "static" poorly des­
cribes the view of society which is considered here. 
It is not a question of looking at society arrested at 
a given moment by abstraction (as has sometimes been 
said), but of analyzing its formation and accounting 
for it. Undoubtedly, the phenomena that have to do with 
structure have something more stable about them than 
have functional phenomena, but there are only differ­
ences of degree between these two orders of fact. 
Structure itself is encountered in becoming, and one 
cannot illustrate-rt except by pursuing this process 
of becoming. It forms and dissolves continually; it is 
life arrived at a certain ~asure of consolidation; to 
disconnect it from the lif~A~ch it derives or from 
that which it determines is equivalent to dissociating 
things that are inseparable* (1960:362). 
Since I shall later emphasize the importance of Durkheim's pro­
cessual view of social morphology, I now merely note that, just 
--------------------------_.­
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as Bohannan noted the processual aspect of Durkheim's key 
terms conscience and representation, so too I must empha­
size that it is misleading to attempt (eg. Bellah, 1973: xiv­
xv) to summarize Durkheim's two analytical modes in terms of 
so-called "structural" and "functional" approaches, since we 
have Durkheim's own word that even "structure is itself encoun­
tered in becoming." Of course, Durkheim's well-known designa­
tion for all the sub-fields of social physiology--including 
religious, juridical, economic, linguistic, and esthetic so­
ciology (eg. see Alpert, 1939:5l}--was based on the noti.on 
of "collective representations" as cultural symbolic forms. 
Now, this same explanatory model--the anchoring of social 
physiological or sociocultural symbolic processes in their 
underlying social morphological substratum--marks all of Durk­
heim's work and that of his school. Yet, for some reason, his 
essential logic here remains relatively obscure to the present 
day. Some prestigious interpreters (eg. Parsons, 1949; Nisbet, 
1965) have, by splitting Durkheim's model in two and assign­
ing social morphology to Durkheim's early "positivistic" 
phase and his concern with "collective representations" to his 
later "idealLstic" phase, proposed thereby a radical discon­
tinuity in Durkheim's life-work. Contrary to these and other 
fateful misconceptions of Durkheim's central causal model, 
propose that, as a general rule, Durkheim always and everywhere 
approached social morphological processes as the causal "ma- \ 
terial" substructure, and "collective representations" as the r 
social physiological or sociocultural process in the reflected 
or projected "ideal" superstructure. Almost alone among con­
temporary secondary observers, Lukes (1973) and Giddens have 
begun to recognize the importance of this dualistic explana­
tory framework. It must be noted,however, that Durkheim's cen­
tral focus was always on the second factor, especially moral 
and juridical and religious "collective representations" (see 
also Book Three). Let us now turn to explore in greater detail 
Durkheim's central causal model as it informs his first and 
last great works. 
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A. Social Morphological Processes 
• 
The first great subdivision of Durkheim's sociological 
system was "social morphology." "We propose to call the sci­
ence that has for its object the study of the material forms 
of society 'social morphology'" (1960:362). The fundamental )
rule of the Durkheim school was to always anchor analyses of
• social facts in their gene~ting material substratum. For in­
stance, late in his career, Durkheim, with the assistance of 
Mauss, summed up their basic interpretive rule this way: 
• 
One of the rules we have followed is that, in studying 
social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we 
take care not to leave them in the air but always to re­
late them to a definite substratum, that is to say, a 
human group occupying a determinate portion of geograph­
ically representable space (1971:809). 
In applying his positivistic version of the scientific method 
to society, Durkheim always sought to anchor his analyses of 
the type of social facts which instinctively drew his atten­
tion--moral phenomena--in an empirically verifiable material 
• "social body." Durkheim's positivistic search for empirically 
determinable entities led him, in direct contrast to those who 
insisted that Durkheim hypostatized social facts, to embrace 
social morphological forms and processes as a key constitutive 
• ground of society and history. 
• 
• 
Social life has various manifestations ... all of them, 
however, have this in common: they emanate from a group, 
simple or complex; the group is their substratum.... It 
is the object most immediately accessible to the socio­
logist because it takes on material forms that we can 
perceive with the senses (1960:360). 
Those who do not perceive the seemingly paradoxical connec­
tions between positivist science and French moral philosophy, 
will probably not understand why Durkheim, although centrally 
•
 
concerned with the facts of the moral life, should have, none­

theless, taken great care to ground his analyses of these mor­

al facts in existentially--empirically verifiable--"material
 
social bodies."
 
As Durkheim launched ~'Annee sociologique,he took some 
care to articulate these various subdivisions of sociological 
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inquiry. For instance, I have quoted above from an important 
programmatic statement "Sociology and Its Scientific Field" 
first published in 1900 in Italian, and only recently trans­
lated by Kurt Wolff (1960). And in 1898 in ~'Annee sociologi­
que, Durkheim wrote a "Note sur la morphologie sociale." There 
he argued th~the content of the new synthetic sociological 
base-line science of social morphology was to be drawn, in 
part, from a series of existing and overlapping disciplines. 
Unfortunately, these special sciences pursue their own iso­
~ed tasks today just as they did in Durkheim's day. 
The works that treat of these questions actually come 
from different disciplines. Geography studies the ter­
ritorial forms of states, history traces the evolution 
of rural or urban groups, demography reviews all that 
concerni~g the distribution of population, etc. There 
is, we believe, an interest in pulling these fragmen­
tary sciences from their isolation, and putting them 
in contact and reuniting them under the same title; 
they would thus take on the sentiments of their unity 1 
(1898:520-21) . 
And, of course, one of the prime intentions of the Annee cir­
cle was precisely to "pull fragmentary sciences from their iso­
lation," "to give them a greater sentiment of their unity." 
To this day, ~'Annee sociologique stands out as one of the 
landmarks in the unity of the social sciences. But in attemp­
ting to generate this new field of social morphology, Durkheim, 
as always is true, had to contend against existing disciplin­
ary boundaries . 
..• because different disciplines exist in separation 
from each other, and almost without being aware of each 
other, the way in which they have divided up the social 
world is not always consistent with the nature of things. 
Thus, for example, geography and demography (or the sci­
ence of population) until recently remained separate from 
one another, and are only beginning to become interrela­
ted. However, both study the same subject matter, in or­
der to understand the material substratum of society; 
for what is it which forms the main substance of society, 
if it is not social space plus the population which oc­
cupies this space? (in Giddens, 1972a:83). 
Against geography's "tribal mentality," for instance, Durkheim 
argued that the new inclusive science of social morphology 
should: 
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study not the forms of the earth, but the forms 
which affect societies and establish them on the earth; 
that is very different. Without doubt, the courses of 
water, mountains, and so forth, enter as elements into 
the constitution of the social substrata; but they are 
neither the only ones nor the most essential (1898:521) . 
In contrast to geography, which assumes that the physical and 
topographical shapes of the earth's surface constitute the ba­
sic "template" to which societies rather passively adapt, Durk­
heim's view of social morphology looked to the ways in which 
societies shape their own habitats. In short, the roles were 
reversed in the two disciplines, for man and society were now 
considered to be active, independent forces in not only shaping 
their own habitats but in changing the face of the earth it­
self. Elsewhere, Durkheim argued: 
... as nations increasingly involve the land in their 
life and transform it for their own use, it becomes, 
to the same degree, increasingly difficult to separate 
them from it. The only thing is, that if in this case 
there is indeed still a relation of dependence, it is 
almost the converse of that which is found originally. 
If now society is linked to the land, this is not be­
cause it has come under its influence, but, on the con­
trary, because it has incorporated it within itself. 
Far from it being the case that society models itself 
upon the land, it is the land which bears the imprint 
of society. Thus it is not the land which explaTnsman, 
it is man which explains the land; and if it remains 
important for sociology to be aware of the geographi­
cal factorm this is not because it sheds new light on 
sociology, but because the former can only be under­
stood in terms of the latter *(in Giddens, 1972a:88). 
Specifically, Durkheim's new sociological science of 
social morphology, rooted in this key perception of society's 
active impact on the constitution of the earth's surface and 
the way it is variously used, would consider the external forms 
and internal contents of society in its spatial aspects, in­
cluding the structures of the "built environment," and the 
movements and interactions of inhabitants of various regions. 
In short, Durkheim assigned a special program to this new 
sub-discipline: 
The social substratum must, above all, be determined in 
its external form. This external form is chiefly defin­
ed by: (1) the size of the territory; (2) the space 
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which the society occupies, that is, its peripheral 
or central position in regard to other "continents"
• and the way it is enclosed by other societies, and so on; (3) the form of its frontiers .... In addition 
to the external form, there is the content, which is, 
first of all, the total mass of the population in its 
numerical size and density. Furthermore, there are wi­
thin society secondary groupings which have a mater­
• ial basis, such as villages, cities, districts, and provinces of varying importance. In respect to each 
of them, there arise various questions which need to 
be studied in respect to the given collectivity: ex­
tension of habitations, size of cities, and villages, 
water courses, external enclosures, size and density
• of populations, and so on. Finally, every group, as a whole or in part, makes use, 
according to its needs, of the soil or that part of it 
that it occupies. Nations surround themselves with fort­
resses or fortified cities, and roads for communication 
are constructed. The disposition of streets and squares,
• the architecture of the houses, and the structure of things made vary from village to town and from the large 
city to the small one, and so on. Man modifies the so­
cial substratum in a thousand ways, and the resultant 
differences have great sociological significance because 
of both the causes on which they depend, and the effects
• that they produce (1960:3fO-6l). 
But as happened with so much else of Durkheim's system 
of sociology, even though he proposed the nascent sub-disci­
pline of social morphology as an essential foundation for 
• sociology, and even assigned it a special program subsequent­
ly developed by such an eminent member of his school as Maur­
ice Halbwachs, nonetheless, social morphology is almost for­
gotten today (however, see the exemplary article by L. Schnore 
• 1958). This crucial aspect of Durkheim's sociology has been 
either consistently ignored, so that several critics persist 
in branding him as a Platonic theorizer leaving his hyposta­
tized "collective conscience" dangling in sociological space
• (see Book Three), or else leading theorists (eg. Parsons, 194~ 
Merton, 1934a) mistakenly treat social morphology as a largely 
"biological factor" which Durkheim later overcame. Again, this 
sad story represents a salutary lesson in the history of any
• science precariously based on highly selective exegesis. 
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B.	 Durkheim'~ Key Link Between Social Morphology and Social 
Physiology: "Moral Density," Intensity, and Social Energy 
The key link between substructural social morphologi­
cal processes and superstructural "social physiological" (sym­
bolic) processes was Durkheim's notion of "moral or dynamic 
densi ty." The very fact that Durkheim would consider "moral" 
and "dynamic" as almost synonymous reveals a central clue to 
his linkages of social morphological processes with social 
physiological or representational processes. Once again, Durk­
heim's dynamic or processual focus moves to center stage 
(structure itself is encountered in becoming"). For Durkheim 
was not merely concerned with the size of the society's ter­
ritory, the number of its inhabitants, the forms of its fron­
tiers, the dominant internal "built" forms, and so forth, but 
more importantly, how the degree of population concentration 
leads to increased rates of social interaction ("dynamic or 
moral density"), social intensity, and new rates of social 
energy, and thus, finally, social change. 
It is clear that social phenomena vary not only with 
the nature of the component elements of society but 
also with their mode of composition; they will espe­
cially be very different according to whethp.r e~ch of 
the subgroups keeps its local life or is drawn into 
the general life--in other words, according to their 
degree of concentration (R:85). 
Now, besides Schnore (1958), and to a certain extent Lukes 
and Giddens, Gianfranco Poggi (1972) stands almost alone among 
contemporary social scientists in understanding the importance 
in Durkheim's system of the intimate inner links between so­
cial morpholog~ social institutions, collective representa­
tions, and types of personality structure. To better grasp 
these inner links, especially between population concentration 
and social energy, we should follow Poggi's observation that 
the key to physical density, and thus, increased "moral" or 
~ynamic" social intensities, is the population/territory ra­
tio (1972:187). The degree of population concentration is only 
partially a matter of physical density (itself a resultant of 
the population/territory ratio), and is also partially due to 
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the existence of key infrastructural transportation and com­
munications networks binding groups together through time and 
space. Again, the key to the linkage in Durkheimian sociology 
between social morphological processes and collectively repre­
sentational processes is not simply the volume of people, but 
rather the rates of sustained social interaction, as Alpert 
saw many years ago (1939: 90). Population density is important 
here only insofar as it leads to increased "moral or dynamic 
density," or in other words, increased social intensity and 
social energy. By "dynamic density," Durkheim argued, 
(it) must not be understood the purely physical 
concentration of the aggregate, which can have no ef­
fect if ... groups of individuals remain separated by 
a social distance. By it is understood the social con­
centration, of which the size is only the auxilliary 
and, generally speaking, the consequence. The dynamic 
density may be defined, the volume being equal, as the 
function of the number of individuals who are having 
not only commercial but also social relations, i.e. 
who not only exchange services or compete with one 
another, but also live a common life (R:113-l4). 
Thus, in Durkheim's system, "moral or dynamic density" 
leads to increased social intensities and energies, and the 
emergence of a common sociocultural life among previously se­
parated individuals or groups. This proposed causal sequence 
constitutes one key anchor to almost all the rest of Durkheim's 
work. Indeed, this notion of greater "moral" densities lead­
ing to greater socic:l,l intensities forms the key link between 
the material social morphological substratum and the emergence 
of the crystallized symbolic forms which come to represent 
this collective effervescence. Long term social morphological 
changes leading to greater population densities and social in­
tensities also constitute a key causal sequence linking the 
progressive division of labor, societal evolution, historical 
change, and the emergence of the notion of the person through­
out history, and so on and so forth. In sum, this generic mi­
cro sociocultural process of increasing social intensities 
leads, on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad, con­
stitutive, historical processes of the evolution of societies, 
persons, and moralities, which formed a central preoccupation 
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in Durkheim's sociological system. Finally, it is very import­
ant to recognize that these intimate linkages between micro 
and macro-societal processes represent a relatively constant 
series of sequential equations running throughout all of Durk­
heim's life-work, from The Division of Labor to The Elementary 
Forms. Let us now briefly explore some of the more important 
sequential linkages underlying these basic process in all of 
Durkheim's major works. 
In The Rules, for instance, Durkheim suggested that 
heightened degrees of sustained social interaction are neces­
sary to the breakdown of segmental societies, and thus, are 
a prior condition of the progressive division of labor. 
Social life can be affected only by the number of those 
who participate effectively in it. That is why the dy­
namic density of a people is best expressed by the de­
gree of fusion of the social segments. For, if each par­
tial aggregate forms a whole, i.e. a distinct indivi­
duality separated by barriers from the others, the act­
ion of the members, in general, remains localized within 
it. If, on the contrary, these partial societies •.. 
tend to be all intermingled within the total society, 
to that extent is the radius of social life extended 
(R:114) . 
Further, Durkheim proposed that, with the continuous extension 
of the "radius of social life," the division of labor proceeds 
apace with the progressive effacement of "segmental" types of 
societies . 
•.. all growth in the volume and dynamic density of 
societies modifies profoundly the fundamental condi­
tions of collective existence by rendering social life 
more intense, by extending the horizon and thought of 
each individual (R:115) . 
•.• the progress of the division of labor is in direct 
ratio to the moral or dynamic density of society (DL: 
257) • 
While space does not allow us here to review all the 
details of his argument, it is important to note that Durk­
heim's thought moved simultaneously on two different levels-­
the intra-societal and the inter-societal levels. In terms 
of external relations between formerly distinct societies, 
Durkheim saw the breakdown of this isolation occuring through 
the extension of the "radius of social Ii fe," and thus the 
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entering into of sustained and ever-more diverse social rela­
tionships to be a necessary prerequisite for the progressive 
emergence of new types of societal complexity. 
The growth of the division of labor is thus brought 
about by the social segments losing their individual­
ity, the divisions becoming more permeable. In short, 
a coalescence takes place which makes the combinations 
possible in the social substance (DL:256). 
The "progressive effacement of the segmental type of society" 
and thus, the evolution of ever-more complex social morpholo­
gical structures on the inter-societal level, depends, in turn, 
on corresponding shifts on the level of the intra-societal 
division of labor. There is an additional variable intervening 
between increasing moral density as the primary causal factor 
and the resulting division of labor. This crucial intervening 
variable underlying the progressive division of labor is com­
petition. 
If work becomes divided more as societies become more 
voluminous and denser, it is not because external cir­
cumstances are more varied, but because the struggle 
for existence is more acute (DL:266). 
Following Darwin and other naturalists, Durkheim observed 
that the competition between members of the same species, or 
by analogy, between members of the same society, is more in­
tense than inter-specific or inter-societal competition be­
cause the more similar the members, the more intense the com­
petition for similar resources. The result of ever-more intense 
intra-societal competition is increasing specialization and 
diversification. 
••. in proportion to the segmental character of the 
social constitution, each segment has its own organs, 
protected and keptapart from like organs by divisions 
separating the different segments. But as these divi­
sions are swept away, inevitably like organs are put 
into contact, battling and trying to supplant one ano­
ther. But, no matter how this substitution is made, 
it cannot fail to produce advances in the course of 
specialization (DL: 269) • 
Against the classical economists who deduced the cause of the 
division of labor from the innate tendency of human nature to 
produce more in order to become happier, Durkheim insisted that 
• 
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increasing competition is the key cause behind the progres­
sive specialization. "If we specialize, it is not to produce
• more, but it is to enable us to live in new conditions of ex­
istence that have been made for us" (DL:275). 
•
 
Thus, Durkheim attempted to specify a whole series of
 
sequential equations intervening between moral density and
 
the progressive division of labor. This series of generic so­

ciocultural sequences ran something like this: greater popula­

tion density within a given geographic area (the population/
 
territory ratio), held together by increasingly comprehensive

• and efficient infrastructural transportation and communica­

tions networks, leads to greater degrees of "dynamic density"
 
or sustained increases in "quantity, intensity, and diversity
 
of social relationships." This increased moral density or so­

• cial intensity leads, in turn, to greater competition- for re­

•
 
sources between members of the same society, while this in­

creased int!asocietal competition leads to greater specializa­

tion and occupational differentiation. These typical socioeco­

nomic responses to long term changes in supply and demand lead
 
almost inevitably, as generally agreed, to greater efficiency 
which leads to greater total productivity, which thus accel­
• 
erates the progressive division of labor by increasing the 
potential for population growth, and the extension of key 
technologies such as the transportation and communications 
systems. This progressive extension of "the radius of social 
life" inevitably leads, in turn, to greater social energies 
• 
• and socioeconomic and cultural change, which leads onward ~.. 
and upward, on the general evolutionary level, in a progres- ~ 
sive self-stimulating feedback cycl~. Certainly, Durkheim 
posited a most complex process which his readers ignore at 
their own peril! 
• 
When discussing subsequent phenonena which he anchored 
in the progressive division of labor, it is important, there­
fore, to remember that this factor is really only a secondary 
one, derived from the primary source of social energy--moral 
or dynamic density--and the resulting social intensity • 
•
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If society, in concentrating, determines the develop­

ment of the division of labor, the latter, in its turn,
 
increases the concentration of society .••. The division
 
of labor remains the derived fact, and, consequently,
 
the advances which it has made are due to parallel ad­
vances of social density .••. That is all we wish to 
prove (DL: 260) • 
The division of labor varies in direct ratio with the 
• 
volume and density of societies, and, if it progresses 
in a continuous manner in the course of social develop­
• 
ment, it is because societies become regularly more dense 
and generally more voluminous (DL:262). 
This fundamental social morphological theme of greater densi­
ties and social or moral intensities underlies all the secon­
• 
dary historical processes concerning the evolution of society, 
religion, law, science, morality, the person, and so on. It 
runs as a constant refrain and explanatory model throughout 
all of Durkheim's works. Indeed, it became the very paradigm 
• 
of Illrkheim's sociology; one of its most succinct expressions 
was the Annee essay by Marcel Mauss and Henri Beuchat in 1906 
on seasonal variations in the life of the Eskimos, which was 
specifically subtitled "Etude de morphologie sociale." 
• 
While it is clearly misleading to proclaim a radical 
discontinuity in Durkheim's career by dividing into positivis­
tic and idealistic phases as Parsons (1949) did, it is true, 
nonetheless, that Durkheim did increasingly turn his attention 
• 
toward establishing the linkages between social morphological 
processes and the emergence and elaboration of collective re­
presentations. Even Parsons himself, as Pope (1975a) empha­
sized, now acknowledges that he " .•. may have overdone the 
• 
periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual development" (1975a: 
106), and now agrees instead with Bellah (1973) that there 
is "an impressive" continuity in Durkheim's work. (See esp­
ecially Giddens, 1970, for convincing refutation of Parsons 
early thesis of the split between the young and old Durkheim). 
However, Parsons clearly saw (along with Alpert, 1939, and 
Foskett, 1939), that Durkheim shifted the main focus of his 
• 
'attention as his career progressed; this remains the valid 
anchor of Parsons' "stage" thesis. Even though he was mistaken 
• 
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about the content and dating of Durkheim's developing stages, 
there is now emerging general agreement that Durkheim's thought 
increasingly focussed on superstructual symbolic processes, 
and the autonomization of collective representations (eg. see 
Giddens, 1971a, 1972a; Lukes, 1973:10, 233-6; Jack Douglas, 
1967:45; Wallwork, 1972:48, 113; Parsons, 1975a:l06;Pope,1973: 
410, 1975a:112, 114). 
It is especially important to note Durkheim's continuing 
concern with elaborating key links between these material and 
symbolic processes, not only because of the misleading "ideal­
ization" of the "later Durkheim," but also because there is 
simply no other way of fathoming Durkheim's identification of 
the moral and the logical with the social. In The Elementary 
Forms, for example, Durkheim anchored his theory of the social 
origins, character, and meaning of religion in the alternating 
slack and intense periods of social interaction among the Aus­
tralian natives. 
The life of the Australian societies passes alternately 
through two distinct phases. Sometimes the population 
is broken up into little groups who wander about inde­
pendently of one another, in their various occupations; 
each family lives by itself, hunting and fishing ... 
trying to procure its indispensable food by all the 
means in its power. Sometimes, on the contrary, the pop­
ulation concentrates and gathers at determined points 
for a length of time varying from several days to sev­
eral months. This concentration takes place when a clan 
or a part of the tribe is summoned to the gathering, 
and on this occasion they celebrate a religious cere­
mony .... These two phases are contrasted with each other 
in the sharpest way. In the first, economic activity is 
the preponderating one, and it is generally of a medio­
cre intensity. Gathering the grains of herbs that are 
necessary for food, or hunting and fishing are not occu­
pat~ons to awaken very lively passions. The dispersed 
conation in which the society finds itself results in 
making its life uniform, languishing, and dull. But when 
a corrobbori a religious celebration takes place, every­
thing changes (EF:245-6). 
Clearly, to Durkheim, the "very fact of concentration" 
itself 'acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant." Social 
life, in its elementary forms, is portrayed here as constant­
ly alternating between isolated, dispersed, "profane," sub­
sistence activities, on the one hand, and concentrated, col­
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lective, intense, effervescent "sacred" activities. 
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When they are at once come together, a sort of elect­
ricity is formed ex their collecting wh~qurckly 
transports them to an extraordinary degree of exalta­
tion. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without 
resistance in all the minds, which are very open to 
outside impressions; each re-echoes the others, and 
is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus 
proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows 
in its advance*(EF:247). 
So it is in the midst of these effervescent social en­
vironments and of this effervescence itself, that the 
religious ideas seems to be born (EF:250). 
And again: 
For a society to become conscious of itself and main­
tain at the necessary degree of intensity the senti­
ments which it thus attains, it must assemble and con­
centrate itself (EF:470). 
Indeed, it was these very linkages between the empirically 
observable material social morphological substratum and col­
lectively symbolic ideal representations, that underlies 
Durkheim's bold and brilliant attempt to build a positivist 
scoiology of morality, religion, and knowledge over against 
the most persistent nemesis of his cultural tradition--name­
ly, the metaphysical and clerical claims of the Catholic 
Metaphysical-Hierocratic Cultural Tradition. 
The formation of the ideal world is therefore not an 
irreducible fact which escapes science, it depends 
upon conditions which observation can touch; it is 
a natural product of social life. For a society to 
become conscious of itself and maintain at the neces­
sary degree of intensity the sentiments which itfuus 
attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself. Now, 
this concentration brings about an exaltation of the 
mental life which takes form in a group of ideal con­
ceptions where is portrayed the new life thus awakened . 
... A society can neither create itself nor recreate 
itself without at the same time creating an ideal (EF: 
470) . 
In short, in Durkheim's developing view, collective efferves­
cence of "social electricity" resulting from imploding "moral 
densities" and increased social intensities generates those 
religious, moral, and logical collective representations as 
externalized symbols of the inward social bond by which society 
first attains self-consciousness of its existence as a group. 
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C.	 "Social Physiology" and "Collective Representations": 
Durkheim'~ Theory of Generic SocioCultural Process 
Preface. Given Durkheim's notion of the radical egocentri­
city of the unsocialized organic ego, how is it possible 
that society and culture ever come to be born? What forces 
breakthrough the isolation of the organic cage and create 
the moralized, self-disciplined person? And once born, how 
is it possible that society and culture should survive beyond 
the moment? In effect, we are asking: what, precisely, was 
Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural process? And what 
is the role of symbolism in this fundamental sociocultural 
process? 
In exploring the first part of Durkheim's central explan­
atory model concerned with the social morphological substra­
tum of society, we discovered that Durkheim's perspective was 
always processual. Social morphology referred not merely to 
the spatial demography of the group, but more importantly, 
to certain key constitutive processes; especially important 
here were those leading to greater moral densities and social 
intensities, and the production and release of social ener­
gies. It is precisely these social energies released at such 
collectively intense times that gives rise to the questions 
now posed: namely, how are groups born? How do groups come 
to conceive of themselves as a group? What role do collective 
representations play in this generic sociocultural process? 
And, how are these cultural symbols to be related to their 
continuing structural bases? While Lukes (1973: chapter 10) 
has given a very useful account of Durkheim's changing esti­
mates of the relation between sub and superstructure (see also 
Book Three), let us now explore some of these questions in 
terms of a frontal analysis of Durkheim's causal model. 
To continue the initial analogy, collective representa­
tions act, in Durkheim's causal schema, as the "ideal" or 
superstructural expression through externalized symbols of 
a groups' awakening self-consciousness. As noted earlier 
(see also Lukes, 1973: introduction), these crystallized sym­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--87-­
boIs are collective and representations in two senses: 
first, they are collectively generated and carried; second, 
they are the externalized, shared vehicles by which the 
group first attains, and then reaffirms, their own distinct­
ive existence as a group. Now, while almost everyone recog­
nizes the importance of several of these notions in Durkheim's 
sociological system, few have clearly brought into focus the 
role of these critical inner connections linking social mor­
phological processes with the corresponding sociocultural pro­
cesses in Durkheim's fundamental explanatory model. 
Doubtless, much of the difficulty in perceiving the 
full outlines of Durkheim's causal model come from his char­
acteristic convergence of generic and genetic-evolutionary 
analyses. Now, Durkheim's own genetic and evolutionary claims 
for the significance of his pilgrimage to the "elementary 
forms" have often annoyed (eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, or W.H. 
Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973) or puzzled (eg. Bellah, 1973:xliii) 
many of his leading secondary interpreters. The British anthro­
pologi~s and American functionalists' search for the generic 
or universal structures of human society led them to persist­
ently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; in 
short, their generic emphasis swamped out Durkheim's genetic 
emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent tenden­
cy of " ... secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's function­
al and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign 
to Durkheim's thought" (197la:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves 
credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's Elemen­
tary Forms, for example, has to be read genetically. Although 
Giddens appears willing to grant that this same work can also 
be read functionally, I cannot so easily agree. For! have 
discovered that, even as Durkheim'~ genetic-evolutionary ~ 
phasis has been persistently slighted, so too his generic 
focus on sociocultural process has been faultilY reported. 
Saving discussion of Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary frame­
work for subsequent chapters, let us now move to more closely 
define Durkheim's concern with generic sociocultural process . 
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It must be acknowledged again and again that much of 
the confusion and neglect was unintentionally assisted by 
Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of generic and 
genetic-evolutionary approaches to sociocultural analysis. 
Now, Tiryakian (1962:19) reminds us that the French word 
elementaire as used by Durkheim "signifies not only 'elemen­
tary' as in a scale of complexity, but also 'fundamental' or 
'basic.' " It is precisely in these terms that Durkheim's Bri­
tish anthropological critics have charged him with confusing 
"earliest" and'simplest" (eg. see Lukes, 1973:456). But the 
logic underlying Durkheim's conflation of his search for the 
universal or generic essence of human society and culture is 
still not widely perceived. For, in fusing his generic and 
genetic-evolutionary investigations into the nature and devel­
opment of human society and culture, Durkheim sought to find 
~ paradigmatic situation, ~ prime case-study, for ~ "crucial 
experiment" in which there would be ~ one-to-~ correspon­
dence, ~ it ~' between symbolic forms and social forms, 
between the social morphological substratum and the social 
physiological or symbolic superstructure. Where collectively 
symbolic representations are deeply inter-fused with the fun­
damental structures of the group, Durkheim felt that he had 
discovered the "monocellular" (eg. see Bellah, 1959:456-7) 
form of sociocultural life, the template, as it were, from 
which all complex sociocultural forms evolved. Thus, the gen­
eric links between religion, society, and culture which Durk­
heim thought he had discovered in Australian aboriginal reli­
gion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connections. 
It is absolutely critical to realize that Durkheim's causal 
model--substructural social morphological processes and super­
structural collectively representational processes--led him 
to return, again and again, to the simplest case, the clear­
est connection between these two halves of human society. 
Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified his 
own characteristic conflation of generic and genetic analyses 
by likening them to Descartes' "first ring of certainty" 
•
 
~~~~._-~-
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(EF:16). For Durkheim's conflation derived, in large part, 
• 
from the influence of his cultural tradition--his was the 
•
 
sociological equivalent of the Cartesian method of systema­

tic doubt, and return to indubitable first principles as the
 
only sure road to objective certainty and inner certitude.
 
"He (Durkheim) simply took it as axiomatic that there is an
 
identity (structural and cultural) between simplicity and
 
•
 
evolutionary priority" (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his con­

flation of generic and genetic in this perspective, we should
 
no longer wonder that only in terms of the most "elementary"
 
•
 
forms--in both senses--did Durkheim believe that he could
 
surely discover generic sociocultural processes directly and
 
unmistakably inter-fused with genetic-evolutionary ones.
 
"Primitive classifications, then, offer privileged cases, be­

cause they are simpler ones" (EF:18). And again, "In the prim­
itive religions, the religious fact still visibly carries the 
mark of its origins" (EF: 20). Those who persist in reading 
• 
Durkheim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely 
or even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional proposi­
tions must continue to neglect Durkheim's own logic and method, 
and his insistence that the intimate relations between society, 
• 
---­
culture, and the person are evolutionarily constructed. As Gid­
dens has rightly noted: "There is no universal relationship be­
tween systems of ideas and their infrastructures~ the nature 
of this relationship is contingent upon the level of advance­
•
 
ment of society" (1972a:27).
 
•
 
Let us briefly outline these two intimately related, but
 
analytically separable, aspects of Durkheim's notion of the
 
dual generic and genetic-evolutionary significance of the
 
"elementary forms." In terms of Durkheim's elaboration of
 
links between material and symbolic process, there is no way 
of fathoming Durkheim's virtual identification of the moral 
and the logical with the social without recognition of two 
• 
previous types of crucial ambiguities concerning the paradigm­
atic Durkheimian terms--namely, "conscience ll and "representa­
tion." As I have emphasized before, we continue to forfeit 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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the key to unlocking the connections between Durkheim's socio­
logy of religion, his sociology of morality, and his sociology 
of knowledge. For in Durkheim's system, structures of conscious­
ness are intimately related to, and evolve out of, structures 
of conscience, while both, in turn, derive from the underlying 
social morphological process. Alpert reminded us over three 
and a half decades ago:"Les Formes Elementaires, it should not 
be forgotten, was originally entitled "The Elementary Forms of 
Thought and of Religious Life" (1939:55; see also W.H, Stanner, 
1967:227). Similarly, as noted earlier, "collective representa­
tion ll contains both a verb-like and noun-like dimension. But 
as Bohannan points out: "American and English interpretations 
of Durkheim ... have separated the two substantive elements 
which Durkheim intended to leave conjoined. In the separation, 
the processual (or verb-like) concept has disappeared" (1960: 
79-80). As Bohannan rightly notes, the fruitful ambiguities of 
Durkheim's key terms conscience and representation led him 
to a fundamentally different, and perhaps more profound, per­
ception of cultural and phenomenological process than the per­
spective today which splits apart the cultural object, the gen­
erating group, the constitutive symbolizing process, and the 
phenomenological experience. 
In terms of Durkheim's own biological metaphors, social 
morphology was to take as its prime task the study of the spa­
tial and material forms and physical-moral energies of socie­
ties, while social physiology was to focus primarily on the 
study of key collective representations as constitutive symbol­
ic processes. Clearly, just as in the organism morphological 
structures are closely intertwined with physiological-psycholo­
gical processes, so too Durkheim postulated similar intimacies 
between social morphological forms and processes and social 
physiological forms and processes. As noted earlier, Durkheim 
always sought to ground sociological analysis in an empirical­
ly verifiable material lI soc ial body." For example, against 
the Marxist Labriola in 1897, Durkheim refuted his later crit­
ics in these terms: "Either the conscience collective floats 
•
 
•
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in a void ... or else it is connected with the rest of the 
world by a substratum, upon which, consequently, it is depen­
dent" (in Giddens, 1972a:159). Bellah suggests: 
The analysis of society, personality, and symbolism and 
their interpretation in The Elementary Forms remains a 
fundamental reference point for present understanding. 
••. In his theory of ritual Durkheim attempts to show 
how a new level of consciousness comes about and super­
sedes the isolated, fragmented, individual conscious­
nesses which operate in the dispersed conditions of ev­
eryday life. The new consciousness could be called a 
social consciousness or even a symbolic consciousness 
••• for it cannot occur without symbolism •.. but it 
penetrates into the interior of the personality and e­
ven strongly affects physiology (1973:xlviii). 
Now, Durkheim's dynamic or processual focus moves to 
center stage in The Elementary Forms. In the "crucial exper­
iment" in which he purposely conflated generic and genetic­
evolutionary analyses, Durkheim'~ concern with both was pro­
cessual through and through. Durkheim took great care here 
to specify the links between social morphological and collec­
tively representational processes, with central focus on the 
social morphological "critical mass" needed for the emergence 
of religious phenomena. Further, these social intensities al­
so are the preconditions for the constitution of moral, reli­
gious, and logical categories and symbols. Let us briefly ex­
plore some of the following key sequential linkages by which 
collectively symbolic representations emerge out of social 
morphological intensities. 
(1)	 Social morphological implosions moralize organic 
egos in creating societies and persons. 
(2)	 The moralization of organic egos by cultural implo­
sions releases man from the confines of the organic 
cage. Social energies lift persons into the realm of 
freedom, of moral rules and intellectual concepts. 
Liberty is the product of reglementation. Man is the 
sociocultural animal. The evolution of man and the 
evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic 
culture is the prime genetic medium of human society 
and human personality. 
(3)	 Symbols act as visible, public collective represen­
tations of group self-consciousness. These collec­
tive representations both represent and constitute 
•
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•
 
symbolic bonds of the group. Due to the moral inten­

sities which created them, certain collective symbols
 
become "sacralized"--that is, invested with obliga­

tory respect and desirability. 
• 
(4) Inevitably, however, moral intensities fade in the 
face of the demands of everyday life. "Sacralized" 
collective symbols face similar moral depreciation. 
Therefore, periodic renewals help to remoralize or 
recreate the sacred intensity of collective symbols 
representing the group, and thus to reaffirm the so­
cial bond, and to revitalize the structures of con­
science and consciousness. 
• 
(5) The marked contrast between these two alternating 
phases of sociocultural life-dispersed and ordinary 
• 
versus gathered together in extraordinary excitement 
--gives rise to dichotomous oppositions between the 
"sacred" and the "profane." This fundamental set of 
symbolic oppositions creates tension in the socio­
cultural and phenomenological fields, and life be­
comes progressively energized by, and organized a­
round, these two poles. 
(6) In the very nature of the alternating rhythms of so­
ciocultural process, the "sacred" significance ori­
ginally attached to the moral implosion of the group
• 
gradually becomes transferred to the image of the 
•
 
group. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective
 
representations become detached from their proces­

sual origins, and crystallized into permanent sym­

bolic forms. Symbolism always tends to grow more au­

tonomous.
 
(7) The "contagiousness" of "sacral energies," plas the 
dependence of sociocultural process upon symbolism, 
means inevitably that the organizing tension between 
"sacred" and "profane" becomes extended to all 
spheres of reality and levels of experience. The 
• 
world is cosmicized through a compounding series of 
symbolic equations. The greater the degree of lami­
• 
nation, or multiple linkage of meanings on several 
levels, the greater the symbolic load, and thus, the 
greater the potency and significance. Phenomenologi­
cal analogy and metaphor serve as symbolic tools for 
the construction of classificatory systems in their 
their early stages. These constitutive symbolic e­
quations serve as crucial bridges transforming em­
pirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. 
Elementary classificatory systems are simultaneous­
ly sociocentric and sacro-magical, for the prime
• symbolic forms are linked to the structure of the group and its magical protocols. The legitimacy of 
structures of conscience and consciousness are bound 
both to the group and its religion. 
•
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Since symbols serve as time-binders holding groups 
together through time and space, as cOllectivities 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
grow, so too must their representational symbols. 
Some viable, yet highly crystallized, symbols and 
transformational equations may become deeply sedi­
mented as axial or paradigmatic collective represen­
tations on the level of cultural traditions. As so­
cieties evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guid­
ance systems. Although first born in the clan and 
its totemic cult, if systems of morality and know­
ledge are to evolve, they must progressively shed 
their primal connection with the restrictive struc­
tures of both group and religion. Symbols blessed 
with a high degree of universalizability may help 
generate supra-societal or civilizational bonds. The 
extension of the social bond in terms of widening 
structures of fraternization, and universalization 
and rationalization of the legitimate structures of 
moral and intellectual authority proceed together on 
the world-historical level (we shall pursue these 
latter points especially in Chapte~Six and Seven). 
(8)	 Since the structure of human symbolic action is in­
herently dramatic (or rhetorical and dialectical), 
here we add the third and final, culminating phase 
to the first phase (tension-creating polarities)and 
the second phase (symbolic equations which extend 
the polarities)--namely, reunification through sym­
bolic transformations. Specifically, the two basic 
religious modes of asceticism (separation) and mys­
ticism (unification) sum up these phases of socio­
cultural process. Hence, tension is resolved, and 
the powers of the imagination and will released, 
through a crucial series of transformations of these 
mounting oppositions into a new and higher synthesis 
or unity. 
Now, if Durkheim's theory of generic sociocultural 
process is still to be considered a brilliant "just-so­
story," as even so insightful and sympathetic critic as 
Evans-Pritchard (1965) insists, then so be it! As Ken Kesey 
said in the introduction to his classic American novel, One 
Flew Over the Cuckoo'~ Nest, "Its the truth even if it 
didn't happen" (1962:13). 
•
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1. Social Morphological Implosions, the Emergence of Society, 
and Transformation of Egos into Moralized Persons 
Given Durkheim's initial image of the isolated unsocial­

ized organic ego, one way of viewing The Elementary Forms isas
 
a detailed description, on the micro social interactional le­

• vel, of "that singularly creative and fertile psychic opera­

tion ... by which a plurality of individual consciousnesses
 
enter into communion and are fused into a common consciousness"
 
(DHN:335). Through this communion process, egos are transform­

• ed into persons. Through this fusion or consubstantiality, a
 
new reality is born--society.
 
•
 
Now, no entity as self-centered and closed as the pre­

socialized individual willingly foregoes its own nature. Only
 
an extraordinary force--a suprahuman (as it were) source of I~
 
energy--can transform isolated egos into moralized persons 
with meaningful goals. Durkheim discovered this source of "sa­
cred energy" in "collective effervescence." 
• 'f 11 . life k 1" h h~ co ect~ve~awa ens re ~g~ous t oug t upon 
• 
reaching a certain degree of intensity, it is because 
it brings about a state of effervescence which changes 
the conditions of psychic activity. Vital energies are 
over-excited, passions are more active, sensations 
stronger; there are even some which are produced only 
at this moment. A man does not recognize himself; he 
• 
feels himself transformed and consequently he trans­
forms the environment which surrounds him (EF:469). 
The social psychological process which Durkheim postulated 
here can be likened to centrifugal and divisive energies im­
• 
ploding into a fused, centripetal source of energy; Chardin 
(1961) described these as ritangential" and "radial" organi­
zing energies, respectively. In effect, the self-seeking ego 
is blasted out of its own self-centered private orbit into a 
new and more powerful "energy state"; or to shift the analogy 
slightly, there is a passage from the "out of step" diffused 
energy of normal white light to the fused and coherent energy 
•
 
of a "laser beam."
 
Now, these moral implosions generate extra-ordinary en­
ergies that transform the isolated and privatized ego into a 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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socially constructed person. The center of his isolated ex­
istence then revolves not around priva~e passions but around 
public prescriptions. 
One can readily conceive how, when arrived at this 
state of exaltation, a man does not recognize him­
self any longer. Feeling himself dominated and car­
ried away by some sort of external power which makes 
him think and act differently than in normal times, 
he naturally has the impression of being himself no 
longer. It seems to him that he has become a new be­
ing: the decorations he puts on and the masks that 
cover his face figure materially in this interior 
transformation, and they aid in determining its na­
ture (EF:249-50). 
Such interior transformations mean that, in a very real sense, 
the pre-socialized ego becomes a new being; now moralized and 
socialized, it is now under the sphere of influence of the po­
werful energies of human society. Analogies with nuclear phys­
ics and other high energy phenomena in attempting to describe 
this crucial generic transformation of egos into persons are 
useful (though, of course, limited). For what Durkheim sought 
to describe here is essentially the evolutionary emergence of 
a totally new phenomena, breaking through the old restrictive 
organic envelope. The organic cage is left behind. It takes 
high-energy forms to overcome other strong energy patterns, 
and this is precisely what Durkheim postulated as going on in 
an "ideal typical" way in the "white heat" of Australian rituaL 
According to Durkheim, as traditional American social 
psychology also maintains (see, ego Nisbet, 1974), "society 
and person are twin-born." Society becomes the center of moral 
and conceptual life, having its phenomenological anchor in the 
newly moralized person's conscience and consciousness. For 
ever more, man shall be homo duplex, "two souls in one body 
twai.n." Ego and body, person and society, these Durkheimian 
symbolic equations are now the twin anchors of the irretrieva­
bly ambivalent human condition. 
When individual minds are not isolated but enter into 
close relation with and work upon each other, from their 
synthes~s arises a new kind of psychic life. It is clear­
ly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that 
led by the solitary individual. Sentiments born and 
•
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•
 
developed in the group have greater energy than pure­

ly individual sentiments. A man who experiences such
 
sentiments feels himself dominated by outside forces
 
that lead him and pervade his milieu. He feels him 

•
 
self in a world quite distinct from that of his pri 

vate existence. This is a world not only more intense
 
but also qualitatively different. Following the col­

lectivity, the individual forgets himself for the com­

mon end and his conduct is oriented in terms of a stan­

dard outside himself •.•. This activity is qualitatively
 
different from the everyday life of the individual, as 
is the superior from the inferior, the ideal from the 
real (SP:91). 
Thus, in Durkheim's view, when a new level of intensity and
• collective effervescence reaches a white heat, and consub­
stantiality is thereby consummated, social energies implode. 
Society and culture are born as entirely new levels of world­
activity. Through this evolutionary breakthrough, society and
• culture are energized, thereafter to dominate biological and 
psychological levels. Through this communion process ,the dual­
ity of human nature is constructed, and the person--as oppo­
sed to the ego--emerges. Society and person are thus mutual
• co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the genetic medium. 
• 
If it is important to emphasize that society depends 
for its continued existence upon persons--"the clan, like 
every other sort of society, can live only in and through the 
individual consciousnesses that compose it" (EF:253)--the 
• 
converse is equally true. Collective ritual and myth--the 
genetic symbolic medium of co-creation--provide, as Durkheim 
poetically said, a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature. " 
If moralized persons are not to lapse back into the scatter­
• 
ed egoisms or deepening autism of pre-social human nature, 
they can sustain themselves only by dipping again and again 
into the very fount of their existence--namely, collectively 
effervescent, symbolically energizing, human society. 
• 
The sentiments which society has for him raise the 
sentiments which he has for himself. Because he is 
in moral harmony with his comrades, he has more con­
fidence, courage, and boldness in action, just like 
the believer who thinks that he feels the regard of 
god turned graciously toward him. It thus produces, 
as it were, a perpetual sustenance of our moral nature 
(EF: 242) . 
• 
....
 
• 
--97-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
Collective action, especially when extra-ordinary in nature, 
raises man above his egoistic half, and replenishes his moral 
nature. Collective ceremonial publicly revalidates his civic 
sense of self as a socially constructed and valuable person. 
Men do not deceive themselves when they feel at this 
time that there is something outside of them which is 
born again, that there are forces which are reanimated 
and a life which reawakens. This renewal is in no way 
imaginary, and the individuals themselves profit from 
it. For the spark of a social being which each bears 
within him necessarily participates in this collective 
renovation. The individual soul is regenerated too, by 
being dipped again in the source from which its life 
comes; consequently, it feels itself stronger, more 
fully master of itself, less dependent upon physical 
necessities (EF:391). 
Consciousness and society, conscience, culture, and per­
son, all imply one another in Durkheimian sociology. As Bohan­
nan points out, it was precisely one of Durkheim's main vir­
tues, in contrast to the heirs of both the idealists and the 
materialists, that he didn't bifurcate sociocultural process 
from phenomenological process. To Durkheim, cultural (that is, 
impersonal) process must become internalized in the person's 
conscience and consciousness if either are to live. There is 
no paradox here, really, for Durkheim himself observed: 
Just as there is no society without individuals, so 
those impersonal forces which are disengaged from the 
group cannot establish themselves without incarnating 
themselves in the individual consciousness where they 
individualize themselves (EF:302). 
Impersonal and personal, universal and particular, thing and 
process, culture and individual, these and other conventional 
dichotomies are seen simply as complementary phases of the 
same overall human process in Durkheim's sociological philoso­
phy. Surely this is necessary prerequisite for the foundations 
of the human sciences of the future. 
Now, according to Durkheim, the contrast between ego­
centric and undisciplined, random action, on the one hand, and 
highly focussed, socialized and moralized human action, on 
the other, creates a basic tension within the heart of man. 
It is as though we have conflicting voices competing for as­
cendancy within our inner lives. Freud, for example, at about 
•
 
• 
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the same time as Durkheim, mythologized this inner conflict 
in terms of id, ego, and superego. While human reality is 
thus basically conflictual to Durkheim, it is also fundamen­
tally creative. There was no oppressive feeling of primal 
guilt in Durkheim, however, as there was in Freud's work; 
no Durkheimian would call man "a disease of history" (N.O. 
Brown, 1959). Rather, if society makes men, so too do men 
make societies, and in the process each irretrievably alters 
the other. Society and person thus stand as mutual co-crea­
tions, and henceforth must perennially cope with their double 
burden. This was Durkheim's fundamental dialectic of human 
action. Forever more, man is double. His interior life has a 
"double-center of gravity"--for on the one hand, we see 
the self-centered and proportionless passions; on the other, 
we witness that cosmos of obligations, ideals,archetypal sym­
bols and dynamic energies called culture. By virtue of the 
latter's contrast with the former, they are set apart or "sa­
cralized. " 
When the Australian goes away from a religious cere­
mony, the representations which this communal life 
has aroused or rearoused within him are not oblit­
erated in a second. The figures of the great ances­
tors, the heroic exploits whose memmory those rites 
perpetuate, the great deeds of every sort, in which 
he too has participated through the cult, in a word, 
all these numerous ideals which he elaborated with 
the cooperation of his fellows, continue to live in 
his consciousness and, through the emotions which are 
attached to them and the ascendancy which they hold 
over his entire being, they are sharply distinguish­
ed from the vulgar impressions arising from his daily 
relations with external things. Moral ideals have the 
sawencharacter. It is society which forces them upon us,~~s the respect inspired by it is naturally extend­
ed to all that comes from it, its imperative rules of 
conduct are invested, by reason of their origin, with 
an authority and a dignity which is shared by none of 
our internal states; therefore, we assign them a place 
apart in our psychical life (EF:298). 
With the evolutionary emergence of human society, and 
therefore also cultural and phenomenological process, a pain­
ful but creative dualism is enshrined in the very heart of 
man. "Our nature is double: there really is a particle of di­
•
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vinity in us because there is within us a particle of these 
•
 
great ideas which are the soul of the group" (EF:299). As al­

ways, Durkheim perceived the key nexus between our inner and 
outer lives to be structures of conscience. And granting that 
conscience and consciousness are always intimately intertwin­
•
 
ed, nonetheless, in general, questions of conscience take pre­

cedence over questions of consciousness. 
• 
Although our moral conscience is a part of our conscious­
ness, we do not feel ourselves on an equality with it. 
In this voice which makes itself heard only to give us 
orders and establish prohibitions, we cannot recognize 
our own voices; the very tone in which it speaks to us 
• 
warns us that it expresses something within us that is 
not of ourselves. This is the objective foundation of 
the idea of the soul: those representations whose flow 
constitutes our interior life are of two different spe­
cies which are irreducible one into another. Some con­
cern themselves with the external and material world; 
• 
others with an ideal world to which we attribute a moral 
superiority over the first. So we are really made up of 
two beings facing in different and almost contrary di­
rections, one of whom exercises a real preeminence over 
the other. Such is the profound meaning of the antithes­
is which all men have more or less clearly conceived be­
tween the body and the soul, the material and the spiri­
tual beings who coexist within us (EF:29B). 
The progressive transformation of the organic ego into a per­
• 
sonality structured by conscience and consciousness generates 
the dualism of human nature. As with the old Christian image 
of man as homo duplex, the two parts of man are opposed to 
one another as body is to soul. 
• 
It is perfectly true that we are made up of two distinct 
parts, which are opposed to one another as the sacred to 
• 
the profane, and we may say that, in a certain sense, 
there is divinity in us. For society, this unique source 
of all that is sacred, does not limit itself to moving 
us from without and affecting us for the moment; it es­
tablishes itself within us in a durable manner. It arou­
ses within us a whole world of ideas and sentiments which 
express it but which, at the same time, form an integral 
and permanent part of ourselves (EF:297-B). 
In sum, the human condition is both unprecedently powerful 
•
 
and irretrievably ambiguous.
 
• 
-- ------- --------------------
•
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2. The Break From the Organic Cage: Man'~ Ascent From the 
Kingdom of Necessity to the Kingdom of Freedom 
Evans-Pritchard observed of Durkheim's theses, borrow­
ing a phrase from Engels, that through the genetic medium of 
religious symbolism "f-1an ascends from the kingdom of necessi­i
• ty to the kingdom of freedom" (1965:61). I believe that this
 
telling phrase succinctly summarizes Durkheim's general frame­

work of thought. Since the textual evidence presented here
 
comes largely from The Elementary Forms, it should be noted
 
• that from his first great book on, Durkheim never tired of
 
repeating that society is the source of moral rules and inte­

llectual concepts, that society constructs the person, that 1
 
culture releases man from the fixed bonds of the organic cage,
 
• that human liberty comes through sociocultural reglementation,
 
and so on and so forth. Let us, then, further explore Durk­

heim's early formulation of his philosophical anthropology.
 
In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim correct­

ly argued that cultural evolution replaced biological heredi­

ty as the prime mode of human adaptation. "The more elevated
 
the ~pecies, the more discretionary instinct becomes" (DL:
 
322) .
 
• the hereditary contribution diminishes, not only
 in relative value, but in absolute value. Heredity be­
comes a lesser factor in human development, not only 
because there is an ever greater multitude of new ac­
quisitions it cannot transmit, but also because those 
it transmits disturbs individual variations less .•••
• Indeed, it is very remarkable that instinctive life is 
• 
weakened as one mounts in the animal scale (DL:321). 
Thus, Durkheim posited a progressive release from the cramped 
confines of the organic cage--from the kingdom of necessity. 
With all his repeated arguments on "creative synthesis" (see 
• 
especially Rules, and "Individual and Collective Representa­
tions" in Sociology and Philosophy), Durkheim pushed back the 
liberating principle of the human condition to society and 
culture in themselves. 
To say that the influence of heredity is more general, 
more vague, less imperious is to say that it is small­
er. It no longer imprisons the activity of the animal 
in a rigid form, but leaves him with freer activity. 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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When from animals one passes to man, this regression 
is still more marked .... Even where instinct survives, 
it has less force, and the will can more easily subdue 
it (DL:322). 
And again: 
... heredity always leaves more room for new combina­
tions. Not only is there a growing number of things 
over which it has no power, but the properties whose 
continuity i~ assures become more plastic. The indivi­
dual is, thu~,~~rong1y chained to his past; it is 
easier for him to adapt himself to new circumstances 
which are produced, and the progress of the division 
of labor thus becomes easier and more rapid (DL:328). 
Agreeing with the old adage that "the progress of conscience 
is in inverse ratio to that of instinct" (DL:346), Durkheim 
further argued that the very notion of the person progress­
ively emerges through societal differentiation and the multi­
plication of individual possibilities . 
... individual differences steadily multiply ... the 
constitutive elements of the average type are more di­
versified ..•. The average man assumes a physiognomy less 
and less precise and recognizable, and more and more sch­
ematic. He is an abstraction more and more difficult to 
fix and delimit. Further, the more elevated the species 
to which societies belong, the more rapidly they evolve, 
since tradition becomes more supple ••.. The average type 
changes, then, from one generation to the next (DL:327). 
The increasing suppleness of cultural traditions, as opposed 
to the rigidity of molecular inheritance, depends, in turn, on 
on societal differentiation. Thus, there emerges a more in­
tense and continuous collective symbolic life • 
.•• as the social horizon extends, as collective life, 
instead of being dispersed in a multitude of small cen­
ters where it can only be weak, is concentrated in a 
more limited number of places, it becomes at the same 
time more intense and more continuous (PE:297). 
The increasing intensity and continuity of long-term collect­
ive cultural activity forces man himself to change in turn . 
... as societies become more vast and, particularly, 
more condensed, a psychic life of a new sort appears. 
Individual diversities, at first lost and confused a­
midst the mass of social likenesses, become disengaged, 
become conspicuous, and multiply. A multitude of things 
which used to remain outside consciences because they 
did not affect the collective being become objects of 
•
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representations. Whereas individuals used to act only 
by involving others •.. each 0 f them becomes a source 
of spontaneous activity. Particular personalities be­
come constituted, take consciousness of themselves . 
... (the psychic life of society) becomes freer, more 
extensive, and, as it has, after all, no other bases 
than individual consciences, these extend, become com­
plex, and thus more flexible . 
... Hence, the cause which called forth these differ­
ences separating man from the animals is also that 
which has forced him to elevate himself above himse]f 
(DL:347-8). 
Indeed, as Durkheim repeated again and again, this di­
versification itself forces man to grow increasingly autono­
mous and rational. Thus, both morality and knowledge move 
toward greater universall.ty and freedom. In Moral Education, 
for example, Durkheim contended that: 
... the more societies become complex, the more dif­
ficult for morality to operate as a purely automatic 
mechanism. Circumstances are never quite the same, 
and as a result the rules of morality require intel­
ligence in their application. Society is continually 
evolving; morality itself must be sufficiently flex­
ible to change gradually as proves necessary (ME:52). 
The distinguishing characteristic of man from animals is " ... 
the greater development of his psychic life, (which) comes 
from his greater sociability" (DL:347). Inaeed, Durkheim 
transforms the old definitions of man as the reasoning ani­
mal, or homo religiosus, into homo sociale et syrnbolizans. l 
Given this evolutionary grounding of man's liberation from 
genetic chains to the past in emergent human interaction 
and cultural relationship, Durkheim enunciated the follow­
ing principle: "With societies, individuals are transformed 
in accordance with the changes produced in the number of so­
cial units and their relationships" (DL:345). For man's evo­
lutionary identity as the sociocultural animal means that 
man's dependence upon society is a liberating dependence. 
They (individuals) are made more and more free of 
the yoke of the organism. An animal is almost com­
pletely under the influence of his physical environ­
ment; its biological constitution predetermines its 
existence. Man, on the contrary, is dependent upon 
social causes (DL:345). 
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Man is the cultural animal. Man is the creature who 
dwells wi thin his own images. "Man is the animal," said C. 
• 
Geertz, 'who is suspended in webs of meaning that he himself 
has spun." Man is the "time-binder" as Korzybski suggested. 
Man 1s the only creature who makes himself through the med­
ium of his own symbolic forms. The evolution of man and the 
• 
evolution of culture are contemporaneous. Symbolic culture 
is the prime genetic medium of human societies and persons. 
Culture is an autonomous, emergent phenomenon, irreducible 
to biology and psychology; indeed, cultural processes feed­
• 
back down and alter biological structures (eg. the brain of 
homo sapiens) and individual psychological processes. Cul­
ture is the prime symbolic meaning and directive system of 
a group. This is part of Durkheim's profound, and basically 
optimistic, philosophical anthropology. 
•
 
Further, if energy and information are considered basic ~
 
categories of life processes, then culture may be likened toI'
 
"social DNA," for it lays the foundation of human informa­

•
 
tional processes. Both socialization (social reproduction
 
and the simultaneous construction of the person) and life­

cycle development are in-formed by the great collective sym­

bolic forms. "Mutations" or revolutions in the more adapta­

•
 
ble (efficient and universalizable) symbolic forms stand on
 
the mainline of sociocultural evolution. Human culture is
 
negentropic, for instead of randomizing its potency, symbolic
 
evolution shows a clear and definite tendency toward increas­

•
 
ing complexity and adaptive power (eg. see Weber's concept
 
of "rationalization"). I believe that Talcott Parsons deser­

ves credit for having been one of the first, as far as I know,
 
to explore the analogy between religious culture in Durkheim's
 
•
 
Elementary Forms and genetic processes, information theory,
 
and general systems theory (eg. see Parsons, 1973 ). I be­

lieve he might agree that culture acts as social DNA, for
 
that is the secret to human evolution.
 
With animals, the organism assimilates social facts 
to it, and, stripping them of their special nature, 
transforms them 1nto biological facts. Social life 
•
 
•
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is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and part­

icularly in higher soci~ties, social causes substi­

tute themselves for organic causes. The organism is
 
spiritualized (DL:346). 
This "hyper-spiritualization" is the very source of the 
reorganization of organic nature as social and cultural life 
• 
implode into ever-more powerful and universal structures of 
conscience and consciousness; this is the foundation of hu­
man freedom. As we discovered earlier, Durkheim argued that 
liberty comes through reglementation. 
•
 
Liberty itself is the product of regulation. Far from
 
•
 
being antagonistic to social action, it results from
 
social action. It is far from being an inherent pro­

perty of the state of nature. On the contrary, it is
 
a conquest of society over nature ...•
 
Liberty is the subordination of external forces to so­

cial forces, for it is only in this condition that the
 
•
 
latter can freely develop themselves. But this subord­

ination is rather the reverse of the natural order.
 
It can, then, realize itself progressively only insofar
 
as man raises himself above things and makes law for
 
them, thus depriving them of their fortuitous, absurd,
 
amoral character; that is, insofar as he becomes a so­

cial being. For he can escape nature only by creating 
another world where he dominates nature. That world is 
society (DL:386-7). 
It is only because we moderns habitually think of freedom in 
•
 
negative terms, as the release of the individual from con­

straining traditional claims, that we have difficulty with 
Durkheim's notion that, at root, human freedom is positive-­
it emerges only through relationship. As Lynch (1966)v it is 
•
 
observes,

only mutuality that is ultimately liberating. 
• 
The individual submits to society and this submissive­
ness is the condition of his liberation. For man free­
dom consists in deliverance from blind, unthinking phy­
sical forces; this he achieves by opposing against them 
the great and intelligent force which is society, under 
whose protection he shelters. By putting himself under 
the wing of society, he makes himself, also to a certain 
extent, dependent upon it. But this is a liberating de­
pendence. There is no paradox here (SP:72). 
Truly, then, "Man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the
• kingdom of freedom" through collective symbolic forms. 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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3.	 Collective Representations as Symbols of Group 
Self-Consciousness 
"For a society to become conscious of itself and main­
tain the necessary degree of intensity the sentiments which 
it attains, it must assemble and concentrate itself" (EF:470). 
In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed that human society 
is itself first created through the genetic medium of reli­
gious ritual. This symbolic genetic medium concentrates and 
intensely focusses social energies, as a solar mirror collects 
the rays of the sun, and thereby generates the first form of 
group self-consciousness. Durkheim's image of primitive reli­
gion, as Lukes aptly suggests, as a kind of "mythologized so­
ciology" was not a late development. For as early as 1897, in 
Suicide (see also Durkheim 1886, R.A. Jones, 1974b), Durkheim 
succinctly summarized this essential notion in this way: "Re­
ligion is--in a word--the system of symbols by means of which 
society becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic 
way of thinking of collective existence" (S:3l2). Indeed, phys­
ical concentration becomes moralized through ritual sacrifice, 
for through such symbolisms men actually feel themselves be­
coming consubstantial. And the generative medium of this crea­
tive metamorphosis is collectively representational symbolism. 
As always, in his exploration of the nature and origins 
of the elementary forms of sociocultural life, Durkheim fuse1 
his generic and genetic investigations. Therefore, he sought 
the generic nature of sociocultural process in terms of the 
genetic origins of human society. This necessarily involved 
central focus on what I shall call the "primitive sacral com­
plex" (see succeeding chapters) as the womb of society,cultuxe, 
and person. I believe, along with Giddens (eg. 1971a:106, 110, 
114), that Durkheim's theses here ShOUllbae~genetically as well 
as generically. In critical terms, this means that Parsons' 
attempt to treat, for example, Durkheim's theory of the gen­
eric role of religion (translate to "ultimate value system 
based on non-empirical referents") in maintaining normative 
concensus, and thus, social order, in all societies is largely 
•
 
• 
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misconceived. Rather, Durkheim here demonstrated genetically, 
in terms of the most elementary forms he could discover, the
• self-creativeness of generic sociocultural process. Or, as 
Giddens puts it, "Religion is the expression of the self-crea­
tion, the autonomous development, of human society" (1971a :110) . 
And, of course, the emergence and crystallization of collective
• symbolic representations as the cultural vehicle of group 
self-consciousness depends upon sustained social morphological 
intensities and imploding energies. Surely this recognition 
should greatly change the widely pervasive image of The Ele­
• mentary Forms supposed "idealization" of religion as the gen­
eric basis of The Central Value System, as well as the older 
misleading of Durkheim aS~Platonic social realist. 
Now, the very key to this collective process of group and
• self-transformation (for the person is created along with the 
group) is the creative effect of cultural symbols. Indeed, as 
my formula that culture acts as "social DNA" suggests, Durk­
heim proposed that "Social life in all its aspects, and in
• every period of its history, is made possible only through a 
vast symbolism" (EF:264). (Parsons, among others, mistook this 
as Durkheim's turn toward idealism). Now, the symbolic basis 
of the socioreligious bonds of the Australian aboriginees on
• which Durkheim lavished his attention was, of course, the to­
temic emblem. Over and above the ties of "blood and soil," 
Durkheim insisted that the clan was first and foremost a com­
munity of common belief, of shared symbols, a community of
• memories. 
For the members of a single clan are not united to 
each other either (solely) by a common habitat or by 
common blood, as they are not necessarily consanguin­
eous and are frequently scattered over different parts
• of the tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from 
• 
their having the same name and the same emblem, their 
believing that they have the same relations with the 
same categories of things, their practising the same 
rites, or, in a word, from their participating in the 
same totemic cult (EF:194). 
In the final analysis, Durkheim made the symbolic community 
prior to the geographical or even the biological community. 
•
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Indeed, kinship here is seen first and foremost as a socio­
religious bond. 
In essence, Durkheim proposed that public process is 
symbolic process. Symbolism serves as the visible vehicle of 
communication by which communion is consummated; it acts as 
the external cultural medium through which society attains 
consciousness of itself as a group . 
•.. if left to themselves, individual consciousnesses 
are closed to each other; they can communicate only 
by means of signs which express their internal states. 
If the communication established between them is to 
become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of 
all particular sentiments into one common sentiment, 
the signs expressing them must themselves be fused 
into one single and unique resultant. It is the ap­
pearance of this that informs individuals that they 
are in harmony and makes them conscious of their mo­
ral unity (EF:262). 
External signs and symbols, as prime modes of social communi­
cation, thus serve as the womb of society. Man makes himself 
through the genetic medium of cultural symbols. 
Durkheim further proposed that material things as signs 
and gestures serve as externalized symbols which represent in­
ternalfeelings. Especially important here is the creative role 
of religious and ritual symbolism in the awakening of conscien­
ce and consciousness, the key phenomenological embodiments of 
sociocultural process. For what was closed and private becomes 
open, public and creative. Thus, paradoxically, in the begin­
ning, moral processes depend upon the utilization of material 
objects or physical gestures which, while devoid of "value" 
in themselves, yet become moralized or "sacralized" through 
group action . 
••. collective representations originate only when 
they are embodied in material objects, things, or be­
ings of every sort--figures, movements, sounds, words, 
and so on--that symbolize them in some outward appear­
ance. For it is only by expressing their feelings by 
translating them into signs, by symbolizing them ex­
ternally, that the individual consciousnesses, which 
are by nature closed to each other, can feel that they 
are communicating and are in unison. The things that 
embody the collective represent~tions arouse the same 
feelings as do the mental states they represent, and, 
•
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in a manner of speaking, materialize. They too are 
respected, feared, and sought after as helping po­
wers. Consequently, they are not placed on the same 
plane as the vulgar things that interest only our 
physical individualities but are set apart from them. 
Therefore, we assign them a completely different place 
in the complex of reality and separate them; and it 
is this radical separation that constitutes the es­
sence of their sacred character (DHN:335). 
Now, the specific empirical focus of these sacred sym­
bolisms is the totem. As noted earlier, Durkheim proposed 
that the community of ideals and memories symbolized by the 
totem underlay the communities of "blood and soil." The rite 
is thus the religious occasion when "Men who feel themselves 
united, partially by bonds of blood, but still more by a com­
munity of interest and tradition, assemble and become con­
scious of their moral unity" (EF:432). Here, Durkheim sug­
gested, men are led to symbolically project their sense of 
moral community onto some external object which they portray 
as the constitutive principle of their consubstantiality. 
This symbol embodying their essential mutuality is the totem. 
"They are led to represent this unity in the form of a very 
special kind of consubstantiality: they think of themselves 
as all participating in the nature of some determined animal" 
(EF:432; on consubstantiality, see also Kenneth Burke, 1969). 
The men who assemble on the occasions of these rites 
believe that they are really animals or plants of the 
species whose name they bear. They feel within them 
an animal or vegetable nature, and in their eyes, 
this is what constitutes whatever is most essential 
and the most excellent in them. So when they assem­
ble, their first movement ought to be to show each 
other this quality which they attribute to themsel­
ves and by which they are defined. The totem is their 
rallying sign, for this reason .•• they design it upon 
their bodies, but it is no less natural that they 
should seek to resemble it in their gestures, their 
cries, their attitude .... By this means, they mutual­
!x. show one another that they are all members of the 
same moral community and th~y become conscious of the 
kInship uniting them. The rl.te does not limit itselr 
to expressing this kinship; it makes it or remakes it. 
For it exists only insofar as it is believed in, and 
the effect of all these collective demonstations is 
to support the beliefs upon which they are founded * 
(EF: 400) . 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--109-­
Thus, in short, Durkheim regarded the totem as the first 
prime constitutive symbol: lilt is the flag; it is the sign 
by which each clan distinguishes itself from the others, the 
visible mark of its personality, a mark borne by everything 
which is a part of the clan ... men, beasts, or things" (EF: 
236) . 
I wish to emphasize now, as Robert N. Bellah (1973) 
has rightly pointed out, that these symbolic systems serve 
not merely a neutral representative function, but more im­
portantly, they are creative, or "constitutive" as Bellah 
suggests. They are "constitutive symbolism,1I the genetic 
cultural medium, vital to the very construction of the group 
in the first place. 
That an emblem is useful as a rallying center for 
any sort of group is superfluous to point out. By 
expressing the social unity in a material form, it 
makes this more obvious to all, and for that very 
reason the use of emblematic symbols must have 
spread quickly ..•• But more than that, this idea 
should spontaneously arise out of the conditions 
of common life; for the emblem is not merely a con­
venient process for clarifying the sentiment society 
has of itself: it also serves to create this senti­
ment; it is one of its constituent elements (EF:262). 
I believe that Durkheim here proposed a profound phenomeno­
logy of generic sociocultural process: cultural symbols are 
the genetic medium leading to the co-creation of the person 
and society. Such key symbols act not merely as neutral de­
vices of objective representation but also enter into the 
self-creation of the group itself. Acting as the collective­
ly representational symbols of group self-consciousness, 
gradually they become the very foundations of impersonal 
thought and group action. These dual functions of symbolism-­
representative and constitutive or creative--must be empha­
sized as twin keys as important to Durkheim's thought as the 
intimate relations between structures of conscience and con­
sciousness • 
Collective representations ••• presuppose that minds 
act and react upon one another; they are the product 
of these actions and reactions which are themselves 
possible only through material intermediaries. These 
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latter do not confine themselves to revealing the 
mental state with which they are associated; they 
aid in creating it. Individual minds cannot corne in 
contact and communicate with each other except by 
corning out of themselves; but they cannot do this 
except by movements. So it is the homogeneity of 
these movements that gives the group consciousness 
of itself and consequently makes it exist. When this 
homogeneity is once established and these movements 
have once taken a stereotyped form, they serve to 
symbolize them only because they have aided in form­
ing them*(EF:263). 
4.	 Alternating Phases of SocioCultural Life and 
Periodic Renewals 
Preface. By their very nature, however, such moral intensi­
ties are extra-ordinary. "Ecstasy" (in the root sense, see 
EF:259) cannot last forever. High energy particles fall into 
lower orbits; newly fused eg~ caught up in the momentary in­
tensities of moralized implosions, face the problem of the 
"morning after." Inevitably, the extraordinary concentration 
of human energies disperses and fades back into the inter­
stices of everyday life. In short, "ecstasy," while self­
fulfilling, is also self-exhausting. Further, the demands 
of everyday life--of eating, working, babies crying, fires 
burning, storms corning, enemies approaching, and so on-­
rudely intrude upon the sacred inviolability of the communal 
sacralizing moment. "Charisma," to use Weber's roughly para­
llel term, is like a high mountain peak surrounded by undu­
lating valleys. At some point, we must corne down from the 
heights and return to the mundane tasks of everyday life. 
The tension between everyday routine (Weber's alltag) 
and the charismatic moment is two-fold. First, these sacred 
symbols and energies flow back out to socialize. energize, 
and sacralize us and the world as we strive to "meet the de­
mands of the day." Correspondingly, even though we are newly 
energized, the farther we get from the the generating source 
of power, the more these symbolic energies are usurped and 
dissipated in everyday life. As Durkheim once poetically said, 
they are subject to the "slow usury of time." In sum, al­
•
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though these tensions between alltag and "charisma" allow 
sacred energies to flow, it also means that the energy re­
serves, as it were, shall be constantly depleted. 
Even though we must forego the vulgar summary that 
the function of regular ritual and periodic celebration is 
to help men II recharge their batteries, II as it were, none­
theless, analogies with electricity and other types of ener­
gy flows are stimulating. Both Durkheim and Weber compared 
the IIsacredll and "charisma ll with electricity, in terms of 
its power to energize, and its tendency to flow or its con­
tagiousness. Thus, charismatic forces are like sacred elect­
ricity, for they energize as they flow. Now, because lI ec ­
stasyll is self-exhausting, and because the force of II c haris­
ma II is inevitably dissipated in the routine of everyday life, 
men must gather again and again to renew or recreate these 
sacred energies. liThe essential constitu9nt of the cult is 
the cycle of feasts which return regularly at determined e­
pochs ll (EF:39l). In turn, if society is to continue, that is, 
if the "collective conscience ll is to perdure, it must con­
stantly reassemble itself. II ..• Before all, rites are means 
by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically" (EF: 
432). Thus, rite and ceremonial are the prime public means 
of society's self-creation and recreation. Through religjous 
ritual, society rekindles social energies and moral intensi­
ties, and thereby strengthens both persons and its own con­
sciousness of itself as a group. liThe rite serves ... to re­
vivify the most essential elements of the collective conscious­
ness. Through it the group periodically renews the sentiments 
which it has of itself, and of its unity" (EF:420). 
Just as moral intensities inevitably fade, so too the 
energy of the sacralized collectively representational sym­
bols face the same dissipation or moral depreciation. Be­
cause they no longer circulate at the same speed, they 
are no longer current, they lose their worth as IIcurrency." 
Charismatic moment and charismatic symbol equally tend to 
fade from consciousness and conscience. Society then tends to 
•
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lapse back into that whirl of isolated and privatized ego­
isms from which it had only just escaped. 
Of course, social sentiments could never be totally 
absent. We remain in relations with others, the ha­
bits, ideas, and tendencies which education has im­
pressed upon us and which ordinarily preside over 
our relations with others, continue to make their 
action felt. But they are constantly combatted and 
held in check by the antagonistic tendencies arou­
sed and supported by the necessities of the daily 
struggle. They resist more or less successfully, ac­
cording to their intrinsic energy: but this energy 
is not renewed. They live upon: their past, and con­
sequently, they would be used up in the course of 
time, if nothing returned to them a little of the 
force -that they lose through these incessant con­
flicts and frictions (EF:390). 
In addition, the only way the twin attributes of human 
personhood--conscience and consciousness--can be in-formed 
and re-formed is through symbolic processes. "Since society 
cannot exist but in and through individual consciousnesses, 
this force must also penetrate us and organize itself within 
us; it becomes an integral part of our being anu by that 
very fact this is elevated and magnified" (EF: 39D. In turn, 
social institutions and cultural forms also fundamentally de­
pend upon viable energizing symbols. Thus, as the power of 
symbols fade, society, culture, and the person also begin 
to fade in the same degree. In short, beyond the desire for 
charismatic communitas (see Victor Turner, 1969), and 
periodic recharismatization of the profane, the continuing 
life of society and of symbolic culture require more or less 
regular moments of renewal and recreation. 
Steven Lukes provides the following lucid and concise 
summary of some of Durkheim's basic theses here: 
... symbol ism was _ 'necessary if society is to become 
conscious of itself', and is 'no less indispensable 
for assuring the continuation of this consciousness.' 
Indeed, 'social life, in all its aspects and in every 
period of history, is made possible only by a vast 
symbolism.' The role of the emblem was to perpetuate 
and recreate the 'social sentiments' aroused by the 
rites; moreover, the rites themselves enabled 
social communication to 'become a real communion, 
that is to say, a fusion of all particular sentiments 
•
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into one common sentiment,' and they not only expres­
sed but served to 'support the beliefs upon which they 
are founded.' Hence, the cult in general was both a 
'system of signs by which the faith is outwardly trans­
lated' and a 'collection of the means by which this is 
created and recreated periodically' (1973:472). 
Let us now explore the course of Durkheim's argument 
in this regard. Remember, first, that the life of the Aus­
tralian aborigenees, which Durkheim chose for his "crucial 
experiment," passed through alternating phases (as, apparent­
ly, all energy forms must). Using Durkheim's own dichotomies, 
one might term these the "economic" or "egoistic" phase (see, 
however, Book Three), on the one hand, and the "social" phase 
on the other. In the first, the population is scattered, hunt­
ing for food. In the second, the group gathers and moral in­
tensities rise, and sociocultural energies are generated and 
released (see also, for example, EF:246-7). 
The religious life of the Australian passes through 
successive phases of complete lull and of superexci­
tation, and social life oscillates in the same rhy­
thm. This puts clearly into evidence the bond uniting 
them to one another, but among the peoples called civ­
ilized, the relative continuity of the two blurs their 
relations. It might even be asked whether the violence 
of this contrast was not necessary to discharge the 
feelings of sacredness in its first form. By concen­
trating itself almost entirely in certain determined 
moments, the collective life has been able to attain 
its greatest intensity and efficacy, and consequently 
to give men a more active sentiment of the double ex­
istence they lead, and of the double nature in which 
they participate (EF:250-l). 
Now, as we have noted, "ecstasy" is self-consuming. In 
terms of the ultimate consummation or release of charismatic 
energies in the second or sacral phase, Durkheim noted: 
This effervescence often reaches such a point that it 
causes unheard of actions. The passions released are 
of such impetuosity that they can be restrained by 
nothing. They are so far removed from their extraor­
dinary conditions of life, and they are so thoroughly 
conscious of it, that they feel that they must set 
themselves outside of and above their ordinary morals 
..•• They produce such a violent super-excitation of 
the whole physical and mental life that it cannot be 
be supported very long; the actor taking the princi­
pal part finally falls exhausted to the ground (EF: 24 7-8). 
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Inevitably, the ebb and flow of everyday life returns. Durk­
heim observed that collective effervescence can never sus­
tain itself for long: " ... the exaltation cannot maintain 
itself at such a pitch; it is too exhausting. Once the cri­
tical moment has passed, the social life relaxes, intellect­
ual and emotional intercourse is subdued, and individuals 
fall back into their ordinary level" (SP:92). Since Durkheim's 
social psychology here inevitably suggests sexual analogies, 
especially when these charismatic moments or communitas are 
considered as orgiastic activities, it should be noted that 
the evident value of the analogy between moral and physical 
intercourse is, apart from the mutual excitation, the commun­
ion that is ultimately consummated. These analogies are not 
unusual, for one of the favorite images of mystics, for exam­
ple, over the centuries has been the intimate and all-encom­
passing union with their divine being or world-principle as 
bride or bridegroom. 
Inevitably, the demands of everyday life intrude upon 
communitas, upon the special world set apart. It is simply 
a rule of existence that men, having once attained the heights, 
must return to the lowlands, to the secure and supportive rou­
tine of everyday life. Indeed, there is a hidden dialectic 
in the alternating rhythms of "charismatic communitas" and 
the all tag or routine "profane" existence, for it is precise­
ly the continuing contrast between the two different forms 
of creativity unique to each that enables us to appreciate 
the distinctive virtues of the other. As always, diversity 
is generative; it is their very opposition which creates their 
processual unity. Durkheim observed that: 
Society is able to revivify the sentiments it has of 
itself only by assembling. But it cannot be assembled 
all the time. The exigencies of life do not allow it 
to remain in congregation indefinitely; so it scatters, 
to assemble anew when it feels again the need of this. 
It is to these necessary alternations that the regular 
alternations of sacred and profane times correspond (EF: 
391) • 
Moral passions are thus dissipated in the routine of 
"meeting the demands of the day" (Weber, after Goethe). Al­
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though energized by collective moralization, such sacred 
forces face inevitable depreciation. So too do the collect­
ive~y representational symbols, which serve as the genetic 
medium and prime cultural vehicle of these moralizing for­
ces. Society thus threatens to constantly lapse back into 
an amorphous collocation of warring egoisms. 
Without symbols, social sentiments could have only 
a precarious existence. Though very strong as long 
as men are together and influence each other reci­
procally, they exist only in the form of recollect­
ions after the assembly has ended, and when left to 
themselves, these become feebler and feebler; for 
since the group is now no longer present and active, 
individual temperaments easily regain the upper hand. 
The violent passions--which have been released in the 
heart of a crowd fall away, and are extinguished when 
this is dissolved, and men ask themselves with aston­
ishment how they could ever have been so carried away 
from their normal character (EF:263). 
Due to these alternating phases of communitas and all­
tag, or in Durkheim's terminology, the "sacred" and the "pro­
fane," sociocultural life rises and falls in an oscillating 
rhythm. And thus, the moralized personB commitment to his 
newly found obligations and goals also ebbs and flows with 
the rise and decline of sociocultural symbolism. The contin­
ued viability of significant prime symbols, as a genetic and 
cultural medium, is vital to the continued via~ility of both 
society and the moralized person. 
Sacred beings exist only when they are represented 
as such in the mind. When we cease to believe in them, 
it is as though they did not exist. Even those which 
have material form and are given by sensible exper­
ience, depend upon the thought of worshippers who a­
dore them; for the sacred character which makes them 
objects of the cult is not given by their natural 
constitution; it is added to them by belief •••. If 
these sacred beings when once conceived, are to haveno 
need of men to continue, it would be necessary that 
the representations expressing them always remain the 
same. But this stability is impossible. In fact, it 
is in the communal life that they are formed, and 
this communal life is essentially intermittent. So 
they necessarily partake of this same intermittency. 
They attain their greatest intensity at the moment 
when the men are assembled together and are in immed­
iate relations with one another, when they all partake 
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of the same idea and the same sentiment. But when 
the assembly has broken up and each man has returned 
to his own peculiar life, they progressively lose 
their own original energy. Being covered over little 
by little by the rising flood of daily experiences, 
they would soon fall back into the unconscious, if 
we did not find some means of calling them back to 
consciousness and revivify them. If we think of them 
less forcefully, they amount to less for us and we 
count less upon them; they exist to a lesser degree 
(EF : 38 6 - 7) . 
As always, Durkheim considered evolutionary differences be­
tween these alternating rhythms according to social type. 
This rhythm is capable of varying in different societ­
ies. Where the period of dispersion is long, and the 
dispersion itself is extreme, the period of congrega­
tion, in its turn, is very prolonged, and produces 
veritable debauches of collective and religious life. 
Feasts succeed one another for weeks and even for mon­
ths, while the ritual life sometimes attains to a sort 
of frenzy. Elsewhere, these two phases of the social 
life succeed one another after shorter intervals, and 
then the contrast between them is less marked. The 
more societies develop, the less they seem to allow 
of too great intermittencies (EF:39l-2). 
Therefore, Durkheim proposed an evolutionary rule: in general, 
the intensity of collective rites varies inversely with their 
society's continuity and complexity. 
Further, the periodic renewal of self and society 
through ritual concelebration becomes reinforced, in a sort 
of psychosocioculturalfeedback process, as the prime creative 
cultural medium. Thus, religious culture, which by its nature 
seeks to establish definite and obligatory relationships be­
tween the macrocosm and the human microcosm, acts as a sort 
of "social DNA" in a number of ways. First, it both social­
izes and resocializes men (that is, acts as the medium of so­
cial reproduction), and second, it directs the growth of so­
ciety and the person as they develop. In social psychological 
terms, Durkheim suggests that the person realizes his contin­
ued dependence on collective symbolic process, and thus "he 
holds with all the strength of his soul to these practices in 
which he periodically recreates himself; he could not deny 
their principle without causing an upheaval of his own being, 
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which he resists" (EF:403). Durkheim further observed that 
"the real reason for the cults" is to be found "in the in­
ternal and moral regeneration which they bring about" (EF: 
388) • 
The only way of renewing the collective representa­
tions which relate to sacred beings is to retemper 
them in the very source of the religious life, that 
is to say, in the assembled groups •.•. The common 
faith becomes reanimated quite naturally in the heart 
of this reconstituted group, it is born again because 
it again finds those very conditions in which it was 
born in the first place. After it had been restored, 
it easily triumphs over all the private doubts which 
have have arisen in individual minds. The image of the 
sacred things regains power enough to resist the in­
ternal or external causes which tend to weaken it. 
In spite of their apparent failure, men can no longer 
believe that their gods will die, because they feel 
them living in their own hearts •... Men are more con­
fident because they feel themselves stronger; and they 
really are stronger, because forces which were lang­
uishing are now reawakened in their consciousness 
(EF: 387) . 
However, the mere fact of physical congregation alone 
is not, of course, sufficient to generate adequate moral in­
tensities and thus social communion. Rather, symbolic proces­
ses enter, as necessary elements, into the very creation of 
society and self. The specific form of the first constitutive 
cultural symbols was ritual sacrifice, joined with mythic 
commemorations. Through sacred commensality all are made 
"as one," again and again . 
.•• the object of this communion is manifest. Every 
member of a totemic clan constitutes a mystic sub­
stance within which is the pre-eminent part of his 
being, for his soul is made out of it. From it came 
whatever powers he has and his social position, for 
it is this which makes him a person. So he has a vi­
tal interest in maintaining it intact and in keeping 
it, as far as possible, in a state of perpetual youth. 
Unfortunately, all forces, even the most spiritual, are 
used up in the course of time if nothing comes to re­
turn to them the energy they lose through the normal 
workings of things; there is a necessity of the first 
importance here which .•. is the real reason for the 
positive cult. Therefore, the men of a totem cannot 
retain their position unless they periodically reviv­
ify the totemic principle which is in them; and as 
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they represent this principle in the form of a vege­
table or an animal, it is to the corresponding ani­
mal Or vegetable species that they go to demand the 
supplementary forces needed to renew this and reju­
venate it. A man of the Kangaroo clan believes him­
self and feels himself a kangaroo; it is by this qual­
ity that he defines himself; it is this which marks 
his place in the society. In order to keep it, he 
takes a little of the flesh of this same animal into 
his own body from time to time. A small bit is enough, 
owing to the rule: the part is equal to the whole (EF: 
- -- - - -- 378-9). 
Even more, Durkheim observed that there are special 
moments and special things which are favored as commensal 
sacrifices due to their special potencies, and thus, their 
special symbolic significance. Contrary to his repeated as­
sertions strewn throughout The Elementary Forms, Durkheim 
here acknowledged that the choice and content of religious 
symbols is not wholly arbitrary (see also Mary Douglas, Nat­
ural Symbols, 1973). Especially important here were the first 
fruits of the harvest. 
If this operation is to produce all the desired ef­
fects, it may not take place at no matter what mo­
ment. The most appropriate time is when the new gen­
eration has just reached its complete development, 
for this is also the moment when the forces anima­
ting the totemic species attain their maximum inten­
sity. They have just been drawn with great difficul­
ty from those rich reservoirs of life, the sacred 
trees and rocks. Moreover, all sorts of means have 
been employed to increase their intensity still more 
•... Also, by their very aspect, the first fruits of 
the harvest manifest the energy which they contain: 
here the totemic gods acclaims himself in all the 
glory of his youth. This is why the first fruits have 
always been regarded as a very sacred fruit, reser­
ved for very holy beings. So it is natural that the 
Australian uses it to regenerate himself spiritually. 
Thus, both the date and the circumstances of the cere­
monies are explained (EF:379). 
Often, the manifest purpose of totemic ritual commun­
ion is to insure the reproduction of the totemic species. 
"When the close union of the animal has once been admitted, 
men feel acutely the necessity of assuring the regular repro­
duction of the principal object of the cult" (EF:432-J) .Indeed, 
as Durkheim noted, "it is owing to this state of dependency 
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upon the thought of men, in which the gods find themselves, 
that the former are able to believe in the efficacy of their 
assistance" (EF:387). 
Of course, men would be unable to live without gods, 
but on the other hand, the gods would die if their 
cult were not rendered. This does not have the sole 
object of making the profane beings communicate with 
sacred beings, but it also keeps these latter alive 
and is perpetually remaking and regenerating them 
(EF:388). 
In addition, the totemic commensal sacrifice often takes on 
the added meaning of a mythic commemoration. The heroic mem­
ories of the ancestors, who first received the totem from the 
spirits or from the world-directive principle, are thus sim­
ultaneously called to life. Belief and act, conscience and 
consciousness, are forever joined in fundamental sociocult­
ural process. Imagination and symbol serve as the key media­
ting terms. The function cr rather the effect of commemorative 
rites, Durkheim observed, consists " ..• in recollecting the 
past and, in a way, making it present by means of a veritable 
dramatic representation" (EF:4l6). "We have here a whole 
group of ceremonies whose sole purpose is to awaken certain 
ideas and sentiments, to attach the present to the past or 
the individual to the collectivity" (EF:423). 
Everything is in representations whose only object can 
be to render the mythical part of the clan present to 
the mind. But the mythology of.a group is the system 
of beliefs common to this group. The traditions whose 
memory it perpetuates express the way in which the so­
ciety represents man and the world: it is a moral sys­
tem and a cosmology as well as a history. So the rite 
serves and can serve only to sustain the vitality of 
these beliefs, to keep them from being effaced from 
memory, and in sum, to revivify the most essential ele­
ments of the collective consciousness. Through it the 
group periodically renews the sentiment which it has 
of itself and of its unity: at the same time, indivi­
duals are strengthened in their social natures. The 
glorious souvenirs which are made to live again before 
their eyes, and with which they feel they have a kin­
ship, give them a feeling of strength and confidence: 
a man is surer of his faith when he sees to how distant 
a past it goes back and what great things it has in­
spired (EF:419-20). 
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In the last, Durkheimian, analysis, society perdures 
only, as Weber also once observed, as a "community of memo­
ries." It is these shared memories of the heroic ancestors, 
coupled with the memory of the "charismatic communitas" that 
lingers on. These not only constitute phenomenological foun­
dations of society, but also continue to energize and direct 
people by their august greatness or awful sanctity. Thus', 
Durkheim postulated another key dialectic to human symbolic 
action--the ideal becomes a reality, yet inevitably they di­
verge, only to fuse again, and in the process, each pole ir­
retrievably alters the other. 
All that was said, done, and thought during this period 
of fecund upheaval survives only as memory, a memory 
no doubt as glorious as the reality it recalls, but 
which is no longer at one. It exists as an idea or ra­
ther as a composition of ideas. Between what is felt 
and perceived and what is thought of in the form of 
ideals there is now a clear distinction. Nevertheless, 
these ideals could not survive if they were not period­
ically renewed. This revivification is the function of 
religious or secular feasts and ceremonies, all public 
addresses in churches and schools, plays and exhibi­
tions, in a word, whatever draws men together into an 
intellectual and moral communion. These movements are, 
as it were, minor variations of the great creative move­
ments. But these means have only a temporary effect. For 
a short time the ideal comes to life and approaches real­
ity, but it soon becomes differentiated from it (SP:92). 
Indeed, Durkheim universalized the necessity of regular renew­
als of the charismatic energy of all groups: 
.•• This is why all parties, political, economic, or 
confessional, are careful to have periodical reunions 
where their members may revivify their common faith by 
manifesting it in common. To strengthen those senti­
ments which, if left to themselves, would soon weaken, 
it is sufficient to bring those who hold them together 
and to put them into closer and more active relations 
with one another (EF:240-1). 1 
By virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual commen­
sality, and the commemorative dramatic representations or mi­
metic re-enactments of the ancestors heroic deeds, and the 
ensuing "community of memories," the sacred symbols become 
historicized. Sacral symbols thereby become attached to dura­
ble social sentiments and memories. Thus, the dialectic of 
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symbol and sociocultural process deepens, for these .. 
• 
systems of totemic emblems, which are necessary if society 
• 
is to become conscious of itself, are no less indispensable 
for assuring the continuation of this consciousness" (EF:263). 
If society and person are to endure, they must become rooted 
in symbolic forms. If symbols are to survive, sentiments must 
become durable; in short, they must become historicized. If 
sentiments are to attain historical durability, they must be 
symbolically sedimented deep within the sociocultural pro­
•
 
cess. In other words, they must become prime constitutive sym­

bols. 
• 
if the movements by which these sentiments are ex­
pressed are connected with something that endures, the 
sentiments themselves must become more durable. These 
other things are constantly bringing them to mind and 
arousing them; it is as though the causes which exci­
• 
ted them in the first place continued to act. Thus 
these systems of emblems, which are necessary if so­
ciety is to become conscious of itself, are no less 
indispensable for assuring the continuation of this 
consciousness (EF:263). 
• 
Besides the more or less regular periodic commemorations 
or concelebrations of ritual commensality, Durkheim observed 
that there are other periods of history which are, as it were, 
permeated by charisma. During these extraordinary times, the 
• 
ideal is formed and lived, and becomes thereby a model for 
generations to come. These are the crucial turning points of 
societies, the charismatic times when a people is really born, 
or made anew, or reformed, or when they embark upon entirely 
new directions and aspirations. Such extraordinary periods, 
since they strike so deeply into the axial structures of con­
science and consciousness, come to constitute the cultural 
• 
historical capital off of which societies and persons live 
for generations after. Here, Durkheim observed: 
• 
Besides these passing and intermittent states, there 
are other more durable ones, where this strengthening 
influence of society makes itself felt with greater 
consequence and frequently even with greater bril­
liance. There are periods in history when under the 
influence of some great collective shock, social in­
teractions have become much more frequent and active. 
That general effervescence results which is character­
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istic of revolutionary or creative epochs. Now this 
greater activity results in a general stimulation of 
individual forces. Men see more and differen~~y now 
than in normal times. Changes are not merely~ahades 
and degrees: men become different. The passion moving 
them are of such intensity that they cannot be satis­
fied except by violent or unrestrained actions, act­
ions of superhuman heroism or of bloody barbarism. 
This is what explains the Crusades, for example, or 
many of the scenes, either sublime or savage, of the 
French Revolution (EF:24l). 
As Robert N. Bellah (1973:xlix) notes, Durkheim thus 
distinguished between two basic phases of sociocultural pro­
cess: the creative and the re-creative or commemorative. Ri­
tual repeats archetypal symbolic events, while those "great 
historic outbursts of collective effervescence" create new 
prime guidance symbols. Thus, charismatic movements come to 
represent foundation periods in the life of all societies. 
... at such moments of collective ferment are born 
the great ideals upon which civilizations rest. The 
periods of creation or renewal occur when men for var­
ious reasons are led into a closer relationship with 
each other, when reunions and assemblies are most fre­
quent, relationships better maintained, and the ex­
change of ideas most active. Such was the great crisis 
of Christendom, the movement of collective enthusiasms 
which in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, bring­
ing together in Paris the scholars of Europe, gave 
birth to Scholasticism. Such were the Reformation and 
Renaissance, the revolutionary epochs and the Social­
ist upheavals of the nineteenth century. At such mo­
ments, this higher form of life is lived with such in­
tensity and exclusiveness that it monopolizes all minds 
to the more or less complete exclusion of egoism and 
the commonplace. At such times the ideal tends to be­
come one with the real, and for this reason men have 
the impression that the time is close when the ideal 
will in fact be realized and the Kingdom of God estab­
lished on earth (SP:9l-2). 
Finally, we should reflect briefly on the "eternal" 
significance of these generic dialectical processes which 
Durkheim here postulated, such as those between symbol and 
sentiment, self and society, charismatic and ordinary moment, 
communitas and history, and so on and so forth. Many inter­
preters of Durkheim's Elementary Forms have taken his famous 
concluding remark that "there is something eternal in reli­
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gion" (EF:474) in a rather narrow functional sense. Believ­
ers, for instance, have seized upon this passage as evidence 
that religion, in the traditional metaphysical sense, should 
be considered an eternal generic phenomenon (eg. see G. Baum, 
1973:14). Others have concluded that Durkheim spoke in formal 
generic terms of the universal functional contributions of 
religion to social solidarity, psychological strength, and so 
on. Ye~ neither position adequately grasps Durkheim's full 
meaning or larger intention, for neither takes into account 
the genetic and evolutionary and metaphorical meanings of 
Durkheim's famous statement. Setting aside until a succeed­
ing chapter discussion of the "primitive sacral-magical com­
plex," we should not forget that Durkheim here interpreted 
religion in a metaphorical sense as the prime symbolic form 
by which a group attained consciousness of itself as a group. 
Further, in Durkheim's doctrine, ritual process was seen main­
ly as signifying the self-creativeness of sociocultural pro­
cess; Durkheim secularized its meanings. Giddens (1971a, 1972a) 
is one of the few analysts who has begun to stress this aspect 
of Durkheim's sociology of religion. Indeed, if one puts this 
famous quotation back in he context of his total statement, 
one can clearly discern Durkheim's real underlying intention . 
There is something eternal in religion which is des­
tined to survive all the particular symbols in which 
religious thought has successively enveloped itself. 
There can be no society which does not feel the need 
of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the 
collective sentiments and the collective ideas which 
makes its unity and its personality. Now this moral 
remaking cannot be achieved except by the means of 
reunions, assemblies, and meetings where the indivi­
duals, being closely united to each other, reaffirm 
in cornmon their cornmon sentiments; hence corne the cere­
monies which do not differ from regular religious cere­
monies, either in their object, the results which they 
produce, or the processes employed to attain these re­
sults. What essential difference is there between an 
assembly at Christmas celebrating the principal dates 
of the life of Christ, or of Jews remembering the Exo­
dus from Egypt, or the promulgation of a new moral or 
legal system or some great event in the national life 
(EF : 4 74 - 5) ? 
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5. The Sacred and the Profane: Fundamental Tensions in 
Sociocultural Life 
• Preface. The marked contrast between these two alternating 
phases of sociocultural life gives rise, in Durkheim's model, 
to dichotomous notions contrasting the sacred with the pro­
fane. This conflict between dispersed and autistic egos and
• communalized and moralized persons is creative in that the 
tension works to energize and organize all of human life. 
Tension between the sacred and the profane is the driving 
force in the symbolic field of society, and within the per­
• son. As is true of all levels of reality, without this ten­
sion between incompatible elements or positions, no energy 
would flow. Difference energizes~ diversity is generative. 
Energy flows created by this tension between the sacred and
• the profane serves, in short, to organize and energize and 
guide the decision matrices of societies and persons. 
Now, if human experience were merely neutral or homo­
geneous, we would find ourselves devoid of reason for choice,
• and, therefore, action. If human reality lacked elementary 
invidious distinctions--such as those between good and evil, 
order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher and the 
lower, the positive and the negative, the beautiful and the
• monstrous, the creative and the destructive, the way forward 
and the way back, and so on--we would lack the basic organi­
zing tension that energizes and directs human action. Every 
society and person makes some series of distinctions between
• fundamental polarities, for without these compounding opposi­
tions, we stand paralyzed. Given a primal undifferentiated 
unity, in Durkheim's case the communion of aboriginal collec­
tively effervescent ritual, our next need is to begin to dif­

• ferentiate within this unity certain separable parts. Such
 
•
 
fundamental cleavages between "higher" and "lower" ~g. Genesis,
 
see also K. Burke, 1970) serve as the vehicle for differen­

tiating reality and allowing us to deal with its specific
 
forms. Primal unity, and then progressive differentiation,
 
coupled with periodic re-unification~ these are the funda­
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mental phases in Durkheim's dialetic of generic sociocult­
ural process. 
• 
Now, always and everywhere, positive and negative as­
pects of these basic polarities are expressed in terms of 
conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral right and 
wrong are always intimately intertwined with questions of 
• 
consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality ra­
ther than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and 
persons lay themselves under positive obligations to affirm 
as true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable 
• 
those series of phenomena judged as "sacred" to the group. 
Sacred means values constitutive to the group. These posi­
tive injunctions generate goals and values which are carried 
through the imagination, and internalized in the personality 
• structure, and established in the institutions of the group. Conversely, all societies and persons find themselves nega­
tively obligated to avoid falsity, evil, destructiveness, 
and regions of unreality. Those who follow the positive norm­
• ative prescriptions gain in self-esteem, and their sense of 
self-worth and contributions to moral order are often public­
ly validated. Those who violate, or congenitally follow nega­
tive proscriptions, lose in status and self-esteem. They may 
• be branded or "labelled" as failures, and at the most, as 
dangerously destructive deviants. As Robert K. Merton once 
observed, every society has its own peculiar set of "moral 
alchemies," especially for the assignment of guilt and nega­
• tive status. Anxiety, fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate 
defilement are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate 
(see, for example, P. Ricoeur, 1969). Thus, by its very na­
ture, deviance is linked with the profane, and the profane
• is also dependent, in turn, upon the prior definition of the 
sacred. As Mary Douglas (1966) -notes, "purity and danger" 
are relational. 
Just as human nature is irretrievably rent by conflict 
• beteeen the dictates of ego and person, body and soul, so too 
society and culture are inevitably polarized in terms of the 
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active opposition between the sacred and the profane, between 
• 
the pure and the impure. Indeed, one of the virtues of Durk­
heim's perspective here is that he clearly perceived the in­
timate links between the resonating tensions between all 
that is sacred, true, good, orderly, pure, powerful, and all 
• 
that is profane, false, evil, chaotic, dangerous, in symbol­
ic terms on both the phenomenological and sociocultural lev­
els. In short, public and private phenomenologies are to be 
seen as inextricably intertwined phases of the same generic 
• 
human process. 
a.	 The Transformation of the Ego, Alternating Phases of So­
cial Life, and the Emergence of the Sacred and the Profane 
•
 
Through collective effervescence, Durkheim postulated,
 
• 
and the resulting fusion into a common consciousness, egos 
are transformed into persons. Through this consubstantialit~ 
a new reality is born--society. In the very nature of this 
transformation " •.• the contents of their consciousness is 
changed" (EF:389). The very core of this change from ego to 
person is the emerging contrast between the sacred and the 
profane. 
•
 
In his own set of positivist symbolic equations, Durk­

heim associated the ego, commonness, and utilitarian life 
activities with the profane, while the person, the extra-or­
dinary, and things worthy of obligatory respect were linked 
•
 
with the sacred. Hence, from the first, it is the alterna­

tion of phases of sociocultural life which gives rise to 
these very different psychological and cultural modes of 
life. Durkheim observed, for instance, that when an indivi­
dual participates in the collective effervescence: 
• 
• 
.•. it is just as though he really were transported 
into a special world, entirely different from the one 
where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment 
filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold 
of him and metamorphose him. How could such experiences 
as these, fail to leave in him the conviction that there 
really exist two heterogeneous and mutually incomparable 
worlds? One is that where daily life drags wear­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--127-­
ily along; but he cannot penetrate into the other 
without at once entering into relations with extra­
ordinary powers that excite him to the point of fren­
zy. The first is the profane world, the second that 
of sacred things (EF:250). 
Thus, Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different 
worlds of human experience: ordinary days spent by dispersed 
egos in utilitarian tasks, versus extraordinary feast days 
spent by moralized persons in concentrated collective cere­
monial. 
On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual a­
vocations which take the greater part of the attention. 
Everyone attends to his own personal business; for 
most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the 
exigencies of material life, and the principal incen­
tive to economic activity has always been private in­
terest. On feast days, on the contrary, these preoc­
cupations are necessarily eclipsed; being essentially 
profane, they are excluded from these sacred periods. 
At this time, their thoughts are centered upon their 
common beliefs, their common traditions, the memory 
of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of which 
they are the incarnation; in a word, upon social things 
(EF: 399-90) . 
Now, due to his own polemical situation and cultural commit­
ments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with the so­
cial and the moralized person, and the profane with disper­
sed egos engaged in common and utilitarian activity. I be­
lieve, however, that the validity of Durkheim's insight into 
the universality of sacred and profane cultural symboliza­
tions can be considered quite apart from the peculiar con­
tents of referents which he utilized. I believe that Durk­
heim appeared to have made a basic mistake by seemingly ban­
ishing common and9ractical activity, especially in the eco­
nomic sphere, from the all-important realm of the social and 
the moral (see also Book Three). Unfortunately, his polem­
ics led him here to extreme statements contrary to other parts 
of his own doctrine, such as the following sociologically in­
advisable thesis: "The principal incentive to economic act­
ivity has always been private interest." This is only true 
if economic action is to be regarded solely from the biologi­
calor utilitarian point of view. However, I believe that one 
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could mount a properly sociological view of economic action, 
drawing	 in part from Durkheim himself (see also Book Three): 
Even the material interests which these great reli­
gious ceremonies are designed to satisfy the public 
order and are therefore social. Society as a whole 
is interested that the harvest be abundant, that the 
rain fall at the right time and not excessively, that 
the animals reproduce regularly. So it is society 
that is in the forefront of every consciousness; it 
dominates and directs all conduct; that is equivalent 
to saying that it is more living and active, and con­
sequently, more real, than in profane times (EF:390). 
b.	 The Positive Pole of Sociocultural Life: Attributes of 
the Sacred 
According to Durkheim, key distinguishing characteris­
tics of "sacredness" include: hierarchical value, the moral 
authority and obligatory respect due to high position, its 
opposition to, or ability to repel, the profane, and its "con­
tagiousness." Such attributes are, of course, linked together. 
It is important to remember at the outset, however, that the 
sacred and the profane are relationally defined--that is, 
their dichotomous existence is inter-dependent. Their contrast 
is necessary to their very mutual existence; much like the 
contrast between figure and field is necessary to perception. 
Second, following the same metaphor, just as localized figures 
depend for their separate perceptual existence upon contrast 
with the prior existence of a more generalized background 
field, so too does the profane depend upon the prior exist­
ence of the more fundamental category of the sacred. Or, in 
other words, as Poggi (1972) observes, even the profane itself 
is a religious creation! For the sacred defines not only it­
self, but its opposite as well. Thus, the anchor of the sym­
bolic system of society and the person is the sacred; it is 
the ground of human existence. While the negative pole of the 
profane is a necessary element, only the sacred is sufficient. 
Let us now explore some of these more or less paradoxical con­
tentions of Durkheim in his magisterial Elementary Forms. 
First, it is well to remember that Durkheim directed 
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our attention toward religion as the primal evolutionary 
matrix of society, culture, and the person; I call this his 
seminal thesis of the "primitive sacral complex" (see a suc­
ceeding chapter in this Book). This meant that in generic 
terms Durkheim defined religion's role in social, cultural, 
and phenonenological process in relational terms. That is, 
religion referred to the energizing and guiding oppositions 
between sacred and profane, on the one hand, and the micro 
and macrocosm on the other. In etymological terms, this mean­
ing of religion was as re-ligare that which binds or ties 
everything together, and orients experience, and guides us 
toward a common goal. 
This is one reason why Durkheim constantly repeated his 
contention that sacredness is superimposed upon objects, pla­
ces, and things by society--"anything can be sacred." Now, 
while I have criticized this position that symbols are utter­
ly arbitrary and conventional, I believe that Durkheim's cen­
tral thrust here was correct in emphasizing that symbolic sets 
and series of equations are socioculturally generated. They 
are not natural "givens." Indeed, using Levi-Strauss's funda­
mental binary opposition between nature and culture, these 
symbolic sets of equations are the interface between "condi­
tions" and "intentions." Symbols are our own creations, the 
means by which we make and remake ourselves. Therefore, the 
first key to understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal 
significance of the opposition between the sacred and the pro­
fane is to be sought in terms of the symbolic sets of equa­
tions by which society, culture, and person are progressively 
constructed. 
Early in The Elementary Forms, for instance, Durkheim 
defined religion, as the symbolic interface between nature 
and culture, society and person, in terms of the compounding 
series of oppositions between the collectively defined sacred­
ness and profaneness. 
All known religious beliefs, whether simple or complex, 
present one common characteristic: they presuppose a 
classification of all things, real and ideal .•. into 
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two classes or opposed groups, generally designated 
by ... the words profane and sacred. This division of 
the world into two domains, the one containing all 
that is sacred, the other all that is profane, is the 
distinctive trait of religious thought. The beliefs, 
myths, dogmas, and legends are either representations 
or systems of representations which express the nature 
of sacred things, the virtues and powers which are at­
tributed to them, or their relations with each other 
and with profane things. But by sacred things one must 
not understand simply those personal beings which are 
called gods or spirits: a rock, a tree, a spring, a 
pebble, a piece of wood, a house, in a word, anything 
can be sacred (EF:52). 
In his drive to emphasize the social creation of sacredness, 
Durkheim argued that this positive pole of sociocultural life 
is not based upon the inherent qualities of objects. 
The sacred character assumed by an object is not implied 
in the intrinsic properties of this latter: it is added 
to them. The world of religious things. is no~one part­
D:urar-aspect of empirical nature; it is superimposed 
upon it (EF:26l). -
Durkheim resisted, therefore, all efforts to narrowly circum­
scribe the parameters of religious symbolism; indeed, he had 
to do so if he was to successfully maintain his tacit conten­
tion that religious action is the constitutive foundation 
of human life. Thus, definitions of religion cannot be limited 
solely to consideration of spirits, gods, rites, etc.; rather, 
any definition must refer to the massive and sustained social, 
cultural, and phenomenological impacts of religious action. 
The circle of sacred objects cannot be determined, 
then, once and fcrall. Its extent varies infinitely, 
according to the different religions. That is how Bud­
dhism is a religion: in default of gods, it admits 
the existence of sacred things, namely, the four noble 
truths and the practices derived from them. {Footnote: 
not to mention the sage and the saint who practice 
these truths and who for that reason are sacred (EF: 
52) . 
Now, the particular ceremonial occasions whereby the op­
positions between the sacred and the profane are symbolically 
orchestrated, and human energies mobilized, are called rites. 
Religious rites serve to concentrate collective attentions 
and intentions; as a solar mirror collects the rays of the 
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sun, ceremonial and ritual act as the focal point by which 
the refractory rays of life are gathered up together and 
fused into the most potent instrument of society. The rite, 
the magic circle, is thus the point of origin, and contin­
uing creative center of sociocultural life (see, for example, 
Josef Pieper, 1953). 
A rite can have this character; in fact, the rite 
does not exist which does not have it to a certain 
degree. There are words, expressions, and formula 
which can be pronounced only by the mouths of con­
secrated persons; th8€e are gestures and movements 
which everybody can~perform. If the Vedic sacrifice 
has had such an efficacy that, according to mythol­
ogy, it was the creator of the gods ... it is because 
it possessed a virtue comparable to that of the most 
sacred beings (EF:52). 
Now, the creative character of these socioculturally genera­
ted symbols is clearly manifest in the sacred objects of the 
Australian aboriginees. The churinga, Durkheim observed, not 
only" ... keeps the profane at a distance," but it also has: 
... all sorts of marvellous properties: by contact 
it heals wounds ... it has the same power over sick­
ness; it is useful for making the beard grow; it con­
fers important powers over the totemic species, whose 
normal reproduction it ensures; it gives new force, 
courage, and perserverance, while, on the other hand, 
it depresses and weakens their enemies. This latter 
belief is so firmly rooted that when two combatants 
stand pitted against one another, if one sees that 
the other has brought the churinga against him, he 
loses confidence and his defeat is certain (EF:142-3). 
Clearly, this passage reveals the centrality of symbols of 
prime potency within aboriginal culture. Following Durkheim, 
Pieper, and Evans-Pritchard, we may now discover why through 
religious ritual man "ascends to the kingdom of freedom." 
First, because religion in the sense of re-ligare places 
man in direct and mutually obligatory relationships with the 
generative and directive sources of the macrocosm. Second, 
because freedom is thus defined relationally--it is not mere­
ly a negative category, a state from which we escape from 
constraint, from negative being. Rather, human freedom is 
seen here as a voluntary and consistent relationship with 
the generative and directive sources of the cosmos. 
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Next, Durkheim asked: how is the sacred to be disting­
uished from the profane? His first answer was: reflective 
judgments made about reality always distinguish gradations 
or hierarchy of value. Human reality is neither simple nor 
homogeneous; rather, rankings and invidious status distinc­
tions of higher and lower, are perennially made. Clearly, 
greater dignity and honor--in short, va1ue--are accorded to 
those things which come as if "from on high." 
One might be tempted, first of all, to define them by 
the place they are generally assigned in the hierarchy 
of things. They are naturally considered superior in 
dignity and power to profane things, and particularly 
to man, when he is only a man and has nothing sacred 
about him. One thinks of himself as occupying an in­
ferior and dependent position in relation to them; and 
surely this conception is not without some truth (EF:52-3). 
Then, Durkheim noted that the respect we accord sacred objects, 
places, and times differs greatly from the practical attitude 
by which we regard common, everyday things. 
The sentiments which they inspire in us differ 
from those we have for simple visible objects. As long 
as these latter are reduced to their empirical charact­
eristics as shown in ordinary experience, and as long 
as the religious imagination has not metamorphosed them, 
we entertain for them no feeling which resembles respect, 
and they contain within them nothing that is able to 
raise us outside ourselves. Therefore, the represen­
tations which express them appear to us to be very dif­
ferent from those aroused in us by collective influen­
ces. The two form two distinct and separate mental 
states in our consciousness, just as do the two forms 
of life to which they correspond. Consequently, we get 
the impression that we are in relations with two dis­
tinct sorts of reality and that a sharply drawn line 
of demarcation separates them from each other: on the 
one hand is the world of profane things, on the other, 
that of sacred things (EF:243). 
Further, Durkheim argued that this unique capacity of 
society to construct anchors of our existence, to demarcate 
our lives and attitudes mto two organized and opposing camps, 
is not limited to aboriginal societies. Rather, the ability 
to define some things as worthy of respect and others as de­
serving of "damnation," is a generic capacity of all societ­
ies in all times and places. 
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In the present day just as much as in the past, we see 
society constantly creating sacred things out of ordi­
nary ones. If it happens to fall in love with a man and 
if it thinks it has found in him the principal aspira­
tions that move it, as well as the means of satisfying 
them, this man will be raised above the others, and, as 
it were, deified. Opinion will invest him with a majes­
ty exactly analogous to that protecting the gods .... In 
addition to men, society also consecrates things, espe­
cially ideas. If a belief is unanimously shared by a peo­
ple, then ... it is forbidden to touch it ... to deny it 
or contest it. NOw, the prohibition of criticism is an 
interdiction like the other and proves the presence of 
something sacred. Even today, howsoever great may be the 
liberty which we accord to others, a man who should to­
tally deny progress or ridicule the human ideal to which 
modern societies are attached would produce the effect 
of a sacrilege. There is at least one principle which 
those most devoted to free examination of everything 
tend to place above discussion and to regard as untouch­
able •.. as sacred: this is the very principle of free 
examination (EF:243-4). 
However, Durkheim reflected, hierarchical gradation and 
high moral authority, while necessary elements, are insuffi­
cient by themselves to distinguish sacredness. It is important 
to note that when Durkheim suggested that hierarchical scales 
rank phenomena in terms of more or less value, he acknowledged 
here an underlying gradation by degree. That is, there is a 
continuum here ranging from extremely sacred to neutral to ex­
tremely profane. Indeed, Durkheim admitted: "It must not be 
lost to view that there are sacred things of every degree, and 
that there are some in relation to which a man feels himself 
relatively at his ease" (EF:53). Thus, I believe that Evans­
Pritchard's (1965) and W. H. Stanner's(1967) objections to Durk­
heim's seemingly rigid dichotomy between sacred and profane 
are lessened. 
In summarizing the two extremes of the sociocultural 
hierarchy of valuation, Durkheim next argued that an addition­
al key criterion distinguishing sacredness from profaneness is 
their radical polar opposition to one another. Durkheim appear­
ed to argue here in rather static and categorical terms that 
the opposition between these two poles is absolute. Such a 
statement, however, as numerous critics of this aspect of Durk­
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heim's sociology of religion have pointed out, is both theo­
retically and empirically untenable. I believe that taking 
Durkheim's statements here too literally, simply at face va­
lue, is both unjustified and misleading. 
But if a purely hierarchical distinction is a criter­
ion at once too general and too imprecise, there is 
nothing left with which to characterize the sacred in 
its relation to the profane except their heterogeneity. 
However, this heterogeneity is sufficient to charact­
erize this classification of things and to distinguish 
it from all others, because it is very particular: it 
is absolute (EF:53). -­
However, again Durkheim's rhetorical animus was responsible 
here for this seeming over-statement. The most viable meaning 
of Durkheim's notion of the absoluteness of the opposition be­
tween the sacred and the profane is that their polar relation­
ship is an absolute societal universal. In other words, while 
their opposition is relational--not rigid and absolute, none­
theless, it is true that their polar opposition is a cultural 
universal. 
However, my attempted rescue of Durkheim from his polem­
ical indiscretions is. partially restricted by his penchant for 
rhetorical excess. Had he not (I believe mistakenly) identi­
fied the ego and utilitarian activity with the profane, Durk­
heim would not have made the following revealing statement: 
In the history of human thought there exists no other 
example of two categories of things so profoundly dif­
ferentiated or so radically opposed to one another. 
The traditional opposition of good and bad is nothing 
beside this; for the good and the bad are only two op­
posed species of the same class, namely morals, just as 
sickness and health are two different aspects of the 
same order of facts, life, while the sacred and profane 
have always and everywhere been conceived by the human 
mind as two distinct classes, as two worlds between 
which there is nothing in common (EF:53-4). 
Had Durkheim set his anti-utilitarian polemics aside and 
rested content with the universal opposition between good and 
evil, truth and error, the pure and the impure, order and chaos, 
and so forth, he would have spared himself much undeserved op­
probium and us much confusion. While his rhetorical excess led 
him astray, his underlying purpose comes through clearly enough 
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in the following passage: 
We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal be­
ings to whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves 
and our own interests at the same time; we cannot devote 
ourselves entirely to the group and entirely to our own 
egoism at once (EF:356). 
When Durkheim set his programmatic statements aside and 
returned to description rather than polemic, his real inten­
tions and empirical concerns prevailed. For instance, I find 
little that is objectionable in the following quote: 
The forces which play in one area are not simply those 
which are met witn in the other, but a little stronger; 
they are of a different sort. In different religions, 
this opposition has been conceived in different ways. 
Here, to separate these two sorts of things, it has 
seemed sufficient to localize them in different parts 
of the physical universe; there, the first have been 
put into an ideal and transcendental world, while the 
material world is left in full possession of the others. 
But howsoever much the forms of contrast may vary, the 
fact of the contrast is universal (EF:54). 
In short, as I earlier argued, although the symbolic contents 
of this opposition may vary, the "fact of the contrast" between 
the sacred and the profane is a cultural universal. This uni­
versal attribute gives rise to Durkheim's definition of reli­
gious phenomena. 
The real characteristic of religious phenomena is that 
they always suppose a bipartite division of the whole 
universe, known and ;{nowable, into two classes which em­
brace all that exists, but which radically exclude each 
other. Sacred things are those which the interdictions 
protect and isolate; profane things, those to which 
these interdictions are applied and which must remain 
at a distance from the first. Religious beliefs are the 
representations which express the nature of sacred things 
and the relations which they sustain, either with each 
other or with profane things. Finally, rites are the 
rules of conduct which prescribe how a man should com­
port himself in the presence of these sacred objects. 
When a certain number of sacred things sustain relations 
of coordination or subordination with each other in such 
a way as to form a system having a certain unity, but 
which is not comprised within any other system of the 
same sort, the totality of these beliefs and their cor­
responding rites constitutes a religion (EF:56). 
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c. The Contagiousness of the Sacred 
Earlier analogies likening the sacred with various
• energy forms and flows suggest what Durkheim meant when he 
referred to the "contagiousness of sacred forces," as ano­
ther of their distinguishing qualities. Like a sort of "sacred 
electricity," those phenonena endowed with "charismatic ener­
• gy" reveal great elusiveness and fluidity. "A sacred charact­
er is to a high degree contagious" (EF:254). The sacred is 
first and foremost to be regarded as an energizing force; its 
very intensity "incites it to spreading" (EF:363).
• This extraordinary intensity and diffuseness of "sacred 
electricity" has at least two important consequences. First, 
it requires that the profane be isolated from the sacred, 
thus giving rise to myriad boundary-making efforts; second,
• as the sacred energy flows and spreads, it tends to organize 
the whole life of the group into a symbolically aligned mi­
crocosm of the universe. We shall discuss the first aspect 
now, and come back to the "global" nature of sacred-profane
• symbolic cosmization shortly. 
It is important to note, moveover, that the constant ef­
fort directed toward isolating and prohibiting contact between 
these opposing forces is largely intended to protect the sacred
• from con-fusion with the profane. The energetic contagiousness 
of the sacred requires that it be bottled up, as it were, and 
held in its most potent and pure state. If the sacred refers 
to the sum total of all the aspects of the virtuous side of
• the universal dichotomy, then, as the focal or gathering point 
of these sacred energies, it is necessary to maintain its 
clarity and undiluted potency. Indeed, this is precisely what 
• 
is referred to in the etymological meaning of profane-­
pro-fanum -- that which is outside the temple. 
• 
Durkheim's analysis of totemism rests on this underly­
ing notion of a primal undifferentiated "sacred electricity." 
Of the American Indians, Durkheim commented: "Now the common 
principle of life is the wakan. The totem is the means by 
which an individual is put into relations with this source of 
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energy; if the totem has any powers, it is because it incar­
nates the wakan" (EF:224). Indeed, the wakan or charisma­
tic force is: 
... the original matter out of which have been con­
structed those beings of every sort which the reli­
gions of all times have consecrated and adored. The 
spirits, demons, genii, and gods of every sort are 
only the concrete forms taken by this energy, or 
"potentiality" in individualizing itself, in fixing 
itself upon a certain determined object or point in 
space, or in centering itself around an ideal and 
legendary being (EF:228). 
It should be noted, in passing, that Durkheim's description 
of the "essential consubstantiality of all sacred things" and 
the "fluidi ty" of sacred energies converges closely wi th Weber's 
description of charisma and the evolution of the gods in his 
magisterial The Sociology of Religion (1963,1968). Durkheim's 
proposition that " ... the wakan .•. comes and goes through 
the world, and sacred things are the points upon which it a­
lights" (EF:228-Q' could have been written by Weber, or per­
haps it was the other way around, as Mauss once insisted (see 
R. Aron, 1967: 271; E. Tiryakian, 1966:332, #7). 
Durkheim's evolutionism was so strong that he discerned 
this primal, undifferentiated flow of sacred energy as lying 
back of all the more crystallized spirits and gods. Instead 
of gods at the origin of religious life, Durkheim discovered 
"indefinite, anonymous forces," and it is for this reason that 
he refused to define religion solely in terms of gods. 
We are now in a better condition to understand why 
it has been impossible to define religion by the idea 
of mythical personalities, gods, or spirits; it is be­
cause this way of representing religious things is in 
no way inherent in their nature. What we find at the 
origin and basis of religious thought are not deter­
mined and distinct objects and beings possessing a sa­
cred character of themselves; they are indefinite po­
wers, anonymous forces, more or less numerous in dif­
ferent societies, and sometimes even reduced to a unity, 
and whose impersonality is strictly comparable to that 
of the physical forces whose manifestations the sciences 
of nature study. As for particular sacred things, they 
are only individualized forms of this essential princi­
ple .•.• Even the most elementary mythological construct­
ions are secondary products which cover a system of be­
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liefs, at once simpler and more obscure, vaguer, and 
more essential, which form the solid foundations upon 
which the religious systems are built. It is this prim­
itive foundation which our analysis of totemism has en­
abled us to reach (EF:229, 232). 
Additionally, Durkheim noted that the sacred and the 
profane are not simply defined by the obligatory respect due 
to the former. Rather, their active antagonism implies that 
the universality of the rigorous systems of interdictions 
serve to "close one sphere to another," for "between them 
there is an abyss" (EF:357). The particular reason for this 
"exceptional isolation and mutual exclusion" "Nhi.ch Durkheim 
found in the "contagious" nature of sacred phenomena, and 
thus the corresponding need to keep these anchors of socio­
cultural life from being irretrievably confounded one in the 
other. Thus, there are two forces at work here: the conta­
giousness of the "sacred electricity," and the sort of random­
izing entropy characterizing all energy flows . 
..• by a sort of contradiction, the sacred world is in­
clined, as it were, to spread itself into this same pro­
fane world which it excludes elsewhere; at the same time 
that it repels it, it tends to flow into it as soon as 
it approaches. This is why it is necessary to keep them 
at a distance from one another and to create a sort of 
vacuum between them. What makes these precautions ne­
cessary is the extraordinary contagiousness of a sacred 
character. Far from being attached to the things which 
are marked with it, it is endowed with a sort of elu­
siveness. Even the m()!=;+: superficial or roundabout con­
tact is sufficient to enable it to spread from one ob­
ject to another. Religious forces are represented 
in the mind in such a way that they always seem to es­
cape from the points where they reside and to enter every­
thing passing within their range .•.. It is also upon this 
principle of the contagiousness of sacredness that all 
the ritesofconsecration repose. The sanctity of the 
churinga is so great that is action is even felt at a 
distance (EF:358). 
Because of the contagiousness of this charismatic ener­
gy, Durkheim next explored the whole system of interdictions 
which spread out like reversed magnets from the ritual core 
throughout the whole fabric of social life. The pure is like 
a distilled precipitate that only retains its unique quali­
ties and potencies when isolated and concentrated. Since, if 
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left to themselves the sacred and profane would confound 
themselves in the generic flow of life and existence, social 
interdictions or taboos become necessary to maintain their 
separate identities. Like survey markers continuously erased 
by time and circumstance, the boundary lines between the pure 
and the impure, between order and chaos, must be constantly 
maintained and periodically realigned. Dirt, weeds, noise, 
chance, ugliness, and so on, these and other phenomena which 
constantly threaten the clear outlines and meaningful patterns 
of our axial organizing coordinates must be controlled and in­
terdicted. 
Since, in virtue of this extraordinary power of expan­
sion, the slightest contact, the least proximity, either 
material or simply moral, suffices to draw religious 
forces out of their domain, and since, on the other hand, 
they cannot leave it without contradicting their nature, 
a whole system of measures is indispensable for maintain­
ing the two worlds at a respectful distance from one ano­
ther. This is why it is forbidden to the profane, not 
only to touch, but even to see or hear that which is sa­
cred, and why these two sorts of life cannot be mixed in 
their consciousnesses. Precautions are necessary to keep 
them apart because, though opposing one another, they 
tend to confuse themselves into one another (EF:359-60). 
Finally, I must insist that this passage clarifies some of 
the intellectual controversies which have swirled around these 
points. First, contrary to Durkheim's earlier extreme "abso­
lutistic" statements, and contrary to Stanner's and Evans­
Pritchard's acceptance of these rhetorical excesses at their 
face value, in his more empirically descriptive work Durkheim 
never radically dichotomized these polarities nor rigidly ab­
solutized their universal opposition. For if there can really 
be no contact between the sacred and the profane, what need 
have we then of interdicting their possible confusion? Further, 
what need would we have of rites that transform one category 
into another? Indeed, as we shall see, religious life is only 
possible and even necessary if there is at least the possibil­
ity of continuous contact and threats of confounding the sa­
cred with the profane. Much tension in sociocultural life 
depends upon just this risk of confusion and pollution; 
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the irony of the human condition depends on it. Second, it 
is clear that the meaning of their interdicted separation is
• to maintain the axial boundaries, the survey markers on the 
base map of culture. Third, these cultural maps are not sole­
ly cognitive, but also simultaneously moral, emotional, and 
imaginative as well.
• d.	 Pollution and Walling Off the Profane: The Negative or 
Ascetic Rites 
Beyond the contagiousness of the sacred, and the need to
• keep it potent in its concentrated, pure form, there is also 
need to keep profaneness segregated from the sacred. Not only 
must these elements not be allowed to mix and confound them­
selves in the homogeneity of life, but they must also be wal­
• led off, as it were, from each other if the order of the mi­
crocosm is to maintained. This is the function (or consequence) 
of the negative or ascetic rites. If harmony in the cosmos is 
to be maintained, the relationships between the sacred and the
• profane, in terms of the alignment of the microcosm with the 
macrocosm, must be continuously regulated and reaffirmed. 
Through these ascetic or regulatory rites, we establish and 
reinforce boundaries separating the profane from the sacred.
• Naturally, these interdictions spread to the whole of socio­
cultural life. Time, space, objects, events, people, and so 
forth, in short, all aspects of life, become classified, se­
parated, and re-articulated in terms of the fundamental an­
• chor of oppositions between sacred and profane. The whole 
• 
world becomes valorized, that is, society progressively imposes 
positive, negative (and neutral) valences on all details of 
existence. 
In genetic-evolutionary terms, it is important to note 
• 
how primitive societies thus tend to become hedged in by ri­
tual prescriptions and proscriptions. Sacral and magical ta­
boos come to permeate tribal life. Questions of right and 
wrong, of truth and error, become inextricably bound up with 
the cosmic consciousness reflected in the mirror of the micro­
•
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cosmic conscience. Sin, guilt, and pollution come from vio­
lating the boundaries between sacred and profane. Disturban­
• ces of the harmonious relations between macro and microcosm 
in bringing illness, attack, bad weather, etc., threaten the 
entire society. Thus, the first major forms of deviance are 
those of the "religious criminal" whose violation of the 
• norms laid down by the collective conscience must be strong­
ly repressed. As noted, profaneness and deviance are inti­
mately intertwined. Moreover, the interdiction or prohibition 
of contact itself becomes sacrosanct, so that the rule in­
• stead of the actual violation becomes gradually sanctioned. 
Thus, the image rather than the event gradually takes over, 
giving rise to all those more or less "irrational" restrict­
ive practices surviving long after their original reason for 
• being has been lost forever to memory. 
Now, the contact between sacred and profane is both in­
evitable and even necessary. In view of their opposition and 
prescribed separation, this prohibited mixing might seem para­
• doxical. Yet, we should always remember that these are rela­
tional polarities; if there were absolutely no contact possi­
ble between them, we would have no way of contrasting them, 
and thus, even of identifying them as universal contraries. 
It is only because, prior to conscious and systematic reflect­
ion, they are simply bound up with the mix and flow of every­
day life. Paradoxically, it is only ~ profanations and de­
filements that we are able to separate out the sacred from
• the non-sacred in the first place. Second, however, beyond 
the inevitable pollutions of the pure and creative sources 
of life, points of communion must be possible if we are to 
regularly experience re-creation by the energizing powers of
• "sacred electricity" in our daily lives. There must be regu­
larly scheduled passages from the profane to the sacred world, 
and back again. If these "doors II do not open, the crucial 
links binding the micro to the macrocosm would be fatally 
snapped. 
Even while it tends to permeate life because of its 
•
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fluidity and contagiousness, the sacred or positive pole of 
sociocultural life is also separated and protected. Sacred
• things are, by definition, a "world apart." 
By definition, sacred beings are separated beings. 
That which characterizes them is that there is a 
break in continuity between them and the profane 
beings •••. A whole group of rites has the object of
• 
of realizing this state of separation which is es­
sential. Since their function is to prevent undue 
mixings and to keep one of these two domains from 
encroaching upon the other, they are only able to 
impose abstentions or negative acts •.• taboos •.. 
interdictions (EF:337-8).
• Thus, things worthy of respect must be protected from con­
tamination with things of little or negative value. In short, 
the fundamental classificatory principle is that things of 
unequal value must be separated. This principle is especially
• important because of the tendency of the sacred to spread by 
virtue of its own energy, and thus to confound itself in les­
ser states of being. 
All that is sacred is the object of respect, and every
• sentiment of respect is translated in him who feels it, by moveme~ts of inhibition. In fact, a respected being 
is always expressed in the consciousness by a represen­
tation which, owi~g to the emotion which it inspires, 
is charged with a high mental energy: consequently, it 
is armed in such a way as to reject to a distance every
• other representation which denies it in whole or in part. 
• 
Now, the sacred world and the profane world are antagon­
istic to each other. They correspond to two forms of life 
which mutually exclude each other, or which at least can­
not be lived at the same time with the same intensity. 
We cannot give ourselves up entirely to the ideal to 
whom the cult is addressed and also to ourselves and 
our own interests at the same time: we cannot devote 
ourselves entirely to the qroup and entirely to our own 
egoism at once (EF: 356-7) • 
Now, the critical factor is not the separation of sacred and 
• profane beings or things in the external world, for life it­
self combines both poles of existence inextricably in its on­
ward flow. Indeed, since the origin of these separations which 
we project outward and imprint upon the world is really cul­
• ture and mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred and 
profane lies within man himself. The interdiction is, first 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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and foremost, ~ phenomenological injunction that man directs 
toward his own conscience and consciousness, towards his own 
imagination and will. 
Here there are two systems of conscious states which 
are directed and which direct our conduct toward op­
posite poles. So the one having the greater power of 
action should tend to exclude the other from the con­
sciousness. When we think of holy things, the idea of 
a profane object cannot enter the mind without encoun­
tering grave resistance; something within us opposes 
itself to its installation. This is because the repre­
sentation of a sacred thing does not tolerate neigh­
bors. But this psychic antagonism and this mutual ex­
clusion of ideas should naturally result in the exclu­
sion of the corresponding things. If the ideas are not 
to coexist, the things must not touch each other or have 
any sort of relations. This is the very principle of the 
interdict (EF:357). 
Both thought and action must be different in the pres­
ence of sacred things. Sacred places, sacred times, impose 
their own norms and appropriate behaviors. One need not be 
told how to act in a sacred place, for instance; it issues 
its own requirements; indeed, a fully socialized adult would 
not think of profaning a church, temple, courtroom, hospital, 
historical site, etc., regardless of whether or not others 
are there at the same time to sanction potential deviance. 
Since it (the sacred) is opposed to the profane world 
. .• it must be treated in its own peculiar way: it 
would be a misunderstanding of its nature and d confu­
sion of it with something that it is not, to make use 
of the gestures, language, and attitudes which we em­
ploy in our relations with ordinary things .... We may 
handle the former freely; we speak freely to vulgar 
beings; so we do not touch the sacred beings, or we 
touch them only with reserve; we do not speak in their 
presence, or we do not speak the common language there. 
All that is used in our commerce with the one must be 
excluded from our commerce with the other (EF:357). 
Now, there are various kinds of taboos meant to separate 
the sacred from the non-sacred. For not even the sacred is a 
homogeneous category. First, we must distinguish between var­
ious degrees and types of sacredness; for example, greater 
• 
and lesser forms of charismatic power, and their differentia­
tion by task • 
•
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•.• there are interdictions of different sorts which 
it is important to distinguish ..•. These interdictions 
are intended to prevent all communication between the 
purely sacred and the impurely sacred, between the sa­
credly auspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All 
these interdictions ... corne from the fact ~~~~there 
are inequalities and incompatibilities between sacred 
things (EF:338, 340). 
Especially important here are the oppositions between magical 
and religious taboos. Durkheim distinguishej between magical 
and religious interdictions in terms of the differing reasons 
for their respective sanctions. 
First of all, beside those corning from religion, there 
are others which are due to magic. The two have this in 
common, that they declare certain things incompatible, 
and prescribe the separation of the things whose incom­
patibility is thus proclaimed. But there are also very 
grave differences between them. In the first place, the 
sanctions are not the same in the two cases (EF:338). 
According to Durkheim, magical sanctions revenge violation of 
taboo in an automatic fashion, as if it were a mechanical fact. 
Religious sanctions, over and above the seemingly mechanical 
retribution forthcoming to all violations, adds a real socio­
cultural and psychological punishment. There is no "sin" in 
magic, and therefore no need for re-definition of self and 
internalization of guilt . 
... the violation of the religious interdicts is fre­
quently believed .•. to bring about material disorders 
mechanically, from which the guilty man will suffer, 
and which are regarded as a judgement on his own act. 
But even if these really carne about this spontaneous 
and automatic judgement is not the only one; it is al­
ways completed by another one, supposing human inter­
vention. A real punishment is added to this, if it does 
not anticipate it, and this one is deliberately inflict­
ed by men; or at least there is a blame and reprobation. 
Even when the sacrilege has been punished, as it were, 
by the sickness or natural death of its author, it is 
also defamed; it offends opinion which reacts against 
it; it puts the man who did it in fault. On the con­
trary, the magical interdiction is judged only by the 
material consequences which the forbidden act is be­
lieved to produce, with a sort of physical necessity. 
In disobeying, a man runs risks similar to those which 
an invalid exposes himself in not following the~~vice 
of his physician; but in this case disobedience is not 
a fault; it creates no indignation. There is no sin in 
magic (EF:338-9). 
•
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Continuing the contrast, Durkheim proposed that magic 
is basically asocial, and therefore nonnormative; it relates 
mainly to the factual or behavioral order. Religious inter­
dictions, by contrast, are primarily concerned with the so­
ciocultural and phenomenological order of IIsacredness.1I Ma­
gical proscriptions, on the other hand, are concerned main­
ly with the technical impropriety of linking inappropriate 
profane utilities. In sum, religious interdictions are ethical 
II categorical imperatives,1I while magical interdictions are 
IItechnical" recipes. 
This difference in sanction is due to profound differ­
ence in the nature of the interdictions. The religious 
interdiction necessarily implies the notion of sacred­
ness; it comes from the respect inspired by the sacred 
object, and its purpose is to keep this respect from 
failing. On the other hand, the interdictions of magic 
suppose only a wholly lay notion of property. The things 
which the magician recommends be kept separate are those 
which, by reason of their characteristic properties, can­
not be brought together and confused without danger .... 
Magic lives on profanations ... and reasons of temporal 
utility. In a word, religious interdictions are categor­
ical imperatives; others are useful maxims, the first 
form of hygienic and medical interdictions. We cannot 
study two orders of facts as different as these simul­
taneously, or even under the same name, without confu­
sion. We are only concerned with religious interdict­
ions here (EF:339). 
However, even with these basic distinctions, Durkheim acknow­
ledged that magical and sacral interdictions are continuous 
in other respects. For Durkheim made magical taboos a deriva­
tive subset of sacral-social ones. 
This is not saying that there is a radical break in 
continuity between the religous and the magical in­
terdictions: on the contrary, it is one whose true na­
ture is not decided .•.. Magical interdicts cannot be 
understood except as a function of the religious ones 
(EF : 339, #5) . 
This kinship is true regardless of whether the technical pro­
hibition carne first and then was subsequently secularized, or 
whether it was first sacral and then only later became de-sac­
ralized, yet was still customarily observed. In short, magical 
taboos are directed primarily toward cognitive norms of con­
sciousness, while sacral taboos are directed mainly toward 
•
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ethical norms of conscience. As always, questions of con­
science and right action tend to override questions of con­
sciousness and right thinking. 
Having thus set aside magical taboo from prime consi­
deration, Durkheim next briefly distinguished between types 
of sacral interdictions. Recognizing that there are degrees 
of sacredness, Durkheim noted that " ... the more sacred re­
pels the less sacred" (EF:341). Thus, all the interdictions 
" arrange themselves into two classes: the interdictions 
between the sacred and the profane, and the purely or the im­
purely sacred" (EF:341) . 
... the most imp~rtant interdictions .•. are intend­
ed to prevent all communication between the purely sa­
cred and the impurely sacred, between the sacredly in­
auspicious and the sacredly inauspicious. All these in­
terdictions have one common characteristic; they come 
not from the fact that some things are sacred while oth­
ers are not, but from the fact that there are inequali­
ties and incompatibilities between sacred things (EF:340). 
But Durkheim also set aside these various types of interdict­
ions, as not really touching "what is essential in the idea 
of sacredness." Such observances could not lead to Durkheim's 
central sociological interest, namely, the cult or moral com­
munity and its collectively representational rites. All his 
statements concerning the radical abyss separating the sacred 
and the profane aside, we must remember that Durkheim here in­
sisted: "Before all, a cult is made by regular relations be­
tween the profane and the sacred" (EF:340). 
Durkheim next turned our attention to the center of his 
interest: those interdicts prohibiting contact between the sa­
cred and the profane. Again, it is important to note that the 
setting of these crucial boundaries is a one-directional pro­
cess, for it is the sacred which defines both its boundaries, 
and also walls off the profane. The profane may threaten the 
sacred and the order of the microcosm, but only sacral symbol­
ism and action is sufficient to organize the world and main­
tain the all-important harmonious relations between microcosm 
and macrocosm . 
•
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... there is another system of religious interdictions 
which is much more extended and important; this is the 
one which separates, not different species of sacred 
things, but all that is sacred from all that is pro­
fane. So it is derived immediately from the notion of 
sacredness itself, and it limits itself to expressing 
and realizing this. Thus, it furnishes the material for 
a veritable cult, and even of a cult which is at the ba­
sis of all the others; for the attitude which it pre­
scribes is one which the worshipper must never depart 
from in all his relations with the sacred. It is what 
we call the negative cult. We may say that its inter­
dicts are the religious interdicts par excellence (EF: 
- 340). 
e. Types of Sacral Interdictions 
Sacral interdictions which seek to separate and restrict 
the profane from the sacred are the focus of religious cults. 
The ritual is the means by which the cult implements these in­
terdictions. Durkheim called this the negative or ascetic cult. 
These interdictions can take multiple forms. The preeminent 
taboos are those concerned with restricting contact between 
these two constructed anchors of sociocultural life . 
Before all are the interdictions of contact: these are 
the original taboos, of which the others are scarcely 
more than particular varieties. They rest upon the prin­
ciple that the profane should never touch the sacred (EF: 
341) . 
Under certain circumstances, contact with blood, hair, corpses, 
and so on, is forbidden, as the contact is unholy. 
Clearly perilous to violation are alimentary interdict­
ions, especially those concerning the consumption of totemic 
life. 
An exceptionally intimate contact is the one resulting 
from the absorption of food. Hence comes the interdict­
ion against the sacred animals or vegetables, and espe­
cially against those serving as totems. Such an act ap­
pears so sacrilegeous that the prohibition covers even 
adults .•. only the old men attain a sufficient reli­
gious dignity to escape this interdict sometimes (341-2). 
Now, this prohibition works both ways--sacred foods are for­
bidden to the profane, and profane foods are forbidden to 
those considered sacred. Moveover, we see emerging here a 
kind of cosmization of food and human diet. Those who take up 
•
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• 
full-time religious status, or as Weber said "take a lease 
on charisma," as professional ascetics or religious virtuosos, 
inevitably make a systematic, symbolically aligned, and res­
tricted diet part of their methodical regimen . 
•
 
... if certain foods are forbidden to the profane be­

cause they are sacred, certain others, on the contrary,
 
are forbidden to persons of a sacred character, because
 
•
 
they are profane. Thus, it frequently happens that cer­

tain animals are especially designated as the food of
 
women; for this reason they believe that they partake
 
of a feminine nature and they are consequently profane.
 
On the other hand, the young initiate is submitted to
 
a series of rites of particular severity; to give him
 
•
 
the virtues which will enable him to enter into the
 
world of sacred things, from which he had up until then
 
been excluded, they center an exceptionally powerful
 
group of religious forces upon him. Thus, he enters
 
into a state of sanctity which keeps all that is profane
 
at a distance. Then he is not allowed to eat the game
 
•
 
which is regarded as the special food of women (EF:342).
 
The old aphorism "you are what you eat" reminds us that diet,
 
in both meanings of the term, has often become a prime spiri­

tual technology. As an ascetic regimen, the dieter purposely
 
restricts his nutritional intake to some predetermined mini­
mum; as a means of building himself and his disposition, the 
dieter attempts to align the type of character he wishes to 
• 
embrace with the type of foods symbolically associated with 
• 
those specific attributes. This serves as an excellent exam­
ple of sociocultural norms organizing and directing lower bio­
physiological levels; or in Levi-Strauss1s terms, of culture 
organizing nature • 
Certainly, other types of contact are forbidden also. 
Visual recognition, for example: 
One comes into relations with a thing merely by regard­
ing it: a look is a means of contact. This is why the
• 
sight of a sacred thing is forbidden to the profane in 
certain cases. A woman should never see the instruments 
of the cult (EF:342). 
The contagiousness of the sacred, and the potential defilement 
of it by the profane, means that even verbal contact may be
• dangerous. 
The word is another way of entering into relations with 
persons or things. The breath establishes a communica­
• 
•
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• 
tion; this is the part of us which spreads outwards. 
Thus it is forbidden to the profane to address the 
sacred beings or simply to speak in their presence .... 
Besides the sacred things, there are words and sounds 
• 
which have the same character; they should not pass 
the lips of the profane nor enter their ears. There 
are ritual songs which women must not hear under pain 
of death. They may hear the noise of the bull-roarers, 
but only from a distance. Every proper name is consi­
• 
dered an essential element of the person who bears it; 
being closely associated in the mind to the idea of 
this person, it participates in the sentiments which 
the latter inspires. So if the one is sacred, the other 
is too. Therefore, it may not be pronounced in the cour­
se of the profane life (EF:343-4). 
Moreover, in religious ritual, men often acquire another name, 
a special designation that not only signifies their new or re­
born status, but also replaces their ordinary or profane names 
•
 
for sacral purposes.
 
•
 
In addition to their public and everyday names, all men
 
have another which is kept a sec~et: the women and child­

ren do not know it; it is never used in the ordinary life .
 
.•. Th6re are ceremonies during which it is necessary to
 
speak a special language which must not be used for pro­

fane purposes. It is the beginning of a sacred language
 
(EF:344). 
In addition, the common profane appearance must often 
be set aside--men shave, are forced to strip naked, or 
• 
put on special ritual costumes which signify their change of 
being. When approaching the sacred,men must put aside their 
common, ordinary selves, and thus the things signifying this 
profane style of life must also be set aside. 
• 
Not only are the sacred things separated from the pro­
fane, but also nothing which either directly or indi­
rectly concerns the profane life should be confused 
with the religious life. Complete nudity is frequent­
ly demanded of the native as a prerequisite to being 
admitted to participation in the rites; he is required
• 
to strip himself of all his habitual ornaments ..•. If 
he is obliged to decorate himself to play his part in 
ritual, this decoration has to made especially for the 
occasion; it is forbidden to use them in profane affairs; 
when the ceremony is finished, they are buried or burnt 
(EF : 34 4 - 5) •
• Not only must the outward appearance of the self be 
changed when approaching the sacred, but moreover, common and 
• 
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ordinary everyday activities must also be suspended. Thus, 
society constructs not merely personality structures, but 
also time and spatial structure. The temporal rhythms of 
everyday life revolve around these alternating phases of sa­
cred high intensity rites and everyday practical dispersal. 
In general~;~cts characteristic of the ordinary life 
are forbidden while those of the religious life are 
taking place. The act of eating is, of itself, profane; 
for it takes place every day, it satisfies essentially 
utilitarian and material needs, and it is a p~rt of 
out ordinary existence. This is why it is prohoited 
in religious times (EF:345). 
Thus, time is punctuated by the extraordinary effervescence 
of the collective rites. As Halbwachs later showed, even the 
frameworks of memory and anticipation have a social and cult­
ural character. In later societies, of course, it was the reli­
giously sanctioned day of celebration, recollection, and re­
creation that came to anchor the weekly work cycle . 
.•. all temporal occupations are suspended while the 
great religious solemnities are taking place •..• The 
life of the Australian is divided into two very dis­
tinct parts: the one is devoted to hunting, fishing, 
and warfare; the other is consecrated to the cult and 
these two forms of activity mutually exclude and repel 
one another. It is on this principle that the universal 
institution of religious days of rest reposes. The dis­
tinctive character of the feast days in all known reli­
gions is the cessation of work and the suspension of 
public and private life, insofar as it does not a reli­
gious objective (EF:345). 
Once again, however,we see that in counterposing religious 
and economic activity, Durkheim got himself in the bind of 
presuming that the former is social and normatively control­
led and the latter is not. If work is indeed the preeminent 
form of profane activity, then should we not be interested 
in the ways in which it becomes sacralized? And, in turn, the 
way in which the workaday rhythms tend to "secularize" the 
sacred? 
work is an eminent form of profane activity: it 
• 
has no other apparent end than to provide for the 
temporal necessities of life; it puts us in rela­
tions with ordinary things only. On feast days, on 
the contrary, the religious life attains an excep­
•
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tional degree of intensity. So the contrast between 
the two forms of existence is especially marked at 
this moment; consequently, they cannot remain near 
each other. A man cannot approach his god intimately 
while he still bears on him marks of his profane life: 
inversely, he cannot return to his usual occupations 
when a rite has just sanctified him. So the ritual&y 
of rest is only one particular case of the general in­
compatibility separating the sacred from the profane: 
it is the result of an interdiction (EF:346). 
The need for separation takes another form--spatial. 
For example, certain places are inevitably set aside as spe­
cial residences of the sacred. Sanctuaries and cultic ground 
tend to become "churches" and "temples" in the sense of holy 
places and facilities. 
The sacred character of the churinga is so great that 
it communicates itself to the locality where they are 
stored: the women and the uninitiated cannot approach 
it. The religious nature radiates to a distance and com­
municates itself to all the surroundings: everything 
near by participates in this same nature and is there­
fore withdrawn from profane touch. Is one man pursued 
by another? If he succeeds in reaching the (sanctuary) 
he is saved; he cannot be seized there. Even a wounded 
animal which takes refuge there must be respected. Quar­
rels are forbidden there. It is a place of peace •.. a 
sanctuary of the totemic group, a veritable place of 
asylum (EF:142). 
The critical factor here to note is how these interdictions 
become basic temporal, spatial, and cultural anchors of every­
day life. Nature is moralized by culture: in turn, society 
andculture are cosmicized by nature. Therefore, the very 
frameworks of sociocultural life are constructed out of the 
more or less systematic application of these ramifying sacred/ 
profane oppositions. Durkheim noted that even granting the 
complexity of these myriad interdictions, they finally rest 
upon "two fundamental interdictions, which summarize and 
dominate" (EF:346), sociocultural life. 
In the first place, the religious life and the profane 
life cannot coexist in the same place. If the former is 
to develop, a special spot must be placed at its disposi­
tion, from which the second is excluded. Hence comes the 
founding of temples and sanctuaries: these are the spots 
awarded to sacred beings and things and serve them as res­
idences, for they cannot establish themselves in any place 
•
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except on the condition of entirely appropriating to 
themselves all within a certain distance. Such arrange­
ments are so indispensable to all religious life that
• 
even the most inferior religions cannot do without them. 
The spot where the churinga are deposited is a veritable 
sanctuary. So the unintiated are not allowed to approach 
it. It is even forbidden to carryon any profane occupa­
tion whatsoever there ••.• Likewise the religious time 
and the profane time cannot coexist in the same unit of
• 
time. It is necessary to assign determined days or per­
iods to the first, from which all profane occupations 
are excluded. Thus feast days are born. There is no re­
ligion and, consequently, no society which has not known 
and practiced this division of time into two distinct 
parts, alternating with one another according to a law
• 
varying with peoples and civilizations (EF:346-7). 
We shall soon return to the progressive extension of the sa­
cred/profane oppositions throughout the whole of sociocultur­
al life. Let us now briefly turn our 
• 
from fluid to crystallized symbolism, 
of these sacral symbolic forms. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
attention to the passage 
and the autonomization 
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6. Crystallization and Autonomization of Symbolism 
• 
"The images of totemic beings ~~ sacred than the 
•
 
beings themselves" (EF:156). Almost inevitably, due to the al­

ternating rhythms of sociocultural process, and the contagious­

ness of sacred symbols, the significance originally attached to
 
the newly moralized group gradually becomes transferred to the
 
•
 
image of the group. Since such symbols represent the collectiv­

ity to itself, they become the basis of the cultural bond.
 
Social interaction is always symbolic, as every introduct­
ory student learns. By attaining a certain stability, these sa­

• 
cral collective representations enable the group to perdure. 
Since consciences and consciousnesses are constructed through 
the medium of symbolic process, persons ground themselves in 
these group symbols as the anchor of their existence. In this 
•
 
long and complex process, the collectively projected image be­

comes more sacred than the group event which it first symboli­

zed. Inevitably, the fluid and shifting collective representa­

tions become detached from their processual origins, and cry­

stallize into relatively permanent symbolic forms. In short, 
symbolism always tends to become autonomous. The irony of this 
necessary generic process of displacement, substitution, and 
• 
autonomization should, however, not be overlooked (eg. see 
Simmel, 1950). 
•
 
Given the inevitable alternating rhythms of sociocultural
 
process, our next task then is to briefly explore some ways in
 
which newly generated symbols gradually become detached from
 
•
 
their processual origins. In effect, Durkheim asked: what hap­

pens to collective symbols when the moral implosion is over?
 
Once generated, does symbolism fade without a continuing under­

lying collective effervescence? On the contrary, since symbol­

•
 
ism is essential to group life, instead of fading, symbols take
 
on increasing significance. Indeed, symbols serve as prime
 
"time-binders" holding groups together through time and space.
 
Let us now turn to explore Durkheim's outline of the fundamen­

tal constitutive sociocultural process whereby cultural sym­
• 
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•
 
boIs, once detached from their original generating matrices,
 
come to take on a life of their own; how, in short, the image
 
comes to take precedence over the underlying represented real-.
 
ity. Let us first consider Durkheim's earlier distinction be­
tween fluid and crystallized symbolism. 
• 
a. The Passage From Fluid to Crystallized Symbolism 
•
 
True to his processual view of society and culture,Durk­

heim had earlier distinguished (eg. in The Rules and Suicide)
 
between fluid and crystallized symbolic representations. Durk­

heim postulated a continuum here, ranging from new and highly
 
fluid sociocultural "currents" (eg. opinion, fad and fashions, 
movements, etc.) on the one hand, and highly crystallized or 
stably institutionalized cultural forms such as religious and 
• 
moral systems, science, law, and on, on the other hand. As Lukes 
(1973:10) observed, Durkheim suggested that: 
• 
There is a whole series of degrees without a break in 
continuity between the facts of the most articulated 
structure and those free currents of social life which 
not yet definitely molded. The differences between them 
are, therefore, only differences in the degree of con­
solidation they present. Both are simply life, more or 
less crystallized (R:12). 
Close to the beginning of The Rules of Sociological Me­
• 
thod, for instance, Durkheim emphasized that it is important 
not to overlook these fluid "social currents." For those look­
ing only to the highly crystallized major cultural systems will 
presume that symbolic forms must be rooted in some continuing 
• 
social organizational base. Durkheim, of course, agreed, but 
his overarching concern with sociocultural process on all levels 
of complexity led him to insist that we should attempt to anchor 
analysis of symbolic forms not so much in terms of a "material 
• 
social body" as in a sociocultural process. Thus, if in their 
early stages sociocultural forms are still shifting and uncer­
tain, then we ought to expect that the symbols which reflect 
and guide these substructural processes would also be more or 
•
 
less fluid .
 
• 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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Since the examples we have just cited (legal and moral 
regulations, religious faiths, financial systems, etc.) 
all consist of established beliefs and practices, one 
might be led to believe that social facts exist only 
where there is some social organization. But there are 
other facts without such crystallized form, which have 
the same objectivity and the same ascendancy over the 
individual. These are called "social currents. 1I Thus, 
the great movements of enthusiasm, indignation, and 
pity in a crowd do not originate in anyone of the part­
icular individual consciousnesses (R:4). 
Inevitably, however, some of these "fluid ll II social cur­
rents ll become habitualized patterns of social interaction, and 
thus become institutionalized. Correspondingly, the symbolic 
forms which represent these social patterns also become stabi­
lized in more stable systems, and thus institutionalized (eg. 
see Berger and Luckmann, 1966). As often noted, the institu­
tionalization of these sociocultural facts implies that they 
have become generally shared, continuously transmitted over 
generations, and obligatorily observed. Durkheim remarked: 
.•• certain of these social manners of acting and think­
ing acquire, by reason of their repetition, a certain 
rigidity which on its own account crystallizes them, so 
to speak, and isolates them from the particular events 
which reflect them. They thus acquire a body, a tangible 
form, and constitute a reality in their own right, quite 
distinct from the individual facts which produce it. Col­
lective habits are inherent not only in the successive 
acts which they determine but, by a privilege of which 
we find no example in the biological realm, they are 
given permanent expression in a formula which is repeat­
ed from mouth to mouth, transmitted by education, and 
fixed even in writing (R:7). 
Searching as he was for a definitive index of exterior signs 
by which to recognize and objectively analyze "social facts,1I 
in this early attempt in The Rules Durkheim rightly directed 
attention primarily to institutions and highly crystallized 
major cultural forms. However, as his approach to positivism 
shifted from grounding analysis of "moral facts ll in "material 
bodies ll and II mechanical ll process to grounding analysis in so­
ciocultural, and especially symbolic process (this eVOlution 
CUlminating in The Elementary Forms), Durkheim correspondingly 
carne to focus attention on the passage from fluid to crystal­
lized forms, instead of just the latter pole • 
•
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social life consists,then, of free currents perpetually 
in the process of transformation and incapable of being 
mentally fixed by the observer, and the scholar cannot 
approach the study of social reality from this angle. 
But we know that it possesses the power of crystalliza­
tion without ceasing to be itself. Thus, apart from the 
individual acts to which they give rise, collective ha­
bits find expression in definite forms: legal rules, mo­
ral regulations, popular proverbs, social conventions, 
etc. As these forms have a permanent existence and do 
not change with the diverse applications made of them, 
they constitute a fixed object, a constant standard with­
in the observers reach, exclusive of subjective impres­
sions and purely personal observations (R:45). 
Now, in Suicide, Durkheim's cultural realism led him 
along the same lines when he insisted that "collective tenden­
cies have an existence of their own." "Social life is made up 
of representations" (S:312). Let us reverse his order, and con­
sider fluid "collective representations" first. 
... not all social consciousness achieves such external­
ization and materialization. Not all the esthetic spirit 
of a nation is embodied in the works in inspires; not all 
morality is formulated in clear precepts. The greater 
part is diffused. There is a large collective life which 
is at liberty; all sorts of currents come, go, circulate 
everywhere, cross and mingle in a thousand different ways, 
and just because they are constantly mobile are never crys­
tallized in an objective form .... all these eddies, all 
these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single modifi­
cation of the main legal and moral precepts, immobilized 
in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these very precepts 
merely express a whole subjacent life of which they par­
take; they spring from it but do not supplant it. Beneath 
all these maxims are actual, living sentiments, summed upby 
these formula but only in a superficial envelope. The 
formula would awake no echo if they did not correspond to 
definite emotions and impressions scattered throughout 
society (S:3l5). 
A little earlier Durkheim had noted that society externalizes 
its attitudes and sentiments in material objects. Thus, for 
example, a certain style of architecture can be said to "mater­
ialize" a certain cultural sentiment . 
.•• society •.• also includes material things, which play 
an essential role in the common life. The social fact is 
sometimes so far materialized as to become an element of 
the external world. For instance, a definite type of arch­
itecture is a social phenomenon; but it is partially em­
bodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, once 
constructed, become autonomous realities, independent of 
•
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individuals. It is the same with the avenues of commun­
ication and transportation, with instruments used in in­
dustry or private life which expresses the state of tech­
nology at any moment in history, of written language, 
etc. Social life which is thus crystallized, as it were, 
and fixed on material supports, is by just so much ex­
ternalized, and acts upon us from without (S:3l3-l4). 
And as we shall discover from his analysis of the Australian 
materials, as symbolic currents crystallize into systems they 
tend to take on their own inner nature and form; in short, 
they grow increasingly autonomous. And, the more these sym­
bolic systems are permeated with religious rationales and 
magical protocols, the more rigid they become. Some symbolic 
forms, on the other hand, reveal a special suppleness; these 
lend themselves to further development and universalization, 
as we shall discover in Chapter Seven. Durkheim refers to: 
... the definite formula into which the dogmas of faith 
are precipitated, or legal precepts when they become 
fixed externally in a consecrated form ••. They have a 
manner of action of their own. Juridical relations are 
widely different depending on whether or not the law is 
written. Where there is a constituted code, jurispru­
dence is more regular but less flexible, legislation 
more uniform but also more rigid. Legislation adopts it­
self less readily to a variety of individual cases, and 
resists innovations more strongly. The material forms it 
assumes are thus not merely ineffective verbal combina­
tions but active realities, since they produce effects 
which would not occur without their existence. They are 
not merely external to individual consciousnesses, but 
this very externality establishes their specific quali­
ties. Because these forms are less at the disposal of 
individuals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to 
circumstances, and this very situation makes them more 
resistant to change (S:3l4-l5). 
Now, closely related to institutionalization of social 
patterns and crystallization and legitimation of cultural 
symbolic forms is the process of "sedimentation" or the lay­
ering down of mUltiple levels of symbolic meaning through 
time. Since society and culture are inter-generational, sen­
timents which gain a certain durability over time may be sed­
imented both in terms of sequence and depth of significance. 
Some lower levels may even be rediscovered or reappropriated 
and thence brought up to the level of conscious reflection• 
•
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Now, it is precisely this complex layering down of cultural 
elements from various sources and times, and their synergetic 
fusion, which constitutes the inner secret of that human socio­
cultural historical complex known as civilization. In the rele­
vant sections of The Elementary Forms, for instance, we see 
Durkheim observing: 
• In addition to these free forces which are constantly corning to renew our own, there are others which are 
fixed in the methods and traditions which we employ. 
We speak a language that we did not make; we use instru­
ments that we did not invent; we invoke rights that we 
did not found; a treasury of knowledge is transmitted
• to each generation that it did not gather itself, etc. It is to society that we owe these varied benefits of 
civilization .•.. Now it is these things that give man 
his own place among things; a man is a man only because 
he is civilized (EF:242-3). 
• 
We shall further explore Durkheim's theory of the evolution of 
• 
cultural symbolic forms in the following sections: in this Book, 
the chapters immediately succeeding on "The Tree of Evolution­
ary Life," "The Primitive Sacral Complex,""Durkheim's Notion 
of Civilizations," and the sections in Book Three, Part I, on 
the autonomization of collective representations in Durkheim's 
causal model, and his various transitions to sociocultural real­
ism . 
• b. The Autonomization of Symbolic Forms 
•
 
Well before The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,
 
Durkheim had already noted the tendency of collective symbolic
 
systems, once institutionalized as the representative ground
 
•
 
of legitimate moral authority and intellectual decision, to
 
grow increasingly autono~ous. Autonomous here means the tenden­

cy to become self-ordering, with its own laws, and developmen­

tal processes. As Weber once similarly remarked, "We are insert­

edintoseparate spheres of existence, each with its own laws." 
Whereas in Part I of Book Three I shall explore Durkheim's no­
tion of the autonomization of symbolic forms from the methodo­
•
 
logical level, especially from the point of view of his argu­

ment from "relational realism" and "emergence," here I shall 
• 
•
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approach this generic sociocultural process substantively in 
terms of primitive religion and ritual. 
It should be noted that as early as The Division of La­
bor, Durkheim had remarked on the tendency toward autonomiza­
tion of the collectively symbolic superstructure . 
... wherever a directive power is established, its pri­
mary and principal function is to create respect for 
the beliefs, traditions, and collective practices; that 
is, defend the common conscience against all enemies 
within and without. It thus becomes its symbol, its liv­
ing expression in the eyes of all. Thus, the life which 
is in the collective conscience is communicated to the 
directive organ as the affinities of ideas are communi­
cated to the words which represent them, and that is how 
it assumes a character which puts it above all the others 
.... It is the collective type incarnate. It participates 
in the authority which the latter exercises over conscien­
ces, ann it is from these that it draws its force. Once 
constituted, however, without freeing itself from the sour­
ce when it flows and whence it continues to draw its sus­
tenance, it nevertheless becomes an autonomous factor in 
social life, capable of spontaneously producing its own 
movements without equal impulsion, precisely because of 
the supremacy which it has acquired (DL:84). 
Now, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to in­
dicate how the progressive detachment of symbols from the 
groups which they had come to symbolize occurred. First, the 
"hyper-spiritual" or moral forces, if they are to truly com­
municate, must gain some external, visible form of expression. 
The symbolic vehicle for moral and cognitive communion thus 
inevitably becomes lodged in an external material form or re­
peatable gesture. These visible, external, public signs are 
taken to manifest inward states. There is an eternal dialect­
ic here between cultural forms and natural forms, for the 
former are dependent on the latter for their existence, even 
the one exists only to rise above the other. Moral processes 
depend upon natural vehicles to externalize the inner process­
es of moral communion which may lead to a linkage, exchange, 
or even confounding of their separable natures. We might re­
• 
call that Durkheim had already explored the need for the clan 
to generate the totem as its prime "collective representation." 
• 
•
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Now, by its very nature, the ideal forces must be externalized 
to become communicated. The vehicle for this moral-logical com­
munion inevitably becomes lodged in a specific material form 
or gesture. Conversely, the natural symbolic potencies inher­
ent in specific material mediums also feed back and structure 
the possible symbolic arrangements (eg. see Levi-Strauss, 1963, 
Victor Turner, 1967, Mary Douglas, 1973). As I have insisted, 
it is simply mistaken to assert, as Durkheim did along with 
many others, that symbols are utterly arbitrary and convention­
al. The only adequate way to conceptualize these two poles of 
culture and nature is as analogical, that is, as a resonating 
series of more or less parallel matrices of events. It is meta­
phor and analogy which allow us to pass from one to the other 
in a more or less coherent fashion. 
Since the clan cannot exist without a name and an emblem, 
and since this emblem is always before the eyes of men, 
it is upon this and the objects whose image it is, that 
the sentiments which society arouses in its members are 
fixed. Men are thus compelled to represent the collective 
force, whose action they feel, in the form of the thing 
serving as flag to the group. Therefore, in the idea of 
this force were mixed up the most different kingdoms: in 
one sense, it was essentially human, since it was made 
up of human ideas and sentiments: but at the same time, 
it could not fail to appear as closely related to the ani­
mate or inanimate beings who gave it its outward form .... 
There is no society where it is not active. In a general 
way, a collective sentiment can become conscious of it­
self only by becoming fixed upon some material object; 
but by this very fact, it participates in the nature of 
this object, and reciprocally, the object participates 
in its nature (EF:269) . 
Second, this inevitable linkage (or confounding) or moral 
and material is accelerated by the contagiousness of the sacred 
images which naturally spread as if propelled by some "sacred 
electricity" from thing to thing, from event to event. What 
Durkheim saw as contagiousness also rests, in part, of course, 
upon the verbal and symbolic mechanisms of metonymy and synec­
doche (see especially the works of K. Burke), by which one 
•
 
thing comes to represent or "stand for another" in the exten­

sion of specific phenomenological linkages between a moral 
event and a natural sign, and thus the facilitation of trans­
•
 
• 
--161-­
:terence of symbolic loads. Asking: "How does it happen that 
these externalized moral forces come to be thought of in the 
•
 
form of totems?"--that is, specific plants or animals, Durk­

heim replied: 
• 
It is because this animal or plant has given its name 
to the clan and serves it as an emblem. In fact, it is 
a well-known law that the sentiments aroused in us by 
something spontaneously attach themselves to the sym­
bol which represents them. For us, black is a sign of 
mourning; it also suggests sad impressions and ideas. 
This transference of sentiments comes simply from the 
fact that the idea of a thing and the idea of its sym­
bol are closely united in our minds; the result is that
• 
the emotions provoked by the one extend contagiously to 
• 
the other. But this contagion, which takes place in every 
case to some degree, is much more complete and more mark­
ed when the symbol is something simple, definite, and 
easily representable, while the thing itself, owing to 
its dimension, the number of its parts, and the complex­
ity of their arrangements, is difficult to hold in the 
mind. For we are unable to consider an abstract entity, 
which we represent only laboriously and confusedly the 
source of the strong sentiments which we feel. We cannot 
explain them to ourselves except by connecting them to 
some concrete object of whose reality we are vividly a­
• 
ware. Then if the thing itself does not fulfill this con­
dition, it cannot serve as the accepted basis of the sen­
timents felt, even though it may be what really aroused 
them. Then some sign takes its place; it is to this that 
we connect the emotions it excites. It is this which is 
loved, feared, and respected; it is to this that we are
• 
are grateful; it is for this that we sacrifice ourselves. 
The soldi er who dies for his flag, dies for his country; 
but as a matter of fact, in his own consciousness, it is 
the flag that has the first place. It sometimes happens 
that this even directly determines action. Whether one 
isolated standard remains in the hands of the enemy or
• not does not determine the fate of the country; yet the soldier allows himself to be killed to regain it. He lo­
ses sight of the fact that the flag is only a sign and 
that it has no value in itself, but only brings to mind 
the reality that it represents; it is treated as if it 
were this reality itself (EF:251-2).
• Third, there is another sense of "contagion" here which 
is important to the continual attempts to separate out sacral 
from profane phenomena. For "contagion" also means "dangerous," 
and because, as Mary Douglas (1966) suggests, "the unclear is
• the unclean," the very mixture of sacred and profane symbolism 
in the onward flow of everyday life means that these boundaries 
•
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must be constantly	 reaffirmed in ever-new ways. The keeping 
•
 
of the sacra, the esoteric sacred mysterie~ becomes a spe­

cial responsibility of the magicians and priests, those reli­
gious virtuosos who '~ake a lease on charisma," as Weber once 
said. Mixture is dangerous because it threatens the newly con­
•	 
structed symbolic coordinates of the collectivity itself. If 
the	 group depends upon these symbolic coordinates, then their 
erasure means the collaps~ of the group itself. 
The churinga are preserved in a sort of temple upon 
whose threshold all noises from the profane life must
• 
cease; it is the domain of sacred things. On the con­
trary, the totemic animals and plants live in the pro­
fane world and are mixed up with the common everyday 
life. Since the number and importance of the interdict­
ions which isolate sacred things, and keep it apart, 
correspond to the degree of sacredness with which it
• 
is invested, we arrive at the remarkable conclusion 
that the images of	 totemic beings ~ more sacred than 
the beings themselves (EF:155-6). 
Durkheim thus avoided the crude error of some other early 
anthropological analysts who presumed that the natives actually
•	 worshipped their totemic animals or even the1r totem poles! 
"In reality, it is	 not to the animal as such that the (totemic) 
cult is addressed,	 but to the emblem and the image of the to­
tem" (EF:198). Specifically, Durkheim observed:
•	 The Arunta dance around the nurtunja, and assemble be­

•
 
fore the image of their totem to adore it, but a simi­

lar demonstration is never made before the totemic be­

ing itself. If this latter were the primarily sacred ob­

ject, it would be with it, the sacred animal or plant,
 
that the young initiate would communicate when he is
 
introduced into the religious life; but we have seen
 
•
 
that, on the contrary, the most solemn moment of the ini 

tiation is the one when the novice enters into the sanc­

tuary of the churinga. It is with them and the nurtunja
 
that he communicates. The representations of the totem
 
are therefore more actively powerful than the totem it­
self* (EF:156)-.--- ---­
Now, it is evident	 that the clan is too complex a reality, 
with all its multiple spheres and levels of relationships and 
mutual obligations, to be represented clearly and fully by a
• single image. 
The totem is the flag of the clan. It is therefore nat­
ural that the impressions aroused by the clan in indivi­
•
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dual minds--impressions of dependence and of increased 
vitality--should fix themselves to the idea of totem 
rather than that of the clan: for the clan is too com­
plex a reality to be represented clearly in all its 
complex unity by such rudimentary intelligences. More 
than that, the primitive does not even see that these 
impressions corne to him from the group. He does not 
know that the corning together of a number of men asso­
ciated in the same life results in disengaging new ener­
gies, which transforms each of them. All that he knows 
is that he is raised above himself and that he sees a 
different life from the one he ordinarily leads. How­
ever, he must connect these sensations to some external 
object as their cause. Now what does he see about him? 
On every side those things which appeal to his senses 
and strike his imagination are the numerous images of 
the totem. They are the churinga and bull-roarer, upon 
which are generally carved combinations of lines having 
the same significance. They are the decorations cover­
ing the different parts of his body, which are totemic 
marks. How could this image, repeated everywhere and in 
all sorts of forms, fail to stand out with exceptional 
relief in his mind? Placed thus in the center of the 
scene, it becomes representative. The sentiments exper­
ienced fix themselves upon it, for it is the only con­
crete object upon which they can fix themselves. It con­
tinues to bring them to mind and to evoke them after the 
assembly has dissolved, for it survives the assembly, 
being carved upon the instruments of the cult, upon the 
sides of rocks, upon bucklers, etc. By it, the emotions 
experienced are perpetually sustained and revived. Every­
thing happens just as if they inspired them directly. 
It is still more natural to attribute them to it for, 
since they are common to the group, they can be associa­
ted only with something that is equally common to all. 
Now the totemic emblem is the only thing satisfying this 
condition. By definition, it is common to all. During 
the ceremony, it is the center of all regards. While 
generations change, it remains the same; it is the perm­
ament element of the social life. So it is from it that 
those mysterious forces seem to emanate with which men 
feel that they are related, and thus they have been led 
to represent these forces under the form of the animate 
or inanimate beings whose name the clan bears (EF:252-3). 
Given his sociocultural framework, Durkheim interpreted 
the totem as an external emblematical expression of the inward 
social bond. The totem signified an inner unifying principle 
which was expressed in terms of an obligatory sacral symbol. 
• 
The totem is the source of the moral life of the clan. 
All the beings partaking of the same totemic principle 
consider that owing to this very fact, they are moral­
• 
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ly bound to one another; they have definite duties of 
assistance, vendetta, etc. towards each other, and it 
is these duties which constitute kinship. So while the
• totemic principle is a totemic force, it is also a moral power (EF:2l9). 
It was this constitutive ground of legitimate moral and intel­
lectual authority of the collective bond and individual con­
•
 
science that the natives revered, argued Durkheim. Lukes apt­

ly summarizes Durkheim's thought in this regard: 
• 
The role of the emblems was to perpetuate and recreate 
the social sentiments aroused by the rites: moreover, 
the rites themselves enabled social communication to 
'become a real communion, that is to say, a fusion of 
all particular sentiments into one common sentiment,' 
• 
and they not only expressed but served to 'support the 
beliefs upon which they are founded.' Hence, the cult 
in general was both 'a system of signs by which the 
faith is outwardly translated,' and 'a collection of 
the means by which this is created and recreated per­
iodically' .•.. Durkheim saw totemism as essentially con­
• 
stitutive of aboriginal social organization: the totem 
identified the clan, whose members were bound by speci­
fic ties of kinship, so that the 'collective totem is 
part of the civil status of each individual.' Indeed, 
a 'clan is essentially a group of individuals who bear 
the same name and rally around the same sign. Take away 
• 
the name and the sign which materializes it, and the 
clan is no longer representable. Since the group is pos­
sible only on this condition, both the institution of 
the emblem and the part it plays in the life of the 
group are thus explained' (1973:472) • 
Stating that "we are now in a position to understand all that 
is essential in the totemic beliefs," Durkheim observed: 
Since religious force is nothing other than the collect­
ive and anonymous forces of the clan, and since this can
• be represented in the mind only in the form of the totem, the totemic emblem is like the visible body of the god. 
Therefore, it is from it that those kindly and dreadful 
actions seem to emanate, which the cult seeks to provoke 
or prevent; consequently, it is to it that the cult is 
addressed. This is the explanation of why it holds the
• first place in the series of sacred things (EF:253). 
Finally, while it is not my present problem to review Durk­
heim's positivist alchemies, we should note that Durkheim posi­
ted here a whole series of inner transformations invisible 
• to the participants themselves. Like the present day structur­
alists who often claim his mantle (eg. Levi-Strauss), Durk­
•
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heim presumed that: 
Social action follows ways that are too circuitous and 
•
 
• 
selves in connection, and from that, we are able to catch 
a glimpse of the way in which they were led to represent 
them under forms that are really foreign to their nature 
and to transfigure them by thought (EF:239-40). 
•
 
Having thus traced Durkheim's notion of the crystalliza­

tion and autonomization of symbolism, let us next turn our at­

•
 
tention to the progressive extension of these increasingly auto­

nomous sets through symbolic equations. For it is only by ex­

tending such fundamental polarities that men are able to build
 
up more complex classificatory systems which may then gradually
 
•
 
become detached from both their original sacral and collective
 
basis. Only by striving to view this long sequence as a whole
 
process with many phases and transformations can we ever hope
 
to understand how our modern rational and universally valid
 
obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms 
complex to allow the ordinary observer to 
comes. As long as scientific analysis does 
teach it to them, men know well that they 
but they do not know by whom. So they must 
selves the idea of these powers with which 
cognitive classificatory systems 
•
 
•
 
• 
•
 
•
 
came to emerge • 
that are too 
see when it 
not come to 
are acted upon, 
invent by them­
they feel them­
•
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7.	 The Building of Classificatory Systems: Cosmization 
Through Symbolic Equations 
Preface. Since sociocultural process depends upon symbols 
(which grow increasingly autonomous), inevitably the organi­
zing tension between "sacral" and "profane" collective repre­
sentations becomes extended to all spheres of reality and le­
vels of experience. "All known religions have been systems 
of ideas which tend to embrace the universality of things, 
and to give us a complete representation of the world" (EF: 
165). The so-called "contagiousness" of "sacral" symbolism 
leads to a universal classificatory system covering the II ... 
whole world in the fashion of a gnosis or cabbala" (PC:70). 
Rooted first in varying degrees of phenomenological or con­
crete resemblance to the "sacral" and "profane" oppositions 
which anchor all emerging systems of morality and knowledge, 
through compounding series of analogies these symbolic equa­
tions progressively link together diverse experiences, places, 
times, and levels of existence. As the prime vehicles for the 
extension and synthesis of knowledge, analogy and metaphor 
are crucial for the construction of these systems guiding 
conscience and consciousness, especially in the early stages. 
"In China, in all the Far East, and in modern India, as well 
as in ancient Greece and Rome, ideas about sympathetic actions, 
symbolic correspondences, and astrological influences not only 
were or are very widespread, but exhausted or stillexhaust col­
lective knowledge" (PC:5). Thus, the progressive extension and 
elaboration of resonating levels of phenomenologically based 
symbolic equations and proportions serves to progressively a­
lign all aspects of experience into more or less coherent 
structures of conscience and consciousness. liThe men of the 
clan and the things which are classified in it form by their 
union a solid system, all of whose parts are united and vibrate 
sympathetically" (EF:175). These constitutive systems of sym­
bolic equations and sequences act as bridges transforming em­
pirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity. IIThis organ­
•
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ization, which at first may appear to us as purely logical, 
is at the same time moral" (EF:175). Thus simultaneously moral 
and cognitive, these rudimentary systems of classification 
come to serve as the central directive paradigms of their 
cultures. World, self, and society become progressively or­
ganized around these compounding series of symbolic equations, 
For example, of the highly ramified Chinese Taoist system of 
classification, and also of moral and intellectual direction, 
Durkheim and Mauss observed: "It governs all details of life 
among the most immense population that humanity has ever known" 
(PC:67). In sum, first through polarities which create tension 
in the symbolic field, and then through ramifying series of 
symbolic equations based on the primal tensions,thewholeworld 
becomes cosmicized; the small scale human world becomes 
valorized • 
In this regard, two essential principles have begun to 
emerge from our systematic in-depth reconstruct~on of the 
"nuclear structure" of Durkheim's substantive work so far. Let 
us first recall that Durkheim presumed that structures of con­
science and consciousness are socioculturally and historically 
constructed, and thus remain for a long time linked and even 
confounded with specific groups. Moreover, as we have seen al­
ready, and will explore further in the succeeding section on 
the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and culture 
the systems of morality and knowledge which so often become 
dominant first emerge in their most systematic way out of ma­
gical ritual and religious myth. In short, the two inner con­
stitutive principles of the construction of over-arching sys­
tems of moral and intellectual classification are that these 
are, to a great extent, sociocentric and sacral-magical. As 
Durkheim and Mauss noted: "Among the Zuni, the idea which so­
ciety has of itself, and its worldview, are so interlaced and 
merged that their organiztion, has perfectly been described 
as 'mytho-sociologic , " (PC:42) . 
Now, the linkage of the form of symbolic systems to the 
structure of the group, and the linkage of their content to 
•
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•
 
the sacral outlooks and magical protocols, are two principles
 
of utmost importance for the human sciences. Both Weber and
 
Durkheim, for instance, were very sensitive to this inner
 
•
 
linkage of the legitimate structures of conscience and con­

sciousness to the structure of the group and to its religion.
 
Although first born in the clan and the totemic cult, if sys­

tems of morality and knowledge are to evolve, they must pro­

•
 
gressively shed their primal connection with the restrictive
 
structures of both group and religion. For, as we have propo­

sed, as societies evolve, so too~~heir prime symbolic guid­

ance systems. And as Benjamin Nelson (see especially 1973a)
 
has proposed, following both Weber and Durkheim, we should 
expect that the extension of the social bond--that is, shifts 
in the structures of social fraternization--and universaliza­
• 
tion and rationalization of the legitimate structures of moral 
and intellectual authority proceed together on the world-his­
torical level. Indeed, as Nelson, Weber, and Durkheim empha­
• 
size, the failure to break with either sacral-magical praxis 
(ritual protocols, stereotyping, etc,) and classificatory sys­
• 
tems rooted primarily in the collectivity, constitute prime 
obstacles to mOdernization. 
Now since Primitive Classification preceeded The Elemen­
tary Forms, and since, as we have seen, Durkheim originally 
• 
intended to entitle the latter "The Elementary Forms of Thought 
and of Religious Life" (Alpert, 1939:55), let us first turn 
to recall the general problems and theses which Durkheim pro­
posed to address. Then we shall consider the more fully ela­
borated answers which Durkheim offered in 1912. 
a. Durkheim'~ Socio-Logic: The Links Between Symbols ~ Groups 
• 
As a prelude to the project which culminated in The 
Elementary Forms, Durkheim wrote On Some Primitive Forms of 
Classification with Mauss to reveal the inner sociocultural 
"prehistory" of the categories of moral rules and intellectual 
• 
concepts. As always, Durkheim's socio-logic--his insistence 
that symbols and logics be linked first to the group--had to 
• 
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•
 
contend with a powerful and pervasive counter logic. And, in
 
our own time, as in Durkheim's, that psycho-philosophical ab­

straction of the modern Western world--the generic ego float­

•
 
ing in space endowed with a self-guiding rationality shining
 
by virtue of its own inviolable "inner light"--still reigns.
 
But Durkheim argued: "We have no justification for supposing
 
that our mind bears within it at bIrth, completely formed,
 
•
 
the prototype of this elementary framework of all classifica­

tion" (PC:8). Indeed, I believe that the general thrust of
 
Durkheim's thought here was correct, for the modern notion of
 
the generic ego as the repository of an innate moral sense
 
and a calculus of rationality depended upon the negation of 
tradition and the delegitimation and stripping away of the 
authority of the collectivity. What is most misleading here, 
•
 
of course, was the implicit symbolic equation between ration­

•
 
ality, individualism, and freedom, the latter conceived lar­

gely in the negative sense as the absence of traditional so­

cial and cultural constraints. As Lukes (1968), among others,
 
has observed, one of Durkheim's lasting accomplishments is to
 
•
 
have demonstrated that there is no necessary inner connection
 
between logical nominalism and its modern secular equivalents,
 
and individual freedom and political democracy. Indeed, clo­

ser attention to the bIrth pangs of the modern world would
 
•
 
have revealed, as both the Puritans in the English Civil War
 
and Hobbes showed, that such positions may just as easily be
 
linked with authoritarian and totalitarian regimes--with the
 
Leviathans of the modern world. In sum, what Durkheim rightly
 
insisted upon was that our modern notions here have themsel­
ves a distinct rhetorical structure. Against this highly dyna­
mic position, Durkheim and Mauss declared in the opening pages 
•
 
of their essay:
 
•
 
The faculties of definition, deduction, and induction
 
are generally considered as immediately given in the
 
constitution of the individual understanding. Admitted­

ly, it has been known for a long time that, in the cour­

se of history, men learned to use these functions better
 
and better. But it is thought that in their essential
 
features they have been fully formed as long as mankind 
•
 
I •
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
,
 
has existed. It has not even been imagined that they 
might have been, by a painful combination of elements, 
borrowed from extremely different sources, quite for­
eign to logic and laboriously organized. And this con­
ception of the matter was not at all surprising so long 
as the development of logical faculties was thought to 
belong simply to individual psychology, so long as no 
one had the idea of seeing in these methods of scien­
tific thought veritable social institutions whose ori­
gin sociology alone can retrace and explain (PC:3). 
Yes, that is the key: scientific rationality, especially of 
the utilitarian or positivist varieties, even the rationali­
ty of the pre-social individual which are so often symboli­
cally associated, are themselves modern social institutions! 
And, as with so many other useful fictions of the Enlighten­
ment, such as the "noble savage," "Robinson Crusoe," or the 
self-equilibrating market mechanism of market capitalism, 
these are merely images which we mistakenly project back into 
history, and onto other societies and cultures. Now, Durkheim 
clearly saw that, instead of being primarily anchored as fix­
ed faculties inherent in the generic ego, modern universalis­
tic and rationalistic classificatory systems had undergone a 
long evolution which they could not adequately explain in 
terms of their own premises. Durkheim's insights here are 
crucial, for as societies evolve, so too do their prime sym­
bolic guidance systems, and if our modern system emerged 
from the past, there must be some way of specifying the in­
ner link between two systems so different. The key to this 
inner evolution, Durkheim posited, was a link or parallel 
between the extension of the social bond and the rationali­
zation and universalization of classificatory systems and, 
thus, of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual 
authority. These were Durkheim's root "socio-Iogics," which 
so few seem to have understood then and even today. 
It is interesting to note that few readers of Primitive 
Classification have recognized that the very structure of the 
essay is evolutionary. The more or less static preoccupations 
of the two schools (American structuralism-functionalism and 
British social anthropology) which still lay claim to the le­
•
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• 
gitimating mantle of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit" work 
against this crucial recognition. This is especially true of 
the latter school whose penchant for small-scale ethnographic 
• 
analyses and anti-evolutionary biases have led them, although 
basically sympathetic, to mount what appears to be a devasta­
ting series of charges against the logical and evidential 
structure of Durkheim and Mauss's essay. For instance, Rodney 
• 
Needham, the English translator of Primitive Classification, 
has raised a whole series of seemingly fatal criticisms against 
this essay (but see Alpert, 1965:665). Needham charges that 
there is good reason to believe that "Durkheim and Mauss's 
• 
entire venture was misconceived" (1963:xxvi). Needham insists 
that " •.. there is no logical necessity to postulate a causal 
connection between society and symbolic classification" (1963: 
xxiv). "In no single case is there any compulsion to believe 
• 
that society is the cause or even the model of the classifica­
tion" (1963: xxv). "Now society is alleged to be the model on 
which classification is based, yet in society after society 
examined no formal correspondence can be shown to exist. Dif­
• 
ferent forms of classification are found with identical types 
of social organization, and similar forms with different types 
of society" (1963:xvi). Needham adds that the most serious 
methodological failing was that " .•• Durkheim and Mauss did 
not subject their thesis to test by concomitant variation" 
(1963:xvi). Finally, in terms of the logical sequence under­
lying Durkheim's argument, Needham makes the oft-repeated 
•
 
charge that:
 
•
 
If the mind is taken to be a system of cognitive facul­

ties, it is absurd to say that the categories originate
 
in social organization .... The social model must itself
 
be perceived to possess the characteristics which make
 
it useful in classifying other things, but this cannot
 
be done without the very categories which Durkheim and
 
Mauss derived from the model (1963:xxvii).
 
Needham concludes with what must be one of the "weakest recom­

mendations for the theoretical and historical value of tran~
 
• 
lating and reading a classic essay ever given: "Whatever its
 
faults, its prime theoretical contribution has been to isolate
 
• 
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classification as an aspect of culture to which sociological 
inquiry should be directed" (1963:x1). Damning with faint 
• praise! William Runciman (1969:190) felt the same way, brand­
ing Durkheim's sociology of religion as "fundamentally mis­
conceived," and summed up his disdain by referring to Durk­
heim's sociology of knowledge as resting ona "logical howler." 
• Now, although Steven Lukes follows many of Evans-Pritch­
ardIs and Needham's criticisms (eg. "in the first place, the 
very relations established must always presuppose the prior 
existence of these very abilities", 1973:447), nonetheless, 
• he offers a more subtly inflected critical review. Lukes even 
finds some aspects of Durkheim's thesis valuable. Although 
Lukes hardly more than Needham has clearly recognized the "nu­
clear structure" underlying Durkheim's work as we have eXIJ10r­
• ed it here, his judgements in this regard are generally more 
reliable. Although resolutely criticizing Durkheim's evolu­
tionary claims, Lukes, apparently influenced by the lone voice 
of Robin Horton (1967, 1973), does acknowledge that " ... the 
• hypothesis that primitive and traditional religions contain 
the germs of scientific thinking is, in many ways, both chal­
lenging and plausible" (1973:449). (We shall soon pursue this 
notion in the following section on the primitive sacral com­
• p1ex). And Lukes especially praises Durkheim's claims that: 
•
 
•.• belief systems, including primitive religions,
 
should be treated as cosmologies. This claim has
 
proved immensely fruitfu1....Perhaps their most theo­

retically significant aspect derives from the impli­

cations of his (other) claim that there are struct­

ural correspondences between symbolic classification 
and social organization, and quite generally between 
different orders of social facts (1973:449). 
Now, doubtless as many critics have charged, if the 
• 
human mind were totally devoid of any inherent classificatory 
ability, as Durkheim's rather extreme statements in Primitive 
Classification so often seem to suggest, then~~ou1d simply 
lack the rudimentary ability to construct ordered societies 
•
 
in the first place. Once again, Durkheim's "besetting schol­

arly vice" of petitio principii was at work. However, it should 
• 
•
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not be overloo~ that Durkheim himself explicitly acknowled­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
ged this logical necessity in The Elementary Forms. 
... it is not our intention to deny that the indivi­
dual intellect has of itself the power of perceiving 
resemblances between the different objects of which it 
is conscious. Quite on the contrary, it is clear that 
even the most primitive and simple classifications 
presuppose this faculty (EF:170). 
Doubtless, Durkheimts bald sociologism ("The first logical 
categories were social cat~gories; the first classes of things 
were classes of men", PC:82) was overstated. Once again, his 
rhetorical animus toward psychologism led him to excess: 
Far from classifying spontaneously and by a sort of 
natural necessity, humanity in the beginning lacks 
the most indispensable conditions for the classifica­
tory function. Further, it is enough to examine the 
very idea of classification to understand that men 
could not have found its essential elements in him­
self (PC:7). 
Consequently, I am not interested here in pursuing what 
appears to many (eg. Needham) as Durkheimts main proposition-­
namely, that social forms were the sole and primary source of 
logical categories. Rather, like Lukes and Benjamin Nelson 
(1973a), I am more interested in what we might term the "weak­
er" and less explored version of Durkheimts theses--namely, 
that cognitive and moral classifications have been throughout 
history inextricably bound up with the structure and culture 
of collectivities. Now, while certainly the English anthropo­
logists have done some o.f the finest work on symbolism and 
ritual using Durkheimts leads, I am convinced that the perspect­
ive which is emerging here has been generally slighted by them 
and most others. I believe that if we focus on the evolution­
ary structure of Durkheimts thought, and constantly relate it 
to Weberts sometimes parallel and sometimes complementary 
work, we shall help pioneer a new and crucial foundation for 
the emerging human sciences. 
Now, it was this "socio-logic" which linked symbols to 
groups rather than to individual minds (see especially Evans­
Pritchard, 1965), which led Durkheim and Mauss to explore 
these relationships, while it was his rhetorical stance and 
•
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dialectical ambitions which led the former to excess. In the 
beginning of Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss 
• posed their problem in this manner. 
• 
A class is a group of things; and things do not present 
themselves to observation grouped in such a way. We may 
well perceive more or less vaguely their resemblances. 
But the single fact of these resemblances is not enough 
to explain how we are led to group things which thus re­
• 
semble one another; to bring them together in a sort of 
ideal sphere enclosed by definite limits, which we call 
a class, a species, etc .... To classify is not only to 
form groups; it means arranging these groups according 
to particular relations. We imagine them as coordinated 
or subordinate one to the other, we say that some (the 
species) are included in others (the genera), that the 
former are subsumed under the latter .... Every classifi­
cation inplies a hierarchical order for which neither the 
tangible world nor our mind gives us the model. We there­
fore have reason to ask where it was found (PC:7-8).
• To buttress their case which, as we shall see, so often rests 
upon an ingenious use of analogy between social forms and 
logical forms, Durkheim and Mauss note the curious lineage of 
the very terms of classifications themselves: 
• The very terms which we use in order to characterize it 
allow us to presume that all these logical notions have 
an extra-logical origin. We say that species of the same 
genera are connected by relations of kinship; we call 
certain classes "families;" did not the very word genus 
• 
(genre) itself originally describe a group of relatives 
(PC:8)? 
Thus, Durkheim and Mauss proposed their socio-logical program 
of inquiry into the elementary forms of classification. 
Far from being able to say that men classify quite nat­
•
 
urally, by a sort of necessity of their individual under­

standing, we must on the contrary ask ourselves what could 
have led them to arrange their ideas in this way, and 
where they could have found the plan of this remarkable 
disposition. We cannot even dream of tackling this ques­
tion in all of its ramifications (PC:9).
• But after a decades more work, Durkheim felt ready to 
address these problems which he first broached with Mauss in 
1903. Now, as I have had occasion to remark before, because 
many secondary observers have failed to understand both nurk­
• heim's linkage of conscience and consciousness and his evolu­
tionary framework, many have also failed to understand why 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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he returned again and again primarily (some would say almost 
exclusively) to consideration of such problems in terms of 
their paradigmatic lIelementary forms. 1I But if, indeed, Durk­
heim was inspired in proposing that our modern forms of clas­
sification have a prehistory, then how else are we to empiri­
cally illuminate this hidden shroud if not by recourse to what 
appear as the elementary forms? Thus, in the first substantive 
chapter of Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss focus­
sed on Australian totemism, to which the former devoted his 
full attention, of course, in The Elementary Forms. In this 
light, Primitive Classification can be seen as a wider evolu­
tionary prolegomena to one of the two main threads of Durkheim's 
story which was later to unfold in his masterpiece of 1912. 
Therefore, the thrust of Needham's and many others' criticisms 
of Durkheim's logical base is attenuated by our shift from 
concern with the generic categories to the evolution of systems 
of classification, and the criticisms of the evidential base 
are lessened by the detailed and systematic presentation found 
in the classic of 1912. 
Before we turn to consider how Durkheim charted in 1912 
the manner in which classificatory systems are built up through 
a progressive extension of a series of resonating symbolic 
equations, let us briefly review Durkheim's setting of this 
specific problem in 1903. Doubtless his 1903 preliminary ef­
fort was less adequate than his later full blown analysis, 
for in the former we see that Durkheim and Mauss posited, ala 
Levy-Bruhl's law of II mys tical participation II (see also Lukes, 
1973:438, #17), a primitive state of undifferentiated confusion 
of categories. Now, in seeking to investigate the prehistory 
of modern universally valid, internally consistent, and ra­
tional II scientific ll classifications, Durkheim was right in 
generally contrasting the fluidness of the former to the fix­
ity of the latter. Indeed, however much religious thought and 
hermetic alchemical traditions may have contributed to the 
development of western thought, s~ience as we know it today is 
simply not possible until the various orders of being are view­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
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ed as closed to one another, until phenomenal spheres are re­
garded as stable, and until there is the widespread feeling 
of certitude that invariant laws describing these closed and 
stable relationships can be discovered because there is a 
"sufficient reason" for this particular world-order. Durkheim 
noted this important difference between modern and primitive 
thought patterns: 
For us to classify things is to arrange them in groups 
which are distinct each from the other, and are separa­
ted by clearly determined lines of demarcation .... At 
the bottom of our conception of class there is the idea 
of a circumscription with fixed and definite outlines. 
Now one could almost say that this conception of classi­
fication does not go back before Aristotle. Aristotle was 
the first to proclaim the existence and the reality of 
specific differences, to show that the means was cause, 
and that there was no direct passage from one genus to 
another (PC:4-5). 
Now, Durkheim's achievement in deriving the Aristotelian cate­
gories from social and cultural process (what has been called 
his "social Kantianism") was to attempt to illuminate both 
the generic and especially the genetic-evolutionary processes 
by which primitive symbolic systems gradually became transform­
ed into modern scientific classifications. In so doing, he be­
gan with the original totemic situation in which transforma­
tions from one classificatory set to another apparently pro­
ceeded at random and without a fixed logic. 
If we descend to the least evolved societies known ... 
we shall find a ... general mental confusion. Here, the 
individual loses his personality. There is a complete 
lack of distinction between him and his exterior soul 
or his totem. He and his "fellow animal" together compose 
a single personality. The identification is such that 
the man assumes the characteristics of the thing or ani­
mal with which he is thus united .... There is a complete 
indifferentiation between sign and thing, name and per­
son, places and inhabitants .... For the primitive the 
principle generatio aequivoca is proved.... Animals, 
people, and inanimate objects were originally almost al­
ways conceived of as standing in relations of the most 
perfect identity to each other (PC:6-7). 
Durkheim and Mauss even went so far as to liken this to the 
development of the individual (PC:7), as in the principle of 
"ontogeny recapitulating phylogeny." Finally, Durkheim and 
•
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Mauss noted the survival of this primitive mode of thinking 
•
 
even today, beneath many of our sophisticated forms. Obser­

• 
ving that "It would be impossible to exaggerate the state of 
indistinction from which the human mind developed," Durkheim 
and Mauss noted: 
Even today a considerable part of our popular litera­
ture, our myths and our religion is based on a funda­
• 
mental confusion of all images and ideas. They are not 
separated from each other, as it were, with any clar­
ity. Metamorphoses, the transmission of qualities, the 
substitution of persons, souls and bodies, beliefs about 
the materialization of spirits and the spiritualization 
of material objects, are the elements of religious 
thought or of folklore. Now the very idea of such trans­
mutations could not arise if things were represented by 
delimited and classified concepts (PC:5). 
Now, granting that the postulate of a primitive state
• of indistinction and confusion to which rationality, as a coun­
ter principle, gradually gave order is an inadequate formula­
tion of the problem, let us turn our attention to The Elemen­
tary Forms in which Durkheim greatly elaborated his earlier
• analysis of Australian totemism. We shall return at the end 
of this section to Durkheim's summary statements of his ear­
lier theses in the conclusion to Primitive Classification. 
But, first, since Durkheim thought that the "contagiousness"
• of .. sacral" symbolism 0 ffered the key to understanding the 
origin of both classificatory systems as such, and the nature 
of mythological transformations from one set of phenomena to 
• 
another, let us first turn to further analyze this essential 
process. Now, even though Durkheim's later statement was far 
• 
better than his first tentative version, he still put far too 
much emphasis on "contagion", while leaving its inner symbol­
ic mechanisms too little explored. Since the extension of sym­
bolic equations holds the key to the construction of systems 
of morality and cognitive classification, let UE precede these 
other analyses with a quick look at some perspectives which 
• 
try to illuminate the basic equational and transformational 
structures of symbolic process. 
• 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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b. Analogy and Metaphor: The Structure of Symbolic Equations 
It is crucial for those wishing to build the founda­
tions of the human sciences to recognize the critical im­
portance of analogy and metaphor as constitutive processes 
in building the human cosmos called culture. For the use of 
analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for the extension 
of experience and the synthesis of knowledge. As such, they 
allow us to link together separate things and events into 
a meaningful relationship. Recognition of phenomenological 
similarity or difference, and the construction of inner or 
essential comparison~ and contrasts, is the basic way of con­
stituting relationships. Besides controlled experiment, one 
of the few tried and tested ways of extending knowledge from 
the known to the unknown is through analogy and metaphor. 
Indeed, the human cosmos called culture depends on these pro­
cesses of symbolic equations as one of its key inner consti­
tutive processes. 
All cultural expressions thus take on meaning through 
such equational structures. Language, for example, is built 
up by extending a series of root metaphors from one situation 
to another, by translating and retranslating basic guiding 
images into their various manifestations. The more seminal 
the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with potential 
meaning will the word root become. In this spinning out pro­
cess, a whole web of related meanings is gradually construct­
ed, and the whole language can be seen to "hang together" on 
a surprisingly small number of key pegs. Indeed, images come 
before words; an extended search through a good dictionary 
should convince almost anyone of the centrality of these root 
images, and the equational structure in which whole rafts of 
words and phras~are interdefined. Literary meaning, too, is 
built up out of a compounding series of symbolic equations. 
Indeed, the heart of the task of the literary critic is pre­
cisely to unfold and systematically elucidate these basic as­
sociational clusters, as Kenneth Burke calls them, or "what 
goes with what." 
•
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All other forms of knowledge and expression also have 
their own special equational structures and sequences. Noting
• this universality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking 
devices, Northrop Frye has remarked upon the " ... similarity 
of form between the units of literature and of mathematics, 
the metaphor and the equation,1l which led him to wonder if:
• ..• it is true that the verbal structures of psychology, 
anthropology, theology, history, law, and everything 
else built out of words have been informed or construct­
ed by the same kind of myths and metaphors that we find, 
in their original hypothetical form, in literature (1957: 
•
 
352)?
 
• 
Now, there are good reasons for this to be so. For all 
knowing, indeed, all mental processes, ultimately rest upon 
perception, imagination, and cognition. The first supplies im­
• 
ages, the second projects images, while the third compares and 
contrasts these images and reconstructs them into a meaningful 
interpretive schema. Thus, for example, the perceptual and cog­
nitive training of young children centers largely around the in­
• 
creasingly systematic comparison (discernment of similarity, 
likeness) and contrast (difference) between these images, and 
their classification into sets, and abstraction of their shared 
qualities into generalizable attributes. Thus, the two key ele­
ments of symbolic process--polarities which create tension, 
and symbolic equations which link diverse events into series 
of meaningfully associated clusters, can be easily seen in 
•
 
terms of the verbal games which adults often play with child­

ren for intellectual entertainment. For example, given a ser­
ies of rudimentary polarities such as hot/cold, black/white, 
up/down, left/right, etc., it is a simple matter for most 
• 
school age children, once they grasp the underlying logic, to 
begin to generate their own series of oppositions. Indeed, 
knowledge always begins with such first order experiential 
gestalts. A further stage is reached when these perceptual di­
• 
chotomies are given an analogical structure, such as hot is to 
summer as cold is to winter, and so on. Indeed, when this cap­
ability of constructing their own equational structures is ac­
•
 
• 
• 
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quired, the comparing and contrasting reaches a new level of 
sophistication, and the child grows into higher order proces­
ses. The continued importance of these operations is attested 
• 
to by the use of the Miller's Analogies Test for entrance in­
to graduate school. 
Now, we should not be surprised to discover that almost 
all higher level cognitive and judgemental process, including 
•
 
science itself, also rest upon equational structures which con­

tain an irreducible phenomenological or first order base. Al­

though the positivists' program for the philosophy of science
 
banished all symbolic overtones from scientific language, and 
insisted that science consists exclusively of the systematic 
linkage of evidentially validated propositions, nevertheless, 
• 
other contemporary philosophers of science have revealed the 
continuing importance of images, analogies, models, and para­
digms in the growth of science. For instance, Norman R. Camp­
bell, one of the pioneers of this recognition, maintained that 
• 
the truly valuable element in scientific theories derives from 
a more or less fruitful embedded analogy which enables us to 
• 
imaginatively extend our understanding of laws from the familiar 
to the unfamiliar. Indeed, Campbell argued that this is the 
very structure of hypotheses and theories, and their prime val­
• 
ue, as contrasted with the inertness of law-like statements. 
Focussing on the process of discovery, Campbell, against the 
positivists, contended that the embedded analogy" ••• is essen­
tial to and inseparable from the theory and is not merely an 
aid to its formulation" (1920:119: see also 129-30). Signifi­
cantly, Northrop Frye, from a rather different perspective, 
makes a similar observation " ••• whatever is constructive in 
•
 
any verbal structure seems to me invariably some kind of meta­

phor" (1957:353). Decades later, Mary Hesse (eg. Models and Ana­
• 
logies in Science, 1963) continued the same argument against 
the positivist~' denuding of the structure of scientific theory. 
Further, it is int~resting to note that other contemporary 
philosophers of science contend that scientific discovery and 
revolutions in science come about through "gestalt switches" 
•
 
•
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and paradigm changes (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958, T.S. Kuhn, 1962).
 
Kuhn's notion of a paradigm as a model, an exemplar to be emu­

lated by the scientific communit~ is almost Durkheimian. In­

•
 
deed, a sociologist might be indulged the speculation that had
 
philosophers of science been more familiar with fundamental
 
sociocultural theory, they would have reached these conclu­

sions in far clearer fashion long ago. In short, I submit that
 
•
 
science too, instead of moving exclusively in analytical fash­

ion from proposition to proposition, also grows and changes by
 
moving from image to image. This is the irreducible phenomeno­

logical and metaphorical structure of all cultural processes.
 
•
 
Researchers in the human sciences too would do well to
 
attempt to search out the fundamental equational and transform­

ational structures underlying their specific materials. For in­

stance, the philosopher Stephen Pepper (1942) has convincingly
 
•
 
analyzed several "root metaphors ll of world-scope. For example,
 
the informing IIbilliard ball ll analogy which N.C. Campbell dis­

covered underlying the Gay-Lussac law of gases in chemistry is
 
a specific illustration of the workings of atomistic and mech­

• 
anistic metaphors which have been so closely identified with 
the very structure of modern science. It is important to recog­
nize, therefore, that these II roo t metaphors" of atomism and 
mechanism constitute interpretive logics which tend to cut a­
cross modern physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, econo­
mics, political theory, sociology, jurisprudence, ethics, rel­
gion; in short, almost all modern disciplines in the Anglo 
• 
Cultural Tradition. Indeed, analysis of 
such cross-cutting interpretive logics of cultural traditions 
means that the historical thrust in the human sciences would 
be to proceed both analogically and homologically. Analogical 
•
 
analysis means looking at the in-depth symbolic linkages be­

tween one sphere and another (eg. religious 'ethics and econo­
mic norms). The task here would be to unravel the series of 
inner symbolic equations generating horizontally congruent 
• 
spheres of action and meaning through the progressive extension 
of prime analogues from one set of experiences to another. 
• 
• 
• 
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Homological analysis means looking at the historical connect­
ions between analogous elements in different spheres of devel­
opment. Here the main task becomes to unravel the key sets of 
transformational equations linking diverse cultural phenomena 
with their common historical origins. 
• 
c. Levi-Strauss's Notion of Totemism as a Primitive 
Equational Structure 
• 
If we take this perspective and return to Durkheim's 
study of the primitive kind of systems in which phenomenologi­
cal analogy serves as the chief classificatory principle, it 
• 
is striking to note that one who calls himself "an inconstant 
disciple" of Durkheim should have developed a theory of totem­
ism precisely around such notions of deeply embedded equation­
al structures. Indeed, the "structuralist" progra'll centers on 
• 
elucidating the basic equational and transformational opera­
tions which constitute cultural process. Levi-Strauss views 
totemism as" a classificatory scheme which allows the na­
tural and social universe to be grasped as an organized whole" 
• 
(1966:135). It is precisely these equational and transforma­
tional structures (which Levi-Strauss further explores in the 
several volumes of his Mythologiques), which mark totemism as 
a primitive, melded, phenomenologically based system of meta­
hors and condensation symbolism in which different spheres 
and levels of experience are pulled together and seen as con­
vertible one into the other. 
• 
The mythical system and the modes of representations it 
employs serve to establish homologies [analogies?] be­
tween natural and social conditions, or more accurately, 
it makes it possible to equate significant contrasts 
found on different planes: the geographical, meterolo­
gical, zoological, botanical, technical, economic, social,
• 
ritual, religious, and philosophical (1966:93). 
Arguing that " .• the totemic representation amounts to a code 
which makes it possible to pass from one system to another re­
gardless of whether it is formulated in natural or cultural 
• 
terms," Levi-Strauss also notes that this totemic classifica­
tion is more than just a system of knowledge, for "It is also 
• 
•
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the basis of an ethic which prescribes or prohibits modes of 
behavior" (1965: 97) .
• The isomorphism between social status and relations and 
symbolic cultural categories acts as the core, the framework, 
or template--the metaphorical translating column--of public 
and private phenomenological process. Arguing that the func­
• tion of totemism as a phenomenological code " ... is to guar­
antee the convertibility of ideas between different levels of 
social reality,1I Levi-Strauss suggests that this is what Durk­
heim meant to get at: "As Durkheim seems sometimes to have
• realized, the basis of sociology is what may be called 'socio­
logic' (1966:76) .II 
• 
... ideas and beliefs of the totemic type particularly 
merit attention because they constitute codes making it 
possible to ensure, in the form of conceptual systems, 
the convertibility of messages appertaining to each le­
vel ..•. This mediation between nature and culture is one 
of the distinctive functions of the totemic operator (1966: 
90-1) . 
• 
•.. totemism postulates a logical equivalency between a 
society of natural species and a world of social groups 
•
 
(1966: 104) .
 
Thus, instead of adopting a Utilitarian or pragmatic approach
 
to food interdictions, for instance, Levi-Strauss views them
 
as a symbolic way to emphasize a crucial link or opposition
 
•
 
between culture and nature: "Eating prohibitions and obliga­

tions thus seem to be theoretically equivalent means of deno­

ting significance in a logical system some or all of whose ele­

ments are edible species" (1966:103).
 
•
 
Now, while utilizing such fundamental generative opposi­

tions as culture/nature, general/particular, generic logic/
 
change and history, Levi-Strauss, searching for the panhuman
 
logic operating in the elementary structures of the human mind,
 
feels as if he can explain all the diversity in symbolism and 
human action through abstract models of differentiation and 
integration. In so far as he overstates his case, his work 
• 
can be viewed as a kind of applied metaphysics. Yet, still 
his problem is akin to Durkheim's original one: how does dif­
ferentiation generate integration? Perhaps LaCapra (1972) is 
•
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more sensitive than most secondary observers to the signifi­
cance of Levi-Strauss's development of Durkheim's seminal in­
• sights. Let us conclude with a fine summary statement of 
• 
Levi-Strauss's insights into totemism as a symbolic coding 
system: 
What is significant is not so much the presence or ab­
sence of this or that level of classification as the ex­
istence of a classification with, as it were, an adjust­
able thread which gives the group adopting it the means 
of "focussing" on all planes, from the most abstract to 
the most concrete, the most cultural to the most natural, 
without changing its intellectual instrument (1966:136).
• Thus totemism can be viewed as an ingenious primitive way of 
converting phenomenological diversity into moral and concep­
tual unity, of transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Indeed, 
this "science of the concrete" is adequate for its context,
• and as Durkheim observed, served as the foundation for the 
emergence of later rational and universal classificatory sys­
tems. 
•	 
d. Sacral "Contagion" as A Primitive Metaphorical Link 
Now, if Durkheim viewed the "contagion" of sacral forces 
as the prime unifying link in primitive classificatory systems, 
this was because this process contained a number of crucial
• metaphorical principles, especially "the part is equal to the 
whole," and "like produces like." Late in The Elementary Forms, 
for instance, Durkheim summed up these metaphorical principles 
in this way:
• Since all the forces of the universe have been conceived 
• 
on the model of the sacred forces, the contagiousness in­
herent in the second was extended to the first, and men 
have believed that all the properties of a body could be 
transmitted contagiously. Likewise, when the principle 
according to which like produces like had been establish­
ed in order to satisfy certain religious needs, it detach­
• 
ed itself from its ritual origins to become, through a 
sort of spontaneous generalization, a law of nature (EF:404). 
Indeed, to Durkheim the contagion of sacral symbolism served 
as a way of translating through synecdoche and metaphor these 
constitutive	 principles into simpler form. Let us briefly ex­
plore these primitive analogical classificatory operations. 
•
 
!
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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Once again, religion serves as the prime symbolic ve­
hicle by which the sociocultural microcosm is first construct­
ed. Due to the contagiousness of sacred energies, mounting 
oppositions between it and all that is profane spread to things 
that appear to resemble the totemic incarnation in some way or 
another. It is these binary oppositions which serve as the 
first principle of classification. 
When a classification is reduced to two classes, these 
are almost necessarily conceived as antitheses; they 
are used primarily as a means of clearly separating 
things between which there is a very marked contrast 
(EF: I 70) • 
As Levi-Strauss notes, such binary oppositions serve as the 
organizing womb of culture. Thus, the very basis of the sym­
bolic alignments of the microcosm with the macrocosm is the 
series of radical antitheses between the sacred and the pro­
fane. 
Now, the symbolic contagion of sacral energies is the 
linking force to the extension of these binary oppositions. 
A sacred character is to a high degree contagious: it 
therefore spreads out from the totemic being to every­
thing that is closely or remotely connected with it. 
The religious sentiments inspired by the animal are 
communicated to the substances upon which it is nour­
ished and which serves to make or remake its flesh and 
blood, to the things that resemble it, and to the dif­
ferent beings with which it has constant relations. 
Thus, little by little, sub-totems are attached to the 
totems, and form the cosmological systems expressed by 
the primitive classifications. At last, the whole world 
is divided up among the totemic principles of each tribe 
(EF: 254) • 
Now, one of the marks of primitive thought in this re­
gard is its phenomenological or concrete imagistic bases, for 
the ways in which experiences may be judged relevant to one 
or another set of symbolic references depend more upon the 
concrete details of specific situations, prevailing group de­
finitions, and the individuals involved, than upon any univer­
sal or rational criterion. The point of departure here is the 
"natural attitude," which is shared by primitive and modern 
man in his everyday mode alike. Experience is linked to exper­
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
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ience, image to image, instead of to abstract governing prin­
ciples. The key anchor of this progressive cosmization is 
thus analogy. Based upon degrees of resemblance to the totem­
ic incarnation, analogies drawn in a concrete way from imme­
diate experience are progressively extended to other more or 
less related sets of experiences. Things similar to the sa­
cred image are believed to be driven by the same essential 
energizing principles. 
The Australian does not place things in the same clan 
or in different clans at random. For him as for us, 
similar images attract one another, while opposed ones 
repel one another, and it is on the basis of these feel­
ings of affinity or of repulsion that he classified the 
corresponding things in one place or another (EF:170). 
Later in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim spoke of the 
"law of contagion" as containing two sub-principles of so­
called "sympathetic magic." The first principle was that "the 
part is equal to the whole," which means that "Anything touch­
ing an object also touches everything which has any relations 
of proximity or unity whatsoever with this object. Whatever 
affects the part also affects the whole" (EF:39B) . 
... when a sacred thing is subdivided, each of its 
parts remains equal to the thing itself. Insofar as 
religious thought is concerned, the part is equal to 
the whole; it has the same powers, the same efficacy. 
The debris of a relic has the same virtue as a relic 
in good condition. The smallest drop of blood contains 
the same active principle as the whole thing .... This 
conception would be inexplicable if the sacredness of 
something were due to the constituent properties of the 
thing itself, for, in that case, it should vary with 
that thing, increasing and decreasing with it. But if 
the virtues it is believed to possess are not intrin­
sic to it, and if they come from certain sentiments 
which it brings to mind and symbolizes, though these 
originate outside it, then, since it has no need of 
determined dimensions to play this role of reminder, 
it will have the same value whether it is entire or 
not. Since the part makes us think of the whole, it 
evokes the same sentiment as the whole (EF:26l-2). 
The second principle is that like attracts like. The 
representation of a being or condition reproduces this being 
or condition. Durkheim compared these two principles in terms 
of the differences between sympathetic magic and the effica­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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ciousness of the totemic commensal rites. For instance, Durk­
heim spoke first of the mechanisms at work in a magic charm: 
The charm is, to a large extent, a simple phenomenon 
of transfer. The idea of the image is associated in the 
mind with that of the model; consequently, the effects 
of an action performed upon a statue are transmitted 
contagiously to the person whose traits it reproduces. 
The function of the image is for its original what that 
of a part is for the whole: it is an agent of transmis­
sion. Therefore, men think that they can obtain the same 
result by burning the hair of the person whom they wish 
to injure: the only difference between these two sorts 
of operations is that in one, the communication is made 
through similarity, while in the other is by means of 
contiguity. 
It is different with the rites which concern us. They 
suppose not only the displacement of a given condition 
or quality, which passed from one object into the other, 
but also the creation of something entirely new. The 
mere act of representing the animal gives birth to this 
animal and creates it~ by imitating the sound of wind 
or falling water, they cause clouds to form, rain to 
fall, etc. Of course, resemblance plays an important 
part in each case, but not all the same one. In a charm, 
it only gives a special direction to the action exerci­
sed; it directs in a certain wayan action not origina­
ting in it. In the rites of which we have just been de­
scribing, it acts by itself and is directly efficacious. 
So, in contradiction to the usual definitions, the real 
difference between the two principles of so-called sym­
pathetic magic and the corresponding practices is not 
that contiguity acts in one case and resemblance in the 
other, but that in the former there is simple contagious 
communication, while there is production and creation in 
the latter (EF:39S-9). 
And Durkheim added this footnote: "We say nothing of what has 
been called the law of opposition, for as Hubert and Mauss 
(in their "General Theory of Magic") have shown, a contrary 
produces its opposite only through the intermediary of a sim­
ilar" (EF:399). Thus, like attracts or produces like; analogy 
is the mediating principle, the crucial third term between 
empirical diversity and the all-embracing moral unity of the 
cosmos. 
What ultimately results from these cross-mixings is oft­
en a very complex classificatory system, what Levi-Strauss 
has called a "bricolage," based upon the phenomenological 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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"science of the concrete." In short, there is a special logic 
to the elementary forms of human classification, whether these 
be elaborated by primitive peoples or moderns. The primitive 
classificatory process, though seemingly idiosyncratic, really 
does not proceed at random. Nor is it alogical or pre-logical; 
it is phenomeno-logical. What must be respected here especially 
is the extraordinary difficulty of building up systems of 
moral and intellectual classification from scratch. Given 
their meager cultural resources, the wonder is that primitive 
societies should have ever been able to construct classifica­
tory systems of such sophistication and general usefulness. 
Whatever their inadequacies, and these are manifold, one of 
their undeniable virtues is, as Durkheim emphasized, that they 
laid the first foundations of our modern epochal achievements 
in science. 
We have seen the facility with which the primitive con­
fuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous 
things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see 
one of the causes which has contributed the most to 
facilitating these confusions. Since religious forces 
are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening 
that the same principle animates very different objects 
equally; it passes from some into others as the result 
of either a simple material proximity or even of a su­
perficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals, 
plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men 
because they bear the name of an animal; the animals 
because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the 
plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks 
because they mark the place where the ceremonies are 
celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore consi­
dered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one 
single religious principle ought to pass as having the 
same essence, and as differing from one another only in 
secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite 
natural to arrange them in a single category, and to re­
gard them as mere varieties of the same class, transmu­
table into one another. 
When this relation has been established, it makes the 
phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken 
by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical 
life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings in 
spite of their natural differences? But we have seen 
that these confusions and participation have played a 
role of the highest utility in logic; they have served 
•
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•
 
to bind together things which sensation leaves apart
 
from one another. So it is far from true that con­

tagion, the source of these connections and confusions,
 
is marked with that fundamental irrationality that one 
is inclined to attribute to it at first. It has opened 
the way for the scientific explanations of the future 
(EF: 364-5) • 
• 
Indeed, Durkheim went so far as to identify the origin of the 
so-called "law of causality" (force and sequence) with these 
primitive notions. (We shall later pursue the significance of 
Durkheim's general assertions here in the following section 
• 
on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society and 
culture). It is important to repeat that even though to modern 
"rationalized" observers these primitive systems of resona­
ting symbolic equations might seem wholly unreasonable and in­
• 
deed devoid of everything we think of as logic, a veritable 
superstitious "bricolage," nonetheless, part of Durkheim's 
lasting achievement here was to emphasize the inner logic of 
their construction and their evolutionary significance. Ele­
• 
mentary classificatory systems are 
cal projections constructed through 
sion of knowledge through analogy. 
a series of phenomenologi­

the principle of exten­

To a certain extent, these
 
systems are "mytho-sociological," as Durkheim said, since col­
• 
lective representations have sacralized the entire field of 
human experience. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
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e. Symbolic Equations and The Legitimate Foundations of 
• 
Moral and Intellectual Authority of Collectivities 
The construction of systems of moral and intellectual 
classification through the progressive extension of symbolic 
equations originally rooted in the sacral/profane opposition
• of collectivties is well illustrated by Durkheim and Mauss's <~f 
seminal monograph on Primitive Classification. For example, 
of the phenomenological extension of concrete analogy among 
the American Zuni Indians, Durkheim and Mauss noted: 
• What we find among the Zuni is a veritable arrangement 
• 
of the universe. All beings and facts in nature, 'the 
sun, moon, and stars, the sky, earth, and sea, in all 
their phenomena and elements; and all inanimate objects, 
as well as plants, animals, and men,' are classed, la­
belled and assigned to fixed places in a unique and in­
tegrated system in which all the parts are coordinated 
and subordinated one to another by 'degrees of resem­
blance' (PC: 4 3) • 
Through progressive extension of analogies, these compounding 
•
 
systems of classification are interwoven more and more tight­

ly; cross-indexed as~librarian might say. Indeed, the degree 
of complexity, "cross-indexing," and internal consistency 
might serve as some basic criteria for judging the comparative 
• 
degree of cultural complexity as represented in the central 
classificatory system. 
•
 
In the form in which we now find it, the principle of
 
this system is a division of space into seven regions:
 
north, south, west, east, zenith, nadir, and the center.
 
Everything is assigned to one or another of these seven
 
regions. To mention only the seasons and the elements,
 
•
 
the wind, breeze, or air, and the winter season are at­

tributed to the north; water, the spring, and its damp
 
breezes to the west; fire and the summer, to the south;
 
the earth, seeds, the frosts which bring the seeds to
 
maturity and end the year, to the east. The pelican,
 
crane, grouse, sagecock, the evergreenoak, etc. are
 
things of the west. With the east are classed the deer, 
antelope, turkey, etc. (PC:43-4). 
Now, these more or less systematic phenomenological 
• 
linkages continue to ramify: flora and fauna are linked with 
specific regions of the sky and seasons of the year, colors 
are added, as are human virtues and social classes. Indeed, 
•
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
redundancy serves an important function, as in all systems 
of communication, for it almost seems as if primitive cult­
ures constantly rotated the symbolic matrix, each time tying 
in yet another thread in the emerging cosmological fabric. 
This rotation and redundancy increases "inter-convertibility," 
as Levi-Strauss observes. 
A particular coloris attributed to each region and char­
acterizes it, The north is yellow, because, it is said, 
the light is yellow when the sun rises and sets; the 
west is blue because of the blue light seen at sunset. 
The south is red because it is the region of summer and 
fire, which is red. The east is white because it is the 
color of the day. The upper regions are streaked with 
colors like the play of light among the clouds; the low­
er regions are black like the depths of the earth. As 
for the center, the navel of the world, representative 
of all regions, it is all the colors simultaneously (PC: 
44) . 
In addition, men and things form integral parts of the 
same cosmological system. The emerging symbolic economy thus 
includes not only the creation of value but also the alloca­
tion of symbolic value to all the resources of the world. Na­
tural elements are assigned social functions. 
Not only things, but social functions are distributed 
in this way. The north is the region of force and de­
struction, thus war and destruction belong to it; to 
the west, peace and hunting; to the south, the region 
of heat, agriculture, and medicine; to the east, the 
region of the sun, magic, and religion; to the upper 
world and the lower world are assigned diverse combin­
ations of these functions (PC:44). 
Noting that " ... this division of the world is exactly the 
same as that of the clans within the pueblo" (PC:44), Durkheim 
and Mauss argued: 
not only do the divisions of things by regions and 
the division of society by clans correspond, but they 
are inextricably interwoven and merged. One may equal­
ly well say that things are classified either with the 
north, south, etc. or with the clans of the north, 
south, etc. (PC:47). 
Contending that we may discover the evolutionary links between 
the type of classification by clans, seen in Australian totem­
ism, and more complicated systems of classification by quar­
ters, as seen for example in some of the American tribe~ 
•
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Durkheim and Mauss claimed: 
Things were first of all localized by clans and totems. 
But this strict localization of clans ... necessarily 
brought with it a corresponding localization of the 
things attributed to the clans. From the moment that 
the wolf people, for example, belong to a particular 
quarter of the camp, the same necessarily applies to 
to the things of all sorts which are classified under 
this same totem. Consequently, the camp has only to be 
oriented in a fixed way and all its parts are immedia­
tely oriented together with everything, things and peo­
ple, that they comprise. In other words, all things in 
nature are henceforth thought of as standing in fixed 
relationships to equally fixed regions in space (PC:65). 
Durkheim and Mauss further observe that this represents 
that stage of cosmological classificatory system which por­
trays the " ..• tribe as a microcosm of the universe," an imago 
mundi. 
Certainly, it is only tribal space which is divided 
and shared in this way. But just as for the primitive 
the tribe constitutes all humanity, and as the founding 
ancestor of the tribe is the father and creator of men, 
so also the idea of the camp is identified with that of 
the whole world. The camp is the center of the universe, 
and the whole universe is concentrated within it. Cosmic 
space and tribal space are thus only very imperfectly 
distinguished, and the mind passes from one to the other 
without difficulty, almost without being aware of doing 
so. And in this way things are connected with particular 
quarters (PC:65). 
Now, this notion of the camp as the center of the world is a 
particularly good illustration of what Durkheim and Mauss cal­
led the "sociocentrism" of primitive and archaic classifica­
tory systems or cosmologies. 
It has quite often been said that man began to conceive 
things by relating them to himself. The above allows us 
to see more precisely what this anthropocentrism, which 
might better be called sociocentrism, consists of. The 
center of the first schemas of nature is not the indivi­
dual; it is society. It is this that is objectified, not 
man. Nothing shows this more clearly than the way in 
which the Sioux retain the whole universe, in a way, 
within the limits of tribal space; and we have seen how 
universal space itself is nothing else than the site oc­
cupied by the tribe, only indefinitely extended beyond 
its real limits. It is by virtue of the same mental dis­
position that so many peoples have placed the center of 
the world, "the navel of the earth," in their own poli­
tical or religious capital, ie. at the place which is 
•
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• 
the center of their moral life (PC:86-7). 
Now, these insistent symbolic linakges imply consubstan­
tiality--that the same sacred principle inheres in all linked 
• 
things. They are made of the same "cosmic" substance, and en­
ergized by the same basic principle. The problem becomes to 
orchestrate a ha~monious alignment between the two parallel 
orders. We witness here amost important equational process-­
• 
the moralization of nature, and the naturalization of man. In 
this crucial reciprocal interpenetration, as Levi-Strauss ob­
serves, world, self, and society grow together in a "solid 
system all of whose parts are united and vibrate sympatheti­
cally. " 
• 
Men regard the things in their clan as their relatives 
or associates; they call them their friends and think 
that they are made out of the same flesh as themselves. 
Therefore, between the two are elective affinities and 
• 
quite special relations of agreement. Things and people 
have a common name, and in a certain way they naturally 
understand each other and harmonize with one another .... 
Just as a man who belongs to the Crow clan has within 
him something of this animal, so the rain, since it is 
of the same clan and belongs to the same totem, is also 
necessarily considered as being 'the same thing as a 
crow'; for the same reason, the moon is a black cockatoo, 
every blacknut tree a pelican, etc. All the beings arran­
ged in a single clan, whether men, animals, plants or in­
animate objects are merely forms of the totemic being ..•.
• 
All are really of the same flesh in the sense that all 
• 
partake of the nature of the totemic animal (EF:174-5). 
These consubstantial linkages continue to ramify as the 
societies grow more complex, until, as Durkheim and Mauss said 
of the Chinese Taoist system, " ••• the whole world is covered 
like a gnosis or a cabbala." Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss imply 
here that one of the hidden keys to understanding the growth 
of cultural complexity comes from the suppleness or differen­
•
 
tial ease to which the central classificatory matrices of cul­

tures can be progressively applied to encompass the incredi­
ble diversity of empirical facts. This differential ability 
to generalize, to progressively extend, in short, to univer­
•
 
salize prime symbolic oppositions, shall prove a critical fac­

tor in later sociocultural evolution. Of the complex Taoist 
• 
I 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
--194-­
classificatory system, for instance, Durkheim and Mauss noted: 
In order to adapt the basic principles of the system to 
the facts, the divisions and subdivisions of regions 
and things were ceaselessly multiplied and complicated. 
The fact is that this classification was intended above 
all to regulate the conduct of men; and it was able to 
do so, avoiding the contradictions of experience, thanks 
to this very complexity (PC:70-1). 
Now, it is important to emphasize that such classifica­
tory systems serve not merely cognitive but moral functions 
as well. This dual aspect of phenomenological process means 
that such " ... classifications (are) intended above all to 
regulate the conduct of men," or as Levi-Strauss says, "these 
classifications also carry ethics." We have emphasized through­
out this book that structures of conscience and consciousness 
are always intimately interwoven, but had we drawn the conclu­
sion that the more elementary these systems become, the more 
the representations also function as reglementations? Thus, 
as Weber (1963,1968) also saw, primitive magical rites, which 
are the counterpart of myths, serve eminently practical func­
tions--to ensure long life, reproduction of game or to make 
crops grow, to cure sickness, repel enemies, etc. It is hard­
ly surprising then that such systems of conscience and con­
sciousness should corne to " ... govern all details of life." 
... a divinatory rite is not generally isolated; it is 
part of an organized whole. The science of the diviners, 
therefore, does not form isolated groups of things, but 
binds these qroups to each other. At the basis of a sys­
tem of divination, there is thus, at least implicitly, 
a system of classification (PC:77). 
For instance, of the rather sophisticated divinatory 
rites of the Chinese Taoists, Durkheim and Mauss remarked: 
This classification of regions, seasons, things, and 
animal species dominates the whole of Chinese life. 
It is the very principle of the famous doctrine of 
feng-shui, and through this it determines the orien­
tation of buildings, the foundations of towns and hous­
es, the siting of tombs and cemeteries; if certain 
tasks are undertaken here and others there, if certain 
affairs are conducted at such and such a time, this is 
due to reasons based on this traditional systematiza­
tion. And these reasons are not taken only from geo­
mancy; they are also derived from considerations con­
cerning hours, days, months, and years: a certain di­
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rection which is favorable at one time becomes unfavor­
able at another. Forces agree or discord according to 
season. Thus not only is everything heterogeneous in 
time, as in space, but the heterogeneous parts of which 
these two settings are composed correspond, or are oppo­
sed, and are arranged, in one system. And all these in­
finitely numerous elements are combined to determine the 
genus and the species of things in nature, the direction 
of movement of forces, and acts which must be performed, 
thus giving the impression of a philosophy which is at 
once subtle and naive, rudimentary and refined. Here we 
have, then, a highly typical case in which collective 
thought has worked in a reflective and learned way on 
themes which are clearly primitive (PC:?3). 
The intimate linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies, there­
fore, that structures of morality and knowledge will line up 
in parallel fashion. There is no escaping this attempt at har­
monious alignment, for the structures of responsibility are 
preeminently collective, as Durkheim noted with altruistic and 
fatalistic suicide. No, change comes here through greater a­
lignment or severing of relations between the microcosm and 
macrocosm, or between systems of morality and knowledge. Not­
ing that "There is nothing more natural, moreover, than the 
relation thus expressed between divination and the classifi­
cation of things," (PC:??), Durkheim and Mauss compared the 
Chinese system to the Greek: 
... the Chinese classification was essentially an in­
strument of divination. Now the divinatory methods of 
Greece are remarkably similar to the Chinese, and the 
similarities denote procedures of the same nature in 
the way fundamental ideas are classified. The assign­
ment of elements and metals to the planets is a Greek, 
perhaps Chaldean, fact, as much as a Chinese. Mars is 
fire, Saturn is water, etc. The relations between cer­
tain sorts of events and certain planets, the simultan­
eous apprehension of space and time, the particular cor­
respondence of a certain kind of undertaking, are found 
equally in both these different societies. 
A still more curious coincidence is that which allows a 
relationship to be established between Chinese and 
Greek astrology and physiognomy, and perhaps with the 
Egyptian. The Greek theory of zodiacal and planetary 
melothesia, which is thought to be of Egyptian origin, 
is intended to establish strict correspondence between 
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certain parts of the body and certain positions of the 
stars, certain orientations, and certain events. Now 
in China also there exists a famous doctrine based on 
the same principle. Each element is related to a cardi­
nal point, a constellation and a particular color, and 
these different groups of things are thought to corres­
pond, in turn, to diverse kinds of organs, inhabited by 
souls, to emotions, and to different parts whose reunion 
forms the 'natural character.' Thus, yang, the male prin­
ciple of light and sky, has the liver-rn-the viscera, 
the bladder as mansion, and the ears and sphincters a­
mong the orifices. This theory, the generality of which 
is apparent, is not of mere curiosity value; it implies 
a certain way of conceiving things. By it, the universe 
is in fact referred to the individual; things are expres­
sed by it, in a sense, as functions of the living organ­
ism; this is really a theory of the microcosm (PC:76-77). 
Although some have criticized him for ignoring the body (eg. 
Victor Turner, 1967; P. Worsley, 1956) or the natural environ­
ment, Durkheim did acknowledge, it seems, that primitive and 
archaic societies did feel compelled to construct parallel 
alignments between society, the body, and the natural environ­
ment, especially the heavens in Mid-Eastern empires. Thus, 
world, self, and society are all cosmized. 
Now, the systems of classification which we call primi­
tive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding to­
gether moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a more 
or less coherent system. Such cosmological classifications are, 
at one and the same time, moral, intellectual and emotional, 
for the body, society, and the environment are also used ana­
logically as resonating microcosms of the other. Thus, the 
analytical dimensions cross-cut knowledge, belief, and action. 
The ties which unite things of the same group or differ­
ent groups to each other are themselves conceived as so­
cial ties .... The expressions by which we refer to these 
relations still have a moral significance; but whereas 
for us they are hardly more than metaphors, originally 
they meant what they said. Things of the same class were 
really considered as relatives of the individuals of the 
same socml group, and consequently of each other. They 
are of the 'same flesh,' the same family. Logical rela­
tions are thus, in a sense, domestic relations (PC:84). 
And since domestic relations are rooted primarily in sentiment, 
it is not surprising that these other (ana)logical relations 
too should become suffused with social sentiment. In Moral Ed­
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ucation, for instance, Durkheim explicitly noted that cogni­
tive representations must not only be moral reglementations, 
but affect the sentiments as well. The existential is groun­
ded in the essential which then converts the obligatory into 
the desirable. Such representations must: 
... warm th€ heart and set the will in motion. The point 
here is not~~nrich the mind with some theor~tical notion 
... but to give it a principle of action, which we must 
make as effective as necessary and possible. In other 
words, the representation must have something emotional: 
it must have the character of a sentiment more than a 
conception. Since, in the long run, one only learns by 
doing, we must multiply the opportunities in which the 
sentiments thus communicated to the child can manifest 
themselves in action. To learn the love of collective 
life we must live in it, not only in our minds and ima­
ginations, but in reality (ME:229). 
Although in Primitive Classification Durkheim was temp­
ted~~dentify the appa;ent inability of primitive man to form 
fixed logical concepts with the fused emotion ladenness of 
these moral-cognitive representations and reglementations, on 
the same page Durkheim and Mauss also link these sentiments 
to the authority of the sacral-magical complex. Indeed, it is 
the obligatoriness, the collectivization of responsibility 
for disharmonies between the microcosm and the macrocosm, 
which tends to make such representations and reglementations 
sacred. And because inviolable, immune to rational criticism 
and change . 
... emotion is naturally refractory to analysis, or at 
least lends itself uneasily to it, because it is too com­
plex. Above all, when it has a collective origin it de­
fies critical and rational examination. The pressure ex­
erted by the group on each of its members does not permit 
individuals to judge freely the notions which society it­
self has elaborated and in which it has placed something 
of its personality. Such constructs are sacred for indiv­
iduals (PC:88). 
Indeed, it is this infusion of religious or sacred sentiment 
into the central classificatory paradigms which characterizes 
the distinctiveness of the archaic cosmological system . 
... it is possible to classify other things than con­
cepts, and otherwise than in accordance with the laws 
of pure understanding. For in order for it to be pos­
sible for ideas to be systematically arranged for rea­
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sons of sentiment, it is necessary that they should not 
be pure ideas, but that they should themselves be pro­
ducts of sentiment .... For those who are called primi­
tives, a species of things is not a simple object of 
knowledge, but corresponds above all to a certain senti­
mental attitude. All kinds of affective elements combine 
in the representation of it. Religious emotions ... not 
only give it a special tinge, but attribute to it the 
most essential properties of which it is constituted. 
Things are above all sacred or profane, pure or impure, 
friends or enemies, favorable or unfavorable; ie. their 
most fundamental characteristics are only expressions of 
the way in which they affect social sensibilities. The 
differences in which they are grouped are more affective 
than intellectual (PC:85-6). 
Indeed, it is precisely this on-going dialectic between senti­
ment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination and mo­
rality, macrocosm and microcosm, culture and nature, which 
marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory systems. 
Now, even granting the more or less direct line of con­
tinuity connecting our own day with these elementary forms, 
the great gulf remaining between the two is revealed by the 
religious affectivity of regions of space in primitive systems. 
In contrast to the uniformly neutral, geometric homogeneity 
of physical space in modern western thought, primitive cul­
tures have a highly emotionally charged, heterogeneous con­
ception of space. 
For us, space is formed of similar parts, which are sub­
stitutable one for the other. We have seen, however, 
that for many peoples it is profoundly differentiated 
according to regions. This is because each region has 
its own affective value. Under the influence of diverse 
sentiments, it is connected with a special religious 
principle, and consequently it is endowed with virtues 
sui generis which distinguishes it from all the others. 
And it is this emotional value of notions which plays 
the preponderant part in the manner in which ideas are 
connected or separated. It is the dominant characteris­
tic in classification (PC:86). 
We see here the stark contrast between the world-views of the 
"enchanted garden" and the "world-as-machine. 1I 
How did there come to be this great contrast if, indeed, 
as Durkheim repeatedly insisted, "there is no gulf between 
these stages of mankind ll ? Since such primitive cosmological 
systems are largely built on phenomenological analogies, the 
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fusion of cognitive, moral and affective categories, socio­
centrism, and sacral-magical protocols, modern systems will
• emerge only where classifications become progressively root­
ed in abstract "essential" principles which are true by their 
very nature, in which structures of conscience and conscious­
ness become separated and the latter granted some legitimate
• institutionalizedautonomy, where these categories become de­
tached from their prime or original group status referents, 
and in which questions of truth and fidelity are resolved pri­
marily by recourse to rational logical and evidential canons
• rather than by collective recourse to traditional magical prax­
is. In regard to one of these dimensions, Durkheim and Mauss 
observed: 
... the history of scientific classification is, in
• 
the last analysis, the history of the stages by which 
this element of social affectivity has progressively 
weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflect­
ive thought of individuals (PC:8 ). 
It is important to recognize, moreover, that this evolution 
• 
does not come about simply through the antagonism of one mode 
of classification to the other, and the replacement of the 
former by the latter. Rather, as Benjamin Nelson (1973a) and 
Edmund Leites (1974) have realized, the passage to modernity 
• 
comes about through the expansion of structures of fraterni­
zation, of universalization, of rationalization, within spe­
fic religiously based cultural traditions. Indeed, as they 
emphasize, conflict over the legitimacy of alternate anchors 
• 
of moral and intellectual legitimacy, and structures of res­
ponsibility, are central to this critical evolutionary pas­
sage from "sacral-magical" to "faith" to "rational" structures 
of conscience and consciousness. 
• Certainly, one of the most valuable case-studies, all 
the more profound because it combines Durkheimian and Weber­
ian interpretive perspectives, of a classificatory system in 
which categories are primarily related to specific group sta­
• tuses and to the ritual praxis associated with them is Louis Dumont's study of the sacral foundations of Indian social or­
ganization in Homo Hierarchicus (1970). In contrast to the 
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western notion of social stratification as rooted primarily 
in economic criteria, Dumont shows how the religious opposi­
tion between the pure and the impure serves as the key organ­
izing principle for cultural and structural legitimacy in the 
Indian caste organization. Following both Nelson and Dumont, 
Jerome Gittleman offers these valuable observations: 
Their description of the persistent authority of sacro­
magical structures in the social institution of 'caste' 
illustrates the immense difficulty of the historical 
passage from 'sacro-magical' to 'faith' structures of 
consciousness. 
In his essay 'For a Sociology of India,' Louis Dumont 
points out that Indian culture has the appearance of 
a sort of 'history museum' in which new culture traits 
are pulled up, juxtaposed, or sedimented upon the old 
traits, but do not replace them. Dumont argues that 
this is due to the hierarchical nature of Indian so­
ciety which places a premium upon the prestige of sta­
tus attaching to all things, and not upon their intrin­
sic functions. In another essay, , A Structural Defini­
tion of a Folk Deity,' Dumont refers to the 'familiar 
impossibility of universal judgements in India,' which 
he explains by reference to the prescriptive structures 
of caste hierarchy: 'In the caste society nothing is 
true by nature and everything by situation, there are 
no essences but only relations.' By 'relations' Dumont 
is referring (in Nelson's language) to the sacro-magi­
cal definition of 'situation' prescribed ritualistical­
ly for each caste status--a particularistic, rigid, col­
lective praxis which defines the sociocultural spaces 
allocated to things, cognitions, and acts in terms of 
a sacro-magical whole. The term 'essences' refers to 
those cultural universals which would make it possible 
to describe things in terms of the category 'true by 
nature' if the sacro-magical rites of collective praxis 
had not preempted the logical space 'true' (1974:83). 
Thus, the failure to break with the sociocentric referent-­
the lack of cross-cutting social bonds of widening fraterni­
zation--and the sacro-magical traditional collective proto­
cols constituted, in Weber's terms, an almost "ineradicable 
obstacle" to modernization. 
Durkheim and Mauss were sensitive to the mechanics of 
these crucially significant world-historical processes. They 
well knew both the positive and negative results of the per­
meation of society and culture by sacral and magical ration­
ales. Evoking echoes of Weber's image of archaic culture as 
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an "enchanted garden," Durkheim observed in 1912:
 
The field of religious things extends well beyond the
 
limits within which it seemed to be confined at first.
 
It embraces not only the totemic animals and the human
 
members of the clan, but since no known thing exists
 
that is not classified in a clan and under a totem,
 
there is likewise nothing which does not receive to
 
some degree something of a religious character, When,
 
in the religions which later came into being, the gods
 
properly so-called appear, this one over the sea, that
 
one over the air, another over the harvest or over the
 
fruits, etc., and each of these provinces of nature will
 
be believed to draw what life there is in it from the
 
god upon whom it depends. This division of nature among
 
these different divinities constitutes the conception
 
which these religions give us of the universe~.Far from
 
being limited to one or two categories of beings, the
 
domain of totemic religion extends to the final limits
 
of the knomuniverse. Just like the Greek religion, it
 
puts the divine everywhere; the celebrated formula
 
"everything is full of the gods" might equally well ser­

ve it as a motto (EF:179-80). 
And like Weber, Durkheim noted an important parallel between 
the evolution of the gods, ethical obligations, structures of 
conscience and consciousness especially in terms of individua­
tion of responsibility, and the evolution of societies. In 
sum, as societies develop, so too do their symbolic and prime 
classificatory systems, especially their notions of gods as 
symbols of prime potency. But this last is a theme which we 
must save for the chapter after this on the genetic-evolu­
tionary significance of the primitive sacral complex as the 
womb of society, culture, and the person. Having explored in 
relative detail Durkheim's view of the building of classifi­
catory systems, both moral and cognitive, through the exten­
sion of a series of symbolic equations, rooted in religion, 
which serves to cosmicize the human world and valorize human 
experience, let us now turn our attention to the final phase 
of symbolic process. I mean the overcoming of invidious dual­
isms which have thus been endlessly generated through symbol­
ic transformations. Tension-creating polarities, symbolic e­
quations which extend the polarities, and then unity through 
symbolic transformations thus constitute the three main phases 
of symbolic process. 
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8. Symbolic Transformations: The Positive Communion Rites 
• Preface. W.H. Stanner (1967) has suggested that the most 
• 
viable aspect of nurkheim's sociology of religion is his dy­
namic theory of symbolic process which focussed essentially 
on cultural operations and transactions concerning value. I 
generally agree with Stanner, and even Parsons (1973:175) 
has complimented the former's quasi-nurkheimian efforts in 
this direction. 
Now, as Kenneth Burke has rightly emphasized over the
• years, the structure of symbolic action is inherently drama­
• 
tic (or rhetorical and dialectical). As we have discovered 
using nurkheim's materials, the temporal structure of generic 
symbolic action reveals at least three basic phases. First, 
binary polarities introduce a basic tension into human exper­
ience; dilemmas energize Everyman. Second, through metaphor 
and analogy, a whole series of symbolic equations, radiating 
out from the original opposition, serve to bind together dif­
• ferent experiences in a resonating system charged with multi­
ple levels of meaning. The greater the degree of lamination, 
or multiple linkage of meanings on several levels, the great­
•
 
er the symbolic load, and thus the greater the potency and
 
significance. Third, tension is resolved, and the powers of
 
•
 
imagination and will released, through a crucial transforma­

tion of the mounting oppositions into a new and higher unity.
 
All human symbolic action thus has an inherently dramatic de­

•
 
sign. Van Gennep also saw these crucial phases with his three
 
stages of "rites of passage"--separation, transition, and in­

corporation (or preliminal, liminal, and ~ost-liminal, 1960:
 
ego 11). In this section we shall investigate the importance
 
• 
of positive communion rites which serve to effect a creative 
symbolic transformation from the profane to the sacred. 
As we proceed, we should recall, for instance, Burke's 
counsel that " ... in the structural analysis of the symbolic 
act, not only the matter of "what equals what", but also the 
matter of "from what to what" (1973:38) is important. Burke 
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offers some basic hermeneutical rules here: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
The first step ..• requires us to get our equations 
inductively, by tracing down the interrelationships 
as revealed by the objective structure of the book it­
~elf•... Along with the distinction between opposing 
principles, we should note the development of from 
what to what (1973:70-71). 
Thus, like Levi-Strauss (eg. in the first volume of his Mytho­
logiques, The Raw and the Cooked, 1969), Burke goes so far as 
to suggest a notation for these inner relationships: "The two 
main symbols for charting structural relationships would be 
the sign for equals (=) and some such sign as the arrow (from 
~ to)" (1973: 74). Even though Burke developed his theories 
separately from Durkheim's influence, Parsons (1973:176) cred­
its the former with great insight into the " ... fully mature 
Durkheimian position developed in The Elementary Forms." Nhile 
Levi-Strauss's structuralism is rather different from Burke's, 
clearly both structuralist and dramatistic analysis converge 
in their common concern with the inner form of symbolic pro­
cess as a series of self-equilibrating equations and trans­
formations (see also Jean Piaget, Structuralism, 1971). Both 
perspectives are concerned with the deep constitutive and 
transformative processes making up the human symbolic economy. 
Finally, we would do well to remember here that Durk­
heim chose to analyze religious phenomena in depth because 
they represent the most systematic and sophisticated transla­
tion of generic symbolic processes into explicit symbolic 
forms. Religious processes were analytically important, in 
short, for the light they helped shed on generic symbolic 
processes. Certainly, as a non-believer, Durkheim did not 
accredit the truth claims of religions as such: nor do we 
need to do so here in our review of his epochal discovery 
and elaboration of the inner structure of generic human sym­
bolic process. Rather, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970) translates 
theological relationships and terms into their "logological" 
equivalents, so too we are primarily concerned here with re­
translating back religious symbols into their original and 
constitutive sociocultural equivalents. Thus, we may be jus­
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tified, to a certain extent, in considering the two prime 
religious modes of asceticism and mysticism as serving to 
transfigure two basic phases of sociocultural process. Just 
as all religions embody, to a greater or lesser extent, as­
cetic and mystical modes (see especially Max T"leber,1963,1968), 
so too does the generic human symbolIc process which religion 
translates into sacral terms also contain both negative (asce­
tic) and positive (mystical) phases. Separation and reunifi­
cation are thus the rhetorical and dialectical phases of all 
human symbolic processes. 
a.	 Symbolic Metamorphoses: The Sacred and the Profane Are 
Not Closed to Each.Other 
While I do not wish to defend Durkheim's hyperbole in 
regard to the so-called "absoluteness" of the opposition be­
tween sacred and profane, I have tried to demonstrate that 
his rhetorical excesses derived in large part from Durkheim's 
own symbolic equation of the profane with egoistic and util­
itarian economic activity. But contrary to many of Durkheim's 
critics who were misled by the strident tone of some of his 
programmatic declarations, Durkheim himself did not treat the 
contrast between the sacred and the profane as absolute in 
practice. Therefore, before we explore some of the materials 
concerning communion rites, we would do well to note that 
Durkheim observed, in the first section of The Elementary 
Forms, that symbolic metamorphoses from one category of be­
ing to another can and do, indeed must, take place. The sa­
cred and the profane are thus not hermetically sealed boxes 
from which whole categories of existence can never escape. 
This is not equivalent to saying that a being can 
never pass from one of these worlds into another: 
but the manner in which this passage is effected, 
when it takes place, puts into relief the essential 
duality of the two kingdoms. In fact, it implies a 
veritable metamorphosis (EF:54). 
Now, close exegesis reveals that Durkheim did not treat 
this basic dichotomy as rigidly or statically as his critics, 
especially Evans-Pritchard n965) or Stanner (1967), contend. 
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As always, Durkheim merely sharpened their opposition in or­
der to heighten the drama of their inevitable resolution, and 
thus, their inner transformation and reunification. For instan­
ce, after emphasizing the universality of the sacred/profane 
opposition early in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim acknowled­
ged: 
This interdiction cannot go so far as to make all com­
munication between the two worlds impossible, for if 
the profane could in no way enter into relations with 
the sacred, this latter would be good for nothing (EF:55). 
Further, did not Durkheim remark that " ... every consecration 
by means of annointing or washing consis~in transferring into 
a profane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF: 
362)? Now, if one looks to the latter phases of Durkheim's 
treatment of generic symbolic process in his 1912 masterwork, 
you shall discover that Durkheim did indeed explore the sym­
bolic transformations from one state of being to another. In­
deed, Durkheim acknowledged that sacred beings: 
•.. would serve for nothing and have no reason whatso­
ever for their existence if they could not come in con­
tact with ••• worshippers ...• There is no positive rite 
which does not constitute a veritable sacrilege, for a 
man cannot hold commerce with sacred beings without 
crossing a barrier which should ordinarily keep them 
separate (EF:379-80). 
For what, indeea, wouldbe the point of separating all that is 
sacred from all that is profane if there were not some regu­
larly scheduled means of passing from the latter to the form­
er, if'there were no way for harmony between micro and macro­
cosm to be restored? 
It would have been almost impossible for Durkheim to 
leave that "absolute'! and irreconcilable opposition floating 
in the air, forever incapable of resolution. For the "abso­
luteness" of this opposition implies an exclusively rhetorical 
structure to human action. But not only is this unlikely in 
the nature of symbolic processes, it also ignores the 
fact that Durkheim, as a master dialectician, always recogni­
zed the ever-present desire for reconciliation of tension-fil­
led opposites in a new and creative unity. As Burke constantly 
reminds us, to separate implies a ioininq. Diversity ;mpli~s 
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unity, "extremes meet" as Coleridge said. No, in the end, 
• 
there must always be some path which men can take to restore 
themselves and their troubled worlds to wholeness, to health 
and well-being. Rites are these mediums of symbolic metamor­
phoses; rites are collective moral therapeutics. 
•
 
In addition, Evans-Pritchard (eg. 1965:6S) charges Durk­

heim's basic dichotomy with "situational inflexibility." But,
 
•
 
once again, if we set aside Durkheim's rhetorically inspired
 
programmatic declarations, we discover that, in practice, Durk­

heim did indeed recognize what Van Gennep called the "pivot­

ing of the sacred" around a few central symbolic axes. In the
 
•
 
first part of The Elementary Forms did not Durkheim acknow­

ledge that " ... it must not be lost to view that there are sa­

cred things of every degree, and there are some in relation
 
to which a man feels himself relatively at ease" (EF:S3)?
 
•
 
It should, first of all, be remembered that at the heart of
 
the sacramental world-view is the implicit declaration that
 
the orders of being are not necessarily closed to one another,
 
and that the exercise of this faith depends especially upon 
special situational dispensations to ritually ingest a tiny 
part of the sacred totem. 
• 
The profane function of vegetables and even of animals 
is ordinarily to serve as food; then the sacred char­
• 
acter of the totemic animal or plant is shown by the 
fact that it is forbidden to eat them. It is true that 
since they are sacred things, they can enter into the 
composition of certain mystical repasts, and ... some­
times serve as veritable sacraments; yet normally they 
cannot be used for everyday consumption (EF:ISO-I). 
In addition, it should be recalled that whether or not a sa­
cralization of the profane or a profanation of the sacred oc­
curs depends upon the proper approach to any communion ritual. 
• Sacrilege occurs when the taboos surrounding the sacred ob­
• 
jects are violated; yet there is no sacrilege when the ap­
propriate preparatory steps have been taken. Indeed, even: 
... when it is permitted to eat the plant or animal 
that serves as totem, it is not possible to do so 
freely; only a litte bit may be taken at a time. To 
go beyond this amount is a ritual fault that has 
grave consequences (EF:ISI). 
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Further, the definition of sacralization and sacrilege are 
differentiated by degree for different types of people. That 
is, different roles are granted differential dispensations 
to approach the sacred objects; this is, of course, the begin­
ning of specialization and differentiation of religious roles. 
The old men and those who have attained a high reli­
gious dignity are freed from the restrictions under 
which ordinary men are placed. They can eat the sacred 
thing because they are sacred themselves; this rule is 
in no way peculiar to totemism, but it is found in the 
most diverse religions (EF:152; see also 346,#47). 
Now, as there are always exceptions to the rule, Durk­
heim observed that there are also exceptions to the strict 
totemic food interdictions. Although Evans-Pritchard charged 
that Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy was "situationally 
inflexible," Durkheim did in fact note that practical neces­
sity changed the definition of the sacral situation . 
.•. here also there are exceptions and tolerations 
.•. especially in the case of necessity, when the 
totem is a dangerous animal, for example, or when 
the man has nothing to eat. There are certain tribes 
where men are forbidden to hunt the animals whose 
name they bear, on their own accounts, but where 
they may kill them for others. But the way in which 
this act is generally accomplished clearly indicates 
that it is something illicit. Oneexcuses himself as 
though for a fault, and bears witness to the chagrin 
which he suffers, and the repugnance which he feels, 
while precautions are taken that the animal may suf­
fer as little as possible (EF:154). 
As with the case of King David and his men eating the temple 
showbreads in time of famine, Durkheim recognized (to borrow 
a term from Van Gennep ) the "pivoting of the sacred" along 
several symbolic axes. Let us conclude this brief excursus 
with Van Gennep's unjustifiably overlooked formulation of 
this important problem. 
Characteristically, the presence of the sacred (and 
the performance of appropriate rites) is variable. 
Sacredness as an attribute is not absolute; it is 
brought into play by the nature of particular situa­
tions .... The "magic circles" pivot, shifting as a 
person moves from one place in society to another. 
The categories and concepts which embody them operate 
in such a way that whoever passes through the various 
positions of a lifetime one day sees the sacred where 
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before he has seen the profane, or vice versa. Such 
changes of condition do not occur without disturbing 
the life of society and of the individual, and it is 
the function of the rites of passage to reduce their 
normal effects (1960:12-13). 
b. The Transition From Negative to Positive Rites 
Observing that "The absolute and universal nature of 
the contrast between the sacred and the profane does not mean 
that things or beings cannot or do not pass from one sphere 
to another" (1974:174), Robert Nisbet also rightly notes that 
the negative or ascetic rites serve merely as a preparatory 
stage to the passage to the sacred pole of sociocultural life 
"Purification rites, as in initiation or eucharistic ceremon­
ies, are the means through which a person or thing passes from 
the profane state to the sacred" (1974:174). Negative or as­
cetic rites, as we have seen, serve to demarcate the boundar­
ies between the sacred and the profane, and thus to progres­
sively separate all that which is aligned with the latter 
from the former. 
By definition sacred beings are separated beings. That 
which characterizes them is that there is a break in 
continuity between them and the profane beings .... A 
whole group of rites has the object of realizing this 
state of separation which is essential. Since their 
function is to prevent undue mixings and to keep these 
two dOlTI<"l i.ns from encroaching upon the other, they are 
only able to impose abstentions or negative acts 
taboos or interdictions (EF:337-8). 
Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's description of the tran­
sition from the negative, ascetic rites, to the positive com­
munion ri tes . 
Durkheim himself observed that the whole system of sa­
cral interdictions, abstentions, purifications, etc. signify 
a progressive shedding of profane states, and thus serve as 
the necessary preparation for eventual sacral reunification. 
Up to the present, the negative cult has been presen­
ted to us only as a system of abstentions. So it seems 
to serve only to inhibit activity, and not to stimulate 
it or modify it. And yet, as an unexpected reaction to 
this inhibitive effect, it is found to exercise a posi­
tive action of the highest importance over the religious 
and moral nature of the individual (EF:348). 
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We might first recall, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1970, 1966) has 
insisted over the years, that the negative is crucial to hu­
man symbolicity. For only through the negative, in the sense 
of moral commands, is man moralized. Thus, man becomes a mor­
al personality through the negative, through abstention and 
purification. For the suffering inherent in the negative 
thrust means that the individual rises above the profane; in 
other words, culture moralizes nature. 
The positive cult is possible only when a man is train­
ed to renouncement, to abnegation, to detachment from 
self, and consequently to suffering...• It is necessary 
that he train himself, and it is to this that the ascet­
ic practices tend. So the suffering which they impose is 
not arbitrary and sterile cruelty; it is a necessary 
school ...• Suffering is the sign that certain of the 
bonds attaching him to his profane environment are bro­
ken; so it testifies that he is partially freed from the 
environment and, consequently, it is justly considered 
the instrument of deliverance .•.• He is stronger than na­
ture because he makes it subside (EF:35~. ­
Indeed, the passage from the profane to the sacred re­
quires a whole series of rites which serve to transform and 
liberate the moral subject. Van Gennep clearly recognized 
this with his distinctions between rites of separation (pre­
liminal), transition (liminal), and incorporation (post-lim­
inal). And Durkheim, in his discussion of the sacral origins 
of property, for instance, provided many insights into the 
symbolic significance of crossing thresholds and boundaries. 
In fact, owing to the barrier which separates the sa­
cred from the profane, a man cannot enter into inti­
mate relations with sacred things except after rid­
ding himself of all that is profane in him. He can­
not lead a religious life of even a slight intensity 
unless he commences by withdrawing more or less com­
pletely from the temporal life. So the negative cult 
is in one sense a means in view of an end: it is a 
condition of access to the positive cult. It does not 
confine itself to protecting sacred beings from vul­
gar contact; it acts upon the worshipper himself and 
modifies his condition positively. The man who has 
submitted himself to its prescribed interdictions is 
not the same afterwards as he was before. Before,he 
he was an ordinary being who, for this reason, had 
to keep at a distance from the religious forces. 
Afterwards, he is on a more equal footing with them; 
he has approached the sacred by the very act of leav­
• 
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ing the profane; he has purified and sanctified him­
self by the very act of debasing himself from the 
ba~~ i~1 ~rivial matters that debased his nature. So the~~l~e~ confer efficient powers just as well as the 
positive ones; the first, like the second, can serve 
to elevate the religious tone of the individual .... 
No one can engage in a religious ceremony of any im­
portance without first submitting himself to a sort 
of preliminary initiation which introduces him pro­
gressively into the sacred world. Unctions, lustra­
tions, benedictions or any essentially positive oper­
ation may be used for this purpose; but the same re­
sult may be attained by means of fasts and vigils or 
retreat and silence, that is to say, by ritual abstin­
ences which are nothing more than certain interdictions 
put in practice (EF:348). 
Indeed, noting that "asceticism ... is an integral part of 
human culture" (EF:356), Durkheim emphasized the universality 
of the separation phase as preparatory to the reunification 
phase. 
There is no interdict, the observance of which does 
not have an ascetic character to a certain degree ••.. 
In order to have real asceticism, it is sufficient 
for these practices to develop in such a way as to 
become the basis of a veritable scheme of life. Norm­
ally the negative cult serves only as an introduction 
and preparation for the positive cult (EF:350). 
Finally, we might recall, as Nisbet U974) reminds us, that 
Durkheim considered ascetic suffering as good, for it creates 
self-discipline, it moralizes the ego. It implies a reorder­
ing of the world, the overcoming of nature by culture, a re­
establishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great 
"Yea and Nay" of all things. And as fasting increases our 
hunger for the "Bread of Life," so privation, abstinence, 
and suffering increases the tension to consummate the posi­
tive pole of sociocultural life . 
..• abstinences and privations do not come without 
suffering. We hold to the profane world by all the 
fibers of our flesh; our senses attach us to it; 
our life depends upon it. It is not merely the na­
tural theater of our activity; it penetrates us from 
every side; it is a part of ourselves. So we cannot 
detach ourselves from it without doing violence to 
our nature and without painfully wounding our in­
stincts. In other words, the negative cult cannot 
develop without causing suffering. Pain is one of 
its necessary conditions (EF:351). 
-----------------------------------------------
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Let us next briefly explore the significance of the 
"liminal" period (see V. Turner, 1967 especially), seen for 
example in initiation ceremonies, in which a person's change 
in social status is portrayed and experienced as a change in 
being. These are critical transformation points, "watershed 
moments," when there are "changes of slope" (as Burke sug­
gests) in one's life trajectory. Here, the young initiates 
are forced to become veritable ascetics for a short while-­
separated from society, they are forced to undergo various 
preparatory privations, abstentions, sufferings. 
This is what generally takes place at certain criti­
cal periods when, for a relatively short time, it is 
necessary to bring about a grave change of condition 
in a subject. Then, in order to introduce him more ra­
pidly into the circle of sacred things with which he 
must be put into contact he is separated violently 
from the profane world; but this does not come with­
out abstinences, and an exceptional recrudescence of 
the system of interdicts. Now this is just what hap­
pens in Australia at the moment of initiation. In or­
der to transform youth into men, it is necessary to 
make them live the life of a veritable ascetic. Mrs. 
Parker very justly calls them the monks of Baime (EF: 
351) . 
Often this passage from a profane to a sacred status, that is 
initation into the constitutive cultural mysteries and ranks 
(see the works of Kenneth Burke), is conceived of as a meta­
morphosis, a transformation totius Substantiae . 
.•• initiation is a long series of ceremonies with the 
the object of introducing the young man into the reli­
gious life: for the first time, he leaves the purely 
profane world where he passed his first infancy, and 
enters into the world of sacred things. Now this chan­
ge of state is thought of, not as a simple and regu­
lar development of pre-existent germs, but as a trans­
formation totius substantiae, of the whole being. It 
is said that at this moment the young man dies, that 
the person that he was ceases to exist, and that ano­
ther is instantly substituted for it. He is reborn 
under a new form. Appropriate ceremonies are felt to 
bring about this death and rebirth •... Does this not 
prove that between the profane being which he was and 
the religious being which he becomes, there is a break 
of continuity (EF:54)? 
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Later in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim explored some of 
the specific privations required of the initiate in various 
Australian societies. 
The neophyte is submitted to a great variety of nega­
tive rites. He must withdraw from the society in which 
his existence has beenoa~sed up until then, and from 
almost all human society. Not only is it forbidden 
for him to see women and unitiated persons, but he al­
so goes to live in the brush, far from his fellows, 
under the direction of some old men, who serve him as 
godfathers. So very true it is that the forest is con­
sidered his natural environment, that in a certain num­
ber of tribes, the word with which the initiation is 
designated signifies "that which is from the forest." 
For this same reason, he is frequently decorated with 
leaves during the ceremonies at which he assists. In 
this way he passesbng months, interspersed from time 
to time with rites in which he must take a part. This 
time is a period of all sorts of abstinences for him. 
A multitude of foods are forbidden him •.• he is allow­
ed only that quantity of food which is absolutely in­
dispensable for the maintenance of life~ he is even 
sometimes bound to a rigorous fast, or must eat impure 
foods. When he eats, he must not touch the food with 
his hands. In some cases, he must go beg for his food. 
Likewise, he sleeps only as much as is indispensable. 
He must abstain from talking ••. it is by signs that 
he makes known his needs. He must not wash; sometimes 
he must not move. He remains stretched out upon the 
earth, immobile, and without clothing of any sort (EF: 
348) . 
Now, clearly one recurrent image for portraying this 
change of status and being is the cycle of death and rebirth. 
As Kenneth Burke says, "The symbolic slaying of an old self 
is complemented by the emergence of a new self" (1973:39). 
Very often this death to society, which is as Durkheim obser­
ved (eg. EF:55), the extreme logical expression of the ascet­
ic thrust, is signified by withdrawl, segregation, by fast­
ing, going naked, and so forth; in short, by separation from 
all those activities and ties which constitute the daily 
ground of prior social and cultural experience. 
Now the result of the numerous interdictions is to 
bring about a radical change of condition for the 
initiate. Before the initiation, he lived with the 
women~ he was excluded from the cult. After it, he 
is admitted to the society of men~ he takes part in 
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the rites, and has acquired a sacred character. The 
metamorphosis is so complete that it is sometimes re­
presented as a second birth. They imagine that the 
profane person, who was the young man up until then, 
has died and been carried away by the god of the ini­
tiation ... and that quite another individual has ta­
ken the place of the one that no longer is. So here 
we find the very heart of the positive effects of 
which negative rites are capable (EF:349-S0). 
Now, the very act of withdrawal from all these social 
forms and statuses means that the initiate becomes suspend­
ed in a "liminal" stage, as Turner (1967) after Van Gennep 
calls it, which is "betwixt and between." Here, the initia­
tes are conceived of as neither children nor adults, neither 
living nor dead, and both living and dead, when seen from 
another aspect, as Turner notes. Their condition is one of 
ambiguity and paradox, a confusion of all the normal cate­
gories. Withdrawins from the ordered social and cultural 
microcosm of the village, the initiate returns to that un­
differentiated pole of experience--the forest, where he 
sheds his clothes, the marks of his social status, and co­
vers himself with leaves. Quoting Jacob Boehme's aphorism 
that "In Yea and Nay all things consist," Turner observes: 
Liminality may be regarded as the Nay to all posi­
tive structural assertions, but as in some sense the 
source of them all, and, more than that, as a realm 
of pure possibility whence novel configurations of 
ideas and relations may arise (Turner, 1967: 97). 
Noting Mary Douglas's (1966) suggestion that "the unclear 
is the unclean," Turner observes that the initiates " ... as 
a transitional being are considered particularly polluting, 
since they are neither one thing or another, or maybe both" 
(1967:97). Only the old men, who are, so to speak, "inocu­
lated'against them because of their own store of sacredness, 
are allowed commerce with these ambiguously sacred and pro­
fane transitional beings. 
We are not dealing with structural contradictions 
when we discuss liminality, but with the essentially 
unstructured (which is at once destructured and pre­
structured) and often the people themselves see this 
in terms of bringing neophytes into close connection 
•
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with the deity or with superhuman power, with what is,
 
in fact, often regarded as the unbounded, the infinite,
 
the limitless. Since neophytes are not only structural­

ly invisible (though physically visible), and ritually 
polluting, they are very commonly secluded •.. from the 
realm of culturally defined and ordered states and sta­
tuses (1967:98). 
• 
We shall briefly explore Durkheim's own perceptions of the 
inherent ambiguity of sacred forces in the following section. 
Since sex distinctions are so important in primitive 
societies, during the liminal period the initiate is portray­
•
 
ed as sexless, or as androgynous. Turner observes:
 
•
 
•.. in liminal situations (in kinship dominated socie­

ties) neophytes are sometimes ..• symbolically repre­

sented as neither being male nor female. They are sym­

bolically either sexless or bisexual, and may be re­

garded as a kind of human prima materia--as undiffer­

entiated raw material. [For example, in Plato's SympO­

• 
sium] the first humans were androgynes. If the liminal 
period is seen as an interstructural phase in social 
dynamics, the symbolism both of androgyny and sexless­
ness immediately becomes intelligible in soc~ological 
terms without the need to import psychological (espe­
cially depth-psychological) explanations. Since sex 
distinctions are important components of structural 
status, in a structureless realm they do not apply 
(1967 :98-99) . 
Further, since property is an essential component of the norm­
• 
al social order, the transitional beings must cast away their 
possessions. Again, for those who would be reborn in a new 
faith, all religions require a special form of institutiona­
lized poverty, which signifies disengagement from the things 
•
 
of this world. Turner notes:
 
•
 
A further structurally negative characteristic of
 
transitional beings is that they have nothing. They
 
have no status, property, insignia, secular clothing,
 
rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them
 
structurally from their fellows. Rights over proper­

ty, goods, and services inhere in positions in the
 
politico-jural structure. Since they do not occupy 
such positions, neophytes exercise no such rights 
(1967:98) • 
The symbolic analogues of the liminal period, in which
• retreat is preparatory to return (ala Toynbee), are often bor­
rowed from basic organic processes. Turner observes: 
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... certain liminal processes are regarded as analo­
gous to those of gestation, partuition, and suckling. 
Undoing, dissolution, decomposition, are accompanied 
by processes of growth, transformation, and the re­
formulation of old elements into new patterns (1967: 
99) . 
Further, in representations of the ambiguous nature of the 
transitional period, Turner notes how the principle of sym­
bolic economy utilizes symbols carrying simultaneously sev­
eral meanings. The greater the multiplicity of meanings, the 
greater the symbolic load and potency; thus, multivalent sym­
bols are central to representations in this phase. 
•.. logically antithetical processes of death and 
growth may be represented by the same tokens, for 
example, by huts and tunnels that are at once tombs 
and wombs, by lunar symbolism (for the same moon 
waxes and wanes), by snake symbolism (for the snake 
appears to die, only to shed its old skin and reap­
pear), by the bear (for the bear "dies" in autumn 
and is "reborn" in the spring), by nakedness (which 
is at once the mark of a newborn infant and a corp­
se prepared for burial), and by innumerable other 
symbolic formations and actions. This coincidence 
of opposite processes and notions in a single repre­
sentation characterizes the peculiar unity of the 
liminal: that which is neither this nor that, and 
yet is both (1967:99). 
Thus, we see that in the "liminal" period, by its nega­
tive thrust, the "wayfarer" is returned to the primal undif­
ferentiated ground of being, what Burke (1966:46) notes has 
been called, in negative theology, the Urground, or as Boeh­
me termed it, the Unground. Here contact is reestablished 
with the primal unity, the time before distinction and form 
emerged. Here men reimmerse themselves in the original gen­
erative sources from which men were originally shaped, the 
primal clay. Again and again (eg. Genesis), we see religions 
portraying the time before time as formlessness, darkness, 
a primordial ocean, and so on, in which there is a creation 
of cosmos from chaos. The primordial act of creation is thus 
also a separation--the light from darkness, the waters above 
from the waters below, which signals the emergence of form 
and finiteness. Durkheim himself observed the importance of 
this aspect of symbolic process in many primitive creation 
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myths. 
other Australian societies place at the begin­
ning of humanity either strange animals from which 
men were descended in some unknown way, or mixed 
beings, half-way between the two kingdoms, or else 
unformed creatures, hardly representable, deprived 
of all determined organs, and even of all definite 
members, and the different parts of whose bodies 
were hardly outlined. Mythical powers, sometimes 
conceived under the form of animals, then interven­
ed and made men out of these ambiguous and innumer­
able beings which Spencer and Gillen say represent 
"stages in the transformation of animals and plants 
into human beings." These transformations are repre­
sented to us under the form of violent and, as it 
were, surgical operations. It is under the blow of 
an axe or, if the operator is a bird, blows of the 
beak, that the human individual was carved out of 
this shapeless mass, his mouth opened and his nos­
trils pierced. Analogous legends are found in Amer­
ica, except that owing to the more highly developed 
mentality of these peoples, the representations which 
they employ do not contain confusions so troublesome 
for the mind. Sometimes it is a legendary personage 
who, by the act of his power, metamorphosed the ani­
mal who gives its name to the clan into a man. Some­
times the myth attempts to explain how, by a series 
of merely human events and a sort of spontaneous evo­
lution, the animal transforms himself little by lit­
tle, and finally took on a human form (EF:157-S). 
Finally, Turner notes how, as the initiation progres­
ses from the negative to positive aspects and the liminal 
being is given greater form, the initiate is then introduced 
to the esoteric mysteries, the constitutive gnosis of the 
cult. Indeed, it is the communication of these sacra which 
confers form on the moral subject. 
The arcane knowledge or gnosis obtained in the limi­
nal period is felt to change the inmost nature of 
the neophyte, impressing him as a seal impresses wax, 
with the characteristics of his new state. It is not 
a mere acquisition of knowledge, but a change in being . 
... Communication of the sacra is the heart of the 
liminal matter (1967:102). 
Indeed, as with Parsons' 1973 suggestions that Durkheim came 
to conceive the significance of the generic symbolic religious 
process as equivalent to social DNA, so too does Turner con­
sider the communication of these constitutive sacral symbols 
as the foundation of the entire culture. 
•
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• 
The central cluster of non-logical sacra is then the 
symbolic template of the whole system of beliefs and 
values in a given culture, its archetypal paradigm 
• 
and ultimate measure.... The term archetype denotes 
in Greek a master stamp or impress, and these sacra, 
presented with numinous simplicity, stamp into neo­
phytes the basic assumptions of their culture .... 
The communication of sacra both teaches the neophytes 
how to think with some degree of abstraction about 
• 
their cultural milieu and gives them ultimate stan­
dards of reference. At the same time, it is believed 
to change their nature, transform them from one kind 
of human being into another. It intimately unites man 
and office. But for a variable while, there was an 
uncommitted man, an individual rather than a sacral 
persona, in a sacred community of individuals (1967: 
108) • 
Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's notion of the ambi­
• 
guity of sacredness. 
c. The Ambiguity of the Notion of Sacredness 
Not only was Durkheim's sacred/profane dichotomy not 
• 
a rigid opposition, but we should also note that Durkheim dis­
tinguished between various forms of sacredness itself, the 
prime constitutive pole of sociocultural life and phenomeno­
logical action. Horeover, Durkheim noted how these subdivi­
• sions of the sacred pole are not merely antagonistic but, 
given certain conditions, may be transformed one into the 
other. Now, perhaps Rudolf Otto's Idea of the Holy is the 
most famous expression of the duality of the "numinous." 
• Like Otto, Durkheim noted that the sacred simultaneous~at­
tracts and repels us; that we may simultaneously entertain 
two opposed attitudes toward it--horror and respect, awe and 
fascination. Such ambivalent sentiments toward the pure and 
• the impure are directed toward those aspects of life endowed 
with a special potency, with "charisma" as Weber said. As 
Kenneth Burke notes, "Sacer might be more accurately trans­
lated as "untouchable," since the extremely good, the extrem­
• ely bad, and the extremely powerful are equally "untouchable" (1973:55). In short, Durkheim observed that there were two 
poles within the sacred segment of culture; and he further 
•
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noted that the "sacredly inauspicious", the impure, may be 
transformed into the pure. When there is a passage from nega­
, tive to positive status by situational changes, theirdefini­
, 
tions are transformed by their different meanings in differ­
ent contexts. As Mary Douglas observes: 
Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides 
the materials of pattern. Order implies restriction ... 
so disorder by implication is unlimited ... its poten­
,
 
,tial for patterning is indefinite. This is why, though
 
we Seek to create order, we do not simply condemn dis­

order. We recognize that it is destructive to existing
 
patterns; also that it has potentiality. It symbolizes
 
both danger and power. Ritual recognizes the potency
 
,
 
of disorder (1966:94 ).
 
Let us now brie.Ely explore' Durkheim' s recognition of this im­

portant insight, developed most fully by the British anthro­

pologists of religion and ritual, that "formlessness is cred­

ited with powers, some dangerous, some good," and Van Gennep's 
insight that "danger lies in marginal states." 
First, it should be recalled that Durkheim's distinct­
,
 ion between the,sacredly inauspicious and the sacredly auspi­

cious was situationally defined, that is, these two aspects 
of the sacred pole of symbolic life depended on the specific 
definition of the situation. For example, only under certain 
• 
circumstances maya man ingest the totemic animal; without a 
whole series of ,preparations, it becomes sacrilege and con­
fers guilt instead of grace. It is a profanation of the sacred 
when performed "out of turn." 
• 
Owing to the contagiousness inherent in all that is 
sacred, a profane being cannot violate an interdict 
without having the religi6us force, to which he ha~ 
• 
upduly approached, extend itself over him and estab­
lish its empire over him. But, as there is an antag­
onism between them, he becomes dependent upon a hos­
tile power, whose hostility cannot fail to manifest 
itself in the form of violent reactions which destroy 
him. This is why sickness or death are considered the 
natural consequences of transgressions of this sort; 
and they are consequences which are believed to come 
by themselves, by a sort of physical necessity. The 
• 
guilty man feels himself attacked by a force which 
dominates him and against which he'is powerless. Has 
he eaten the totemic animal? Then he feels it penetra­
ting him and gnawing at his vitals; he lies down on 
the ground and awaits death (EF:360). 
•
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Indeed, Durkheim goes on to remark that "Every profanation 
implies a consecration": 
but one which is dreadful, both for the subject
 
consecrated and for those who approach him. It is
 
the consequences of this consecration which sanc­

tion, in part, the interdict (EF:360).
 
And Durkheim asks us: "Does not every consecration by means 
of annointing or washing consist in transferring into a pro­
fane object the sanctifying virtues of a sacred one" (EF:362)? 
Now, Durkheim repeatedly:raveRobertson Smith credit here 
for having been one of the first to recognize the inherent am­
biguity of the notion of sacredness (see, however, Evans-Pritch­
ard, 1965:51-2). This crucial duality or multivalency of sa­
cral energies raises the problem of situational shifts, com­
plex inversions, and transformations of symbolic equations. 
One of the greatest services which Robertson Smith 
has rendered to the science of religions is to have 
pointed out the ambiguity of the notion of sacredness. 
Religious forces are of two sorts. Some are benefi­
cent guardians of the physical and moral order, dis­
pensers of life and health and all the qualities 
which men esteem: this is the case with the totemic 
principle, spread out in the whole species, the my­
thical ancestor, the animal-protector, the civili­
zing heroes, and the tutelar gods of every kind and 
degree. It matters little whether they are conceived 
as distinct personalities or as diffused energies; 
under either form they fulfill the same function and 
affect the minds of the believers in the same way: the 
respect which they inspire is mixed with love and gra­
titude. The things and the persons which are normally 
connected with them participate in the same sentiments 
and the same character: these are the holy things and 
persons. Such are the spots consecrated to the cult, 
the objects which serve in the regular rites, the 
priests, the ascetics, etc. 
On the other hand, there are evil ~nd impure powers, 
productive of disorders, causes of death and sickness, 
instigatnrs of sacrilege. The only sentiments which 
men have for them are a fear into which horror gener­
ally enters. Such are the forces upon which and by 
which the sorcerer acts, those which arise from corp­
ses or menstrual blood, those freed by every portion 
of sacred things, etc. The spirits of the dead and 
malign genii of every sort are their personified forms. 
Between these two categories of forces and beings, the 
contrast is as complete and even goes into the most 
radical antagonism. The good and the salutary powers 
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repel to a distance these others which deny and con­
tradict them. Therefore the former are forbidden to 
the latter. Any contact between them is considered 
the worst of profanations. This is the typical form 
of those interdicts between sacred things of differ­
ent species (EF:455-6). 
Specifically, Durkheim cited the following illustrations of 
this principle of the multivalence or ambivalence of sacral 
energies: 
Women during menstruation, and p.specially at its be­
ginning are impure; so at this moment they are rigor­
oUply sequestered; men have no relations with them. 
Bull roarers and churingas never come near a dead man. 
A sacrilegious person is excluded from the society of 
the faithful; access to the cult is forbidden him. 
Thus, the whole religious life gravitates about two 
contrary poles between which there is the same opposi­
tion as between the pure and the impure, the saint 
and the sacrilegious, the divine and the diabolic 
(EF: 455-6) . 
In addition, Durkheim noted how the representations of sa­
cred forces combine the "divine and the diabolic" in the same 
moral universe. 
There is no physical or moral ugliness, there are no 
vices or evils which do not have a special divinity. 
There are gods of theft and trickery, of lust and war, 
of sickness and of death. Christianity itself ... has 
been obliged to give the spirit of evil a place in its 
mythology. Satan is an essential piece of the Christ­
ian system; even if he is an impure being, he is not 
a profane one. The anti-god is a god, inferior and sub­
ordinated, it is true, but nevertheless endowed with 
extended powers; he is even the object of rites, at 
least of negative ones. Thus religion, far from ignor­
ing the real society and making abstractions of it, is 
in its image; it reflects all its aspects, even the 
most vulgar and the most repulsive. All is to be found 
there, and if in the majority of cases we see the good 
victorious over the evil, life over death, the powers 
of light over the powers of darkness, it is because 
reality is not otherwise. If the relations between 
these two forces were reversed, life would be impos­
sible; but as a matter of fact, it maintains itself 
and even tends to develop (EF:468). 
Now, Durkheim proceeded to complicate the matter even 
further by noting that instead of a simple dichotomization 
between these two inverted halves of the religious life, there 
is actually a close inner relationship. 
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But while these two aspects of the religious life op­
pose one another, there is a close kinship between 
them. In the first place, both have the same relation­
ship towards profane beings: these must abstain from 
all contact with impure beings, just as from the most 
holy things. The former are no less forbidden than the 
latter: they are withdrawn from circulation alike. This 
shows that they too are sacred. Of course, the senti­
ments inspired by the two are not identical: respect 
is one thing, disgust and horror another. Yet, if the 
the gestures are to be the same in both cases, the sen­
timents expressed must not differ in nature. And, in 
fact, there is a horror of religious respect, especial­
ly when it is very intense, while the fear inspired by 
malign powers is generally not without a certain rever­
ential character. The shades by which these two atti­
tudes are differentiated are even so slight sometimes 
that it is not always easy to say which state of mind 
the believers actually happen to be in. Among certain 
Semitic peoples, pork was forbidden, but it was not al­
ways known exactly whether this was because it was a 
pure or an impure thing, and the same may be said of a 
very large number of alimentary interdictions (EF:456-7). 
Sometimes this inner kinship between the dangerously sacred 
and the auspiciously sacred is revealed by the transforma­
tion of one into another through changes in the definition 
of the situation. 
But there is more to said; it frequently happens that 
an impure thing or an evil power becomes a holy thing 
or a 3uardian power, without changing its nature, 
through a simple modification of external circumstan­
ces. We have seen how the soul of a dead man, which is 
a dreadful principle at first, is transformed into a 
protecting genius as soon as the mourning is finished. 
Likewise, the corpse, which begins by inspiring terror 
and aversion, is later regarded as a venerated relic: 
funeral anthropagy, which is frequently practicied in 
the Australian societies, is a proof of this transform­
ation. The totemic animal is the pre-eminently sacred 
being; but for him who eats its flesh upduly, is a case 
of death (EF:457). 
Now, since the relationship between the symbol and the 
structure of a situation may shift, so too may the meaning 
of its positive or negative sacredness. For example, as we 
have seen, to partake of the totemic animal, as today to eat 
the eucharistic host, without the proper preparations and 
special circumstances, almost necessarily implies sacrilege. 
Indeed, the passage from sacrilege to sacredness depends 
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largely upon these inner symbolic transformations. 
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In a general way, the sacrilegious person is merely 
a profane one who has been infected with a benevolent 
religious force. This changes its nature in changing 
its habitat; it defiles rather than sanctifies. The 
blood issuing from the genital organs of a womalli 
though it is evidently as impure as that of menstru­
ation, is frequently used as a remedy against sick­
ness. The victim involved in expiatory sacrifices is 
charged with impurities, for which they have concen­
trated upon it the sins which were to be expiated. 
Yet, after it has been slaughtered, its flesh and 
blood are employed for the most pious uses. [Footnote: 
Among the Hebrews, for example, they sprinkled the al­
tar with the blood of the expiatory victim; they burn­
ed the flesh and used products of this combustion to 
make water of purification]. On the contrary, though 
the communion is generally a religious operation whose 
normal function is to consecrate, it sometimes pro­
duces the effects of a sacrilege. In certain cases, 
the persons who have communicated are forced to flee 
from one another as from men infected with a plague. 
One would say that they have become a source of dan­
gerous contamination for one another: the sacred bond 
which unites them also separates them (EF:457). 
Durkheim offers the following cogent summary of his insight 
into the ambiguity of the sacred: 
So the pure and the impure are not two separate clas­
ses~ut two-varIeties of the same crass, which 1n­
eTUdes al~acred thingS: There are two sorts of-Sa­
crednes~the propitious and the-unpropitious,-ana­
not only is there no break in-COntinuity between-­
these two-opposed fOrms, bu~also one object may 
pass from the one to the other-wIthOUt changing-its 
natUre. The pure ismade out of the impure, and reci­
procally:-It"'1Stil-the ooSSIbTIi~of these tr'anSIDU=" 
tations that the-amb-rgulty of the sacred consists * 
(EF: 458) . 
Finally, Durkheim asks: How is it that the powers of 
evil have the same intensity and contagiousness as the sacred? 
Criticizing Robertson Smith's non-acknowledgement of these in­
ner transmutations, Durkheim suggests that the key to these 
inner transformations may be found in the definitional se­
quence with which they enter into generic sociocultural pro­
cess. While we need not follow, or even accredit, all the 
twists and turns of his argument, Durkheim was clearly aware 
that the sequence, what we might even call the musical pat­
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tern (see Levi-Strauss, 1969), of symbolic ritual process is 
most complex, in which a symbol for one pole may substitute 
for the other, and the "pure may contaminate while the impure 
sometimes serves to sanctify" (EF:458). Basically, Durkheim 
argued from his sociological position that the direction and 
sequence of religious force may be inverted depending upon 
the sociocultural circumstances, from something being impureto 
becoming an instrument of purification . 
... the sanctity of a thing is due to the collective 
sentiment of which it is the object. If, in violation 
of the interdicts which isolate it, it comes in con­
tact with a profane person, then this same sentiment 
will spread contagiously to this latter and imprint 
a special character upon him. But in spreading, it 
comes into a very different state from the one it was 
in first. Offended and irritated by the profanation 
implied in this abusive and unnatural extension, it 
becomes aggressive and inclined to destructive violen­
ces: it tends to avenge itself for the offense suffer­
ed. Therefore, the infected subject seems to be fil­
led with a mighty and harmful force which menaces all 
that approaches him; it is as though he were marked 
with a stain or blemish. Yet the cause of this blem­
ish is the same psychic state which, in other circum­
stances, consecrates and sanctifies. But if the anger 
thus aroused is satisfied by an expiatory rite, it sub­
sides, alleviated; the offended sentiment is appeased 
and returns to its original state. So it acts once more 
as it acted in the beginning; instead of contaminating, 
it sanctifies. As it continues to infect the object to 
which it is attached, this could never become profane 
and religiously indifferent again. But the direction 
of the religious force with which it seems to be filled 
is inverted: from being impure, it has become pure and 
and instrument of purification (EF:460). 
We should not be surprised that, in the final analysis, Durk­
heim correlated these two different faces of the sacred with 
two different aspects of collective well-being and disharmony . 
... the two poles of the religious life correspond to 
the two opposed states through which all social life 
p~s~es. Between the propitiously sacred and the unpro­
p1t10usly sacred there is the same contrast as between 
the states of collective well-being and ill-being. But 
since both are equally collective, there-rB, between 
the mythological constructions symbolizing them, an in­
timate kinship of nature. The sentiments held in common 
vary from extreme dejection to extreme joy, from pain­
ful irritation to ecstatic enthusiasm; but, in any case, 
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there is a communion of minds and a mutual comfort 
resulting from this communion. The fundamental pro­
cess is always the same; only the circumstances col­
or it differently. So, at bottom, it is the unity and 
the diversity of social life which make the simultan­
eous unity and diversity of sacred beings and things* 
(EF: 460) . 
Let us now finally turn to consider the last stage of gener­
ic symbolic process--namely, the reunification of the com­
pounding series of polarities through ritual transformation 
of opposites into a new and vital synthesis--in terms of 
Durkheim's description of oblation and totemic commensal 
sacrifice. 
d. The Positive Cult: Oblation and Sacrificial Communion 
The final phase of generic symbolic process generally 
centers on rituals which reconcile opposites, which transform 
diversity into unity, which restore harmony and wholeness to 
divided and suffering consciences and consciousnesses. Release 
and liberation from negative being is achieved through the 
symbolic mechanism of victimage, which leads to collective 
reunion. These symbolic transformations often center around 
mythic or ancestral commemorations, re9resentations of ideal 
models of perfection and aspiration, oblations and sacrifi­
cial offerings, and a kind of sacred commensality which sig­
nifies some basic kind of consubstantiality. Durkheim noted: 
In the form which it takes when fully constituted, 
a sacrifice is composed of two essential elements: 
an act of communion and an act of oblation. The wor­
shipper communes with his god by taking in a sacred 
food, and at the same time he makes an offering to 
his god (EF:384). 
Now, as we have seen, ascetic separation is always the 
prelude to mystical reunion, for these are best viewed as sirn­
ply two basic phases of the same overall symbolic process. 
Negative or ascetic rites have always served to separate, to 
prepare the moral subject for the coming metamorphosis. As 
such, they signify the acknowledgement of guilt, of separa­
tion, of privation, which intensifies the tension between the 
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two poles of life, and thus, which helps propel the to-be 
reborn subject forward. Without the positive pole, there is 
no goal, no viable purpose or meaning to the trials of as­
cetic preparation. This is precisely the cause of the spiri­
tual void so deeply felt in all cultures touched today by 
ascetic Protestantism. We are left hanging in moral space, 
'I' . 1 ' alone, has t h e goa1 d rops out and Utlltarlan oglcsAremaln. T ese 
are truly post-traditional cultures, "beyond belief," beyond 
hope. But Durkheim clearly noted: 
If it (the negative cult) orders the worshipper to 
flee from the profane world, it is to bring him near­
er to the sacred world. Men have never thought that 
their duties toward religious forces might have been 
reduced to a simple abstinence from all commerce: they 
have always believed that they upheld positive and 
bilateral relations with them (EF:366). 
Further, the shedding of the old self is a prerequisite to 
rebirth. Combining these factors, as Kenneth Burke has ob­
served, we see that the "principle of perfection" (akin to 
the self-equilibrativeness presumed by structuralists) inher­
ent in symbolic systems necessitates a sacrificial victim on 
which to displace the collectively incurred guilt. As Burke 
proposes (eg.1966, 1970, 1973), victimage is expiatory; 
Christianity, of course, has developed this generic neces­
sity to the highest degree with the representation of Christ 
as the "Perfect Victim." Burke says: "If action is to be our 
key term, then drama, if drama, then conflict, if conflict, 
then victimage" (1966:545). In other words, the collective 
release provided by sacrificial victimage generally serves 
as a prelude to some renewed form of communion and freedom. 
In its essential form this is the dramatic or dialectical 
structure of human symbolic action. 
Now, it is precisely the mediatory function of the 
sacrificial oblation as a bridge between separated spheres 
of being which is the final prerequisite for the transforma­
tion of the profane into the sacred. Sacrificial victimage 
is the vehicle for the extension of the moral bond. For exam­
ple, after reviewing various ceremonies of the Australian 
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aborigines such as scattering of a certain type of sacred 
dust, of letting blood flow from the veins directly onto sa­
cred sites, and so forth, Durkheim noted the importance of 
these oblations or sacrificial offerings to the sacred forces: 
The interest of this system of rites lies in the fact 
that in them we find, in the most elementary form act­
ually known, all the essential principles of a great 
religious institution which was destined to become one 
of the foundation stones of the positive cult in the 
superior religions: this is the institution of sacri­
f i ce (EF: 3 7 7) . 
Indeed, we know what importance the Durkheimians placed upon 
the institution of sacrifice by Hubert and Mauss's great mono­
graph on the subject (1964). 
Here, Durkheim again paid homage to what he called Ro­
bertson Smith's revolution in understanding the nature of sac­
rifice (see however Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Throughout The 
Elementarv Forms Durkheim kept up a running conversation, 
partly laudatory and partly critical, with Smith's work. 
We know what a revolution the work of Robertson Smith 
brought about in the traditional theory of sacrifice. 
Before him, sacrifice was regarded as a sort of tri­
bute or homage, either obligatory or optional, analo­
gous to that which subjects owe to their princes. Ro­
bertson Smith was the first to remark that this clas­
sic explanation did not account for two essential char­
acteristics of the rite. In the first place, it is a 
repast: its substance is food. Secondly, it is a re­
past in which the worshippers who offer it take part, 
along with the god to whom it is offered. Certain parts 
of the victim are reserved for the divinity~ others 
are attributed to the sacrificers, who consume them•..• 
Now, in a multitude of societies, meals taken in com­
mon are believed to create a bond of artificial kin­
ship betwen those who assist at them. In fact, rela­
tives are people who are naturally made of the same 
flesh and blood. But food is constantly remaking the 
substance of the organism. So a common food may pro­
duce the same effects as a common origin. Acccording 
to Smith, sacrificial banquets have the object of ma­
king the worshipper and his god communicate in the 
same flesh, in order to form a bond of kinship between 
them. From this point of view, sacrifice takes on a 
wholly new aspect. Its essential element is no longer 
the act of renouncement which the word sacrifice or­
dinarily expresses: before all, it is an act of ali­
mentary communion (EF:377-78). 
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But Durkheim, proceeding to criticize Smith on various points, 
suggested that, for example, the oblations Australian abori­
gines offered up were part of the complex symbolic web of re­
ciprocity which serve to bond together tribes and their gods. 
The seasonal cycle of death and rebirth of flora and fauna 
corresponded to a moral cycle of a crisis of confidence and 
rebirth of hope in men in the viability of the relationship 
between gods and men • 
... Vegetaion dies every year: will it be reborn? 
Animal species tend to become extinguished by the 
effect of natural and violent death: will they be 
renewed at such a time, and in such a way as is 
proper? Above all, the rain is capricious: there 
are long periods during which it seems to have dis­
appeared forever. These periodical variations of na­
ture bear witness to the fact that at the the cor­
responding periods, the sacred beings upon whom the 
plants, animals, rain, etc. depend are themselves 
passing through grave crisis: so the~ too, have 
their periods of giving way. But men could not re­
gard these spectacles as indifferent spectators. 
If he is to live, the universal life must continue, 
and consequently the gods must not die. So he seeks 
to sustain and aid them: for this, he puts at their 
service whatever forces he has at his disposition, 
and mobilizes them for this purpose. The blood flow­
ing in his veins has fecundating virtues; he pours 
it forth. From the sacred rocks possessed by his 
clans he takes those germs of life which lie dormant 
there, and scatters them into space. In a word, he 
makes oblations. The external and physical crises, 
moreover, duplicate internal and mental crises which 
tend toward the same result. Sacred beings exist only 
when they are represented as such in the mind. When 
we cease to believe in them, it is as though they 
did not exist (EF:386). 
Pursuing the argument with Smith, Durkheim argued that 
the reciprocity implied in the continued viability of both 
gods and human culture demanded that men reverse the flow 
of energy, and periodically return some of the sacred sub­
stance back to the original source from which it was first 
received. To clarify this reverse flow of energy, Durkheim 
suggested: 
Let us return to the first act of the Intichuma, to 
the rites destined to assure the fecundity of the ani­
mal or vegetable species which serves the clan as totem. 
• 
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This species is the preeminently sacred thing; in it 
is incarnated that we have been able to call, by meta­
phor, the totemic divinity. Yet we have seen that to 
perpetuate itself it has the need of the aid of men. 
It is they who disperse the life of the new generation 
each year; without them, it would never be born. If 
they stopped celebrating the Intichuma, the sacred be­
ings would disappear from the face of the earth. So in 
one sense, it is from men that they get their existence; 
yet in another way, it is from them that lnen get theirs, 
for after they have once arrived at maturity, it is from 
them that men acquire the force needed to support and re­
pair their spiritual beings. Thus, we are able to say 
that men make their gods, or, at least, make them live; 
but at the same time, it is from them that they live 
themselves. So they are regularly guilty of the circle 
which, according to Smith, is implied in the very idea 
of a sacrificial tribute: they give to the sacred beings 
a little of what they receive from them, and they re­
ceive from them all that they give (EF:38~-3). 
Indeed, so necessary and universal is this generic inner re­
ciprocal relationship between constitutive collective symbols 
and group processes that Durkheim insists that oblation is 
not a late product of civilization, but an original and con­
tinuing generic necessity. 
If the sacrificer immolates an animal, it is in order 
that the living principles within it may be disengaged 
from the organism and go to nourish the divinity. Like­
wise, the grains of dust which the Australian detaches 
from the sacred rock are so many sacred principles which 
he scatters into space, so that they may go to animate 
the totemic species and assure its renewal. The gesture 
with which this scattering is made is also that which 
normally accompanies offerings •..• We have seen that 
in order to have rain the Kaitish pour water over the 
altar, with the same end in view. The effusions of blood 
which are usual in a certain number of Intichuma are 
veritable oblations. Just as the Arunta or Dieri sprink­
le the sacred rock or the totemic design with blood, so 
it frequently happens that in the more advanced cults, 
the blood of the sacrificed victim or of the worshipper 
himself is spilt before or upon the altar. In these ca­
ses, it is given to the gods, of whom it is the prefer­
red food; in Australia, it is given to the sacred spe­
cies (EF:383). 
Finally, let us turn our attention to commensal commun­
ion. Released from profane or negative status through the 
mediation of the oblation, the worshippers then turn to cele­
brate their deliverance by replenishing their sacred energies. 
--- ~-------
---
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By partaking of the sacred totem, they are mystically trans­
formed into a common flesh and spirit. Commensal celebration 
creates a new moral bond; spiritual forces are renewed. The 
cycle which we entered many pages ago is now completed . 
... a whole series of prelimiary operatiQns, lustra­
tions, unctions, prayers, etc., transform the animal 
to be immolated into a sacred thing, whose sacredness 
is subsequently transferred to the worshipper who eats 
it .... The alimentary communion is one of the essential 
elements of the sacrifice .... After the totemic animal 
has been killed, the Alatunja and the old men solemly 
eat it. So they communicate with the sacred principle 
residing in it and they assimilate it. The only differ­
ence we find here is that the animal is naturally sa­
cred while it ordinarily acquires this character arti­
ficially in the course of the sacrifice. Moreover, the 
object of this communion is manifest. Every member of 
a totemic clan contains a mystic substance within him 
which is the preeminent part of his being, for his soul 
is made out of it. From it carne whatever powers he has 
and his social position, for it is this which makes him 
a person. So he has a vital interest in maintaining it 
intact, and in keeping it, as far as possible, in a 
state of perpetual youth. Unfortunately, all forces, 
even the most spiritual, are used up in the course of 
time if nothing comes to return to them the energy they 
lose through the normal working of things; there is a 
necessity of the first importance here which ... is the 
real reason for the positive cult. Therefore, the men 
of the totem cannot retainthpirposition unless they 
periodically revivify the totemic principle which is 
in them; and as they represent this principle in the 
form of a vegetable or animal, it is to the correspond­
ing animal or vegetable species that they go to demand 
the supplementary forces needed to renew this and reju­
ventate it (EF:378-9). 
The civil status and personhood are reaffirmed in the re­
creation of the moral subject through commensal celebration. 
And, as we saw before, the rule governing such mystical re­
unification is "the part is equal to the whole." 
A man of the Kangaroo clan believes himself and feels 
himself a kangaroo; is by this quality that he defines 
himself; it is this which marks his place in the socie­
ty. In order to keep it, he takes a little of the flesh 
of this same animal into his own body from time to time. 
A small bit is enough, owing to the rule: the part is 
equal to the whole (EF:379). 
The cycle of rebirth completed, let us now rest. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
•
 
THE EVOLUTIONARY TREE OF SOCIOCULTURAL LIFE
 
The succession of societies cannot be represented 
as in a single plane; it resembles, rather, a tree 
with branches extending in diverging directions (R:19). 
• 
The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's 
guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This meta­
phor served as a logical axis for the classification 
of forms of human experience and entire social systems. 
The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant 
conditions of social and cultural life, while the bran­
•
 
ches represented different types of society (LaCapra,
 
1972:12) • 
Preface. True to the nineteenth century tradition of thought, 
Durkheim always married evolutionary perspectives with his so­
• 
ciological framework. Biological and evolutionary metaphors 
were "in the air," and found a ready adherent in the positiv­
ist Durkheim. Surely one of his key subterranean metaphors 
was the "tree of social life." As Giddens (197la,b,c, 1972a,b) 
•
 
Lukes (1973), Nisbet (1974), and Hinkle (1976), among others,
 
have pointed out, evolutionism permeated all of Durkheim's 
works. Lukes remarks that "It is interesting to note that Spen­
cer also often used the analogy of a tree to symbolize evolu­
•
 
tion" (1973:150,#49). Whether it be Durkheim's sociology of re­

ligion, knowledge, morality, law, etc., all his special studies 
were articulated within a genetic and evolutionary framework. 
Indeed, consideration of the progressive changes from primitive 
•
 
to modern societies constituted both the departure and arri­

val points of Durkheim's sociology. It is importa~to emphasize 
and explore the crucial role played by evolutionary images in 
his sociological system, for Durkheim is still unfortunately 
• 
portrayed as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist searching for 
the generic bases of social order and control. Careful analy­
sis of Durkheim's embrace of evolutionary thinking reveals the 
•
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need to distinguish between the following related, but sep­

arable, elements: his metaphor of the tree of sociocultural

• life, his genetic approach and the importance of the primi­

tive sacral complex as the evolutionary womb of society and
 
culture, his methodological notion of a scale of progressive
 
evolutionary types, and his perceptions of general evolution­

• ary processes seen, for example, in the "progressive division
 
of labor," the emergence of abstract, monotheistic religions,
 
and the growth of rational, universalizable thought. Here we
 
shall consider simply the substantive importance of Durkheim's

• key evolutionary metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life.
 
As with most great thinkers, Durkheim's preoccupation
 
with progressive changes, especially on the world-historical
 
level, stemmed from deep concern and erudite reflection on

• the basic forces transforming the society of his own day. In­

•
 
deed, as Durkheim himself indicated (eg. see "Les Principes
 
de 1789 et la sociologie," 1900, translated by Tiryakian, 1971,
 
and also in Bellah, 1973), one fruitful way of interpreting
 
the historical significance of his positivist sociology of
 
"moral facts" was as an attempt to institutionalize the cen­

tral values of the French Revolution. For decades after this
 
still-unresolved tempest, the contending forces continued their

• bitter national frat1cidal quarrels; foremost here were ques­

tions of the legitimate grounds of moral authority. Durkheim's
 
systematic study of the evolution of moral facts, and its ul­

timate pay-off--a positivist or "scientific" morality--served

• as a powerful intellectual tool justifying the still-to-be in­

•
 
stitutionalized ideas of the French Revolution and the Franco­

Latin "Laic" Positivist Cultural Tradition. From his own spe­

cial world-historical perspective, Durkheim legitimized this
 
emerging morality as historically necessary. In short, Durk­

heim's life-work can be viewed as a profound attempt to con­
struct new bases of argument demonstrating the significance 
•
 
and validity of these basic changes, and the emerging Positi­

vist morality. 
I submit, therefore, that Durkheim was always centrally 
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•
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concerned with societal, cultural, and personal evolution. 
The transition from simple to complex societies, and the in­
dividual's changing position within that great historical 
transformation, constituted one of the central axes of Durk­
heim's thought. As Benjamin Nelson (1969b,1972a) along with 
Giddens, has rightly insisted, Durkheim's sociological out­
look was always "processual" through and through; that is, 
he was centrally concerned with the prime constitutive and 
trans formative processes involved in basic world-historical 
transformations, especially those on the road to modernity. 
It is significant that Durkheim and Weber's macro-level con­
cerns converged on this point, for evolutionary thinking was 
deeply embedded in their work. 
Yet, the widely pervasive image of Durkheim as a "sta­
tic" thinker remains strong today. Why? An eye for irony would 
help here, for the simple truth of the matter is this: he who 
first helped rescue Durkheim also distorted his doctrine in 
the very same process! I refer, of course, to Talcott Parsons 
in his magisterial The Structure of Social Action. Recogni­
tion of Parsons' enormous influence in this regard is a pre­
requisite to understanding the curious fate of Durkheim's 
doctrine in American sociology (see especially R. Hinkle,1960). 
While Parsons must be granted his full due for the originality 
and profundity of his heroic rescue of Durkheim from the igno­
minious clutches of the radical empiricists and reductionists, 
nonetheless, Parsons must also assume responsibility for let­
ting his own drarr~ shunt aside the real underlying evolution­
ary structure of Durkheim's system. Perhaps one of the first 
keys to Parsons simultaneous "rescue" and subsequent distor­
tion emerges from the famous assertion early in his treatment 
of Durkheim in The Structure of Social Action: "Durkheim was 
almost wholly concerned with ... "social statics." The prob­
lem of order is Durkheim's central problem from an early stage." 
(1949:307). Although he admitted that Durkheim's first major 
work, The Division of Labor in Society, was "ostensibly a 
study of social differentiation," Parsons largely ignored his 
crucial evolutionary matrix. In addition, Parsons generally 
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devalued the importance of The Division of Labor in Durkheim's 
intellectual development; he especially slighted Durkheim's
• theoretical insistence on the important role played by social 
morphological changes underlying societal differentiation. 
Parsons suggested that these factors merely represented "dead­
ends" in Durkheim's theoretical development. Similarly, Par­
• sons largely ignored Durkheim's crucial underlying evolution­
ary perspective in his works dealing with the development of 
religion, morality, law, logical thought, science, the family, 
and so on. Parsons persisted throughout his discussion of the
• rest of Durkheim's sociological work in portraying him as he 
would have liked him to be--namely, an abstracted, static theo­
rist, perplexed by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma " and 
searching, as Parsons himself did, for the generic bases of so­
• cial order and control. I must insist, however, that real pro­
gress in understanding the potential significance of Durkheim's 
work for the human sciences cannot come until this wholly mis­
leading image of Durkheim is finally set aside.
• Recently, some perceptive observers have begun to raise 
serious questions concerning the Parsonian orthodoxy on Durk­
heim's supposed aversion to change and historical thinking. 
Anthony Giddens, for example, has pointedly and repeatedly
• criticized Parsons on precisely this matter. 
Far from the "problem of order" having been "Durkheim's 
central problem from an early stage," it can perfectly 
well be said that it was not a problem for Durkheim at 
all. The central issue informing his writings was that
• 
of change ••• he was preoccupied with the confrontation 
between the dissolving "traditional" and the emergent 
"modern" type (19 72a : 4l) • 
Even the oblique refutation of Parsonian orthodoxy by one of 
his own proteges, I mean Robert Bellah in his excellent arti­
• cle "Durkheim and History" (1959), has not overcome the popu­
lar misportrayal of Durkheim as a static, abstracted theorist. 
Nor has Parsons himself, even in his recent turn toward evo­
lutionary theory, yet given Durkheim his just due as one of
• the great world-historical thinkers. And although Parsons re­
centlyadmitted (1973:l57), in an isolated comment, that Durk­
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heim must, indeed, he considered an evolutionary thinker, he 
has as yet done little to restore Durkheim's name to the first
• rank of world-historical thinkers, along with Weber and other 
pioneers of modern social science. 
A. The Tree of Sociocultural Life as a Metaphor of Multilineal 
• 
Evolution 
As we shall soon discover, one of the major underlying 
reasons why Durkheim formulated this metaphor was to absolve 
himself of the typical charges against the simple unilinear,
• progressive evolutionary schemas characteristic of many nine­
teenth century thinkers. For example, Durkheim repeatedly criti­
cized Comte for treating the progressive evolution of "mankind­
in-general" as the subject matter of sociology (see especially
• The Rules of Sociological Method). Indeed, one of Durkheim's 
reasons behind his embrace of the metaphor of the evolutionary 
tree of sociocultural life was to graphically portray the po­
tentially manifold lines take in societal evolution. The grow­
• th of differentiated complexity was never simple nor uniform; 
therefore, the image of the tree of social life was meant to 
convey recognition of progressive as well as static or regres­
sive evolutionary lines, and as we shall soon see, of evolu­
• tionary survivals as well as the leading edge of progressive 
evolution. As always, the philosopher in Durkheim sought to 
reconcile historical diversity with generic unity. Durkheim's 
image of the manifold lines taken by general evolutionary pro­
• cesses needs to be emphasized, I repeat, for, on the contrary, 
even among those who grudgingly recognize Durkheim's evolution­
ism, many persist in portraying him as a rather typical, uni­
linear social evolutionist. While Durkheim took over the evo­
• lutionism of the nineteenth century--the very leit-motif of 
the time--he did so critically; and thus he must be ranked, 
albeit tardily, as one of the pioneers of multilineal evolu­
tionary theory.
• Although most readers, if not too deeply under Parsons 
lingering spell, now recognize the crucial role of genetic­
•
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evolutionary perspectives in Durkheim's work, until recently 
one of his guiding metaphors remained submerged, largely hid­
den from public view. Among the few secondary interpreters 
who must be given credit for having recognized the existence 
of Durkheim's metaphor (ego Alpert, 1939:197; J.A. Barnes, 
1966:161; Wallwork, 1972:42; Lukes, 1973:149-50, 281 #27), 
most neglected to develop its general significance within 
Durkheim's system. In view of the typical ironies involved 
in the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" {McCloskey, 1974), 
it is not surprising that one of the first observers to move 
the metaphor of the tree of social life to center stage of 
Durkheim's system is both young and a relative outsider to 
the field of sociology. Given, however, his background as a 
historian, it is perhaps understandable that Dominick LaCapra 
has been the first, so far as I know, to repeatedly emphasize 
the potency of Durkheim's evolutionary metaphor within his 
doctrine. 
The notion which provided orientation was Durkheim's 
guiding metaphor of a tree of social life. This meta­
phor served as a logical axis for the classification 
of forms of human experience and entire social systems. 
The trunk of the tree corresponded to the invariant 
conditions of social and cultural life, while the bran­
ches represented different types of society (1972:12). 
LaCapra rightly emphasizes that Durkheim's metaphor combined, 
in one and the same image, both evolutionary continuity (the 
roots and the trunk), and discontinuity and diversity (the 
branches and fruits). LaCapra suggests the derivation of 
these notions in this manner: 
In his guiding model of the tree of sociocultural life, 
Durkheim combined a flexible theory of invariance with 
a notion of different "social species" or types. His 
conception of the common trunk and its relation to ar­
chaic societies owed much to Rousseau. His idea of ty­
pological branches and its relation to history derived 
in large part from Saint-Simon (1972:195). 
Now, perhaps one of the main reasons why so many obser­
vers have had difficulty spotting this seminal metaphor in 
Durkheim's sociological system is due to its very ubiquitous­
ness. For while Durkheim explicitly formulated it, its perva­
•
 
• 
--236-­
sive influence can be seen almost everywhere beneath the sur­
face. The almost wholly implicit status of a key image, meta­
• phor, or assumption is certainly not unusual; often it is the 
rule rather than the exception. Many people feel no need to 
spell out what they take to be obvious, and, of course, as 
philosophers have often remarked, this is precisely the prob­
• lem. Indeed, much of the potency of subterranean metaphors in 
linking diverse phenomena would be lost if they were constant­
ly subjected to conscious and critical review. Whether speci­
fically correct or not, it is precisely this implicit connota­
• tional load or metaphorical "penumbra" which often extends our 
imagination, and leads us in new directions and to crucial in­
sights (see especially N.R. Campbell, 1920; N.R. Hanson, 1958; 
M. Hesse, 1963; T.S. Kuhn, 1970).
• However, at certain points Durkheim's guiding metaphor 
did indeed surface to meet the reflective light of day. One 
of the earliest statements can be found, appropriately enough, 
in Durkheim's "Cours de science sociale: Lecon d'overture"
• published in the Revue Internationale de ~'enseignement in 
1883. Noting that Durkheim rejected the conceFtion of unilinear 
evolution implied in Comte's famous law of the three stages, 
LaCapra provides the following translation:
• Whatever Pascal may have said--and Comte mistakenly 
took up his celebrated formula--mankind cannot be 
compared to a man who, having lived through all past 
centuries, still subsists. Rather, humanity resembles 
an immense family whose different branches, which have 
• 
increasingly diverged from one another, have become 
little by little detached from the common trunk to 
• 
live their own lives. Besides, what assurance is there 
that this common trunk ever existed (1972:l95)? 
Again, in an important footnote halfway through his most ex­
plicitly evolutionary book, The Division of Labor, Durkheim 
characteristically reflects: 
•
 
In speaking of one social type as being more advanced
 
than another, we do not mean to suggest that the dif­

ferent social types are stages in one and the same as­

cending linear series, more or less elevated according
 
to their historical places. It is, rather, certain that,
 
if the genealogical table of social types could be com­
pletely drawn up, it would resemble a tufted tree, with 
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a single trunk, to be sure, but with diverging bran­
ches. However, in spite of this tendency, the dis­
tance between the two types is measurable; they are 
higher or lower. Surely we have the right to say of 
a type that it is above another when it began with 
the form of the latter and yet has gone above it. 
~ch is certainly the case with a more elevated bran­
ch or bough (DL:14l-2, #21). 
Indeed, close scrutiny of this passage reveals that Durkheim 
took the time to explicitly state his subterranean metaphor 
in order to absolve himself of unfounded charges of "unilin­
eal evolution. II The explanations Durkheim himself offered for 
this metaphor reveals that his intention behind this image 
was not merely to indicate evolution, but to portray progres­
sive evolution in terms of a multilineal matrix, including 
regressive as well as leading lines. 
The same image, repeated in Durkheim's neglected arti­
cle IITwo Laws of Penal Evolution ll (1901; see Tiryakian, 1964, 
and Jones and Scull, 1973), makes it clear that the metaphor 
of the tree of sociocultural life was intended to combine, in 
one root image, both evolutionary continuity and discontinuity. 
It is relatively easy to determine whether one social 
type is more or less advanced than another: one has 
only to see whether they are more or less complex, and 
as to the extent of similar composition, whether they 
are more or less organized. This hierarchy of social 
types, moreover, does not imply that the succession of 
societies takes on a unilinear form; on the contrary, 
it is certain that the sequence must rather be thought 
of as a tree with many branches all diverging in great­
er or lesser degree. But, on this tree, societies are 
found at differing heights, and are found at differing 
distances from the common trunk. It is on this condi­
tion that one looks at it in this way that one may 
talk in terms of a general evolution of societies 
(Jones & Scull, 1973:285-6). 
In contrast to the simple varities abounding in his own day, 
Durkheim's own evolutionary perspective was more subtle and 
multilineal at its very heart. For although the tree of social 
life can have only one trunk, it has many branches reaching 
in different directions, and perhaps even incomparable fruits, 
issuing from many cross-fertilizations and unique graftings. 
Thus did Durkheim seek to reconcile historical diversity and 
essential sociocultural unity • 
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B.	 Multilineal Evolution, SocioCultural Sedimentation, 
and Evolutionary Survivals 
All historical explanations must struggle with the 
problem of assigning ratios to evolutionary continuity and 
discontinuity. In terms of this basic problem, Durkheim's 
key metaphor of the tree of social life carried two different, 
though related, meanings. The first and most explicit conno­
tation, the genetic evolutionary sense of the metaphor, con­
veyed the image of a progressive mainline of societal evolu­
tion. The second and more implicit connotation conjured up 
the image of different evolutionary strata layered and sedi­
mented together ina new working sociocultural complex. The 
first sense of Durkheim's metaphor focussed attention on the 
macro-level, on the leading edge of evolutionary progress, 
while the second sense reminds us, on the micro-societal le­
vel, of the continuing role played in contemporary society 
by certain sociocultural survivals held over from earlier 
periods and types. Thus, the duality of his metaphor implied 
that societal evolution could be compared to the tree of so­
cial life in a number of senses, for not only are contempor­
ary societies based upon the progressive achievements of the 
present in overcoming the past, but some of the past contin­
ues to live on underneath the present. 
Put another way, Durkheim's metaphor conveyed the dual 
sense of evolutionary stages and types on the one hand, and 
evolutionary survivals on the other. The first implies direct 
continuity with by-gone days. Yet both meanings, simultaneous­
ly opposed and related, were bound up with Durkheim's same 
guiding metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life. 
Since this dual aspect of Durkheim's evolutionary thinking has 
been little noted, let us now briefly explore this fruitful 
ambiguity, especially in regard to the second sense of sur­
vivals or evolutionary holdovers from primitive or archaic so­
cieties once thought to be wholly passed over by the leading 
edge of progressive evolution. 
• 
• 
• 
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Now, one finds references to various sorts of hist­
orical holdovers scattered throughout Durkheim's work. For 
example, in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim spoke of folklore 
as " ... the debris of passed religions, unorganized survivals" 
and offers the examples of " .•. celebrations of May Day, the 
summer solstice or the carnival, beliefs relative to genii, 
local demons, etc. II (EF:5l; see also 57). Moreover, Durkheim 
observed that certain traces of primitive totemism can be dis­
covered even in the modern world. 
Though no visible traces of collective totemism remain 
in civilized countries, the idea that there is a con­
nection between each individual and some animal, plant, 
or other object, is at the bottom of many customs still 
observable in many European societies. (Footnote: Thus 
at the birth of a child, a tree is planted which is 
cared for piously; for it is believed that its fate 
and the child's are united) (EF:19l). 
Further, in Primitive Classification, at the very end, Durk­
heim and Mauss insist that the primitive sacral foundations of 
logical thought continue to this very day. 
But¥is not the case that these remote influences 
which we have just studied have ceased to be felt 
today. They have left behind them an effect which 
survives and which is always present; it is the 
very cadre of all classification, it is the ensem­
ble of mental habits by virtue of which we conceive 
things and facts in the form of coordinated or hier­
archized groups (PC:88). 
Now, although some who persist in viewing Durkheim only 
as a anti-traditionalist positivist might think it strange, 
those who wish to grasp the full complexity and profundity of 
Durkheim's thought will not be surprised to discover that he 
suggested that it is well that " ••. the past persists beneath 
the surface of the present, even when they are at variance" 
(PECM:174). Although he stood for the future against the "re­
pressiveness" of the past, nonetheless, Durkheim realistically 
recognized that the present, past, and future cannot always 
stand at war. Indeed, in contrast to those who railed against 
the historical indecency of "irrational survivals," Durkheim 
counseled: "Every social structure is full of these paradoxes" 
(PECM:174). So strong was this seemingly paradoxical convict­
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ion, that Durkheim proposed at the end of his profound lec­
tures "Physique des moeurs et du droit" that "Old institu­
tions never disappear entirely; they only pass into the back­
ground and fade away by degrees" (PECM: 21 7) • 
Durkheim evaluated the continuing importance of evolu­
tionary survivals in a number of different ways--those that 
are non-functional or functional only as a transition from 
old to new structures, and those that become functional in 
certain ways because they become traditional. It is difficult, 
of course, to discriminate among these various shades and 
grades of continuing functional importance; further, it must 
be noted that other sedimented modes of survival and trans­
formation are possible than those explicated here. In the first 
sense, and perhaps the most predictable way as a positivist 
interested in overcoming the tenacious clutches of the past, 
Durkheim insisted that certain sociocultural traits lingering 
on from earlier societies no longer were appropriate to the 
changed structures of modern societies. Several types of exam­
ples could be offered, but Durkheim's critique of the legal 
institution of inheritance is representative: 
We have seen that inheritance ab intestat, a survival 
of the old right of family joint ownership, is today 
an archaic survival and without justification. It no 
longer corresponds to anything in our ethics, and could 
be abolished without disturbing the moral structure of 
our societies in any way (PECM:216). 
Now, it was precisely these difficult distinctions between so­
ciocultural forms that are to be judged as "archaic survivals" 
no longer corresponding to the present or emerging structure 
of modern societies, from those elements that are judged as 
still functional that underlies Durkheim's positivist attempt 
to build a new morality in terms of systematic evolutionary 
distinctions between "normal" and "pathological" social pheno­
mena. Indeed, it is a common refrain in Durkheim, especially 
as he argued against traditionalists, that it is vain and use­
less to attempt to resurrect or preserve the past beyond its 
appointed hour. 
Nonetheless, it is the same Durkheim who next argued, 
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in an almost imperceptible shift, that evolutionary survivals 
may serve an important transitional function in the progressive 
move from the old to new structures. For example, Durkheim's 
image of the tree of sociocultural life led him, in terms of 
his genetic investigations into the primitive roots of the le­
gal notion of property, to conclude that its communal origins 
continue in various forms even today: "Since communal proper­
ty is the stock from which the other forms sprang, we find tra­
ces of it in their structure as a whole" (PECM:168). Now, al­
though this image of survivals from earlier times led Durkheim 
to dec:are that these continuities with the communal origin of 
property (eg. in legal inheritance) are archaic and do not fit 
the contemporary social structure and individualist achievement 
ethos of modern society, nevertheless, he also suggested that 
these earlier forms served as important transitional links be­
tween one notion of property and its successor. 
Inheritance is therefore bound up with archaic concepts 
and practices that have no part in our present-day eth­
ics. It is true that this fact alone does not warrant 
our thinking it is bound to disappear. We sometimes 
have to keep such survivals, where they are needed. The 
past persists beneath the present, even when they are 
at variance. Every social structure is full of these 
paradoxes. We can do nothing to cancel what has been-­
the past is a reality and not to be done away with. The 
earliest forms of society have provided a foundatkn for 
the most recent: it often occurs that a continuity of 
some sort has been kept up whereby the older forms in 
part are preserved to nourish the newer (PECM:174-5). 
Here we see Durkheim employing both senses of his metaphor, 
for such survivals, though "archaic" remnants of the past, not 
only played an important transitional role, but also because 
the past lives on in attenuated form "beneath the surface of 
the present." Durkheim concluded, in regard to the same ques­
tion of the proper role of the continuity of the communal ba­
sis of property, that: 
The old institutions never disappear entirely; they 
only pass into the background, and fade away or de­
grees. This one has played too great a role in his­
tory for it to be conceivable that nothingof it should 
survive. It would only survive, however, in a weakened 
form (PECM:2l7). 
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Indeed, Durkheim's passion for paradox, surpassed per­
haps only by Weber, led him, again and again, to insist that 
"life is made of contradictions," that we cannot wholly extir­
pate the past, just as the future cannot be seized immediately. 
For example, in relation to the question of the continuation 
of the altruistic type of morality appropriate to primitive 
social solidarity in the isolated modern structural context of 
the army, Durkheim observed: 
... the suicide of lower societies, in survival among 
us because the military morality itself is in certain 
respects a survival of primitive morality. (Footnote: 
... which does not mean that it is destined to disap­
pear forthwith. These survivals have their own bases 
for existence, and it is natural for some of the past 
to remain in the midst of the present. Life is made of 
these contradictions) (S:238). 
Finally, Durkheim explored, in passing, the other main 
possibility that certain historical holdovers, because of their 
traditional status, continue to playa role of certain signi­
ficance in maintaining contemporary sociocultural equilibrium. 
Durkheim cited, for example, the survival of certain food ta­
boos, dating back at least to the Pentateuch, among the strict 
adherents of Judaic Law. Such religious interdictions, having 
lost much or all of their original reason for being, come to 
be identifiecf!ttWe Judaic religion as a special "way of life." 
Though of primitive tribal totemistic origin, yet, Durkheim 
noted, "it becomes necessary that they persist, in spite of 
their irrationality." 
Just as the individual type, the collective type is 
formed from very diverse causes and even from fortui­
tous combinations. Produced through historical devel­
opment, it carries the work of circumstances of every 
kind which society has gone through in its history. 
It would be miraculous, then, if everything there were 
adjusted to some useful end •••. There are some of them 
remaining without any use, and those whose services are 
most incontestable often have an intensity which has no 
relation to their utility, because it comes to them, in 
part, from other causes. The case is the same with col­
lective passions. All the acts which offend them are 
not dangerous in themselves, or, at least, are not as 
they are made out to be. But, the reprobation of which 
these acts are the object still has reason for exist­
ing, whatever the origins of the sentiments involved, 
once they are made of a collective type, and especial­
•
 
• 
--243-­
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
ly if they are essential elements, everything which 
contributes to disturb them, at the same time dis­
turbs social cohesion and compromises society. It 
was not at all useful for them to be born, but once 
they have endured, it becomes necessary that they 
persist in spite of their irrationality ...• Of cour­
se, reasoning in the abstract, we may well show that 
there is no reason for a society to forbid the eat­
ing of such and such a meat, in itself offensive. 
But once the horror of this has become an integral 
part of the common conscience, it cannot disappear 
without a social link being broken, and this is what 
sane consciences obscurely feel (DL:I06-7). 
Besides describing the processes of sedimentation of old and 
new cultural elements into a new working sociocultural complex, 
Durkheim's profound observations make it clear that such vital 
links with the past, though changed from their original func­
tion, take on new integrative significance as symbolizing the 
very identity of the group itself; that is, they become true 
"collective representations." This can only happen because so­
cial and cultural life is historically constructed and sedimen­
ted. In sum, Durkheim's image of the growth and decline of 
various types of social life is really rather complex--old 
elements that no longer correspond to current necessities can 
and must give way, new elements constantly emerge; yet in the 
process older elements may change in their prime functions and 
gradually take on wholly different and perhaps even more import­
ant roles in the continuation and extension of the inherited 
and constantly reconstructed sociocultural complex. 
As might be expected, however, lest Durkheim the posi­
tivist find his larger intentions misrepresented by his real­
istic attitudes toward historical complexities, he took pains 
to absolve himself in the following footnote of potential mis­
casting as a conservative or closet traditionalist. 
That does not mean that it is necessary to conserve 
a penal rule because, at some given moment, it corres­
ponded to some collective sentiment. It has a raison 
d'etre only if this latter is living and energetic. 
If~as disappeared or been enfeebled, nothing is 
vainer or worse than trying to keep it alive artifi­
cially, or by force. It can even be that it was ne­
cessary to combat a practice which was common, but 
is no longer so, and opposes the establishment of new 
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and necessary practices. But we need not enter into 
•
 
this casuitical problem (DL:I07-8, #45).
 
• 
But Durkheim's rhetorical device here of dismissing potential 
inconsistencies in his own doctrine as mere "casuitical prob­
lems" will not suffice. For it is precisely these ticklish 
dilemmas which generate so much of Durkheim's troubles in at­
tempting to systematically distinguish between "normalities" 
and "pathologies" in relation to a series of evolutionary 
types. Indeed, it is no accident that LaCapra's attention 
• 
was usurped by these implications, since he always added 
"normality" and "pathology" as the companion keys, along 
with the metaphor of the tree of sociocultural life, to 
comprehending the foundations of Durkheim's sociology. 
•
 
But, in any case, whatever the problems Durkheim genera­

ted for himself in other parts of his system, it should be 
remembered that they came from a profound thinker's wrest­
lings with the eternal problems of historical diversity and 
• 
generic unity. That Durkheim could so intimately intertwine 
past and present, progressive and evolutionary lines, histor­
ical holdovers and contemporary changes, in short, unity and 
diversity, in one potent and resonating image of the evolu­
• 
tionary tree of sociocultural life, is added testimony to 
his dialectical genius. 
• 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX: 
WOMB OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE 
[In the beginning] religion comprises all, extends to all. 
It contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs properly 
religious, morality, law, the principles of political or­
ganization, and even science. Religion ... regulated the 
details of private life (DL:135). 
In primitive societies, criminal law is religious law.... 
Offenses against the gods are offenses against society 
(DL: 92) . 
... All laws come from the divinity; to violate them is 
to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins which 
must be expiated (DL:139). 
If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond doubt, 
it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller and smaller 
portion of social life. Originally, it pervades everything; 
everything social is religious, the two words are synony­
mous. Then, little by little, political, economic, scien­
tific functions free themselves from the religious func­
tion, and constitute themselves apart (DL:169). 
Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to 
reach common agreement that religion is the most primi­
tive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations of 
collective activity--law, morality, art, science, politi­
cal formation, etc. have emerged from it, by a series of 
transformations. In the beginning, everything is religious 
[1897] (in Giddens, 1972a:16l). 
Religion contains within itself from the very beginning, 
even if in an undistinct state, all the elements which in 
dissociating themselves from it, articulating themselves, 
and combining with one another in a thousand ways, have 
given rise to the various manifestations of collective life. 
From myths and legends have issued forth science and poet­
ry; from religious ornamentations and cults have come the 
plastic arts; from ritual practice were born law and morals. 
One cannot understand our perception of the world, of im­
mortality, of life, if one does not know the religious be­
liefs which are their primordial forms. Kinship started 
as an essentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift, 
and homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual, 
communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on •••• 
•
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• 
A great many problems change their aspects completely as 
soon as their connections with the sociology of religion 
are recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at 
tracing these connections [1899] (1960:350-5l). 
• 
It is through a religion that we are able to trace the 
structure of a society, the stage of unity it has reach­
ed, and the degree of cohesion of its parts, besides the 
expanse of the area it inhabits (PECM:160). 
Religions are the primitive way in which societies become 
conscious of themselves and their history. They are in 
the social order what sensation is in the individual 
•
 
(PECM:160) .
 
Durkheim was interested to discover in ... primitive reli­
• 
gion that undifferentiated whole from which the elements 
of society gradually differentiated .... With the example 
of the Australian clan and its religious life, he under­
took to analyze the social analogue of the unicellular or­
ganism, the basic sLructural type from which all the other 
social structures have differentiated (Bellah, 1959:456). 
Religion •.. constitutes the fount from which all other 
institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society. 
•
 
One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ulti­

mate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the prototype,
 
and ultimate source, of all conduct (poggi, 1971:253). 
• 
In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed 
he had found the seeds of all later developments of the 
human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that 
the original source of logical thought lies in the collect­
ivity, and that religion was the first seat of collective 
consciousness. He held that science and philosophy, the 
crowning achievements of reason, also have their genesis 
in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man first 
conceived of things being related to one another intern­
• 
ally; it is through religion that men first grasped the 
• 
unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm of the 
sacred embraces both the physical and the social world; 
religious forces provide the nexus between things which 
to the senses appear discrete and unconnected. Once man 
began to think that what appears dissimilar to his senses 
may have an internal unity, science and philosophy become 
possible .••. In brief, the dual aspects of religious for­
ces--their physical and moral aspects--made religion the 
matrix from which the main seeds of civilization developed 
(Tiryakian, 1962:4l-2). 
• 
[Durkheim's] ... historical studies pointed out that all 
social institutions develop from a common sphere of life 
which is the fountainhead, the primordial institution of 
all human societies (Tiryakian, 1964:250). 
•
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• 
The fundamental categories of thought and ••• science 
are of religious origin .••• Up until a relatively advan­
ced moment of evolution, moral and legal rules have been 
indistinguishable from ritual prescriptions .... Nearly 
all the great social institutions have been born in reli­
gion (EF:466). 
Religion is the womb from which come all the leading 
germs of human civilization (EF:255).
• Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and 
even scientific thought were born of religion, were for 
a long time confounded with it, and have remained pene­
trated with its spirit (EF:87). 
•
 
Between the logic of religious thought and that of scien­

tific thought there is no abyss (EF:27l). 
• 
We have shown •.• that the most essential ideas of the 
human mind--ideas of time, space, type and form, force 
and causality, and personality--those, in short, to which 
philosophers have given the name of 'categories,' and 
which dominate all logical activity, were elaborated with­
in the very center of religion. Science has borrowed them 
from religion. There is no gulf between these two stages 
in the intellectual life of mankind [1913] (in Giddens, 
1972a:248) • 
• 
Preface. "In the beginning," Emile Durkheim observed, "reli­
gion comprises all, extends to all" (DL:135). Throughout his 
career, Durkheim suggested that "the elementary forms of reli­
• gious life" served as the original and prime matrix out of 
which all the other major cultural forms emerged. Durkheim 
discovered that originally "religion pervaded the whole so­
cial life" (DL:14l); religion, society, culture, and the in­
• dividual were fused together in what I shall call the "primi­
tive sacral complex," or, for short, the "sacral womb." The 
primitive or elementary sacral complex served as the prime 
evolutionary womb of society and culture, as the original and 
• fundamental ground of civilizational process. "Religion is 
the womb from which come all the leading germs of civilization" 
(EF:255). Indeed, Durkheim's special sociologies--his studies 
of religion, morality, law, logic and science, anomie, educa­
• tion, the family, and so forth--all were anchored in the notion 
of the primitive sacral complex as their prime genetic matrix. 
•
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! submit that the full significance of Durkheim'~ guiding para­
~ of the primitive sacral complex ~ the prime evolutionary
• womb of society, culture, and person still awaits rediscovery 
as a fundamental interpretive strategy in the human sciences. 
Moreover, Durkheim's forgotten seminal paradigm represents a 
needed complement and reinforcement for the work of the other 
• pioneering architect of the sociology of religion--r mean Max 
Weber. This convergence of theoretical and evolutionary per­
spectives represents a most promising synthesis in the compara­
tive and historical sociology of religion and culture (eg. see 
• B. Nelson, 1973a). 
Now, as we discovered in Chapter Four, Durkheim saw man 
in generic terms as homo religiosus. Man is the sociocultural 
animal who makes and remakes himself through the genetic medium 
• of collective symbolic process. Thus, human society itself ori­
ginates primarily through the creative medium of symbolic ritual. 
Collective ritual overcomes the egoism inherent in human nature, 
and by gathering people together and focussing social energies
• in a kind of moral implosion, generates the first symbolic form 
of collective self-consciousness. "Symbolism is 'necessary if 
society is to become conscious of itself' and no less indispen­
sable for assuring the continuation of this consciousness;' in­
• deed, 'social life in all its aspects and in every period of 
its histo ry is made possible only by a vast symbolism' " (Lukes, 
1973:472). Further, when human sentiments reach a high degree 
of intensity, they take on a religious aspect, that is, they
• become objects of obligatory respect, founts of moral authority, 
of legitimacy, of "sacredness." Through the creation of a pub­
lic symbolic process, embodied in what Nelson (1973a) terms a 
"sacro-magical collective conscience,' we witness the awakening
• of the phenomenological anchors of collective symbolism (cul­
ture)--namely, conscience and consciousness, and thus, in 
turn, the creation of the person. 
Two prime characteristics of the emergence of these ele­
• mentary cultural forms are that they are: (a) socio-centric in 
terms of reference and, at the same time, (b) governed by sacro­
magical rationales and practices. This means that structures of 
•
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conscience and consciousness, of prime rules and meanings, 
are simultaneously centered around social forms and permeated 
by religious rationales and magical rites. In sum, the collect­
ive foundations of legitimate moral and intellectual authority 
are grounded in the group and its religion; one might say that 
they are "fused" together. This is the basis of Mauss's famous 
notion of the sociological task as seeking out "total social 
facts" (ego 1967). Here, we shall turn our attention to the 
high degree of fusion between these prime characteristics of 
early culture s . 
But, since our focus has now shifted from generic to 
genetic-evolutionary perspectives, we shall also be concerned 
with the historical significance of the primitive sacral com­
plex in which we may discover two opposed meanings. For the 
double historical significance of the sacral complex is that 
it both served as the creative womb of human culture and an 
obstacle to progressive cultural evolution. First, as a crea­
tive womb, Durkheim suggested that all the major cultural forms, 
and the even the notion of the person, are originally sacral 
creations. "The most essential ideas of the human mind .•. 
were elaborated within the very center of religion" (in Gid­
dens, 1972a:248). For behind the elementary phenomenologies or 
concrete ana-logics of mythical and ritual processes, Durkheim 
professed to discover the "contagiousness" of what might be 
called "sacred electricity" as the unifying principle of prim­
itive cosmologies and ethical systems. What sensory experience 
separated, religion bound together (as in the root meaning of 
"re-ligare"). Without the "essentialism" provided by the in­
visible world, which cuts across all empirically separate do­
mains, neither logic, nor the person, nor even society itself, 
or indeed, any other crucial cultural form, could be construct­
ed. Indeed, the fusion of society, culture, and person with 
religion and magic was the mutual precondition of their very 
existence. This awarding of the first, and in a certain sense, 
highest, rank, to the sacral womb was Durkheim's boldest, least 
known, and, perhaps to some, most astonishing idea. 
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But, if the sacral womb served as the essential prin­
ciple of the fusion of society, culture, tradition, and per­
• son into a coherent and meaningful pattern, then it has to 
be acknowledged that it also served to con-fuse them. "It 
[religion] contains in a confused mass, besides beliefs pro­
perly religious, morality, law, the principles of political
• organization, and even science" (DL:135). ~10reover, religious 
sanctions permeated everyday life, they "regulated the de­
tails of private life" (DL:135), which means, of course, 
since religion was collective, there was often no clear se­
• paration between public and private spheres. Indeed, as Durk­
heim noted, "Originally religion pervades everything: every­
thing social is religious, the two words are synonymous" (DL: 
169). If "charisma," to use Weber's parallel term, transform­
• ed empirical diversity into moral and cognitive unity, it also 
acted to imprison the former in the latter. "To primitive so­
cieties, criminal law is religious law •••• Offenses against 
the gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). Thus, the 
• struggle to disengage from the intrusive and all-embracing 
claims of religious sanctions, the attempt to carve out auto­
nomous spheres for thought and action--in short, the release 
from sacral control--becomes a key problematic for historical 
• investigation. For, subsuming all certain knowledge under 
mythical and magical categories inevitably masks the autonomy 
of the empirical world: submitting all questions of valid 
judgement and action to the pressure of sacral and magical
• controls inevitably represses diversity and innovation. "All 
laws come from the divinity: to violate them is to offend the 
divinity, and such offenses are sins which must be expiated" 
(DL:139). Indeed, these are the type of insights which formed 
• the basis of the Enlightenment critique of religion, against 
which Durkheim took up such an ambivalent position. 
Now, Durkheim proposed that as societies grow more 
complex and differentiate, cultural forms and the notion of 
• the person also evolve. This differentiating co-evolution 
means that the various departments of society, spheres of cul­
•
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ture, and dimensions of the person grow increasingly autono­
mous. Living their own life alone, each element develops its 
I.
 
•
 
own special physiognomy, and becomes governed by its own law.
 
If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond 
doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller 
and smaller portion of social life .... Little by little, 
political, economic, scientific functions free them­
selves from the religious function, and constitute
• themselves apart (DL:169).
 
The struggle of the various spheres of life to separate them­

selves out from their original fusion in the sacral womb be­

comes a central concern. Separation, division, differentiation,
 
• autonomization--all faces of the same process--become the roots
 
of the historical problematic of secularization.
 
This historical dialectic of fusion and diffusion, of
 
merger and division--two of the many faces of the eternal dia­

• lectic between the one and the many--constitutes an essential
 problematic of the comparative and historical sociology of re­

ligion to Durkheim. In his concern with the autonomization and
 
rationalization of culture and person, Durkheim converged with
 
• Weber's great historical and comparative inquiries into the
 
vicissitudes experienced by societies which attempt to prevent
 
secularization by maintaining the fusion of the sacral complex
 
or to accelerate diffusion and secularization.
 
• But secularization always implies at least two related,
 
though sometimes opposed, sociocultural processes. Religion be­

comes secularized, first, in the sense that the intensity of sa­

cral images and sanctions, and the degree of social control ex­

• erted by sacerdotal institutions, are diminished or eroded in
 
•
 
sociocultural evolution. But the second sense of seculariza­

tion is equally crucial--namely, that sacral images and sanc­

tions become progressively translated and sedimented into sec­

ular spheres. l This notion of secularization as cultural trans­

lation represents the crucial third term, or process, in the
 
historical problematic of the relations between society and re­

ligion. For, if the archaic sacral complex served as the con­

• stitutive instrument and evolutionary womb of society, culture,
 
and person, and if, on the contrary, much of progressive socio­

cultural evolution is accomplished only through separation from
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the fusion demanded by religious norms and sacerdotal institu­
tions, then secularization as translation mediates between
• these two apparently opposed processes. A primal unity anchor­
ed in religion, the separation and autonomization of the sec­
ular world, and then secularization as reciprocal translation 
become the three faces, or phases, of mainline world-his~
• torical process to sociologists of religion and culture. 
It is precisely in his insightful recognition of the 
double significance of the primitive sacral complex and the 
double meanings of secularization that Durkheim overcame the
• prejudices against religion of his Enlightenment brethren, and 
which, albeit belatedly, constitutes his revolution in the hu­
man sciences. Thus, like his contemporary Max Weber, Durkheim 
viewed the intimate links between religion, society, culture,
• and the person as functioning sometimes as obstacles, sometimes 
as facilitators of sociocultural evolution. Although he did 
not possess Weber's sensitivity to the historical vicissitudes 
of this complex dialectic of release and control--best seen as
• struggles over claims to preeminent legitimate moral and intel­
lectual authority--Durkheim was also fundamentally concerned 
with the ways in which religious rationales and ritual prac­
• 
tices served to advance or retard cultures along the mainlines 
of increasing autonomization, rationalization, and universali­
zation. We shall explore the latter processes more fully in 
the succeeding chapters. 
It is appropriate, therefore, that when Durkheim came
• to announce his program in the prefaces to ~'Annee sociologique 
he suggested to the several sciences of man: "A great many 
problems change their aspects completely as soon as their con­
• 
nections with the sociology of religion are recognized. Our 
efforts must therefore be aimed at tracing these connections" 
[1899] (1960:350). Yet, since Durkheim's death, few sociologists, 
and fewer still researchers in related areas, have heeded or, 
• 
indeed, even recognized this crucial foundation of Durkheim's 
charter for sociology and the human sciences. What precisely 
does the notion of the primitive sacral complex imply? How did 
•
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•
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• 
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Durkheim, an arch-positivist, come to grant religion both gen­
eric and genetic primacy? And what can Durkheim's seminal para­
digm of the primitive sacral complex mean to the systematic 
study of the interrelations between religion, society, culture, 
personal phenomenologies, and historical processes today? 
We shall explore these and related questions in this chapter. 
Before exploring the various phases in Durkheim's devel­
opment of the central significance of the primitive sacral com­
plex, let us first examine other observers' dawning recognition 
of the importance of Durkheim's paradigm, and his genetic-evo­
lutionary presuppositions. 
A. Precedents 
Fortunately, the current renaissance in Durkheim studies 
has shown some glimmering awareness of the centrality of Durk­
heim's notion of the primitive sacral complex. As Robin Horton 
observes: " •.• people are mining the rich seams of his thought 
as energetically as ever, and yet these seams show little sign 
of exhaustion" (1973:271). This nascent recovery is even more 
striking since it results from a converging series of largely 
independent discoveries. Although influenced by the earlier 
generation who "rescued" Durkheim (eg. Parsons, Alpert, Evans­
Pritchard, to mention only a few leaders) from the cudgels of 
his less sympathetic critics, this current renaissance has 
given Durkheim's life-work more systematic and detailed consi­
deration. In addition, many important articles and short pie­
ces have been newly translated. Slowly, a different picture of 
Durkheim and his work begins to emerge: as Kenneth Burke said: 
"A way of seeing is always a way of not seeing." This dictum 
applies doubly to the present case. Since Durkheim rarely spel­
led out his fundamental interpretive logics, his evolving "10­
gics-in-use," the 'Inuclear structure" of his work often remains 
obscure. Consequently, even those who have recently rediscover­
ed Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral womb remain in­
clined to treat this notion only in passing. However, a few 
theorists, boldly breaking with past neglect, and realizing 
•
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the evolutionary significance of this paradigm, have begun to 
incorporate Durkheim's original perspective into their own work. 
A careful review of recent literature reveals a mounting 
series of what might be called "parenthetical" recognitions of 
Durkheim's thesis of the generic and genetic-evolutionary pri­
macy of the primitive sacral complex. For example, in 1959 in 
an important review of Durkheim's life-long concern with his­
toricalprocess (all the more remarkable since it came from with­
in the Parsonian functionalist camp), Robert Bellah cited the 
programmatic passage from the second Annee preface, and remark­
ed: 
Durkheim was interested to discover in religion, espe­
cially primitive religion, that undifferentiated whole 
from which the elements of society gradually differen­
tiated.... With the example of the Australian clan and 
its religious life, he undertook to analyze the social 
analogue of the unicellular organism, the basic struct­
ural type from which all the other social structures 
have differentiated (1959:456). 
Bellah also noted, in regard to the second Annee preface, that 
Durkheim actually undertook researches into these problems, es­
pecially in what I shall call the second and third phases of 
his development of the significance of the sacral womb (see 
Bellah, 1959:456).1 
A year later, Joseph Neyer also cited the relevant sec­
tion from the second Annee preface, but in a footnote, and with­
out developing its implications (1960:67, #61) .In 1962, Edward 
Tiryakian clearly perceived the centrality of Durkheim's para­
digm: 
In presenting Durkheim's perspective on religion, our 
main interest has been to show the crucial role he at­
tributed to religion in the development of human thought. 
In the primitive religion of totemism, Durkheim believed 
he had found the seeds of all later developments of the 
human intellect. What he wanted to demonstrate was that 
the original source of logical thought lies in the col­
lectivity, and that religion was the first seat of col­
lective consciousness. He held that science and philoso­
phy, the crowning achievements of reason, also have their 
genesis in religion. It is in primitive beliefs that man 
first conceived of things being related to one another in­
ternally~ it is through religion that men first grasped 
the unity of nature, the totality of things. The realm 
of the sacred embraces both the physical and the social 
•
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world~ religious forces provide the nexus between things 
which to the senses appear discrete and unconnected. 
Once man began to think that what appears dissimilar to 
his senses may have an internal unity, science and philo­
sophy became possible .... In brief, the dual aspects of 
religious forces--their physical and moral aspects--made 
religion the matrix from which the main seeds of civili­
zation developed (1962:4l-2). 
And in 1964, Tiryakian remarked, in passing, that Durkheim's 
" ... historical studies pointed out that all social institutions 
develop from a common sphere of life which is the fountainhead, 
the primordial institution of all human societies" (1964:250~ 
my emphasis). 1 
In 1965, Robert Nisbet, speaking of the analysis in The 
Elementary Forms of representative rites, noted that" ... out 
of these representative rites also came ... esthetic and rec­
reational activities .... The gradual disengagement of these 
activities from the original religious matrix constitutes one 
important phase of secularization of culture" {1965:87).2 And 
in 1967, Raymond Aron remarked that in Durkheim's eyes: "Reli­
gion is the original nucleus from which not only moral and re­
ligious rules in the strict sense have emerged ... but from 
which scientific thought too has derived" {1967:6l-2).3 Also 
in 1967, W.H. Stanner noted the significance of Durkheim's 
claims for the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral com­
plex, citing Durkheim's defense of the autonomization of reli­
gious collective representations vis-a-vis the materialist 
view of history in a book review in 1897 (1967:22l). 4 
In 1971, Poggi utilized the telling phrase "religion as 
the proto-institution" to characterize Durkheim's notion of 
the genetic primacy of the primitive sacral complex, which he 
described in these terms: 
Religion •.. constitutes the fount from which all other 
institutions have sprung, at the dawn of each society. 
One might say that myth is the prototype, and the ulti­
mate source, of all knowledge, and ritual, the proto­
type, and ultimate source, of all conduct (197l:253). 
Poggi also cited the relevant section to Durkheim's preface to 
5the second volume of L'Annee sociologique. In 1972, LaCapra, 
in another revealing phrase, described the genetic-evolutionary 
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primacy of the sacral womb as a "primitive nebula" (1972:105) 
from which all the other cultural forms have emerged. l Also 
in 1971, Anthony Giddens noted in passing that "In his earli­
est writings, Durkheim commented on the importance of religion 
to society, recognizing it to be the original source of all 
subsequently evolved moral, philosophical, scientific, and jur­
idical ideas" (197la:l05). And in 1972, Giddens proposed that 
one of the major propositions in The Elementary Forms was Durk­
heim's thesis that" ... representations created in religion 
are the initial source from which all subsequent forms of hu­
man thought have become differentiated" (1972a:20-l). Giddens 
further observed: 
In the collective representations of primitive religion, 
there are fused together nascent conceptions of science, 
poetry, and art. The various branches of intellectual 
activity only become differentiated out of this original 
set of representations with the growth of social differ­
entiation in the division of labor and the consequent 
fragmentation of the integral conscience collective of 
primitive society. The differentiation of intellectual 
life accompanies the evolving differentiation in moral 
ideas (1972a:26). 
And, finally, in 1973 Steven Lukes again cited the se­
cond Annee preface (1973:237), but without developing its signi­
ficance. However, in regard to Durkheim's article published in 
the same volume "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena," 
Lukes remarks that it " •.• was a first, rather groping attempt, 
to see religion as a social phenomena, indeed, the primitive 
social phenomena, from which all others subsequently emerged" 
(1973:240). Of the same essay, Lukes further notes: 
What characterized religion was the inseparable unity 
of thought and action: it corresponded to a 'stage of 
social development at which these two functions are not 
yet dissociated and established apart from one another, 
but are still so confused with one another that it is 
impossible to mark a clear dividing line between them' 
(1973:242) . 
Lukes, too, noted Durkheim's argument that "the fundamental no­
tions of science are of religious origin" (1973:444). Further, 
Lukes cited the neglected Annee book review in 1913 by Durk­
heim of his own Elementary Forms and a related work by Levy­
Bruhl in which Durkheim clearly reiterated the dual generic 
•
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and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral com­
plex (Giddens, 1972a:246-9 provides a translation). Finally,
• although ambivalent about Durkheim's evolutionary claims, 
Lukes acknowledged that " ... the hypothesis that primitive and 
traditional religions contain the germs of scientific thinking 
is, in many ways, both challenging and plausible" (1973:449}.1
• Finally, Neil Smelser noted in passing that "Religion was re­
garded by Durkheim as the undifferentiated parent of all suc­
ceeding cultural forms" (1976:lll}.2 
Now, one remarkable thing about this mounting series of
• rediscoveries of Durkheim's paradigm of the primitive sacral 
complex as the womb of society and culture is not only that 
these were (apparently) independent, but that these various ob­
servers managed to cite relevant evidence from many different
• Durkheimian texts! 3 Again and again, whic~vflxt or observer, 
revealing phrases such as fount, fountainhead, womb, matrix, 
nucleus, primordial institution, proto-institution, primitive 
nebula, and so forth, are invoked to describe the same funda­
• mental insight of Durkheim. And yet, and this is the reason 
cite so extensively, ~ of these recent observers apparently 
recognized the full significance of Durkheim'~ paradigm.4 
Happily, however, at least two different sociocultural
• and evolutionary thinkers have gone beyond these preliminary 
or "parenthetical" recognitions, and have moved to consciously 
incorporate Durkheim's paradigm into their own interpretive 
frameworks. Their independent rediscovery has stimulated them
• to some powerful intellectual reformulations which are destin­
ed to have an important impact on the comparative sociology of 
religion, and upon the study of the evolving relations between 
religion, society, culture, and the person in general. First,
• in a most thoughtful essay, Robin Horton was one of the first 
to begin to properly emphasize the genetic-evolutionary nature 
of Durkheim's theses in the sociology of religion, morality, 
and knowledge •
•	 Horton is most sensitive to Durkheim's thesis that " ••• 
we find the vital germs of the most elaborated sciences in the 
first stirrings of the most primitive religions" (1973:262) • 
•
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Concentrating his attention on Durkheim's notion of the "way. 
in which primitive religious thought gives rise to the theoret­
• ical sciences," Horton states: 
• 
As I read Durkheim, the core of this sociology of 
thought is the thesis that most aspects of mental 
life have grown by differentiation and elaboration 
from a primitive religious basis. By 'most aspects, , 
I mean not only religion as moderns know it, but the 
arts, the theoretical constructions of the sciences, 
• 
and, indeed, the very categories of logical thought 
(1973:258) • 
In an instructive comparison, Horton contrasts Durkheim's model 
of the genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral com­
•
 
plex with another classic paradigm deriving from the same gener­

al school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's notion of the chasm between prim­

itive and modern mentality. Rather than contrasting and dichoto­

mizing primitive (or sub-tribal and tribal) with modern (or civ­

•
 
ilizational) thought, Durkheim instead emphasized their funda­

mental evolutionary continuities. Where Levy-Bruhl entertained
 
a contrast/inversion schema, Durkheim worked out of a continui­

ty-evolution schema.
 
•
 
To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation
 
between 'primitive' and 'modern' in terms of contrast,
 
and the transition between them in terms of inversion,
 
while Durkheim sees the relation in terms of continuity,
 
and the transition as a process of evolution (1973:270).
 
But so surprising to those of us who have been brought 
up to believe the core of Durkheim's sociology of religion is 
the sacred/profane dichotomy is Durkheim's contention that II ••• 
• 
our logic was born of this logic •.. between the logic of reli­
gious and scientific thought there is no abyss II (EF: 270), that 
Horton was led to remark: 
• 
Most readers are likely to be thoroughly puzzled by my 
exposition. For they have been brought up to believe 
that what I call Durkheim's subsidiary thesis is, in 
fact, his principal if not his only thesis. As for what 
I have taken as his primary thesis, this for many will 
be the first time they have heard of it. Some may even 
wonder if it isn't just a figment of my imagination! 
(1973:267) • 
• Horton's point is well-taken, for so conditioned have we become 
to the standard, truncated image of Durkheim's sociology of re­
ligion that we may well be reluctant to part with our prejudi­
•
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ces!	 Horton concludes: 
••. orthodox modern social scientists tend to proclaim 
themselves disciples of Durkheim in their approach to 
the study of religion. But, in their actual analyses, 
they ignore the main theme of their master'~ work in 
this sphere, and extol an inconsistent minor theme ....
This is a very oda-situation (1973:276; my emphasis). 
It is, indeed, a very odd situation; a problem for the history 
of sociological theory, and the sociology of knowledge. Why 
have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's paradigm of the 
primitive sacral complex? 
Perhaps the most distinctive and potent effort yet made 
to incorporate aspects of Durkheim's notion of the centrality 
of the primitive sacral complex into a comparative and evolu­
tionary sociocultural framework can be found in the 1973 essay 
"Civilizational Complexes and Inter-Civilizational Encounters" 
by Benjamin Nelson. From the perspective of an in-depth compar­
ative and historical differential sociology of the changing 
foundations of claims to preeminent legitimate moral and in­
tellectual authority, Nelson has distinguished three basic 
structures of conscience and consciousness on the world-his­
torical level. His stated intention is " •.. to discriminate a 
series of patterns in the structures of consciousness, and the 
degree of collectivity or individuality in the forms of their 
representation" (1973~9l). Significantly, Nelson's path-break­
ing efforts have been inspired by the work of both Weber and 
Durkheim on primitive and archaic religion and culture. Nelson 
acknowledges the complementariness of these pioneer's perspect­
i ves: "Weber's frames need to be supplemented by reference to 
the works of Durkheim, Mauss, and Maine, especially the essay 
by Durkheim and Mauss on Primitive Classification, and Durk­
heim's ... Elementary Forms" (1973a:92). What Nelson has term­
ed "Consciousness Type I"--a "sacro-magical collective con­
science"--was directly influenced by Durkheim's notion of the 
genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex, 
and the importance 0 f "altruisme" a},~3uicidal "ideal type" 
which reveals its inner structure. 
•
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• 
The first pattern of structures of consciousness is 
characterized by the predominance of collective accep­
tances of responsibility to make amends for collective 
wrongs or falls from a state of undividedness. The ru­
• 
ling supposition is that all lapses from unity in both 
macrocosm and microcosm have to be atoned by collective 
assumptions of liability, collective propitiations, sac­
rifices, commemorations .... The ruling instances of 
these sacro-magical forms may be found in all societal 
and civilizational complexes dominated by prescriptive 
etiquettes and rituals all oriented to the total ful­
fillment of laws believed to be ontological in charact­
er and to have their sanctions in the cosmic orders, 
the commands of the ancestors, the primordial tradi­
tions, that require they be preserved through literal 
performance of fixed obligations. A number of varia­
• 
tions are possible in the social structural guarantees 
of these ritual performances. These differences do not, 
however, fundamentally alter the central supposition 
that the whole society is under total obligation to 
fulfill the ontological demands and to offer totalis­
tic propitiations, placations, commemorations, if the 
harmonies of the cosmos are to endure ... or to be re­
stored.... The central reality is the dominance of a 
sacro-magical structure which binds the entire commun­
ity in ... expressions of the collective conscience 
• 
(1973a:91-2) • 
Surely we need deeply informed and bold extensions of our pio­
neer's paradigms, such as Nelson's, which help us to corne to 
grips with the world-historical significance of the primitive 
•
 
sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, person.
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B. Durkheim'~ Genetic-Evolutionary Methodology 
Why have we so persistently slighted Durkheim's central 
• paradigm of the primitive sacral complex as the evolutionary 
womb of society, culture, and person? Perhaps our neglect here 
stems from both our failure to adequately distinguish between 
analyses pitched at the generic and the genetic levels, and 
• Durkheim's own characteristic conflation of the two approaches. 
Let us, therefore, briefly consider the "madness in Durkheim's 
method" in deliberately fusing his generic and genetic-evolu­
tionary approaches in his paradigm of the sacral womb. 
• Stemming largely from the influence of the British an­
thropologists and American functionalists, the standard, trun­
cated image of Durkheim's sociology of religion is that it was 
pitched primarily, or at least most intelligibly, on the gener­
• ic or universal social structural level. The claim was that re­
ligion and ritual served multiple social functions--especially 
the promotion of social solidarity. Ever since Parsons pro­
claimed that Durkheim's central problem was the search for the 
• generic bases of social order and control, and that Durkheim's 
central problem concerned "social statics," Durkheim's genetic­
and evolutionary theses have languished in darkness. Durkheim's 
own claims for the genetic and evolutionary significance of
• his pilgrimage to the "elementary forms" have often annoyed 
(eg. Evans-Pritchard, 1965, W.H. Stanner, 1967, Lukes, 1973), 
or puzzled these theorists (eg. Bellah, 1973). The British an­
thropologists and American functionalists' search for the gen­
• eric or universal structures of human society led them to per­
sistently slight Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary claims; 
in short, their generic emphases swamped out Durkheim's genetic 
emphasis. Giddens especially has noted this persistent " .••
• tendency of secondary writers to conflate Durkheim's function­
al and historical analysis in a way which is in fact foreign 
to Durkheim's thought" (197la:106). Indeed, Giddens deserves 
credit for having repeatedly stressed that Durkheim's Elemen­
• tary Forms has to be read genetically (197la:114). 
As early as 1895 in The Rules, Durkheim explicitly term­
•
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ed his method "genetic" (R:138), and proposed the following 
interpretive canon: "One cannot explain a social fact of any 
complexity except by following its complete development 
through all social species" (R:139). And in 1898, Durkheim 
prefacedhis Annee essay on "Incest" with this methodological 
rule: 
• 
In order to understand a practice or an institution, 
a juridical or moral rule, it is necessary to trace 
• 
it as nearly as possible to its origin; for between 
the form it now takes and what it has been, there is 
a rigorous relationship. No doubt, as any institution 
is transformed during its course of development, the 
factors on which it largely depended for its exist­
ence have also varied. However, these transformations, 
in their turn, are likewise dependent on the nature 
of the point of departure. There are social phenomena, 
just as there are organic phenomena, and although the 
manner in which they must develop is not fatally pre­
• 
determined by the properties which characterize them 
at their birth, these properties do not cease to have 
• 
a profound influence on the entire course of their 
history [1898] (1963:13). 
Now, it must be acknowledged that much of the confusion 
and neglect was unintentionally assisted by Durkheim's own 
characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolutionary 
analyses. As Tiryakian reminds us, "The French elementaire sig­
nifies not only 'elementaryJ as in a scale of complexity, but 
• 
also 'fundamental' or 'basic' (1962:19). It is precisely in 
these terms that Durkheim's British anthropological critics 
• 
have charged him with confusing "earliest" and "simplest" 
(eg. Lukes, 1973:456). Even so, the logic underlying Durkheim's 
"conflation" of his search for the universal or generic essence 
of human society with his genetic investigations into the evol­
ution of society and culture remains opaque to many. For exam­
ple, contrasting what he takes to be Weber's comparative and 
•
 
historical investigations into the world-religions with Durk­

•
 
heim's crucial experiment focussed on a single "elementary
 
form," William Runciman contends that the latter's sociology
 
of religion was "fundamentally misconceived" (1969:187; 191).
 
But Runciman, and others, fail to perceive that £y fusing his
 
generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations into the na­
ture and development of society and culture, Durkheim sought 
•
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to find a paradigmatic situation, a prime case-study, in 
which there would be a one-to-one correspondence, as it were, 
• between symbolic forms and social forms, between the substra­
tum of social morphological processes and superstructural so­
cial physiological or symbolic cultural processes. 
Where collectively symbolic representations are deeply
• inter-fused with the fundamental structures of the group, Durk­
heim felt he had discovered the IImonocellularll (see Bellah, 
1959:456-7) form of sociocultural life; the template, as it 
were, from which all complex sociocultural forms have evolved. 
• Thus, the generic links between religion, society, and culture 
which Durkheim thought he had discovered in Australian abori­
ginal religion were primarily genetic and evolutionary connect­
ions. Durkheim himself went to great lengths in the introduct­
• ion to The Elementary Forms to explain his seemingly peculiar 
method. To those who might object to his conflation of generic 
with genetic analyses, he rhetoricized: IIBut why give them 
[the elementary forms] a sort of prerogative? Why choose them 
• in preference to all others as the subject of our study? It is 
merely for reasons of method ll (EF:15). He then justified his 
genetic methodology in these terms: 
Everytime that we undertake to explain something human,
• 
taken at a given moment in history--be it a religious 
belief, a moral precept, a logical principle, an esthet­
ic style, or an economic system--it is necessary to com­
mence by going back to its most primitive and simple 
form, to try to account for the characteristics by which 
it was marked at that time, and then to show how it de­
• 
veloped and became complicated little by little, and 
how it became that which it is at the moment in question 
(EF:15). 
Thus, Durkheim's approach was always processual--it is simply 
mistaken to portray Durkheim as a static, abstracted thinker 
• searching for the generic bases of social order and control. 
For it is absolutely crucial to realize that Durkheim's causal 
model--substructural social morphological processes and super­
structural collectively representational processes--led him 
• to always return to the simplest case, the clearest connection 
between these two halves of human society. For here IIAll is 
reduced to that which is indispensable, to that without which 
•
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there could be no religion. But that which is indispensable is
 
that which is essential--that which we must know before all
 
else" (EF:IB).
 
•
 
Indeed, it is not surprising that Durkheim justified
 
his characteristic conflation of generic and genetic-evolution­

ary analyses by likening them to Descartes' "first ring" (EF:
 
16) of certainty. For, in the last analysis, Durkheim's confla­

•
 
tion derived from his cultural tradition--it was the sociologi­

cal equivalent of the Cartesian method of systematic doubt,
 
and return to first principles as the only sure road to object­

ive certainty. Moreover, Durkheim's genetic and evolutionary
 
•
 
presuppositions were basically those of the Enlightenment (see
 
Cassirer, 1951). "He [Durkheim] simply took it as axiomatic
 
that there is an identity between simplicity and evolutionary
 
priority" (Lukes, 1973:456). Viewing his conflation of generic
 
•
 
and genetic in this perspective, we should no longer wonder
 
that only in terms of the most "elementary" forms--in both
 
senses--did Durkheim believe that he could surely uncover gen­

eric sociocultural processes directly and unmistakably inter­

fused with genetic-evolutionary ones. "Primitive civilizations 
offer privileged cases because they are simpler ones" (EF:IB). 
And again, "In the primitive religions, the religious fact 
• 
still visibly carries the mark of its origins" (EF:20). Those 
who persist in readi$Durkheim'~ fundamental investigations 
as if they were solely or even primarily abstract, ahlstori­
cal, functional propositions, must continue to neglect Durk­
•
 
heim'~ own logic and method, and his insistence that the in­

timate relations between society, culture, and person are e­
volutionarily constructed. As Giddens rightly notes: "There 
is no universal relationship between systems of ideas and 
•
 
their infrastructures; the nature of this relationship is con­

tingent upon the level of advancement of society" (1972a:27). 
Indeed, Durkheim clearly saw, as did Weber, that as 
societies evolve, so too do their prime symbolic guidance sys­
• tems. In the general evolutionary passage from "mechanical" to 
"organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a whole series of 
•
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progressive sociocultural shifts in the content, form, and di­
• 
rection of development of collective symbolic forms, which more 
•
 
or less corresponded to underlying social morphological differ­

entiations. From The Division of Labor, through Primitive Class­

ification to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim never wavered from
 
his primary concern (see Horton, 1973; Giddens, 1971a,b;1972a,
 
•
 
b;1973) with the transformation of the concrete, tribal, fused,
 
sacral-magical collective consciousness into ever-more abstract,
 
autonomous, differentiated, rational, and universalizable cul­

tural symbolic forms. Indeed, toward the end of his life, Durk­

•
 
heim (with Mauss) turned his attention explicitly to the sedi­

mentation and diffusion of universalizable symbolic forms on
 
the inter-societal level as these became the basis of civiliza­

tional bonds (see Chapter Seven).
 
•
 
In these terms, the genetic-evolutionary significance
 
of the primitive sacral complex becomes clearer--for it served
 
as the prime evolutionary matrix out of which all the other ma­

jor social, cultural, and phenomenological forms progressively
 
•
 
emerged. When he announced his program of detailed research
 
into the world-historical creativity of the sacral womb in the
 
preface to the second volume of L'Annee sociologique, Durkheim
 
acknowledged that awarding it primacy might surprise some:"The
 
•
 
according of first rank to this set of phenomena has produced
 
some astonishment, but it is these phenomena which are the germ
 
from which all the others •.. are derived" [1899] (1960:350).
 
Lest he be misunderstood, 1 Durkheim hastened to add:
 
But it must be understood that the importance we thus 
attribute to the sociology of religion does not in the 
least imply that religion must play the same role in 
•
 
present day societies that it has played at other times.
 
In a sense, the contrary conclusion would be more sound.
 
Precisely because religion is a primordial phenomenon, 
it must yield more and more to the new social forms which 
it has engendered. In order to understand these new forms, 
one must connect them with their religious origins, but 
without thereby confusing them with religious phenomena, 
•
 
properly speaking (1960:352-3).
 
A decade and a half later, after devoting his energies 
to his school's famous journal ~'Annee sociologique,Durkheim's 
Elementary Forms represented the culmination of his program of 
•
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• 
detailed, multi-disciplinary research into the genetic and e­
volutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex. Toward 
the end of this masterwork, Durkheim concluded: 
... We have established the fact that the fundamental 
categories of thought, and consequently, of science, 
are of religious origin. We have seen that the same is 
true for magic and consequently for the different pro­
cesses which have issued from it .... It has long been 
known that up until a relatively advanced moment of e­
volution, moral and legal rules have been indistinguish­
able from ritual prescriptions. In summing up, then, 
it may be said that nearly all the great social insti­
tutions have been born in religion (EF:466). 
If we still wish to lay claim to Durkheim's "charisma-on-depo­
sit" (see McCloskey, 1974), or if we hope to understand the 
complex relations between religion, society, culture, person, 
and historical	 process, can we any longer afford to continue 
slighting Durkheim's seminal paradigm of the generic and gen­
etic-evolutionary primacy of the sacral womb? 
C.	 Phases in Durkheim'~ Development of the Notion of 
the Primitive Sacral Complex 
Preface. Durkheim's awareness of the significance of the gen­
eric and genetic evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral 
complex evolved over the years in a series of distinguishable 
phases. In the first phase, Durkheim's "laic" positivism led 
him to portray religion, defined as the preeminent form of 
the "collective conscience" (DL:85), largely in negative terms. 
Using juridical indexes to discern the stages in evoluion of 
the "moral life," Durkheim first distinguished religion by its 
obligatory, "repressive," character. But it must always be re­
membered that primitive legal systems were "repressive," ac­
cording to Durkheim, because "mechanical solidarity" was deep­
ly embedded in traditional religious rationales and magical 
duties. Indeed, Durkheim repeatedly described transgressions 
in primitive cultures asftype of "religious criminality." 
However, as he investigated further, Durkheim's opin­
ion clearly shifted. By his own admission, 1895 was a crucial 
turning point. Reading Robertson Smith and lecturing on reli­
• 
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gion, Durkheim discovered how religious phenomena could fit 
more positively into his own sociological program. In his of­
• ten repeated series of lectures "Physique generale des moeurs 
et du droit," Durkheim constantly reworked his early emphasis 
on the "repressiveness" of early religions by exploring the 
creative embeddedness of primitive juridical forms such as 
• property, taxes, contract, and so on, in archaic sacral and 
magical rationales. And in the great L'Annee sociologique, 
Durkheim both announced his special program to the human sci­
ences, and carried much of it out through his own essays and 
• the inspiration and direction he gave to the other members of 
the Annee school, most notably Marcel Mauss (see Paul Honig­
sheim, 1960). 
In third phase, which centers, of course, on The Elemen­
• ~' Forms of the Religious Life (1912), Durkheim's program 
and his own systematic insight into Australian aboriginal reli­
gion and rite yielded a profound and exquisitely wrought theory 
of the generic and genetic-evolutionary creativeness of the 
• sacral womb. So central had the dual significance of the prim­
itive sacral complex become to Durkheim's system, that he 
never tired of repeating (eg. vis-a-vis Levy-Bruhl), that there 
is no gap in continuity between these stages in sociocultural 
• evolution! Let us now explore the first phase in Durkheim's 
development of the notion of the world-historical centrality 
of the primitive sacral complex as womb of society and culture. 
• 
1. The Early Phase: Religion in Primitive Society as Repressive 
Durkheim cannot really be said to have had a sociology 
of religion in his early phase. As Lukes rightly observes, 
Durkheim's early writings on religion were rather "thin and 
• inconclusive" (1973:238). At this stage, his nascent sociology 
of religion was really only an adjunct to his concern with law 
and morality, and what little there was was often negative. 
Basically, Durkheim's early view of religion was two-fold. 
• First, he saw religion as the "preeminent form of the collective 
consciousness" (DL:285). Second, as the basis of "mechanical sol­
i'ltrity," religion was "repressive." Using law as an objective 
•
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index to determine the state of the II mora1 1ife,1I Durkheim 
found that II ... in primitive societies, criminal law is reli­
gious 1awll (DL:92). Penal law in II mechanica1 solidarity ll was 
viewed as II re1igious criminality, II as transgressions against 
religiously sanctioned collective norms. In his early phase, 
Durkheim's critical positivism held the upper hand in deter­
mining his largely negative image of primitive religion as 
both IIrepressivell and IIregressive.1I 
Perhaps Durkheim's first explicit statements on the so­
ciological nature of early religions are to be found in his re­
view of Spencer's Ecclesiastical Institutions, which appeared 
as part of an 1886 review essay entitled ilLes Etudes de Science 
Socia1e ll (translated by R.A. Jones, 1974). Of this essay, Lukes 
has remarked: 
In 1886, he had written of religion as having, together 
with law and morality, the role of assuring the equili­
brium of society and adapting it to external conditions 
and of its being a IIform of social discip1ine,1I merely 
a form of custom; he also saw the idea of divinity as 
serving to 'symbolize traditions, cultures, collective 
needs,' and argued that the sociologist must look at 
what 'the symbol conceals and translates' (1973:238). 
Jones has also noted some of the important continuities 
and discontinuities between this early essay and Durkheim's 
Elementary Forms. For instance, Durkheim was already insisting 
that we must attempt to translate the symbolic meaning of rite 
and myth through some type of sociological analogy. 
What ought to concern us is not the symbol but what 
the symbol stands for and expresses. What is thus hid­
den under this wholly superficial phenomenon could per­
haps be discovered if we could compare it with others 
which resemble it in certain ways. Indeed, what differ­
ence is there between religious prescriptions and the 
injunctions of morality? They are both addressed to the 
members of the same community, are supported by sanc­
tions that are sometimes identical and always analogous; 
finally, the violation of both arouses in conscience the 
same feelings of anger and disgust (1974:212). 
Further, Durkheim argues that 1I1aws, morality, religion, are 
the three great regulating functions of societyll (1974:213). 
The essential function of each is moral discipline of the ego. 
Religion is therefore only a form of custom, like law 
and manners. What distinguishes this form from all the 
•
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others is that it imposes itself not only on conduct 
but on the conscience. It dictates not only acts, but 
ideas and sentiments~•.. Religion commences with faith, 
that is to say, beliefs accepted or submitted to with­
out discussion (1974:2l2-l3). 
Thus, religion is, at root, irrational, and when reflection is 
awakened "It [religion] can remain a collective discipline only 
if it imposes itself upon all spirits with the irrestible auth­
ority of habit" (1974:2l3). Surprisingly, Durkheim rejected 
Spencer's notion that " .•• evolution presumes an increasing 
role for reason and free inquiry to the detriment of custom 
and prejudice" (Jones, 1974:207). 
It is far from true, as Mr. Spencer thinks, that the 
place and importance of custom are going to diminish 
with civilization••.• A society without prejudices 
would resemble an organism without reflexes: it would 
be a monster incapable of living. Sooner or later, 
therefore, custom and habit will recover their rights; 
it is this that authorizes us to presume that religion 
will survive the attacks upon it. As long as there are 
men who live together, there will be among them some 
common faith. What one cannot foresee and what the fu­
ture alone can decide, is the particular form in which 
that faith will be symbolized (1974:2l3). 
Thus, even at this early date, Durkheim began to separate him­
self from the general nineteenth century view of religion as, 
at best, an immature stage which had to be overcome. For reli­
gion is identified in 1886 with tradition, custom, and a com­
mon faith, and the need for these is perennial. Finally, we 
should note that Durkheim saw here that " ..• if one penetra­
tes beneath the surface .•• one discovers everywhere the same 
development, and at the origin, the same germ" (1974:2ll). 
Let us turn next to The Division of Labor, published 
in 1893. Here, Durkheim characterized religion as the "eminent 
form of the collective conscience" (DL:285). And, as Lukes 
notes (1973:239), there was "also an inclusive and unpursued 
definition of religion" in these terms: 
... the sole characteristic that all such ideas as reli­
gious sentiments equally present seems to be that they 
are common to a certain number of people living togeth­
er, and that, besides, they have an average intensity 
that is quite elevated. It is, indeed, a constant fact 
that, when a slightly strong conviction is held by the 
same community of men, it inevitably takes on a reli­
•
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ious character. It inspires in consciences the same 
reverential respect as beliefs properly religious. It 
is, thus, very probable •.• that religion corresponds 
to a region equally central in the common conscience 
(DL:169). 
However, Durkheim admitted the provisional nature of such a 
view: "It remains, it is true, to circumscribe this region, to 
distinguish it from that to which penal law corresponds, and 
with which, moreover, it is often wholly or in part confused. 
These questions are left to study" (DL:169). 
Speaking of the "physiological" 'characteristics of "me­
chanical solidarity," Durkheim said " .•. religion pervades the 
whole society, but that is because social life is made up al­
most exclusively of common beliefs and of common practices 
which derive from unanimous adhesion a very particular inten­
sity" (DL:178). This social intensity means that one might 
term primitive culture a "conscience collective," since "all 
consciences vibrate in unison" (DL: 152). In "mechanical soli­
darity" " ••. all consciences are composed of practically the 
same elements" (DL:135). "Everybody professes and practices 
the same religion; schisms and dissents are unknown; they 
would not be tolerated" (DL:135). Clearly, Durkheim was here 
constructing an evolutionary "ideal type," rather than an 
accurate description of the diversity of all primitive cul­
tures. Thus, "solidarity which comes from likeness is at its 
maximum when the collective conscience completely envelops 
our whole conscience and coincides at all points with it" (DL: 
130). In short, Durkheim argued that " ••• social life comes 
from a double source, the likenesses of consciences and the 
division of labor. The individual .•• in the first case 
becomes part of the collective type" (DL:226; see also Lukes, 
1973:151-2; Giddens, 1971b, 1972a; Chapter Eight of this dis­
sertation) • 
As is well known, Durkheim chose law, and specifically 
types of punishment, as his positivist index to the evolving 
stages of the "moral life." Underlying this choice was the 
presumption that "law reproduces the principal forms of social 
solidarity" (DL:68). Durkheim termed "repressive" the type of 
•
 
• 
--271-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
religiously sanctioned collective punishment appropriate to 
"mechanical solidarity." "The similitude of consciences gives 
rise to juridical rules which, with the threat of repressive 
measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon all. The 
more pronounced this is, the more complete is social life con­
founded with religious life" (DL:226). Giddens summarized Durk­
heim's theses well: 
This dominance of the individual by the collectivity is 
indexed by the nature of the punishment which is meted 
out when a man deviates from the rigidly specified codes 
of conduct which are prescribed by the conscience col­
lective. Repressive sanctions are collective both rn­
their source, and in their expression. A repressive sanc­
tion is a response to the highly intense emotions which 
are generated in the majority of individuals when a man 
transgresses the ideals embodied in the conscience col­
lective. It is an expression of anger on the part of the 
community, the avenging of an outrage to morality (1972a:6). 
Thus, "repressive" law is "diffuse," that is, "the whole socie­
ty participates in it" (DL:76). Primitive penal law is not ex­
plicitly formulated because " ••• the rule is known and accep­
ted by everybody." Further, primitive penal law is stationary, 
conservative: " ••. in lower societies, law ••• is almost ex­
clusively penal; it is likewise very stationary. Generally, 
religious law is always repressive; it is essentially conser­
vative" (DL:78). 1 Therefore, primitive penal law is often ri­
tually and magically stereotyped: "tie know what a large place 
in the repressive law of many peoples ritual regimentation, 
etiquette, ceremonial, and religious practices play" (DL:72). 
In sum, religiously sanctioned " .•. repressive law corresponds 
to the heart, the very center of the common conscience" (DL:113). 
Whether or not Durkheim " .•• vastly overstated the role 
of repressive law in pre-industrial societies" (Lukes, 1973: 
159; see also Sheleff, 1975), is not our prime concern here. 2 
What we are concerned with is elucidating Durkheim's evolving 
notion of the sacral complex as a central interpretive "ideal 
type," a useful heuristic in the human sciences. What most in­
terests me here is Durkheim's thesis that the greater the de­
gree of penetration of legal norms ~ sacral rationales and 
magical sanctions, the greater the repressiveness of the pun­
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ishments for transgressions. What is at issue here, as Nelson 
(1973a) clearly saw, was the degree of collectivity or indivi­
duality in the logics of moral responsibility. That is why 
punishment was first an act of collective vengenance against 
the wrong-doer by the outraged sacral-magical common conscien­
ce; it was a demand for an "expiation of the past" (DL:88). 
lihen we desire the repression of a crime, it is not 
that we desire to avenge it personally, but to avenge 
something sacred.... M:>st often we represent it in the 
form of one of several beings: ancestors, divinity. 
That is why penal law is not simply religious in ori­
gin, but, indeed, always retains a religious stamp. 
It is because the acts it punishes appear to be at­
tacks upon something transcendent (DL:IOO). 
Durkheim's use of the word "expiation" here is most important. 
For in the primitive sacral complex, " ... offenses against the 
gods are offenses against society" (DL:92). Because the struct­
ures of responsibility for maintaining harmonious relations be­
tween micro and macrocosm were primarily collective, violations 
of religious interdictions were considered criminal because they 
were, in effect, sacrilege involving the fate of the whole so­
ciety. "Everybody is attacked; consequently, everybody opposes 
the attack" (DL:I07). Indeed, in terms of the sacral-magical 
collective conscience, as Nelson (1973a) has termed it, it is 
believed that "... all laws ... come from the divinity; to vio­
late them is to offend the divinity, and such offenses are sins 
which must be expiated" (DL:139). 
For these and other reasons, Durkheim argued that "it is 
certain that penal law was religious in its origin" (DL:92). 
Durkheim provided the following summary of the sacerdotal foun­
dations of primitive penal law. 
It is an evident fact in India and Judea, since the 
law practived there was considered revealed. In Egypt, 
the ten books of Hermes, which contained the criminal 
law with all the other books relative to the government 
of the state, were called sacerdotal and ..• from ear­
liest times the Egyptian priests exercised judicial 
power. The same was the case in ancient Germany. In 
Greece, justice was considered an emanation from Zeus, 
and the sentiments a vengenance from God. In Rome, the 
religious origins of penal law are clearly shown both 
by old traditions, and by the juridical terminology it­
self (DL:92). 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--273-·­
In the sacral complex, then (which may include archaic socie­
ties also)l, many criminal acts are actually delictions which, 
~ violating the law of the gods, disturb the harmonious rela­
tions between macrocosm and microcosm. Such delictions or tran­
sgressions constitute public sacrilege, since they put in jeo­
pardy the fate of the whole society . 
••• in lower societies, the most numerous delicts are 
those which relate to public affairs; delicts against 
religion, against custom, against authority, etc. We 
need only to look at the Bible, the laws of Manou, at 
the monuments which of the old Egyptian law, to see 
the relatively small place accorded to prescriptions 
for the protection of individuals, and, contrariwise, 
the luxuriant development of repressive legislation, 
concerning the different forms of sacrilege, the omis­
sion of certain religious duties, the demands of cere­
monial, etc. At the same time, these crimes are the 
most severely punished (DL:93). 
Durkheim later counterposed "religious criminality" with "human 
criminality" in his elaboration of his earlier thesis in his 
Annee essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" [1900] (1973). Clear­
ly, Durkheim was building up a positivist counterpoint to the 
"repressiveness" of religion in traditional societies, where: 
•.. because all the prescriptions that it lays down are 
commandments from God, so to speak, under his direct 
sovreignity, they all owe to this origin an extraordi­
nary prestige which renders them sacrosanct. Thus, when 
they are violated, public conscience does not content 
itself with a simple reparation, but demands expiation 
which avenges it. Since what gives penal law its pecu­
liar character is the extraordinary authority of the 
rules which it sanctions •.. law which is agreed to be 
the word of God Himself cannot fail to be essentially 
repressive. We have even been able to say that all pen­
al law is more or less religious, for its very soul is 
the sentiment of respect for a force superior to the 
individual man, for a power in some way transcendent, 
under some symbol which it makes penetrate into conscien­
ces, and this sentiment is also the basis of religiosity. 
That is why, in general fashion, repression dominates 
all law in lower societies. It is because religion com­
pletely pervades juridical life, as it does, indeed, all 
social life (DL:140-l). 
It is about this point that we first encounter Durkheim's 
earliest formulation of the notion of the sacral complex: 
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Religion comprises all, extends to all. It contains, in 
a confused mass, besides beliefs properly religious, 
morality, law, the principles of political organization, 
and even science. Religion ... regulated the details of 
private life (DL:135). 
Indeed, "Religion, the eminent form of the conunon conscience, 
originally absorbed all representative functions with practi­
cal functions" (DL:285). It is not, surprising, then, that in 
such a situation where crime is religious, or should we say, 
"sacrilegious" : 
••• there exists a luxuriant criminality, peculiar to 
those societies •.• delicts against religious faith, 
against ceremonial, against traditions of all sorts, 
etc. The real reason for this development of repressive 
rules is that this moment in the evolutionary scheme 
the collective conscience is extensive and strong, 
since labor has not yet divided (DL:146). 
But this homogeneity, this fusion, cannot last. Inevita­
bly, the various cultural forms begin to differentiate and au­
tonomize themselves from their fused embeddedness in the pri­
mal sacral complex. With the division of labor, the progres­
sive "extension of the radius of social life," the "efface­
ment of the segmental type of society," and so on and so forth 
(see Chapter Four), the structures of collective responsibili­
~ begin to erode, and sacral rationales become secularized. 
Indeed, Durkheim argued that "The more or less complete dis­
sociation between law and religion is one of the best signs 
by which we can recognize whether a society is more or less 
developed than another" (DL:142). This is so because the 
grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority shift 
from the group and its religious tradition to the individual. 
Thus, Durkheim I ~ perception of progressive moral evolu­
tion was intimately bound up with the passage from collective 
to individual structures of responsibility. Indeed, he held 
it as axiomatic that " ••. the more one closely approaches the 
origins of religious development, the more ritual and mater­
ial practices surpass in importance purely moral beliefs and 
precepts, whereas the latter become more predominant in the 
religions of civilized peoples" (Soc:230). Through progress­
ive sociocultural evolution, collective representations shift 
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in content from concrete, magically stereotyped, tribal, "re­
pressive," sacral norms to increasingly abstract, universali­
• zable, rational civilizational collective representations.
 
•
 
At the same time as religion, the rules of law become
 
universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at first
 
to local circumstances, to particularities, ethnic, cli­

matic, etc., they free themselves little by little, and
 
with the same stroke become more general. What makes
 
•
 
this increase of generality obvious is the uninterrupted
 
decline of formalism. In lower societies, the very ex­

ternal forms of conduct are predetermined even to the de­

tails. The way in which man must eat, dress in every sit­

uation, the gestures he must make, the formula he must
 
pronounce, are precisely fixed. On the contrary, the fur­

•
 
ther one strays from the point of departure, the more mo­

ral and juridical prescriptions lose their sharpness and
 
precision. They rule only the most general forms of con­

duct, and rule them in a very general way .••. Civiliza­

tion has a tendency to become more rational and more lo­

gical ••• that alone is rational which is universal.
 
What baffles understanding is the particular and the con­
crete (DL:289). 
So closely do Durkheim's views on sociocultural evolu­
tion here complement Weber's (ie. the decline of sacral-magical
• formalism and stereotyping, etc.), that they both attributed a 
key role in this process of progressive rationalization and 
universalization of certain cultural forms to the evolving no­
tions of the gods themselves (see Weber, 1963). The evolution
• of law, of conscience and consciousness, of society and cul­
ture, are, in short, all intimately bound up with religious 
evolution. 
The fact which perhaps best manifests this increasing
• 
tendency of the common conscience is the parallel tran­
scendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean 
the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not 
distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods, 
only sacred beings without their sacred character being 
related to any external entity as their source .••• Little
• 
by little, religious forces are detached from the things 
of which they are at first only the attributes, and be­
come hypostatized. Thus is formed the notion of spirits 
or gods who, while residing here or there as preferred, 
nevertheless exist outside of the particular objects to 
•
 
which they are specifically attached. By that very fact,
 
they are less concrete •••• They remain very near us, con­
stantly fused into our life ••.. The Greco-Latin poly­
theism, which is a more elevated and better organized 
form of animism, marks new progress in the direction of 
•
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• 
transcendence. The residence of the gods becomes more 
sharply distinct from that of men .... But it is only 
with Christiantiy that God takes leave of space; his 
kingdom is no longer of this world. The dissociation 
• 
of nature and the divine is so complete that it degen­
erates into antagonism. At the same time, the concept 
of divinity becomes more general and more abstract, 
for it is formed, not of sensations, but of ideas. The 
God of humanity is necessarily less concrete than the 
gods of the city or the clan (DL:288-89). 
It has not been sufficiently noticed that Durkheim maintained 
this view of moral and religious evolution throughout his 
career; clearly, the very structure of his essay (with Mauss)
• on Primitive Classification is genetic and evolutionary, as
 
is so much of The Elementary Forms.
 
One crucial outcome of this progressive moral and reli­

gious evolution was the gradual erosion of collective struct­

• tures of moral and intellectual authority, and thus, the dis­

appearance of "religious criminality." Having so closely iden­

tified religion with strong and extensive states of the tri­

bal collective conscience, Durkheim argued that as the latter

• is eroded by the division of labor, penal law is increasingly
 
separated from religious interdictions. " .•. religious crimi­
nality ended by completely departing, or almost completely de­
parting, from penal law" (DL:164); thus, " ..• a whole world
• of sentiments cease to count among the strong and defined
 
states of the common conscience" (DL:159) .
 
... if there is one truth that history teaches us be­

yond doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a 
•
 
smaller and smaller portion of social life. Origin­

ally, it pervades everything; everything social is re­
• 
ligious, the two words are synonymous. Then, little by 
little, political, economic, scientific, functions 
free themselves from the religious function, constitute 
themselves apart, and take on a more and more acknow­
ledged temporal character. God, who was at first pre­
sent in all human relations progressively withdraws 
• 
from them; he abandons the world to men and their dis­
putes .•.. The individual feels himself less acted upon; 
he becomes more a source of spontaneous activity. In 
short, not only does not the domain of religion grow 
at the same time and in the same measure as temporal 
life, but it contracts more and more. This regression 
did not begin at some certain moment of history, but 
we can follow its phases since the origins of social 
evolution. It is, thus, linked with the fundamental 
•
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conditions of the development of societies, and it shows 
that there are a decreasing number of collective beliefs 
and sentiments which are both collective enough and 
strong enough to take on a religious character .... The 
average intensity of the common conscience becomes pro­
gressively enfeebled .... The same law of regression ap­
plies to the representative element of the common con­
science quite as much as to the affective element (DL: 
169-70)	 . 
It is interesting to note, finally, that Durkheim appeared ra­
ther sanguine about the progressive secularization of culture 
at this point. Let us now turn to the next stage in Durkheim's 
development of the paradigm of the primitive sacral complex. 
2.	 The Second Phase: Durkheim's Breakthrough to a Sociology 
of Religion 
The second phase of Durkheim's developing interest in 
the sociology of religion is perhaps the most important and 
least known. This phase covers roughly the decade from 1895 to 
1905. His last years at Bordeaux and first years at Paris were 
most creative--they were the "breakthrough" years. But since 
the bulk of Durkheim's efforts were invested during this time 
in teaching and building L'Annee sociologique, we still have 
great difficulty in bringing the depth and scope of these a­
chievements into clear focus. I must emphasize that this phase 
of development of Durkheim's concern with the creativity of 
the primitive sacral complex deserves more attention than it 
has yet received. For it was during this period that the foun­
dations (still often unperceived--see Chapter Four) of Durk­
heim's sociology of religion and knowledge were laid down, and 
detailed, inter-disciplinary research into the crucial role of 
the primitive sacral complex begun. l During this phase, the 
sociology of religion moved from a peripheral position, as mere­
ly an adjunct to his sociology of law and morality, to the cen­
ter stage of Durkheim's program for the human sciences. In 
short, during this fertile, but half--invisible period, Durkheim 
moved away from his earlier negative view of religious pheno­
mena toward viewing the sacral complex as the very womb, the 
creative matrix of human society, culture, and person. 
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Space does not here permit detailed examination of all 
the documents which appear in rapid succession in this phase; 
we shall now merely note some highlights. While the end of this 
second phase may be movable, the beginning is more definite-­
1895. For Durkheim himself acknowledged that his discovery of 
the works of the English anthropologists of religion, especial­
ly Robertson Smith, which were integral parts of his first lec­
ture course on religion in 1894-95, served as turning points in 
his career. Of this breakthrough to a sociology of religion, 
Steven Lukes observes: "The work of Robertson Smith and his 
school offered Durkheim an overall perspective on religion, 
which he then transformed in light of his own theoretical pre­
occupations" (1973:239). Durkheim himself noted: 
It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view of 
the essential role played by religion in social life. 
It was in that year that, for the first time, I found 
the means of tackling the study of religion sociologi­
cally. This was revelation to me. That course of 1895 
marked a dividing line in the development of my thought, 
to such an extent that all my previous researches had 
to be taken up afresh in order to be made to harmonize 
with these new insights •••• [This reorientation] was 
entirely due to the studies of religious history which 
I had undertaken, and notably to the reading of the 
works of Robertson Smith and his school (in Lukes, 1973: 
237) . 
Apparently, none of Durkheim's 1894-95 lecture notes survive 
(Lukes, 1973:238). However, it appears that Durkheim had found 
in Robertson Smith's theory of religion " ••• the means of tack­
ling the study of religion sociologically." Especially import­
ant, Lukes suggests, were Smith's " ••• emphasis on the social 
functions of totemic rituals and ••• the central idea of the 
divinization of the community" (1973:239; see also 238). Clear­
ly, much of Durkheim's later Elementary Forms was foreshadow­
ed in Smith's Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (see 
also Durkheim, PECM:180, and EF; see Chapter Four). 
The importance of Durkheim's breakthrough to a rudi­
mentary sociocultural theory of religious process cannot be 
exaggerated; for the new importance attached to religious 
symbols even began to make Durkheim alter his underlying cau­
sal model. It has not been sufficiently recognized that his 
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growing understanding of religious processes led Durkheim to 
acknowledge the autonomization of collective representations. 
But this shift comes through very clearly in a book review in 
1897 of Labriola's exposition of historical materialism. Durk­
heim explicitly rejected the Marxist claims, denied thdt his 
reductionism derived from Marxism, and insisted instead on the 
autonomization of collective representations, using religion 
as his prime example. 
Sociologists and historians are tending increasingly to 
reach common agreement that religion is the most primi­
tive of all social phenomena. All other manifestations 
of collective activity--law, morality, art, science, po­
litical formation, etc.--have emerged from it, by a ser­
ies of transformations. In the beginning, everything is 
religious .... It is indisputable that, at the outset, 
the economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life 
is, by contrast, luxuriant and all-pervasive. Why could 
it not follow from this, and is it not more probable, that 
that the economy depends much more upon religion than 
the former does upon the latter (in Giddens, 1972a:16l-2)? 
As Lukes (1973:62) and Jones (1974) note, this declaration re­
presents a decisive shift from Durkheim's position in 1886 when 
he maintained that " ... the role of the conscience collective 
is limited to acknowledging facts without producing them," and 
even his 1893 position vis-a-vis Fustel de Coulanges (DL:179). 
Thus, it was during the seminal 1897-99 period that Durkheim, 
under the new influence of sociology of religion, seeing that 
his causal model needed to be enlarged, first began to empha­
size the autonomization of collective representations and the 
significance of the sacral complex (see also Book Three, Part 
I). ! believe this coincidence to be more than accidental. Of 
this momentous shift, Lukes observes: "Largely as a result of 
his preoccupation with religion, he became more and more in­
terested in the sphere of beliefs and ideals, and in the so­
ciological explanation of the attribution of moral values" 
(1973:4l9) . 
In the same year, Durkheim published Suicide which al­
so emphasized the importance of "collective representations," 
and the role of religions in primitive and modern suicides. 
For example, in Book Three, Chapter One, after insisting that 
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" collective tendencies have an existence of their own" 
(5:309), Durkheim outlined his theory of culture. He remark­
ed that "Religion is •.. the system of symbols by which a so­
ciety becomes conscious of itself; it is the characteristic 
way of thinking of collective existence" (5:312). Indeed, ear­
lier Durkheim had interpreted altruistic suicides in precise­
ly these terms. Altruistic suicide was used by Durkheim as an 
objective index revealing the nature of the social bond pecu­
liar to traditional societies rooted in ties of "blood and 
soil." The fact that the altruistic suicide regards self-sac­
rifice as obligatory--a moral duty and perhaps even a privi­
lege--signifies that the individual is here submerged in the 
"sacral-magical collective conscience. II Self-sacrifice, or the 
systematic eradication of the ego in certain religions, implies 
a state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the 
"pantheistic" structure of society itself. Since religion was 
the symbolic way in which society crystallized self-conscious­
ness, it follows, said Durkheim, that "mechanically integrated" 
societies, in which the individual counts for little, should 
express these social and cultural realities in pantheistic re­
ligious projections. 
But it was in the Annee sociologique, volume two (1897­
1898), published in 1899, that Durkheim first explicitly an­
nounced his program of detailed research into the genetic-evo­
lutionary significance of the primitive sacral complex. In the 
preface to the second volume, as many have noted but few have 
developed, Durkheim stated: 
This year, as well as last, our analyses are headed by 
those concerning the sociology of religion. The accord­
ing of the first rank to this sort of phenomenon has 
produced some astonishment, but it is these phenomena 
which are the germ from which all others--or at least 
almost all others--are derived. Religion contains in 
itself from the very beginning, even if in an indistinct 
state, all the efments which in dissociating themselves 
from it, articulating themselves and combining with one 
another in a thousand ways, have given rise to the var­
ious manifestations of collective life. From myths and 
legends have issued forth science and poetry; from reli­
gious ornamentations and cults have come the plastic arts; 
from ritual practice were born law and morals. One can­
•
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not understand our perception of the world, our philOSO­

phical conceptions of the soul, of immortality, of life,
 
if one does not know the religious beliefs which are
 
their primordial forms. Kinship started out as an es­

•
 
sentially religious tie; punishment, contract, gift and
 
homage are transformations of expiatory, contractual,
 
communal, honorary sacrifices, and so on .... A great
 
many problems change their aspects completely as soon
 
as their connections with the sociology of religion are
 
recognized. Our efforts must therefore be aimed at tra­

cing these connections (1960:350-51). 
And indeed, Durkheim's efforts and those of the Annee school 
were "aimed at tracing these connections" between modern social 
• 
and cultural phenomena and their origins in the primitive and 
archaic sacral complex. As Durkheim himself acknowledged of his 
own work: "My previous researches had to be taken up afresh in 
order to harmonize with these new insights," so too did Durk­
• 
heim expect his new "ideal type" of the sacral complex to re­
orient investigations in the human sciences. And the main site 
in which Durkheim worked out his program was the Annee itself. 
Indeed, in the same volume of the Annee in which his 
• 
seminal program was first announced, Durkheim also offered a 
tentative essay	 "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena." 
This lead article should be seen as Durkheim's first and ad­
mittedly preliminary attempt to " ... view religion as a social 
• 
phenomena, indeed the primitive social phenomena, from which 
all others subsequently emerged" (Lukes, 1973:240). Lukes 
rightly reports	 that Durkheim's approach to religion at this 
point was still	 "largely pre-ethnographic." 
•	 
... Durkheim had not yet become "saturated" with the 
technical and first hand literature, and in particu­
lar he was not yet, as he later became, a "veteran of 
Australian ethnology." Indeed, the greater part of Aus­
tralian ethnographic work, which aroused an immense a­
mount of interest among European scholars, really dated
• 
from the later 1890's. At this early stage, Durkheim's 
approach was largely formal and rather simpliste: he 
worked out a number of hypotheses about~e nature of 
religion and its role in social life, and he set out a 
range of questions for the sociology of religion to con­
front. Subsequently, his treatment of relgion was to be
• 
considerably more nuanced and complex, and in contact 
with a rich and	 detailed mass of empirical detail (1973: 
240) . 
The results of Durkheim's deepening saturation in this "rich 
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and detailed" Australian ethnography as he sought to demon­
strate the generic and genetic-evolutionary primacy of the 
sacral complex began to appear in rapid succession thereaft­
er in ~'Annee sociologique. In 1898, there appeared the essay 
"La Prohibition de l'inceste et ses origines" (translated in 
1963 by Sagarin). In 1899, as noted, there was his essay "On 
the Definition of Religious Phenomena." In 1900, Durkheim's 
development, extension, and refinement of his earlier argument 
concerning "religious criminality" and related topics appear­
ed under the title "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (translated 
1973 by Jones and Scull).l Also, in the school year 1900-01, 
Durkheim lectured for the first time on "Les Formes elemen­
taires de la religion." In 1902, the untranslated article 
"Sur Ie totemisme" appeared. In 1903 Durkheim and Hauss wrote 
the great monograph Primitive Classification (translated by 
Rodney Needham, 1963). In 1905, Durkheim published the essay 
"Sur l'organization matrimoniale des societies australiennes" 
(see also Bellah, 1959, Lukes, 1973). Truly, a most product­
ive period, with a major monograph appearing almost every 
year! 
Clearly, Durkheim was intent on elaborating the primi­
tive sacral complex as the central interpretive "ideal type" 
for the human sciences. However, in addition to these many 
important essays, Durkheim and his colleagues contributed a 
massive outpouring of book reviews on diverse subjects of in­
terest not just to sociology, but to all the sciences of man. 
Space does not here permit detailed review of this fascinating 
and seminal scholarship, 2 but Durkheim's fundamental outlines 
of the centrality of the sacral complex begin to emerge ra­
ther clearly. For example, the moral authority of certain be­
liefs and social practices take on the character of "sacred­
ness," and it is the moral community which is the carrier of 
legitimate structures of conscience and consciousness. The 
organizing opposition between "sacred" and "profane" appear­
ed in the article on defining religion in 1899. The embedded­
ness of primitive kinship bonds in sacral symbols, the root­
• 
• 
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edness of social and legal obligations in religious rationales 
and magical formulas, the embeddedness of primitive logic in 
collective mythological symbolism, the compounding binary sys­
tem of symbolic equations being extended to all of existence, 
and so on and so forth, all first emerged during this highly 
creative period of group research into the significance of 
the sacral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person. 
For illustrative purposes, one of the most revealing 
shifts in Durkheim' s attitude toward the "repressiveness" or 
creativeness of the sacral complex can be found in his explan­
ations of the sacral bases of legal phenomena such as property, 
contract, taxes, and so on. These shifts are especially note­
worthy because they represent a clear continuity with Durk­
heim's earlier sociology of law, prior to the 1895 breakthrough. 
Durkheim developed these ideas in his often-repeated series of 
lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du droit" which, as 
Lukes tells us, reached their definitive form in the 1898-1900 
lecture series at Bordeaux (portions of these lectures are 
translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals). For exam­
ple, after defining the right of property as essentially rest­
ing on "the right to exclude others from use of things" (PECM: 
142), Durkheim characteristically explained the origin of this 
specific right in sacral terms. For only the sacred can serve 
as the source of exclusionary taboo. Careful readers will note 
that here, as elsewhere, Durkheim often argued as much from 
an implied analogy as from historical fact • 
.•. the thing appropriated is a thing distinct from com­
mon property. Now this feature is also shared by all re­
ligious and sacred things. Whenever we have a religious 
ritual, the world over, the feature that distinguishes 
the sacreq entities is that they are withdrawn from gen­
eral circulation: they are separate and set apart. The 
common people cannot enjoy them. Those who have a kin­
ship, as it were, can alone have access to them--that is, 
those who are sacred as they are: the priests, the great, 
and the magistrates ...• It is these prohibitions that lie 
at the foundation of what is called taboo .... Taboo is the 
the setting apart of an object as something consecrated, 
as something belonging to the sphere of the divine. By 
virtue of this setting apart, it is forbidden to appro­
priate the object of taboo under pain of sacrilege .... 
We can see how close the connection is between this con­
•
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cept and that of ownership. Around the thing appropria­
ted, as around the sacred thing, a vacuum formed .... 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.'
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Therefore, we are right in supposing that the origins 
of property are to be found in the nature of certain 
religious beliefs. Since the effects are identical, 
they can in all liklihood be attributed to similar cau­
ses (PECM:143-4). 
Taxes also, Durkheim suggested, may have a sacral ori­
gin. For instance: 
... the sacrilege that a man thinks he is committing 
against the gods by the very fact of tilling and break­
ing up the soil is, in truth, committed against society, 
since society is the reality hidden behind these mythi­
cal concepts. It is therefore, in a way, to society that 
man makes his sacrifices and offers up the victim.... 
These sacrifices, these first fruits of all kinds, are 
the earliest form of taxes. First, they are debts paid 
to the gods; they then become tithes paid to the priests, 
and this tithe is already a regular tax that later on is 
to pass into the hands of the lay authorities. These 
rites of atonement and propitiation finally become what 
amounts to a tax, although unsuspected. The germ of the 
institution is there, however, and is destined to devel­
op in the future (PECM:162-3). 
Durkheim offered a similar genealogy for the emergence 
of the legal institution of consensual contract. Originally, he 
he contended, sacred oaths were the binding force for the ex­
change of obligations. "The consensual contract is a contract 
by solemn ritual" (PECM:194). 
The wills can effect a bond only on condition of declar­
ing themselves. The declaration is made by words. There 
is something in words that is real, natural, and living 
and they can be endowed with a sacred force, thanks to 
which they compel and bind those who pronounce them. It 
is enough for them to be pronounced in ritual form and 
in ritual conditions. They take on a sacred quality by 
that very act. One means of giving them this sacred char­
acter is the oath, or invocation of a divine being. 
Through this invocation the divine being becomes the 
guarantor of the promise exchanged. Thereby the promise 
becomes compulsive, under threat of sacred penalties of 
known gravity. For instance, each party pronounces some 
phrase that binds him and a formula by which he calls 
down upon his head certain divine curses if he should 
fail in his undertaking .••• sacrifices and magical rites 
of all kinds reinforce still further the coercive force 
of the words uttered (PECM:182). 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that, even in our own secular­
ized era, legal oaths retain the character of a divinely guaran­
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teed conditional self-curse (eg. swearing on the Bible). The 
importance of primitive sprachlogik (see also Cassirer, 1953­
1955-1957) and ritual stereotyping in undergirding contracts 
is developed further by Durkheim in terms of Roman law and 
culture. 
This, then, seems to be the or1g1n of contracts made in 
all due and solemn formality. One of their features is 
that they are binding only if the parties make an under­
taking by a formula, solemn and agreed, which cannot be 
evaded. It is the formula which binds. This is the dis­
tinctive sign by which we recognize a main feature of 
magical and sacred formulas. The juridical formula is 
only a substitute for sacred fOrmalities and rites.-­
When certain definite words, arranged in a definite se­
quence, possess a moral influence which is lost if they 
are different or merely pronounced in a different se­
quence, we can be certain that they possess or have pos­
sessed a sacred significance and that they derive their 
peculiar powers from sacred causes. For it is only the 
sacred phrase which has this effect upon things and up­
on human beings. With the Romans especially, one fact 
tends to show clearly that the origin of the contract 
had a sacred character; this is the custom of the sacra­
mentum. When two contracting parties were in disagree­
ment on the nature of their respective rights and du­
ties, they deposited a sum of money in a temple ... this 
was the sacramentum. The one who lost his case also for­
feited the smn he had deposited. This means that he was 
fined to the benefit of the deity, which argues that his 
project was held to be an offense against the gods. These 
gods were, then, party to the contract*(PECM:182-3). 
Durkheim then sketched out the stages in the evolution of the 
rights of contract as it became progressively secularized and 
assumed its present form. Since, again, Durkheim saw that 
"juridical formalism is only a substitute for sacred formali­
ties and rites," we see that: 
Had it not been for the existence of the contract by 
solemn ritual, there would have been no notion of the 
contract by mutual consent. Nor would there have been 
any idea that the word of honor, which is fugitive and 
can be revoked by anyone, could be thus secured only 
by magic and sacred processes .•.. The binding £orce, 
the action, are supplied from without. It is religious 
beliefs that brought about the synthesis; once formed, 
other causes sustained it, because it served a purpose 
(PECM:194). 
Illustrations could be multiplied, but perhaps these 
suffice to indicate the brilliance of Durkheim's insight into 
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the sacral origins of legal, institutional, and other cultural 
forms, and the enduring fascination of his description of cer­
tain crucial sociocultural processes. We now see the nature 
and power of Durkheim's new interpretive perspective, and how 
far he had come, after the breakthrough of 1895, in exploring 
the cultural creativeness and evolutionary centrality of the 
• 
primitive sacral womb. Indeed, it is, perhaps, not too much 
to suggest that Durkheim's emerging sociology of religion rest­
ed on this crucial paradigm. 
• 
3. The Third Phase: The Primitive Sacral Complex as Womb of 
Society and Culture 
Durkheim's third phase centers, of course, on The Ele­
mentary Forms of the Religious Life, published in 1912. In a 
• very real sense this masterpiece represented the culmination 
of Durkheim's program announced in the preface to the second 
Annee sociologique, which was first carried out by Durkheim 
himself and his co-workers in the pages of this famous "col­
• lective representation" of the Durkheimian school in France. 
Early in The Elementary Forms, we see Durkheim proclaiming: 
"Today we are beginning to realize that law, morals, and even 
scientific thought itself were born of religion, were for a 
• long time confounded with it, and have remained penetrated 
with its spirit" (EF:87); he then proceeded to substantiate 
these claims in detail. Indeed, the very core of Durkheim's 
exhaustive examination of Australian aboriginal religion as 
• the site for his crucial experiment into the genetic and evo­
lutionary creativity of the sacral complex was his premise 
that only primitive religion was capable of imposing moral 
and conceptual unity upon empirical diversity; in short, of 
• transforming "chaos" into "cosmos." Thus, primitive rite and 
myth provided the crucial foundation, the template, as it were, 
which subsequent cultural forms only elaborated. "The funda­
mental categories of thought ... and science are of religious
• origin .... All the great social institutions have been born 
in religion" (EF:466). 
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This third and culminating period opens roughly around 
1906, with Durkheim's lecture course on "La Religion: Origines" 
(see Stanner, 1967:225; Lukes, 1973:581). By this time, Durk­
heim had become thoroughly "saturated" with the ethnographic 
literature on Australia and North America. In 1907, Durkheim 
delivered his paper "The Determination of Moral Facts" in 
which he, as Parsons noted years ago, widened out his moral 
theory to include desirability as well as obligation. In 1909, 
Durkheim published the first part of his forthcoming Formes 
Elementaires. In this regard, Stanner tells us: 
Durkheim at first intended to publish under the title 
Elementary Forms of Thought and Religious Life. In 1909 
three parts appeared as articles with titles consonant 
with that intention. The introduction, plus a part o­
mitted from the book, was printed ... as 'Sociologie 
religieuse et theorie de la connaisance,' and versions 
of the second and third chapters •.. as "Examen criti­
que des systemes classiques sur les origines de la pen­
see religieuse.' I have not seen any explanation of the 
changes of title, but the effect was to obscure the se­
cond though in no way secondary object of study: an at­
tempt to 'renovate the theory of knowledge' by a new ex­
amination of the categories. This was unfortunate because 
the book's longer perspective went far beyond religion. 
It looked in the direction of a grander sociology based 
on what might be called a natural positivist epistemolo­
gy ..•. It was by means of this epistemology that in his 
view religion, morals, and even science could be concil­
iated (1967:227). 
Further, Stanner, Lukes, and Giddens, among others, 
have all seen the importance of Durkheim's acknowledgement, 
early in The Elementary Forms, that in his first attempt at 
defining religious phenomena in the Annee article fifteen years 
years earlier, he had stressed the obligatory aspect to the ne­
glect of religious ideas. Doubtless, this early stress on "con­
straint" came from his positivist emphasis, not so much on ex­
ternal indices, as upon the identification of religion with 
the "repressiveness" of archaic legal sanctions. In 1912, Durk­
heim said: 
It is by this that that our present definition is con­
nected to the one that we have already proposed.••. In 
this work, we defined religious beliefs exclusively by 
their obligatory character; but, as we shall show, the 
obligation evidently comes from the fact that these be­
•
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liefs are the possession of a group which imposes them 
upon its members. The two definitions are thus in large 
part the same. If we have thought it best to propose a 
new one, it is because the first was too formal, and 
neglected the content of the religious representations 
too much (EF:63, #68). 
Now, we shall not focus here on the sacred/profane op­
• 
position (but see Chapter Four), but rather on the ability 
of the sacred principle to organize and energize the symbolic 
field. It is through the notion of sacred forces, invisible yet 
immanent in the world, Durkheim argued, that men are first able 
• 
to impose conceptual order upon the world--to mold empirical 
diversity into moral unity. Surely, Durkheim argued, there is 
• 
nothing in the sensation of the lone, isolated ego which can 
supply this ordering principle. No, it~religious symbolism. In 
a most revealing and significant statement in his important ad­
dress "Judgments of Value and Judgments of Reality" in 1911, 
Durkheim observed: 
Collective thought changes everything it touches. It 
throws down the barriers of the realms of nature and 
• 
combines contraries; it reverses what is called the 
natural hierarchy of being, makes disparity equal, and 
differentiates the similar. In a word, society substi­
tutes for the world revealed to us by our senses a dif­
ferent world that is the projection of the ideals of so­
ciety itself (SP:94-S).
• This is the master thesis underlying Durkheim's Elementary 
Forms. 
Now, early in his masterwork, Durkheim discerned the 
sacral origins of art and writing in the totemic symbols and 
• designs inscribed on the churinga and other sacred objects. 
• 
It cannot be doubted that these designs and paintings 
also have an esthetic character; here it is the first 
form of art. Since they are also •.. a written lang­
uage, it follows that the origins of design and those 
of writing are one. It even becomes clear that men com­
menced designing, not so much to fix upon wood or stone 
beautiful forms which charm the senses, as to trans­
late his thought into matter (EF:149). 
Further, Durkheim suggested that the original anchors 
•
 
of kinship relations lay in a sacral bond. Of course, in Ele­

mentary Forms Durkheim saw totemism as symbolizing this social­
sacral link. 
•
 
• 
--289-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
For the members of a single clan are not united to 
each other either by a common habitat, or by common 
blood, as they are not necessarily consanguineous and 
are frequently scattered over different parts of the 
tribal territory. Their unity comes solely from their 
having the same relations with the same categories of 
things, their practising the same rites, or in a word, 
from their participating in the same totemic cult. 
Thus, totemism and the clan mutually imply each other 
(EF:194) . 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that one of his most succinct 
summaries of the sacral basis of the kinship bond appeared in 
his lectures on the development of law and morals. 
All members of the same clan have within them, as it 
were, a particle of the divine being from which the 
clan is supposed to be descended. Thus, they bear the 
mark of a sacred symbol, and this is why they are bound 
to be defended, to have their death avenged, and so on 
(PECM:178). 
The evolution of thought--indeed, the very categories 
of logical thought itself--were seen to be of sacral origin. 
In other words, "logical evolution is closely connected with 
religious evolution" (EF:267). 
For a long time it has been known that the first sys­
tems of representations with which men have pictured 
to themselves the world and themselves were of reli­
gious origin. There is no religion that is not a cos­
mology at the same time that it is a speculation upon 
divine things. If philosophy and the sciences were born 
of religion, it is because religion began by taking the 
place of the sciences and philosophy (EF:2l). 
But how could this be so? What enabled religion to act as the 
womb of society and culture? The answer is to be found in the 
master thesis of Durkheim's stated earlier from 1911. The sym­
bolic potency of religious representations to embrace both ma­
terial and moral realms, emotion and cognition--this ability 
to fuse opposites, separate similarities, in short, to turn 
empirical diversity into moral and conceptual unity--it was 
this ability which lay at the heart of religion's unique po­
wer and evolutionary significance. 
We are now able to explain the origin of the ambiguity 
of religious forces as they appear in history, and how 
they are physical as well as human, moral as well as 
material. They are moral powers because they are made 
up entirely of the impressions this moral being, the 
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group, arouses in ... its individual members ..•. Their 
authority is only one form of the moral ascendancy of 
society over its members. But, on the other hand, since 
they are conceived of under material forms, they could 
not fail to be regarded as closely related to material 
things. Therefore, they dominate the two worlds. Their 
residence is in men, but at the same time, they are the 
vital principles of things. They animate minds and dis­
cipline them, but it is also they who make plants grow 
and animals reproduce. It is this double nature which 
has enabled religion to be like the womb from which 
come all the leading germs of human civilization. Since 
it has been made to embrace all of reality, the physi­
cal world as well as the moral one, the forces that move 
bodies as well as those that move minds have been con­
ceived in a religious form. That is how the most diverse 
methods and practices, both those that make possible the 
continuation of the moral life (law, morals, beaux-arts) 
and those serving the material life (the natural, tech­
nical, and practical sciences) are either directly or 
indirectly derived from religion * (EF:254-55). 
Because the primitive religious force is represented 
as a form of energy, a sort of "sacred electricity" (Weber used 
similar analogies) which is highly fluid and flows in and out 
of things, inevitably it acts to "con-fuse" them. Sacred ener­
gies overflow, they are "contagious," as Durkheim observed; 
and whatever they touch becomes transformed in the same degree 
by this "sacred contagion" (see also Chapter Four). All things 
tcuched ~ the same sacred forces are conceived as possessing 
the same essence--this becomes the elementary classificatory 
principle. 
We have seen the facility with which the primitive con­
fuses kingdoms and identifies the most heterogeneous 
things, men, animals, plants, stars, etc. Now we see 
one of the causes which has contributed the most to fa­
cilitating these confusions. Since religious forces 
are eminently contagious, it is constantly happening 
that the same principle animates very different objects 
equally; it passes from some into others as the result 
of either a simple material proximity or of even a sup­
erficial similarity. It is thus that men, animals, 
plants, and rocks come to have the same totem: the men 
because they bear the name of the animal; the animals 
because they bring the totemic emblem to mind; the 
plants because they nourish these animals; the rocks 
because they mark the place where the ceremonials are 
celebrated. Now, religious forces are therefore consi­
dered the source of all efficacy; so beings having one 
sinqle religious principle ought to pass as having the 
•
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same essence, and as differing from one another only in 
secondary characteristics. This is why it seemed quite 
natural to arrange them in a single category, and to re­
gard them as mere variations of the same class, trans­
mutable into one another. 
When this relation has been established, it makes the 
phenomena of contagion appear under a new aspect. Taken 
by themselves, they seem quite foreign to the logical 
life. Is their effect not to mix and confuse beings, in 
spite of their natural differences? But we have seen that 
these confusions and participations have played a role of 
the highest utility in logic; they have served to bind to­
gether things which sensation leaves apart from one ano­
ther. So it is far from true that contagion, the source 
of these connections and confusions, is marked with that 
fundamental irrationality that one is inclined to attri­
bute it at first. It has opened the way for the scienti­
fic explanations of the future * (EF:364-S). 
Thus, just as egos are moralized into forming a society, so too 
is the world moralized, unified, made into an intelligible cos­
mos through the medium of sacral symbolism. I repeat: sacral 
energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world, 
serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage. 
For instance, Durkheim proposed that the scientific no­
tion of "force," as that of "causality," is derived, ultimate­
ly, from religious notions such as "mana," the Sioux equiva­
lent "wakan," etc.; in short, "charismatic" energies flowing, 
directing, and eventually condensing into spirits and gods. 
lilt is the first form of the idea of force" (EF:232). 
In fact, the wakan plays the same role in the world, 
as the Sioux conceive it, as the one played by the for­
ces with which science explains the diverse phenomena 
of nature .... This, however, does not mean that it is 
thought of as an exclusively physical energy; on the 
contrary ... we shall see the elements going to make 
up this idea are taken from the most diverse realms. 
But this very compositenessof its nature enables it to 
be utilized as a universal principle of explanation. 
It is from it that all life comes ..•. The wakan is the 
cause of all the movements which take place in the uni­
verse .... When the Iroquois says that the life of all 
nature is the product of conflicts aroused between the 
unequally intense orencaof the different beings, he only 
expresses, in his own language, this modern idea that the 
the world is a system of forces limiting and containing 
each other and making an equilibrium...• So the idea of 
force is of religious origin. It is from religion that 
it has been borrowed, first by philosophy, then by the 
sciences (EF:232-3). 
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Moreover, because the moral and the material, the cul­
tural and the natural, are joined in a " ..• solid system whose 
parts are united and vibrate sympathetically," the totemic sys­
tem becomes a cosmological and moral system simultaneously. 
Totemism, as the most primitive religion Durkheim thought could 
be discovered, offers us a rudimentary explanation of the uni­
verse. "To a greater or less extent, all known religions have 
been systems of ideas which tend to embrace the universality 
of things, and to give us a complete representation of the 
world" (EF:165). 
For the Australian, things themselves, everything which 
is in the universe, are a part of the tribe; they. are 
considered elements of it, and so to speak, regular mem­
bers of it; just like men they have a determined place 
in the general schema of society •.•. All known things 
will thus be arranged in a sort of tableau or systematic 
classification embracing the whole of nature (EF:166). 
Thus, the men of the clan and the things which are clas­
sified in it form by their union a solid system, all of 
whose parts are unified and vibrate sympathetically. This 
organization, which at first may have appeared to us as 
purely logical, is at the same time moral. A single prin­
ciple animates it and makes its unity: this is the totem 
•••• All the beings arranged in a single clan, whether 
men, animals, plants, or inanimate objects, are merely 
forms of the same totemic being .••• All are really of 
the same flesh in the sense that all partake of the na­
ture of the totemic animal (EF:175). 
Thus, religion is seen as the great, original unifying princi­
ple in Durkheim's model of the sacral womb. 
In contrast, for example, to Levy-Bruhl, who posited a 
"pre-logical" mentality, a non-Aristotelian logic, Durkheim 
posited the psychic unity of mankind, and thus perceived the 
fundamental sources of identity, of unity in diversity. This 
could never come from the senses alone . 
••• there is nothing in experience which could suggest 
these connections and confusions. As far as the obser­
vation of the senses is able to go, everything is dif­
ferent and disconnected. Nowhere do we see beings mix­
ing their natures and metamorphosing themselves into 
each other. It is therefore necessary that some excep­
tionally powerful cause should have intervened to trans­
figure reality in such a way as to make it appear under 
an aspect that is not really its own. 
•
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It is religion that was the agent of this transforma­
tion; it is religious beliefs that have substituted 
for the world, as it is perceived by the senses, ano­
ther different one. This is well shown by the case of 
• 
totemism. The fundamental thing in this religion is 
that the men of the clan and the different beings whose 
form the totemic emblems reproduce pass as being made 
of the same essence. Now when this belief was once ad­
mitted, the bridge between the different kingdoms was 
already built. The man was represented as a sort of 
animal or plant; the plants and animals were thought 
of as the relatives of men, or, rather, all these be­
ings, so different for the senses, were thought of as 
participating in a single nature. So this remarkable 
•
 
aptitude for confusing things that seem to be obvious­

ly distinct comes from the fact that the first forces 
with which the human intellect peopled the world were 
elaborated by religion. Since these were made up of 
elements taken from the different kingdoms, men con­
ceived of a principle common to the most heterogeneous 
•
 
things, which thus became endowed with a sole and sing­

le essence (EF:26B). 
Against the inevitable objections, Durkheim acknowledged: 
It is true that this logic is disconcerting for us. 
Yet we must be careful not to depreciate it: howsoever 
• 
crude it may appear to us, it has been an aid of the 
greatest importance in the intellectual evolution of 
•
 
humanity. In fact, it is through it that the first ex­

planation of the world has been made possible ...• So
 
it is far from true that this mentality has no con­

nection with ours. Our logic was born of this logic ....
 
Between the logic of religious thought and that of
 
scientific thought there is no abyss (EF:269,270,27l).
 
Indeed, this was Durkheim's constant refrain throughout his 
Elementary Forrns--there is no gap in continuity between primi­
tive and modern thought (see especially Horton, 1973). This
• thesis provides the evolutionary superstructure upon which his 
great masterpiece was organized. When shall we finally come to 
recognize his central intention was to reveal the generic and 
genetic-evolutionary primacy of the primitive sacral complex?
• That this was indeed Durkheim's core thesis can be 
seen from a most revealing contrast, drawn by Durkheim himself, 
between his own work and that of his colleague Levy-Bruhl in a 
book review which appeared in 1913 in L'Annee sociologique.
• Although he acknowledged that they agreed on many points, most 
notably that "primitive mentality is essentially religious," 
Durkheim also took pains to distance himself from Levy-Bruhl's 
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"contrast/inversion" schema, as Horton (1973) has termed the 
latter's description of the passage from primitive to modern 
thought. 
We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of human 
mentality, however different they may be, far from de­
riving from different sources, are created one by the 
'other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We 
have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential 
ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type 
and form, force and causality, and personality--those 
in short, to which philosophers have given the name of 
"categories," and which dominate all logical activity, 
were elaborated within the very center of religion. 
Science has borrowed them from religion. There is no 
gulf between these two stages in the intellectual life 
of mankind .... Although, therefore, human mentality has 
changed and evolved over the centuries in relation to 
society, the different types which it has successively 
manifested have each given rise to the other. The high­
er and more recen~ forms are not opposed to the lower 
and more primitive forms, but are created out of the 
latter (in Giddens, 1972a:248-9). 
Once one grasps the depth and meaning of Durkheim's vision, 
the whole world becomes transformed; one experiences the light 
dawning, the gestalt switch which constitutes scientific revo­
lutions. For that which had been once outcast, especially by 
Durkheim himself and his Enlightenment brethren, I mean the un­
intelligible, chaotic, and even frightening pole in the posi­
tivist faith--namely, the past and religion--were now rehabili­
tated, transformed into meaning and historical order. Levy­
Bruhl, who also overemphasized the rationality of "modern man," 
simply had not yet broken with Enlightenment dogma. But Durk­
heim had, at least in his own mind, effectively reconciled re­
ligion and reason; and the prime alchemical instrument was the 
creativeness of the sacral womb. Primitive man brought order 
out of chaos through myth and ritual. While many prepared the 
way, this was one of the most crucial aspects of Durkheim's 
revolution in the human sciences (see also Lukes, 1973:474-5). 
Now, it must be remembered that the creativeness of 
the primitive sacral complex was evolutionary as well as gen­
etic. Indeed, it was his evolutionism which first led Durkheim 
to discover the creativenss of primitive religion in the first 
place. For example, as we noted in review of The Division of 
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Labor, Durkheim had already recognized the close relation be­
tween the evolution of the collective and individual conscien­
• ce, and the evolution of the notions of the gods. For, much 
like Weber in his profound sketch in The Sociology of Religion 
(1963), Durkheim outlined the progressive passage from clan-
based exclusionary socio-religious bonds to universalistic or
• civilizational symbolic bonds. Originally, said Durkheim, to­
temism served as the sacral base of the kinship bond, for only 
those who had been similarly transformed in the ecstatic "col­
lective effervescence" and the communion sacrifice, and who
• shared similar ancestral genealogies, could bond themselves 
together in a functioning cult. But the commensal barriers of 
clan particularism barred passage to a tribal or inter-socie­
tal symbolic bonds. Like Weber, then, Durkheim's key analyti­
• cal variables here were the obstacles and facilitating chan­
nels for the progressive passages from particularistic to uni­
versalistic social and cultural bonds. For example, in speaking 
of clan totemism, he proposed:
• ••• it is the nature of the social environment which has imposed this particularism. In fact, as long as 
totemism remains at the basis of the cultural organi­
zation, the clan keeps an autonomy in the religious 
society which, though not absolute, it always very 
•
 
marked •••• The group of things attributed to each clan,
 
which are a part of it in the same way the men are, 
have the same individuality and autonomy. Each of them 
is represented as irreducible into similar groups, as 
separated from them by a break of continuity, and as 
constituting a distinct realm. Under these circumstan­
•
 
ces, it would never occur to one that these heterogen­

eous worlds were different manifestations of one and 
• 
the same fundamental force: on the contrary, one might 
suppose that each of them corresponded to an organi­
cally different mana whose action could not extend be­
yond the clan and the circle of things attributed to 
it. The idea of a single and universal mana could be 
born only at the moment when the tribal religion de­
• 
veloped above that of the clans and absorbed them more 
or less completely. It is along with the feeling of tri­
bal unity that the feelings of the substantial unity of 
the world awakens •••• Totemism is essentially a federa­
tive religion which cannot go beyond a certain point of 
centralization without ceasing to be itself (EF:22S-6). 
Having noted the resistance of clan particularism to 
extension of the socio-religious bond, Durkheim next explored 
•
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some special channels which facilitated the spread of "reli­
gious internationalism." Cross-clan sexual totemism, tribal in­
itiation rites stemming from the "organization of the tribe in­
to phatries, matrimonial classes ... and the exogamic inter­
dictions attached to them" (EF: 319), become "veri table tribal 
insti tutions." Mythologies grow up around special heroes or 
sponsoring ancestors of these intra-tribal institutions. Such 
gods struggled, as the clans themselves struggled for structur­
al and cultural supremacy; in the clash, and in the new order 
of reconciliation, one god emerged supreme . 
... the authority of each of these supreme gods is not 
limited to a single tribe; it is recognized equally by 
a number of neighboring tribes .•.. There are very few 
gods for a relatively extended geographical area. So 
the cults of which they are the object have an inter­
national character. It even happens sometimes that myth­
ologies, intermingle, combine and make mutual borrowings 
(EF:325). 
The passage from the ancestral geniuses to the idea of a tribal 
god was accomplished through the medium of the civilizing he­
roes as a transitionary third term (EF: 328). Here: 
•.• the clans were, in a sense, the fragments of the 
divine body. Now is this not just another way of say­
ing that the great god is the synthesis of all the to­
tems and consequently, the personification of the tri­
bal unity? •• Thus an international mythology was es­
tablished, of which the great god was quite naturally 
the essential element ••.. So his name passed to it ••.• 
The internationalization of the totems opened the way 
for that of the great god•••. This culminating idea is 
united without any interruption to the crudest beliefs 
which we analyzed to start with. In fact, the great tri­
bal god is only an ancestral spirit who finally won a 
preeminent place. The ancestral spirits are only enti­
ties forged in the image of the individual souls whose 
origin they are destined to explain. The souls, in their 
turn, are only the form taken by the impersonal forces 
which are found at the basis of totemism, as the indi­
vidualize themselves in the human body. The unity of 
the system is as great as its complexity (EF:332). 
Finally, again emphasizing the importance of "religious 
cosmopolitanism" in extending the social bond from the sub-so­
cietal to the civilizational level, and consequently, in help­
ing to build universalistic and universalizable structures of 
conscience and consciousness, Durkheim concludes: 
•
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So it is far from true that religious internationalism 
is a peculiarity of the most recent and advanced reli­
gions. From the dawn of history, religious beliefs have 
manifested a tendency to overflow out of one strictly 
limited political society; it is as though they had a 
natural aptitude for crossing frontiers, and for diffu­
sing and internationalizing themselves. Of course, there 
have been peoples and times when this spontaneous apti­
tude has been held in check by opposed social necessi­
ties; but this does not keep it from being real and ... 
very primitive (EF:326; see also 473-4). 
In sum, I submit that, almost a decade and a half after 
first announcing his program, Durkheim had demdStrated the gen­
eric and genetic-evolutionary significance of the primitive sa­
cral complex as the womb of society, culture, and person to the 
several human sciences. Should we not now, after many decades 
of nelgect, turn our attention to Durkheim's revolution in the 
human sciences?l 
D.	 Shifts in the Connotational Load Carried ~ the Term "Reli­
gion" in Durkheim'~ System of Sociology 
Paradigmatic terms often depend for their symbolic poten­
cy on a series of connotations which they accumulate over the 
years. In general, the greater the connotational load, the great­
er the number of diverse meanings a paradigmatic term may em­
brace. Indeed, we often witness the "proteanization" of para­
digms, of symbolically charged terms as they become capable of 
embracing myriad meanings, and thus, of transforming empirical 
diversity into moral and conceptual unity. Seen in this light, 
the potency of Durkheim's sociology of religion depended, to a 
large extent, upon the multiplicity of meanings or connotation­
al load which it carried. Thus, perhaps it would be helpful if 
we attempted to sort out some of the separable meanings of the 
term "religion" which Durkheim managed to conflate, or tie to­
gether. 
The first and most general way in which Durkheim utili­
zed the term "religion" was in the common sense meaning of the 
term--he variously spoke of "religion as such," "religion pro­
perly considered," and so on. This everyday, unreconstructed 
connotation implied the usual elements of sacredness, cosmic 
•
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principles or divinities directing life, attempts by men to 
represent and communicate with these generative and directive 
• forces, the problems of evil, institutions and religious spe­
cialists--in short, the system of reciprocal relations between 
macrocosm and microcosm. Indeed, the key elements of Durkheim's 
explicit definition of religion--namely, sacredness and the 
• moral community (Lukes, 1973)--centered on just these general­ly accepted meanings of "religion as such." 
However, it was precisely against these generalized 
background connotations that Durkheim directed his initial po­
• sitivist revision of the meaning and referent of religious sym­bolism and action. As a positivist, Durkheim ruled out of court 
--even before proceedings began--the usual theological and meta­
physical claims put forward by most religions. For he proposed:
• [Men] invent by themselves the idea of these powers 
• 
with which they feel themselves in connection, and 
from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way 
in which they were led to represent them under forms 
that are really foreign to their nature and to trans­
figure them by thought (EF:239-40). 
References could be multiplied; but Durkheim never wavered from 
his positivist denial of a transcendental meaning to religion. l 
Indeed, such transcendental truth claims had to be rejected out 
• 
of hand, for as the French moral and intellectual reformers 
well knew, such "essentialist" appeals blocked their own "laic" 
program to construct an "existential" conscience and conscious­
ness. Against the dominant claims of those wayward incumbents 
• 
of "office charisma" (to utilize l'1eber' s term) who maintained 
a monopoly over definitive interpretation of the "Book of Reve",,:, 
lation," the French and Latin "laic" moral reformers and pro­
phets raised the existential claims of "personal charisma" and 
• 
the certainties to be read in the "Book of. Nature." Thus, in 
short, in the modern world religion became reduced to morality, 
and theology to anthroposociology. 
•
 
I cannot here enter into a detailed examination of Durk­

heim's positivist reduction of religious phenomena. Indeed, the
 
question is most complex, and Durkheim's treatment often surpri­

singly subtle. But let us agree that any adequate explanation 
of human action must include both a set of interpretive syrnbol­
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ic equations by which one sphere or level is to be linked with 
another, and a series of transformation terms which link consti­
tutive processes. In these terms, the Marxist, Durkheimian, 
Freudian, Weberian, functionalist, structuralist interpreta­
tions, to mention only some of the leading contenders, all meet 
the basic criteria of in-depth interpretations of human action. 
However, at least one other crucial interpretive canon should 
be immediately introduced--namely, the phenomenological injunc­
tion to attempt to discern the multiple meanings actors them­
selves bestow upon their own actions. Clearly, from the various 
"distortive" perspectives, the stated intentions of those who 
generate and sustain religious action can and must be set aside 
in favor of "lower levels" (the spatial metaphor is revealing), 
the "unconscious" or "latent functions." Doubtless, there is 
much that cannot be explained in terms of "conscious" intention; 
there is much that escapes us, and which must be imputed by 
"outside" observers. But what, then, is to be the relation be­
tween "unconscious" and "conscious" levels, between "latent" 
and "manifest functions," between "sub" and "superstructures?" 
This fundamental dilemma is analogous to the problem faced by 
physicists and neurophysiologists in relating the so-called 
"primary" and "secondary qualities." 
On what grounds, for instance, did Durkheim claim that 
" ••• the error concerns the letter of the symbol employed, not 
the reality of the fact symbolized" (EF:299). It has not suffi­
ciently emphasized to this point that the special method which 
allowed Durkheim to transmute base theism into sociological 
gold--which allowed him to acknowledge that " ••. I can only 
add that I myself am quite indifferent to this choice [between 
God and society as the religious referent], since I see in the 
Divinity only society transfigured and symbolically expressed" 
[1906] (SP:52)--was an ingenious and unreflective use of ana­
~. This can be seen most clearly in his lectures on the 
sacral and magical bases for the origin and evolution of such 
legal categories as property, contract, and so forth. For ex­
ample, Durkheim argued that there was a fundamental similarity 
between the private appropriation of an object or place and 
• 
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the rather unusual "set apartness" of "sacred" things and pla­
ces. Only rarely did he enunciate one of his most fundamental 
interpretive principles: "Since the effects ~ identical, 
they can in all liklihood be attributed to the same causes" 
(PECM: 143-4) • 
Inevitably, however, the "reductionistic" position in­
volves one in various unforeseen difficulties. As William Kolb 
(1953), Evans-Pritchard (1965), Ricoeur (1970), and many others 
have pointed out over the years, if people did not believe in 
the reality and efficacy of their actions, they simply would 
not pursue them; as a consequence, the "distortive" theorists 
would be deprived of their complex and ingenious sets of inter­
pretive symbolic equations. Unwittingly, Durkheim himself ack­
nowledged this dilennna years ago: "It is undoubtedly true that 
if they were able to see that these influences which they feel 
emanate from society, then the mythological system of interpre­
tations would never be born" (EF:239). Nevertheless, he still 
insisted on the unique truth of his own systematic insight: 
"But social action follows ways that are too circuitous and 
obscure, and employs psychical mechanisms that are too complex. 
to allow the ordinary observer to see when it comes" (EF:239). 
Lukes reports that in 1914, at a conference, Durkheim was ask­
ed directly this question by Gustave Belot: 
Durkheim, Belot insisted, was (despite his claims to 
the contrary), maintaining that all religions were 
false, in so far as they did not accept his own theory. 
Who, asked Belot, would continue to pray, if he knew 
he was praying to no one, but merely addressing a col­
lectivity that was not listening? Where, he continued: 
'is the man who would continue to take part in commun­
ion if he believed that it was no more than a mere sym­
bol, and that there was nothing real in it' (1973:5l8)? 
Doubtless there are many subtleties not addressed here, but, 
ultimately this dilemma comes down to the fact that even the 
"distortive" theorists who reduce religion down to the "lower 
levels" must end up by laying claim to some special dispensa­
tion for their own uniquely inspired alchemies. So tenuous do 
these alchemies become sometimes, so dependent are they upon 
the special faiths which inspired them, that they all run the 
very real risk, as Raymond Aron remarked of Durkheim's inter­
• 
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pretation, of "making their object vanish" (1970:52). And, of 
course, if one does not succeed, any of the other contending 
• 
reductions will only be to glad to assist in making their com­
petitors' objects of interpretation vanish. Indeed, few have 
remarked upon the irony of this cacophany of competing "ulti­
mate interpretations" (but see Ricoeur, 1975); perhaps we 
• 
would be best advised to set each against the other, and let 
the Hobbesian struggle of each against all resolve the "battle 
royal" of the reductionists. In sum, Durkheim must be consider­
ed a positivist whose central problem in this regard was to 
• 
" ..• rediscover the reality of religion after having elimina­
ted the supernatural from it" (Aron, 1970:51). Further, besid­
es eliminating the generic intention from religious action and 
the prime referent 'of religious symbolism, Durkheim added the 
• 
characteristic historical charge, stemming from the various 
"Enlightenments," that religion traditionally held man in in­
tellectual and moral "servitude;" that religions, in short, 
were always, by their very nature, "repressive." Indeed, as 
• 
noted before, in any all-embracing cosmological system " ••• 
law which is agreed to be the word of God Himself cannot fail 
to be repressive" (DL:141). Thus, the initial thrust of Durk­
heim's critical sociology of religion was typical for his day; 
• 
it coincides with the usual "Enlightenment" charges that "reli­
gion is neither good nor true," as Benton Johnson has lucidly 
summarized this position. 
However, after saying all this, it is important to re­
• 
cognize that from this point on Durkheim parted company with 
his anti-metaphysical, anti-clerical, rationalist "Enlighten­
ment" brethren. His dialectical genius as one of the great mo­
dern moral philosophers takes over; for Durkheim next mounted 
• 
an equally ingenious "rescue campaign" to "save the phenomena" 
of religion. Indeed, is it not curious that neither of the 
twin architects of the modern sociology of religion (the other 
being the "religiously unmusical" Max Weber) themselves believ­
• 
ed in the reality of religious action, only in its human signi­
ficance? Instead of wholly setting aside religion as neither 
good ("repressive") nor true ("superstition, the lie of the 
•
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priests ll ), Durkheim attempted to transmute religious thought 
and action into acceptable metaphors and beneficial consequen­
ces. His first step was to insist that religion cannot simply 
be a total illusion, because all men have believed in it in 
one form or another throughout history. Thus, to refute those 
IIdistortive ll theorists who argue that religion is illusion and 
bad, Durkheim appealed to the universality of religious beliefs. 
lilt remains incomprehensible that humanity should have remain­
ed obstinate in these errors through the ages, for experience 
should have very quickly proven them false ll (EF: 257) . 
The second stage in Durkheim's positivist and IIl a ic ll 
program to II save the phenomena ll of religion without its meta­
physical and hierocratic base, was rooted in the very real in­
sight that it is the II moral communityll which is the cultural 
carrier of intellectual and moral legitimate authority, of, 
in a word, IIsacredness.1I 
From our point of view, these difficulties vanish. Reli­
gion ceases to be an inexplicable hallucination and takes 
a foothold in reality. In fact, we can say that the be­
liever is not deceived when he believes in the existence 
of a moral power upon which he depends and from which 
he receives all that is best in himself: this power ex­
ists, it is society. t~en the Australian is carried out­
side himself and feels a new life flowing within him 
whose intensity surprises him, he is not the dupe of an 
illusion; this exaltation is real and is really the ef­
fect of forces outside of and superior to the individual. 
It is true that he is wrong in thinking that this in­
crease of vitality is the work of a power in the form 
of some animal or plant. But this error is merely in re­
gard to the letter of the symbol ••• and not in regard 
to the fact of its existence. Behind these figures and 
metaphors ••• there is a concrete and living reality. 
Thus, religion acquires a meaning and a reasonableness 
that the most intransigent rationalist cannot misunder­
stand (EF:257). 
Durkheim thus carne to see religion as the prime symbolic medi um 
by which societies first attained self-consciousness of them­
selves as a group. IIBefore all, it is a system of ideas with 
which the individuals represent to themselves the society of 
which they are members, and the obscure but intimate relations 
which they have with it ll (EF:257). Or as Giddens lucidly sum­
marizes: IIReligion is the symbolic self-consciousness of so­
•
 
• 
--303-­
ciety, but in a form which is not truly accessible to the 
very men who create it" (1972a:2l). 
• The third stage by which Durkheim conferred new signi­ficance on his positivist transformation of religion into the 
symbolic self-consciousness emerging from the creativeness of 
generic sociocultural process was the one we are primarily in­
• terested in here--namely, the unique distinction of having ser­
ved as the primal creative womb of society, culture, and per­
son. Thus, instead of being viewed primarily as "repressive" 
and "regressive," primitive and archaic religions now became 
• cast as the central evolutionary matrix for all human society. 
What lent this proposition a paradoxical air--especially com­
ing from a life-long "laic" positivist--was that this implied 
the evolution out of religion of the very cultural forms with 
• which the former is so often opposed--namely, logic and scien­
ce, indeed, rational thought itself. An extraordinary sugges­
tion! While religion and science may oppose each other in the 
modern world as competing bases for legitimate intellectual 
• and moral authority, in their common origins in the primitive 
sacral complex they were as one. Rather than the over simple 
rationalist equation of evolutionary progress with seculari­
zation, Durkheim insisted that the achievements of primitive
• religions were an integral part of cultural evolution (see 
especially Robin Horton, 1973). 
However, in the symbolic underground of this positiv­
ist moral philosopher's thought, I propose that Durkheim's 
• dialectical drive took him even further in attempting to re­
concile these apparent opposites. For Durkheim's dialectical 
genius led him to attempt to transmute religion, through the 
evolutionary process, into reason. The alchemical instrument 
• wae, of course, the notion of the primitive sacral complex as 
the womb of society and culture. Now, remember that one of 
the positions often held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren, 
against which he polemicized so vigorously, was the supposi­
• tion that "Reason" is a generic human faculty, embedded 
deep within the lone, isolated, abstract ego. On the contrary, 
Durkheim argued, the fundamental categories of human thought, 
•
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and even the notion of the person itself, ~ social and 
cultural and historical constructions. As societies evolve, 
so too do their prime symbolic guidance systems; and, as 
Durkheim proposed, collective representations, once born in 
the primitive sacral complex, tend to become increasingly ab­
stract, autonomous, universalizable, and rational as they 
reach civilizational levels. And, of course, pUblic symbols 
and moral rules were the preconditions for the awakening of 
individual conscience and consciousness. In sum, Durkheim ar­
gued that the autonomization of the person, and rationaliza­
tion and universalization in the grounds of moral and intel­
lectual discourse, proceed together on the world-historical 
level (see E. Leites, 1974; B. Nelson, 1973a). In short, what 
I suggest is that, by a complex and often circuitous series 
of more or less implicit symbolic equations and cultural-his­
torical transformations, Durkheim's reconstructed positivist 
system tended to transmute religion into reason. Indeed, if 
one understands this complex transformational sequence, we 
can begin to fathom why Durkheim so assiduously pursued the 
construction of sociology as the "science of the moral life 
--for sociology was itself destined to become the ~ form 
of societal self-consciousness, the new fount of legitimate 
"laic" moral and intellectual authority, the new ground of 
"sacredness." Lukes, among others, has noted this crucial dia­
lectical transformation: " ... as a cognitive enterprise, reli­
gion was, if not quite defunct, certaintly moribund. Sociology 
was its successor" (1973:476). 
Thus, Durkheim's positivist paradox was made possible 
only by the combination of his dialectical genius and his mor­
al earnestness. For although he set aside the generic religious 
intention, he simultaneously sought to save the moralizing ef­
fects of religious action by transmuting the religious core 
into his own sociological system--I mean quite literally. Yet, 
in any such profound series of symbolic transformations and 
intellectual alchemies, traditional connotational loads linger 
on. Now, it was precisely by redirecting these lingering mean­
ings of religion in the traditional sense, by submitting them 
I•
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• 
to his own ingenious series of symbolic transmutations, that 
Durkheim's dialectical genius appeared to triumph in overcom­
ing such potent traditional oppositions. If, in the final ana­
lysis, we cannot give ourselves completely over to his reduct­
. 
• 
ions and positivist symbolic equations, can we not, at least, 
follow his brilliant analytical leads into the world-histori­
cal significance of the primitive sacral complex as the womb 
of society, culture, and person? 
• 
• 
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• 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
•
 
DURKHEIM ON CIVILIZATIONS AND INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL PROCESS
 
•
 
Collective representations are the result of an im­

mense cooperation, which stretches out not only into
 
space but into time as well; to make them, a multi­

tude of minds have associated, united, and combined
 
their sentiments; for them, long generations have ac­

cumulated their experience and their knowledge (EF:29).
 
Civilization only expresses a collective life of a spe­

cial genre, the substratum of which is a plurality of
 
interrelated political bodies acting upon one another.
 
International life is merely social life of a higher

• kind, and one which sociology needs to know (1971:813).
 
• 
One of the most important and least explored aspects of 
Durkheim's system of sociology was his continuing concern with 
the civilizational level of sociocultural analysis. In terms 
of his basic explanatory model, Durkheim proposed significant 
parallel developments on the micro and macro levels of socio­
cuLtural process. His concern with the emergence of collect­
ively symbolic representations out of specific social morpho­
• 
• 
p 
logical conditions on the micro societal level led him to 
postulate, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and con­
tinuing parallel between social morphological differentiation 
and differentiation of the corresponding collective represe~­
tations. This parallel evolutionary differentiation implied a 
series of key processual dimensions, including the movement 
from concrete to abstract symbolism, from parochial or tribal 
•
 
to universalizable representations, from the fused embedded­

ness of symbols in the primitive sacral complex to the differ­
entiated autonomy of symbols, spheres, and persons, and so on. 
It is sad, but not surprising, that since the relations between 
• 
societal and civilizational levels have vanished not only from 
secondary accounts of Durkheim's sociology but from the con­
temporary sociological horizon as well, the critical constitu­
•
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tive sociocultural processes underlying these world-histori­
cal developments should also be slighted by subsequent gene­
rations of sociologists. 
Durkheim's deep interest in sociocultural processes led 
him to investigate linkages between social morphological pro­
cesses and cultural symbolic forms not merely in terms of 
their most elementary forms, where the essential links could 
be seen most clearly, but also in terms of their more complex 
forms, especially in terms of civilizations and inter-civili­
zational processes. Indeed, from his first great book to his 
last, Durkheim was centrally concerned with broad evolution­
ary passages from the simplest, most primitive levels of so­
ciocultural process to modern complex civilizations. At var­
ious points in various works, Durkheim referred to certain 
collective representations (eg. Christian individualism, Car­
tesian rationalism, etc.) which had become historically sedi­
mented into Western civilization. In short, just as Durkheim 
recognized a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less 
fluid to crystallized collective representations, so too he 
postulated a vertical continuum of sociocultural processes 
ranging from the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive 
collective representations to the most differentiated, uni­
versal, autonomous cultural symbols on the macro-level of 
sociocultural process. 
In The Division of Labor, for instance, Durkheim pro­
posed that the "progressive effacement" of segmental society 
implied a parallel transformation of concrete and localized 
symbolism into more general, abstract, unifying collective 
representations. 
In a small society, since everyone is clearly placed in 
the same conditions of existence, the collective environ­
ment is essentially concrete. It is made up of beings 
of all sorts who fill the social horizon. The states of 
conscience representing it have the same character. 
First, they are related to precise objects, as this ani­
mal, this plant, this natural force, etc. Then, as every­
body is related to these things in the same way, they af­
fect all consciences in the same way. The whole tribe, 
if not too widely extended, enjoys or suffers the same ad­
vantages or inconveniences from the sun, heat, or cold, 
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from this river, or that source, etc. The collective 
impressions resulting from the fusion of all these in­
dividual impressions are then determined in form as 
well as in object, and, consequently, the common con­
science has a defined character. But it changes its 
nature as societies become more voluminous. Because 
these societies are spread over a vaster surface, the 
common conscience is itself obliged to rise above all 
local diversities, to dominate more space, and conse­
quently to become more abstract. For not many general 
things can be common to all these diverse environments. 
It is no longer such an animal, but such a species ... 
not this forest, but forest in abstracto (DL:287). 
This movement from concrete, highly specific collective 
representations, especially those symbolizing the group itself 
in all its special particularities, is parallele~ given the un­
derlying progressive social morphological differentiation, by 
another closely related evolutionary passage from highly part­
icularized, formalized symbolisms, to increasingly generalized 
rules of conduct. Given the "repressiveness" of what I have 
earlier termed "the primitive sacral complex," Durkheim saw 
a progressive evolution of morality from highly ritualized, 
stereotyped, formalizable rules of specific conduct, to more 
flexible, generalized, rationalized, and more individualized 
forms of morality. As the index of the progressive effacement 
of the segmental type of tribal society in the face of the in­
ternationalization of social life, Durkheim looked to the de­
cline of stereotyping formalism and the rise of generalizable 
rules of conduct. In short, the inevitable breakdown of seg­
mental tribal society, and thus the cult upon which it rested, 
under the pressure of the ineluctable law of the progressive 
extension of the "radius of social life," meant that particu­
laristic or tribal barriers to the internationalization of 
moral rules and conceptual meanings are increasingly attenua­
ted. 
At the same time as religion, the rules of law become 
universal, as well as those of morality. Linked at 
first to local circumstances, to particularities, 
ethnic, climate, etc., they free themselves little 
by little, and with the same stroke become more gen­
eral. What makes this increase of generality obvious 
is the uninterrupted decline of formalism. In lower 
societies, the very external form of conduct is pre­
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determined even to the details. The way in which man 
must eat, dress in every situation, the gestures he 
must make, the formula he must pronounce, are precise­
ly fixed. On the contrary, the further one strays from 
the point of departure, the more moral and juridical 
prescriptions lose their sharpness and precision. They 
rule only the most general forms of conduct, and rule 
them ina very general manner, saying what must be done, 
not how it must be done (DL:289). 
One of the clearest indices of this progressive move­
ment from concrete, particularized, ritually stereotyped form­
alisms to abstract, increasingly universalistic symboli.za­
tion, Durkheim argued, can be found in the progressive trend 
toward transcendental, universal, and monotheistic gods. The 
breakdown of the primitive sacral-magical complex is a key 
process in religious evolution. 
The fact which perhaps best manifest this increasing 
tendency of the common conscience is the parallel tran­
scendence of the most essential of its elements, I mean 
the idea of divinity. In the beginning, the gods are not 
distinct from the universe, or rather, there are no gods, 
but only sacred beings .... But little by little, reli­
gious forces are detached from the things of which they 
were first only the attributes, and become hypostatized. 
Thus is formed the notions of spirits or gods who, while 
residing here or there as preferred, nevertheless exist 
outside of the particular objects to which are more spe­
cifically attached. By that very fact they are less con­
crete ..• The Graeco-Latin polytheism .•. marks new pro­
gress in the direction of transcendence. The residence 
of the gods becomes more sharply distinct from that of 
man. Set upon the mysterious heights of Olympus, or 
dwelling in the recesses of the earth, they personally 
intervene in human affairs only in intermittent fashion. 
But it is only with Christianity that God takes leave of 
space; his kingdom is no longer of this world. The dis­
sociation of nature and the divine is so complete that 
it degenerates into antagonism. At the same time, the 
concept of divinity becomes more general, and more ab­
stract, for it is formed, not of sensations, as origin­
ally, but of ideas. The God of humanity necessarily is 
less concrete than the gods of the city or the clan 
(DL:288-9). 
It is significant that Durkheim's description of the evolu­
tion of the gods, and the corresponding evolution of law and 
morality, parallels Weber's insights into the development of 
early religions. Both Durkheim and Weber--especially in his 
magisterial The Sociology of Religion (1963 and 1968) 
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--viewed the progressive tendency toward religious universal­
ism, and the corresponding decline of the primitive stereoty­
ped sacral-magical collectivized structures of conscience and 
consciousness, as one of the critical processes in sociocult­
ural evolution. In contrast to Durkheim, however, Weber search­
ed for the specific historical preconditions allowing specific 
cultural carriers of universalizing religious tendencies to 
breakthrough the primitive cosmological and ritual conscious­
ness. Significantly, even though Durkheim viewed these cumula­
tive series of specific historical breakthroughs abstractly, 
as constituting generic evolutionary processes, nonetheless, 
at certain points, he did acknowledge the uniqueness of Christ­
ian universalism, for example (see also Book Three) . 
kh' b yiewed, 1" , l'Wh1'le Dur e1m a stractLYAw1den1ng re 1910US un1versa 1sm 
as a generic evolutionary process in The Division of Labor, 
two decades later in The Elementary Forms he took greater care 
to explain how this tendency came about. At first, it might ap­
pear that Durkheim's turn to wider-than-societal frames such 
as universalistic religions and civilizations might prove in­
consistent with the foundation theorem of his school. For how 
is it possible to link universalistic cultural forms to their 
functions in a specific social body? In other words, how are 
we to anchor collective representations on the civilizational 
level to a geographically determinable social morphological 
substratum, when such symbols by definition transcend tribal 
and national boundaries? In The Elementary Forms Durkheim an­
swered by moving from the micro, intra-societal level to the 
macro-evolutionary, inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter­
temporal level. On the intra-societal level, as our investiga­
tion of his basic causal model demonstrated, Durkheim proposed 
that cultural forms symbolized the collective relationships 
of people brought into sustained interaction. Now, as once 
before when he moved from the intra-societal laTel of competi­
tion to the international division of labor, on the inter-so­
cietal or civilizational level Durkheim extended the under­
lying logic of the collectively symbolizing process to include 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--311-­
the increasingly universalistic relations between members of 
different societies; 04 as he would say, members of a new in­
ternational social life . 
... If religion is the product of social causes, how 
can we explain the individual cult and the universal­
istic character of certain religions? If it is born 
in foro externo, how has it been able to pass into the 
inner conscience of the individual and penetrate there 
ever more and more profoundly? If it is the work of 
definite and individualized societies, how has it been 
able to detach itself from them, even to the point of 
being conceived as something common to all humanity 
(EF:472)? 
Durkheim answered that the increasing cosmopolitanism of reli­
gious life and symbols is a consequence of his basic law--the 
ever-increasing extension of the radius of social energy and 
co 113ctive life. 
Neighboring tribes of a similar civilization cannot 
fail to be in constant relations with each other. All 
sorts of circumstances give an occasion for it: besides 
commerce, which is still rudimentary, there are marria­
ges; these international marriages are very common in 
Australia. In the course of these meetings, men natu­
rally become conscious of the moral relationship which 
united them.•.. If sacred beings are formed which are 
connected with no geographically determined society, 
that is not because they have an extra-social origin. 
It is because there are other groups above these geo­
graphically determined ones, whose contours are less 
clearly marked: they have no fixed frontiers, but in­
clude all sorts of more or less neighboring and rela­
ted tribes. The particular social life thus created 
tends to spread itself over an area with no definite 
limits. Naturally, the mythological personages who cor­
respond to it have the same character; their sphere of 
influence is not limited; they go beyond the particu­
lar tribes and their territory. They are the great in­
ternational gods. Now there is nothing in this situa­
tion which is peculiar to Australian societies. There 
is no people and no state which is not part of another 
society, more or less unlimited, which embraces all the 
the peoples and all the states with which the first comes 
in contact, either directly or indirectly; there is no 
national life which is not dominated by a collective life 
of an international nature. In proportion as we advance 
in history, these international groups acquire a certain 
importance and extent. Thus we see how, in certain cases, 
this universalistic tendency has been able to develop it­
self to the point of affecting not only the higher ideas 
of the religious system, but even the principles upon 
which it rests (EF:473-4). 
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Alongside these parallel passages in sociocultural evo­
lution from concrete, tribal, sacrally legitimated collective 
symbols to the later abstract, general, universalizable, dif­
ferentiated, and secularly autonomous spheres of complex cult­
ures, Durkheim posited a critical corollary movement--namely, 
the evolutionary emergence of logical thought itself. Here, 
Durkheim's view of universalization, abstraction, differentia­
tion, autonomization, and rationalization was parallel in many 
ways to Weber's view of the increasing rationalization of all 
departments of life. In contrast to those who presumed that 
the structure of logical thought was inherent in human nature, 
Durkheim set out one of the most significant and overlooked 
postulates of his entire system--namely, that the very struct­
ures of rational thought, and, in turn, the rationales under­
lying modern individualism, are themselves sociocultural his­
torical constructions. Given the inevitable extension of the 
radius of social life, and therefore progressive social morpho­
logical differentiation, then the corresponding differentia­
tion and extension of collectively symbolic cultural forms 
served as critical vehicles for the elaboration of rational­
ity and individualism. In other words, the widening of the so­
cial bond and rationalization of morality and thought proceed 
together on the world-historical level. It is, Durkheim argued, 
only the fact that these sociocultural constructions are so 
deeply sedimented in the very nature of modern complex civili­
zation that we fail to perceive their historical character. 
It has often been remarked that civilization has a 
tendency to become more rational and more logical. 
The cause is now evident. That alone is rational 
which is universal. What baffles the understanding 
is the-Particular and the concrete. Only the gener­
al is well thought of. Consequently, the nearer the 
common conscience is to particular things, the more 
it bears their imprint, the more unintelligible it 
also is*(DL:289-90). 
Now, one of Durkheim's basic dichotomies in this regard was 
the opposition between concepts and sensations. Here, this 
root dichotomy takes on a genetic-historical character, for 
Durkheim identified primitive thought with localized sensations, 
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and logical thought with more generalized, differentiated, 
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and abstracted social relationships. 
That is why primitive civilizations affect us as they 
do. Being unable to subsume them under logical princi­
ples, we succeed in seeing only bizarre and fortuitous 
combinations of heterogeneous elements. In reality, 
there is nothing artificial about them. It is necessary 
only to seek their determining causes in sensations and 
movements of sensibility, not in concepts. And if this 
is so, it is because the social environment for which 
they are made is not sufficiently extended. On the 
contrary, when civilization is ~eveloped over a vaster 
field of action, whenit is appl~d to more people and 
things, general ideas necessarily appear and become pre­
dominant there. The idea of man, for example, replaces 
in law, morality, in religion, that of Roman, which be­
ing more concrete, is refractory to science. Thus, it 
is the increase of volume in societies and their great­
er concentration which explains this great transforma­
tion (DL:290). 
True to his fundamental postulates, Durkheim here expressed 
his seminal notion that logical or rational and universally 
valid thought is itself an evolutionary emergent--a sociocul­
tural historical construction--rather than a generic given. 
In his conclusion to his masterpiece, The Elementary Forms, 
published almost two decades after The Division of Labor, 
Durkheim suggested: 
If logical thought tends to rid itself more and more 
of the subjective and personal elements which it still 
retains from its origin, it is not because extra-social 
factors have intervened; it is much rather because a 
social life of a new sort is developing. It is this-in­
ternational life which has-already resulted in univer­
salizing religious beliefs. As it extends, the collect­
ive horizon enlarges; the society ceases to appear as 
the only whole, to become a part of a much vaster one, 
with undetermined frontiers, which is susceptible of 
advancing indefinitely. Consequently, things can no 
longer be contained in the social moulds according to 
which they were primitively classified; they must be 
organized according to principles which are their own, 
so logical organization differentiates itself from the 
social organization and becomes autonomous. Really and 
truly human thought is not ~ primitive fact; it is the 
product of a history~(EF:493). 
Given the great value placed by Durkheim on these higher 
level evolutionary emergents--especially rationality and indi­
vidualism--one might conclude that such sociocultural achieve­
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ments are consciously won. However, true to his positivist 
commitments, and in direct contrast to spiritualistic or 
ethical philosophers who portray humanity as striving to 
reach ever-higher civilizational levels, Durkheim forcefully 
argued that these results are more or less mechanically pro­
duced. Far from serving as a conscious goal, these civiliza­
tional achievements are themselves mechanical results of ever­
increasing social intensity, energy, social morphological dif­
ferentiation and the progressive division of labor. 
Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of 
the changes which are produced in the volume and in 
the density of societies. If science, art, and eco­
nomic activity develop, it is in accordance with a ne­
cessity which is imposed upon men. It is because there 
is, for them, no other way of living in the new condi­
tions in which they have been placed. From the time 
that the number of individuals among whom social rela­
tions are established begins to increase, they can main­
tain themselves only by greater specialization, harder 
work, and intensification of their faculties. From this 
general stimulation, there inevitably results a much 
higher degree of culture. From this point of view, civ­
ilization appears, not as an end which moves peoples by 
its attraction for them, not as a good foreseen and de­
sired in advance .•• but as the effect of a cause, as 
the necessary resultant of a given state. It is not the 
pole towards which historical development is moving and 
to which men seek to get nearer in order to be happier 
or better, for neither happiness nor morality necessar­
ily increases with the intensity of life. They move be­
cause they must move, and what determines the speed of 
this march is the more or less strong pressure which 
they exercise upon one another, according to their num­
ber (DL:336-7). 
Toward the end of his life, Durkheim took greater care 
to develop the notion of civilization as the highest inter­
national level of sociocultural complexity. First, it is ne­
cessary to distinguish between several meanings of civiliza­
tion, especially the meaning of "high" and "low" culture as 
implied in the phrase "state of civilization" as contrasted 
with the notion of sociocultural complexity. For example, in 
The Division of Labor, and even as late 1906, Durkheim still 
used the term civilization in the first sense: 
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Civilization is the result of cooperation of men in 
association through successive'generations: it is es­
sentiallya social product .... Civilization is the as­
sembly of all the things to which we attach the high­
est price: it is the congregation of the highest human 
values (SP:54). 
Second, Durkheim was often critical of other sociologists at­
tempts to define civilizations in the second sense as a level 
of sociocultural complexity. He contended " ... that these at­
tempts, although conducted by scciologists of worth, have giv­
en only vague, indecisive results of little utility" (R:88,nO). 
For example, in "Two Laws of Penal Evolution ", Durkheim argued 
that " ... the same society can no more change its type in the 
course of its evolution, than an animal can change its species 
IIduring its own Ii fetime [1900] (1973: 2 88), and then followed 
with this footnote: 
This is why it does not seem to us to be very scienti­
fic to classify societies according to their degree of 
civilization, as both Spencer and Steinmetz have done. 
For one is then obliged to classify one and the same 
society into several social species, according to the 
political structure it has successively assumed or ac­
cording to the degree of civilization which it has pro­
gressively passed through. What would one say of a zoo­
logist who classified the same animal into different 
species in this fashion? And yet a society has even 
more than does an organism a definite character, unique 
to itself, in certain respects, from the beginning to 
the end of its existence: consequently, a system of 
classification which fails to recognize this fundamen­
tal unity seriously distorts reality. One can, of cour­
se, distinguish in this fashion between social states, 
not societies: and social states separated thus from 
the permanent substructures which binds them one to ano­
ther, rest on a foundation of air. It is therefore the 
analysis of this infrastructure, and not the changing 
ways of living which it sustains. which alone can pro­
vide the basis for a rational classification (1973:307, 
#2) • 
And in the second edition of his Rules (1901), Durkheim brief­
ly reviewed efforts such as those of the Germans Vierkandt and 
Steinment (the latter which he published in the Annee sociolo­
gique) as deficient for " •.• classifying not social species, 
but historical phases, which is quite different" (R:88). Clear­
ly, Durkheim's own thought, still beset by biological analo­
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gies, had not settled on a clear articulation of the sociolo­
gical meaning and significance of "civilization." 
It was not until 1913 that Durkheim, with the help of 
Mauss, turned attention to a fuller elaboration of this impor­
tant concept in their joint "Sur la notion de civilisation" 
published in the last Annee sociologique to appear with Durk­
heim at the editorial helm. Having just completed detailed 
analyses and explanations of the key intra-societal functions 
of collectively representational processes in The Elen~ntary 
Forms, Durkheim next turned his attention to analysis of the 
inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temporal horizons impli­
ed in the passage from concrete, stereotyped formalisms, fused 
and sacralized symbols toward universalizable cultural forms. 
With this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level 
of sociocultural process the growing recognition of the im­
portance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural forms 
marks a new and significant phase in Durkheim's development, 
albeit one which was cut short by the impending doom of World 
War I. Later, Mauss extended their original joint paper (see 
B. Nelson, 1971), and thereafter, the new thrust of Durkheim­
ian sociology influenced some of the finest writing in the 
historical and social sciences produced in France (see espe­
cially the Annales ... ) during this era (see R. Rhodes, 1974). 
Durkheim and Mauss began their important and overlooked 
"Note on the Notion of Civilization", only recently brought to 
our attention by Benjamin Nelson (1971), by observing that if 
the foundation theorem of their school was applied too narrow­
ly, then crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic cul­
tural forms constituting civilizational complexes would, unfor­
tunately, be slighted. 
One of the rules we follow here is that, in studying 
social phenomena in themselves and by themselves, we 
take care not to leave them in the air but always to 
relate them to a definite substratum, that is, to a 
human group occupying a determinate portion of geogra­
phically representable space. But, of all these groups, 
the largest--that which comprises all of the others in 
itself and which consequently comprises all forms of 
social activity--is, it would appear, that which forms 
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the political society: tribe, clan, nation, city,
 
state, and so on. It seems, then, on first view,
 
that collective life can develop only within polit­

ical organisms having definite contours, within
 
•
 
strictly marked limits, that is to say, that the
 
national life is the highest form of social phe~o­

mena and sociology cannot know one of a higher or­

der. There are, nonetheless, phenomena which do
 
not have such well-defined limits; they pass beyond
 
the political frontiers and extend over less easily
 
determinable spaces. Although their complexity ren­
ders their study difficult, it nonetheless behooves 
us to acknowledge their existence and to indicate 
their place within the bounds of sociology (1971:809). 
•
 
Ethnography and prehistory, Durkheim suggested, have stood
 
•
 
almost alone in" directing our attention to this perspect­
ive," in contrast to both history, which has taci.tly embra­

ced the nation state as its basic unit of analysis, and socio­

logy, which has looked either to sub-national social group­

• 
ings or to an abstracted "humanity" (eg. see Durkheim' s re­
peated criticisms of Comte on this matter in The Rules). 
Now, this important recognition of certain potential 
limitations in the basic explanatory rule of their school re­
presents not so much an abandonment of this rule on the part 
of Durkheim and Mauss, as a crucial turning point in the ex­
tension of their basic interpretive logics to new and more 
• 
significant levels of complexity. Durkheim had previously 
prepared the way for this important extension by his early in­
sistence that universal, abstract, and rational collective re­
presentations take on increasing significance in sociocultural 
• 
evolution in that they come to symbolize the new emerging inter­
national social life. Universalizable symbols--those capable 
of constituting civilizational complexes--express public re­
cognition of the growing bonds between members of diverse so­
• 
cieties. 
• 
Social phenomena that are not strictly attached to a 
social organization do exist: they extend into areas 
that reach beyond the national territory or they devel­
op over periods of time that exceed the history of a 
single society. They have a life which is some ways 
supranational (1971:810) • 
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Durkheim and Mauss utilized the Indo-European family 
of languages to illustrate the significance of these crucial 
inter-societal, inter-temporal matrices of complex sociocul­
tural life. If we limit ourselves simply to societal or sub­
cultural analyses, we inevitably cut ourselves off from these 
wider horizons. This failure becomes more critical when we 
realize that, in general, higher levels of complexity exert 
greater influence on lower levels through time than vice versa. 
it has been recognized that phenomena which pre­
sent this degree of extension are not independent of 
one another; they are generally linked in an inter­
dependent system. It often occurs that one of these 
phenomena involves the others and reveals their exist­
ence .... All peoples who speak an Indo-European lang­
uage have a common fund of ideas and institutions. 
There exist not merely isolated instances, but also 
complex and interdependent systems, which without be­
ing limited to a determinate political organism are, 
however, localizable in time and space (1971:810). 
Durkheim and Mauss assigned the term "civilization" to these 
higher order of translocal sociocultural facts, and defined 
them thus: "A civilization constitutes a kind of moral milieu 
encompassing a certain number of nations, each national cult­
ure being only a particular form of the whole" (1971:811). 
However, these theorists proceeded further, and noted the here­
tofore neglected advantages of the civilizational perspective. 
All sorts of problems, neglected until now, could be 
connected with this subject. One could ask what are 
the diverse conditions which determine variations in 
the areas of civilizations, why have they stopped here 
or there, what forms they have taken and what factors 
determine these forms. As Ratzel has shown, these ques­
tions that are asked concerning political frontiers 
could be posed equally well with respect to symbolic 
frontiers (frontieres ideales) (1971:812). 
Indeed, Durkheim and Mauss's deep concern with the evolution­
ary emergence of these ascending orders of "symbolic frontiers" 
led them to conclude: 
... civilization only expresses a collective life of a 
special genre, the substratum of which is a plurality 
of interrelated political bodies acting upon one ano­
ther. International life is merely social life of a 
higher kind, and one which sociology needs to know . 
... The exclusion of sociology from these studies would 
never have been considered if it were not still 
•
 
• 
--319-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
believed that to explain a civilization one need 
merely ask whence it comes, from what it has bor­
rowed, and by what means it has passed from one 
point to another. In reality, the true manner of 
understanding all this is to determine the causes 
of which it is the result, that is to say, what col­
lective interactions of diverse orders produced it 
(1971:813). 
Further, Durkheim and Mauss emphasized the differential 
susceptibility of various structural and cultural elements to 
inter-cultural and evolutionary sedimentation into the socio­
cultural process on the civilizational level. 
Furthermore, not all social phenomena are equally apt 
to internationalize themselves. Political jurisdictions, 
juridical institutions, the phenonena of social morphol­
ogy constitute part of the specific character of each 
people. On the other hand, the myths, tales, money, com­
merce, fine arts, techniques, tools, languages, words, 
scientific knowledge, literary forms, and ideas--all of 
these travel and are borrowed. In short, they result 
from a process involving more than a determinate society 
(1971:812) • 
Durkheim and Mauss emphasized here a critical dimension in 
inter-civilizational process, for by their very nature, high­
er level cultural forms symbolizing links between diverse so­
cieties must rise above all tribalistic particularities to an 
increasingly universalizable level. A year earlier in the con­
clusion to The Elementary Forms, Durkheim took care to dis­
tinguish universality (or universalizability) from generality, 
or the degree of extension of a concept. 
The universality of the concept should not be confused 
with its generality; they are very different things. 
What ~ mean ~ universality is the property which the 
the concept has of being conununicable to ~ number of 
minds, and in principle, to all minds; but this com­
municability is wholly independent of the degree of its 
extension. A concept which is applied to only one ob­
ject, and whose extension is consequently at the mini­
mum, can be the same for everybody: such is the case 
with the concept of a deity* (EF:482, #9). 
Thus, a universalizable cultural form is one which is capa­
ble of symbolizing inter-societal, inter-temporal phenomena; 
universalizable symbols lie at the very heart of the civili­
zational bond. Durkheim and Mauss developed further this cru­
cial criterion of degrees of potential universal conununicabil­
•
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ity or universalizability among the various social facts as 
• 
more or less successful candidates for incorporation into 
the civilizational process. They noted that certain types of 
cultural elements, by their very nature, are predisposed to 
this very important process of inter-cultural and inter-tem­
poral sedimentation. 
•
 
It is justifiable, then, to ask on what this unequal co­

efficient of expansion and internalization depends. These
 
differences are not determined solely by the intrinsic
 
nature of the social phenomena, but also by the diverse
 
conditions influencing societies. A certain form of col­

lective life, then, mayor may not be susceptible to in­

ternationalization depending on these circumstances.
 
•
 
Christianity is essentially international, but there have
 
also been strictly national religions. There are some
 
languages which are spread across vast territories~ there
 
are others which serve to distinguish nationalities, as
 
is the case with those spoken by the great peoples of
 
Europe (1971:812).
 
Durkheim and Mauss's potentially profound contribution 
here to the sociological theory of collective representations 
•
 
as key constitutive sociocultural processes on the civiliza­

tional level needs only the notion of cultural-historical 
traditions to become one of the most valuable perspectives 
in the human sciences of the future. l 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PERSON THROUGH HISTORY
• Introduction. At the outset, a paradox presents itself: how 
is it possible that the Durkheim who is portrayed as ~~al­
ly anti-individualist was also the very same thinker whose 
• 
centr~ value in the modern world was the human person? How 
could Durkheim deny the individual independent status, and 
then enshrine him at the core of modern culture? How could 
• 
Durkheim, at one and the same time, authorize society as the 
foundation of human life, and then apotheosize the "modern 
cult of the individual"? Do these seemingly contradictory po­
sitions not bespeak of an ineradicable inconsistency in Durk­
heim's thought which vitiates its value? 
•
 
Rather than demonstrating Durkheim at his worst, how­

ever, perhaps these positions reveal him at his best. For, as 
always, Durkheim sought to dialectically reconcile such anti­
•
 
nomies in terms of a new and higher sociocultural synthesis.
 
In transcending the limits of these received dichotomies,
 
Durkheim sought to build a new foundation for the human scien­
ces resting on the twin anchors of socio-10gic and evolution­
ary progress. Problems in understanding this apparent combi­
• 
nation of opposites are really ours, not Durkheim's. For we 
are so much the heirs of a strong tradition of individualism, 
~ ,....- . . ......--.--.. 
of atomism and logical nominalism, that we implicitly assume
-'---' 
there to be an inherent, ineradicable antagonism between the 
individual and society. As Louis Dumont (1965, 1970) suggests, 
our rather unique presuppositions may blind us to differing 
notions of personhood in other cultures; moreover, they may 
blind us to the sometimes destructive results of our own deep­
est moral commitments. 
Stemming especially from Enlightenment notions of "nat­
~-, ­ ...-...----­
ural reason," "natural rights," and the "social contract," we 
----... ~ 
-------
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tend t~be1ieve that the individual precedes society, that 
the individual is self-sufficient, and that social norms and 
•
.cultural rules serve mainly to restrict the natural freedom 
of individuals. Indeed, freedom is often portrayed primarily 
in negative terms such as liberation, as snedding of controls, 
release from the "ancient servitudes," from the irrational 
• constraints of blood, soil, tradition, and Church. Thus, our 
modern negative images of freedom as release from control 
rest on two essential corollaries: the notion of a self-sub­
sistent ego which is the real source of moral virtue and the 
• foundation of certain knowledge, and a state of nature in 
which this ego dwells. Freedom today, therefore, implies the 
release of the individual ego from irrational traditional so­
cial constraints, and return to its pre-established interior 
• harmonies. Conceived with this rhetorical bias, then, freedom in positive terms means largely the spontaneous acting out of 
impulse and primary process, of total simultaneous integration 
of body and mind, of immediate consummation of desire. In the 
• 1970's, at least in America, the Religion of The Self is deep­
ened through the endless pursuit of myriad ingenious "thera­
peutics" designed to shed all distorting external constraints, 
and to restore the Self to its natural harmony. Starting from 
• 
~ 
the lone, isolated ego, solipsism becomes the tacit epistem­
ology, and narcissism our lived ethic. 
The sources of this vast ~ransva1uation of values" are 
many~ but their very diversity and pervasiveness reinforces 
the dynamic mainline of development. The intimate linkage be­
~• ­
tween "Re.-Qson" an~dividua1" in Rationa1ist_~nd Utilitar­
ian philosophy alike, and between the "Individual," subject­
ivity, and the inner emotions of angst in Romantic and Ideal­
• istic philosophy and art, both placed great emphasis on the generic individual. And Durkheim spoke of his own countrymen 
.. 
as "lore wolves, given to a fierce individualism, and suspi­
.. _.~.~._- ~ 
cious......,..i-s-o-1-a-fion." But what these various cultural traditions,
• in their common opposition to the social organicism and inter­personal ethics of the lingering Catholic cultural tradition, 
had placed so high, Durkheim placed low with his notion of 
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the irrationality and insatiability of the pre-social ego. 
Now, it may help to recall that the critical problem
• faced by the pioneers of early modern cultures was a compel­
ling response to massive crises of human certainty and cert­
itude. In the transitional passage to the modern era, haunt­
ing questions widely asked included: "How shall I know if I
• am saved? How do we know anything to be true? How shall we 
gain certain knowledge1'During that time which Huizanga call­
ed "the waning of the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed 
"the Counter-Renaissance," skepticism, fideism, and probabil­
• ism, and so forth held the day. Against this background, var­
ious priestly and prophetic figures, various ascetics and mys­
tics, rose up to proclaim new and mighty objective certain­
ties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certitude in the hu­
• man subject, such pioneers of early modern cultures as Luth­
er, Calvin, the spiritual radicals, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, 
Locke, Leibnitz, and so forth (whatever their myriad other 
differences), all relied on a deeply interior faith, or feel­
• ing, the inherent rationality of the human mind, or some in­
ner experience-of an equally irreducible - sort. In these para­
llel solutions, the religion of the "inner light" and the 
significance of the Self was raised to new heights. Thus,
• for example, Luther's response to the feeling of pervasive 
evil, of total guilt, and anxiety about his own salvation 
led him to the doctrine of justification by faith alone 
(sola fide). Descartes' response to skepticism and the reign­
• ing "fictionalism" of the Church establishment was to have re­
course to a rigorous mathematical clarity anchored in the ir­
c--- _-----­
reducible self-consciousness of the ego (cogito, ergo sum). 
And in a slightly different manner, Calvin's notion of the
• predestined elect and the Puritan's "automachia" (Bercovitch, 
1975) reinforced the same trend. With these pioneers of the 
modern moral universe, there begins that momentous "journey 
into the interior" which also pervades Montaigne's essays,
• Pascal's frightened existential lon~iness and conversion, 
the Elizabethan's melancholic malaise seen in Hamlet's anx­
iety without a true "objective correlative," Leibnitz's mon­
•
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ads, Hobbes' atomism and nominalism, Locke's empiricism, the 
Scottish moralists' "conunon se~e" a~ the unbrIdled egoism
• of the Utilitarian reformers, Rousseau's romanticism of feel­
ing, and on through the various metamorphoses of the Trans­
cendental Self of the idealists such as Kant, Fichte, Hegel, 
and so many others. In the modern era, then, the anchor of 
• legitimate moral and intellectual authority shifts decisive­
ly away from the intelligibility of the natural world mirror­
ed in man's reason (logos), from tradition, from Church, from 
community, to the morally autonomous and intellectually re­
• sponsible Subject. 
In his profound extension of Durkheim's work on the 
evolution of the person through history, Marcel Mauss, after 
tracing the progressive sedimentation of the notion of per­
• sonhood, for instance, speaks of the importance of the phil­
• 
osophy of the Transcendental Ego in the last couple of cen­
turies. 
However, the notion of the person had to undergo yet 
another transformation to become what it has become 
in less than one and a half centuries, the category 
of the ego. Far from being the primordial, innate i­
dea, clearly inscribed since Adam in the most pro­
found depth of being, here it continues almost to our 
day, slowly raising itself, clarifying, specifying,
• 
identifying itself with knowledge of the self, with 
the psychological consciousness <l968:477) • 
We enter here a new moral universe. Not only is this
- ......_----­
• 
moral subject autonomous, but it is also, and this proved 
decisive, self-reliant by virtue of the "personal charisma" 
•
 
of its own "inner light." The same notion lay, of course,
 
at the heart of the "Protestant principle;" truth and free­

dom in the '1»rotes~nt-Era" (Ti11ich, 1957) carne to be seen
 
as the inherent possession or discovery of this moral sub­

ject, this intellectual and self-sufficient monad. Here a­
gain, Mauss, after Durkheim, sounds an important theme in 
the cultural-historical connections between religion and 
• 
secular ideas which brings us close to Weber and which we 
shall explore at greater length in Book Three. For ~!auss ex­
plicitly suggests some crucial connections between the sec­
•
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tarian currents of the post-Reformation period and the Roman­
tic-Idealistic philosophers and moralists. 
• The importance of the sectarian movements in the form­
• 
ation of political and philosophical thought through­
out the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries could not 
be exaggerated. There the questions of individual lib­
erty, of individual conscience, of the right to commun­
icate directly with God, to be one's own minister, to 
have an internal God, were posed. The notions of the 
Moravian Brethren, of the Puritans, the Wesleyans, the 
Pietists, are those which form the base on which the 
notion of the person-ego, ego-conscience, is establish­
ed and is the primordial category there (l968:478). 
• 
After secularization, Enlightenment rationalism and Romantic 
angst and Idealism-?ema1ned rooted in the residues of this 
"inner light mysticism" in terms of each individual's private 
"stock of reason" granted him by nature, the Romantic Self, 
•
 
and so on (see especially Benjamin Nelson, 1965c).
 
•
 
Hence, to a great exten~modern ethics, as well as mod­

ern epistemology largely rest on this hidden, though funda­

mental, notion of the autonomous and self-reliant "inner
 
light." Therefore, conventional epistemological distinctions
 
between rationalism and empiricism, for instance, are not 
fully revealing in these terms. For the common foundations 
of these major modern cultural traditions are based on a new 
•
 
sense of self, a new moral and intellectual subject; in truth,
 
a New Model Man. Indeed, only on such a basis could so much 
be set aside, and modern philosophy predicate itself on the 
autonomous, isolated, self-subsistent ego, floating in space, 
•
 
endowed with rationality, and able to directly intuit or ex­

perience the essential structures of the world. It is on such 
a basis that the ill-fated program of constructing a presup­
positionless philosophy has failed, again and again. 
• 
Against this whole background, then, Durkheim took up 
an entirely different stance, a revolutionary position. He 
argued: "We have no justification for supposing that our mind 
has within it at birth, completely formed, the prototype of 
• 
the elementary frameworks of classification" (PC: 8). But the 
deeply embedded notion of the generic ego endowed with a self­
guiding rationality shining by virtue of its own inviolable 
•
 
---
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
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"inner light" was difficult for Durkheim IS socio-logic to 
dislodge because this counter-logic ~ ultimately rooted 
in ~ rhetorically inspired counter-ethic. Durkheim was in­
sightful to observe that the rel!sio~ and epistemology of 
the ~f is a modern cultural i~stitution; ­for the generic 
ego as the prime repository of an innate moral sense and a 
calculus of rationality depends on the prior negation of 
!radition and the delegitimat10n and s~ng away of the 
authority of culture. Perhaps this is what is felt by so 
many to be at stake in these "realist" versus "nominalist" 
debates--namely, the implicit (and I believe misleading) 
symbolic equation between rationality, individualism, and 
~ 
freedom. In his program to dissolve the presumption of a ne­
cessary connection between nominalist premises, on the one 
hand, and rationality, freedom, and the value of the human 
person on the other, Durkheim had to move first against the 
unwarranted conflation of ego and person, and insist instead 
on the social construction of p:rson~ood, rationa~ity, and 
freedom. 
---- Perhaps we might term Durkheim's revolution in this 
forensic context the "social ·realism breakthrough," or the 
enshrinement of a "social reality principle" (eg. see B. 
Nelson, 1962 ). Now, as we discovered earlier in this Book 
(see also Book Three, part I), Durkheim set out to unravel 
the received systems of symbolic equations on both the ·gen­
eric and genetic-evolutionary levels. On the first level of 
universal or generic elements, Durkheim's doctrine of man as 
homo duplex rhetorically incorporated the autonomous ego of 
the Utilitarians, Rationalists, and Romantics alike, but at 
a lower level. By inverting its high valuation, Durkheim 
transformed the ego into the negative pole of his world-view. 
The socially constructed person was counterposed to the or­
ganic ego as the soul had once been contrasted with the body. 
Ego is to person as body was to soul. Durkheim symbolically 
equated the sacred with social norms and the moralized per­
son, on the one hand, and the profane with dispersed egos en­
gaged in mundane, self-centered, merely utilitarian tasks on 
•
 
--
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the other. Thus, on the abstract, generic level, Durkheim 
regarded the pre-social individual or organic ego as the neg­
ative carrier of in~atiable and egoistic passions (or at 
... .. I 
least, as the locus of privatized passions). On the same lev­
el, he portrayed society as the source of moral discipline, 
legitimate__ authority, reason, concepts, universalizable rules, 
r--- _-­
and so on and so forth. 
Now, in one sense Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation 
of a key image of his opponents (even though inverted) must 
be considered a clever, though Ultimately misconceived, for­
ensic device since he thereby admitted in the backdoor some 
of the very elements against which he had so resolutely tak­
en up arms in the first place (see also Book Three, part I). 
Nonetheless, in a different way, Durkheim's distinctions rep­
resented an inspired dialectical move. Giddens provides an 
important clue to the deeper significance of Durkheim's ef­
forts in distinguishing between the generic ego and the socio­
culturally and historically constructed person when he in­
sists: "Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach 
'liberal individualism,' regarded as a conception of the char­
acteristics of the modern social order, from 'methodological 
individualism'" (1971b:210). 
The deeper intellectual and cu1~ura1 ramifications of 
Durkheim's revolution in thought become more clear and com­
pelling if we recognize that for centuries the progressive 
mainlines of European thought had tacitly presumed there to 
be necessary inner logical, ethical, and historical connect­
ions between so-called "methodological individualism" and 
.,- ---., ---­
atomism (more precisely, logical nominalism) and its suppo­
..--­
sed epistemological correlates of Pragmatic or Utilitarian 
empiricism, and its ethical corre1ates----o¥-:individua1- freedom, 
liberal democracy, and the "Universal Rights of Man" (see 
also Lukes, 1968, 1969, 1973). Thus, on the generic level, 
Durkheim set out to dissolve these symbolic equations by 
first denying isolated egos these claimed virtues and assign­
ing them instead to society and culture. As Lukes notes " ••• 
[Durkheim] sought ••• to cut the conceptual knot that has fre­
•
 
• 
--328-­
quently been held to tie methodological individualism to 
liberalism, asserting both the autonomy of sociology and the
• sacredness of the individual" (1969:19). The generic ego be­
came the repository of negative, rather than positive, values 
such as insatiable sensual appetites, irrationality, and so 
forth--in short, of anomie and egoisme.
• On the historical level, Durkheim insisted: "It is on­
ly by historical analysis that we can discover what makes up 
man, since it is only in the course of history that he is 
formed" (DHN:325). Recall, again, that one of the positions
• held by Durkheim's rationalist brethren against which he po­
lemicized so vigorously and successfully (eg. see The Elemen­
tary Forms) was the supposition that "Reason" is a generic 
human faculty, embedded by nature within the isolated, ab­
• stract Ego. On the contrary, Durkheim argued, the fundamen­
tal categories of human thought itself, and indeed the very 
notion of the person, are social and cultural and especially 
historical constructions. ~, Du~m's key thesis WhiCh\
• we shall presently explore is that the person emerges through 
history. 
On the genetic-evolutionary level, Durkheim portrayed 
the individual as part of two opposite social conditions at
• the two ends of history. In primitive societies, the indivi­
dual's sense of self is necessarily submerged in the group; 
it is permeated by the fused sacro-magical collective con­
science. In evolutionary terms, we witness the progressive
• awakening of structures of conscience and con­
sciousness, or the emergence of the person. Individual auto­
nomy and responsibility progressively emerge with societal 
differentiation. Indeed, the de-collectivization of struct­
• ures of responsibility forms a central theme throughout all 
of Durkheim's sociology. Far from being embedded in generic 
human nature, the modern cult of the morally autonomous and 
intellectually responsible person is rather a critically im­
• portant sociocultural historical construction. 
But how could the individual be at one and the same 
time considered basically amoral and the evolutionary object 
•
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and expression of a higher morality? No real paradox obtains, 
however, since Durkheim's philosophical notion of the pre-so­
• cial or organic ego was couched on the generic or universal 
level, while, on the other hand, his notion of moralized in- \ 
dividualism as a sociocultural emergent was cast on the evo­
lutionary and historical level. The first image represents a
• generic given, while the second image concerns the construct­
ion of the autonomous moral conscience and consciousness as 
the preeminent value of the modern world. Durkheim clearly 
saw that instead of being primarily rooted as fixed faculties
• in the generic ego, modern universalistic and rational class­
ificatory systems had undergone a long and difficult evolution 
which they could not themselves adequately explain in terms 
of their own premises. Modern science and philosophy, of
• course, have great trouble explaining their own histories in 
terms of their own special premises; Hegel saw this clearly. 
The inner key to the evolution of societies and their symbol­
ic systems is the link between the extension of the social
• bond, widening fraternization, and rationalization and univer­
salization of classificatory systems, and thus, of the founda­
tions of the structures of legitimate moral and intellectual 
authority. Scientific rationality, and even the logic upon
• which it rests, then, is itself a comparatively modern cultur­
al institution! 
Those who uncritically embrace the conventional por­
trait of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching
• for the generic bases of social order and control may find 
themselves puzzled by the fact that Durkheim did not urge a 
return to the "value consensus" of pri~Ye "mechanical sol­
idarity." After all, to Durkheim, wasn't society all and the
• individual nothing? Isn't this positYCn inherently conserva­
tive? On the contrary, as ~n 
'-
Enlightenment liberal, Durkheim's 
_..--.--. 
central value was the autonomy and rationality of th;:human 
person. What he calle'd "moral individualism," as embodied for 
example in Christian ethics, especially in its Protestant• 
- ­
varieties and certain secular variants (eg. "The Rights of 
Man," see his "Individualism and the Intellectuals," transla­
•
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ted by Lukes, 1969) was his central value system. At no 
point did Durkheim urge a return to the "repressive" prim­
• itive,sacra1-magical complex.
 
Like his rhetorical opponents, Durkheim retained the
 
modern cult of the human person (la personne humain)as the
 
prime source of value integration in modern "organic soli­

• darity." Durkheim's perennial moral dialectic between person,
 
society, and history led him to seek to balance these rela­

tionships in a way never before fully-ach1eved--namely, by
 
resc~both the moral solidarity of archaic societies and

• the respect for the person generated by societal differentia­

tion and the division of labor. The dialectical~ce he
 
sought can be found neither in the "excessive individualisms"
 
of modern society, nor in the "insufficient indIViduation"

• of "mechanical solidarity."
 
In sum, instead of the pre-social individual as the
 
prime carrier of modern values, Durkheim polemicized against
 
his opponents' enshrinement of the organic ego, the lower and

• lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amora}, egocentric,
 
driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly destruct­
ive. In the process,--Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of 
derivation of autonomous individualism from "realist" rather
• than "nominalist" "premises. Hence, Durkheim's insistence on 
a negative image of the isolated generic ego, and his trans­
ference of the source of moral goodness to society, coupled 
with his corresponding postulate that moral individualism,
• far from being a human universal, is rather a sociocu~tura1 
historical construction, snapped apart the tacit, but deeply 
-,,-- -­
rooted,prevailing presupposition of certain necessary inner 
links between logical nominalism and moral and political au­
• tonomy. Durkheim thus severed the inner symbolic links between 
these doctrines in mediating between preceding cultural tradi­
tions by rejecting certain points and incorporating others in 
a revised form in a new and more compelling model. A bold and
• powerful doctrine, indeed, and one that, to judge from the 
still pervasive presumption of the necessity of the inner sym­
bolic connections which Durkheim set out to dissolve, has 
•
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still to be understood in its full significance. I repeat: 
Durkheim demonstrated the possibility of derivation of auto­
• nomous or moralized individualism from "realistic" or "so­
cially organic" premises. This was one of Durkheim's most 
profound revolutions in the human sciences. 
• 
Now, the long-standing critique of Durkheim as a kind 
of Platonizing metaphysician of society--an extreme hyposta­
tizing social realist--persists in the still popular render­
ing of Durkheim as stridently anti-individualist (but see 
•
 
Chapter Four of this Book). Agains~misleading image,
 
Anthony Giddens rightly suggests:~ -­
Most secondary observers of Durkheim have failed to 
connect his analytical discussion (and rejection) of 
individualism as a methodological approach to social
• theory with his developmental conception of the emer­gence of individualism as a morality brought into be­
ing by the growth of the differentiated division of 
labor •••• Durkheim is often regarded as being fervent­
ly anti-individualist. But his works contain a vigor­
ous defense of individualism--understood in a speci­
• fic way .••• Durkheim's writings represent an attempt to detach "liberal individualism" regarded as a con­
ception o~the characteristics of the modern social 
order, from "methodological individualism" (l97lb:2l0).
-_.--. 
Hence, the misleading, but still pervasive, image of Durkheim 
• as hostile to individualism must now give way to more subtly inflected distinctions drawn between "the various meanings as­
signed by Durkheim to the term "individual" on both the gen­
eric and genetic-evolutionary levels (see Chapter Two; also 
• Lukes, 1973:21-2; Giddens, 1971b:2l7). This final chapter of Book One on the emergence of the 
person through history strives to pull together the various 
strands of our review of the substantive "nuclear structure" 
• of Durkheim's work on both the generic and genetic-evolution­
ary levels as presented thus far; and it also serves as a 
transition between these considerations and the potent ambig­
uities to be discovered in switching from Durkheim's first to 
• second schema of suicide as developed in Books Two and Three. 
It also helps to set up our investigation into the historical 
and cultural roots of anomie and egoisme in BookThree. In our 
•
 
•
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present synthetic effort, the essence of our analysis centers 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
on these theses: 
(1)	 the person, as contrasted with the ego, is socially 
and culturally constructed; 
(2)	 as societies evolve, so too does the notion of the 
person; 
(3)	 greater social fraternization, and the corresponding 
extension of the social bond, coupled with greater 
rationalization and universalization in the grounds 
of moral and intellectual discourse, leads to greater 
autonomization of the person. 
In light of the preceding chapters, then, let us turn first to 
consider crucial facets and phases in the generic phenomenolo­
gies of personhood. Then we shall move to our main considera­
tion here--Durkheim's notion of the ev~n of the person
through history.	 --­
---.-.._­
A.	 Generic Phenomenologies of Personhood 
Preface. What is the person? What is personhood? Person, per­
~' impersonate. From such associations, Norman O. Brown 
weaves a highly negative view of the person which is very dif­
ferent than Durkheim's position. Noting the standard etymolo­
gical and social psychological perspectives, Brown (1966) be­
gins his discussion of personhood in terms of the persona as 
a mask, a disguise, used by actors--that is, characters or 
roles--in a social drama. 
Personality is persona, a mask. The world is a stage, 
the self a theatrical creation •••• The self does not 
belong to its possessor •.•• It is all psychodrama •••• 
Personality is a social fiction, and name a magical in­
vocation of a particular role in social drama •••• Char­
acter is not innate: a man's character is his demon, 
his tutelar spirit; received in a dream. His character 
is his destiny, which is to act out his dream •••• The 
dream stuff out of which personality is made is not 
private, but social; a collective dream•••• The only 
soul is the group-soul, and this consists of nothing 
but group functions •••. Personality is not innate, but 
acquired. Like a mask, it is a thing, a fetish or com­
modity •••• Stereotypes. All personality is rigid .••• 
Names and personalities are fixed by archetypal persons 
and situations; the voices coming through the masks are 
always ancestral voices •••• The ego is public relations • 
••• In the Last Judgment, the apocalyptic fire will burn 
•
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• 
up the masks, and the theater, not leaving a rack be­
hind. Freud came to give the show away •••• The ego is 
a "me-fabrication," a piece of illusion (Uaya), which 
disintegrates at the moment of illumination •••• The 
• 
insane are closer to the truth•.•• (Ch. 5, ~'s Body,' 
1966) • 
Assuming that separation is the root of evil, and thus deny­
ing the "social reality principle," dwelling instead in intra­
psychic primary process, and preparing for an imminent apoca­
lypse of the body, it is no wonder that Brown's metaphysics 
and ethics leave the notion of the person little existential 
•
 
or historical validity.
 
1. Ego and Person 
• 
Contrary to Brown's position, the first step toward a 
viable sociocultural understanding of personhood is to system­
• 
atically distinguish between ego and person. We shall here 
take the term "ego" to refer to that centered bundle of drives 
in each organism which is concerned primarily with survival-­
with food, dominance, sex, flight, and so forth. Hence, we 
may justifiably speak of the pre-social or organic ego. The 
person, on the other hand, as designated by a name for in­
stance, is a sociocultural emergent, not to be primarily un­
• 
derstood in biological or even bio-psychological terms. The 
ego is given, the person is constructed. Since sociocultural, 
the notion of the person implies a primary concern with the 
internalization and objectivation of rules and meanings, with 
• 
questions of morality and knowledge, right and wrong, truth 
and error. In his later works, Ourkheim was careful to make 
this crucial distinction between ego and person. 
We say our individuality and not our personality. Al­
though the two words are often used synonymously, they
• 
must be distinguished with the greatest possible care, 
for the personality is made up essentially of supra­
individual elements (OHN:339). 
Years later, Paul Henri Chombart de Lauwe still had to attempt 
to clarify this crucial distinction:
• Ourkheim's insistence on the existence of society in­dependently of the sum of individuals is related to his 
subsequent position that the individual is only a recep­
tacle and that the important thing is the emergence of 
•
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the person. Many errors concerning Durkheim's socio­
logy come, we believe, from the lack of attention 
• 
given to this cardinal distinction between the in­
dividual and the person, and to the transition from 
one to the other (1966:239, #2). 
And in The Elementary Forms, Durkheim remarked: 
It is not at all true that we are more personal as 
• 
we become more individualized. The two terms are in 
no way synonymous: in one sense, they oppose more 
than they imply one another. Passion individualizes, 
yet it also enslaves. Our sensations are essentially 
individual; yet we are more personal the more we are 
freed from our senses and able to think and act with 
• 
concepts. 50 those who insist upon all the social 
elements of the individual do not mean by that to 
• 
deny or debase the personality. They merely refuse to 
confuse it with the fact of individuation (EF:307-8). 
Thus, the image of man as homo duplex, as two levelledi 
lies at the very foundation of Durkheim's sociocultural vi­
• 
sion of morality, religion, and knowledge. Civilized man is 
"double." On the lower level, there is the organic ego; on 
the upper story there is the socialized person informed and 
directed by collective moral rules and intellectual concepts. 
• 
Social man is superimposed over top of physical man. These 
images remain the valid core of Durkheim's doctrine of man 
as homo duplex; indeed, while I shall dif-fer from Durkheim 
in regard to his negative characterization of the organic 
ego (see Book One, part I), I do consider some such disti.nct­
ion between ego and person as a foundation theorem for the 
human sciences. Indeed, the mind/body Cartesian dualism can 
• 
then become resolved on a higher and different level. For 
as Mauss proposed, the person is a category of the human 
spirit (Ie esprit humain). 
• 
2. Conscience and Consciousness 
At the very core of the notion of personhood are found 
the twin notions of conscience and consciousness (see Chapter 
Three of this Book). If we adopt a sociocultural phenomenolo­
• 
gy of the person, we shall investigate how structures of con­
science and consciousness are constructed through a deepening 
awareness of good and evil, right and wrong, and of truth and 
•
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error. Since structures of conscience and consciousness are 
key anchors to group process, Durkheim anchored the awaken­
• ing of moral rules and intellectual concepts in terms of 
group implosions. Egos are moralized and turned into subjects 
by contact with strong social and cultural energies. When a 
"critical mass" is reached, a moral implosion occurs, cultur­
al energies generated and released, and egos are transformed 
into persons. Culture redirects nature; culture is to nature 
as person is to ego. Thus, awareness of good and evil, of 
truth and error, right and wrong, awakemthrough collective
• symbolic process. Conscience and consciousness are the key 
phenomenological poles of cultural process. 
Now, Durkheim's usage of the ambiguities inherent in
 
the French terms conscience and representation implied both

• noun and verb-like aspects of sociocultural and phenomenolo­

gical process. The intimate linkage between conscience and
 
consciousness in terms of the noun and verb-like meanings
 
of representation--as both cultural object and process--is

• a crucial perspective which is central to the human sciences.
 
•
 
The fruitful ambiguities inherent in these key Durkheimian
 
terms led him to a fundamentally different, and more profound,
 
perception of sociocultural and phenomenological process than
 
the perspectives today which split apart the cultural object,
 
•
 
generating group, constitutive symbolizing process, and phe­

nomenological experience. Durkheim saw these as primarily
 
relational, as merely separable elements in the on-going hu­

man equation.
 
Thus, in Durkheim's foundational sociocultural theory,
 
the logics of moral decision and the moralities of intellect­

ual judgment are always and everywhere intimately intertwin­

• ed. The moralities of thought and the logics of action are
 
always linked together and to the structure and process of 
COllectivities. For instance, Durkheim suggested: 
• 
Even if we believe that religious and moral represen­
tations constitute the essential elements of the idea 
of the soul, still we do not mean to say that they 
are the only ones. Around this central nucleus are 
grouped other states of consciousness having this same 
•
 
•
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character, though to a slighter degree. This is the 
case with all the superior forms of the intellectual 
life, owing to the special price and dignity attribu­
ted to them by society. When we devote our lives to 
science or art, we feel that we are moving in a cir­
cle of things that are above bodily sensations .•.• 
This is why the highest functions of the intelligence 
have always been considered specific manifestations 
of the soul (EF:298-99, #123). 
Indeed, the twin notions of conscience and consciousness con­
stitute key links in Durkheim's system between different his­
torical forms of society and culture and different phenomen­
ologies of the person on the one hand, and Durkheim's corres­
ponding theses on the nature, origin, and development of mo­
rality, religion, and knowledge on the other. And we propose, 
in general, that fundamental changes in the structures of 
conscience often precede fundamental changes in the structures 
of consciousness. Therefore, one central facet of sociocultur­
al inquiry should focus on basic shifts in the collective 
foundations of legjtimate moral and intellectual authority. 
3. Collective Symbolic Process 
Now, Durkheim proposed: "Social life in all its aspects, 
and in every period of its history, is made possible only 
through a vast symbolism" (EF:264). Man makes himself through 
the genetic medium of collective symbolic process. Man is the 
creature who dwells within his own images. The evolution of 
culture and the eVOlution of man are contemporaneous. Culture 
is like social DNA, for it serves as a symbolic guidance sys­
tem. Every society has a symbolically expressed system of know­
ledge and values. Culture is the prime symbolic meaning and 
directive system of a group. Collective symbolic forms pro­
vide ready-made classificatory and interpretive frameworks 
for individual thought, feeling, and group action. Culture 
structures decision, and organizes and energizes human action. 
Societies and persons are constructed and sustained only 
through the action of long-term collective symbolic processes. 
Public process is symbolic process over time and space. 
Now, the key link between what Durkheim called substruct­
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--337-­
tural social morphological process and superstructural sym­
bolic process was his notion of "moral or dynamic density." 
Durkheim postulated that "collective effervescence" leads 
to a kind of "moral implosion" which results from the in­
tense interaction. When a "critical mass" is reached, a 
kind of communion ensues; the resulting fusion into a com­
mon consciousness generates extra-ordinary energies which 
transform the isolated and privatized ego into a socially 
in-formed person. 
With animals, the organism assimilates social facts 
to it, stripping them of their special nature, and 
transforms them into biological facts. Social life 
is materialized. In man, on the contrary, and parti­
cularly in higher societies, social causes substitute 
themselves for organic causes. The organism is spiri­
tualized (DL:346). 
The organic cage is left behind; man ascends "from the king­
dom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (Engels, in Evans­
Pritchard, 1965: 61). The center of the individual's exist­
ence thus comes to revolve not around private passions, but 
around public prescriptions. With this implosion and crystal­
lization into symbolic consciousness, society and culture are 
born as entirely new levels of emergent world-activity. 
Through this evoluti.onary breakthrough, society and culture· 
are energized, thereafter to redirect organic activities. 
Through this communion or fusion process, the duality of hu­
man nature is constructed, and the person--as opposed to the 
ego--emerges. Society and person are twin-born; they are mu­
tual co-creations, and symbolic culture acts as the mid-wife. 
In sum, society and culture become the center of moral and 
conceptual life, having their key phenomenological anchors 
in the newly created person's conscience and consciousness. 
In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim proposed specifical­
ly that human society is first created through the symbolic 
medium of religious ritual. This symbolic process concentrates 
and intensely focusses social and psychic energies (as a so­
lar mirror collects the rays of the sun), and generates the 
first form of group self-consciousness. Mythical and ritual 
symbolism playa critical creative role in the making of con­
•
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science and consciousness, for what was private becomes open, 
public and generative.

• It is only by expressing the1r feelings by translating
 them into signs, by symbolizing them externally, that 
the individual consciousnesses, which are by nature 
closed to each other, can feel that they are communica­
ting and are in unison (DHN:335). 
•
 
These key representations are not merely neutral representa­

•
 
tive devices, but, as B~llah J.l973) suggests, they are emi­

nently creative--for they constitute the group. They serve
 
as "constitutive symbolism." Acting as the collectively re­

presentational symbols of group self-consciousness, gradual­

ly they become the very foundation of a continuing moral and 
cognitive community over time, what we might t~:m a cultural 
tradition. Because thinking implies use of communicable con­
-cepts, the mind is, to a great extent, an impersonaland pub­
• lic activity. As Durkheim proposed: 
•
 
The distinguishing feature of the concept, as compar­

ed with a sensation or image, is its impersonality:
 
it is a representation which .•• is common and commun­

icable. It can pass from one mind to another: it is
 
•
 
by means of concepts that minds communicate. Now a
 
representation can only be common to all the members
 
of a single group if it was elaborated by them in com­

mon, if it is the work of the community. And if con­

ceptual thought has a very special value for us, it is
 
is precisely because, being collective, it is replete
 
with all the experience and science that has been ac­
cumulated by the community over the course of centur­
ies (in Giddens, 1972a:249). 
And Lawrence Krader usefully summarizes Durkheim's dialectic 
•
 
between personality and impersonality.
 
•
 
In Durkheim, the person takes the form of that which
 
is most impersonal in us: the person and the indivi­

dual are counterposed, and the person is defined by
 
his participation in the universal quality of human
 
reason. It is by his universal reason and will that
 
man becomes a person, and not as an individual act,
 
having (only) a relative autonomy in his social mil­
ieu: Durkheim here follows the Kantian notion of hu­
man reason as a syn~hetic ~ priori in his o~ meth~­
dology. The person 1S therefore an abstract10n, be1ng 
• 
neither an individual nor a particular entity, but a 
point in social space at which different lines of so­
cial relations intersect, an objective social pheno­
mena, universal in its phenomenality (1968:483). 
•
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Further, social interaction is always symbolic in­
teraction--belief and act are joined in fundamental sociocul­
tural process. Imagination and symbol are the key mediating 
terms. The key nexus between our inner and outer lives are 
these symbolically carried impersonal moral rules and intel­
lectual concepts, these structures of conscience and con­
sciousness. If it is important to note that society depends 
for its continued existence upon the persons it has created, 
the converse is equally true. Collective myth and ritual pro­
vide a "perpetual sustenance of our moral nature." If moral­
ized persons are not to lapse back into the scattered eqoisms 
of pre-social organic nature, they can sustain themselves 
only by dipping back again and again into the very fount of 
their existence--namely, collectively effervescent, energi­
zing, and redirecting symbolic process. Sociocultural life 
rises and falls in an oscillating rhythm. Thus, the moralized 
person's commitment to his newly found obligations and des­
tiny also ebbs and flows with the decline and rise of the in­
tensity and "fittingness" of sociocultural symbolism. The 
continued viability of prime significant symbols, as a cultur­
al genetic medium, is vital to the continued viability of 
both society and moralized person. We thus see a periodic re­
newal of self and society through ritual celebration: and 
such collective ceremonial replenishes our moral natures. It 
publicly revalidates our sense of self as a socially con­
structed and valuable personage: it revalidates our civic 
status as a personality. Durkheim never separated sociocul­
tural process from phenomenological process. 
Now, symbols serve as "time binders" holding groups to­
gether through time and space. In terms of the elementary 
stages of these processes, Durkheim assumed that: 
(I)	 structures of conscience and consciousness are so­
cioculturally and historically constructed, and thus 
remain for a long time connected and even confounded 
with the structure and process of groups: 
(2)	 the systems of morality and knowledge which are dom­
inant first emerge in most systematic form out of 
the womb of religion and ritual. 
•
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Thus, the two inner constitutive principles of the construc­
tion of over-arching systems of moral and cognitive classi­
fication are that these are first: (a) sociocentric, and (b) 
sacro-magical. Indeed, the linkage of the form of symbolic 
systems to the structure and process of collectivities, and 
the linkage of their content to sacral outlooks and magical 
protocols, are two interpretive principles central to the hu­
man sciences. Both Durkheim and Weber were most sensitive to 
this inner linkage of legitimate structures of conscience and 
consciousness to the structure of groups and to their reli­
gious and legal systems. 
Again, we propose that fundamental changes in the 
structures of conscience, of the collective grounds of right 
and wrong, generally precede fundamental changes in the 
structures of consciousness, of truth and falsity. And since 
the awakening and guiding of structures of conscience and con­
sciousness--as prime phenomenological processes--are largely 
dependent upon religious symbolic forms, should we not then 
tend to seek out the changing foundations of legitimate mor­
al and intellectual authority in terms of shifting religious 
images and sanctions? If we would know how persons are form­
ed and reformed, should we not also look to the ways in which 
"souls" are conceived and reformed? Again, is the connection 
between these two not the notion that the person is a cate­
gory of the human spirit? 
4. Origins of Structures of Conscience 
Society and person are mutual co-creations through that 
symbolic genetic medium which we call culture. Religious sym­
bols, which by their very nature seek to establish definite 
and obligatory relationships between the human microcosm and 
the macrocosm, act as prime guidance systems. The cult is the 
original and prime matrix of culture (Pieper, 1963): it cre-' 
ates "cosmos" out of "chaos." 
Now, tension is produced in the symbolic field, and con­
science and consciousness organized and energized, by the com­
pounding series of symbolic oppositions between the "sacred" 
•
 
•
 
,.
--341-­
and the "profane." Such positive and negative categories are 
central to human imagination and action because they inform 
I us what is "right and wrong," "true and false." The key to 
I 
understanding Durkheim's notion of the universal significance 
of the oppositions between "sacred" and "profane" is to be 
sought in the symbolic sets of equations by which society,
• culture, and person are progressively constructed and recon­
structed. Life becomes progressively organized around these 
two poles of positive and negative energies, like magnetic 
poles attracting and repelling us. The whole of existence be­
• comes valorized through a ramifying series of symbolic equa­
tions linking different experiences together. 
Now, as is true of all levels of reality, without this 
tension between incompatible energies or positions, no ener­
• gy would flow. Difference energizes; diversity is generative. 
Energy flows only if there is a gap, a difference between po­
sitions. Without this fundamental and constitutive tension, 
the symbolic cosmos called culture would prove impossible.
• The tension between good and evil, between right and wrong, 
is the driving force in the symbolic field of society, and 
within the person, for it constitutes the two opposing "mag­
netic" poles of structures of conscience and consciousness.
• Energy flows generated by this deepening tension between the 
"sacred" and the "profane" serve to organize and energize 
the basic decision matrices of societies and persons. Here is 
a crucial key to a fundamental theory of motivation. Theories
• of personality which omit reference to this fundamental organ­
izing tension deep within the very structure of personality 
are in that measure inadequate. For if human experience was 
merely neutral or homogeneous, we would find ourselves devoid
• of reason for choice, and therefore, action. If human reality 
lacked elementary invidious distinctions--between good and 
evil, order and chaos, the pure and the impure, the higher 
and the lower, positive and negative, the beautiful and the
• monstrous, the creative and destructive, the way forward and 
the way back--we would lack the basic organizing tension which 
energizes and directs human action. Systems built around the 
•
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notions of avoidance of pain and tropisms toward pleasurable 
stimuli (eg. behaviorism) are cast on the level of the organ­
• ic ego, and thus must fall back on the weakest kind of mind! 
body analogies to describe these higher level processes. Ev­
ery society and person make some such crucial series of dis­
tinctions between these and other fundamental polarities for
• without these compounding series of oppositions we stand para­
lyzed. In general, then, the deeper the tensions generated £l 
the oppositions between these symbolic and phenomenological 
poles, the deeper the development of the person ~ moral a­
• gent and intellectual subject. 
Always and everywhere, positive and negative aspects of 
these basic polarities are expressed in terms of opposing 
poles in conscience and consciousness. Questions of moral
• right and wrong, so insistent because they involve not mere­
ly the fate of on-going social relations but ultimate destin­
ies as well, are always intimately intertwined with questions 
of consciousness, of truth and error, of following reality ra­
• ther than unreality. In positive terms, all societies and per­
sons place themselves under positive obligations to affirm as 
true, good, significant, and morally right and desirable 
•
 
those phenomena jUdged as "sacred" to the group. To Durkheim,
 
the "sacred" means values constitutive to the group. Sacred­
ness here implies hierarchical value, moral authority, and 
obligatory respect due to high position on the scale of val­
ues, the ability to repel the profane, and a certain "conta­
• giousness" or tendency to spread. But it is important to re­
member that sacred and profane are relationally defined; 
their dichotomous existence is interdependent. Their contrast 
is necessary, much as the contrast between figure and field
• is essential for clear perception. These positive injunctions 
generate goals and values which are carried through imagina­
tion, and internalized in the emerging personality structure, 
and established in the institutions of the group •
• Now, one of the basic classificatory principles is that 
things of unequal value must be separated. The boundary lines 
between the pure and the impure, between order and chaos, 
• 
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must be constantly maintained and periodically realigned. 
Dirt, weeds, noize, chance, ugliness, etc., these and other
• similar negative phenomena which threaten the clear outlines 
and meaningful patterns of our axial coordinates must be con­
trolled, interdicted, and revised. These demarcations are 
like survey markers on the base map of culture; but these
• cultural maps are not solely cognitive, but moral, emotional, 
and imaginative as well. As such, the passage from the profane 
to the sacred requires a whole series of rites which trans­
form the moral subject. Rites are collective moral therapeu­
• tics which, by realigning the mutual relations between human 
microcosm and macrocosm, regenerate the moral community, and 
thus, provide a resustenance of our moral natures. As van Gen­
nep clearly recognized, these symbolic therapeutics proceed
• in at least three main phases; he also noted the important 
"pivoting of the sacred" along various situational and tem­
poral axes. 
If harmony is to?fuaintained, the relationships between
• sacred and profane in terms of the alignment of the microcosm 
with the macrocosm must be continuously regulated and reaf­
firmed. Through ascetic regulatory rites we reestablish and 
reinforce the boundaries separating the sacred from the pro­
• fane. Naturally, because of their source and power, these in­
terdictions spread to the whole of sociocultural life. Time, 
space, objects, events, people, and so on--indeed, all as­
pects of life and existence--become classified, separated,
• and relationships rearticulated in terms of the compounding 
oppositions between the sacred and the profane. The whole 
world becomes valorized--society progressively imputes posi­
•
 
tive, negative, and neutral valences to all details of exist­

ence. Hence, structures of conscience and consciousness are 
•
 
constantly assigned ever greater responsibilities--that of
 
discerning the moral valences of actions which had been pre­

viously left outside the moral universe. And, of course,
 
those who "take a lease on charisma" as Weber once remarked,
 
those who professionally demarcate or realign the boundaries 
between sacred and profane become the arbiters of moral and 
•
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intellectual legitimacy. Distinctions and qualifications be­
come more sophisticated, more rationalized, more systematic,
• and internally consistent, more comprehensive. Some virtuoso 
may even practice full-time asceticism as a life-vocation, 
and may engage in charismatic competitions to determine who 
can most systematically turn away from all that is branded
• profane, all that is a diverting temptation from the "one and 
true path" (eg. the early Egyptian eremi tes) . 
Since sacral and magical taboos corne to permeate early 
tribal life, they corne to constitute the early foundations of
• structures of conscience. Questions of right and wrong, of 
truth and error, become inextricably bound up with the ascent 
to a cosmic consciousness which is then reflected in the mir­
ror of daily life in the human microcosm. Defilement, pollu­
• tion, sin, and guilt corne from violating the boundaries be­
tween sacred and profane. Disturbances of the harmonious re­
lations between micro and macrocosm bring extreme culpabili­
ty--for in bringing illness, death, attack by enemies, cata­
• strophic weather, etc., evil threatens the whole society. 
Thus, the first forms of deviance are those of the "religious 
criminal," whose violations of norms laid down by the collect­
ive conscience are considered sacrilegbus. Profaneness and
• deviance are intertwined, as the conscience counsels us to 
flee from negative status. 
Since questions of apportioning moral responsibility, 
of assigning sin and guilt, are always central, the negative
• or ascetic rites take on a special significance. All societies 
and persons find themselves negatively obligated to avoid 
falsity, evil, destructiveness, and regions of unreality. 
Those who follow the positive normative prescriptions gain
• in self-esteem, and their sense of self-worth and contribu­
tions to moral order are often publicly validated. Those who 
violate, or congenitally follow negative prescriptions, lose 
in status and self-esteem. They may be branded or "labelled"
• as failures and, at worst, as dangerously destructive "de­
viants." As Robert Merton once observed, every society has 
its own peculiar set of "moral alchemies," especially for 
•
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the assignment of guilt and negative status. Thus, as Benja­
min Nelson (1964 ) observes, culture also acts as a symbolic 
economy--that is, every society is engaged in the production 
and distribution of valued symbols of varied worths. Anxiety, 
fear, shame, degradation, and ultimate defilement or abandon­
ment are the deviants' assigned or self-chosen fate. Thus, 
by its very nature, deviance is linked with the profane, and 
the profane is also dependent, as Poggi (1972) clearly saw, 
upon the prior definition of the sacred. As Mary Douglas 
(1966) observes, "purity and danger" are relational. 
Indeed, as Kenneth Burke (eg. 1966) has noted for years, 
the negative is crucial to human symbolicity. For only through 
the negative, in the sense of prohibition and moral command, 
is man moralized. Man takes on a moral personality through the 
negative, through abstention and purification. That is why 
Durkheim emphasized the importance of the negative rites, of 
the ascetic movement" toward separation and withdrawal. "Ascet­
icism is an integral part of human culture" (EF:356). For the 
suffering inherent in the negative thrust means that the in­
dividual rises above the profane; in other words, culture 
moralizes nature. And, indeed, when we see that the analogy 
is often the sacred is to the profane as culture is to nature 
as person is to ego, the importance of these negative associa­
tions becomes apparent. In considering asceticism good, Durk­
heim valued most the self-discipline it creates, for it mor­
alizes the recalcitrant ego (see Nisbet, 1974). Culture, the 
realm of moral rules and concepts, of obligatory and authori­
tative sacredness, dominates nature, and reorders the ego and 
its insatiable passions. This process implies the reordering 
of the world, the overcoming of nature by symbolic culture, 
a reestablishment of the constitutive boundaries of the great 
"Yea and Nay" of all things. And, as fasting increases our 
hunger for the "Bread of Life," so,too,privation, abstinence, 
and suffering increase the tension to consummate the posi­
tive pole of sociocultural life. 
Since the origin of these separations or interdictions 
which we project outward and imprint upon the world is really 
•
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cu1ture-and-mind, the crucial theater of war between sacred 
and profane lies within man himself. The taboo as interdic­
• tion is first and foremost a phenomenological injunction to 
keep separate things of unequal value which man directs to­
ward his own conscience and consciousness, toward his own 
imagination and will. Since magical sanctions revenge viola­
• tion of taboo in an automatic fashion as if by mechanical 
retribution, it is only religious sanctions involving socio­
cultural and psychological punishment which lead to the de­
velopment of the person. There is no "sin" in magic, and 
• therefore no need for redefinition of self and internaliza­
tion of guilt. Only in religious sanctions do we discover a 
deepening of the interior life, the perpetual reconstruction 
of will and imagination. Here we might recall Ricoeur's no­
• tion of the stages of development of the moral conscience 
from stain to sin to guilt (1969). We see that the conscious­
ness of wrong-doing progressively shifts away from external, 
accidental violations to internal, intentional acts. Weber 
• (1963) also clearly saw the crucial world-historical signi­
ficance of religion and the notion of ethical-legal orders 
and the evolution of the images of gods for the development 
of the notion of sin as intentional, and involving indivi­
• dual moral culpability. Only much later do we see the emer­
gence of a prospective moral conscience. The psychodynamics 
of sin and guilt, of intention and act, of retribution and 
salvation, and so on, are crucial to the construction in
• layers of the moral personage, the deepening of the levels 
of self. For this whole phenomenological-symbolic complex 
leads to intensified examinations of conscience, the search­
ing of the soul for intentional commissions and unintention­
• al omissions, for the determination of the moral valences 
of future actions, for the determination of degrees of guilt 
and the development of therapeutic modes for its exoneration 
and purgation; in short, it leads to greater ethical se1f­
• awareness. The progre.ssive attachment of individuals to a 
"cosmos of obligations" leads to greater integration of the 
personality structure, observed Weber; it enabled, in the 
•
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realm of law for instance, a man's word to serve as his bond, 
as the signature to a contract binds. In sum, the emergence
• of complex religious and ethical-legal systems, and their e­
volution in terms of patterning the microcosm after the mac­
rocosm played a crucial role in the in-depth integration of 
structures of conscience and consciousness.
• Almost inevitably these struggles between good and e­
vil take on a dramatic character. Indeed, it is primarily 
in terms of a symbolic struggle that a dramatic design first 
emerges. And it is primarily in terms of dramatic designs
• that conscience and consciousness take up their parts or iden­
tities as persona, as participants in the cosmic drama or 
"Divine Comedy." Symbolic process, and thus the structure of 
human action, inevitably takes on an inherently dramatic (or
• perhaps rhetorical-dialectical) character, and generally pro­
• 
ceeds in at least three distinguishable phases. First, binary 
polarities create tension in the symbolic field and in the 
phenomenological field. Second, symbolic equations link to­
gether different experiences in a resonating system charged 
• 
with multiple levels of meaning. Finally, transformations 
resolve the tension and create a new and higher unity. 
"Right thinking" and "right acting" in this drama are 
judged in terms of our fidelity to our cosmically assigned 
•
 
roles, to the degree to which we pattern ourselves after the
 
ancestors, the divine exemplars, or the founding fathers.
 
The closer we pattern ourselves after the models of essential
 
order, the closer the harmony between microcosm and macrocosm.
 
•
 
Self and model become intertwined, much as socialization re­

quires in-depth role models. The sensitive striving after fi­

delity to the cosmic models, of faithful patterning ourselves
 
after the divine exemplars, deepens the structures of inter­

• 
iority, of will and imagination, of internal life-long con­
sistency of character. 
Now, by virtue of the regular periodicity of ritual 
commensality or the commemorative dramatic representations 
or mimetic reenactments of primordial founding deeds, sacral 
symbols become historicized. Sacral symbols become attached 
•
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to durable social sentiments and collective memories. In the 
ramifying dialectic between symbol, sentiment, and inter-gen­
• 
erational sociocultural process, the horizons of conscience 
and consciousness are stretched into the past and into the 
future. If society and person are to perdure, they must be­
come rooted in inter-generational collective symbolic forms. 
• 
If symbols are to survive and evolve, they must become dur­
able, beyond the reach of the effervescent moment; they must 
become historicized. Similarly, the construction of the per­
son rests upon temporal extensions of the horizons of rules, 
• 
meanings, obligations, concepts, models, and so on, through 
time and space. The person becomes progressively attached 
not merely to a specific group, but to a continuing moral and 
and cognitive community stretching out indefinitely into 
• time and place. The person becomes historicized and deepened 
through identification with myths of origin, and the corol­
lary notions of destiny and salvation. The person becomes 
anchored in a temporal process of beinnings and ends which 
• transcend his isolated existence and give life meaning in 
terms of a compelling dramatic design which redeems the sense 
of aimless flux from insignificance and invests it with ul­
timate purpose (Nelson, 1964 ). 
• In certain extraordinary periods, when the shared 
structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority 
shift, such changes are most powerful when they strike deep­
ly into the axial structures of conscience and conscious­
• ness. In such shifts, the sedimented layers of cultnral tra­
ditions are reorganized. In such times of crisis, we attempt 
to locate the source of evil, of disorder, of suffering and 
disharmony in terms of "theodicies," couched in terms of 
• 
falls from "undividedness," of failure to remain faithful 
to the prime exemplars, or by wandering from the "paths of 
truth and righteousness." As a general rule, all basic mor­
al and intellectual positions originally rest on negations; 
• they exist first in denial. They are relational--that is, 
rhetorical. When beset by crises of uncertainty, by paraly­
zing conflict, we simultaneously seek to construct "theodi­
•
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•
 
cies" (explanations of the sources of evil, of disorder, of
 
how things came to fall apart), and "therapeutics" (recipes
 
for restoring wholeness, harmony). As we proceed to "diagnose"
 
•
 
our personal troubles and collective calamities, we build up
 
a whole resonating system of symbolic associations which link
 
symptoms to causes, and a system of transformational process­

es which explain how our prior system of "theodicies" and
 
•
 
"therapeutics" went astray. Again, questions of sin and guilt,
 
of intention and act, are fundamental, for the grounds of
 
their ascertainment and assuagement largely determine our col­

lective therapeutics. The whole periodic process of determin­

ing "theodicies" and "therapeutics" raises consciousness to
 
new heights and conscience to new depths in the search for
 
verity and fidelity. The deepening and reordering of these
 
• 
twin structures in times of crisis, especially through pro­

phetic pronouncements, often comes to constitute the prime
 
guidance systems of societies and persons through the inform­

ing and inspiring medium of cultural traditions which act as
 
• 
carriers of this central charismatic cultural capital. This,
 
roughly, is the generic dialectical process which Durkheim
 
postulated between symbol and sentiment, communitas and his­

tory, charismatic and ordinary moment, between self and so­

• 
ciety.
 
5. Origins of Structures of Consciousness 
Just as the logics of the construction of systems of 
• 
morality ultimately rest on a compounding series of opposi­
tions between the "sacred" and the "profane," so too the con­
struction of systems of thought rests on refining and extend­
ing such oppositions throughout nature and society. The con­
• 
struction of elementary systems of consciousness proceeds 
through the extension of a system of symbolic equations 
throughout the whole of human experience. Since logic implies 
necessary connection, the first forms of conscious connec­
• tion are those of value, of differentiating between experi­
ences of unequal value, and reconnecting those of equal value. 
All logic is originally ana-logic; to a great extent mental 
•
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discourse remains analogical and phenomenological. The exten-
sion of value, and hence meaning, through fundamental guiding
• metaphors is crucial to both the symbolic "machinery" of the 
mind, and to cultural historical processes. Experience is 
first (and fundamentally) linked to experience, image to im-
age, value to value, and only later are abstracted proposi-
• tions connected to essential governing principles. Therefore, 
on the most elementary levels, truth and error depend ulti-
mately on the closeness of connection to our notions of good 
and evil. Primary process is not so much logical or alogical
• as phenomenological, that is, analogical. As Ricoeur (1969) 
proposes, "the symbol gives rise to thought." 
Analogy and metaphor are prime strategies for connec-
tion between disparate things, for the extension of meaning
• and experience, and the integration of knowledge and value 
into a compelling dramatic design. They allow us to link to-
gether spearate things and events into a new and meaningful 
relationship which was not apparent before our sewing them 
• together. Analogy and metaphor enable us to build up systems 
of relationships over time and through space, to order events 
into a meaningful sequence, and to communicate our concepts 
to others through appeal to similar experience. Recognition
• of phenomenological similarities or differences, and the 
construction of inner or essential comparisons, serve as bas-
ic logicsof classification, of constituting systematic rela-
tionships on the elementary level. As Levi-Strauss (1966)
• observes, we start with a "science of the concreteJ" we start 
where we are, for where else can we start? 
Now, if systematic comparison and contrast are sure 
signs of intelligence at work, then the most elementary forms 
• of classification proceed in terms of systematic extensions 
of crucial orienting "world-metaphors" (eg. see S. Pepper, 
1942). Classification is first analogical; for example, lang-
uage itself is built up extending a series of root phenomeno-
• logical metaphors from one situation to another, by transla-
ting and retranslating basic guiding images into various man-
ifestations. This is a crucial aspect of semiology. The more 
• 
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seminal the root image, the more paradigmatic or laden with 
potential meaning will the root metaphor become. In this
• spinning out process, a whole web of related meanings is grad­
ually constructed, and the whole language can be seen to hang 
together on a surprisingly small number of cognitive and ex­
periential pegs. Indeed, images come before words: an extend­
• ed search through a good dictionary should convince one of 
the centrality and origin-ality of these root images, and the 
significance of the systems of symbolic equations in which 
whole rafts of words and phrases are interdefined. Literary
• meaning, too, is built up out of such compounding series of 
symbolic equations and transformations. Noting this univer­
sality of analogy and metaphor as symbolic linking devices, 
Northrop Frye has remarked on "the similarity between the
• units of literature and of mathematics--the metaphor and the 
equation. ,,1 Indeeed, all other forms of knowledge and cultur­
al expression emerge out of their own special types of equa­
tional structures and sequences--religious mythologies, sac­
• ramental rituals, legal systems, poetry and literature, math­
ematics, and so on through the natural and social sciences. 
Now, the systems of classification which we call prim­
itive are dominated by the multiple necessities of binding
• together moral, cognitive, and affective sentiments into a 
more or less coherent and compelling system. In such cosmo­
logical classifications, the body, human society, and the 
•
 
natural environment are used analogically as bases, as reso­

nating microcosms of one another. For example, the body is 
• 
often portrayed as a microcosm of the universe and parts of 
the body are mapped and correlated with astronomical config­
urations. One of the most sophisticated elaborations of this 
primitive type of intertwining can be found in the Chinese 
• 
system of acupuncture, which is rooted in Taoist notions of 
energy flows which organize the universe and which are mir­
rored in the human body. Homeopathic medicine and even psy­
choanalytic therapeutics can be seen to rest also on not too 
dissimilar kinds of symbolic and structural correspondences. 
Hence, certain analytical, or perhaps anamorphical, dimen­
•
 
•
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sions come to cross-cut knowledge, belief, imagination, and 
action. 
• Since logic implies mutually intelligible discourse 
and necessary connection, it is important not to impose con­
temporary notions of the rules of formal or so-called "sym­
bolic logic" on other types of linkages. There are many types
• of IIl0gic
ll or connection; just as formal philosophical logic 
does not invalidate socio-Iogic or bio-Iogic, so too we in 
the human sciences must take care not to impose our own II10g­
ics" on primitive cultures. We should set aside Levy-Bruhlian
• notions of a "pre-logical II mentality which does not abide by 
Aristotelian canons; for as Durkheim often argued IIThere is 
no gulf, no gap in continuity between these elementary forms 
of classification and our own. II Now, if we accept the postu­
• late of the psychic unity of mankind, then our problem be­
comes to understand the stages of construction of conscious­
ness, of the emergence of "rational logics" from other types 
of connections which are primordial. Since all logic implies
• necessary connection, primitive logics are primarily moral 
logics which are both (a) socio-centric, and (b) sacral-mag­
ical. In this sense, the "moralities of thought and logics 
of action" are formed in terms· of domestic and ritual meta­
• phors. As Mauss and Durkheim discovered in Primitive Class­
ification, logical relations are first, in a very real sense, 
domestic relations; that is, connections between members of 
the same class or group. The inner morality of primitive log­
• ics is familial; members of the same tribe or family share 
the same classifications. And since domestic relations are 
rooted primarily in sentiment, it is not surprising that 
these other (ana)logical relations should emerge out of, and
• become suffused and directed by, social sentiments. Elemen­
tary analogies are rooted in socio-Iogics. 
But these elementary logics are also mytho-logics. For 
these sentiments are intimately intertwined with, and indeed 
• grow out of, the authority of the fused sacro-magical collec­
tive complex. Indeed, it is the obligatoriness, the collecti­
vization of responsibility for reparation and disharmonies 
•
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between the microcosm and the macrocosm which makes these 
representations sacred. The more elementary these systems,
• the more these representations also function, in turn, as 
reglernentations. Representations and regulations, of course, 
both rest on norms and rules. Logic regulates mental life, 
moral rules regulate the life of action. Mental and moral
• healers alike rely on "rules for the direction of the mind 
and soul." Indeed, one of the secret appeals of logic has 
always been its claims to offer regulative norms for mental 
and moral conduct. Shelley's notion that poets are the "leg­
• islators of mankind" is also relevant here. Because elemen­
tary systems of classification are constitutive for their 
groups, they also carry systems of ethics. As always, ethics 
and epistemics, conscience and consciousness, are intimately
• intertwined. The linkage of microcosm to macrocosm implies 
that elementary structures of morality and knowledge will be 
made to line themselves up in parallel fashion. There is no 
escaping this attempt at harmonious alignment, for in primi­
• tive cultures, the structures of responsibility and represen­
tation are preeminently collective. Changes come through clos­
er alignment, shifts, or severing of relations between micro­
cosm and macrocosm, and between integration of systems of mor­
• ality and knowledge. Indeed, it is this on-going dialectic of 
sentiment and symbolism, cognition and emotion, imagination 
and morality, microcosm and macrocosm, culture and nature, 
• 
which marks the elementary elaborations of classificatory 
systems. In sum, these systems of resonating symbolic equa­
• 
tions are intimately connected with the legitimate founda­
tions of moral and intellectual authority of collectivities. 
In a deeper sense, it is religion which provides the 
"essential" reasons for phenomenological linkages which are 
later seized upon by formal logics. Just as egos are morali­
zed into forming persons and society, so too is the world 
moralized, unified, and made into an intelligible and meaning­
• ful cosmos through the "contagion" of sacral symbolism. Sac­
ral energies, symbolizing the invisible yet "essential" world, 
serve as the prime instrument of moral and conceptual linkage. 
•
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Flowing in and out of dissimilar objects, transforming dis­
parate events, a separate world of real "essences" is postu­
lated behind the world of sensory appearance and diversity. 
Things touched by the same energies--in terms of fundamental 
metaphorical notions of "like attracts like" and "the part 
is equal to the whole"--are thus to be classed together; this 
is another fundamental classificatory principle. The addi­
tional rule that things of unequal value must be separated 
then becomes subsumed under this more fundamental determin­
ation of "invisible, essential" inner connections. Thus, be­
sides symbolic equations, the elementary elaboration of 
structures of consciousness depends upon series of symbolic 
inner transformations by which the "essential" ground is man­
ifested in the phenomenal appearance. As Kenneth Burke notes, 
all interpretation requires that we ascertain not only sym­
bolic equations--or "what goes with what"--but also symbolic 
transformations--or "from what to what," that is, a whole 
series of complex sequential equations which link separable 
phases, movements, cycles of terms, etc., to one another in 
a meaningful pattern or dramatic design. As Levi-Strauss ob­
serves, totemism serves as a complex equational and trans­
formational structure of communications which converts phe­
nomenological diversity into moral and conceptual unity; it 
transforms "chaos" into "cosmos." In short, structures of 
consciousness attempt to ground the existential in the essen­
tial which then converts the obligatory into the desirable. 
These systems of moral and intellectual classification 
are "mytho-socio-Iogical" in that world, self, and society 
are pulled together in a "solid system all of whose parts 
are united and vibrate sympathetically." In building a cent.er 
to moral life, intellectual action moves through a progres­
sive extension of symbolic equations originally rooted in the 
positive/negative, sacred/profane oppositions. Through pro­
gressive extension of ramifying analogies, these compounding 
systems of classification are interwoven more and more tight­
ly; they become "cross-indexed." Indeed, the degree of com­
plexity, cross-indexing, and internal consistency serves as 
• 
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basic criteria for judging the comparative degree of cultur­
al complexity as represented in the central classificatory
• system. Redundancy, as in all systems of communication, 
serves an important function. We constantly rotate the sym­
bolic matrix, each time tying in yet another thread in the 
emerging cosmological fabric. These symbolic linkages contin­
ue to grow until "the whole world is covered like a gnosis 
or cabbala." 
But if these analogical and transformational systems 
first grow out of concrete phenomenological experience, they
• also reveal a tendency to separate, to grow by their own au­
tonomous rules. Since primitive classification systems are 
largely built on: (a) phenomenological analogies, (b) the fu­
sion of cognitive, moral, and affective categories, (c) so­
• ciocentrism, and (d) sacral-magical protocols, philosophy and 
then modern scientific systems will emerge only where: (a) 
classifications become progressively rooted in abstract, "es­
sential" principles which are true by their very nature, in­
• stead of by relation (eg. see J. Gittleman, 1974:83), (b) 
where structures of conscience and consciousness become more 
or less separated, and the latter granted some legitimate 
institutionalized autonomy and authority, (c) where these
• categories become detached from their original or prime group 
status referents, (d) and in which questions of truth and fi­
delity are resolved primarily by recourse to rational and 
evidential canons rather than by collective recourse to tra­
• ditional magical praxis. Although first born in the clan and 
its totemic cult, if systems of morality and knowledge are to 
evolve, they must progressively shed their primal connections 
• 
with the restrictive structures of group and religion. There 
is no possibility of passages from "sciences of the concrete" 
• 
to abstract sciences, however, with9~ttrans-historical,or 
trans-mundane or transcendental, grounding of the necessary 
lawfulness and regularity of phenomenal patterns; here the 
passages to modern science rest on specific sorts of "essen­
tialisms" (eg. see Whitehead, 1925). Passages to modernity 
come about through expansion of structures of fraternization, 
•
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and the resolution of conflict over alternate anchors of mor­

al and intellectual authority and responsibility in terms of
 
•
 
wider universalization, autonomization, and hence, rational­

ization. It should be emphasized that one of the hidden keys
 
to understanding the growth of cultural complexity comes from
 
the suppleness or differential ease with which classificatory
 
•
 
matrices of various groups can progressively encompass the
 
widening diversity of experience and empirical fact. This dif­

erential ability, as we saw in the previous chapter, to uni­

versalize symbolic systems, proves to be a critical factor in
 
later sociocultural evolution. 
Having outlined the construction of generic phenomenolo­
gies of personhood, let us next turn to consider Durkheim's 
elaboration of his crucial insight that the notion of the per­
son emerges through history. I wish to emphasize at the out­
set that we shall be concerned here solely with elucidating 
only Durkheim's notions of the emergence of the person. Doubt­
• less, many other interpretive perspectives could be brought 
to bear on this profound process to yield a more complete un­
derstanding. Our present effort, however, may be considered 
a preliminary contribution toward such a project, and to that 
• end our main hope here is merely to bring into full relief 
precisely what Durkheim's theory of the historical emergence 
of the person specifically claimed. This careful delimitation 
of our task here is doubly necessary, for Durkheim himself
• never wrote systematically on this subject. 
• 
• 
• 
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B. The Emergence of the Person Through History 
•	 
Introduction. A crucial element of Durkheim's doctrine is the 
• 
the notion that the person, as a sociocultural construction, 
emerges through history. Unfortunately, Durkheim never sys­
tematically formulated this insight as a central theme of 
his work. Doubtless, Durkheim's doctrine would have fared 
better if he had explicitly developed this theme. It should 
be clearly understood that we make no claim here to offer a 
comprehensive explanation of the emergence of the person 
•	 
through history, but only Durkheim's potential contribution 
to such an outline. 
• 
Now, Durkheim's contribution to this important study 
is neither simple nor mechanical; rather, it is multi-faceted 
and often suprisingly subtle. For we shall discover that Durk­
• 
heim, in turn, explained the emergence of the person in terms 
of societal differentiation as a general evolutionary process, 
in terms of the construction of the notion of the individual 
soul in the primitive sacral womb, in institutional terms of 
the growing	 power of the centralized state as guarantor of 
individual rights vis-a-vis traditional intermediate groups, 
in cultural	 terms with special focus on the civilizational. 
•	 
significance of Christian individualism, in philosophical 
terms vis-a-vis Utilitarian and Romantic philosophies of the 
self, and in terms of the modern institutionalized "cul"t of 
the individual" as the base of the modern value system. Let
-----	 .'----.­
us now turn	 to explore each of these "laminated" notions as 
they converge to constitute Durkheim's contribution to the 
understanding of the emergence of the person through history. 
• 
• 
-----
•
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1. Societal Differentiation and Individuation 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
Preface. Durkheim postulated a general evolutionary connec­
tion between societal differentiation and individuation. He 
~~ ~ 
assumed that increasing soCIaT morphological differentiation 
increasingly frees the individual from the constraints of 
"mechanical solidarity." Now, it might be helpful to brief­
ly recall that Durkheim saw two basic forms of social soli­
darity, two fundamentally different types of social being at 
the two ends of human history. The first type--"mechanical 
solidarity"--implies the fusion of individuals into a primi­
tive sacral-magical collective conscience and consciousness. 
The individual's sense of self is submerged in his group ties 
and traditional obligations: he or she really has no indepen­
dent life apart from the group. The second type of solidari­
ty, the modern type, rests on "organic" social bonds which 
~ 
imply the progressive differentiation of occupational tasks 
leading to a continuously ramifying kind of interdependence. 
Repetitive identity and differentiated interdependence (eg. 
DL:129-3l) are therefore the two basic forms the social bond 
may take. Unity through identity, or unity through diversity: 
a primitive fused identity or advanced differentiated inter­
dependence--these are the two "ideal types" which Durkheim 
sketched broadly over the flow of history. 
Given this interpretive focus on individuation within 
the content of societal differentiation, Durkheim always 
searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the struc­
tures of moral and intellectual responsibility markIDg pro­
gressive passages from the first to the second type of soli­
darity. In his early formulations, Durkheim's processual no­
tion of increasing "moral or dynamic density" and the "law 
of the progressive extension of the radius of social (inter­
actional) life" are central. As noted in Chapter Four of 
this Book, Durkheim postulated a complex series of sequential 
equations running something like this: greater population 
density within a given geographic area (the population/terri­
tory ratio) held together by increasingly comprehensive and 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
...;,-359-­
efficient infra-structural transportation and communications 
networks, leads to greater degrees of "moral or dynamic den­
sity" or sustained increases in "the quantity, intensity, 
and diversity of social relationships." Such increased inter­
action leads to greater competition for resources between 
members of the society, while increased intra-societal com­
petition leads to greater specialization and occupational 
differentiation. These typical socio-economic responses to 
long-term changes in supply and demand lead almost inevita­
bly to greater total productivity, which accelerates, in 
turn, the progressive division of labor by increasing the 
potential for population growth, and the extension of key 
transportation and communications networks. This progressive 
"extension of the radius of social life" leads, in turn, to 
greater social energies and intensities and sociocultural 
change which continues progressively onward in a kind of 
self-stimulating feedback cycle. Hence, the generic micro 
sociocultural process of increasing social intensities leads, 
on the macro-evolutionary scale, to all the broad constitu­
tive historical processes linking the progressive division 
of labor, moral evolution, and the emergence of the person 
through history. 
Let us look first to the state of "primitive indistinc­
tion" which Durkheim postulated as characteristic of the 
place of the individual in "mechanical solidarity." Then we 
shall explore Durkheim and Spencer's differing notions of the 
nature of archaic society, consider "altruisme" as tre early 
type of suicide which most clearly reveals the inner nature 
of the tribal social bond, note Durkheim's suggestion that 
the "chief" represents the emergence of the first individual 
type, compare and contrast Durkheirn and Toennies on the na­
ture of primitive and modern societies, consider Durkheim's 
discussion of some of the obstacles to progressive division 
of labor, review his notion of the division of labor and so­
cietal differentiation, and finally, his idea of universal­
ization process in relation to the evolution of the person. 
• 
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a.	 Durkheim' ~ Notion of "~1echanical Solidarity" 
At this early stage, having first conceived as a grad­
uate student that his essential life-project centered on the 
shifting relations between individual and society, in his 
dissertat{;n Durkheim thought of~duation and differen­
tiation as corollary central processes; he also regarded 
them as a sufficient explanation of the emergence of the per­
son through history. The smaller and more intense the social 
life, the less individuation--at root, it was really a rath­
er simple equation. Yet, even at this point, Durkheim quali­
fied his thesis. Late~ his emphasis shifted from the notion 
that the individual became progressively freed from the con~ 
straints of primitive society to the seminal idea that the 1 
very notion of the individual (eg. the soul, see EF) is so­
cially constructed. In these terms, "mechanical solidarity" 
implied the primitive social and cultural state in which the 
individual was almost wholly submerged in the group, and his 
nascent conscience permeated by traditional, collective, sac­
ro-magical rationales and prescriptive etiquettes. 
In adopting repressive penal law as an external, posi­
tive index to the inner nature of primitive social solidari­
ty, Durkheim observed: "In determining what fract.ion of the 
juridical system penal law represents, we, at the same time, 
measure the relative importance of this solidarity" (DL:l09). 
For it is in the nature of penal law that " ••• the rules it 
sanctions express the most essential social likenesses" (DL: 
105). Indeed, here is to be found a " ..• social cohesion 
whose cause lies in a certain continuity of all particular 
consciences to a common type which is none other than the 
psychic type of society" (DL:l05). 
It is important to emphasize that, from the beginning, 
Durkheim conceived of these relations between individual and 
society from the point of view of shifting historical rela­
tions in this bond not solely in external structural terms 
but also in terms of conscience and consciousness. The dis­
..	 . h d' not 1 . 1 dt1nct10n, as we m1g t say to ay, 1s~mere y ecolog1ca - emo­
•
 
•
 
graphic and structural-institutional but also cultural and 
phenomenological as well. For Durkheim notes the existence 1/ 
• of two types of consciences in man; indeed, in observing 
• 
that man is double, Durkheim sounds a crucial note 
~ 
which 
pervades his later work. 
There are in us two consciences: one contains states 
which are personal to each of us and which character­
• 
izes us, while the states which comprehend the other 
are common to all society. The first represent only 
our individual personality, and constitute it; the se­
cond represent the collective type, and, consequently, 
society, without which it cannot exist ... ~ Although 
distinct, these two consciences are linked one to the 
other since, in sum, they are only one, having one and 
and the same organic substratum. They are thus soli­
dary. From this results a solidarity sui generis, 
which, born of resemblances, directly links the indi­
vidual with society (DL:I05-6).
• However, at this early state, Durkheim had not distinguished 
the process of individuation from personalization. 
Now, secondary observers over the years would have 
served us better had they emphasized more that Durkheim chose 
• penal law as the external index revealing the inner nature of 
the relationship of the individual to the traditional sacro­
magical collective conscience. It is a collective identity 
rooted in ancestral myths and in magical rites (see especial­
• ly Chapter Six of this Book) which repressive law seeks to 
protect and revenge . 
• 
•.. It is this solidarity which repressive laws ex­
presses ...• It is this force which penal law protects 
against all enfeeblement, both in demanding from each 
of us a minimum of resemblances without which the in­
dividual would be a menace to the unity of the social 
body, and in imposing upon us the respect for the sym­
bol which expresses and summarized these resemblances 
at the same time that it guarantees them (DL:I06). 
•
 
It is the commonness of these mythical identities and collec­

tive ritual responsibilities which define the strength of the 
the collective conscience, and thus of mechanical solidarity. 
Violations of these collective identities and responsibili­
• 
ties are considered sacrilegious because they threaten the 
fate of the whole society; that is why early penal law is so 
repressive, and the first type of criminal the "religious 
•
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criminal." 
There exists a social solidarity which comes from a 
certain number of states of conscience which are com­
mon to all the members of the same society. This is 
what repressive law materially represents .... The 
part that it plays in the general integration of so­
ciety evidently depends upon the greater or lesser 
extent of the social life which the common conscience 
embraces and regulates (DL:I09). 
Thus, in the early type of social solidarity centered 
on traditional sacro-magical themes and practices, Durkheim 
viewed the individual as almost wholly submerged in the col­
lective conscience. Likeness, or identity, is demanded of 
every member since individual violations or lapses from the 
collective protocols and magical etiquettes may threaten 
the whole group. But, again, at this early stage, Durkheim 
considers collectivization and individuation as proceeding 
in inverse proportion to the other. Again, at this stage, 
Durkheim had not sufficiently distinguished between person­
alization and individuation. Mechanical solidarity, then, re­
fers si.multaneously to an ecological-demographic, social in­
stitutional, cultural and phenomenological "ideal type" of 
early society in which the moralities of thought and logics 
of action are almost wholly collective. 
[In mechanical solidarity] •.. what we call society 
is a more or less organized totality of beliefs and 
sentiments common to all members of the group: this 
is the collective type ..•. The first can be strong 
only if the ideas and tendencies common to all the 
members of the society are greater in number and in­
tensity than those which pertain personally to each 
member •..• But what makes our personality is how much 
of our individual qualities we have, what distinguish­
es from others. This solidarity can grow only in in­
verse ratio to personality. There are in each of us 
•.. two consciences: one which is common to our group 
in its entirety, which, consequently, is not our self, 
but society living and acting within us; the other, 
on the contrary, represents that in us which is per­
sonal and distinct, that which makes us an individual. 
Solidarity which comes from likenesses is at its max­
imum when the collective conscience completely envel­
ops our whole conscience and coincides at all points 
with it. But, at that moment, our individuality is nil. 
It can be born only if the community takes smaller 
toll of us .••. If our ideal is to present a singular 
•
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and personal appearance, we do not want to resemble 
everybody else. Moreover, at the moment when this sol­
idarity exercises its true force, our personality van­
ishes, for we are no longer ourselves, but the collec­
tive life (DL:129). 
Thus, Durkheim's early conceptualization of his problem as 
the degree of cOllectivization or individualization in the 
structures of legitimate moral and intellectual responsibil­
ity and authority led him to assign the former designation 
to primitive culture and the latter to modern society. I must 
emphasize that Durkheim seemed to assume at this point, along 
with many of his Enlightenment brethren, that if the indivi­
dual were simply freed from the irrationalities of tradition, 
then the individual would naturally come to assume his own 
physiognomy, his own rightful autonomy, and intellectual re­
sponsibility. This was, after all, at the heart of the dog­
matic claims of the French "laic" moral reformers. In his lat­
er work, Durkheim questioned this inherited faith more com­
pletely, and recognized that society constructs the person, 
and that the historical relationship between individual and 
society is not adequately conceptualized in terms of a simple 
opposition between the presence and absence of collective 
control. 
It is about this point that Durkheim explained why he 
chose the designation "mechanical solidarity" to characterize 
this embeddedness of the individual in the sacro-magical col­
lective conscience. In the background of this analysis were, 
of course, multiple polemics--against Spencer, Comte, and al­
so against Toennies. 
The social molecules which can be coherent in this way 
can act together only in the measure that they have no 
actions of their own, as the molecules of inorganic 
bodies. That is why we propose to call this type of 
solidarity mechanical. The term does not signify that 
it is produced by mechanical and artificial means. We 
call it that only by analogy to the cohesion which u­
nites the elements of an inanimate body, as opposed to 
that which makes a unity out.of the elements of aliv­
ing body. What justifies this term is that thelink 
which thus unites the individual to society is wholly 
analogous to that which attaches a thing to a person. 
The individual conscience ••• is a simple dependent 
•
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upon the collective types and follows all of its move­
ments, as the possessed object follows those of its 
owner. In societies where this type of solidarity is 
highly developed, the individual does not appear. In­
dividuality is something which the society possesses. 
Thus, in these social types, personal rights are not 
distinguished from real rights * (DL:130). 
Shifting in mid-paragraph from the biological to legal analo­
gy, Durkheim here proposed that the individual in early socie­
ties is like a simple dependent, a possession of society. In­
deed, in his notion of altruistic suicide, Durkheim explored 
this insight that primitive and archaic cultures permeated by 
sacro-magical structures may bid their members to sacrifice 
themselves for the welfare of the group. 
In his lectures on "Physique generale des moeurs et du 
droit," Durkheim reiterated this image of the collective pos­
session of the individual. 
How then it came that the individual could thus occupy 
himself with the pursuit of aims which were to such a 
degree foreign to his own private concerns? The answer 
is this: his private concerns were relatively unimpor­
tant to him and his personality and everything that 
hung on it had slight moral weight. His personal views, 
his private beliefs and all his diverse aspirations as 
an individual seemed insignificant factors. What was 
prized,above all, were the beliefs held in common, the 
collective aspirations, the popular traditions, and 
the symbols that were an expression of them.••. Absorb­
ed, as he was, into the mass of society, he meekly gave 
way to its pressures and subordinated his own lot to 
the destinies of collective existence without any sense 
of sacrifice. This is because his particular fate had 
in his own eyes nothing of the meaning and high signi­
ficance that we nowadays attribute to it. If we are 
right in that estimate, it was in the nature of things 
that it should be so; societies could only exist at 
that time by virtue of this subservience (PECM:55). 
Besides altruisme, Durkheim also identified communism (see 
Socialism, and Part II of BooK Two of this dissertation) with 
the collective sharing of property in primitive society. 
Communism, in effect, is the necessary product of this 
cohesion which absorbs the individual in the group, 
the part in the whole. Property is definitive only 
of the extension of the person over things. Where the 
collective personality is the only one existent, prop­
erty must also be COllective. It will become individual 
only when the individual, disengaging himself from the 
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mass, shall become a being personal and distinct, not 
only as an organism, but also as a factor in social 
life (DL:179). 
Because of the essential likeness of everyone within the 
the same culture, Durkheim perceived these groups as homogen­
eous	 repetitive units, "segemental societies" as he called 
them. The horde, the clan, are composed by repetition of like 
aggregates within them. 
This organization ... carries with it no other solidari­
ty than that derived from likenesses, since the society 
is formed of similar segments and these in their turn 
enclose only homogeneous elements .•.. For segmental or­
ganization to be possible, the segments must resemble 
one another; without that, they would not be unified. 
And they must differ; without this, they would lose 
themselves in each other and be effaced (DL:176). 
Again, we must emphasize that the homogeneity here depends \ 
on the common permeation of all individuals by the sacro-mag­
ical	 collective conscience. ' 
Originality is not simply rare there, but it has no 
place. Everybody professes and practices ••. the same 
religion; schisms and dissent are unknown; they would 
not be tolerated. But, a this time, religion compris­
es all, extends to all .... Religion regulates the de­
tails of private life ..•. All individual consciences 
are composed of practically the same elements (DL:135). 
We know that, in them, religion pervades the whole so­
cial life, but that is because social life is made up 
almost exclusively of common beliefs and of common 
practices which derive from unanimous adhesion a very 
particular intensity ..•. Because all social masses have 
been formed from homogeneous elements ..• because the 
collective type was very developed there, and the in­
dividual type in a rudimentary state, it was inevitable 
that the whole psychic type of society should take on 
a religious character (DL:178-9). 
And thus, the morali~ies of thought and logics of action are 
primarily collective. 
If there is one rule of conduct which is incontestable, 
it is that which orders us to realize in ourselves the 
essential traits of the collective type. Among lower 
peoples, this reaches its greatest rigor. There, one's 
duty is to resemble everybody else, not to have any­
thing personal about one's beliefs or actions. In more 
advanced societies, required likenesses are less numer­
ous ..• (DL:396). 
Contrary to Nisbet's assertion (1965, 1974:30) that 
•
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Durkheim abandoned the mechanical/organic dichotomy, and 
never returned to it again, we have seen that he anchored 
• his notion of altruistic suicide in this type, and that it 
can be said that The Elementary Forms was an extended commen­
tary on this type of collective conscience and consciousness. 
Indeed, in the very beginning to his final book, Durkheim a­
• gain sounded the same notes in characterizing this type of 
• 
cultural and phenomenological bond as he had almost twenty 
years earlier in The Division of Labor. 
Things are quite different in the lower societies. The 
slighter development of individuality, the small exten­
sion of the group, the homogeneity of external circum­
stances, all contribute to reducing the differences 
and	 variations to a minimum. The group has an intellec­
tual and moral conformity of which we find examples in 
the	 more advanced societies. Everything is common to 
•	 
all. Movements are stereotyped; everybody performs the 
same ones in the same circumstances, and this conformi­
ty of conduct only translates the conformity of thought. 
Every mind being drawn into the same eddy, the indivi­
dual type nearly confounds itself with that of the race. 
And	 while all is uniform, all is simple as well (EF:18).
• b.	 Durkheim Versus Spencer on the Nature of "Military Socie­
ties" 
Part of the intellectual intrigue of The Division of 
• Labor was the underlying forensic context , for Durkheim en­
tertained multiple polemics here. Spencer's schema of "mili­
tary and industrial societies·' was as well-known to Durkheim 
as Toennies' notions of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. Now,
• Durkheim agreed with Spencer that " ..• the place of the in- \ 
dividual ••• becomes greater with civilization" (DL:193). 
But, as Jones remarks, it appears " ••• that Durkheim was most 
critical [of Spencer] at precisely those points where two ~­
• peared to have most in common" (1974a:346). Indeed, as Durk­
heim took pains to establish, such agreement (which misled 
Toennies) was only apparent, for at many points their inter­
pretive frameworks were fundamentally opposed.
• For instance, at first glance one might suppose that 
Spencer's famous general evolutionary law would also describe 
Durkheim's thesis of the movement from social likeness and 
•
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homogeneity to social differentiation. But Durkheim observed: 
Spencer has already said that social evolution, just
•
 
as universal evolution, begins in a stage of more or
 
•
 
less perfect homogeneity. But this proposition does
 
not in any wise resemble the one we have just been de­

veloping. For Spencer, a society that was perfectly ho­

mogeneous would not truly be a society, for homogeneity
 
is by nature unstable, and society is essentially a co­

herent whole. The social role of homogeneity is com­

pletely secondary; it may look towards an ulterior co­

operation, but it is not a specific source of social
 
life. At times, Spencer seems to see in societies such
 
as we have just been describing only an emphemeral jux­

taposition of independent individuals, the zero of so­

• 
cial life. We have, on the contrary, just seen that
 
they have a very strong collective life, although sui
 
generis, which manifests itself not on in exchange-s-­

and contracts, but in a great abundance of common be­

liefs and practices. These aggregates are coherent, not
 
in spite of their homogeneity, but because of it. Not

• 
only is the community not too weak; but we may even say
 
that it alone exists. Moreover, these societies have a
 
definite type which comes from their homogeneity. We
 
cannot treat them as negligible quantities (DL:179, #12).
 
(For differing interpretations of Durkheim's treatment of 
• 
Spencer's ideas here, see Perrin (1975) and Jones (1975). 
This disagreement between Durkheim and Spencer over 
the nature of "mechanical" or "military" societies continued 
on other fronts~ it is especially significant for our present 
• purposes that many of the crucial differences between these two pioneers of sociological theory centered on their esti­
mates of the way in which the individual was bonded to socie­
ty in primitive culture. Thus, although again Durkheim may 
• seemed to have started out from the same point as Spencer, 
he began to draw the line rather quickly. For instance: 
With him [Spencer], we have said that the place of 
the individual in society, of no account in its ori­
gins, becomes greater with civilization. But this in­
• contestable fact is presented to us under an aspect totally different from that of English philosophy, 
so that, ultimately, our conclusions are opposed to 
his more than they are in agreement (DL:193). 
Specifically, Spencer's view of eVOlution led him to view 
• primitive societies as a loose collocation of individuals. 
"Committed to such a view, Spencer had to regard primitive, 
homogeneous societies as mere ephemeral juxtapositions of 
•
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individuals ••• " (Jones, 1974:346). Durkheim observed: 
First of all, according to him, this absorption of 
the individual into the group would be the result of 
force and of an artifcial organization necessitated 
by the state of war in which lower societies chroni­
cally live. It is especially in war that union is ne­
cessary to success. A group can defend itself against 
another group or sUbject it to itself only by acting 
together. It is necessary for all the individual for­
ces to be concentrated in a permanent manner in an 
indissoluble union. But the only means of producing 
this cOhcentration instantaneously is by instituting 
a very strong authority to which individuals are ab­
solutely submissive. It is necessary that as the will 
of the soldier finds itself suspended in executing 
the will of his superior, so too does the will of cit­
izens find itself curtailed by that of the government. 
Thus, it is an organized despotism which would anniha­
late individuals, and since this organization is essen­
tially military, it is through militarism that Spencer 
defines these types of society (DL:193). 
While Spencer defined primitive societies as "military" be­
cause the autonomous individual was oppressed there, Durkheim 
reversed the equation and began with the group instead of the 
individual. As Jones observes: 
Durkheim's response argued that the effacement of the 
individual is characteristic, not of societies posses­
sing a centralized authority, but rather of societies 
characterized by the complete absence of centraliza­
tion. It is the homogeneous (or mechanically solidary) 
society in which the individual personality holds lit­
tle sway, not because it is suppressed by some politi­
calor military force, but because as such "the indi­
vidual" does not exist in such societies. For Durkheim, 
the emergence of centralized authority is not the sign 
of an impending suppression of individualism: rather, 
it is itself the first manifestation of individualism. 
The power granted to the despotic ruler frees him from 
the dictates of the group, and he is the thus the first 
personality to emerge as distinct from the social mass • 
••• The individual ••• does not exist prior to the form 
of social organization and bring it into being: on the 
contrary, the "individual" is the consequence of some 
pre-existing state of social solidarity (1974a:347). 
Now, the fundamental difference here between Spencer's 
and Durkheim's position was, of course, that Spencer assumed 
that the morally autonomous and intellectually responsible 
individual enshrined in nineteenth century English Utilitar­
ian political and moral theory was to be found at the origin 
•
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of human society. The "natural rights" and "social contract" 
theorists had, of course, developed this rhetorical fiction 
in their struggles to disengage from control of Church and 
State. As Jones remarks: " ... Durkheim's opposition to the 
view of rights as fixed in human nature was directed against 
Spencer's notion that man "by nature" possesses the right to 
free contract and equal exchange of value" (1974:347). Thus, 
to Spencer, "industrial societies," based on free contrac-
tual relations among individuals in a market, were peaceful, 
while primitive societies which repressed individual freedom 
were "military." Durkheim, on the contrary, rejected the cor-
ollary notions of a morally autonomous ego in a state of na-
ture, and the idea of an early centralized state despotism. 
We have seen, on the contrary, that this effacement 
of the individual has as its place of origin a social 
type which is characterized by a complete absence of 
all centralization. It is a product of that state of 
homogeneity which distinguishes primitive societies. 
If the individual is not distinct from the group, it 
is because the individual conscience is hardly at all 
distinguishable from the collective conscience. Spen-
cer and other sociologists with him seem to have inter-
preted these distant facts in terms of very modern i-
deas. The very pronounced contemporary sentiment that 
each of us has his own individuality has led them to 
believe that personal rights cannot be restrained to 
this point except by a coercive organization. We cling 
to them so firmly that they find it inconceivable for 
man to have willingly abandoned them. In fact, if in 
lower societies so small a place is given to indivi~ 
dual personality, that is not because it has been re-
strained or artificially suppressed. It is simply be-
cause, at that moment of history, it did not exist 
*(DL:193). 
Extending his counter-logics, Durkheim also moved to 
refute the egoism/altruism evolutionary schema of Spencer. 
Now, Spencer and some of the later "Social Darwinists" some-
times claimed that egoism was basic, the elementary natural 
state of mankind, and altruism only a recent development. 
Durkheim inverted this notion by insisting that a wider so-
ciocultural perspective reveals altruism as elementary and 
original, and egoism as a new social condition. Such a per-
spective became the framework for Durkheim's schemas of sui-
•
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cide. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
we see how ..• false is the theory which makes ego­
tism the point of departure for humanity, and altruism 
only a recent conquest. What gives this hypothesis au­
thority in the eyes of certain persons is that it ap­
pears to be the logical consequence of the principles 
of Darwinism. In the name of the dogma of struggle for 
existence and natural selection, they paint for us in 
the saddest of colors this primitive inhumanity whose 
hunger and thirst, always badly satisfied, were their 
only passions; those somber times when men had no oth­
er occupation than to quarrel with one another over 
their miserable nourishment. To react against those re­
trospective reveries of the philosophy of the eighteenth 
century and also against certain religious doctrines, to 
show with some force that the paradise lost is not be­
hind us and that there is nothing in our past to regret, 
they believe we ought to make it dreary and belittle it 
systematically. Nothing is less scientific than this 
prejudice in the opposite direction. If the hypotheses 
of Darwin have a moral use, it is with more reserve and 
measure than in other sciences. They overlook the essen­
tial element of social life, that is, the moderating in­
fluence that society exercises over its members, which 
tempers and neutralizes the brutal action of the strug­
gle for existence and selection. Wherever there are so­
cieties, there is altruism because there is solidarity. 
Thus, we find altruism from the beginnings (DL:197). 
DurKneim was then driven by this polemic to attempt to 
more precisely define the sphere of the individual and the 
personal. Though still confusing personality with individua­
tion, Durkheim sounded a note which he later elaborated in 
"fhe Dualism of Human Nature" and The Elementary Forms that the 
uniquely bodily locus of sensations is the foundation of in­
dividuality and individuation. 
..• conduct is egotistical in the measure that itis 
determined by sentiments and representations which 
are exclusively personal. If, then, we remember to 
what extent in lower societies the conscience of the 
individual is wrapped in the collective conscience, 
we may even be led to believe that it is a thing to­
tally different from the individual himself, as Con­
dillac would say. This conclusion, however, would be 
exaggerated, for there is a sphere of psychic life 
which, however developed the collective type may be, 
varies from one man to another and remains peculiar 
with each. It is that which is formed by representa­
tions, by sentiments and~ndencies which relate to 
the organism and to the state of the organism. It is 
the world of internal and external sensations and the 
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movements which are directly linked to them. This 
first foundation of all individuality is inalienable 
and does not depend upon any social state. Thus, one 
must not say that altruism is born from egotism. Such 
a derivation would be possible only through a creatio 
ex nihilo. But, to speak vigorously, these two sides 
of conduct are found present from the beginning in all 
human consciences, for there cannot be things which do 
not reflect both of these aspects, the one relating to 
the individual alone, and the other relating to the 
things which are not personal to him (DL:197-8). 
Durkheim continued with this line of thought, developing a 
notion of a shifting balance in sociocultural evolution be­
tween egoism and altruism, and concluded: " ... individualism 
has developed in absolute value by penetrating into regions 
which were originally closed to it" (DL:198). 
In short, while Durkheim and Spencer seemed to take 
off from a common point of departure, at many points Durkheim 
moved to reverse the underlying presuppositions of Spencer's 
thought, especially in regard to the shifting evolutionary 
relations between individual and society. 
It is not necessary, then, with Spencer, to present 
social life as a simple resultant of individual na­
tures, since, on the contrary, it is rather the lat­
ter which come from the former. Social facts are not 
the simple development of psychic facts, but the se­
cond are in large part only the prolongation of the 
first in the interior of consciences (DL:349). 
Thus did Durkheim's social realism and careful evolutionary 
investigations correct Spencer's nominalism. "Society does 
not find the bases on which it rests fully laid out in con­
sciences~ it puts them there itself" (DL:350). 
c. Altruisme as an Index to Mechanical Solidarity 
Whereas in The Division of Labor Durkheim mainly took 
repressive penal law as his prime external index, in Suicide 
he focussed on altruistic suicide as revealing the collective 
nature of the archaic social bond. Altruistic suicide serves 
as a prime illustration (see especially Part I, Book Two) of 
the active acceptance of overwhelmingly strong cultural sanc­
tions of self-abnegation in "mechanical solidarity. However, 
Durkheim did occasionally speak in his first book of altruisme 
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in relation to suicide. 
We find altruism from the beginning of humanity and 
even in a truly intemperate form. For these priva­
tions that the savage imposes upon himself in obedi­
ence to religious tradition, the abnegation with 
which he sacrifices his life when society demands 
such sacrifice, the irrestible desire of the widow 
of India to follow her husband to the grave, of the 
Gaul not to survive the head of his clan, of the old 
Celt to free his companions from useless trouble by 
voluntary death--is not all this altruism (DL:197)? 
Thus, altruisme implies that the individual in primitive and 
archaic societies with low degrees of segmentation, and gov­
erned by traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to 
sacrifice himself for the group as a duty and an honor. To 
Durkheim, for the individual to emerge as a full-fledged en­
tity in his own right--as an intellectually responsible and 
11 autonomous h . 1 11' ..mora YAperson--t e sacro-mag1ca co ect1ve prescr1pt1ve 
etiquettes must first recede. 
According to Durkheim's heuristic "ideal type," in 
primitive society the individual is more or less submerged 
in the group. The collective conscience takes precedence o­
ver the rudimentary individual conscience in the public mo­
res. Indeed, the individual there is so permeated and pene­
trated by the collective conscience that if tradition demands 
self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide embraces self-homicide 
as a duty, perhaps even a privilege to be competed for. In 
contrast to egoistic suicide, the altruist considers self­
sacrifice for the group an obligation, a moral duty which 
fulfills his own nature. 
In this sense, altruistic suicide was utilized by Durk­
heim as an objective index revealing the inner nature of the 
social bond peculiar to traditional societies rooted in ties 
of "blood and soil" and religion. Altruistic suicide is tes­
timony to the low degree of individuation in mechanical sol­
idarity. 
For society to be able thus to compel some of its mem­
bers to kill themselves, the individual personality 
can have little value. For as soon as the latter be­
gins to form, the right to existence is the first con­
ceded to it •••. But there can be only one cause of this 
• 
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• 
feeble individuation itself. For the individual to 
occupy so little place in collective life he must be 
almost completely absorped in the group, and the lat­
ter, accordingly, very highly integrated. For the 
parts to have so little life of their own, the whole 
must indeed be a compact, continuous mass .... As they 
consist of a few elements, everyone leads the same 
life~ everything is common to all, ideas, feelings, 
occupations. Also, because of the small size of the
• 
group, it is close to everyone and loses no one from 
sight~ consequently, collective supervision is con­
stant, extending to everything, and thus more readily 
prevents divergences (S:220-22l). 
In a real sense, altruistic suicide is the ultimate expres­
• 
sion of "mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really 
has little life apart from his group, sacrifices himself for 
his group when deemed necessary. This extreme sense of moral 
obligation is due not only to external conditions in which 
• 
such groups often find themselves, but primarily to the ex­
• 
treme degree of penetration of the collective conscience by 
sacral and magical sanctions. Durkheim refers to altruisme 
in these terms as " ... a state of impersonality which may be 
regarded as a moral characteristic of primitive man" (S:223). 
• 
Hence, primitive cultures exist in a "state of impersonality" 
because the person has little autonomous status there. 
In such situations, the individual is submerged in the 
dictates of the sacro-magical collective conscience. Indeed, 
Durkheim suggests that self-sacrifice and the systematic e­
radication of the ego in certain archaic religions implies a 
state of "impersonalized altruism" which corresponds to the 
• "pantheistic" structure of such societies. Since religion is the symbolic way in which society first crystallized self­
consciousness, it follows, argued Durkheim, that "mechanical­
ly integrated" societies, in which the lone individual counts 
• 
for little, should express these social and cultural reali­
ties in terms of pantheistic religious projections. As the 
individual counted for little in society, so, too, the ego 
counted for little in religion. Indeed, Durkheim's insight 
• here would lead us to expect that societies that had not o­
vercome segmental bases, tribalistic structures of frat­
ernization, and collective sacro-magical moralities of 
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thought and logics of action would probably never construct 
European notions of the autonomy and moral value of the in­
• dividual person. 
d. The Chief as the Emergence of Individual Physiognomy 
One of Durkheim's interesting insights into the general
• evolutionary process of individuation was his suggestion that 
" Chiefs are the first personalities to emerge from the so­
cial mass" (DL:195). With the chief as the administrative fo­
cus of the collective conscience, as it were, we witness the
• emergence of process by which an individual, in representing 
the mass, rises above and takes on an individual physiognomy. 
Hegel also saw the ruler as the collective representation of 
his community, in which the principle of individuation isim­
• personality. "The youth goes forth from the unconscious life 
of the family and becomes the individuality of the community" 
(1967:493). It is precisely this dialectic of individuation 
through becoming the symbolic representation of the communi­
• ty--that is, the incarnation of an impersonal type--which we 
shall meet again and again. 
Now, it is important to emphasize that Durkheim's no­
tion of mechanical solidarity is not refuted by the rise of
• larger political units; rather, it is confirmed. As noted in 
Chapter Six of this Book, perhaps the closest fusion between 
religious, ritual, and political structures occurred in the 
archaic empires of the ancient world. Indeed, it is precisely
• under such conditions, rather than in the primitive case, 
that mechanical solidarity and the "sacral womb" reach their 
paradigmatic level. 
If in some types of societies, the directive power has
• 
so much authority, it is ••• because this authority 
emanates directly from the common conscience, and it 
is great because the common conscience itself is high­
ly developed •••• It is under these conditions that me­
chanical solidarity reaches its maximum power, for the 
action of the common conscience is stronger when it is
• 
exercised, not in a diffuse manner, but through the me­
dium of a defined organ (DL:18l). 
Durkheim later explored some. of these processes at length in 
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his interesting essay "Two Laws of Penal Evolution" (transla­
ted by Jones and Scull, 1973). Here, Durkheim foreshadowed 
his later analysis by observing: 
.•. ~rimitive peoples do not at all present this ab­
sence of centralization that we have just observed. 
There are some, on the contrary, subservient to an 
absolute power. The division of labor has then made 
its appearance among them. But in this case, the tie 
which binds the individual to the chief is identical 
with that which in our days attaches the thing to the 
person. The relations of a barbarous despot with his 
subjects, as that of a master with his slaves, of a 
father of a Roman family with his children, is not to 
be distinguished from the relations of an owner with 
the object he possesses. In these relations there is 
none of the reciprocity which the division of labor 
produces. They have with good reason been called uni­
lateral. The solidarity that they express remains me­
chanical. The whole difference is that it links the 
individual, not more directly to ~ group, but to . 
the image of the group. But the un1ty of the whole 1S, 
as before, exclusive of the individuality of its parts 
*(DL: 180). 
In sum, where religion and political-legal structures are 
fused, the individual is depersonalized by submergence in 
the collective image of the group. 
NOw, Durkheim later summarized this process of the sub­
ordination of the social mass under all sorts of traditional 
collective sacro-magical injunctions to the centralized image 
of the group in these terms: 
Individuals, instead of subordinating themselves to 
the group, were subordinated to that which represented 
it, and as the collective authority, when it was dif­
fuse was absolute, that of the chief, who is only its 
organized incarnation, naturally took on the same char­
acter (DL:195). 
In this dialectic between individuation and attachment to an 
impersonal image, on the one hand, and between center and 
periphery on the other, the social mass, especially in emer­
ging large scale political units, becomes subordinated to a 
specific individual who focusses and incarnates the existence 
of the group. The chief becomes the first individual in his­
tory, according to Durkheim, to separate himself from the so­
cial mass only because he serves as an the image of an imper­
sonal type, a collective representation of the group. 
•
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• 
It is a general law that the eminent organ of every 
society participates in the nature of the collective 
being that it represents. Where society has a reli­
gious, and, so to speak, superhuman character, whose 
• 
source .•. lies in the constitution of the common con­
science, it necessarily transmits itself to the chief 
who directs it and who is thus elevated above the rest 
of men. Where individuals are in simple dependence 
upon the collective type, they quite naturally become 
dependent upon the central authority in which it is 
incarnated. Indeed, the right of property which the 
community exercises over things in an undividen way 
passes intact into the superior personality who finds 
himself thus constituted (DL:180). 
• Here Durkheim suggests that the collective or "undivided" 
rights of ownership pass over into the next political stage 
as the undisputed possession of all the goods and people of 
the realm by the political chief. Thus, by an imperceptible 
• 
evolution, the chief, as the collective representation or 
figurehead of the group, becomes endowed with all the tradi­
tional prerogatives once jealously held by the group itself 
for itself. But, the dialectics of this very process lead 
• 
to an inversion for the figure who symbolically incarnates 
the group then comes to usurp or claim these powers and pos­
sessions as his own, often hereditary, right and privilege. 
Possessing deep insight into this interesting dialec­
• tic and reversal, Durkheim then cautioned us: Rather than dating the effacement of the individual 
from the institution of a despotic authority, we must, 
on the contrary, see in this institution the first 
step made towards individualism. Chiefs are the first 
• 
personalities who emerge from the social mass. Their 
exceptional situation, putting them beyond the level 
of others, gives them a distinct physiognomy and ac­
cordingly confers individuality upon them. In domina­
ting society, they are no longer forced to follow all 
its movements. Of course, it is from the group that 
•
 
they derive their power, but once power is organized,
 
it becomes autonomous and makes them capable of per­
• 
sonal activity. A source of initiative is thus opened 
which had not existed before then. There is, hereafter, 
someone who can produce new things and even in certain 
measure, deny collective usages. Equilibrium has been 
broken (DL:195). 
However, by extension, would not also shamans, medicine men, 
magicians, priests, prophets, and so forth, who serve as in­
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carnations of sacred collective forces, also be capable of 
"breaking the equilibrium"? Would they also not qualify as 
social sites for the emergence of individual physiognomy as 
much as chiefs? 
e.	 Durkheim Versus Toennies on The Division of Labor and 
Community and Society 
Two classics of modern historical sociocultural theory 
appeared within five years of each other toward the close of 
the nineteenth century--Ferdinand Toennies' Gemeinschaft und 
Gesellschaft (1897) and Emile Durkheim's De la division du 
travail social (1893). Comparing and contrasting these two 
classics not only demonstrates how two pioneer sociological 
theorists came to grips with similar historical processes, 
but also how their analyses reveal fundamentally different 
attitudes and commitments. Recently, a fascinating exchange 
between Durkheim and Toennies has been translated (see Al­
dous, 1972), which is not only important in terms of the his­
tory of social science, but als~ffhau!€veals the conflict be­
tween these thinkers as spokesman for different cultural tra­
ditions. While Durkheim and Weber never collided in public 
(see Part I, Book Three), Toennies and Durkheim's mutual 
book reviews reveal basic differences as they confronted 
each other's formulation. 
Throughout his life Durkheim was involved on mUltiple 
polemical fronts against opposing cultural traditions. Take, 
for example, The Division of Labor; as noted, Durkheim was 
here engaged in polemics against not only Spencer and Comte, 
but also against Toennies. It is interesting to note, how­
ever, in light of the preceding section, that Toennies saw 
Durkheim's whole sociology as merely "a modification of Spen­
cer's." Now, Durkheim's critique of Toennies' schema in Com­
munity and Society falls into at least two categories: val­
uations of the past versus the present, and the problematic 
relations between the individual and society through history. 
First, Durkheim acknowledged that Toennies' notion of "Com­
munity" was very similar to what he called "mechanical soli­
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darity." 
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Gemeinschaft is the community. It constitutes an 
absolute unity which is incompatible with the distinc­
tion of parts. To merit the name community ... a group 
is not a collection of individuals differing from one 
another; it is a mass, undifferentiated and compact .... 
It is an aggregate of minds so strongly cohesive that 
no one is able to stir independently of the others •.•. 
It is a community where ... communism is carried to the 
highest point of perfection. The whole alone exists; 
it alone has a action sphere peculiar to itself (1972: 
1193) • 
We might recall here that Durkheim's original problem was how 
to combine the solidarity found in traditional communities 
with the respect for the individual found in modern "civil so­
ciety." So, in contrast to the Romantics, he could not simply 
look back to the past, for he was not willing to give up cer­
tain positive values found mainly in modernity. The past to 
him meant high social solidarity; which was good, but it also 
meant the submergence of the individual in the traditional 
collective conscience. But this problem of disengagement from 
lingering hierocratic control confronted the French "laic" 
moral reformers far more than it did the German Romantics and 
Idealists. 
Now, in terms of Toennies' notion of modern society, 
Durkheim remarked: 
Individual minds, far from merging within Gesellschaft, 
are differentiated and even opposed to each other. While 
the first form of society is that which Hegel prefers, 
one recognizes in the second the theory of Bentham.... 
Thus, while in Gemeinschaft the whole had primacy over 
the parts, now under Gesellschaft, the parts are given 
precedence over the whole. The latter is formed only by 
the juxtaposition of the separate parts. That is why, 
while the composition of Gemeinschaft is organic, that 
of Gesellschaft is mechanical (1972:1196). 
Durkheim next stated that he decisively differed from Toennies 
in regard to the latter's theory of Gesellschaft. Toennies'im­
age of modern society is predominantly negative; if he painted 
the traditional community in warm tones, modern society would 
be filled in cold tones. Moreover, Toennies was pessimistic 
about the fate of the individual and the future of social re­
lations in modern Gesellschaft. Toennies' typology seemed to 
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Durkheim, as Durkheim's typology seemed to Parsons, to be too 
dichotomous, as if the two parts had little inner or develop­
mental relation to one another. Durkheim described what saw 
as Toennies' analysis of modern society, and responded nega­
tively to Toennies' pessimism, likening it to Spencer's vi­
sion. Here enters another complexity, for while Durkheim saw 
Toennies' description of modern society as similar to Spen­
cer's, Hobbes', or B~ntham's, Toennies and Spencer themselves 
placed different valuations on the matter. In short, Spencer's 
sanguine or optimistic view is countered by Toennies' pessi­
mism or negative view, while Durkheim opposed both or 
tried to mediate between the two. With Spencer, he wished to 
preserve modern individualism, yet with Toennies (against 
Spencer) he wished to emphasize the crucial importance of so­
cial solidarity or Gemeinschaft relations in modern society. 
Against Toennies, and with Spencer, Durkheim recognized the 
impossibility of any return to the earlier type of social 
solidarity built upon likeness and submission to traditional 
sacro-magical rationales and practices. Benjamin Nelson has 
said of these multiple interactions that: 
The most critical fact about the Durkheimian view is 
its awareness of the immense challenges confronted by 
men and groups in the phase of organic solidarity when 
they seek to coordinate and synchronize their activi­
ties and functions. Unlike Spencer, Durkheim does not 
fancy that the simple breakdown of the unit and its 
unities assures to each and all the ultimate consumma­
tion and satisfaction. Unlike Toennies, he recognizes 
that in the development of society new sorts of soli­
darity to have to be evolved, achieving new kinds of 
cornrnunitarian and individuating structures of conscious­
ness and function, if the trends and tendencies toward 
anomie and normlessness in complex societies are to be 
moderated (1972:120). 
Now,	 Durkheim himself stated in this regard that: 
It [Gesellschaftl is very similar to Spencer's indus­
trial society. It is seen in the reign of individual­
ism••.• The regime of status is, under Gesellschaft 
replaced by the regime of contracts. Since individual 
wills are no longer absorbed in the collective will 
but are placed opposite one another in the full sense 
of their independence, the only thing that could put 
an end to this state of war is a treaty of peace con­
•
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sciously signed ... agreement or contract. The immanent 
and unconscious law of Gemeinschaft is now replaced by 
•
 
a deliberate law, a contractual law. Property also in­

dividualized becomes mobile and money appears. It is 
the era of commerce, of industry, of great cities, of 
free exchange and of cosmopolitanism. In sum, one sees 
that the society which Toennies paints at this moment 
is the capitalistic society [as described by] ... tte 
socialists; and, iri fact, the author often borrows the
• somber colors ... from Karl Marx and from LaSalle (1972: 1196). 
- Of course, two of the main influences on Toennies con­
ception of modern society were Hobbes and Henry Sumner Maine. 
•
 
Of the latter's influence on Toennies, Nelson remarks:
 
• 
Maine was not unaware of the losses incurred in the 
course of the passage from what I have called the tri­
bal brotherhood to universal otherhood. Progress had 
been purchased at a price. The close and compelling 
loyalties of the kindred group of real'or assumed broth­
ers ... had been displaced by a new world of econo mi.c 
• 
relations. Primitive communalism and cooperation had 
given way to impersonal competition where each was as­
sumed to be free to assert his self-interest without 
immediate regard as to the concern for others. Laissez­
faire, which embodied the belligerency permissible in 
primitive society only between distinct kindred groups, 
had triumphed over customary fraternalistic relations. 
Every-·there that the village community had been allowed 
to disintegrate precipitously, melancholy effects had 
been the result. 
•	 
Maine's notions undergo both a loss and a gain at the 
hands	 of Toennies. Under the names of Gemeinschaften 
•
 
and Gesellschaften, Tonnies describes opposed structures
 
of wills and social relationships. Gemeinichaften com­

prises groups that are expressions of organic nonre­

flective wills. Associational forms, Gesellschaften,
 
originate in a negation of the Gemeinscha£ten. The mar­

ketand industrial relations of complex societies are
 
•
 
characterized by transitory, segmental, and calculating
 
relationships. Actually, Toennies went beyond these sim­

ple formulations in his later less well-known studies,
 
but he never quite integrated the social group analysis
 
and his cultural analysis .... , A little known book re­

view of Toennies book by Durkheim detects a critical
 
limitation in Toennies argument (Nelson, 1972: 117). 
One might add that detailed analysis of their mutual criti­
ques reveals that both seem critically aware of the other 
•	 
theorist's flaws; and equally oblivious of the weaknesses in 
their	 own theses. 
Let us next turn to briefly consider the political frame­
•
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works or overtones of their respective analyses. It is most 
significant, again, that both Durkheim's The Division of La­
• 
bor and Toennies' Community and Society revolved around the 
relations between the individual and society, or in slightly 
different terms, between communism, socialism, and individual­
ism. As Mauss tells us (1958:32), Durkheim originally drafted 
• 
his dissertation as "The Relationship Between Individualism 
and Socialism," while Toennies first subtitled his book "A 
Study of Communism and Socialism Considered as Empirical 
Forms of Civilization." These titles throw light, in turn, on 
• the differences between Durkheim's political sociology and 
that of Toennies. Thus, for instance, Durkheim proposed that 
secondary groups such as occupational associations should be 
endowed with both power and moral legitimacy to stand between 
• the lone individual and the powerfully centralized state. 
Mauss tells that Durkheim thought: 
.•. it necessary to grant the professional group a 
portion of the ancient political and property rights 
which domestic groups had, if the individual is not
• to be alone in the face of the State and live in a kind of alternation between anarchy and servitude 
(1958:33) . 
Of Toennies' quasi-HObbegian theory of the relations between 
the individual and the modern state, Durkheim observed:
• It is necessary that this state be strong to contain 
all the individual wills, all the individual interests 
that no longer are bound one to the other, all the un­
• 
chained lusts. One now understands the subtitle--.-.. -.­
Communism is the regime of Gemeinschaft, as socialism 
is that of Gesellschaft .... But while the socialists 
hail Gesellschaft, the regime of their preference as 
the ideal end of progress, Toennies sees in it only the 
inevitable consequence of social evolution, and even 
suggests it may be the forerunner of society's final 
dissolution. He speaks of Gesellschaft without enthu­
• 
siasm•... It is indispensable that the state form and 
develop in order that Gesellschaft be able to endure; 
but, on the other hand, it is able to exercise on the 
members of society only a mechanical action which can­
not last indefinitely. By completely artifical coercion 
it is able to restrain for a time all the internal con­
•
 
tradictions, all the discords that work within the so­

ciety, but sooner or later they will end by breaking 
out. There is true power only in the extent to which 
it represents common ideas and interests. For as Gemein­
•
 
• --382-­
• 
schaft declines, the number of these common ideas and 
the importance of cornmon interests also becomes pro­
gressively fewer. The state of internal war that socie­
ty discloses cannot fail sooner or later to produce, as 
natural consequences, the rupturing of all social bonds 
and the decomposition of the social organism. Thus, the 
life of society comprises two great phases, communism 
and socialism, but the latter is the beginning of an 
end more or less close*(1972:ll97).
• Now, let us recall that Durkheim and Toennies used the 
term "mechanical" to refer to societies at the two opposite 
ends of history. Durkheim used "mechanical ll to refer to a so­
ciety based on likeness, in which the individual stood merely
• as a repetitive, mechanical part submerged in the traditional 
collective conscience. Toennies, on the other hand, used me­
chanical to refer to an impersonal, atomized aggregate of in­
dividuals pursuing their own self-interests in the market so­
• ciety. This interesting inversion of terms led Durkheim to 
put his finger on the very point at which he differed from 
Toennies. 
The point where I part company with him [Toennies] is
• 
with his theory of Gesellschaft ...• Gesellschaft would 
be characterized by a progressive development of indivi­
dualism that the State could forestall only for a time 
and by artificial procedures. It [society] would be es­
sentially a mechanical aggregate; all that would still 
remain of the truly collective life would result not
• 
from internal spontaneity, but from the impetus of the 
State ..•. It is society as Bentham imagined it (1972: 
1198). 
Of course, Durkheim opposed the idea that modern society was 
either artificial or forced. As we shall see in Part II, Book
• Two, Durkheim believed that the progress of organic solidarity 
was spontaneous and harmonious. As Giddens observes: 
•
 
The main theme of The Division of Labor is that modern
 
complex society is not, in spite-of the declining sig­

nificance of traditional moral beliefs, inevitably tend­

ing towards disintegration. Instead the "normal" state
 
•
 
of the differentiated division of labor is one of organ­

ic stability. This does not mean, however, (as Durkheirn
 
considered Toennies' analysis to imply), that the inte­

grating effect of the specialized division of labor can
 
be satisfactorily interpreted in the mode of Utilitar­

ianism, as the result of multifarious individual con­

tracts (197lc:19l). 
•
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On this matter, Durkheim himself stated: 
Now, I believe that all the life of great social ag­
glomerations is as natural as that of small aggrega­
tions. It is neither less organic nor less internally 
activated. Beyond purely individual actions there is 
in our contemporary societies a type of collective ac­
tivity which is just as natural as that of the less ex­
tended societies of former days. It constitutes a dif­
ferent type, but between the two species from the same 
genus, as diverse as they are, there is not a differ­
ence in their basic natures. In order to prove it, a 
book is necessary •... There is so little continuity 
between these two types of societies that it is impos­
sible to conceive how they could be part of the same 
development {1972:ll98}. 
The book was, of course, The Division of Labor in Society. 
Durkheim then criticized Toennies' description of Gesell­
schaft as purely ideological, and suggests that a "better way" 
would have been to empirically study juridical structures, as 
he himself was doing in the drafts of his first great book. 
But, in what does the collective life of Gesellschaft 
consist? The method the author follows ... is complete­
ly ideological ..•. Toennies elaborates concepts more 
than he observes the facts about the phenomena deline­
ated by his concepts. He proceeds dialectically, mak­
ing those distinctions and those symmetrical classi­
fications of concepts so dear to the German logician. 
A better way to reach his goal would have been to pro­
ceed inductively .•. to study the Gesellschaft pheno­
mena through law and mores appropriate to it which 
would reveal its structure. But ... one cannot fail to 
recognize in this book truly forceful thinking and an 
uncommon power of organization {1972:ll98}. 
Let us now turn to Toennies' reply to Durkheim. 
Toennie~ response to Durkheim's critical review was 
brief but cogent. Toennies' reply appeared in 1896 in brief 
comments on Durkheim's The Division of Labor. His review is 
noteworthy because he expressed surprise at Durkheim's usage 
of his terms "mechanical" and "organic" in a reverse manner, 
he insisted that his intentions have not been adequately re­
cognized, and from his own special perspective, Toennies saw 
Durkheim's sociology as basically congruent with Spencer's, 
and finally, he revealed a critical attitude toward Durkheim's 
work which probably derives from the conflict between their 
respective cultural traditions. 
•
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First, Toennies protests that his presentation of organ­
ically and mechanically integrated social structures is not 
• merely the reverse of Durkheim's. 
• 
What I referred to were the possible kinds of positive 
attitudes of people toward each other, hence those of 
the individual toward the social entirety. My types are 
as follows: the entirety is perceived and considered as 
a goal--as a natural whole; or the entirety is perceived 
and considered as a means for individual goals and con­
sequently as an intentionally devised tool (1972:1199). 
Toennies thus started from the individual's perceptions and 
the content of his will while, on the contrary, Durkheim start­
• ed from the social and cultural structures and related these 
back to the individual. Toennies continues: 
• 
I understand both kinds of structures in a sense com­
pletely different from that of Durkheim, Barth, and all 
other sociologists known to me. I understand them in the 
the first range according to their ..• esse objectivum, 
and I am delineating the progressive rationalization 
and externalization of these relations which derive 
from these esse objectivum and reach their climax in 
the conceptIOnS of the universal society and the uni­
•
 
versal state. This doctrine of mine is basically indif­

ferent toward the theory that the esse formale of the 
• 
social life or that of Gesellschaft is organic (1972: 
1199-2000). 
Thus, Toennies reiterated .;hat his starting point and cen­
tral focus were very different from Durkheim's. Implying that 
•
 
Durkheim was centrally concerned with the structural rela­

tions between individual and society through history, Toen­

nies started with the individual's perception of the essen­

tial goal of his life-activity. Toennies' perspective is val­

uable in itself and because Durkheim largely ignored pheno­
menological approaches, and because Toennies' approach influ­
enced both Weber's typologies and his notion of verstehen. 
• 
Then, Toennies' pointed out that Durkheim appeared to 
slight the negative features of the progressive division of 
labor. "I objected several times to his failure to consider 
the negative side of the entire evolution" (1972:2000). Of 
• 
course, Durkheim did see a negative side to the breakdown of 
the division of labor in terms of the forced and anomic divi­
sions of labor (see Part II, Book Two). Thus, Durkheim's view 
•
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•
 
•
 
of the negative consequences was simply not what Toennies 
saw; Durkheim ignored the Romantics' charges of impersonal­
ization, and assumed that specialization of functions was 
necessary and good (eg. see DL:402-3). Toennies' sardonic 
summary of Durkheim's theses went like this: 
The essential subject of Durkheim's work is the moral 
value of the division of labor; he expects public o­
pinion to turn increasingly toward the goal of making 
the division of labor an object of obligation. Thus 
belonging to positive and current morals, it unfolds 
its real (natural) moral value. The author is defend­
ing the division of labor against the reproach of di­
minishing human personality. The entire sociology of 
Durkheim is a modification of Spencer's sociology. In 
the way this perspective is criticized as well as in 
several other commentaries, I found some thoughts I 
agree with (1972:2000). 
These observations raise a crucial question in regard to the 
emergence of the person through history. Toennies rightly saw 
that Durkheim took pains to defend the division of labor a­
gainst the charge of diminishing human personality (DL:402-3), 
but clearly this very charge lay at the heart of the Roman­
tics' critique of progress. Toennies and other thinkers in 
the Romantic tradition (see Part I, Book Three), 
stood for the life of the Spirit, for the Faustian universal­
ity of the whole man. The integrated personality and the deep­
ened interior life versus the narrow, fragmented, functional­
ized bureaucrat--it was this opposition between life and death 
death, Spirit and Mechanism--which lay behind Weber's haunt­
ing plaint at the close of his Protestant Ethic ..• book. It 
also lay behind Toennies' subsidy of the whole personalism 
of community, of the warm, extended primary group relations. 
The organicism of.personality thus was associated with the 
organicism of early community versus the impersonalized atom­
ism of market society which necessitated the rationalization 
and specialization of personality and social structure. 
Let us conclude this brief review of the confrontation 
between Toennies and Durkheim by reflecting on the differences 
between their usages of the key terms "organic" and "mechani­
cal." Perhaps this might reveal key outlooks of their respec­
•
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•
 
tive cultural traditions. In essence, by the term "mechani­

cal" Toennies implied impersonality, atomized Utilitarian so­

cial relations, while to Durkheim "mechanical" implied for­

•
 
ced likeness, repetition as in a machine, and a low degree of
 
individuation as in a flock or birds or school of fish turn­

ing with a single movement. By "organic," Toennies roughly
 
meant undifferentiated, personalistic, stable, communal so­

cial relations found in traditional village communities, 
while Durkheim meant complex differentiation and interdepen­
dency of function. 
• f. Obstacles to the Progress of Organic Solidarity 
•
 
Although Durkheim's general evolutionism did not lead
 
him to Weberian insights into the differential preconditions
 
for specific historical breakthroughs, recognition of obsta­

•
 
cles to the progress of organic solidarity was not wholly ab­

sent from his work. For example, Durkheim did acknowledge that
 
that clan particularism, the force of tradition and heredity,
 
and so forth were obstacles which had to be overcome if the
 
•
 
division of labor was to perform its function of liberating
 
the individual from the sacro-magical collective conscience.
 
Indeed, at one point, in an important footnote, Durkheim ac­

knowledged the possibility of crucial exceptions to his high­

•
 
ly generalized notion that the division of labor, the efface­

ment of the segmental type of society, economic development,
 
and the liberation of the individual necessarily and every­

where go hand in hand. Let us briefly explore these "Weber­

ian" emphases. 
Noting how the new builds on the old--ie. occupational 
functions on class and caste lines--Durkheim adopted an al­
• 
most Weberian emphasis in observing that organic solidarity 
had to breakthrough the restrictive clan barriers to open up 
wider arenas of exchange and universes of discourse. 
• 
In a general way, classes and castes probably have no 
other origin nor any other nature; they arise from the 
multitude of occupational organizations being born a­
midst the pre-existing familial organization. But this 
mixed arrangement cannot long endure, for between the 
two states that it attempts to reconcile, there is an 
• 
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antagonism which necessarily ends in a break. It is 
only a very rudimentary division of labor which can 
adapt itself to those rigid, defined moulds which 
were not made for it. It can grow only by freeing 
itself from the framework which encloses it. As soon 
as it has passed a certain stage of development, there 
is no longer any relation either between the immutable 
number of segments and the steady growth of functions 
which are becoming specialized, or between the heredi­
tarily fixed properties of the first and the new apti­
tudes that the second calls forth. The social mater­
ial must enter into entirely new combinations in order 
to organize itself upon cOlnpletely different founda­
tions. But the old structure ... is opposed to this. 
That is why it must disappear. The history of these 
two types shows in effect that one has progressed on­
ly as the other has retrogressed (DL:182-3). 
Here Durkheim clearly stated that the division of labor must 
breakthrough older and narrower structures, that it faces con­
flict, that it does not proceed automatically and ineluctably, 
that it may be blocked by the rigidity of clan and familial 
based occupational differentiation. Now, the underlying rea­
son for this resistance of familial structures to progres­
sive and impersonal functionalization of occupational tasks 
is the rootedness of the clan in the collective conscience. 
Examples are numerous where this neutralizing influence 
of the common conscience on the division of labor can 
be directly observed. As long as law and custom make a 
strict obligation of the inalienability and communism 
of real estate, the necessary conditions for the divi­
sion of labor do not exist. Each family forms a com­
pact mass, and all devote themselves to the same occu­
pation, to the exploitation of the hereditary patrimony. 
Among the Slavs, the Zadruga is often increased to such 
proportions that great misery becomes prevalent. Never­
theless, as domestic spirit is very strong, they gen­
erally continue to live together, instead of taking up 
special occupations outside such as mariner and mer­
chant. In other societies, where the division of labor 
is more advanced, each class has determinate functions, 
always the same, sheltered from all innovation. Else­
where, there are entire classes of occupations whose 
cultivation is more or less forbidden to citizens. In 
Greece, in Rome, industry and commerce were scorned ca­
reers. Among the Kabyles, certain trades like those of 
butcher, shoemaker, etc. are held in low esteem by pub­
lic opinion. Specialization, thus,cannot move in these 
directions. Finally, even with those peoples where eco­
nomic life has already attained some development, as 
with us during the days of the old corporations, func­
•
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tions were regulated in such a way that the division 
of labor could not progress. Where everyone was o­
bliged to manufacture in the same manner, all indivi­
dual variation was impossible (DL:284-S). 
Further, closely allied to the segmental structure of 
mechanical solidarity was the force of heredity and ascribed 
status systems. In his concern for the liberation of the in­
dividual from the fused common concience, Durkheim saw a se­
ries of factors holding back the de-collectivization of struc­
tures of moral and intellectual responsibility, and thus, in 
turn, the development of differentiated occupational respon­
sibility. 
Race and individuality are two contradictory forces 
which vary inversely with each other. As long as we 
only continue to follow in the path of our ancestors, 
we tend to live as they have lived, and remain adamant 
to all innovation .••. The obstacle that progress meets 
in this quarter is even more difficult to surmount than 
that corning from a community of beliefs and practices. 
For the latter are imposed upon the individual only 
from without and by moral action, whereas hereditary 
tendencies are congenital and have an anatomical base. 
Thus, the greater the part of heredity in the distri­
bution of tasks, the more invariable the distribution, 
the more difficult, consequently, the advances of the 
division of labor are, even when they are useful .... 
A great many facts tend to prove that, in the begin­
ning, heredity had a considerable influence over the 
division of social functions (DL:304-S). 
Now, a special case of this retarding influence of heredity 
and ascribed status on occupational differentiation and the 
liberation of the individual is the caste division of labor. 
As soon as the division of labor appears in character­
istic fashion, it is fixed into a form transmitted by 
heredity. Thus castes grow up. India offers the most 
perfect model of this organization of work, but it is 
found elsewhere. With the Jews, the only functions 
which were sharply separated from others, sacerdotal 
functions, were strictly hereditary. It was the same 
at Rome for all public functions, which implied reli­
gious functions, which were the privilege of the patri­
cians alone. In Assyria, Persia, Egypt, society is di­
vided in the same manner. When castes tend to disap­
pear, they are replaced by classes, which, in order to 
keep their close exclusion and privileges, rely on the 
same principle (DL:306). 
Thus, clans, castes, and classes all constitute obstacles to 
• 
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the differentiation of function, to the division of social 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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•
 
•
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•
 
labor on an open and universalistic base of natural aptitude 
and technical competence. The cultural thrust toward univer­
salism and individual achievement underlies the progressive 
division of labor to Durkheim. 
For the division of labor to be able to develop, men 
had to succeed in shaking off the yoke of heredity, 
progress had to break up castes and classes. The pro­
gressive disappearance of these latter tends to prove 
the reality of his emancipation, for we cannot see 
how, if heredity had lost none of its claims over the 
individual, it could have been weakened as as institu­
tion ...• What is certain is that faith in heredity, 
formerly so intense, has today been replaced by an al­
most opposed faith. We tend to believe that the indi­
vidual is in large part the son of his work, and even 
to scorn the bonds which attach him to him to his race 
and make him depend upon it (DL:308). 
Durkheim's observations here about obstacles lead us 
to a most significant footnote in which he acknowledged that 
there might be important exceptions to his general law of dif­
ferentiation and individuation. Indeed, this admission of the 
insufficiency of his general evolutionary schema leads us di­
rectly to Weber's investigations into the complex and shift­
ing series of relations which advance or retard evolutionary 
breakthroughs. Perhaps Donald Nielsen has put the signifi­
cance of Durkheim's acknowledgement that the division of la­
bor, effacement of segmental type, and economic development 
do not necessarily go hand in hand most succinctly: 
... a high degree of differentiation and division of 
structure and function do not necessarily imply or 
carry with them a full and total thrust toward univer­
salization and fraternization and the makings of newer 
senses of brotherhoods, community, self, and world. We 
err grievously if we suppose that every time we per­
ceive differentiated structures at work we are seeing 
a society which has undergone extensive cultural modern­
ization (1973:108-9). 
Durkheim himself observed: 
But it may well happen that in a particular society •.. 
the division of economic labor may be greatly developed, 
although the segmental type may be strongly pronounced 
there. This seems to be the case with England. Great in~ 
dustry and commerce appear to be as developed there as 
on the continent, although the cellular system is still 
• 
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very marked, as both the autonomy of local life and 
authority of tradition prove .... It is sufficient, 
then, that some sort of circumstance excite an urgent 
need of material well-being with a people for the di­
vision of economic labor to be developed without the 
social structure visibly changing. One must not judge 
the place of a society on the social ladder according 
to its state of civilization, especially of its econo­
mic civilization, for the latter can be only an imita­
tion, a copy, and conceal a social structure of infer­
ior species. The case, if it is true, is exceptional. 
It appears, however (DL:282, #30). 
Besides opening the way for a discussion of Weber's work, 
Durkheim's admission here of exceptions to his general law 
means, as Nielsen suggests, that some societies may break 
with the sacro-magical collective structures of conscience 
and consciousness independently of structural differentia­
tion. Conversely, even with societies which are differentia­
ted institutionally, the failure to break with either sacro­
magical praxis and classificatory systems rooted primarily 
in the collectivity, constitute prime obstacles to moderniza­
tion. 
These multiple possibilities are true in cultural 
spheres as well as in the division of labor. Although science 
and philosophy were symbolically associated in Durkheim's En­
lightenment France with the over-coming of religion, magic, 
and superstition and the liberation of the individual, again 
Durkheim acknowledged that these processes are not necessary 
and inevitable and universal developments. 
In Athens, intellectual development--scientific and 
philosophical--was far greater than in Rome. Now, it 
is held that science and philosophy and collective 
thinking develop in the same way as individualism. 
True, they very often accompany it, but that is not 
inevitably so. In India, Brahminism and Buddhism have 
a very learned and subtle metaphysic--the Buddhist 
religion rests on a whole theory of the world. The 
sciences were developed to a high degree in the tem­
ples of Egypt. We know, however, that in the case of 
both India and Egypt, there was an almost complete ab­
sence of individualism. It is this fact more than any 
other that goes to prove the pantheistic nature of 
these metaphysics and religions: they attempted to 
give the pantheism a kind of rational and charted 
faith. Clearly, a pantheistic faith is not possible 
where individuals have a lively sense of their indi­
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viduality (PECM:58). 
Here,again, Durkheim connec~dpantheistic religious and meta­
physical projections with the pantheistic structure of socie­
ty--name1y, with the penetration of culture by traditional 
sacro-magical collective structures of morality and thought. 
Finally, Durkheim considered the possibility that the devel­
opmenffphilosophy and speculative thought are not necessarily 
correlated with the development of individualism. For the e­
mergence and establishment of autonomous spheres for the in­
dividual are preeminently practical, ie. structural, proces­
ses • 
... for the Athenian, the matter of practical life was 
reduced to something insignificant. He lived a life of 
leisured pursuits. In such a setting there comes a re­
markable flowering of science and philosophy. Once 
they flower, they may, to be sure, inspire an indivi­
dualist movement, but we cannot say they derive from 
it. It is possible, of course, that speculation, open­
ing out in this way, may not have this result and that 
it remains in its essence conservative. In that case, 
it is taken up with making a theory of the state of 
things as they exist or perhaps with a commentary on 
it. Such, in the main, is the nature of sacerdotal 
speculation: and even Greek speculation as a whole had 
this same tendency over a long period. The political 
and moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do 
more than reflect in their systems the political struc­
ture of Sparta and Athens respectively. 
Finally, one last reason that prevents our measuring 
the degree of individualism in a country by the devel­
opment reached in the faculties of speculative thought. 
This is, that individualism is not a theory: it lies in 
the region of practice, not in that of speculation. For 
it to be true individualism, it must make its mark on 
morals and social institutions (PECM:59). 
In sum, while remaining for the most part on the general e­
volutionary level correlating societal differentiation and 
individuation, Durkheim did occasionally descend to the his­
torical level of specific preconditions retarding or advan­
cing societies in different ways along one or other evolu­
tionary line. While more of this differential-historical ana­
lysis would have been desirable (see Part I, Book Three), 
Durkheim did recognize a series of obstacles to progressive 
division of social labor. 
•
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g. The Progress of Organic Solidarity 
We propose here to treat the coming of organic solidar­
• ity from a different point than normal. Instead of focusing 
on the movement from one type of social organization to ano­
ther, we shall turn our primary attention to Durkheim's ori­
ginal and deepest concern--the shifting historical relations
• between individual and society. If the significance of the 
movement from mechanical to organic solidarity is viewed in 
terms of background shifts in the relations between the per­
son's conscience and consciousness and systems of group mor­
• ality, of shifts in the anchors of legitimate moral and in­
tellectual authority from the group to the individual, then 
the deeper historical meaning of Durkheim's correlation of 
societal differentiation and individuation may be read as
• the de-collectivization of structures of morality and thought 
and the emergence of the autonomous and responsible person. 
Durkheim himself compared and contrasted the two types 
in terms of their significance for the individual in these
• terms: 
Whereas the previous type [mechanical solidarity] im­
plies that individuals resemble each other, this type 
presumes their difference. The first is possible only 
in so far as the individual personality is absorbed
• 
into the collective personality; the second is possi­
ble only if each	 one has a sphere of action which is 
peculiar to him; that is, a personality. It is neces­
sary, then, that	 the collective conscience leave open 
a part of the individual conscience in order that spe­
cial functions be established there, functions which
• it cannot regulate. The more this region is extended, the stronger is the cohesion which results from this 
solidarity. On the one hand, each one depends as much 
more strictly on society as labor is divided; and, on 
the other, the activity of each is as much more person­
al as it is specialized .•.• The yoke that we submit to
• is much less heavy than when society completely con­trols us, and it leaves much more place open for the 
free play of our initiative. Here the individuality of 
all grows at the same time as that of its parts. Socie­
ty becomes more capable of collective movement, at the 
same time that each of its elements has more freedom of
• of movement. This solidarity resembles that which we observe among the higher animals. Each organ, in ef­
fect, has its special physiognomy, its autonomy. And, 
moreover, the unity of the organism is as great as the 
•
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individuation of the parts is more marked (DL:131).
 
To the early Durkheim, then, societal differentiation im­

plied individuation because (a) the hold of the collective
 
conscience demanding collective acting out of responsibili­
ties is attenuated, and,therefore, a sphere for individual 
moral and intellectual responsibility is progressively open­
•	 
ed uP, and (b) because functional specialization demanded by
 
•
 
the division of social labor also requires greater use of in­

dividual capacities. The organic solidarity of complex socio­

cultural formations, then, depends upon the emergence of dif­

ferentiated individual responsibilities which knit the social
 
•
 
fabric together in a new and more interdependent way. As Durk­

heim later proposed "The division of labor unites at the same
 
time that it opposes; it makes the activities it differentia­

tes converge; it brings together those it separates." Organic
 
solidarity implies a complex, differentiated, interdependent
 
social bond--unity through diversity instead of unity through
 
identity. "The more one goes back in history, the greater the
 
• homogeneity. On the other hand, the further one approaches to
 
• 
the highest social types, the greater the development of the 
division of labor" (DL:138). 
Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim sounded the 
same refrain from multiple perspectives--social morphological 
differentiation requires greater diversity, and, thus, frees 
the individual. Noting that small scale groups surround the 
individual, Durkheim observed: 
•	 
But for it to be otherwise, would it not be enough for 
the society to be on a fairly large scale? There is no 
doubt that when it is small--when it surrounds every 
individual on all sides and at every moment--it does 
not allow of his	 evolving in freedom. If it be always 
present and always in action, it leaves no room for his
•	 
initiative. But it is no longer the same case when it 
has reached wide	 enough dimensions. tihen it is made up 
of a vast number of individuals a society can exercise 
over each a supervision only as close and as vigilant 
and effective as	 when a surveillance is concentrated 
on a small number. A man is more free in the midst of
•	 
a throng than in a small coterie. Hence, it follows 
that individual diversities can then more easily have 
play, that collective tyranny declines and that indivi­
dualism establishes itself in fact, and that, with time, 
•
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the fact becomes a right (PECM:6l). 
Having just reviewed some obstacles which Durkheim himself 
cited to the progress of the division of labor, one might 
question here his overly abstracted, general evolutionary 
views on rights following on changed states of fact. 
Durkheim then compared and contrasted mechanical and organic 
solidarity in terms of changes in the volume, intensity, and 
definition of the collective conscience (see also Giddens, 
1972a:5). 
Not only, in a general way, does mechanical solidar­
ity link men less strongly than organic solidarity, 
but also, as we advance in the scale of social evolu­
tion, it grows ever more slacker. The force of social 
links which have this origin vary with respect to the 
following three conditions: 
(1) the relation between the volume of the common con­
science and that of the individual conscience. The links 
are stronger as the first more completely envelops the 
second. 
(2) the average intensity of the states of the collec­
tive conscience. The relation between volumes being e­
qual, it has as much power over the individual as it has 
vitality. 
(3) the greater or lesser determination of these same 
states. That is, the more defined beliefs and practices 
are, the less place they leave for individual divergen­
ces. They are uniform moulds into which we all .•• couch 
our ideas and our actions. The consensus is then as per­
fect as possible: all consciences vibrate in unison. In­
versely, the more general and indeterminate-the rules of 
conduct and thOUght are, the more individual-reflection­
must intervene to appry them to particular cases. But it 
cannot awaken without upheavals occuring .••. Centrifugal 
tendencies thus multiply at the expense of social cohe­
sion and the harmony of its movements * (DL:152). 
This is a crucial passage: close attention to it could have 
avoided many subsequent misunderstandings among secondary in­
terpreters. Contrary to Parsons (1949) and J. Foskett (1939), 
among others, who dropped out Durkheim's evolutionism3nd never 
recognized the centrality of his notion of the primitive sac­
ral complex, Durkheim never meant to say that the main differ­
ence between mechanical and organic solidarity lay in the 
presence or absence of shared values or a common value system. 
Rather, as we see in the preceding quotation, he distinguish­
ed between the two in terms of their volume, intensity, ri­
•
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gidity, and content. In other words, Durkheim contrasted a 
strong, repressive, highly stereotyped religious and ~agical­
• 
ly dominated traditional tribal or communal value system 
with a modern secularized and individualized value system. 
• 
Since he linked religion with a "central region in 
the common conscience," we should not fail to note a crucial 
ambiguity in Durkheim's usage of the key terms "common con­
science" or "collective conscience." Lack of recognition of 
Durkheim's special meanings for these terms has led many ob­
servers astray. In a series of key passages early in The Di­
• vision of Labor (eg. 79-80), Durkheim acknowledged that the 
"conscience collective" could be viewed in two ways--as the 
generally diffused value and symbolic system of any society 
(eg. Parsons' generic Central Value System), and as the sit­
• 
uation, most clearly represented by primitive mechanical sol­
idarity, in which the logics of moral decision and intellec­
tual jUdgment are primarily collective, traditional, and per­
meated by sacro-magical rationales and practices. Once again 
• we encounter the conflation of generic and genetic-evolution­
ary meanings in Durkheim's terms and system. However, it must 
be noted that Durkheim, remarking on this ambiguity ("the 
word we have just employed is not, it is true, without ambi­
• 
guity," DL:80), intended that the term conscience collective 
be specifically reserved for the historical situation of ear­
ly society, for the social situation of "the totality of so­
cial likenesses" (DL:80). Durkheim even observed that it 
• might be better to designate a special term for this notion 
of "the totality of social similitudes"--whose clearest ex­
pression is primitive tribal culture (eg. DL:80). Unfortunate­
ly, he did not do so, and, hence, bequeathed us much confu­
• sion. But he did emphasize that "we shall employ the well­
worn expression 'collective or common conscience,' but we 
shall always mean the strict sense in which we have taken it" 
*(DL: 80) • 
• In addition to this explicit proviso, Durkheim's inten­
tions here are clear from the way in which he described the 
crucial transformations from mechanical to organic solidarity. 
•
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This is clearly seen in Part V of Chapter Five of Division, 
where Durkheim spoke of the role of religion in primitive so­
ciety and its secularization and attenuation in organic soli­
darity (see also Chapter Six of this Book on the "primitive 
sacral complex"). 
If there is one truth that history teaches us beyond 
doubt, it is that religion tends to embrace a smaller 
and smaller portion of social life. Originally, it per­
vades everything; everything social is religious; the 
two words are synonymous. Then, little by little, po­
litical, economic, scientific functions free themselves 
from their religious function, constitute themselves 
apart, and take on a more and more acknowledged tempor­
al character. God, who was at first present in all hu­
man relations, progressively withdraws from them; he 
abandons the world to men and their disputes. At least, 
if he continues to dominate it, it is from on high and 
at a distance, and the force which he exercises, becom­
ing more general and more indeterminate, leaves more 
place to the free play of human forces. The individual 
really feels himself less acted upon; he becomes more 
a source of spontaneous activity (DL:169). 
It is, therefore, transformation and secularization of values, 
an~~fheir disappearance, which constitutes the essence of the 
momentous historical shift in relations between the indivi­
dual conscience and the common conscience. 
This is not to say, however, that the common conscience 
is threatened with total disappearance. Only, it more 
and more comes to consist of very general and very in­
determinate ways of thinking and feeling, which leave 
open a place for a growing multitude of individual dif­
ferences. There is even a place where it is slrengthen~ 
ed and made precise: that is the way in which it regards 
the individual. As all the other beliefs and all the 
other practices take on a character less and less reli­
gious, the individual becomes the object of a sort of 
religion. We erect a cult in behalf of personal digni­
ty which, as every strong cult, already has its super­
stitions (0£:172). 
Anthony Giddens has emphasized this crucial aspect of Durk­
heim's ideas in succinct fashion: 
There is a fundamental distinction between "individua­
tion" and "individualism." The growth of individuation 
presupposes a decline in the volume, intensity, and ri­
gidity of the conscience collective: individuals are 
able to develop their own particular propensities and 
inclinations to the degree to which these are freed 
from the control of the moral homogeneity of the com­
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munity. But this in turn entails a transformation in 
the content of collective moral ideals: the decline 
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of traditional religion and the emergence of what Durk­
heim calls variously "moral individualism" or the "cult 
of the individual." The main thesis of The Division of 
Labor is that while individuation is a necessary con=­
comitant of the dissolution of traditional society, it 
implies, not the complete eradication of the conscience 
collective, but its transmutation in the form of the 
development of new moral ideals: those comprised in the 
"cult of the individual." Thus, the "cult of the indi­
vidual" provides a moral validation of the specialized 
division of labor. The values and beliefs composing mor­
al individualism, stressing as they do the dignity and 
worth of the human individual, emphasize that each man 
should develop his talents and capacities to their ful­
lest extent (1972a:6-7). 
Again, one cannot hope to understand why Durkheim viewed the 
progress of the division of labor and the coming of organic 
solidarity in such a virtuous light unless one sees him as 
part of a long-term continuing cultural struggle with the 
Catholic Hierocratic Cultural Tradition to de-collectivize 
and secularize the foundations of morality and thought. 
Against this background, we can better see why Durk­
heim saw the progressive division of labor in a moral light, 
why he saw the coming of organic solidarity a~erating 
the individual from archaic repressiOn, and why he correla­
ted differentiation and individuation. 
If there are more things common to all, there are 
many more that are personal to each. There is, in­
deed, every reason for believing that the latter have 
increased more than the former, for the differences 
between men have become more pronounced in so far as 
they are more cultivated ••.. special abilities are 
more developed than the common conscience. It is at 
least probable that, in each particular conscience, 
the personal sphere is much greater than the other 
(DL: 15 3) . 
Individual diversities multiply as societal diversity increas­
es--this is Durkheim's fundamental law here. Along with this 
parallel movement, Durkheim saw progressive extension of ju­
ridical protection for the individual. (We shall soon explore 
the role of the State as a guarantor of individual rights). 
If all the individuals who make up society are today 
equally protected, no matter what their status, this 
tempering of customs is due, not to the appearance of 
• --398.;.­
a really new penal rule, but to the extension of the 
old one. In the beginning, it was forbidden to make 
an attempt upon the life of the members of the group;
• 
but this did not apply to children and slaves. Now 
• 
that we no longer make this distinction, some acts 
which were not criminal have become punishable •.•• If, 
however, there is place for admitting that the respect 
of society for the individual has become stronger, it 
does not follow that the central region of the cornmon 
conscience [religion] is more extended {DL:166-7}. 
Now, it is this emerging "cult of the individual" which comes 
with the progressive division of labor and organic solidarity 
which we are centrally concerned with tracing here. Indeed, 
• 
Durkheim's central value in the modern world was precisely 
this "cult of the individual." 
• 
It is, indeed, remarkable that the only collective sen­
timents that have become more intense are those which 
have for their object, not social affairs, but the in­
dividual. For this to be so, the individual personality 
• 
must have become a much more important element in the 
life of society, and in order for it to have acquired 
this importance, it is not enough for the personal con­
science of each to have grown in absolute value, but 
also to have grown more than the cornmon conscience. ~ 
must have been ernan~~ated from the yoke of the latter, 
and, consequently, t~ latter must have fallen from its 
throne, and lost the determinate power that it origin­
ally exercised {DL:167}. 
In other words, Durkheim saw a long-term transformation from 
•
 
the cult of the group and tradition to the cult of the indivi­

dual; both were culturally sanctioned, however. Finally, we 
cannot fail to observe that Durkheim sounded occasionally a 
critical note concerning the emerging "cult of the indivi­
•
 
dual" which may lead to extremes.
 
•
 
It is thus ..• a cornmon cult, but it is possible only
 
by the ruins of all others, and, consequently, cannot
 
produce the same effects as this multitude of extin­

guished beliefs. There is no compensation for that.
 
Moreover, if it is cornmon in so far as the community
 
partakes of it, it is individual in its object. If it
 
•
 
turns all wills toward the same end, this end is:no~
 
social:-I'"t thus occupies a completely--ex'Ceptional place
 
in the collective conscience. It is still from society
 
that it takes all its force, but It is not~society
 
that it attaches-uS;-it is toourse"lves:-Hence, it does
 
not constitute a truesoCIallink. That is why wehave
 
been justly able to reproach the theorists who have 
made this sentiment exclusively basic in their moral 
•
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doctrine, with the ensuing dissolution of society * 
(DL:172). 
We see Durkheim acknowledging simultaneously that the "cult 
of the individual" in modern society is culturally sanction­
ed (else it could not be a "cult"), but one which is non-so­
cial. This curious state of affairs suggests that the egois­
tic extremes of this cult may be connected with ~goistic and 
anomic suicides. We shall, of course, pursue this critical 
emphasis of Durkheim's, especially in terms of his multiple 
polemics against the opposing Angle and Romantic notions of 
the individual. 
Now, against the notion that differentiation necessar­
ily implies dispersion, a dissolution of values, and a ren­
ding of the social fabric (as implied by Comte, see Book Two), 
Durkheim repeatedly insisted: 
Social progress ..• does not consist in a continual 
dissolution. On the contrary, the more we advance, 
the more profoundly do societies reveal the senti­
ment of self and of unity•..• It is the division of 
labor which, more and more, fills the role that was 
formerly filled by the common conscience. It is the 
principal bond of social aggregates of higher types 
(DL:173) . 
Durkheim thus came, in a slightly different way, to reiterate 
the essence of organic solidarity, in contrast to mechanical 
solidarity. Again, the crucial factomto Durkheim here were 
the de-collectivization of structures of conscience and con­
sciousness and the emergence of the autonomous person. \ 
This social type rests on principles so different 
from the preceding that it can develop only in pro­
portion to the effacement of that preceding type. In 
effect, individuals are here grouped, no longer ac­
cording to their relations of lineage, but according 
to the particular nature of the social activity to 
which they consecrate themselves. Their natural mil­
ieu is no longer the natal milieu, but the occupation­
al milieu. It is no longer real or fictitious consan­
guinity which makes the place of each one, but the 
function he fills (DL:182). 
Durkheim saw both types as structured in terms of moral 
rules--only the duties demanded of the individual by the 
group were diammetrically opposed. Social life, moral life, 
•
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then, can take two fundamentally different forms. 
Social life comes from a double source, the likenes-
ses of consciences and the division of social labor. 
The individual is socialized in the first case, be-
cause, not having any real individuality, he becomes, 
with those he resembles, part of the same collective 
type; in the second case, because, while having a 
physiognomy and a personal activity which distinguish-
es him from others, he depends upon them in the same 
measure that he is distinguished from them, and con-
sequently upon the society which results from their 
union. The similitudes of consciences gives rise to 
juridical rules which with the threat of repressive 
measures, impose uniform beliefs and practices upon 
all. The more pronounced this is, the more completely 
is social life confounded with religious life, and 
the nearer to communism are economic institutions. 
The division of labor gives rise to juridical rules 
which determine the nature and the relations of divi-
ded functions, but whose violation calls forth only 
restitutive measures without any expiatory character. 
Each of these bodies of juridical rules is, moreover, 
accompanied by a body of purely moral rules. Where 
penal law is very voluminous, common morality is very 
extensive; that is to say, there is a multitude of col-
lective practices placed under the protection of public 
opinion. Where restitutive law is highly developed, 
there is an occupational morality for each profession. 
In the interior of the same group of workers, there ex-
ists an opinion, diffuse in the entire extent of this 
circumscribed aggregate, which, without being furnish-
ed with legal sanctions, is rendered obedience. There 
are usages and customs common to the same order of 
functionaries which on one of them can break without 
incurring the censure of the corporation. This moral-
ity is distinguished from the preceding by differences 
analogous to those which separate the two corresponding 
types of law. It is localized in a limited region of 
society. Moreover, the repressive character of the sanc-
tions attaching to it is much less attenuated. Profes-
sional misdeed call forth reprobation much more feeble 
than attacks against public morality (DL:226-7). 
It must be emphasized that Durkheim considered the modern 
morality of organic solidarity just as moral as the shared 
common conscience of societies permeated by religion and mag-
ic. For both attach the individual to the group; the type 
and content of attachment merely differs in these two cases. 
The rules of occupational morality and justice, how-
ever, are as imperative as the others. They force the 
individual to act in view of ends which are not strict-
ly his own, to make concessions, to consent to compro-
• ~-401--
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
mises, even where society relies most completely upon 
the division of labor, it does not become a jumble of 
juxtaposed atoms, between which it can establish only 
external, transient contacts. Rather, the members are 
united by ties which extend deeper and far beyond the 
short moments during which the exchange is made. Each 
of the functions that they exercise is, in a fixed way, 
dependent upon others, and with them forms a solidary 
system. Accordingly, from the nature of the chosen task 
permanent duties arise. Because we fill some domestic or 
social function, we are involved ina complex of obliga­
tions from which we have no right to free ourselves. 
There is, above all, an organ upon which we are tending 
to depend more and more; this is the State. The points 
at which we are in contact with it multiply as do the 
occasions when it is entrusted with the duty of remin­
ding us of the sentiment of common solidarity (DL:226-7). 
In contrast to those who portray modern society as atom­
istic, Durkheim reminds us of the extensive interdependence 
occasioned by organic solidarity. And, in what may be the 
weak link in his theoretical chain (see also Books Two and 
Three), Durkheim presumed that the interaction necessitated 
by widespread economic interdependence inevitably will gener­
ate moral rules andanew form of stable social solidarity. 
Men cannot live together without acknowledging, and, 
consequently, making mutual sacrifices, without tying 
themselves into one another with strong durable bonds. 
Every society is a moral society. In certain respects, 
this character is even more pronounced in organized 
societies. Because the individual is not sufficient 
unto himself, it is from society that he receives 
everything necessary to him, as it is for society that 
he works. Thus is formed a very strong sentiment of 
the state of dependence in which he finds himself ...• 
On its side, society learns to regards its members no 
longer as things over which it has rights, but as co­
operators whom it cannot neglect and towards whom it 
owes duties. Thus, it is wrong to oppose a society 
which comes from a community oflbeliefs to one which 
has ~ ~peratIVe-basis, according only to the first 
~ morar-cnaracter, and seeing in the-Iatter only an 
economic grouping. In reality, cooperation also has 
its intrinsic moralIty * (DL:228). ---- --­
Organic solidarity, then, has its own distinctive morality; 
because it frees the individual to develop his or her own 
talents, and liberates us from the repressive and narrow 
rules of societies rooted in blood and soil, its prime con­
cern, as Durkheim saw it, was the individual. 
•
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• 
But it [the morality of organic solidarity] is not of 
same nature as the other. The other is strong only if 
the individual is not. Made up of rules which are prac­
ticed by all indistinctly, it receives from this uni­
• 
versal, uniform practice an authority which bestows 
something superhuman upon it, and which puts it beyond 
the pale of discussion. The cooperative society, on the 
contrary, develops in the measure that individual per­
sonality becomes stronger. As regulated as a function 
may be, there is a large place always left for personal 
• 
initiative (DL:228). 
Hence, organic solidarity depends upon individual diversity 
and responsibility; it opens up new areas for individual ini­
tiative. It bonds individuals together in an interdependent 
occupational network rather than in terms of~traditional 
framework of collective sacral rationales and magical proto­
cols. Durkheim summarizes these differences in this manner: 
• 
There are, then, two great currents of social life to 
which two types of structure, not less different, cor­
• 
respond. Of these currents, that which has its origin 
in social similitudes first runs on alone and without 
a rival. At this moment, it confounds itself with the 
very life of society; then, little by little, it cana­
lizes, rarefies, while the second is always growing. 
Indeed, the segmental structure is more and more cover­
ed by the other, but without completely disappearing 
(DL:229). 
• 
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2. The Symbolic Construction of the Person: Dialectic of 
Impersonality and Personality 
• 
• Preface. Without setting aside anything which has been said 
before, in this section we shall come at the same basic ques­
tion from the opposite direction; we shall proceed in reverse 
or complementary gear. In his early writings, as we have dis­
covered, Durkheim correlated historical individuation with 
societal differentiation, thus presuming that the liberation 
• 
of the individual was a largely unproblematic process. But 
is increasing diversity alone sufficient to generate the per­
• 
son as a moral agent and intellectual subject? Although still 
necessary, Durkheim's initial framework suffered from the too 
simple equation of individuation with differentiation; this 
masked the hidden presumption that there lay ready to hand an 
autonomous, rational, indivisible substance which only had to 
be separated out or released in order to take on its full in­
• 
dividual physiognomy. Hence, even though he spoke of the 
transformation rather than the disappearance of the common 
• 
conscience, Durkheim's rhetorical animus lead him to view the 
process of de-collectivization and individuation as still 
primarily a negative process, while only secondarily did in­
creasing competition and occupational diversity stimulate mor­
• 
al and intellectual individualism. In short, the latter pro­
cess remained dependent on the former. 
Yet, in his later writings, Durkheim overcame these hid-, 
den presumptions inherited from the Enlightenment by focus­
ing more profoundly on the sociocultural construction, from 
the very beginning, of the person. Instead of evolutionary 
discontinui~y and breakthrough, generic continuity moved to 
•
 
central stage of his thought. It was especially in The Ele­

•
 
mentary Forms that Durkheim developed the positive sociocul­

tural logic of the construction of the person complementary
 
to his earlier largely negative equation of de-collectiviza­

tion witp individuation in The Division of Labor. In this
 
last work, Durkheim explored in great detail the symbolic 
construction of the notion of the soul, the relation of an 
•
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individual to his totem, and to the ancestors and spirits 
which lay at the heart of the emergence of persons as inform­
• ed centers of conscience and consciousness. Durkheim proposed 
the emergence of the notion of the person under the aegis of 
the notion of the individual soul. The origin of the notion 
of personality was thus placed in the generating matrix of 
• the primitive sacral complex as the great womb of society 
and culture. 
In focussing on the generative relationships between 
public symbols and phenomenological process, between the 
• growth of moral rules and intellectual concepts and the emer­
gence of the personality, Durkheim seized upon a profound dia­
lectic between impersonality and personality. The link be­
tween the impersonal, collective, communicable public sphere
• and the private, personal sphere is symbolic process. As in 
drama, the persona is a mask or role, the individual person 
first emerges in terms of a specific incarnation of a gener­
al soul substance. Hence, in a dialectical paradox, the indi­
• vidual first emerges under the aegis of a generic type; only 
later is the individual judged significant apart from his or 
her participation in the collective essence. We see the same 
process in reverse today; whenever a group or institution 
• takes on personal qualities, such as "Ma Bell" or "Uncle 
Sam," the individual members participating in that collec­
tive identity are correspondingly de-personalized in the 
same degree. That is, their own specific qualities are set
• aside in favor of more or less compulsory adherence to the 
homogeneous projected corporate image. Whereas Durkheim spoke 
of mechanical solidarity to express this depersonalization, 
today we speak of becoming social robots; the repetitiveness
• remains. Kenneth Burke has clearly glimpsed the significance 
of this universal process: 
Once you linger on this question of personality, you 
find it bristling with dialectic&paradoxes, whereby 
• 
the personal and the impersonal subtly change places 
(paradoxes that furtively invest humans with "divine" 
attributes, hence adding to the "mystifications" so 
important in ~hetorical prodding). t~en a figure be­
comes the personification of some impersonal motive, 
•
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the result is a depersonalization. The person becomes 
the charismatic vessel of some "absolute" substance. 
And when thus magically endowed, the person transcends

• his nature as an individual, becoming instead the image
 
•
 
of the idea he stands for (1962:273).
 
Now, Durkheim provided abundant illustrations of these dia­

lectical. paradoxes which stood at the moment of the birth of
 
the person; for if, today, an individual can become deperson­

•
 
alized through this process of submergence in a collective
 
symbolic projection, it is equally true that the very notion
 
of the individual person could only first emerge out of the
 
very same process.
 
•
 
After considering the symbolic construction of the no­

tion of the person, we shall have the sufficient analytical
 
core to understand the complex processes governing the emer­

gence of personhood under the double movement of individua­

•
 
tion (de-collectivization and separation) and phenomenologi­

cal deepening and centering through symbolic processes. These
 
two complementary constitutive sub-processes must go together
 
in any adequate notion of the construction of the person.
 
•
 
After this section, then, and for the rest of our exploration
 
of the emergence of the person through history, we shall try
 
to keep in mind this double dialectic. For example, we shall
 
see that Durkheim viewed the State as an emancipator of the
 
•
 
individual, but after overcomi.ng its rivals for the alle­

giance of the individual, the State, in turn, oppresses the
 
individual. And, further, Christianity and especially Protes­

tantism, comes to liberate the individual from the old law
 
and the hierocracy, but in the process of deepening the 
structures of interiority, submit the individual, in turn, 
to the destructive rigors of a new "iron cage," a new form 
• 
of invisible and self-reinforcing bondage. These are simply 
some of the dialectical paradoxes which lead to the shift 
from Durkheim's first to second schemas of suicide. 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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a. The Transitional Phase 
As noted in Chapter Six, Durkheim's thought underwent 
a crucial transitional phase in his understanding of the evo­
lution of society, religion, and person in his middle period 
--the later Bordeaux and early Paris years when his main ener­
gies were invested in building up ~'Annee sociologique. With 
his developing recognition of the creativeness of the primi­
tive sacral womb, Durkheim came to see better the relation 
between the emergence of the notion of the person and reli­
gious symbolism. Here we can only consider a few representa­
tive illustrations of Durkheim's deepening awareness of the 
dialectic of impersonality and personality. 
Now, in speaking of altruistic suicide, Durkheim noted 
how society and culture in mechanical solidarity are so deep­
ly rooted in religious rationales and magical protocols that 
the ensemble may be termed "pantheistic." 
The metaphysical and religious systems which form the 
logical settings for these moral practices give final 
proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has 
long been observed that they coexist generally with 
pantheistic beliefs •..• [the] essential quality is the 
idea that what reality there is in the individual is 
foreign to his nature, that the soul which animates him 
is not his own, and that consequently he has no person­
al existence. Inversely, where the principle of being 
is not fused with such doctrines but is itself conceiv­
ed of in an individual form ... among monotheistic peo­
ples like the Jews, Christians, Mahometans, or poly­
theists like the Greeks and Latins, this form of sui­
cide is unusual (S:226). 
Durkheim here embarked upon the trail of a profound dialectic 
between the evolution of the individual person and the devel­
opment of religious representations centering on shifts in 
impersonality and personality. In general, where the "princi­
pIe of being" is portrayed in impersonal form, the individual 
is accorded little reality or value. Where, however, the in­
dividual person is valued in his or her own right, religious 
representations tend to take on a personal physiognomy (see 
Part I, Book Two). 
And in his Annee J!lOnograph on "Incest" published in 
1898 (translated 1963), Durkheim first explored the dialecti­
•
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cal relationship between the totem as the representation of 
the ancestor and the individual. Individual identity comes 
through identification with the ancestral totem, and thus, 
the ground of Being. 
The totem ••• is the ancestor of the clan ••. and all 
the members of the clan, having been descended from 
this unique being, are made of the same substance as 
himself. This substantive identity is even understood 
in a much more literal sense than we are able to imag­
ine. One must in fact refrain from confusing the animal 
or the vegetable species, to which the totemic being is 
believed to belong, and this being itself. The latter 
is the ancestor, the mythical being, whence there came 
both the members of the clan and the animals or plants 
of the totemized species. The totemic being is there­
fore, an individual, but containing within itself the 
species and the entire clan. In fact, for the savage 
the fragments which can detach themselves from an or­
ganism do not cease to be a part of it, despite the ma­
terial separation. Thanks to a far-off action whose 
reality is at no time questioned, a severed limb contin­
ues, it is believed, to live, seoarate from the body to 
which it formerly belonged. All "that one contained is 
retained in the other. That is to say, the living sub­
stance, even though divided, retains its unity. It is 
complete in each of its parts, as if one were acting 
on the entirety (1963:86). 
Hence, the clan is ontologically constituted, it is believ­
ed, through its continuing participation with the totemic 
being; splitting or separating from it do not decrease its 
potency. The same is true of the individual, Durkheim sug­
gested, whose existence also derives from, and continues to 
be dependent upon, a Eimilar type of ontological and symbol­
ic participation. 
The same is true of each individual in relationship 
to the totemic being. The latter has been able to give 
birth to his progeny only in fragmenting it, but it is 
complete in each of the fragments and it remains iden­
tical in all of the divisions and subdivisions, down 
to infinity. It is therefore literal that the members 
of the clan consider themselves as forming a single 
flesh ••• a single blood, and this flesh is that of 
the mystical being from whom they have all descended. 
These conceptions, strange as they appear to us, are 
not without a fundamental objective; for they only 
serve to express in a material form, the collective 
unity which is characteristic of the clan. A homogen­
eous and compact mass where these exist, so to speak, 
no differentiated parts, where each one lives like all 
• 
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and each resembles all--this is the clan. Such a 
group sees its own image in terms of a feeble in­
dividuation, of which it has a vague consciousness, 
by imagining that its members are incarnations, 
hardly at all different, from one and the same prin­
ciple; they are various aspects of the same reality, 
a single soul is several bodies (1963:87). 
The analogies with the Christian notion of the mystical body 
of Christ are certainly striking here; one wonders to what 
extent this well-known theological doctrine may have influen­
ced Durkheim's formulation. In any case, Durkheim suggested 
here that the primitive clan solved the perennial problem of 
unity and diversity, and at the same time constituted itself 
as a collectivity and the individuals within it, by portray­
ing themselves as parts of the totemic being. 
Durkheim went on to speak in this context of the role 
of the notion of the "blood-covenant," a seminal insight 
which he learned from reading Robertson Smith (see Lukes, 
1973). Here, a different sort of consubstantiality is seen: 
One practice particularly demonstrates ••• the impor­
tance which is then attributed to this con-substantial­
ity, and at the same time, it goes to make us see what 
this common substance is. The physiological unity of 
the clan is ••• far from absolute; it is a society 
where one can enter by a road other than birth. The 
formality by which a stranger is adopted and natural­
ized into the clan consists of introducing into the 
veins of the neophyte some drops of the familial blood: 
what is called, according to the work of Smith, the 
blood covenant •••• Since the community of blood suf­
fices to form a foundation of this identity of nature, 
it is hence the blood that contains primarily the com­
mon principle, which is the soul of the group and of 
each of its members. Nothing is more logical than this 
conception. For the chief functions that the blood ful­
fills in the organism designate it for such a role. 
Life ends when it spills out; therefore, it must be the 
vehicle of life •••• It follows that through this inter­
mediary the life of the ancestor was propagated and dis­
persed across the lives of his ancestors (1963:88). 
Thus, besides the symbolic participation in a common totem, 
individuals may participate in the clan by joining the same 
stream of life symbolized by blood. As a principle of life, 
then, the blood symbolizes the creative flow from the fOU~Hg 
ancestor; it serves as a link to the ontological level. 
•
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Thus, the totemic being is immanent in the clan; it 
is incarnate in each individual, and it is in the 
blood that it resides. It is in the very blood itself. 
But not only is this an ancestor, at the same time it 
is a god; protector born of the group, it is the ob­
ject of a veritable cult, the center of the very reli­
gion of the clan. It is on this being that the destin­
ies of so many of the individuals, as well as of the 
collectivity, depend. As a result, there is god in 
each individual organism (for he is complete in each) 
and it is in the blood that this god resides; from 
which it follows that the blood is a divine thing 
(1963:89) . 
Durkheim would later elaborate these insights in his The Ele­
mentary Forms. 
In 1903, in Primitive Classification, Durkheim and 
Mauss declared: 
If we descend to the least evolved societies ..• we 
shall find an even more general mental confusion. 
Here, the individual loses his personality. There is 
a complete lack of distinction between him and his 
exterior soul or his totem. He and his fellow animal 
together compose a single personality (PC:6). 
This passage shows that Durkheim had not yet fully arrived 
at the position of the symbolic construction of the person 
by society; for if the individual does not yet really exist, 
as he proposed earlier in The Division of Labor, how is it 
possible for him to lose his personality? What this suggests 
instead is that because the earliest structures of morality 
and knowledge were collective, traditional, and sacro-magical, 
the individual was bound to think in these terms also. The 
representational life, as well as moral life, was collective, 
and thus the individual's status was conflated or embedded 
in the group's identity. Toward the end of Primitive Classi­
fication, Durkheim and Mauss noted how the emotion attached 
to such collective representations interfered with cognitive 
clarity. 
From another point of view, in order to be able to 
mark out the limits of a class, it is necessary to 
have analyzed the characteristics by which the things 
assembled in this class are recognized and by which 
they are distinguished. Now emotion is naturally re­
fractory to analysis, or at least lends itself uneas­
ily to it, because it is too complex. Above all, when 
•
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it has a collective origin, it defies critical and ra­
tional examination. The pressure exerted by the group 
on each of its members does not perMit individuals to 
judge freely the notions which society itself has elab­
orated and in which it has placed something of its per­
sonality. Such constructs are sacred for individuals. 
Thus, the history of scientific classification is, in 
the last analysis, the history of the stages by which 
this element of social affectivity has progressively 
weakened, leaving more and more room for the reflective 
thought of individuals (PC:87). 
In short, only when the structures of conscience and con­
sciousness are universalized and rationalized, in another one 
of those fundamental dialectical paradoxes, does the person 
attain a secure place to stand. 
b. Individual and Totem 
In The Elementary Forms of The Religious Life, Durkheim 
explored the symbolic relationship between an individual and 
his totem which granted the person civil status, and inform­
ed, directed, and energized structures of conscience and con­
sciousness. Elaborating his insights of fifteen years pre­
vious, Durkheim noted how the individual person came to take 
on a sacred and permanent status through his or ~connec­
tion with a totemic being. Through the symbolic symbiosis of 
man and totem, the individual takes on a specific name and 
unique physiognomy. 
Every member of the clan is invested with a sacred 
character .•.. This personal sacredness is due to the 
fact that the man believes that while he is a man in 
the usual sense of the word, he is also an ~ni~al or 
plant of the totemic species .... In fact, bears its 
name; this identity of name is therefore supposed to 
imply an identity of nature. The first is not merely 
considered as an outward sign of the second; it sup­
posed it logically. This is because the name, for a 
primitive, is not merely a word or a combination of 
sounds; it is a part of the being, and even something 
essential to it. A member of the Kangaroo clan calls 
himself a Kangaroo; he is, therefore, in one sense, 
an animal of this species. So each individual has a\ 
double nature: two beings coexist within him, a man 
and an animal (EF:l56). 
Thus, by participating through symbolic mediations such as 
a shared name and rituals, the individual is ontologically 
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and culturally constituted, and thus can take on an indivi­
dual profile within the horizon of the group. 
• 
In certain Australian tribes, and in the majority of 
tribes of North America, each individual personally 
sustains relations with some determined object, which 
are comparable to those which clan sustains with its 
totem..•. The name of the thing also serves as the 
name of the individual. It is his personal name, his
• 
forename, which is added to that of the collective to­
tem..•. There is	 an identity of nature between the in­
dividual and the thing; now, an identity of nature im­
plies one of name. Being given in the course of espe­
cially important religious ceremonies, this forename 
has a sacred character (EF:183-4).
• Symbolic identification becomes participation; animal and 
man stand as alter egos. 
• 
Between the individual and his animal namesake there 
exist the very closest bonds. The man participates in 
the nature of the animal •..• The relationship of the 
two is even so close that it is believed that in cer­
• 
tain circumstances, especially in the case of danger, 
the man can take the form of an animal. Inversely, the 
animal is regarded as a double of the man, as his al­
ter ego. The association of the two is so close that 
their destinies are frequently thought to be bound up 
together: nothing can happen to one without the other's 
• 
feeling a reaction. If the animal dies, the life of 
the man is menaced. Thus, it comes to be a very general 
rule that one should not kill the animal nor eat its 
flesh. On its side, the animal protects the man and 
serves him as a sort of patron. It informs him of pos­
sible dangers and of the way of escaping them; they 
• 
say that it is his friend. Since it frequently happens 
to possess marvellous powers, it communicates them to 
its human associate, who believes in them.... This 
confidence of an individual in the efficacy of his 
protector is so great that he braves the greatest dan­
gers and accomplishes the most disconcerting feats 
with an intrepid serenity: faith gives him the neces­
sary courage and	 strength. However, the relations of 
a man with his patron are not purely and simply those 
of dependence. He, on his side, is able to act upon 
•	 
the animal. He gives it orders; he has influence over 
it (EF:185-6). 
By becoming identified, then, with a specific totemic animal, \. 
the individual becomes separated out from his fellows, and 
• 
becomes constituted as a active agent by tapping into a ex­
tra-human source of power. 
Thus, the individual first emerges in symbolic connec­
•
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tion with an impersonal, non-human type. Durkheim said: 
• 
The primitive has a certain incapacity for thinking 
of the individual apart from the species; the bonds 
uniting him to the one readily extend to the other; 
• 
he confounds the two in the same sentiment. Thus, 
the entire species becomes sacred for him (EF:186). 
For our present purposes, however, instead of saying that 
the individual is at first confounded with the group, it may 
• 
be preferable to propose that the individual first only emer­
ges in symbolic connection with the group type, as a special 
incarnation of the general essence. Indeed, only in this way 
is individuation made possible as a subsequent process. 
The same principle is applied in the one case to the 
clan and in the other to the individual. In both cases 
we find the same belief that there are vital connec­
tions between the things and the men, and that the 
former are endowed with special powers, of which their
• 
human allies may also enjoy the advantage. We also 
find the same custom of giving the man the name of the 
thing with which he is associated and of adding an em­
blem to this name. The totem is the patron of the clan, 
just as the patron of the individual is his personal 
totem (EF:187).
• 
c.	 The Emergence of the Notion of the Soul as the Foundation 
of Personhood 
One would not have predicted that the Durkheim who in
• 1893 argued that individuation was dependent upon de-collec­
tivization and separation out from the fused, sacro-magical 
collective conscience of archaic society would come, in his 
later years, to anchor the first emergence in this very same
• primitive symbolic structure. The very notion of the indivi­
dual first emerged under the aegis of the religious notion 
of the soul, Durkheim proposed in The Elementary Forms. As 
with religion itself, Durkheim had first to establish that
• the notion of the soul was generic, a human universal. 
Just as there is no known society without a religion, 
so there exist none, howsoever crudely organized, where 
we do not find a whole system of collective represen­
tations concerning the soul, its origin and destiny .•..
• 
The idea of the soul seems to have contemporaneous with 
humanity itself (EF:273). 
Then, Durkheim observed tha~ to the Australians, each indivi­
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dual is seen as a new reincarnation of a previous soul~ 
there is a fixed "pool of souls" into which each generation 
dips and returns. 
the souls which, in each generation come to ani­
mate the bodies of newly born children, are not spe­
cial and original creations~ all these tribes hold 
that there is a definite stock of souls, whose number 
cannot be augmented at all, and which reincarnate 
themselves periodically. When an individual dies, his 
soul quits the body in which it dwelt, and after the 
mourning is accomplished, it goes to the land of the 
souls~ but after a certain length of time, it returns 
to incarnate itself again, and these reincarnations 
are the cause of conception and birth. At the begin­
ning of things, it was these fundamental souls which 
animated the first ancestors, the founders of the clan. 
At an epoch, beyond which the imagination does not go, 
and which is considered the very beginning of time, 
there were certain beings who were not derived from 
any others. For this reason, the Arunta called them 
the Altj irangamitj ina, the uncreated ones, those who 
exist from all eternity (EF:280-81). 
Now, since the ancestors, the founders commemorated and apo­
theosized in the group myths, are sacred, those individuals 
in which they are reincarnated are sacralized also, that is, 
given civic status and a separate and meaningful identity 
as valued personages . 
•.. each individual is considered as a new appearance 
of a determined ancestor: it is this ancestor himself, 
come back in a new body and with new features. Now, 
what were these ancestors? In the first place, they 
were endowed with powers infinitely superior to those 
possessed by men today, even the most respected old 
men and the most celebrated magicians. They are attri­
buted virtues which we may speak of as miraculous ..•. 
It was they who gave the earth the form it has at pre­
sent. They created all sorts of beings, both men and 
animals. They are nearly gods. So their souls also 
have a divine character. And since the souls of men 
are these ancestral spirits reincarnated in the human 
body, these are sacred beings too (EF:282). 
It is, then, the collective participation in the foun­
ding ancestor's patrimony which enables both group and indi­
vidual to exist. They view themselves, quite literally, as 
not only spiritual but genetic heirs. All members of the 
group are con~substantial with him • 
.•• tradition puts the origin of each clan, not in a 
•
 
r
 
• 
--414-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
number of ancestors, but only two, or even in one. 
This unique being, as long as he remained single, 
contained the totemic principle within him inte­
grally, for at this moment there was nothing to 
which this principle could be communicated. Now, 
according to this same tradition, all the human 
souls which exist, both those which now animate 
the bodies of men and those which are at present 
unemployed, being held in reserve for the future, 
have issued from this unique personage; they are 
made of his substance (EF:283). 
The sacred substance is thus transmitted from generation to 
generation; and it is this spiritual-genetic continuity which 
enables group and individual to act as moral agents in the 
world and with each other. They are contemporaneous on the 
spiritual level; they partake of the same vital substance. 
Thus, there is a perfect spiritual continuity be­
tween the generations; it is the same soul which is 
transmitted from a father to his children and from 
these to their children, and this unique soul, al­
ways remaining itself in spite of its successive 
divisions and subdivisions is the one which animated 
the first ancestor at the beginning of all things 
(EF:292) . 
Each generation, therefore, shares genetically in the sacred 
center; each is genetically consubstantial. 
Now, the Australians cherished certain symbolic objects 
called churinga, which served as mediators between the ances­
tors, the individual, and the totemic animal . 
..• there is a mystic, religious principle in each 
new-born child, which emanates from an ancestor of 
the Alcheringa. It is this principle which forms the 
essence of each individual, therefore, it is his soul 
or in any case the soul is made of the same matter 
and the same substance .... The idea of the totem and 
that of the ancestor are even so closely kindred that 
they sometimes seem to be confounded .•.. In a word, 
the ancestors are the fragments of the totem•... But 
if the ancestor is so readily confused with the to­
temic being, the individual soul, which is so near 
the ancestral soul, cannot do otherwise. Moreover, 
this is what actually results from the close union of 
each man with his churinga ..•. The churinga repre­
sents the per~~~~lity of the individual who is be­
lieved to·have'ADorn of it ..•. It also expresses the 
totemic animal .••. Thus, the churinga is at once the 
body of the ancestor, of the individual himself, and 
of the totemic animal .••• These three beings form a 
solid unity. They are almost equivalent and inter­
•
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changeable terms (EF:288, 290). 
Durkheim then summarized the thrust of his thought in terms 
of the emergence of the individual person under the title of 
reincarnated soul in these terms: 
• 
Since no other souls than these exist, we reach the 
conclusion that, in a general way, the soul is nothing 
other than the totemic principle incarnate in each in­
dividual (EF:282). 
• 
The soul, then, to Durkheim, was first seen as an individual­
ized incarnation of the same general totemic principle under 
which the group came to symbolically conceive of itself. The 
construction of a collective conscience and the awakening of 
• 
individual conscience are corollary, contemporaneous proces­
ses; both are dependent upon the same symbolic processes of 
projection, crystallization, and retrojection. Self and so­
ciety are twin-born, and symbolic culture acts as the prime 
genetic medium. 
•
 
Now, these processes illustrate Durkheim's insistence
 
that phenomenological processes are intimately intertwined
 
with social and cultural processes. It makes little sense to
 
•
 
oppose the individual to society, and society to culture,
 
since these poles of the human microcosm work with, not a­

gainst, each other; they are continuing mutual co-creations.
 
Here, Durkheim noted that collective representations must be­

come individualized in a unique fashion in each person if 
they are to really take hold of each individual's full inner 
life. 
• 
But in penetrating into these individuals, it must 
inevitably individualize itself. Because the con­
sciousnesses, of which it is thus an integral part, 
differ from each other, it differentiates itself ac­
cording to their image, since each has its own phys­
iognomy, it takes a distinct physiognomy in each
• 
(EF:282) •
 
And in 'The Dualism of Human Nature/, after noting that "once
 
the group has dissolved and the social communion has done its
 
work, the individuals carry away within themselves these
 
•
 
great religious, moral, and intellectual conceptions that so­

cieties draw from their hearts during their periods of great­
est creativity" (DHN:336), Durkheim proposed: 
•
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In mingling with our individual lives in this way, 
however, these various ideals are themselves indivi­
dualized. Because they are in a close relation with 
our other representations, they harmonize with them, 
and with our temperaments, characters, habits, and 
so on. Each of us puts his own mark on them; and this 
accounts for the fact that each person has his own 
particular way of thinking about the beliefs of his 
church, the rules of common morality, and the funda­
mental notions that serve as the framework of concep­
tual thought (DHN:336-7). 
Here we witness the individualization of collective represen­
tations, the particularization of shared symbols in terms of 
each person's own special outlook and moral and intellectual 
physiognomy. 
Now, it is in this way that we see Durkheim unfolding 
the dialectic of impersonality and personality. For the in­
dividual to emerge as an independent center of action and 
thought in his own right, he must first participate through 
symbolic mediators in the collective essence. Only through 
this collective, impersonal participation is later individua­
tion--special unique incarnations--possible at all. 
So the individual soul is only a portion of the collec­
tive soul of the group; it is the anonymous force at 
the basis of the cult, but incarnated in an individual 
whose personality it espouses; it is mana individuali­
zed•... If the soul is a particular form-of the imper­
sonal principle which is diffused in the group, the 
totemic species and all the things of every sort which 
are attached to these, at bottom it is impersonal it­
self. So, with differences only of degrees, it should 
have the same properties as the force of which it is 
a special form, and particularly, the same diffusion, 
the same aptitude for spreading itself contagiously 
and the same ubiquity. But, quite on the contrary, the 
soul is voluntarily represented as a concrete definite 
being, wholly contained within itself and not communi­
cable to others: it is made the basis of our personal­
ity. But this way of conceiving the soul is the pro­
duct of a late and philosophic elaboration. The popu­
lar representation, as it is spontaneously formed from 
common experience, is very different, especially at 
first. For the Australian, the soul is a very vague 
thing, undecided and wavering in form, and spread over 
the whole organism•.•• So it has a diffusion, a conta­
giousness and an omnipr.esence comparable to those of 
the mana. Like the mana, it is able to divide and du­
plicate itself indefinitely, though remaining entire 
in each of its parts; it is from these divisions and 
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duplications that the plurality of souls is derived. 
On the other hand, the doctrine of reincarnation, 
whose generality we have established, shows how many 
impersonal elements enter into the idea of the soul 
and how essential those are. For if the same soul is 
going to clothe a new personality in each generation, 
the individual forms in which it successively devel­
ops itself must all be equally external to it, and 
have nothing to do with its nature. It is a sort of 
generic substance which individualizes itself only 
secondarily and superficially (EF:299). 
This, then, is the dialectic--something internal depends for 
its existence upon something external; something individual 
and unique depends upon something generic and universal. The 
individual first emerges as an emanation from, and then re­
turns to, the collective, impersonal, "pool of souls" in 
which each generation is successively clothed. It is this 
double movement of emanation and return which illustrates 
the dialectic of impersonality and the growth of personality • 
••• the existence of individual souls, when once ad­
mitted, cannot be understood unless one imagines an 
original supply of fundamental souls at the origin 
of things, from which all the others were derived. 
Now these archetype souls had to be conceived as con­
taining within them the source of all religious effi­
cacy; for, since the imagination does not go beyond 
them, it is from them and only from them that all sa­
cred things are believed to come, both the instruments 
of the cult, the members of the clan, and the animals 
of the totemic species. They incorporate all the sa­
credness diffused in the whole tribe and the whole 
world, and so they are attributed powers noticeably 
superior to those enjoyed by the simple souls of men 
(EF: 313) • 
Thus, "the individual, the soul of an ancestor which 
he reincarnates or from which he is an emanation, his chur­
inga, and the animals of the totemic species •.• are partial­
ly equivalent and interchangeable things" (EF:30l). These 
things are intimately linked symbolically because all neces­
sarily partake of the respect bestowed by the group on its 
own ~onstituti~collective representations. The same collec­
tive sentiments are attached to each. 
So all these various objects, whether real or ideal, 
have one common element by which they arouse a single 
affective state in the mind, and through this, they 
become confused. In so far as they are expressed by 
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one and the same representation, they are indistinct. 
This is how the Arunta has corne to regard the churinga 
as the body common to the individual, the ancestor and 
even the totemic being. It is his way of expressing the 
identity of the sentiments of which these different be­
ings are the object (EF:30l). 
True to his basic hermeneutic of interpreting sacral repre­
sentations as symbolic equations or translations of social 
realities, Durkheim then argued that the notion of tbe immor­
tality of the soul was a metaphorical representation of the 
continuity of the clan over many generations. 
The primitive does not have the idea of an all-power­
ful god who creates souls out of nothing. It seems to 
him that souls cannot be made except out of souls. So 
those who are born can only be new forms of those who 
have been; consequently, it is necessary that these 
latter continue to exist in order that others may be 
born ..•. In fine, the immortality of the soul is the 
only way in which men were able to explain the fact 
which could not fail to attract their attention; this 
fact is the perpetuity of the group. Individuals die, 
but the clan survives. So the forces which gave it life 
must have the same perpetuity. Now these forces are the 
souls which animate individual bodies; for it is in 
them and through them that the group is realized. For 
this reason, it is necessary that in enduring, they re­
main always the same; for, as the clan always keeps its 
characteristic appearance, the spiritual substance out 
of which it is made must be thought of as qualitatively 
invariable. Since it is always the same clan with the 
same totemic principle, it is necessary that the souls 
be the same, for souls are only .the totemic principle 
broken up and particularized. Thus there is something 
like a germinative plasm, of a mystic order which is 
transmitted from generation to generation and which 
makes ..• the spiritual unity of the clanthrouqh all 
time (EF:304). 
Finally, just as Durkheim noted earlier how the totem­
ic principle becomes individualized in each consciousness 
and consciousness, so too he next noted the emergence of a 
" •.• protecting genius who is attached to each individual" 
(EF:3l4). Here, " •.. a sympathetic bond unites each indivi­
dual to his protecting ancestor" (EF: 315) • 
The individual soul is only another aspect of the 
ancestral spirit .•• this serves after a fashion, 
as a second self ••.. At bottom, it is one soul in 
twchnJies. The kinship of these two notions is so 
close that they are sometimes expressed by one and 
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same word .•.. The individual totem is merely the out­
ward and visible form of the ego or personality, of 
which the soul is an inward and invisible form (EF:316). 
Here, we see the emergence of the notion of an individual 
guardian spirit, the daemon of the Greeks, for example. 
Hence, at one and the same time, the ancestor or founding 
hero or demi-urge serves as a principle of generic imperson­
ality and highly individualized personality. " .•. the genius 
is another form or double of the soul of the individual" (EF: 
311) • 
Thus, the individual totem has all the essential char­
acteristics of the protecting ancestor and fills the 
same role: this is because it has the same origin and 
proceeds from the same idea. Each of them, in fact, 
consists in a duplication of the soul. The totem, as 
the ancestor, is the soul of the individual, but ex­
ternalized and invested with powers superior to those 
it is believed to possess while within the organism. 
Now this duplication is the result of a psychological 
necessity: for it only expresses the nature of the 
soul which is ••. double. In one sense, it is ours: 
it expresses our personality. But at the same time, 
it is outside of us, for it is only the reaching into 
us of a religious force which is outside of us. We can­
not confound ourselves with it completely, for we at­
tribute to it an excellence and a dignity by which it 
raises far above us and our empirical individuality. 
So there is a whole part of ourselves which we tend to 
project into the outside. This way of thinking of our­
selves is so well established in our nature that we 
cannot escape it, even when we attempt to regard our­
selves without having recourse to any religious sym­
boIs. Our moral consciousness is 1 i.ke a nucleus about 
which the idea of the soul forms itself: yet when it 
speaks to us, it gives the effect of an outside power, 
superior to us, which gives us our law and judges us, 
but which also aids and sustains us .... Everything 
goes just as if we really had two souls: one which is 
within us, or rather which is us: the other which is 
above us, and whose function is to control and assist 
the first one (EF:316-17). 
c. Conclusion: Soul and Person 
'The idea of the soul was for a long time .•. the popu­
lar form of the idea of personality" (EF:30S). Thus did Durk­
heim trace the emergence of the notion of the individual per­
son under the aegis of impersonal concepts and rules. 
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... the notion of the person is the product of two 
sorts of factors. One of these is essentially imper­
sonal: it is the spiritual principle serving as the 
soul of the group. In fact,~~s this which constitutes 
the very substance of individual souls. Now, this is 
not the possession of anyone in particular: it is a 
part of the collective patrimony; in it and through it, 
all cor.sciousnesses communicate. But, on the other 
hand, in order to have separate personalities, it is 
necessary that another force intervene to break up and 
differentiate this principle: in other words, an indi­
viduating factor is necessary. It is the body that ful­
fills this function. As two bodies are distinct 
from each other, and as they occupy different points 
of space and time, each of them forms a special center 
about which the collective representations reflect and 
color themselves differently. The result is that even 
if all the consciousness in these bodies are directed 
towards the same world, to wit, the world of ideas and 
sentiments which bring about the moral unity of the 
group, they do not all see it from the same angle; each 
one expresses it in its own fashion (EF:30S-6). 
Thus, as in his doctrine of the dualism of human nature, to 
Durkheim the impersonal, shared, collective moral and intel­
lectual meanings which lay at the basis of personality are 
individualized by the body. As noted in the first chapter of 
this Book, moral rules and intellectual concepts are general; 
the individualizing principle is the body. 
Of these two equally indispensable factors, the form­
er is certainly not the less important, for this is 
the one which furnishes the original matter of the i­
dea of the soul. Perhaps some will be surprised to see 
so considerable a role attributed to the impersonal 
element in the genesis of the idea of personality. But 
the philosophical analysis of the idea of person, which 
has gone so far ahead of the sociological analysis, has 
reached analogous results on this point. Among all the 
philosophers, Leibnitz is one of those who have felt 
most vividly what a personality is; for above all, the 
monad is a personal and autonomous being. Yet, for Leib­
nitz, the contents of all the monads are identical. In 
fact, all are consciousnesses which express one and the 
same object, the world; and as the world itself is only 
a system of representations, each particular conscious­
ness is really only the reflection of the universal con-· 
sciousness. However, each one expresses it from its own 
point of view, and in its own manner. We know this dif­
ference of perspectives comes from the fact that the 
monads are situated differently in relation to each other 
and to the whole system which they constitute (EF:30S-6). 
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Along with Kant, Durkheim saw the personal as anchored in 
the impersonal, in shared concepts and moral rules; in 
short, in universal Reason. Thus, it is not merely differ­
ence, separateness, or uniqueness which constitutes the es­
sence of individual personhood, but also the phenomenologi­
cal deepening and centering of active structures of con­
science and consciousness. Therefore, there are two comple­
mentary poles in the symbolic construction of the person; 
there are two crucial processes which proceed simultaneously 
or reciprocally extend one another--namely, individuation 
in the sense of separation and deeper participation in sym­
bolic, and universalizable, culture. 
Kant expresses the same sentiment, though in a dif­
ferent form. For him, the cornerstone of the person­
ality is the will. Now, the will is the faculty of 
acting in conformity with reason, and the reason is 
that which is most impersonal within us. For reason 
is not my reason; it is human reason in general. It 
is the power which the mind has of rising above the 
particular, the contingent, and the individual, to 
think in universal forms. So from this point of view, 
we may say that what makes a man a personality is 
that by which he is confounded with other men, that 
which makes him a man, not a certain man. The senses, 
the body and, in a word, all that individualizes is, 
on the contrary, considered as the antagonist of the 
personality by Kant. This is because individuation is 
not the essential characteristic of the personality. 
A person is not merely a single subject distinguished 
from all the others. It is especially a being which is 
attributed a relative autonomy in relation to the en­
vironment with which it is most immediately in contact. 
It is represented as capable of moving itself ...• Now 
our analysis permits us to see how this conception was 
formed and to what it corresponds (EF:306). 
It isipthis sense that we come to speak of the individual as 
an active whole, an indivisible and self-moving center of 
thought, feeling and action. I am a person, I have a body. 
In fact, the soul, a symbolic representation of the 
personality, has the same characteristic. Although 
closely bound to the body, it is believed to be pro­
foundly distinct from it and to enjoy, in relation 
to it, a large degree of independence. During life, 
it may leave it temporarily, and it definitely with­
draws at death. Far from being depennent upon the 
body, it dominates it from the higher dignity which 
is in it. It may well take from the body the outward 
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form in which it individualizes itself, but it owes 
nothing essential to it. Nor is the autonomy which 
all peoples have attributed to the soul a pure illu­
• 
sion; we now know what its objective foundation is. 
It is quite true that the elements which serve to 
form the idea of the soul and those which enter into 
the representation of the body come from two differ­
ent sources that are independent of one another. One 
sort are made up of the images and impressions coming
• from all parts of the organism; the others consist in the ideas and sentiments which come from and express 
society. So the former are not derived from the latter 
(EF: 307) • 
In sum, Durkheim reminded us that individuation and person­
• 
alization are complementary, rather than identical, proces­
ses. We shall, in turn, hold Durkheim to this crucial recog­
nition of the double dialectic of impersonality and person­
ality in Books Two and Three as we explore his notions of 
• egoistic and anomic suicide in relation to the modern sta­
tus of the indi.vidual; we shall especially hold to the re­
cognition that the construction of the individual person 
is a symbolic, and not merely mechanical social morphologi­
• cal, process. And, thus, as in a following section on the c~ntribution of Christian culture to the emergence of the 
individual person through history, we shall look especially 
for cultural sanctioning of extreme forms of individualism. 
• Here, Durkheim summarized his basic position in this manner: 
• 
Whatever we receive from society, we hold in common 
with our companions. So it is not at all true that 
we are more personal as we are more individualized. 
The two terms are in no way synonymous: in one sense, 
they oppose more than they imply one another. Passion 
individualizes, yet it also enslaves. Our sensations 
• 
are essentially individual; yet we are more personal 
the more we are freed from our senses and able to 
think and act with concepts. So those who insist upon 
all the social elements of the individual do not mean 
by that to deny or debase the personality. They merely 
refuse to confuse it with the fact of individuation 
(EF: 307) • 
Finally, contrary to those who persist in portraYin~f~s rad­
ically anti-individualist, we can do no better than to cite 
• Durkheim's concluding footnote to this profound section on 
the symbolic construction of the notion of the person in 
terms of the idea of the soul. 
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• 
For all this, weCPnot deny the importance of the indi­
vidual factor: this is explained from our point of 
view just as easily as its contrary. If the essential 
element of the personality is the social part of us, 
• 
on the other hand there can be no social life unless 
distinct individuals are associated, and this is rich­
er the more numerous and different from each other they 
are. So the individual factor is a condition of the im­
personal factor. And the contrary is no less true, for 
society itself is an important source of individual 
differences (EF:308, #128). 
Contrary to some, Durkheim did not postulate a Platonic so­
ciety floating in space; rather, as we discovered in Chapter 
• 
Four of this Book, Durkheim always acknowledged that it is 
only through interaction of individuals that society is pos­
sible. As a corollary, shared, public culture must become 
internalized within the personality structure, if it is to 
• be effective socially and phenomenologically; conversely, 
as internalized in specific individuals, it is refracted 
in a unique light and individualized. Then, such individual­
ized and altered ways of feeling and thinking may then come, 
• in turn, to contribute something new and significant to the group. As Durkheim himself said: 
just as society exists only in and through indi­
viduals, the totemic principle exists only in and 
through the individual consciousnesses whose associa­
• tion forms the clan. If they did not feel it is them, it would not exist; it is they who put it into things 
(EF:283) • 
Just as there is no society without individuals, so 
those impersonal forces which are disengaged from 
•
 
the group cannot establish themselves without incar­

nating themselves in the individual consciousnesses 
where they individualize themselves. In reality, we 
do not have two different developments, but two dif­
ferent aspects of one and the same development (EF:302). 
Let us, therefore, lay this chimera to rest once and for all;
• let us learn from Durkheim who never separated sociocultural 
from phenomenological process. 
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3. The State as Guarantor of Individual Rights 
Returning to Durkheim's earlier theme of the emanci~­
• tion of the individual from the "despotisms of the group," 
let us briefly explore the historical role which Durkheim as­
signed the State as guarantor of individual rights. Now, as 
we noted in our discussion of obstacles to individuation
• through the progressive division of labor, the emergence of 
the person is not an automatic, mechanical process. There are 
many factors which may retard these advances such as clans, 
castes, and classes. These secondary groups resist differen­
• tiation and thus individuation; hence, their claims on the 
individual must be opposed by an equally strong force. Durk­
heim found this counter-vailing force in the State; he spoke 
of the " ... individual rights that the State secures by
• stages, overcoming the resistances of collective particular­
ism" (PECM:66). De-collectivism, and the liberation of the 
individual from the restrictive and narrow claims on his loy­
alty comes through shifting his protection and obligations to
• to a new and higher level, a centralized and autonomous lev­
el which cuts across multiple and conflicting social groups. 
Proceeding on the principle that " •.• it is out of \ 
the conflict of social forces that i~idual liberties are
• born" (PECM:63), Durkheim argued that individual rights emer­
ged out of this tension between the centralizing State and 
traditional secondary groups. The State thus comes to stand 
alongside the division of labor as a prime instrument of in­
• dividuation. Durkheim's discussion here looks back to his 
suggestion that the chief is the first individual person to 
emerge from the social mass, and forward to his discussions 
of the rise of socialism, of the new representative role
• which should be assigned to corporate groups in modern poli­
ty and society, and his extensive discussion of the complex 
and changing relations between law and governmental interven­
tion in his essay on "Two Laws of Penal Evolution."
• While these historical processes are most complex, we 
shall pursue Durkheim's contribution to their elucidation in 
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terms of the rather narrow frame of the State acting as the 
guarantor of individual rights vis-a-vis secondary groups.
• Although Durkheim's political sociology (see also Part II, 
Book Two) has been too often slighted by sociologists, some 
secondary observers, especially Bendix (1960a), Richter (1960), 
Giddens (197lb), LaCapra (1972), Lukes (1973), and Nisbet 
• (1974), have noted the crucial rol~ played by the:state in 
Durkheimian sociology. Recognizing the importance Durkheim 
placed on " ••• the special relation between the rise of the 
~ -_., -----­political state and the emergence of the individual from what 
Durkheim calls the social mass" (1974:145), Nisbet devoted a• -_... 
section to discussion of the relation between the growth of 
the State and the emergence of the individual in Durkheim's 
sociology. Nisbet's discussion is valuable in that he placed
• Durkheim's argument within the context of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century sociopolitical theory (eg. Rousseau and 
Tocqueville), and because he detected a certain ambivalence 
in Durkheim's treatment. 
• ••• it is possible to see in Durkheim's political 
• 
thought adequate recognition of the historical role 
of the political state in the West in, first, actual­
ly creating the seminal idea of individual positive 
rights, rights not to be abrogated by any internal 
association within the political order, and, second, 
by this very fact, a sphere of freedom unknown in 
• 
simple societies where the local or functional asso­
ciation is supreme. In this respect, Durkheim's polit­
ical thought is fully up to the mark in that long tra­
dition of political thought in the West beginning with 
Plato and culminating in Rousseau and "Austin that has 
stressed the profound role of the political state in 
• 
providing the context of rights and liberties. But so 
is it possible also to see Durkheim in that other-- . 
related but different--tradition which reaches from 
Aristotle to Burke and Tocqueville and which, without 
denying the value, even necessity, of the state never­
theless recognizes, as the first tradition does not, 
the vital importance of institutional checks upon po­
litical power, division of authority, pluralism, lo­
calism, and the indispensable role of intermediate 
associations (Nisbet, 1974:150). 
•
 
Durkheim's relation to Rousseau and the problem be­

queathed by the Enlightenment in attempting to maintain a 
dualistic theory which places polity and society in separate 
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compartments has been profoundly explored by Reinhard Ben-
dix. Bendix sees a hiatus between Durkheim's sociological 
and political theories: "The liberal tradition in its clas­
sical or Durkheimian version is characterized by a 'dualism' 
according to which society and government constitute two in­
terdependent, but partially autonomous, spheres of thought \ 
and action"(1960a:189). "For Durkheim, it was the State a­
lone which guarantees the 'moral existence' of the indivi.dual, 
and in his judgment the State was capable of having this ef­
fect because it is 'an organ distinct from the rest of socie­
ty' II (l960a:200-0l) . 
The emancipation of the individual from the "despot­
ism of the group" appears in the bulk of his work as 
a result of the increasing division of labor and the 
related attenuation of custom and law. Though as a 
political, liberal Durkheim valued this "range of in­
dividual development," as a social philosopher he 
feared its consequences for social mobility where 
these consisted in the isolation of the individual 
and the loss of regulative norms of conduct (anomie). 
Accordingly, he sought t0-Eafeguard the individual 
against the danger§ of anomie by his reintegration 
in the seconda~roups of ~l!.0ciety•••• Yet, at the 
same time, he called on the aid of the State to pre­
serve individual-liberties against the-despotism" 
with which these grou£§S~~qqJd see]{_" to control the 
individual~··~rrclt~J?E!~~ is, therefore, 
a "dualis~~ whereby man's psycholog1cal and moral at­
tributes are explained in terms of his membership in 
the society, while the society as a whole is charac­
terized by an overall process (the increasing divi­
sion of labor) which accounts among other things for 
man's capacity to alter these attributes through 
State intervention in the interest of justice. This 
incongruity between Durkheim's sociological and polit­
ical theories was symptomatic of the liberal tradi­
tion in the nineteenth century (Bendix,1960a:188-89). 
Then Bendix provides an extraordinarily cogent summary of 
the evolution of three types of relations between State and 
society in the West, leading up to the modern situation of 
highly centralized national power, the destruction of inter­
mediate centers of authority, and the institution of nation­
al citizenship. Not the least of the virtues of Bendix's 
summary here is that it ties in Durkheim's political theory 
...... 
to that of Max Weber's. 
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The "great transformation" leading to the modern polit­
ical community made the decline of social solidarity 
inevitable, because (if so complex a matter can be 
stated so simply ) no association based on a coales­
cence of interests or an ethnic and religious affilia­
tion could recapture the intense reciprocity of rights 
and duties that was peculiar to the "autonomous juris­
dictions" of an estate society. The reason is that in 
these "jurisdictions" or "law communities" as Max Weber 
called them, each individual was involved in a "mutual 
aid" society, which protected his rights only if he ful­
filled his duties. This great cohesion within social 
ranks was above all a counterpart to the very loose in­
tegration of a multiplicity of jurisdictions at the '"na­
tional" political level. In this respect, the absolu­
tist regimes achieved a greater integration though cen­
tralized royal administration and the people's loyalty 
to the king, although the hereditary privileges appro­
priated by Church and aristocracy also subjected the 
ordinary man to the autocratic rule of his local master. 
Where such hereditary privileges replaced the "law com­
munities" of an earlier day, the privileged groups 
achieved considerable social cohesion, but the people 
were deprived of what legal and customary protection 
they had enjoyed and hence excluded even from their 
former passive participation in the reciprocity of 
rights and obligations. 
Modern political communities have achieved a greater 
centralization of government than either the medieval 
or the absolutist political systems, and this achieve­
ment has been preceded, accompanied, or followed by 
the participation of all adult citizens in political 
life (on the basis of the formal equality of the fran­
chise). The price of these achievements consists in the 
diminished solidarity of all "secondary groups." This 
t>rice" is a by-product of the separation between socie­
ty and government in the modern political community. 
Whereas solidarity had been based on the individual's 
participation in a "law community," or on his member­
ship in a privileged status group possessing certain 
governmental prerogatives, it must arise now from the 
social and economic stratification of society aided by 
the equality of all adult citizens before the law and 
in the electoral process (Bendix, 1960a: 201-2) . 
Durkheim did recognize this dilemma in his observation 
that the State, too, can become despotic in turn if it has no 
counter-vailing force, and thus, in his proposals for the en­
franchisement of professional-occupational groups (see Part 
II, Book Two). Further, in Socialism, Durkheim focussed on 
the double movement--the individualist and centralizing 
"statist" tendencies--inherent in the French Revolution., 
, 
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The first resulted in having it admitted as evident 
that the place of individuals in the body politic 
should be exclusively determined by their personal 
value, and consequently of having traditional ine­
qualities rejected as unjust. The second had the re­
sult that the reforms judged necessary were consi­
dered realizable, because the State was conceived as 
as the natural instrument of their realization. Be­
sides, these principles are jointly responsible for 
another in the sense that the stronger the State is 
constituted, and the higher it is raised above all 
individuals, of whatever class or origin, the more, 
therefore, did all individuals appear equal through 
connection with it (Soc:l02-3). 
Thus, after the Revolution, only the central State survived 
and grew stronger. Collective life was then caught between 
two opposing forces--the central bureaucratic State on the 
one hand, and the anomic, dispersed ego on the other. And 
these opposing poles of modern life "fed off each other," 
as it were (see, for eg., S:389, and Part II, Book Two). 
Having noted that the liberation of the individual by 
the State from restrictive "collective particularisms" is a 
double-edged sword which can work against, as well as for, \ 
the individual, let us now turn to consider Durkheirn's main 
thesis here. In The Division of Labor, Durkheim sounded this 
theme which he was to later develop in his lectures transla­
ted as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals--namely, that ] 
respect for the individual grows along with State power • 
•.. the place of the individual becomes greater and 
the governmental power becomes less absolute. But \ 
there is no contradiction in the fact that the sphere 
of individual action grows at the same time as that . 
of the State, or that the functions which are not made 
immediately dependent upon the central regulative sys­
tem develop at the same time as it (DL:220). 
Now, Durkheim had here again to confront the modern liberal \ 
notion that the State and the Individual are opposed to each 
other as Society and the Individual. Thus, as we discovered 
in Durkheim's discussion of Spencer's doctrine, there is pre­
sumed to be an inherent contradiction between the growth of 
the power of the central State and the emergence of indivi­
dual rights and freedom. In liberal doctrine, the State was J 
seen as encroaching upon individual freedoms~ " •.. the ideal 
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State of Spencer is really the primitive form of the State" 
(DL:221) • 
Do we not arrive here at a contradiction that cannot 
be resolved? On the one hand, we establish that the 
State goes on developing more and more: on the other, 
that the rights of the individual, held to be actively 
opposed to those of the State, have a parallel develop­
ment. The government organ takes on an ever greater 
scale, because its function goes on growing in impor­
tance and because its aims, that are in line with its 
own activity, increase in number: yet we deny that it 
can pursue aims other than those that concern the in­
dividual. Now, these aims are by definition held to be­
long to individual activity. If, as we suppose, the 
rights of the individual, the State does not have to 
establish them, that is, they do not depend on the 
State. But then, if they do not, and are outide its 
competence, how can the cadre of this competence go 
on expanding, in face of the fact that it must less 
and less take in things alien to the individual (PECM: 
57)? 
Here, again, we see the momentous import of Durkheim's shift 
in the grounds of argument; for, in rejecting the rnatural 
rights" and "social contract" theories, Durkheim argued that 
the notion of personhood is a social construction, and 
hence, that the notion of individual rights is a legal and 
political construction. 
The only way of getting over the difficult¥is to dis­
pute the postulate that the rights of the individual 
are inherent, and to admit that the institution of 
these rights is in fact precisely the task of the 
State. Then, certainly, all can be explained (PECM:57). 
Thus, with the shift in viewpoint we can extricate ourselves 
from the ideological conflicts of modern political theory, 
and we can also make better sense of the emergence of the 
individual person and the growth of State power through his­
tory. 
We can understand that the functions of the State may 
expand, without any diminishing of the individual. We 
can see too that the individual may develop without 
causing any decline of the State, since he would be 
in some respects the product himself of the State, 
and since the activity of the State would in its na­
ture be liberating to him. Now, what emerges, on the 
evidence of the facts, is that history gives sound 
authority for this relation of cause and effect as be­
tween the progress of moral individualism and the ad­
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vance of the State. Except for abnormal cases ••• the 
more the individual is respected (PECM:57). 
History seems indeed to prove that the State was not 
created to prevent the individual from being disturb­
ed in the exercise of his natural rights: no, this 
was not its role alone--rather, it is the State that 
creates and organizes and makes a reality of these 
rights. And, indeed, man is man only because he lives 
in society (PECM:60-l). 
In sum, against the Utilitarian and Kantian forms of indivi­
dualism which opposed the power of the State to the autonomy 
of the individual, Durkheim began from the premise of man-in­
society and argued that the State creates rights. 
If we work on the premise that the rights of the in­
dividual are not ieso facto his at birth: that they 
are not inscribed 1n the nature of things with such 
certainty as warrants the State in endorsing them 
and promulgat~g them; that, on the contrary, the 
rights have t~on from opposing forces that deny 
them: that the State alone is qualified to play this 
part--then it cannot keep to the functions of supreme 
arbiter and administrator of an entirely prohibitive 
justice, as the Utilitarian or Kantian individualism 
would have it (PECM:65). 
Here we see in capsule Durkheim's theses--that rights are 
natural only in society, hence are created by society, not 
in opposition to it: that rights have to be won from oppo­
sing social forces which deny them: and that the State plays 
a crucial historical role in establishing individual rights. 
Durkheim elaborated his ideas in his lectures. Reiter­
ating his themes of The Division of Labor that societal dif­
ferentiation leads generally to individuation, and that " ••• 
that individualism which establishes itself in fact, and 
with time, the fact becomes a right" (PECM:61), Durkheim then 
qualified this general law. 
Things can, however, only have this course on one 
condition: that is, that inside this society, there 
must be no forming of any secondary groups that en­
joy enough autonomy to allow of each becoming in a 
way a small society within the greater. For then, 
each of these would behave towards its members as if 
it stood alone and everything would go on as if the 
full-scale society did not exist. Each group, tight­
ly enclosing the indivieuals of which it was made up, 
would hinder their development: the collective mind 
would impose itself on conditions applyinq to the in­
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dividual. A society made up of adjoining clans or of 
towns or villages independent in greater or lesser de­
gree, or of a number of professional groups, each one 
autonomous in relation to the others, would have the 
effect of being almost as repressive of any individual­
ity as if it were made up of a single clan or town or 
association. The formation of secondary groups of this 
kind is bound to occur, for ina great society there are 
always particular local or professional interests which 
naturally bring together those people with whom they 
are concerned. There we have the very stuff of associa­
tions of a special kind, of guilds, of coteries of ever­
y variety; and if there is nothing to offset or neutral­
ize their activity, each of them will tend to swallow up 
up its members (PECM:6l-2). 
Here, then, is Durkheim's starting point--intense social in­
teraction leads to the development of moral interests, and 
each group comes to exert, therefore, a compelling influence 
over the individuals on whom it lays obligations. Each is 
jealous of its own particular moral life; each lays upon its 
members claims which exclude other obligations, wider inter­
ests. For example, of domestic society Durkheim remarked: ". 
" ••• we know its capacity to assimilate when left to itself. 
We see how it keeps within its orbit all those who go to make 
it up and are under its immediate domination" (PECM: 61). As 
with the illustration of altruistic suicide, then, Durkheim 
viewed unchallenged group influence over an individual as 
inherently repressive. Therefore, some force must oppose the 
claims of secondary groups on the individual. The liberation 
of the individual from the hold of tight, narrow, local scale 
secondary groups must be won by the State. 
In order to prevent this happening, and to provide a 
certain range for individual development, it is not 
enough for a society to be on a big scale; the indivi­
dual must be able to move with some freedom over a 
wide field of action. He must not be curbed and mono­
polized by the secondary groups, and these groups must 
not be able to get a mastery over their members and 
mould them at will. There must therefore exist above 
these local, domestic--in a word, secondary--authori­
ties, some overall authority which makes the law for 
them all: it must remind each of them that it is but 
a part and not the whole, and that it should not keep 
for itself what rightly belon~s to the whole. The only 
means of avoiding this collective particularism, and 
all that involves for the individual, is to have a 
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special agency with the duty of representing the o­
verall collectivity, its rights and its interests, 
vis-a-vis these individual collectivities (PECM:6l-2). 
As noted from Bendix's observations earlier, it is the State 
which, in overcoming the conflicting claims of various sta­
tus groups and law communities, elevates the individual to 
the rank of citizen and then grants formal equality to all 
adults through the franchise. The national centralizing State 
then depends on the institution of national citizenship and 
vice versa. Here, Durkheim observed of the State: 
These rights and these interests merge with those of 
the individual. Let us see why and how the main func­
tion of the State is to liberate the individual per­
sonalities. It is solely because, in holding its con­
stitutive societies in check, it prevents them from 
exerting the repressive influences over the individual 
they would otherwise exert. So, there is nothing inher­
ently tyrannical about State intervention in the dif­
ferent fields of a collective life; on the contrary, 
it has the object and effect of alleviating tyrannies 
that do exist (PECM:62-3). 
Nisbet, after Durkheim, offers the concrete historical exam­
ple of: 
•.• the Cleisthenean reforms at the end of the sixth 
century B.C., with their reduction of the power of 
traditional society resting on kinship and their spe­
cific granting to the individual of positive rights 
they had not previously known ••. (1974:147). 
The emancipation of the individual, and the creation of in­
dividual rights and protection of the dignity of the human 
person, then, is one of the prime functions of the growth 
of the State in history, according to Durkheim. 
-'''.- . 
••• the State must deploy energies equal to those 
for which it has to provide a counter-balance. It 
must even permeate all those secondary groups of 
family, trade, and professional associations, Church, 
regional areas, and so on ••• which tend to absorb 
the per~onality of their members. It must do this in 
order to prevent this absorption and free these in­
dividuals, and so as to remind these partial socie­
ties that they are not alone and there is a right 
that stands above their own' rights. The State must 
therefore enter into their lives, it must supervise 
and keep a check on the way they operate and to do 
this it must spread its roots in all directions. For 
this task, it cannot just withdraw into the tribunals, 
it must be present in all spheres of social life and 
•
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make itself felt. Wherever these particular collec­
tive forces exist, there the power of the State must 
be, to neutralize them: for if they were left alone
• and to their own devices, they would draw the indivi­dual within their exclusive domination. Now, socie­
ties are becoming every greater in scale and ever 
more complex: they are made up of circles of increas­
ing diversity, and of manifold agencies .•.• Therefore, 
if it is to fulfill its function, the State, too, must
• branch out and evolve to the same degree (PECM:65). 
Here, then, was the liberal singing the praises of the inter­
ventionist State; the Enlightenment still lived on strongly ) 
in Durkheim as he everywhere saw the necessity of de-col lec- I 
• tivization and the sanctioning of the Individual and Reason. 
Listen to his summary of this theme: 
• 
It is only through the State that individualism is 
possible, although it cannot be the means of making 
it a reality, except in precise conditions. We might 
say that in the State we have the prime mover. It is 
the State which has rescued the child from patriachal 
domination and from family tyranny; it is the State 
which has freed the citizen from feudal groups and 
later from communal groups; it is the State that has 
•
 
liberated the craftsman and his master from guild tyr­

anny. It may take too violent a course, but the action 
becomes vitiated only when it is merely destructive. 
And this is what justifies the increasing scope of its 
functions (PECM:64). 
Finally, it should be noted that Durkheim went beyond
• the assertion that the State played a merely negative role 
in emancipating the individual from the grip of secondary 
groups to propose that the State also played a positive role 
in the construction of the moral milieu to nourish a new no­
• tion of the individual. This new, positive conception is the 
right and dignity of the human person seen, for example, in 
''l'he Declaration of the Rights of Man. II Durkheim said that 
the fundamental duty of the State is to call the indi­II ••• 
• vidual to a moral way of life. 1I 
• 
••. our moral individuality, far from being antagon­
istic to the State, has on the contrary been a product 
of it. It is the State that sets it free. And this grad­
ual liberation does not simply serve to fend off the 
opposing forces that tend to absorb the individual: it 
also serves to provide the milieu in which the indivi­
dual moves, so that he may develop his faculties in 
freedom. There is nothinq neqative in the part played 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--434-­
by the State. Its tendency is to ensure the most com­
plete individuation that the state of society will al­
low. Far from tyrannizing over the individual, it is 
the State that redeems the individual from society. 
But whilst this aim is essentially positive, it has 
nothing transcendental about it for the individual 
consciousness, for it is an aim that is also essential­
ly human •.•• It is not this or that individual that the 
State seeks to develop, it is the individual in genere, 
who is not to be confused with any single one of us. 
And whilst we give the State our cooperation--and it 
could do nothing without it--we do not become the a­
gents of a purpose alien to us; we do not give up the 
pursuit of an impersonal aim which belongs to a region 
above all our own private aims but which nevertheless 
has close ties with them (PECM:69). 
In contrast to the Romantic-Idealist philosophers (eg. Hegel), 
Durkheim contended that his notion of the liberating State 
had nothing mystic about it; it was not a transcendental en­
tity floating above all individuals and over the nation. 
On the one hand, our concept of the State has nothing 
mystic about it, and yet, it is still in its essence 
individualistic. The fundamental duty of the State is 
laid down in this very fact: it is to persevere in 
calling the individual to a moral way of life (PECM:69). 
Finally, Durkheim argued that the central State is today one 
of the prime upholders of the cult of the human person, of 
moralized individualism. 
If the cult of the human person is to be the only one 
destined to survive, as it seems, it must be observed 
by the State as by the individual equally. This cult, 
moreover, has all that is required to take the place 
of the religious cult of former times (PECM:69). 
On the other hand, Durkheim also recognized, as Bendix 
and Nisbet observed, the danger of the reverse process--name­
ly, that the centralized State, in turn, having conquered se­
condary institutions may itaelf become despotic without ri­
vals. With no competitors, the State then threatens to reab­
sorb the mass of individual molecules. 
It will be argued, might not the State in turn become 
despotic? Undoubtedly, provided there were nothing to 
counter that trend. In that case, as the sole existing 
collective force, it produces the effects that any col­
lective force not neutralized by any counter-force of 
the same kind would have on individuals. The State it­
self then becomes a leveller and repressive. And its 
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repressiveness becomes even harder to endure than that 
of small groups, because it is more artificial. The 
State, in our large scale societies, is so removed 
from individual interests that it cannot take into ac­
count the special or local conditions in which they 
exist. Therefore, when it does attempt to regulate 
them, it succeeds only at the cost of doing violence 
and distorting them. It is, too, not sufficiently in 
touch with individuals in the mass to be able to mould 
them inwardly, so that they readily accept its pressure 
on them. The individual eludes the State to some extent 
--the State can only be effective in the context of a 
large scale society--and individual diversity may not 
corne to light. Hence, all kinds of resistance and dis­
tressing conflicts arise (PECM:63). 
Here, we see a more somber note enter into Durkheim's diSCUS~\ 
sion of the role of the State in regard to the liberation Of_~ 
the individual~ for Durkheim recognized that the State's pow­
er could cut both ways, for and against the individual. Durk­
heim's basic problem in this context, then, became the balan­
cing off of State and secondary groups against one another, 
each serving not only to check the other's weakness but to 
contribute in a complementary manner its own strengths. 
••• small groups do not have this drawback. They are 
close enough to things that provide their raison d'etre 
to be able to adapt their actions exactly and they sur­
round their individuals closely enough to shape them 
in their own image. The inference to be drawn is simply 
that if that collective force, the State, is to be the 
liberator of the individual, it has itself need of some 
counter-balance~ it must be restrained by other collec­
tive forces, that is, by those secondary groups •••• It 
is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone, 
nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this 
conflict of social forces that indIVidUar-lIEertfes-are 
born. Here-again we see the-S:rgnificance of these 
groups. Their usefulness is not merely to regulate and 
govern the interests they are meant to serve. They have 
a wider purpose~ they form one of the conditions essen­
tial for the emancipation of the individual*(PECM:63). 
And as we shall discover in Part II of Book Two, Durkheim 
became less sanguine about the beneficence of the State. In­
deed, Durkheim sounded the note in these lectures that we 
Shall~~atly amplified later in Suicide and the preface to 
second edition of The Division of Labor: we are suffering 
from a rnalaise~ the cure is the national enfranchisement of 
occupational groups. 
• 
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Our present malaise has the same or1g1n as the social 
malaise we are suffering from. It is due to the lack 
• 
of secondary organs intercalated between the State and 
the rest of society •••• These organs seem necessary to 
prevent the State from tyrannizing over individuals: 
it is now plain that they are equally essential to pre­
• 
vent individuals from absorbing the State. Th~liberate 
the two confounded forces, whilst linking them at the 
same time •••• We can see how serious this lack of in­
ternal organization is ••• it involves ••• a profound 
loosening and an enervation ••• of our whole social and 
po~ical structure. The social forms that used to serve 
as a framework for individuals and a skeleton for the 
society, either no longer exist or are in course of be­
•
 
ing effaced, and no new forms are taking their place.
 
So that nothing remains but the fluid mass of indivi­
duals. For the State itself has been reabsorbed by them. 
Only the administrative machine has kept its stability 
and goes on operating with the same automatic regularity 
(PECM:106). 
• Now, since Durkheim himself directly linked the modern social 
malaise with its political counterpart, we shall do so also. 
Since Durkheim acknowledged that when the pursuit of a value 
--the emanci~ation of the individual by the State--goes to
• extreme, it may end in disaster, we too shall look for the 
unanticipated negative consequences of extreme individuation 
pursued as a absolute value (see Books Two and Thre~' 
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4.	 Law and the Person: The Development of Individual Prop­
erty and Contract 
•	 One of the most fascinating and least explored areas 
in Durkheim''3work is his evolutionary sociology of law con­
tained primarily in his lectures 'Physique generale des moeurs 
et du droit." We shall trace here the coming of individual 
•
 
• property and contract as "objective correlatives" of the gen­

eral emergence of the individual through history. For, as
 
Durkheim himself noted of the frequent failure of French in­

dividualism to resist lapsing into authoritarian regimes af­

ter an	 orgy of revolution: 
•
 
••• in order to set up an individualistic moral code,
 
it is not enough to assert it or to translate it into
 
fine systems. Society, rather, must be so ordered that
 
this set-up is made feasible and durable. Otherwise,
 
it remains in a vague doctrinaire state (PECM:60).
 
One can hardly conceive of the emergence of the modern notion 
of indivjdualism, especially as it emerged out of the Anglo­
American demo=racies, without its anchors in the free indivi­
dual control of property and freedom of contract. Indeed,•	 
-­these socio-economic-Iegal-political processes are one of a 
piece; was not the cry "free .markets make free men"? 
Rejecting again utilitarian explanations of the or1g1n
• of property, and Locke's legitimation of property in terms 
of individual labor, Durkheim began with the collective own­
ership of land in traditional agricultural societies. He 
then traced some main steps through which property, too, be­
• came de-collectivized • 
• 
• 
••• precisely because property, in its origins, can 
only be collective, it remains to eXPlain how it be­
came something individual. How is it·· that individuals 
thus grou~ed together, attached to an identical group. 
of things, came to acquire separate rights over sepa­
rate things? The land holding cannot, in principle, be 
broken up: it forms a single unit, and that is the unit 
of inheritance; and this indivisible unit is imposed 
upon the group of individuals. How does it happen that, 
in spite of this, any individual should have been able 
to reach the point of having a property of his own? 
As we might guess, this individuation of property could 
not came about without involving other changes in the 
situation between things and persons. For as long as 
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the things preserved this moral superiority over per­
sons, as it were, it was impossible for the individual 
to become their owner and establish his own command 
over them (PECM:164-5). 
Thus, instead of starting with the natural rights of indivi­
duals to hold separate property, Durkheim began with the so­
cio-historical fact of the collective holding of land. Since 
the land was indivisible as a hereditary unit, how did it corne 
to be divided, held, or controlled by individuals? 
Durkheim saw a two-fold process. First, there was the 
emergence of an individual as head of the group (eg. patri­
archal power). Then there was the development of moveable 
forms of property. The first change was analogous to the e­
mergence of the chief from out of the social mass, and the 
second to the shift away from land as the basis of wealth. 
To begin with, it was enough for one of the members 
of the family group to be raised in some rank in some 
way--by a chain of circurnstances--for him to be lent 
a prestige that none of the others had and to make 
him the representative of the family group. In conse­
quence, the ties binding the things to the group bound 
them direct to this privileged personality. And since 
this individual embodied in himself the whole group, 
men and things, he was in fact invested with an author­
ity that placed things as well as men under his domi­
nance, and thus an individual property carne into exist­
ence. This change was achieved with the corning of pa­
ternal, and more especially, patriarchal, power •••• 
It is not alone people, traditions and sentiments that 
happen to find expression in his person. It is, too, 
above all the patrimony, with all the concepts attach­
ing to it. The Roman family was made up of two kinds 
of elements: the head of the family, on the one hand, 
and on the other the rest of the family, called the 
familia, which comprised at once the sons of the fam­
ily and offspring, the slaves and all things or prop­
erty. All that was of moral or religious significance 
in the familia was, as it were, concentrated in the 
person of the head of the family. This is what gave 
him such a supreme position. The family's center of 
gravity thus became displaced. It passed from the 
things it was vested in to a given person. Hencefor­
ward, an individual carne to be an owner, in the full 
sense of the word, since the things were subject to 
him, rather than he to them (PECM:165-6). 
Just as the chief or patriarch was lifted above the group, 
so, too, the collective possessions which had possessed him 
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earlier now became part of his possession. As a symbolic rep­
resentative of the group, his person came to absorb the pos­
sessions and property of the group; they became part of his 
collective patrimony. 
The second cause--the development of moveable property 
as the basis of wealth--largely depended on the development 
of industry and commerce. As long as land was the productive 
base of society, it was withdrawn from individual use; the 
linkage of land to kinship barred treating land as a commod­
ity for sale on a market (see also Karl Polanyi, 1944). 
This second cause was the development in the sphere of 
personal or moveable property. Indeed, it was only land­
ed property that had a sacred character. This had the 
effect of withdrawing it from being within the disposal 
of individuals and so made a communal system necessary. 
Personal or moveable property, on the other hand, was 
in itself, as a rule, of profane nature. However, so 
long as industry remained solely agricultural, personal 
property played only a secondary and auxiliary part; 
. moveables were hardly more than adjuncts or annexes of 
landed property. This was the center to which all that 
was moveable in the family gravitated, things as well 
as people. It kept all things within its sphere of ac­
tion and thereby prevented them from acquiring any le­
gal status in keeping with their particular features, 
and from developing within them of some new right. Also, 
any earnings that members of the family could make out­
side the family community flowed into this family patri­
mony and was merged with the rest of the property, on 
the theory that the accessory follows the principal 
(PECM:166). 
While real estate was hedged about with all kinds of tradi­
tional constraints and prohibitions, moveable property com­
ing from trade and manufactures was considered comparatively 
profane, did not directly involve the fate of the group, and 
thus was able to develop in a freer fashion under the con­
trol of individuals. The individual was allowed to dispose 
of such "personal property," as opposed to "real property," 
according to his discretion, because it did not involve the 
fate of the collective patrimony. 
With time, however, and with the progress of tradp and 
industry, the personal or moveable property took on 
greater importance; it then cut away from this landed 
property of which it was only an adiunct: and became 
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an autonomous factor in economic life. Thus a fresh 
nucleus was made outside real estate, and so did not 
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of course have its characteristic features .... Nothing 
tied them to any given point in space: nothing made 
them immovable. This meant that they depended directly 
only on the person of the one who acquired them ..•. 
It is clear, in the light of present day laws, that 
real estate and moveable property are quite different 
in nature, and this reflects the separate phases in 
the evolution of the law. The former is still loaded 
with prohibitions and obstacles which are mementoes of 
its ancient sacred character. The latter has always 
been freer, more flexible, more entirely left to the 
discretion of individuals. Real as this duality may 
be, we must not lose sight of the fact that the one 
type of property issued from the other. Personal prop­
erty, as a distinct entity in law, was formed only as 
a result of landed property and on its pattern: it is 
a weak reflection, an attenuated form of it. It was 
landed property as an institution which first estab­
lished a bond sui generis between groups of persons 
and certain given things. Once that had been done, 
public opinion was quite naturally ready to admit that, 
as social conditions changed, bonds similar in main 
might link things with personalities in place of col­
lectivities (PECM:167). 
Thus, collective ownership established the bond between 
things and men because it was hedged about with sacredness; 
after this legal precedent, a similar bond between men and 
things emerged, only in terms of non-landed property. Fin­
ally, as Durkheim noted in the following summary of his the­
ses here, the sacredness invested in the collective holding 
of land passed over into the individual person. 
Originally, property was related to land, or at least 
the distinguishing features of landed property extend­
ed even to moveables, owing to their lesser importance:
these features, by virtue-of- their- sacred nature-, -im---------­
ply of necessity communalism. Here, then, we have the 
starting point. Then, by a dual process, individual own­
ership splits off from collective ownership. The concen­
tration of the family, on the other hand, which estab­
lished patrimonial powers, causes all these sacred vir­
tues .•• to issue from the person of the head of the 
family. From now onwards, it is man who stands above 
things, and it is a certain individual in particular 
who occupies this position, that is, who owns or pos­
sesses. Whole categories of profane things take shape 
independently of the family estate, free themselves of 
it, and thus become the subject of the new right of 
property, one that is in its essence individual. Then 
again, the individualizing of property followed from 
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landed property losing its sacrosanct quality--a 
quality which was absorbed by the human being (PECM: 
168) •
• Now, Durkheim proposed a similar evolution for the 
emergence of individual contract. Originally, as we saw in 
Chapter Six, the contract was guaranteed by external ritual 
formulas; it was regarded as sacred because the gods were
• thought to be a party to the contract. Indeed, "juridical 
formalism is only a substitute for sacred formalities and 
rites" (PECM:182). As with property, while sacro-magical 
anchors serve to establish contract as a legal institution,
• as these fade in force other concepts come to the fore. What 
becomes especially central to the evolving institution of 
contract is the notion of intention, of freely given mutual 
consent, of the individual as a responsible moral agent in
• his own right. Thus, instead of external guarantees, the in­
dividual's word becomes his bond. As Weber (1963) observed, 
the eVOlution of gods as ethical-legal deities, and the cor­
responding "attachment of the individual to a cosmos of ob­
• ligations" is of great importance for the evolution of cul­
• 
ture; it enables, for instance, an individual's universalis­
tic commitment to honesty and equity to secure for him a new 
legal status, including the right to enter into individual 
contracts. And, of course, one of the central themes of clas­
sical sociology, echoed in Durkheim'sconcern with the evol­
ving relations between de-collectivization and legal sanc­
• 
tions in The Division of Labor, has been the passage from 
"status to contract" (Maine). 
• 
Again, versus Spencer and the Utilitarians (recall 
Durkheim's emphasis on the non-contractual elements in con­
tract in Division), Durkheim argued that " ••• nothing has 
fluctuated so much in the course of time as the idea of free­
dom of contract" (PECM:67). And then he outlined his thesis 
concerning the parallel evolution of the value placed on in­
dividual intentionality and the development of individual
• consensual contract. 
With the Romans, the contract came into force at the 
moment when its text was declared and it was the phra­
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sing of the text that governed the engagements enter­
ed into and not the intention behind the words. Later, 
the intention began to corne into the reckoning, and 
the contract made under material duress was no longer 
held to be regular. Some forms of moral pressure like­
wise began to be ruled out. What brought about this 
development? The answer is, that people began to have 
a far loftier idea of the human person and the small­
est attempt on his freedom became more intolerable. 
Everything points to this development not having end­
ed yet, and to our becoming even more severe in this 
matter (PECM:67-8). 
Now, Durkheim began with two traditional legal forms from 
which consensual contract emerged--narnely, the real contract 
(so-called because it focussed on the transfer of a material 
object or possession) and the ritual contract. In both these 
forms it is the external t~ansfer of a thing or the external 
formula which is the force which binds, which makes the con­
tract. The consensual contract emerges by degrees from the 
socio-legal foundation which these types established. 
The consensual contract (or contract by mutual con­
sent) in the final analysis is, as it were, a point 
of convergence where the real contract and the rit­
ual contract meet in their process of development. 
In the real contract there is the transfer of a thing 
and it is this transfer that gives rise to the obliga­
tion; in receiving a certain object that you hand to 
me, I become your debtor. In the contract by ritual, 
no performance takes place; everything takes place by 
words, usually accompanied by ritual gestures .... 
OUr word, once given, is no longer our own. In the 
solemn agreement or contract by ritual, this transfer 
had already been achieved, but it was subject to the 
magic-religious processes .•. which alone made the 
transfer possible since it was these ceremonies that 
gave an objective character to the word, and to the 
resolve of the promisor. Once this transfer sheds the 
ritual that was previously a condition of it and is 
rid of it, once it constitutes the whole contractual 
act in itself, then the consensual contract has corne 
into existence (PECM:l96). 
Then, for the passage to consensual contract, Durkheim post­
ulated a continuing process of simplification and seculari­
zation. Once the form was established, the different uses 
it was put to led to changes in its structure and in its 
internal guarantee. 
Now, given the contract by ritual as an existing fact1 
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this process of cutting down and simplifying was 
bound to come about of itself. On the one hand, we 
see a diminishing of the verbal or other ritual cere­
monies was brought about by a kind of decline from 
within, under the pressure of social needs that call­
ed for greater speed in the process of exchanges. On 
the other hand, the practical effects of the contract 
by ritual could be got adequately by means other than 
those of ceremonies; it was enough for the law to de­
clare as irrevocable any declaration of the will pre­
sented as such: this simplification was the more eas­
ily allowed of, since in the natural course of time 
the practices that had accumulated had lost a great 
part of their meaning and early authority (PECM:196-7). 
Now, Durkheim connected these early forms of contract 
to the early structure of society in which the individual 
counted for little. Civil and criminal law were not clearly 
distinguished; the most heinous crimes, as we saw in Chapter 
Six, were crimes against religious authority, which demanded 
expiation by the sacro-magical collective conscience. The in­
dividual who was wronged in an agreement, who could not col­
lect debts, had little recourse except self-help. He could, 
for instance, post himself outside the door of the debtor, 
calling public attention to the deliction and, ultimately, 
even die there and haunt his nemesis. 
The system of real contract and the ritual contract 
correspond to a stage in social evolution in which 
the right ·of individuals commands only a slight meas­
of protection .... It is true that the defaulting debt­
or often was sentenced to a penalty such as Whipping, 
imprisonment, or fine •••. But the rule was still un­
known whereby the true sanction is one of compelling 
the contracting party to keep his word, or to make 
good the loss or injury inflicted on the other party 
by failing to honor an undertaking. In other words, 
penal sanctions at this stage are only applied in re­
spect of a contract where it appears to be an offense 
against the public authority: the way in which it af­
fects the individual does not enter into consideration. 
For loss or injury in private cases there is no provi­
sion (PECM:197-8). 
Then Durkheim noted that not only external sanctions--the 
outer structure of the contractual right--have been modified 
in the course of time to yield the consensual contract, but 
the internal structure also. The traditional forms of con­
tract were largely unilateral--one party gave and the other 
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received. For consensual contract to emerge, there must be 
the possibility of bilateral relations, of mutual give and 
take. 
In the beginning, the formal or ritual contract, like 
the real contract, could only be unilateral .... To 
create a bilateral bond, that is, in order that there 
shall be an exchange in the course of the contract, in 
order that each contracting party shall be both debtor 
and creditor at once, there had to be two separate con­
tracts, independent one of the other, for the role as­
signed to each was entirely different. There was of ne­
cessity an actual transposition. The one who spoke 
first as stipulator or creditor later on spoke as debt­
or or promisor, and vice versa. The independence of the 
two processes was such that the validity of the one was 
entirely distinct from that of the other .•.. 
The consensual contract alone was able at a single 
stroke to create the two-way track of bonds that we 
find in any reciprocal agreement. For the greater flex­
ibility of the system allows any contracting party to 
play at one and the same time the dual role of debtor 
and creditor, of stipulator and promisor. As a man is 
no longer under compulsion to adhere strictly to a de­
finite formula, the reciprocal obligations can be con­
tracted simultaneously. The two parties declare at one 
and the same time that they consent to the exchange on 
the conditions agreed between them (PECM:199-200). 
Akin to the greater flexi.bility of bilateral, mutual 
relations, was the emergence of bona fide contracts which 
were, quite literally, dependent on the reciprocal "good 
faith" of each party. Here, the possibility of "taking the 
role of the other" and the freedom from fixed, ritual form­
ulas moved individual intentions to center stage. Will, in­
tention, personal honesty, fidelity, trustworthiness--in 
short, the internalization of authority--became the founda­
tion on which consensual contracts rested. 
Another new feature of some significance arose when 
consensual contracts became inevitably contracts in 
good faith (or bona fide). The name is given to con­
tracts whose range and legal effects must be exclu­
sively determined by the intent of the parties. The 
real contract and the consensual contract were not 
able to claim this characteristic, or at least, only 
very imperfectly. Indeed, in each case the obligation 
did not come about purely and simply from the consent 
given or from the demonstration of will. Another fac­
tor needed to bind the parties come into it. There­
fore, this very factor which was indeed the decisive 
•
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one, was bound deeply to affect the nature of the 
form of both these contracts; so it was impossible 
that these forms of contract should depend exclusive­
ly or even mainly on what we might call the psycho­
logical factor, that is, the will or intention (PECM: 
200-01) • 
The reason that a new factor had to enter into these tradi­
tional forms of contract is that they both derived their 
binding force from their form, rather than the mutual re­
solve of the parties directly involved. It is the formula 
rather than the intention which binds and obligates. 
The role played by the thing in the real contract is 
filled by the words or the ritual used in the formal 
contract. Here, it is the words used and the gestures 
that make the obligation; it is these, too, that de­
fine it. In order to know what the provisor or debtor 
is bound to give or to do, we must not consider his in­
tent or that of the opposite party, but the formula he 
has used. The legal analysis, at least, has to start 
with the formula. Since it is the words that effect the 
binding, it is the words, too, that give the measure 
of the bonds forged .••• The formula has a value in it­
self ••• has its own force, and this force could not 
depend on the wills of the contracting parties since, 
on the contrary, the formula produces its effects, me­
chanically, as it were, no matter what the intentions 
of those using it •••• For all these reasons, good faith 
and the intent of the parties hardly came into the 
reckoning, whether for real or ritual contracts 
(PECM: 201) • 
Now, Durkheim suggests that a great change came with the e­
mergence of the consensual contract, a break through paral­
lel to societal differentiation and the erosion of sacro­
magically stereotyped and guaranteed mechanical solidarity. 
Thus, just as altruisme is used by Durkheim as an index to 
mechanical solidarity, so, too, he used the emergence of 
consensual, bona fide contracts as a sign of the progressive 
emergence of the individual person through history. 
From the time the consensual contract was established, 
however, it was a different matter. Here we no longer 
find anything intervening in the relation contracted 
and affecting its nature. Certainly, there are still 
words being used ••• but these no longer have any force 
in themselves because they lack any sacred character. 
Their only value now is in giving expression to the 
wills they reveal and therefore in the end it is the 
state of these wills that decides the obligations co~-
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tracted. The words in themselves are no longer of im­
portance; they are only symbols to be interpreted, and 
what they signify is the state of the mind and will 
that inspired them .••. What I am giving to another is 
my firm resolve to act in a specified way (PEOi:202). 
Hence, the emergence of consensual, bona fide contracts is 
significant not only in sociocultural terms, but also be­
cause it marks a new stage in phenomenological evolution~ it 
helped create a new type of 9haracterstructure • 
.•• if a contract is to be achieved, the main thing 
is that it shall exist in the intention or will of 
the party to it. If the will is lacking on either side, 
there can be no contract. For what the one in fact is 
giving, is his intention of acting in a certain way, 
of transferring his ownership in a cer.tain object; what 
the other declares, is his intention of accepting what 
is thus transferred to him. If the intention is absent, 
nothing remains but a form of contract empty of any 
positive content. All that is pronounced is words de­
void of meaning and so, devoid of value •••• The con­
sensual contract had to be a bona fide contract, and 
now it could not be one of good faith except on condi­
tion of its being one by mutual consent (PECM:203). 
In this way, Durkheim again used shifts in the foundations 
of legal institutions as reflecting shifts in the fundamen­
tal relations between society and culture; just as Durkheim 
never separated sociocultural from phenomenological process, 
so, too, he intimately linked social, cultural, legal, and 
phenomenological evolution. Again, his complex matricing of 
cultural processes should serve as a guide to us. 
We can see how far the consensual contract amounts to 
a revolutionary innovation in the law. The dominant 
part played in it by consent and the declaration of 
the will had the effect of transforming the institu­
tion. It differs from the earlier forms of contract 
from which it descends by a whole series of distinc­
tive features. That is not all. The principle on which 
the institution in its new form rests, contains in it­
self the germ of a whole new development (PECM:203). 
The principle involved here is, of course, the emer­
gence of the autonomous and responsible person. Durkheim 
then briefly traced the ways in which free consent was made 
central to this new legal institution. 
The idea governing this development is that the con­
sent is truly itself, and binds truly and absolutely 
• 
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the one who consents, only on condition that it has 
been freely given. Anything that lessens the liberty 
• 
of the contracting party lessens the binding force 
of the contract (PECM:203). 
Now, it must be emphasized that Durkheim had a keen grasp of 
the difficulties encountered in the evolution of free consen­
sual contract~ for various traditional, collective encumbran­
• ces and obstacles had to be overcome. 
• 
To us this idea may seem a natural one but it only 
broke through very slowly and in the course of meeting 
with resistance of every kind. For centuries, the bind­
ing force of the contract had been supposed to reside 
outside the parties, in the formula pronounced, in the 
gesture made, .in the thing delivered. Given this fact, 
the worth of the bond contracted could not be made to 
depend on what might have occurred in the depths of con­
sciousness of the contracting parties, or on the condi­
tions in which their resolve was taken (PECM:204).
• Thus, various coercive pressures, the conditions in which 
the contract was formulated and agreed upon, and so on, be­
came the background for passing judgment on the legal validi­
ty of contracts~ anything blocking the free consent of the 
• parties came under scrutiny. But, eventually, it was not 
merely the degree of responsibility or free will involved 
which determined the validity of the contract, but the na­
ture and degree of undeserved injury to one party by another. 
• Equity and justice--expressed in terms of a broad sympathy 
• 
for human suffering--changed the conditions of validity of 
consensual contracts. 
It is therefore not the amount of a greater or lesser 
freedom that matters; if contracts imposed by con­
• 
straint, direct or indirect, are not binding, this does 
not arise from the state of the will when it gave con­
sent. It arises from the consequences that an obliga­
tion thus formed inevitably brings upon the contrac­
ting party. It may be, in fact, that he took the step 
that has bound him only under external pressure, that 
• 
his consent has been extracted from him. If this is 
so, it means that the consent was against his own in­
terests and the justifiable needs he might have under 
the general principles of equity. The use of coercion 
could have had no other aim or consequence but that of 
forcing him to yield up some thing which he did not 
wish to do, to do something which he did not wish to 
do, or indeed of forcing him to one action or the oth­
er on conditions he did not will. Penalty and distress 
•
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have thus been undeservedly laid on him (PECM:206). 
Durkheim next links our notions of equity and justice with 
• an emerging broad sympathy for human suffering in general, 
the same sort of sentiments which lie behind the modern 
"cult of the individual" or our institutionalized respect 
for the rights and dignity of the human person.
• The feelings of sympathy that we usually have for our fellow creatures are outraged when suffering is 
inflicted on someone when it is in no way deserved. 
The only kind of infliction that we find just is a 
penalty, and the penalty presupposes a culpable act. 
•
 
Any act must therefore seem immoral to us that caus­

es injury to a fell~~man who has otherwise done noth­
• 
ing to alienate our ordinary human ~ympathies. We de­
clare it to be unjust. Now an unjust act could not be 
sanctioned by law without inconsistency. This is why 
any contract in which pressure has a part becomes in­
valid. It is not at all because the determining cause 
of the obligation is exterior to the individual who 
• 
binds himself. It is because he has suffered some un­
justified injury, because, in a word, such a contract 
is unjust. Thus, the coming on the scene of contract 
by mutual consent, together with an increase in human 
sympathies, inclined the minds of men to the idea that 
the contract was only moral and only to be recognized 
and given sanction by society, provided it was not 
merely a means of exploiting one of the contracting 
parties, in a word, provided it was just (PECM:207). 
In sum, " ••• just as the consensual emerged from the ritual
• contract" so the objectively equitable contract succeeded 
the consensual contract. This whole le~al process, then, un­
derlies, reinforces, and acclerates the emergence of the in­
dividual person through history.
• 
• 
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5.	 Christian Universalism and the Sanctification of the 
Person 
In the passage from Judaism to Christianity, we witness 
a momentous dialectic between universalism and individualism. 
For the breakdown of Jewish ritual-legal particularism and 
the breakthrough to a universalistic "faith structure of con­
sciousness'was closely allied with a new sanctification of 
the individual person. It is important for our present pur­
poses to recognize that Durkheim emphasized the moral crea­
tivity of Christian culture in enlarging the sphere of opera­
tion of the individual conscience. And since conscience is 
inherently a phenomenological cateogory, the coming of Chris­
tianity has great significance for phenomenological, as well 
as sociocultural, evolution. 
The phenomenology of Christian individualism, as both 
Durkheim and Weber noted, was a powerful, even decisive, 
force in sanctioning an autonomous sphere for the individual 
person, over against the traditional collective claims of 
"blood and soil." For as Nelson (1973a) has observed, the 
prime sociocultural significance of Christianity was that it 
decisively broke through the tribal sacro-magical collective 
conscience of the archaic "sacral complex," and extended the 
new socio-religious bond to all "brothers" in the faith. 
Whereas post-exilic Judaism anchored its collective identity 
in the traditional Mosaic law and ritual prescriptions de­
signed to insure ethnic purity, Christianity broke through 
these restrictive tribal bonds and extended its message of 
salvation to all men. Whereas the Judaism of the Pharisees 
and the Sadducees, of the scribes and rabbis, was restricted 
to the cultural heritage of an exclusive ethnic group, Chris­
tianity constructed a new type of socio-religious bond which 
cut across ethnic barriers and social statuses. Christianity 
constituted a new form of fraternization which cut across 
tribal and regional boundaries: it represented one of the 
first massive and sustained breakthroughs to a more univer­
salistic "faith structure of consciousness." Paul's famous 
• 
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proclamation sums up this simultaneous cross-cutting of ter-
ritorial and socio-religious bonds, and the emergence of a
• new universalistic and internalized faith: "There is neither 
Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is nei-
ther male nor female: for ye are all one in Jesus Christ" 
(Galatians, 3:28). 
• Now, in a striking convergence of perspectives concern-
ing the world-historical significance of this awakening of 
new universalistic depths of conscience, both Durkheim and 
Weber saw this expansion to be of crucial evolutionary im-
• portance. The deepening of personal obligation, both in re-
gard to abstract impersonal ideals and to interpersonal ob-
ligations, was seen as of prime importance in the in-depth 
construction of character structures. Indeed, Weber empha-
• sized that " .•• the increased importance of an ethical at- 
tachment of individuals to a cosmos of obligations, making 
it possible to calculate what the conduct of a given person 
may be .•• has the greatest importance" (1963:35-6). The
• progressive awakening of a universalistic conscience and 
consciousness, the deepening internalization of moral and 
ethical obligations, the heightened responsibility for one's 
own sins and salvation, the growing centrality of a more or
• less systematic phenomenology of intentions as the basis of 
casuistry (especially from Abelard on, see D. Luscombe, 
1971: Nelson, 1973a: E. Leites, 1974), were all of critical 
significance in the evolutionary construction of the moral
• individualism so revered by Durkheim. 
• 
Indeed, we see here the subtle and continuing dialec-
tic between universalism and individualism which made Chris-
tianity significant for Durkheim, Weber, and Troeltsch. For 
the Christian appeal to all men rests on a certain irreduci-
• 
b~ equality between them (all are children of one God, all 
are sinners, etc.). And the essential key to this new found 
equality is the potential internal response of each indivi-
dual to the kerygma of the Gospel message--that is, the ca-
pacity for faith. "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you" 
• 
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(Luke, 17:21). Here, the Pauline mission to the Gentiles 
proved crucial in its double emphasis on universalism and 
internal, individual faith commitment. The new Christian 
community, freed from Jewish collective ritual-legalism, 
was a community founded on individual belief in a univer­
salistic and personalistic revelation, not on ethnic or ter­
ritorial ties. As Nock (1938) emphasized, the growth of 
Christianity depended upon individual acts of conversion. 
"Except a man be born again, he cannot see the Kingdom of 
God" (John, 3:3). And Paul said in his second letter to the 
Corinthians: "Therefore, if any man be in Christ, he is a 
new creature: old things are passed away; behold, all things 
are become new" (5:17). Inevitably, as Durkheim observed, 
this strong emphasi.s on conversion and internal faith paved 
the way for a profound deepening of the internal life, the 
life of the spirit, of la personne humain. The sensitive 
striving after fidelity to the divine model, of faithful pat­
terning ourselves after the incarnated exemplar, inevitably 
deepens the structures of interiority, of will and imagina­
tion, of life-long consistency of character. 
We see here another facet of the world-historical pro­
cess of rationalization so central to Weber's perspective. 
Through the progressive internalization of ethical-legal 
norms, the personality structure becomes more integral, more 
consistent, and hence, as we discovered in the preceding sec­
tion on legal evolution, more predictible and reliable. When 
notions of individual guilt and responsibility, of sin and 
the culpability of the individual conscience, come to be 
linked with a systematic casuistry of the prospective moral 
conscience and the sorting through of logic and evidence 
governing the choice of alternative moral judgments, then 
we witness a tremendous step forward in the emergence of the 
notion of the morally autonomous and intellectually respon­
sible person. Further, in identifying the emergence of the 
individual conscience with the construction of a new level 
of in-depth integrated personality structures, Weber also 
•
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• 
included, as a corollary process, the growing autonomization 
of facts and individuals, and the greater degree of calc~­
bility and universalizability which accompanies these linked 
• 
processes. As we have seen, Durkheim, too, believed that the 
autonomization of the person, and rationalization and univer­
salization in the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse 
proceed together on the world-historical level. Recently, Ed­
mund Leites has described this crucial process with particu­
lar cogence: 
•
 
.•• two of the most decisive advances in the philoso­

phic and theoretical development of the norm of moral
 
and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an ex­

traordinary extension (in moral and religious matters) 
•
 
of "universalities in terms of reference and communi­

ties of discourse" .... Major advances in the articula­

tion of the norm of autonomy have gone along with re­

jections of moralities and theologies whose terms of
 
reference and modes of argumentation are believed to 
be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cul­
tures and traditions. What is sought are ways of deci­
ding moral and religious matters which all reasonable 
men, whatever their history and culture, would accept 
• 
and would have to accept, given the correctness of the 
procedures •.•• There are important cultural and civi­
lizational linkages between: (1) the struggle for uni­
versalities in terms of reference, and argumentation 
in moral and religious matters, and (2) the development 
of norms of individual autonomy (1974:97-8). 
•
 
Besides Christianity, of course, there is the example of Soc­

•
 
rates, subsequent Greek philosophy, Stoic philosophy and Ro­

man law, all of which became fused together in medieval Eu­

rope. Indeed, as we saw in a previous section of this chap­

ter, Durkheim himself declared "Rationalism is only one of
 
the aspects of individualism .•• each is the converse of 
the other" (ME:12)r Durkheim also noted the importance of 
these developments in the Middle Ages (DL:163-4, see also 
• his discussion of Abelard in L'Evolution pedagogique en France). 
• 
Let us briefly explore Durkheim's scattered comments 
on the civilizational significance of Christian universalism 
and individualism for the emergence of the person through 
history. It is clear that Durkheim judged the Christian con­
tribution to be of momentous importance: 
•
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But remarkable as Roman individualism may be, it is 
slight enough compared to that which developed within 
Christian societies. The Christian form of religion is 
an inward one: it consists of inward faith rather than 
outward observances, for a deeply held faith eludes 
any external constraint (PECM:58). 
With Christianity, we witness a fundamental shift in the 
grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual authority from 
a traditional tribal-ritual structure of conscience and con­
sciousness to a new kind of cross-cutting socio-religious 
bond in which all become "brothers in the faith," and in 
striving to model themselves on the divine exemplar, deepen 
the structures of interiority. "For Christianity ... it is 
the mind, the conscience of man which is sacred and incompar­
able~ for the soul is ... a direct emanation of divinity" (in 
Lukes, 1973:387,#39). Durkheim recognized, as did Weber, that 
the fundamental Christian experience of conversion de­
manded a wholly different level of personality integration. 
True conversion is a profound transformation whereby 
the soul in its entirety, through turning in a com­
pletely new direction, changes its position or stand­
point, and consequently alters its perspective on the 
world (in Giddens, 1972a:207). 
Christian conversion signifies, in historical perspective, 
the phenomenological revolution implied in the shift in the 
legitimate grounds of conscience and consciousness. The in­
dividual believer, freed from the restrictive bonds of tri­
bal and territorial religion, came to focus on his internal 
states, his convictions, examination of conscience, prayer, 
and so forth. Thus, Christianity demanded a great deal more 
from the individual than previous religions~ more than the 
others, Christianity is, as Durkheim noted, an inward, in­
dividualistic religion, not only in practice but in doctrine. 
Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his 
thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that 
which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit . 
.... The most common rite is prayer~ and prayer is an 
internal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue 
and piety do not consist in material acts, but in in­
ternal states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a per­
petual surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged 
to perpetually examine his conscience, he must learn 
to question himself, to analyze himself and scrutin­
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ize his intentions: in short, to reflect upon himself. 
Thus, of the two possible poles of all thought, nature 
on the one hand, and man on the other, it is necessar­
ily around the second that the thought of the Chris­
tian societies and also consequently their system of 
education, has come to gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a: 
239-40) . 
Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the 
very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process 
of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nas­
cent conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than 
adherence to the multiple religious cultures of Anti~uity. 
In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective 
of communicating to the child a certain number of de­
fined talents. These were either considered as a sort 
of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic val­
ue of the individual, or else they were seen, as was 
the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools 
which an individual needed in order to play his role 
in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating 
into the pupil certain habits and items of knowledge. 
It was not a question of influencing the personal­
ity in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity, 
but in clothing it in a sort of external framework, 
the differents parts of which could be created independ­
ently ...• Christianity, by contrast, very early on ac­
quired the conception that there is in each of us an 
underlying mode of being from which forms of intelli­
gence and sensibility derive, and in which they find 
their unity; and that it is this underlying mode of 
being which has to be reached if one really wants to 
carry out the work of the educationalist and to pro­
duce a lasting effect. According to Christian belief, 
to shape a man is not to embellish his mind with cer­
tain ideas or to allow him to acquire certain s?ecific 
habits, but to create in him a general attitude of the 
mind and the will which makes him see reality in gen­
eral in a definite perspective. And it is easy to un­
derstand how Christianity came to hold this view. It 
is because .•• in order to be a Christian, it is not 
enough to have learnt this or that particular item, 
to know how to discriminate between certain rites or 
pronounce certain formulas, or to know certain tradi­
tional beliefs. Christianity consists essentially in 
a certain attitude of the soul, in a certain habitus 
of our moral being. To foster this attitude in the 
child is thus the essential goal of education (in 
Giddens, 1972a:206-7). 
Now, this "certain habitus of the entire moral being," 
this commitment to influencing the total personality in its 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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depths, was based upon the Christian notion of the "unity 
and intrinsic moral value of the self" (Wallwork, 1972:132). 
•.. the goal of Christian education always involved 
directing the basic orientation of the self as a uni­
fied whole •.•• The important thing was the general dis­
position of the mind and the will of the whole person­
ality. In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian 
concept of training the total personality distinguish­
es the whole of Western pedagogical instruction 
(Wallwork, 1972:132). 
Modern Western education, even though now largely seculari­
zed, Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on 
the total personality, and on penetrating with transcendental 
values and moral habits the "inner, deep rececesses of the 
soul." 
For us the principal object of education is not to 
provide the child with a greater or lesser degree of 
items of knowledge, but to create within him a deep­
lying disposition, a kind of perspective of the soul 
which orients him in a definite direction, not only 
during childhood, but for life •..• Our conception of 
the goal has become secularized; consequently, the 
means employed must themselves change. But the ab­
stract schema of the educational process has not al­
ered. It is still a matter of descending into depths 
of the soul which Antiquity was unconscious of 
(in Giddens, 1972a:207-8). 
Indeed, the deep religio-cultural sanction of indivi­
dualism and the development of the interior life, the life 
of the human spirit, which came with Christianit~ served as 
an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral indi­
vidualism" which Durkheim held dear. This intimate histori­
cal and cultural connection between Christianity and indivi­
dualism is most important for our present purposes (see Part 
I, Book Three). Giddens remarks that: 
... 
Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, 
is the immediate source from which modern moral in­
dividualism is derived •.•• Christian ethics provided 
the moral principles upon which the "cult of the in­
dividual" is founded, but now Christianity is becom­
ing supplanted by sacred symbols and objects of a new 
sort. This is most clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, 
in the events of the French Revolution, where freedom 
and reason were glorified ..•• The French Revolution 
gave the most decisive impetus to the growth of moral 
individualism in modern times (1971a:llS-16). 
•
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Thus, Christian sanctions, especially in their later Protes­
tant forms, became secularized in the Enlightenment notions 
. ,----.,. 
of the "Individual" anc1Un1versal "Reason," which were; ac­
cording to Ma5r-weber,among the last great forms "charisma 
has taken in, £ts fateful historical course (1968: 114~. In" 
his review of Saint-Simonis historical analysis of the pas­
sage to the modern era, Saint-Simon, said Durkheim, saw the 
Protestant Reformation (rather than the Italian Renaissance) 
as the crucial opening wedge in the fundamental reorganiza­
tion of the "moralities of thought and logics of action" un­
derlying European social and cultural order. Especially im­
portant here was the individualistic "Protestant principle" 
(Tillich, 1948) of free examination in matters of conscience 
and inner faith. 
It was only in the sixteenth century that the forces 
antagonistic to the old system found themselves strong' 
enough to come into the open .... At first these forces 
were directed against theological rule~ Luther and his 
co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a power in 
Europe. At the same time ,in a general way, they under­
mined theological authorlty by "destroying the princi­
ple of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of 
examination, which--restrained at first within quite 
narrow limits--was to inevitably increase and ... fin­
ally embrace an indefinite area." This two-fold change 
operated not only among peoples converted to Protes­
tantism, but even among those who remained Catholic. 
For once the principle was established, it extended 
well beyond the conditions where it had first been pro­
claimed.As a result, the bond which tied individual 
consciences to ecclesiastical power--although not shat­
tered--was loosened and the moral unity of the social 
system definitely unsettled (Soc:151-2). 
Saint-Simon, and Durkheim after him (see also Part II, Book 
Two), also clearly perceived the spreading secularization of 
this individualistic aspect of the Protestant Ethos into po­
litical revolution (see also, Jel1inek, 1901, Weber, 1968). 
In a curiously parallel movement, both this individualistic 
drive and the trend toward political centralization proceed­
ed together (eg. see Soc:152). Eventually, as the struggle 
• 
deepened, the new "Protestant principle"--the new moralities 
of thought and logics of action--of freedom of conscience 
and rationalistic or mystical individualism which accompan­
•
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ied it, became extended to their outer limits. 1I0ne sees the
 
principle of the right of examination in religious matters
 
• extended to its extreme limit
ll (Soc:153). Hence, we see the
 
progressive extension of individualism as an absolute prin­

ciple into the legitimized egoism at the base of modern econo­

mies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim attacked so
 
• relentlessly with his notion of anomie and egoisme.
 
Finally, we should not fail to note that at the height
 
of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to the defense of
 
the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, he rhe­

• torically used the origins of Western individualism in Chris­

tian doctrine to invert the attacks of the Catholic conserva­

tives against the IIla ic ll Third Republic intellectuals and
 
moral re formers.
 
• What, in any case, are we offered in place of this in­

•
 
dividualism that is so disparaged? The merits of Chris­

tian morality are extolled to us and we are subtly in­

vited to rally to its support. But are those who take
 
this position unaware that the originality of Christian­

ity has consisted precisely in a remarkable development
 
of the individualist spirit? While the religion of the
 
•
 
Ancient City was entirely made up of material practices
 
from which the spiritual element was absent, Christian­

ity expressed in an inward faith, in the personal con­

viction of the individual, the essential conditions of
 
godliness. It was the first to teach that the moral vir­

tue of actions must be measured in accordance with in­

•
 
tention, which is essentially private, escapes all ex­

ternal judgments and which only the agent can competent­

ly judge. The very center of the moral life was thus
 
transferred from outside to within and the individual
 
was set up as the sovereign judge of his own conduct
 
having no other accounts to render than those ~o him­

•
 
self and to his God. Finally, in completing the defin­

itive separation of the spiritual and the temporal, in
 
abandoning the world to the disputes of men, Christ at
 
the same time opened the way for science and freedom
 
of thought. In this way, one can explain the rapid pro­

gress made by scientific thought from the date that
 
• 
Christian societies were established (Trans. by Lukes, 
1969 :26-7). 
We shall follow Durkheim's own counsel in the rest of our 
exploration that lilt is a singular error to present indivi­
dualist morality as antagonistic to~ristian morality~ quit 
the contrary, it is derived from it ll (1969:27). And ~all 
•
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ask how it was that, by adhering to the religion of the self 
and, thus, continuing the Christian heritage, modern cultural 
• traditions came to exert extraordinary pressures on certain 
individuals ultimately issuing in suicide. In sum, we shall 
hold it as established, even in Durkheim's doctrine, that our 
modern ethos of individualism is ultimately derived from the 
• belief systems and continuing phenomenological sanctions of 
Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular. 
6. The Modern Cult of Moral Individualism 
• The emergence of the person through history finds its
 
•
 
culmination in Durkheim's religion of la personne humain. As
 
a nineteenth century liberal and positivist moralist, Durk­

heim's central value in the modern world was the cult of mor­

al individualism. Far from being anti-individual, the de-col­

lectivization of structures of morality and thought, and the 
:.
 emergence of the morally autonomous and intellectually re­
sponsible person lay at the heart of Durkheim's concern.
 Durkheim was critical of those who attempted to derive so­
ciety from the association of autonomous individuals; but 
, 
• 
his criticism served only 
~ 
to demonstrate the possibility, in­
deed, the necessity, of deriving au~nomous moral individual­
ism from socially realistic or organic premises. Indeed, far 
from the individual being identified with the release of the 
lone ego from traditional social control, Durkheim repeatedly 
• 
argued that the noti~rson--asa ~te~ory of the 
human ~irit--is a prime sociocultural and historical con­
• 
.... -_. 
struction. 
~ 
Now, Durkheim's remarks on the modern cult of moral in­
dividualism centered in the years 1897 and 1898 with the pub­
lication of Suicide, the definitive draft (see Lukes, 1973: 
254, #5) of his lectures "Physique generale des moeurs et du 
droit," and his revealing pclemical article "Individualism 
• 
and the Intellectuals" (trans. By S. Lukes, 1969; see also 
Bellah, 1973). In Suicide, Durkheim offers the following sum­
mary of his valuation of the emerging cult of the individual 
•
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and the religion of humanity. 
Not only is this aim [the exaltation of the human per­
sonality] really one of the aims of modern societies, 
but it is a law of history that peoples increasingly 
detach themselves from every other objective. 
Originally, society is everything, the individual noth­
ing. Consequently, the strongest social feelings are 
those connecting the individual with the collectivity; 
society is its own aim. Man is considered only an in­
strument in its hand; he seems to draw all his rights 
from it and has no counter-prerogative, because nothing 
higher than it exists. But gradually things change. 
As societies become greater in volume and density, they 
increase in complexity, work is divided, individual dif­
ferences multiply, and the moment approaches when the 
only remaining bond among the members of a single hu­
man group will be that they are all men. Under such con­
ditions, the body of collective sentiments inevitably 
attaches itself with all its remaining strength to its 
single remaining object, communicating to this object 
an incomparable value by so doing. Since human person­
ality is the only thing that appeals unanimously to all 
hearts, since its enhancement is the only aim that can 
be collectively pursued, it inevitably acquires excep­
tional value in the eyes of all. It thus rises far above 
all human aims, assuming a religious nature (5:336). 
Here, we see Durkheim ground this "law of history" not merely 
in terms of societal differentiation and individuation, but 
also in terms of the need for an over-arching collective re­
presentation wide enough to encompass all of humanity itself. 
Since all we share in common in the modern world is our hu­
manity itself, this becomes the central value and sacred col­
lective representation. Later, we shall see that 
Durkheim "rotated" his "andlytical matrix" and offered other 
reasons to ground this "cult of the individual." But, with 
one eye to the Books to follow, I merely wish to raise now 
the question of the possible relationship between this reli­
gion of the individual and anomic and egoistic suicides: 
what do the pathologies of individualism have to do with the 
religion of individualism? Are they simply opposites, as 
Durkheim sometimes suggests, or are they intimately related, 
as he suggests at other points? These problems are crucial to 
issues discussed in Books Two and Three of this dissertation. 
Let us consider Durkheim's general evolutionary obser­
vations on the emergence of individualism in his lectures 
• 
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translated as Professional Ethics and Civic Morals which 
form a link to his earlier work in The Division of Labor. \ 
Here, again, de-collectivization in terms of societal dif­
ferentiation and individuation is central . 
.•• the further one travels in history, the more one 
is aware of the process of change. In the early stage, 
the individual personality is lost in the depths of 
the social masS, and €lien later, by its own efforts, 
breaks away. From being limited and Of small regard, 
the scope of the individual life expands and becomes 
the exalted object of moral respect. The individual 
comes to acquire ever wider rights over his own per­
son and over the possessions to which he has title; 
he also comes to form ideas about the world that seem 
to him most fitting and to develop his essential qual­
ities without hindrance (PECM:56). 
This development is inevitable, necessary, and legitimate to 
Durkheim, of course. It cannot be reversed, for it lays at 
the foundation of modern social institutions and cultural or­
der. It represents the culmination of the main line of devel­
opment of history; we cannot return to the past. 
Shall we find some people saying that the cult of the 
individual is a superstiti.on of which we ought to rid' 
ourselves? That would be to go against all the lessons 
of history: for as we read on, we find the human per­
son tending to gain in dignity. There is no rule more 
soundly established. For any attempt to base social in­
stitutions on the opposite principle is not feasible 
and could be convincing only for a moment: we cannot 
force things to be other than they are. We cannot undo 
the individual having become what he is--an autonomous 
center of activity, an impressive system of personal 
forces whose energy can no more be destroyed than that 
of cosmic forces (PECM:56). 
Now, Durkheim was quick to emphasize, again, that this ideal 
is a social ideal; the person is a social and cultural con­
struction and, thus, the cult of la personne humain has for 
its central object not the concrete individual but the sym­
bol of humanity itself. 
What lies at the base of individual rights is not the 
notion of the individual as he is, but the way in which 
society puts the riqhts into practice, looks upon 
it and appraises it. What matters, is not what the in­
dividual is, but how much he counts, and on the other 
hand, what he ought to be. The reason why he has more 
or fewer rights, certain rights and not others, is not 
that he is constituted in a particular way; it is be­
cause 
• 
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society attributes this or that importance to him and 
attaches a higher or lower value to what concerns him. 
If all that affects the individual affects the society, 
the society will react against all that might diminish 
him. This would not only forbid the slightest offences 
against him, but even more, the society would hold it­
self bound to work towards increasing his stature and 
towards his development (PECM:66-7). 
•
 
In rejecting the nominalist biases of the "natural rights"
 
tradition, Durkheim argued that rights are social creations; 
that the legal enfranchisement of, and respect for, the indi­
vidual person was a sociohistorical construction. Instead of 
•
 
society itself being the prime value, it is the social sanc­

tioning of the autonomous human person, and his institution­
alized rights, which moves to center stage of social pro­
gress. 
•
 
the rights of the individual, then, are in a state
 
•
 
of evolution: progress is always going on and it is not ,
 
possible to set any bounds to its course. What yester­

day seemed but a kind of luxury becomes overnight a
 
right precisely defined .... Everything indicates that
 
we are becoming more alive to what touches on the in­

dividual personality (PECM:68).
 
Now, as we saw in an earlier section, the individual's 
rights emerge with, and are guaranteed by, the State in Durk­
heim's political sociology. Here, Durkheim suggests that mod­
• 
ern democracy is the political system best suited to modern 
individualism. 
•
 
Whilst the advances in democracy are thus made inevi­

table by the state of the social milieu, they are promp­

ted equally by our inmost moral concepts. Democracy in­

deed, as we have defined it, is the political system
 
that conforms best to our present day notion of the in­
dividual. The values we attribute to individual person­
ality make us loath to use it as a mechanism to be 
wielded from without by the social authority. The per­
sonality can be itself only to the degree in which it
•
 
is a social entity that is autonomous in action (PECM:
 
90). 
It is significant that Durkheim here noted that democracy 
and individualism are rooted in "our moral concepts" as well 
•
 
as in the advanced organic division of labor. Further, demo­

cracy's superiority as a political system, Durkheim argued, 
was that it encouraged a constant interchange of information 
•
 
•
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between the central administrative apparatus and the dispe~d 
citizenry (see also Giddens, 1971c; Lukes, 1973). 
To be autonomous means, for the human being, to under­
stand the necessities he has to bow to and accept them 
with full knowledge of the facts. Nothing that we do 
can make the laws of things other than they are, but 
we free ourselves of them in thinking them, that is, in 
in making them ours by thought. This is what gives de­
mocracy its moral superiority. Because it is a system 
based on reflection, it allows the citizen to accept 
the laws of the country with more intelligence and 
thus less passivity. Because there is a constant flow 
of communication between themselves and the State, the 
State is for individuals no longer like an exterior 
force that imparts a wholly mechanical impetus to them. 
Owing to constant exchanges between them and the State, 
its life becomes linked with theirs, just as their life 
does with that of the State (PECM:9l). 
Further, Durkheim noted that whereas the type of crimes 
that were most severely repressed in archaic society II ••• 
were those carried out against the family or religious or po­
liticalorders ll (PECM:lll) , today it is crimes against indi­
viduals which draw public concern. Whereas before lithe suf­
fering of the individual made little impact on the feeling~' 
today: 
it is individual suffering that is the hateful 
thing. The notion that a man suffers without deser­
ving it is intolerable to us .... The reason is that 
these sentiments that center on man, the human being, 
become very strong, whilst those that link us direct 
with the group pass into the background. The group no 
longer seems to have value in itself and for itself: 
it is only a means of fulfilling and developing human 
nature to the point demanded by the current ideals. 
It is the supreme aim, compared with which all others 
are but of secondary value. That is why morals of in­
dividual man have come to transcend all others (PECM: 
l12) • 
This shift testifies to an underlying shift in the grounds 
of legitimate moral and intellectual authority. A similar 
shift can be detected in terms of the general duties of man 
to man, especially ~een in the increase of homicide prohi­
bitions with the progress of civilization. Instead of the 
dualistic in and out-group moralities of early societies, 
we see the progress of the religion of humanity, of univer­
•
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salistic moralities and obligations; again, we see Durk­
heim's inner equation between universalism and individual­
ism. 
The reason why homicide is prohibited nowadays under 
threat of the most seveEpenalties •.• is that the 
human person is the object of a sacred respect that 
was formerly attached to very different things ..•. 
There is no doubt at all that the respect and the 
value attached to the person by public opinion grow 
with civilization. Might we then not say that the 
homicide rate varies according to the relative posi­
tion of the individual in the mounting scale of mor­
al ends (PECM:113, l14)? 
But it was really in his polemical article, published 
during the Dreyfus controversy in France, that Durkheim most 
explicitly stated his doctrine of the religion of humanity 
and the cult of la personne humain. Now, in attempting to 
turn back the conservative attack on the individualism of 
the intellectuals, Durkheim had first to disengage his no­
tion of the grounds of moral individualism and civil rights 
from their Utilitarian and Romantic variants (see also the 
succeeding section). Durkheim began by distinguishing be­
tween egoism and moral individualism . 
••• once one has ceased to confuse individualism with 
its opposite, that is to say, utilitarianism, all 
these contradictions vanish as if by magic. The reli­
gion of humanity has all that is required to speak to 
its believers in a tone that is no less imperative 
than the religions it replaces. Far from confining it­
self to indulging our instincts, it offers us an i­
deal which infinitely surpasses nature; for we do not 
naturally have that wise and pure reason which, dis­
sociated from all personal motives, would make laws 
in the abstract concerning its own conduct. Doubtless, 
if the dignity of the individual derived from his in­
dividual qualities, from those particular characteris­
tics which distinguish him from others, one might fear 
that he would be enclosed in a sort of moral egoism 
that would render all social cohesion impossible. But 
in reality he receives this dignity from a higher 
source, one which he shares with all men. If he has 
the right to this religious respect, it is because he 
has in him something of humanity. It is humanity that 
is sacred and worthy of respect. And this is not his 
exclusive possession. It is distributed among all his 
fellows, and in consequence he cannot take it as a 
goal for his conduct without being obliged to go be­
yond himself and turn towards others. The cult of 
•
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which he is at once both object and follower does not 
address itself to the particular being that consti­
tutes himself and carries his name, but to the human 
person, wherever it is found, and in whatever form it 
is incarnated. Impersonal and anonymous, such an end 
soars far above all particular consciences and can 
thus serve as a rallying point for them (1969:23). 
Precisely because the religion of humanity is universal, it 
may serve as a central focus for each individual; this ab­
stract, impersonal, altruistic religion of the human person 
is the descendant of the "Declaration of the Rights of ~1an." 
The individual who is the subject of the ideals embod­
ied in moral individualism is not the concrete indivi­
dual, the particular personality, but "man" in general. 
The morality of the "cult of the individual" is compo­
sed of those values given intellectual expression by 
the eighteenth-century philosophers and inspiring the 
French Revolution. These are values which emphasize 
the dignity of "man" in the abstract; as such, not on­
ly do they not derive from the "egoism" of the utili­
tarians, but they are its direct opposite. Egoism is 
the pursuit of self-interest. But these values imply 
sentiments of sympathy for others and for human suffer­
ing. Precisely because they are created by society, 
they have a religious quality (Giddens, 197Ib:211). 
But, as we shall see, there may, indeed, be an unintended, 
indirect connection between moral individualism and its de­
vOlution into egoism. Durkheim's rhetorical task in disenga­
ging individualism from Utilitarianism, however, made him em­
phasize their differences so as to deflect the attack of the 
Catholic conservatives. Durkheim claimed: 
... In short, individualism thus understood is the 
glorification not of the self, but of the individual 
in general. Its motive force is not egoism but sym9a­
thy for all that is human, a wider pity for all suf­
ferings, for all human miseries, a more ardent desire 
to combat and alleviate them, a greater thirst for jus­
tice. Is this not the way to achieve a community of all 
men of good will (1969:24)? 
In short, moral individualism is altruistic, Utilitarian in-\V 
dividualism is egoistic. 
Moreover, Durkheim connected this altruistic, abstract 
French moral individualism with Enlightenment "Reason." "This 
cult of man has for its first dogma the 
.--
autonomy of reason 
and for its rite the freedom of thought" (1969:24). However, 
• 
• 
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again, against the anti-Dreyfusards, Durkheim felt compelled 
to defend the liberal equation of "Individual" and "Reason" 
from some of its extreme or destructive consequences. 
Now, it will be said, if all expressions are free, by 
what miracle will they then be harmonious? If they are 
formed without knowledge of one another, and without 
having to take account of one another, how can they 
fail to be incoherent? Intellectual and moral anarchy 
then would be the inevitable consequence of liberalism. 
Such is the argument, always being refuted and always 
reappearing, which the perennial adversaries of reason 
take up periodically .••. Certainly, it is true that in­
dividualism does not go without a certain intellectual­
ism; for liberty of thought is the first of all liber­
ties. But why has it been seen to have as a consequence 
this absurd self-infatuation which would confine each 
within his own desires and create a gap between men's 
minds (1969:24)? 
To deflect these charges that individualism may lead to an 
"absurd self-infatuation," Durkheim insisted that his own 
type of individualism did not challenge all authority, but 
simply demanded that "authority be rationally based." 
What it demands is the r1gnt of each individual to know 
those things that he may legitimately know. It does not 
sanction unlimited right to incompetence. Concerning a 
question on which I cannot pronounce with expert know­
ledge, my intellectual independence suffers no less if 
I follow a more competent opinion. The collaboration of 
scientists is only possible thanks to this mutual defer­
ence. Each science borrows continuously from its neigh­
bors propositions which it accepts without verifying. 
The only thing is that my intellect requires reasons 
for bowing to the authority of others. Respect for au- ~ 
thority is in no way incompatible with rationalism pro­
vided that authority be rationally based (1969:24). 
Durkheim then defended the Dreyfusards whose authority in 
this matter came " •.. not because, as chemists or philolo­
gists, philosophers or historians, they attribute to them­
selves any special privileges" (1969:25), but rather because 
" ••• being men they seek to exercise their entire right as 
men and to keep before them a matter which concerns-'reason a­
lone" (1969 :25). It was simply a problem of " ••. practical 
morality concerning which every man of good sense is compe­
tent and about which no one ought to be indifferent!' (1969 :25). 
Not only did Durkheim defend individualism by trying 
•
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to set aside the conservative equation of anarchy and ego­
ism, but he argued that the religion of humanity, the "cult j 
of moral individualism," is the orily value system which can \ 
integrate modern societies. 
Not only is individualism distinct from anarchy, but 
it is henceforth the only system of beliefs which can 
ensure the moral unity of the country. One often hears 
it said today that only a religion can bring about this 
harmony. This proposition, which modern prophets feel 
it necessary to utter in a mystical tone of voice, is 
really no more than a simple truism over which every­
one can agree. For we know today that a religion does 
not necessarily imply symbols and rites in the full 
sense, or temples or priests. All this external appa­
ratus is merely its superficial aspect. Essentially, 
it is nothing other than a system of collective beliefs 
and practices that have a special authority. Once a 
goal is pursued by a whole people, it acquires, as a 
result of this unanimous adherence, a sort of moral su­
premacy which raises it far above private goals and 
thereby gives it a religious character (1969:25). 
But, to Durkheim, there was no possibility of returning to \\ 
past religio-social organization. It is not enough, as the ~ 
Parsonians have done for several decades, to insist that 
every society must have some over-arching value system which 
functions as a religion; the question is what kind of value 
system is needed in the twentieth century. 
On the other hand, it is clear that a society cannot 
hold together unless there exists among its members ,~~ 
a certain intellectual and moral community. However, \J. 
having recalled this sociologica~truism, one has not 
advanced very far. For if it is true that religion is, 
in a sense, indispensable, it is no less certain that 
religions change, that yesterday's religion could not 
be that of tommorow. Thus, what we need to know is 
what the religion of today should be (1969:25). 
Durkheim claimed, of course, that only the religion of human­
ity was suited to serve as the central value system of modern 
societies; indeed, it was made necessary by the very process 
of societal differentiation, de-collectivization, and indivi­
duation traced earlier. 
Now, all the evidence points to the conclusion that 
the only possible candidate is precisely this religion 
of humanity whose rational expression is the indivi­
dualist morality. To what, after all, should collec­
tive sentiments be directed in the future? As socie­
•
 
•
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ties become more voluminous and spread over vaster 
territories, their traditions and practices, in order 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
to adapt to the diversity of situations and constantly 
changing circumstances, are compelled to maintain a 
state of plasticity and instability which no longer 
offers adequate resistance to individual variations 
(1969: 25-6) • 
Now, as Lukes observes, Durkheim's dialectical genius came 
here to t~re in taking over the conservative's own argu­
ment, and turning it against them. 
Thus, by an ingenious inversion of the characteristic 
anti-Dreyfusard argument that the unity, indeed the 
very survival, of the nation were being threatened for 
the sake of one individual's rights, Durkheim argues 
that the "individualist, who defend; the rights of the 
individual, defends at the same time the vital inter­
ests of society." A religion which tolerates sacrilege 
loses its authority, and since the religion of the in­
dividual is "the sole link which binds us one to an­
other, such a weakening cannot take place without the 
onset of social dissolution" (1969:15). 
Thus, only the religion of humanity, the "cult of moral in­
dividualism,"is at the center of modern culture: contrary to 
the Catholic conservatives, it is attacks on this religion 
which endanger social stability . 
••. as a consequence of a more advanced division of 
labor, each mind finds itself directed towards a dif­
ferent part of the horizon, reflects a different as­
pect of the world and, as a result, the content of 
men's minds differ from one subject to another. One 
is thus gradually proceeding towards a state of af­
fairs, now almost attained, in which the members of 
a single social group will no longer have anything-in 
common other than their humanity, that is, the char­
acteristics whICh constitute the human person-in gen­
eral. This idea of the human person ••• is therefore 
the sole idea that 8"U"rvives, immutable ~ impersonal, 
abOve the. changin~ tides of popular opin10ns: and the 
sentiments which 1t awakens are the only ones to be 
found in almost all hearts. The communion of minds can 
no longer form around particular rites and prejudices, 
since rites and prejudices have been swept away in the 
natural course of things. In consequence, there remains 
nothing ~ men may ~ and honor in common, apart 
from man h1mself. This 1S why man has become a god for 
man;- and it is why""""hecan no longer turn to other gods 
without being untrue to himself. And just as each of us 
embodies something of humanity, so each individual mind 
has something within it of the divine, and thereby finds 
finds itself marked by a characteristic which renders 
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it sacred and inviolable to others. The whole of in­
dividualism lies here * (1969:26). 
•
 
While one cannot help but admire Durkheim's dialectical gen­

•
 
ius here, there is, perhaps, some justification in wondering
 
about his apotheosis of the fact that we moderns have nothing
 
in common anymore except the lowest common denominator--our
 
humanity itself. Can we today remain as sanguine as Durkheim
 
•
 
about the liberal anchoring of the modern world in our most
 
abstract and lowest common denominators? Is this not an in­

herently weak point of unity? Is this bond sufficient to at­

tach individuals to altruism and turn them away from egoism?
 
•
 
Just as Durkheim said that "the whole [the philusophy] of in­

dividualism lies here," may we not wonder if the crux of
 
Durkheim's later problems, especially in terms of the ambigu­

ities besetting his suicide schemas, might not also lie in
 
these tenuous, and often inverted, connections? 
• 
At this point, however, in the heat of battle, Durkheim 
could not pause to trace some of the potential inversions of 
his central value system. He insisted that the "cult of moral 
individualism ll is anchored in historical necessity. 
That is what makes it into the doctrine that is cur­
rently necessary. For, should we wish to hold back its 
progress, we should have to prevent men from becoming
• 
increasingly differentiated from one another, reduce 
their personalities to a single level, bring them back 
to the old conformism of former times, and arrest, in 
consequence, the tendency of societies to become ever 
more extended and centralized, and stem the unceasing 
growth of the division of labor. Such an undertaking,
•
 
whether desirable or not, infinitely surpasses all hu­

man powers (1969:26). 
Thus, those intellectuals who defended the civil rights of 
unjustly treated individuals were, in fact, defending the 
cultural foundation of modern social organization.
• We are now in a better position to understand the rea­
• 
son why certain people believe that they must offer an 
unyielding resistance to all that seems to threaten the 
individualist faith. If every attack on the rights of 
an individual revolts them, this is not solely because 
of sympathy for the victim. Nor is it because they fear 
that they themselves will suffer similar acts of injus­
tice. Rather, it is that such outrages cannot rest un­
punished without puttinq national existence in jeooardv. 
• 
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It is indeed impossible that they should be freely 
allowed to occur without weakening the sentiments 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
that they violate; and as these sentiments are all 
that we still have in common, they cannot be weaken­
ed without disturbing the cohesion of society. A re­
ligion which tolerates acts of sacrilege abdicates 
any sway over men's minds (1969:27). 
Since all we share in common in modern "organic solidarity" 
is our common ~ attacks on tne reI1~ion of 
...,......,;-----=~-=---.
the individual attacK the-very foundation of modern society. 
The r~f the individual can, therefore~ allow 
itself to be flouted without resistance, only on pen­
alty of ruining its credit; since it is the sole link 
which binds us to one another, such a weakening cannot 
take place without the onset of social dissolution. 
Thus, the individualist, who defends the rights of the 
individual, defends at the same time the vital inter­
ests of society; for he is preventing the criminal im­
poverishment of that final reserve of collective ideas 
and sentiments that constitutes the very soul of the 
nation. He renders his country the same service that 
the ancient Roman rendered his city when he defended 
traditional rites against reckless innovations. And if 
there is one country among all others in which the in­
dividualist cause is truly international, it is our 
own; for there is no other whose fate has been so 
closely bound up with the fate of these ideas. We gave 
the most recent expression to it, and it is from us 
that other people have received it. We cannot, there­
fore, renounce it today, without renouncing ourselves; 
without diminishing ourselves in the eyes of the world, 
without committing real moral suicide (1969:27-8). 
Now,	 Durkheim was forced to acknowledge, however, that 
many	 people still confused egoistic indivi~with moral 
indivi~ism. And wh~ insisted that the latter is a so­
cial	 construction, cannot the same be said of the former? 
A verbal similarity has made it possible to believe 
that individualism resulted from individual, and thus 
egoistic, sentiments. In reality, the religion of the 
individual is a social institution like all known re­
ligions. It is society which assigns us this idea as 
the sole end which is today capable of providing a fo­
cus for men's wills. To remove this ideal, without put­
ting any other in its place, is therefore to plunge us 
into that very moral anarchy which it is sought to a­
void (1969:28). 
In light of the ambiguities abounding in his treatment of 
the causes and types of suicide (see Books Two and Three), 
however, one is led to wonder whether the "moral anarchy" 
•
 
I
'.
 
marked by ap9mie and egoisme may not be ironically connec­
. ----­
ted with this very~re1igio~O~ the self; whether the cultur­
al sanctioning of the individU:alc?s the source and founda­• 
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tion of modern values, especially in the Romantic and utili­
tarian traditions, might not lead to extreme, unforeseen, 
and destructive outcomes. Durkheim himself had to criticize 
• as we shall see in the following section, these two opposing 
cultural traditions for basing individualist ethics on the 
lone individual. Instead, Durkheim argued for social real­
ism and the derivation of moral individualism from cultural 
• values. 
This is how it is possible, without contradiction, to 
be an individualist while asserting that the individual 
is a product of society, rather than its cause. The rea­
son is that individualism is itself a social product, ~ 
like all moralities and all religions. The individual 
receives from society even the moral beliefs which de­
• 
• J
ify him. This is what Kant and Rousseau did not under­
stand. They wished to deduce their individualist ethics 
not from society, but from the notion of the isolated 
individual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from 
it resulted the logical contradictions of their system 
(1969:28, #1). 
However, this passage and many to follow do acknowledge that 
it was common for cultural values to sanction types of indi­
•
 
vidualism different from Durkheim's non-egoistic, abstract,
 
altruistic, religion of humanity. As Durkheim himself noted 
in Suicide, then, even our egoism is, in large part, a pro­
duct of society! 
Now, Durkheim himself admitted that even his own type 
of rationalistic individualism, as derived from the eight­• 
... 
•
 
eenth century Enlightenment and the French Revolutionary de­
clarations, was primarily negative. it was advanced primari­

ly as a rhetorical weapon to de-collectivize society; and be­

cause of the intensity of the struggle, this negativistic 
thrust itself became destructive. 
All the same, we should not consider as perfect and 
definitive the formula with which the eighteenth ~~ 
gave expression to individualism, a formula which we 
have made the mistake of preserving in an almost un­
changed form. Although it was adequate a century ago, 
it is now in need of being enlarged and completed. It 
• 
Y 
•
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presented individualism only in its most negative as­
~ect. Our fathers were concerned exclusively with free­
•
 
1ng the individual from political fetters which ham­

pered his development. Freedom of thought, freedom to 
• 
write, and freedom to vote were thus placed among the 
primary values that it was necessary to achieve, and 
this emancipation was certainly the necessary condi­
tion for all subsequent progress. However, carried a­
way by the enthusiasm of the struggle, solely concern­
ed with the objective they pursued, they ended by no 
longer seeing beyond it, and by converting into a 
sort of ultimate goal what was merely the next stage 
in their efforts. Now, political liberty is a means, 
not an end. It is worth no more than the manner in 
• 
which it is put to use. If it does not serve something 
which exists beyond it, it is not merely useless: it 
becomes dangerous. If those who handle this weapon do 
not know how to use-rt in frUItful batt~thiY wilr­
not be slow in turning IT against themselves -­
(1969: 28-9) • 
• 
While it is probable that Durkheim was issuing here a call 
for a kind of party unity, over against the age ..old a.nti-re­
publican threat from the monarchic and hierocratic forces in 
France, is it not also possible that the achievement of a 
•
 
largely negative kind of freedom might lead certain indivi­

duals to turn their extreme individualism against themselves 
--namely, in suicide? Durkheim himself 
~ 
notes the disenchant­
• 
ment that came after the achievement of the aspiration to 
found the Third Republic; might we not apply Durkheim's rea­
soning in Suicide about the anomie of success to this vic­
tory of individualism and the resulting ennui? 
It is precisely for this reason that it has fallen to­
• 
day into a certain discredit. The men of my generation 
recall how great was our enthusiasm when, twenty years 
• 
ago, we finally succeeded in toppling the last barriers 
which we impatiently confronted. But alas! disenchant­
ment came quickly; for we soon had to admit that no one 
knew what to ~ with thIS I'IEer~that had been so la­
boriously ach1eved. Those to whom we owed it only made 
use of it in internecine strife. And it was from that 
• 
moment that one felt the growth in the cOlii1try of this 
current of gloom and despondency, which became stronger 
with each day that passed, the ultimate result of which 
must inevitably be to break the spirit of those least 
able to resist *(1969 : 29) • 
Like Saint-Simon after the French Revolution (see Socialism), 
Durkheim wished to see---rationalistic individualism move for­
\.. ~ 
•
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ward from negative to positive expressions; hence, their 
positivism. Here, Durkheim acknowledged that "individual 
• liberty is a delicate instrument," even a double-edged 
sword which might unwittingly be turned against self as well 
as to defend individual freedom. 
•
 
Thus, we can no longer subscribe to this negative i­

deal. It is necessary to go beyond what has been a­

chieved, if only to preserve it. Indeed, if we do not
 
•
 
learn to put to use the means of action that we have
 
in our hands, it is inevitable that they will become
 
less effective. Let us, therefore, use our liberties
 
in order to alleviate the functioning of the social
 
machine, still so harsh to individuals, in order to
 
put at their disposal all possible means for develop­

ing their faculties unhindered, in order, finally, to 
work towards making a reality of the famous precept: 
to each according to his works! Let us recognize that, 
in general, liberty is a delicate instrument the use 
•
 
of which must be learnt, and let us teach this to our
 
children; all moral education should be directed to
 
this end (1969:29).
 
Thus, at a time when the moral foundations of the Third Re­

public were threatened, Durkheim issued a call to the ration­

• alistic individualists to hold fast to their values, and also
 
to refine and extend them: to move beyond the negative thrust
 
of the past to positive reconstruction of the society in
 
terms of the classical French ideals. Might he not, had the
 
• connections been made clear (as we shall attempt in the suc­

ceeding Books of this dissertation), in different circum­

stances, also issued a call to disentangle the negative and
 
destructive and unintended outcomes of this religion of the
 
• self from its valid foundations? In other words, can we any
 
longer ignore the real contemporary relevance of the an­

cient wisdom that virtues, pushed to extreme, may become vi­

• 
ces?
 
•
 
It is a matter of completing, extending, and organi­

zing individualism, not of restricting it or strug­

gling against it. It is a matter of using and not sti­

fling rational faculties .•.. In all these circumstances,
 
does not our duty appear to be clearly marked out? All
 
those who believe in the value, or even merely in the
 
necessity, of the moral revolution accomplished a cen­

tury ago, have the same interest: they must forget the 
differences which divide them, and combine their efforts 
so as to hold positions already won •••. For today, the 
•
 
--473-­
urgent task, which must be put before all else, is 
that of saving our moral patrimony: once that is se­
• 
cure, we shall see that it is made to prosper 
(1969:29-30). 
Finally, in many of his statements in Suicide, it must 
be noted that, for rhetorical reasons again, Durkheim could
'. 
not and did not acknowledge explicitly that moral individual­
• ism and the religion of the self, even in their Utilitarian 
or Romantic forms, might invert itself into "moral anarchy." 
But here, of course, Durkheim argued normativ;Iy, in terms 
of a projected ideal, not actuality.
• This cult of man is something very different from the egoistic individualism which leads to 
suicide. Far from detaching individuals from socie­
ty, and from every aim beyond themselves, it unites 
them in one thought, and makes them servants of one 
•
 
work. For man, as thus suggested to collective affec­

tion and respect, is not the sensual, experiential 
individual that each one of us represents, but man 
in general, ideal humanity as conceived by each peo­
ple at each moment of its history. None of us wholly 
incarnates this ideal, though none is wholly a stran­
•
 
ger to it. So we have, not to concentrate each sepa­

rate person upon himself and his own interests, but 
to subordinate them to the general interests of hu­
mankind. Such an aim draws him beyond himself: imper­
sonal and disinterested, it is above all individual 
personalities: like every ideal, it can be conceived 
• 
of only as superior to and dominating reality. This 
ideal even dominates societies, being the aim on which 
all social activity depends. This is why it is no long­
er the right of these societies to dispose of this i­
deal freely (5:337). 
At its best, Durkheim's projection may be true: in the norm­
• al case , however, it is hard to deny the devolution, inver­
sion, or extremity of most cultural-ethical ideals. Durk­
heim's condemnation of suicide as immoral because it "den­
ies the religion of humanity" may be commendable, but it is
• insufficiently dialectical for our present purposes. What 
is missing here is the ironic insight that, as he stated 
elsewhere, " ..• even our immorality is part of our morali­
ty," that the religion of the self can become self-destruc­
• tive: in short, that our virtues may also become the source 
of our vices. 
•
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Under these conditions, suicide must be classed among 
immoral acts; for in its main principle it denies this 
•	 
religion of humanity.... Society is injured because 
the sentiment is offended on which its most respected 
• 
moral maxims today rest, a sentiment almost the only 
bond between its members, and which would be weakened 
if this offense could be committed with impunity. How 
could this sentiment maintain the least authority if 
the moral conscience did not protest its violation? 
From the moment that the human person is and must be 
considered sacred, over which neither the individual 
nor the group has free disposal, any attack upon it 
must be forbidden (S:337). 
For our part, we cannot accept such an undialectical point
• of view, and shall, instead, search out all those parts of 
Durkheim's treatment of suicide which admit the ironic in­
sight. The notion that the modern cult of moral individual­
ism, when pushed to extreme, like all cults, ends in invert­
• ing itself, shall serve as our basic guide in Books Two and 
Three which follow. There, we shall explore the possibility 
that anomic and egoistic suicides in the modern world ulti­
mately stem from cultural sanctions. 
•	 }
7.	 Durkheim'~ Critique of Anglo Utilitarian and Romantic­Idealistic Notions of Individualism 
Before we begin our detailed exegesis of the logic
• and structure of Durkheim's famous book, Suicide, we should 
not fail to notice that Durkheim himself felt obliged in 
various places to attempt to refute those traditions which 
gave cultural sanction to individualism on nominalistic prem­
• ises. Such traditions largely failed to meet his criteria for 
dissolving the possible equation between individualism and 
egoism--namely, the impersonal, altruistic marriage of the 
abstract Individual and Reason projected by the French Cultur­
• al Tradition. For example, Durkheim acknowledged: 
Doubtless it can happen that individualism is prac­
tised in quite a different spirit. Certain people use 
it for their own personal ends, as a means of disguis­
ing their egoism and escaping more easily from their
• 
duties toward society. But this deceptive misuse of in­
dividualism proves nothing against it, just as the u­
tilitarian fictions of religious hypocrites prove noth­
ing against religion (1969:24). 
•
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For such traditions rooted individualistic ethics in the mor­
al autonomy of the individual alone, and some UtilItarians, 
• in equating egoism and individualism, went so far as to pro­
claim that competitive economic egoism inevitably leads to 
altruism, to the common good. 
Here, Durkheim had to face the fact, quite apart from 
• the arguments about methodology in the social sciences, that 
egoisme, anomie, and an individualism couched in ethical 
terms were often intimately intertwined. His normative pro­
testations aside, the amoralism of the man in the state of 
• nature of the eighteenth century philosophers was very close 
to anomie; this identification was, of course, the source of 
Parsons' linkage of anomie to the Hobbesian dilemma. Indeed, 
• 
. ..
 
as we shall see,----Guyau (1962) earlier l:rsetr the term "anomie"
 
in a laudatory way in approximately this sense. Hence, we 
shall watch with fascination as Durkheim, in Suicide, at­
tempts to deal with this dilemma that values lead to vices, 
that good intentions lead to bad results; in short, that 
• extreme individualism was (is) widely sanctioned by the dom­
inant----cu~tural values of the modern world. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, Durkheim directed 
much of his polemical skill in The Division of Labor to refu­
• ting Spencerian liberal Utilit;rian individualism. This~om-=< f .............
 
inalist position deduced society from the lone individual; 
but Durkheim argued, " ... the psychologist who starts by 
restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find the non­
• ego." Association is a primary social phenomena which cannot 
• 
be abstractly derived from self-interested contractual rela­
tions. 
If this important truth has been disregarded by the 
utilitarians, it is an error rooted in the manner in 
• 
which they conceive the genesis of society. They sup­
pose originally isolated and independent individuals, 
who, consequently, enter into relationships only to 
cooperate, for they have no other reason to clear the 
space separating them and to associate. But this theo­
ry, so widely held, postulates a veritable creatio ex 
nihilo. It consists, indeed, in deducing society from 
the individual. But nothing we know authorizes us to 
believe in the possibility of such spontaneous genera­
•
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tion. According to Spencer, for societies to be formed
 
within this hypothesis, it is necessary that primitive
 
units pass from the state of perfect independence to

• that of mutual dependence. But what can have determined
 such a complete transformation in them? Is it the pros­

pect of the advantages presented by social life? But
 
they are counterbalanced, perhaps more than counterbal­

anced, by the loss of independence, for, among indivi­

duals born for a free and solitary life, such a sacri­

• fice is most intolerable. Add to this, that in the first
 social types social life is as absolute as possible, for
 
nowhere is the individual more completely absorbed in the
 
the group. How could man, if he were born an individual­

ist, as is supposed, be able to resign himself to an ex­

istence clashing violently with his fundamental inclin­

• ation? How pale the problematical utility of cooperation
 must appear to him besides such a fall! With autonomous
 
individualities, as are imagined, nothing can emerge
 
save what is individual" and, consequently, cooperation
 
itself, which is a social fact, submissive to social
 
rules, cannot rise. Thus, the psychologist who starts

• by restricting himself to the ego cannot emerge to find
 
•
 
the non-ego (DL:279).
 
Here,we see one of the clearest expressions of Durkheim's so­

cial realism (see also Part I, Book Three). Indeed, if one
 
starts from social realism, and then attempts to "get inside"
 
•
 
the nominalist perspective, it is clear that egoistic indivi­

dualism can and is socially created; that the Hobbesian di­

lemma is not natural but social; that social nominalism leads
 
to a culturally sanctioned collocation of atoms trading goods
 
on an international market. In such a moral universe, indivi­
dual persons are enjoined to be egoistic; they are forced to 
act as if they were Robinson Crusoes. Durkheim pointed out 
•
 
the logical contradictions of such a world-view:
 
•
 
Collective lif$Lis not born from ind~vidual life, but ~
 
it is, on ~e contrar~the second which is born from
 
the first. It is on this cond{tion alonetnat one can
 
expla~ow the personal individuality of social units
 
has been able to be formed and enlarged without disin­

tegrating society .••• It is not thp. absolute personal­
ity of the monad, which is sufficient unto itself, and 
could do without the rest of the world, but that of an 
organ or part of an organ having its determined func­
tion, but which cannot, without risking dissolution, 
separate itself from the rest of the organism. Under
• these conditions, cooperation becomes not only possible but necessary. Utilitarians thus reverse the natural or­
der of facts, and nothing is more deceiving than this 
inversion (DL:279-80). 
•
 
V 
• 
Durkheim didn't exclude the Idealist philosophers and ethi­

cists from his rebuttal of nominalistic individualism; he
 
• accused them also of starting their ethical systems from the ,
 
absolute autonomy of the lone individual.
 
•
 
As the utilitarians, the idealists have it [cooperation]
 
consist exclusively in a system of economic relations,
 
of private arrangements in which egotism is the only ac­

tive power. In truth, the moral life traverses all the
 
•
 
relations which constitute cooperation (DL:2BO).
 
Indeed, Durkheim saw the common foundations between the op­

posed camps of Romantic-Idealist and Anglo Utiltarian philo­

sophers in terms of the moral subsidy of the autonomo~indi­

vidual. The Enlightenment, Durkheim recognized, started from 
, ­
• 
the ego in a state.-9f nature, which was, from the sociologi­
cal point of view, inherently amoral. ----­
..• man is a moral being only because he lives in so­
ciety, since morality consists in being solidary with 
a group and varying with this solidarity. Let all so­
cial life disappear, and moral life will disappear with 
it, since it would no longer have any objective. The 
state of nature of the philosophers of the eighteenth
• 
century, if not immoral, is at least amoral. Rousseau 
himself recognized this (DL:399). 
• 
In his polemical article, "Individualism and the Intel­
lectuals," Durkheim was careful to distinguish his type of 
rationalistic moral individualism from its Utilitarian and 
Rom\.ntic variants. First, Durkheim attacked the "narrow ego­
ism"of the Utilitarian economists. 
In order to facilitate the condemnation of individual­
ism, it has been confused with the narrow and utilitar­
• 
ian egoism of Spencer and the economists. This is to 
• 
take the easy way out. It is not hard, in effect, to 
denounce as an ideal without grandeur that narrow com­
mercialism which reduces society to nothing more than 
a vast apparatus of production and exchange, and it is 
only too clear that all social life would be i.mpossible 
if there did not exist interests superior to the inter­
• 
ests of individuals. Nothing is more just than that 
such doctrines should be treated as anarchical, and 
with this attitude we are in full agreement. But what 
is admissible is that this individualism should be pre­
sented as the only one that there is or even that there 
could be. Quite the contrary, it is becoming more and 
more rare and exceptional. The practical philosophy of 
Spencer is of such moral poverty that it now has scarce­
ly any supporters. As for the economists, even if they 
•
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once allowed themselves to be seduced by the simpli­
city of this theory, they have for a long time now 
felt the need to temper the rigor of their primitive
• 
orthodoxy and to open their minds to more generous 
sentiments .•.. In truth, if individualism had no oth­
er representatives, it would be quite pointless to 
move heaven and earth in this way to combat an enemy 
that is in the process of quietly dying a natural 
death (1969:20).
• While Durkheim was certainly right in describing the shift \ 
away from Utilitarian individualISm among many intellectuals 
(the "Social Go~pel" movement in the-u-nlted States and Fabian . 
socialism in Britain were two indicators of this shift), one
• wonders if Durkheim would have been quite so sanguine about 
the death of Utilitarian individualism had he survived into 
the mid-twentieth century. Further, this passage is impor­
tant because D~m agreed with the conservatives here that
.--­
Utili~n individualism is "anarchical;" yet, this movement• 
- -, 
marked by a fundamental "moral poverty" itself emerged as an 
ethically rooted and motivated reform movement. 
After dismissing the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian
• individualism, Durkheim turned to consider the other contend­
er--namely, Kantian Idealistic individualism • 
... --­
• 
However, there exists another individualism over which 
it is less easy to triumph. It has been upheld by the 
great majority of thinkers: it is the individualism of 
Kant and Rousseau, that of the spiritualistes, that 
• 
which the Declaration of the Rights of Man sought, more 
or less successfully, to translate into formula, that 
which is currently taught in our schools and which has 
become the basis of our moral catechism. It is true 
that it has been thought possible to attack this indi­
vidualism under the co\er of the first type, but that 
• 
differs from it fundamentally and the criticisms which 
apply to the one could not be appropriate to the other. 
So it is far from making personal interest the object 
of human conduct, that it sees in all personal motives 
the very source of all evil. According to Kant, I am 
only certain of acting well if the motives that influ­
ence me relate, not to the particular circumstances in 
which I am placed, but to my quality as a man in ab­
stracto (1969:2Q-21). 
Such a moral stance carried, of course, real moral grandeur.
• For instead0:: of justifying egoism, as the Utilitarians_ had 
done, by argu~ng that the pursuit of self~t inevita­
•
 
- --
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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bly leads to the common good, that egoism regulated only by 
competition leads to altruism, the Idealists and Rationalists 
argued that egoistic judgments must be overcome through uni­
versalization. 
Conversely, my action is wicked when it cannot be jus­
tified logically except by reference to the situation 
I happen to be in and my social condition, my class or 
caste interests, my passions, etc. That is why immoral 
conduct is to be recognized by the sign that it is 
closely linked to the individuality of the agent and 
cannot be universalized without manifest absurdity 
(1969:21) • 
However, when Durkheim was not engaged in polemics with the 
right-wing, and he was simply trying to establish his own 
"science of morality," he was less generous to the Kantian 
categorical imperative (eg. see DL:4l2). 
Another expression of this universalization of indivi­
dual wills as the basis of moral action was to be found in 
Rousseau's Social Contract and his notion of the "general 
will." Durkheim noted: 
---... Similarly, if according to Rousseau, the general will, 
which is the basis of the social contract, is infalli­
ble, if it is the authentic expression of perfect jus­
tice, this is because it is a resultant of all-tlle par­
ticular wills; consequently, it c5nstitutes a kind of 
impersonal average from which all individual consider­
ations have been eliminated, since, being divergent and 
even antagonistic to one another, they are neutralized 
and cancel each other out. Thus, for both these think­
ers, the only ways of acting that are moral are those 
which are fitting for all men equally, that is to say, 
which are implied in the notion of man in general 
(1969:21) • 
Now, Durkheim insisted that the Rationalist and Idealist no­
tions of abstract, impersonal moral individualism are farre­
moved from the "moral poverty" of Utilitarian individualism 
which confuses the ego and the person. 
This is far from that apotheosis of comfort and pri­
vate interest, that egoistic cult of the self for 
which utilitarian individualism has been justly re­
proached. Quite the contrary: according to these mor­
alists, duty consists in averting our attention from 
what concerns us personally, from all that relates to 
our empirical individuality, so as uniquely to seek 
that which our human condition demands, that which we 
hold in common with all our fellow men. This ideal goes 
• 
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so far beyond the limit of utilitarian ends that it 
appears to those who aspire to it as marked with a re­
• 
ligious character. The human person, whose definition 
serves as the touchstone according to which good must 
be distinguished from evil, is considered as sacred ...• 
• 
It has something of that transcendental majesty which 
the churches of all times have given to their Gods. It 
is conceived as being invested with that mysterious pro­
perty which creates an empty space around holy objects, 
which keeps them away from profane contacts and which 
draws them away from ordinary life. And it is exactly 
this feature which induces the respect of which it is 
the object (1969:21). 
And it is exactly this feature of Rationalist and Idealist 
• 
moral philosophy which must be examined to see if here, as 
elsewher~ the high-sounding moral idealism and good inten­
tions may not lead to unanticipated, destructive results. 
Surely when such a premium is put upon the individual person, 
• 
when man becomes god, then the balance between community and 
self shifts decisively. In the third quarter of the twentieth 
century, for instance, we see the "cult of the individual" 
metamorphosing into the "cult of the self," into the"Religion 
,.. --­
of the Self," with myriad therapeutics designed to rl.d-the
• 
• 
Self of all unnecessary and artificial distractions. Durkheim 
here argued in his normal tone of high-minded seriousness 
that this extreme emphasis on the individual was balanced by 
a corresponding emphasis on supra-individual norms and con­
cern with the community. 
Now, it is a remarkable fact that all these theorists 
of individualism are no less sensitive to the rights 
of the collectivity than they are to those of the in­
• 
dividual. No one has insisted more emphatically than 
• 
Kant on the supra-individual character of morality and 
law. He sees them rather as a set of imperatives that 
men must obey because they are obligatory•.•• Now, 
Kantianism led to the ethics of Fichte, which was al­
ready thoroughly imbued with socialism, and to the 
philosophy of Hegel whose disciple was Marx. As for 
• 
Rousseau, one knows how his individualism is complemen­
ted by an authoritarian conception of society. Follow­
ing him, the men of the Revolution, in promulgating the 
famous Declaration of Rights, made France one, indivisi­
ble, centralized, and perhaps one should even see the 
revolutionary achievement as being above all a great 
movement of national concentration. Finally, the chief 
reason for which the spiritualistes have always fought 
against utilitarian morality is that it seemed to them 
•
 
• 
--481-­
•
 
to be incompatible with social necessities (1969:22).
 
Now, even granting that Durkheim was here involved in a rhe­

torical defense of rationalistic individualism against the
 
•
 
conservative right, one wonders about the oscillation in
 
such ethical systems between the individual and the central­

ized and often authoritarian State; indeed, Durkheim himself
 
counted this as one of the great problems of the modern era
 
• 
(see Part II, Book Two). Durkheim himself stated " .•. there 
is no reason of State which can excuse an outrage against the 
person when the rights of the person are placed above the 
State" (1969:21-22): but the problem remains nevertheless. 
•
 
Thus, Durkheim was forced, by the rhetorical situation, indefun:l­

inq French rationalistic "moral individualism" to: (a) set
 
aside as indefensible the Utilitarian equation of egoism with
 
individualism, and (b) argue that true individualism, such as
 
•
 
expressed in Kant, the Enlightenment, and the "Declaration of
 
the Rights of Man," was rooted in an abstract, altruistic
 
religion of humanity which, nonetheless, depended upon a
 
strong centralized State in which the relations between the
 
•
 
lone individual and the society's means of governance remain­

ed problematical. Of course, these were not merely philoso­

phical problems, for the moral demands and the culture of
 
the individual had changed the very foundations of modern so­

cial organization (a principle which we shall critically ap­
ply to Durkheim's theses in Part I of Book Two). 
•
 
One can see how grave this question is. For the lib­

eralism of the eighteenth century which is, after all,
 
what is basically at issue, is not simply an armchair
 
•
 
theory, a philosophical construction. It has entered
 
into the facts, it has penetrated our i~stitutions and
 
customs. It has become part of our whole life, and, if
 
we really must rid ourselves of it, it is our entire
 
moral organization that must be rebuilt at the same
 
time (1969 : 22) •
 
Now, when Durkheim permitted himself a few critical re­

marks on the uncertain empirical fate of his values, he ac­

knowledged some of the crucial difficulties in living out

• "moral individualism." Indeed, did not Rousseau himself note
 
that although " ••• the Protestant is forced to be free, this 
•
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burden may be too great for some to bear"? 
•
 
Certainly, we do not propose to defend the way in
 
which these different thinkers have set about combin­

ing these two aspects in the construction of their sys­

tems. If, with Rousseau, one begins seeing the indivi­
dual as a sort of absolute who can and must be suffi­
cient unto himself, it is obviously difficult then to 
explain how civil society could be established 
•
 
(1969:23).
 
• 
Indeed, although earlier he used the example of Kant and 
Rousseau to deflect the conservatives' equation of indivi­
dualism with anti-social egoism, Durkheim later admitted 
some crucial flaws in their points of departure. Even though 
their positions favored altruism and the religion of humani­
ty, their whole framework started from the pre-social autono­
my of the individual person. 
• 
This is what Kant and Rousseau did not understand. 
They wished to deduce their individualist ethics not 
from society, but from the notion of the absolute in­
dividual. Such an enterprise was impossible, and from 
it resulted the logical contradictions of their system 
(1969:28, #1). 
• We might also add, besides "logical contradictions," social, 
cultural, and phenomenological contradictions. One might as 
well rephrase Durkheim's objection to the Utilitarran-start­
\ . 
ing point: if, instead of ~rting from the ego, one starts 
from the absolute autonomy of the individual,- how ~one• 
emerge to find the embeddedness, the relationalness of the 
person? If from ego you cannot emerge to find non-ego, then 
from absolute autonomy you cannot emerge to find relational 
• interdependence. We have, here, then the first crucial fac­
tor in our second schema of suicide--namely, an extraordinar­
ily strong modern cultural sanction for absolute individual­
ism; this recognition shall prove crucial.~---------
• Now, one may find scattered throughout Durkheim's 
works critical references to both the Utilitarian and Ideal­
ist-Romantic positions; we shall explore several passages 
directly relevant to the second schema of suicide in Part 
• II of Book Three of this dissertation. Let us, now briefly 
note, however, some of the few criticisms which Durkheim 
permitted himself in his summary review of Rousseau's doc­
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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trine in his Latin dissertation Quid Secundatus politicae 
scientiae instituendae contulerit published in 1892 (transla­
ted by Ralph Manheim 1965). These criticisms are important 
for our present purposes because Rousseau combined so many 
different strains of thought; beginning as a republican Cal­
vinist, he moved from the Enlightenment rationalism of the 
eighteenth century to the Romanticism of the nineteenth cen­
tury. Hence, he mediates between all three major modern cul­
tural traditions. For example, Durkheim ob­
served of Rousseau's philosophy of government that "The ex­
istence of a government is in such sharp contradiction with 
Rousseau's general principles of social philosophy that even 
the genesis of government is difficult to explain" (1965: 
130). And, after noting the absence of intermediary institu­
tions and the restriction of the "general will" to a realm 
of universals, Durkheim explained one of the crucial unresol­
ved tensions in Rousseau's work in this way: 
This conception is itself a consequence of the fact 
that Rousseau sees only two poles of human reality, 
the abstract, general individual who is the agent and 
objective of social existence, and the concrete empir­
ical individual who is the antagonist of all collective 
existence. He fails to see that, though in a certain 
sense these two poles are irreconcilable, the first 
without the second is no more than a logical fiction 
(1965 :131) • 
Further, in his conclusion, after comparing and contrasting 
the various solutions of Hobbes, Montesquieu, and Rousseau 
to the problem of relating absolute individualism to society 
and the state, Durkheim noted: 
Though the three thinkers agree that the social and 
the individual are dissimilar, we observe an increas­
ing effort to root the social being in nature. But 
therein lies the weakness of the system. While ••. 
social life for Rousseau is not contrary to the nat­
ral order, it has so little in common with nature that 
one wonders how it is possible. Rousseau says somewhere 
that respect for the legislator's authority presupposes 
a certain social spirit. But his remark applies still 
more to the establishment of a society. If, however, a 
society is formed of isolated, atomized individuals, 
one is at a loss to see where it comes from. Perhaps 
if Rousseau had granted a Hobbesian state of war we 
might understand why, with a view to ending it, men 
•
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• 
should organize into a body and go so far as to recast 
their original nature. But he cannot advance this ex­
planation because in his view the state of war is a re­
sult of life in common. And just as he fails to explain 
• 
how social life, even in its imperfect historical forms, 
could come into being, he has great difficulty in show­
ing how it can possibly cast off its imperfections and 
establish itself on a logical basis. So unstable is its 
foundation in the nature of things that it cannot but 
appear to us as a tottering structure whose delicate 
balance can be established and maintained only by an al­
most miraculous conjunction of circumstances 
(1969:137-8). 
We shall also ask, in relation to anomic and egoistic sui­
• 
cides (see Books Two and Three), whether or not the relation 
between society and the absolutized individual, and the in­
ternaJ equilibrium within the latter, in the modern world is 
not so delicate that it may be "maintained only by an almost 
• 
miraculous conjunction of circumstances." 
Finally, let us recall that the first time Durkheim 
used the term anomie in one of his own works it was directed 
against the absolute individualism and apotheosis of the i­
• 
magination among the Romantic artists (see also Part II, 
Book Three for references to the Romantics). For the Roman­
tics (eg. see N. Frye, 1947) claimed special dispensations 
for themselves; they were above rules and "normal morality. " 
• 
In claiming special powers, ~he Romantic artists equated 
divine inspiration with the individual imagination. Durk­
heim's acknowledgment of this pathology appeared in a foot­
note in the suppresed part of the introduction which Simp­
• 
son included as an appendix to The Division of Labor. 
There is very often attributed to the aesthetico­
moral activity a certain superiority. Now, the sen- . 
timent of obligation, that is, the existence of duty, 
is in danger of being weakened in admitting that there 
• 
is a morality, and perhaps a higher, which rests in 
the independent creations of the individual, which no 
rule determines, which is essentially anomic. We be- ~ 
lieve, on the contrary, that anomie is the contradic­
tion of all morality (DL:43l, #21). 
•
 
•
 
•
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FOOTNOTES 
• BOOK ONE
 
tl, page l19--translation by Marsha R. and David McCloskey.
 
•
 
#1, pg. 146--1 owe the Latin translation to Fr. James G.
 
Goodwin, S.J., Professor of Sociology, Seattle Universit~
 
#1, pg. l64--Terry Clark (1968:88) observes how the Durkheim­
ians also came to celebrate "periodical reunions" which 
generated a "veritable collective effervescence ll and 
"collective representations." 
• 
• tl, pg. 295--It is this second meaning of secularization as 
translation of religious symbols and ethical drives into 
secular spheres which underlies our Weber ian insights into 
ethical sanctioning of the second schema of suicide which 
we shall construct in Book Three. Unfortunately, space 
does not permit a full Weber ian investigation into the 
• 
historical-cultural origins and development of these sanc­
tions for absolute individualism and legitimate insatia­
bility. 
#1, pg. 29B--If there was one sociologist of religion best 
situated to discover the significance of Durkheim's notion 
of the primitive sacral complex, it was Robert N. Bellah, 
student of Parsons, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, consider the 
fact that in neither his 1964 article on "Religious Evolu­
tion" nor his 1973 Introduction did Bellah develop his ear­
lier insights. It is one indication of how powerful concep­
• 
tual blinders can become that even when personally pre­
sented, in 1976, with a draft copy of this chapter, Bellah 
still failed to comprehend the significance of Durkheim's 
seminal paradigm. 
#1, pg. 299--Yet, to the best of my knowledge, Tiryakian has
• not incorporated this paradigm into his other work. 
• 
#2, pg. 299--But see Nisbet's insistence in the same work 
that " ... it remains true that the long-range significance 
of Durkheimls study of religion ••• is not so much develop­
mental •.. as it is what can best be described as micro­
sociological" (1965:94). Nisbet hadn't changed his struc­
tural emphasis in 1974:168; yet, see 1974:170 where he a­
gain notes the evolutionary emphasis on religion, but makes 
little of it; all in all, a curious performance of recogni­
tion and then tossing the insight away. 
• 
#3, pg. 299--See also Aron (1967:109); Aronls ambivalency to­
ward the Durkheimians is revealed in his critical stance 
throughout this volume; so that one suspects to gain a sym­
•
 
•
 
--486-­
• 
pathetic perspective from which to interpret Durkheim, 
Axon comes to America and views Durkheim through Parsons' 
eyes. Thl1s, to a large measure, both Durkheim and Weber 
were favorably mediated to their respective countrymen 
through Parsons' reconstruction in his The Structure of 
Social Action. --­
• 
#4, pg. 299--See also Stanner (1967:219), who, true to the 
neo-functionalism of anthropology, neglects Durkheim's 
genetic-evolutionary emphasis."Fundamentally, it was the 
failure to break with historicism that prevented the pro­
position from emerging clearly as one of identity [of 
religious and social thought]" (1967:221). 
• 
~5, pg. 299--See also Poggi (1971:242) "Religion was ••. not 
just one institution among others, but rather the para­
digm, the matrix, and ultimate support of all institu­
tions." Also, Poggi sums up the Durkheimian relationship 
between religion and other institutions in this way: "Re­
ligion is the paradigmatic, proto-, and meta-institutiorr' 
•
 
(1971:250).
 
•
 
#1, pg. 300--Although clearly sensitive to Durkheim's general
 
evolutionary perspective, LaCapra felt constrained to re­

interpret (eg. 1972:107-117) Durkheim's theses in terms
 
of Mauss, Levi-Strauss, and victor Turner. Significantly,
 
LaCapra cited as evidence rather obscure and previously
 
untranslated material, rather than from classics such as
 
•
 
The Divi~onof Labor, L'Annee preface, or The Elementary
 
Forms. Apparently, this prime translated material had be­

come so burdened over the years with obfuscatory secon­

dary interpretations that it became almost impossible to
 
recover the full meaning of Durkheim's paradigm. The
 
problem lies not with the paradigmatic text but with our
 
distorting secondary filters. 
• 
#1, pg. 30l--Significantly, both Giddens and Lukes, surely 
two of the most sens1t1ve and prolific ~ecent reinterpre­
ters of Durkheim's work, addressed the problem of the 
generic and genetic role of religion in Durkheim's 
thought without bothering to formulate his central para­
digm. 
• 
#2, pg. 30l--Yet, once again, in several chapters devoted to 
Durkheim's methodology, Smelser neglects Durkheim's fusion 
of his generic and genetic-evolutionary approaches in his 
seminal paradigm of the primitive sacral complex. 
• 
#3, pg. 30l--Positively, it speaks well for the now well-docu­
mented objectivity of Durkheim's model. Negatively, it 
reflects badly on the inherent discontinuity, the built­
in loss, in the development of sociological theory. For 
even when the model is recovered by one, they lose it1 
without a full statement leqitimating this model by a 
•
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contemporary leader in the discipline, the idea shall 
continue to languish.
• *4, 30l--I call this sadly inevitable process the "routini-
zation of charisma-on-deposit" (McCloskey, 1974), and 
apply it to Durkheim's notion of anomie as another para-
digmatic case (see appendix). 
• 
tn, 303--Horton has also wondered "why this striking aspect 
of Durkheim's sociology of ideas has been so neglected 
by posterity." It is a problem for the sociology of know-
ledge, and cultural processes. 
• 
*1, 309--When Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary emphases drop 
from view, or are collapsed into his generic analyses of 
religion, it appears that religion would have argued for 
a return to primitive religion; but, as we shall see, 
Durkheim viewed this situation as highly repressive. 
*1, 3l5--There was a certain ambivalence toward repressive
• religious law even in Durkheim's early phase. For the 
• 
posi~ivists, the irrationalities of traaitional society 
were, of course, bad. But because Durkheim also postulat-
ed the need for moral discipline of the pre-social ego, 
the repressiveness of primitive religion had a positive 
evolutionary value. For religious rules attached the ego, 
as Weber also noted, to a "cosmos of obligations." 
*2, 31S--Sheleff's argument does not impress me, largely, be-
cause he lacks recognition of the "nuclear" or paradigm-
atic structure of Durkheim's thought. 
• 
~l, 3l7--The crucial fact to recognize is that structural 
differentiation and cultural transformation are not ne-
• 
cessarily correlated. The archaic empires also were dom-
inated by sacro-magical collective structures of con~
 
science and consciousness (see Nelson, 1973a). Indeed, 
such large scale empires (eg. advanced horticultural so-
cieties or agrarian empires) serve as the fullest expres-
sions of this structure of conscience. 
• 
*1, 32l--Much of the work of the Annee circle focussed on 
the primitive sacral complex and its cultural creativity 
and evolutionary centrality; see, for ego Honigsheim, 
1960. In many ways, this literature remains unexplored. 
~l,	 326--See also Tiryakian (1964) for a discussion of this 
neglected but important article. 
• 
*2, 326--A full-scale review of this literature would be fas-
cinating; for a check-list, see Honigsheim (1960).  
*1, 34l--Implied in Durkheim's notion of progressive cultur-
al evolution and societal differentiation was seculariza-
• 
•
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tion and the growing autonomy of spheres of life and per­
sons. This evolutionary view implies that religion too 
• 
has become differentiated from the other main societal 
and cultural forms in which it was formerly embedded. To 
the positivists religion was something to be overcome; 
• 
but cannot religionists also take certain heart from this 
process? For if everything else is allowed to take on its 
own special nature, freed from sacral control, then does 
it not follow also that religion is freed to take on its 
own special nature? 
• 
#1, 342--Parsons'sleight-of-hand in inserting an "ultimate, 
non-empirical reference" as implied in Durkheim's socio­
logy of religion was nothing short of remarkable; even 
more surprising, no one called him on it. See Parsons 
(1949) . 
•
 
#1, 364--In the original plan, this dissertation contained a
 
systematic introduction to the methodology of interpret­

ing cultural traditions; space limitations forced its de­

letion. However, for some references, see Parts I and II,
 
Book Three.
 
#1, 395--See Frye, 1947: 352 • 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
I 
•
 
--489-­
• 
BOOK TWO 
I. DURKHEIM'S FIRST SCHEMA OF SUICIDE 
•
 
Synopsis. Durkheim's two schemas of suicide revolve around
 
the problem of locating egoism and insatiable desires. I pro­

pose that Durkheim shifted on his analytical axes from the
 
•
 
notion that the absence of moral discipline generates modern
 
suicides, to the insight that anomie and egoisme are generat­

ed by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanctions.
 
Hence, absence/presence is the fundamental axis of this dis­

• 
sertation: we shall explore each of these possibilities in 
the following two Books. 
In Part I of Book Two, we shall explore Durkheim's 
first schema of suicide. This schema presumes absence of mor­
•
 
al constraint over the desires of the organic ego in the mod­

ern transitional crisis. This schema rests on Durkheim's doc­

tine of man as homo duplex: thus, both anomie and egoisme im­

ply the release of the inherently egocentric and insatiable
 
•
 
passions from the traditional moral discipline. Another key
 
to Durkheim's schemas was his evolutionary framework. Thus,
 
modern "moral anarchy" contrast with altruisme and fatalisme
 
in traditional societies. Altruisme and fatalisme represent
 
• 
the repressive discipline of 'mechanical solidarity'which 
keeps the ego's passions in rigid check. 
The first two polar types--egoisme versus altruisme-­
connote self versus group primacy. Altruisme refers to the 
primitive, archaic, or traditional society in which the in­
dividual is made to feel morally obligated to sacrifice him­
self for the welfare of his group. Altruisme is used by Durk­
• 
heim as a visible, objective index revealing the inner nature 
of the social bond of archaic societies, that is, of the in­
ter-dependence found in "mechanical sOlidarity." By contrast, 
•
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egoisme refers to the state of ~oral anarchy' in the contem-
porary transitional era in which there is no effective moral
• discipline over the infinite passions of the organic ego. 
Analogously, fatalisme implies passive resignation to one's 
collectively assigned fate, while anomie implies the release 
of the insatiable desires of the organic ego.
• However, it should be noted that the weakening hold of 
the collective discipline of traditional norms acts merely 
as the releasing and sustaining condition of the inherent 
egoism and insatiability of the organic ego. Thus, we must
• distinguish between two phases in the origin of anomie and 
egoisme--breakdown and breakthrough. Durkheim's central con-
cern was not so much with the breakdown of norms as with the 
• 
breakthrough or eruption of an "infinity of dreams and de-
sires." Thus, even in the first schema, the basic problem is 
not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the 
presence of destructive egocentric passions. 
• 
In Part II of Book Three we shall explore Durkheim's 
• 
explanations of the causes of the modern crisis, and his rem-
edies. Now, anomie and egoisme are historically specific;  
they represent not so much the generic breakdown of social 
order and control (Parsons' "Hobbesian dilemma") as the re-
• 
lease of the organic ego from traditional moral discipline. 
Anomie and egoisme stand as objective, outward indices of the 
"moral anarchy" plaguing the transitional era, prior to the 
full institutionalization of "moral individualism" and "or-
ganic solidarity." To curb the modern "infinity sickness," 
Durkheim suggested constructing social structural supports 
for the new type of moral individualism appropriate to emer-
• 
ging "organic solidarity." 
• 
The specific historical causes of the modern transi-
tional crisis include the Industrial and French Revolutions. 
The rapid displacement of secondary groups in these "twin 
revolutions" meant that the individual is caught between the 
centrifugal pUll of his own egocentric,anarchic passions on 
the one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of 
• 
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the modern state on the other. There were too few secondary 
groups standing between the central State and the lone in­
• dividual to effectively moralize egos as the family, gUild, 
local community, and religion had once done. This malintegra­
tion not only strained the institutional structure, but also 
released the egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic
• ego. To remedy modern "moral anarchy," Durkheim proposed to 
• 
reconstitute professional groups as a regular part of social 
life. 
Proceeding chronologically, starting with his analyses 
of the anomic and forced divisions of labor, we shall consid­
er Durkheim's analysis of socialism as a historically speci­
fic response to the rise of market capitalism. Finally, we 
• 
shall review his remedial proposal for increasing the "moral 
mechanics" of professional groups, and the enfranchisement 
of these intermediate associations on the national political 
level. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
PART I 
• ANOMIE AND EGOISME AS CAUSED BY THE ABSENCE OF HISTORICAL SOCIAL CONSTRAINT OVER THE ORGANIC EGO 
Preface. The richness of Durkheim's Suicide is still not 
• fully perceived. Involved in an exceedingly complex argument, 
the subtlety of which is too often ignored, Durkheim first 
proposed that anomie and egoisme are generated by the absence 
of crucial social and cultural factors. His first schema 
• rests on the tacit image of human nature as inherently ego­
istic and insatiable, and on an evolutionary schema of the 
two types of solidarity found in human societies at the two 
ends of history. His first schema concerns the breakdown of
-
effective legitimate social and cultural constraints over the• 
unsocialized or organic--ego in the---modern transitional crisis, 
prior to the full institutionalization of "organic solidarity." 
L ---- ~ 
This breakdown of moral discipline releases the floods of ego­
• istic and insatiable passions characteristic of the pre-social 
half of homo duplex. Egoisme and anomie, as the primary forms 
of the "moral anarchy" endemic to the modern world, contrast 
with the altruisme and fatalisme seen in primitive or archaic 
• societies. There the "repressive" social and moral discipline 
of "mechanical solidarity" holds the ego's natural passions in 
rigid check by subordinating the individual to the fused, sa­
cro-magical "collective conscience." Thus, altruisme implies
• active acceptance of group primacy, while fatalisme implies 
resignation to one's collectively assigned fate. The entire 
first schema is graphically summarized in Figure 4. 
The first schema emphasizes the historical importance
• of long term structural transformations. To illuminate these we 
shall draw especially on The Division of Labor, Socialism, Pro- \ 
fessional Ethics and Civic Morals, among other shorter pieces. 
•
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To remedy these modern forms of "moral anarchy," Durkheim, 
contrary to some portrayals of him as a conservative primari­
• ly concerned with value consensus, order and social control, 
never argued for a regression back to the earlier religious­
ly sanctioned "repressive" type of social solidarity. Such a 
return is neither possible nor desirable, according to Durk­
• heim. Rather, to curb the modern "infinity sickness," Durk­
heim first argued that we must move forward by constructing 
social structural supports for the new type of "moral indivi­
dualis~'appropriate to emerging "organic solidarity."
• By contrast, Durkheim's second implicit schema rests on 
the notion that anomie and egoisme are generated by the pres­
ence of culturally sanctioned drives for absolute individual­
ism and "progress and perfection." To curb these "infinities 
• of dreams and desires" is much more difficult than in the 
first schema, and requires more than piecemeal reforms. For 
such drives for autonomy and perfection lay permanently em­
bedded in the ethos of European civilization. Such drives 
• constitute our most distinctive virtues, as well as our vi­
ces. Now, the image of modern egoisme and anomie as generated 
by the absence of something social is the only one perceived 
and pursued so far by most sociologists. The discovery of the 
• second schema may well represent a landmark in the history 
of sociological theory. For it shall afford us the opportuni­
ty, perhaps for the first time, to substantively link two of \ 
the master paradigms of two great pioneers of modern sociolo- i'
• gy--narnely, Durkheim's Suicide with_Weber's The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
I wish to emphasize at the outset, however, that Durk­
heim's masterpiece remains ambiguous at many points (see also
• Book Three). At no point did he attempt to summarize these 
schemas as I shall do. Nor did he ever outline anything simi­
lar to the many other schemas that abound on reinterpreting 
the logic of Suicide (see appendix). Therefore, the fact re­
• mains that Durkheim's underlying schemas in Suicide must be 
constructed and interpreted in accordance with the underlying 
•
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"nuclear structure" of his thought outlined in Book One.
 
This is precisely where most previous interpretations of

• his typology of suicide have broken down (see, for example,
 
Whitney Pope, 1976). t'le must perform both systematic "stra­

tigraphies" and systematic "topographies." Having undertaken
 
the first task in Book One, we now turn to take up the latter

• task of detailed exegesis in Book Two.
 
•
 
Now, although egoisrne and anomie are two central con­

cepts in Suicide, Durkheim began with neither. Instead, he
 
spent all of Book One outlining his intentions, giving a POSi-~.
 
•
 
tivist definition of suicide, arguing for a purely sociologi­

cal explanation, eliminating counter-claims to causal priori­

ty (eg. psychopathic states, race, heredity, cosmic factors,
 
imitation), defending his inverted method of considering cau­

•
 
ses before descriptions, and his use of statistics as prime
 
sets of evidence. In over a hundred carefully argued pages,
 
Durkheim revealed his deductive method, his positivist premi­

ses, his use of objective indices to reveal the state of the
 
"moral life," and his characteristic method of argumentation 
by elimination of counter-claims (see Alpert, 1939). Durkheim 
began Suicide as a battling positivist. He sardonically noted 
• 
that "Although sociology has been in vogue for some time •.. 
it must be confessed that results up to this point are not 
really proportionate to the number of publications nor the in­
terest which they arouse" (S:35). Of course, the present work 
• 
was destined to become the most famous vindication of Durk­
heim's own program for this growing social science. 
Durkheim's intrOduction provides us with a characteris­
tic foretaste of what was to corne: the seemingly strange com­
• 
binations of opposing elements in his sociology such as de­
ductive rationalism coupled with statistical empiricism, the 
positivist's anti-metaphysical passion for facts and "Science" 
coupled with the positivist's equally strong passion for so­
• cial and moral reform, and so on. Indeed, as we noted at the 
outset, one of the very hallmarks of Durkheim's thought is 
the attempt to bind together seemingly contradictory elements 
•
 
• 
--496-­
in a new and viable synthesis which would overcome previous 
antinomies. The measure of Durkheim's greatness are these per­
• vasive dialectical reconciliations. The measure of his fail­
ure is the strength of these inherent polarities, and the 
drift of modern events. 
Throughout Book One, Durkheim characteristically remind­
• ed us of the moral fervor and deeper concern underlying that 
classic of modern sociology which has become all things to all 
people--Suicide. Clearly, beyond any concern for establishing 
sociology as an autonomous discipline, and establishing it on 
• a rigorously scientific basis through systematic examination 
of suicide statistics, Durkheim was engaged in both a fundamen- ~ 
tal critique of modern society and an exploration of possible 
remedies for moral reconstruction. His deeper purpose was to
• take the "pulse of our moral life." 
There will emerge from our study some suggestions con­
cerning the causes of the general contemporary malad­
justment being undergone by European societies and con­
cerning remedies which may reduce it •••• Suicide as it 
• 
exists today is precisely one of the forms through 
which the collective affliction from which we suffer 
is transmitted~ thus, it will aid us to understand it 
(S:37) • 
Although it may sound strange to some at first, I propose that 
• 
suicide as such was not really Durkheim's prime concern in wri­
ting his famous book on the subject. Rather, as always, Durk­
heim was a positivist moral philosopher working sociological­
ly. What he really sought to~in Suicide was to provide an ana­
• 
tomy and critique of the two dominant forms of modern "moral 
anarchy." Comparative statistics and multivariate analysis 
served merely as the means, the instrument of objective exam­
ination of the collective pathologies of modern civilization. 
• 
Although important, statistics concerning differential suicide 
rates served merely as Durkheim's objective means for taking 
the "pulse of our moral life." And what Durkheim's statis­
tics showed was that the "moral temperature" of modern socie­
• ties was dangerously low. Taking a seemingly individual phe­
nomena such as suicide, Durkheim sought not only to demonstrate 
beyond question its collective basis, but also to thereby lay 
•
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bare the two halves of the modern soul. 
Durkheim's argument here rested on the premise that in­
dividual pathology must be explained sociologically--that is, 
in terms of collective pathology. Any adequate therapeutic, 
therefore, must also be collective, if we ever hope to cure 
the individual manifestations. To this end, Durkheim proceed­
ed throughout the early part of Suicide to systematically e­
liminate all non-sociological explanations of suicide, this 
seemingly most solitary of all human vocations. Durkheim sum­
med up his eliminations of counter-positions in these terms: 
We have shown that for each social group there is a 
specific tendency to suicide explained neither by the 
organic-psychic constitution of individua~nor by the 
nature of the physical environment. Consequently, by 
elimination it must necessarily depend upon social cau­
ses and be in itself a collective phenomenon(S:145). 
Inverting the normal inductive sequence, Durkheim began with a 
purely sociological explanation of the social causes of self­
homicide. 
Disregarding the individual as such, his motives and 
his ideas, we shall seek directly the states of the 
various social environments (ie. religion, family, po­
litical society, occupational groups, etc.), in terms 
of which the variations of suicide occur. Only then re­
turning to the individual, shall we study how these 
general causes become individualized so as to produce 
the homicidal results involved (S:151). 
I cannot now consider Durkheim's procedure here criti­
cally from the point of view of the philosophy of science 
(see Toby Huff, 1975). Suffice it to say that the socio-logic 
of his procedure in the early pages of Suicide is clear--for 
Durkheim began with suicide rates instead of individual suici­
dal events (see, however, Jack Douglas, 1967). Hereafter this 
insistence was to become a principle of positivist sociology-­
that is, sociological explanation deals with rates, not indi­
vidual occurences. Explaining the differentials in rates a­
mong different groups thus becomes a central sociological prob­
lem. On the other hand, the casual reader may become misled 
if he hastily concludes from such passages that Durkheim was 
insensitive to psychological issues, or that he was not con­
•
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cerned with individual manifestations of collective patholo­
gies. For, on the contrary, the use of objective statistical
• indices was simply the positivist's chosen vehicle for pass­
ing from the exterior to the interior of the "moral life." 
Durkheim himself anticipated many of these potential 
charges against him when he exclaimed in a footnote in Sui­
• cide: 
• 
We do not expect to be reproached further ... with 
wishing to substitute the exterior for the interior 
in sociology. We start from the exterior because it 
alone is immediately given, but only to reach the in­
terior (5:315, #12). 
Not wishing to mistake the sign for the thing signified, we 
shall, of course, follow Durkheim's lead here in focussing 
attention primarily not upon statistics but upon his ration­
• 
ales in explaining the historical development of differential 
rates of suicide in modern European society. 1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
--499-­
• 
CHAPTER ONE 
• 
EGOISME 
Preface. One need be neither a linguist nor a Durkheim 
scholar to recognize that his first suicidal types--ego­
isme and altruisme--refer primarily to self or group pri­
• macy, as Parsons (1949) among others has rightly noted. For 
the contrast is as old as moral philosophy itself. It is 
not surprising that Durkheim, as a positivist moral philo­
sopher working sociologically, as one deeply concerned 
with the "chronic" "moral anarchy" of the modern world,•
­
began by giving this ancient dichotomy a new historical 
anchor and sociocultural meaning. 
Given his doctrine of the inherent egoism and insatia­
• 
---~-~-~----;,.-------:----=-~~~bility of human nature (see Book One), it is clear that in 
his first schema Durkheim identified these two moral cate­
gories with the two opposite ends of history. Altruisme re­
ferred to the primitive, archaic, or traditional type of
• society in which the individual is made to feel morally ob­
ligated to sacrifice himself for the welfare of his group. 
By contrast, egoisme referred to the state of "moral anar­
chy" in the contemporary transitional or "critical" era in
• which no legitimate social mechanism constrained the natu­
ral egoism and insatiable passions seemingly embedded in 
the pre-socialized ego. Thus, while altruisme implies group 
primacy, this legitimate precedence of the group over the
• individual is historically specific. And egoisme implies 
not only the precedence of the individual over the group, 
but also, in historical terms, the release of the inherent­
~ egoistic passions from their traditional restraints. ~­
mie versus fatalisme, in turn, refers to the insatiability• 
......, 
of modern egoistic passions, in contrast to their rigid re­
pression in ~chaic "mechanically integra"ted society." 
•
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because he attempted to demonstrate a deeper, more historical­
ly rooted causal relationship than at first apparent, but also 
• 
because Durkheim repeatedly placed himself in "double binds" 
by virtue of his multiple and sometimes conflicting cultural 
commitments. Caught here between his positivism, "laic morali­
ty," and anti-clerical republicanism, and his over-riding
----­
con­
cern for social solidarity, Durkheim found an acceptable way 
out in terms of his own historical group--the Jews. According 
to Durkheim, Jews combined love of learning, professional sta­
tus and upward mobility with high social solidarity and the 
• lowest suicide ratesof any religious group. Let us now examine Durkheim's developing logic more closely. 
A. Confessional Group Influence on Suicide Rates 
• After deciding on the basis of comparative· statistics 
that "confessional influence is so great as to dominate" (5: 
154) all other categories, Durkheim embarked upon an analysis 
of the causes behind the differences in suicide rates of the 
• various religious groups. At the outset, we should note Durk­
heim's curious notion, perhaps derived from his positivism or 
his early "mechanistic" emphasis (see Book Three), that reli­
gious beliefs per se play little causal role in generating 
• the differential suicide rates between Protestant and Catholic. 
• 
••. they both prohibit suicide with equal emphasis: not 
only do they penalize it morally with great severity, 
but both teach that a new life begins beyond the tomb 
where men are punished for their evil actions, and Pro­
testantism as well as Catholicism numbers suicide among 
them•••• If Protestantism is less unfavorable to the 
development of suicide, it is not because of a differ­
ent attitude from that of the Catholics •••• Their"dis­
similar influence must proceed from one or more of the 
general characteristics differentiating them (5:157).
• But whether or not these religious groups explicitly prohibit 
suicide with equal severity is hardly the point. What should 
be at issue is whether, and to what extent, these different re­
ligious cultures generate tensions reaching suicidal intensity.
• It does not seem too harsh or summary a judgmen~ to note that 
Durkheim's positivism, at least at this point in his career, 
•
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• 
generally allowed hiWeI~ penetrate into the role of religious 
images, beliefs, and sanctions only insofar as necessary to 
negate the content of religion as a crucial factor. This con­
stitutes one prime difference with his great sociological con­
temporary Max Weber, who also correlated Protestantism with 
distinctive features of the modern world (see Book Three). Al­
though religious prohfbitions of suicide hardly exhaust the 
• 
potentially relevant contributions of religious culture to 
suicide, Durkheim hastily concluded that the difference under­
lying the differential between Protestant and Catholic suicide 
rates must necessarily be found in the contrasting organiza­
tions of religious society. 
• 
Especially important here are the different ways in 
which these groups envelop and direct the individual. Focus­
sing on types of religious organization, Durkheim argued that 
the key difference between Protestant and Catholic society is 
that the former favors individualism and free inquiry, while 
the latter demands obeisance to traditional hierarchical auth­
•
 
ority.
 
The only essential difference between Catholicism and 
Protestantism is that the second permits free inquiry 
to a far greater extent than the first. Of course, Ca­
tholicism as an idealistic religion concedes far great­
• 
er place to thought and reflection than Greco-Latin 
polytheism or Hebrew monotheism. It is not restricted 
to mechanical ceremonies but seeks the control of the 
conscience. So it appeals to conscience, and even when 
demanding blind submission of reason, does so by employ­
ing the language of reason. Nonetheless, the Catholic 
• 
accepts his faith ready made, without scrutiny•••• A 
whole hierarchical system of authority is devised, with 
• 
marvellous ingenuity, to render tradition inviolable. 
All variation is abhorrent to Catholic thought (S:157-B). 
Obviously, Catholic hierocratic control of the individual con­
science represented to Durkheim a survival of "repressive, 
mechanical solidarity." Hardly concealing his anti-clerical, 
"laic" morality, Durkheim noted that, by contrast, because the 
Protestant is more "the author of his own faith," that the lat­
•
 
ter religion more closely corresponds with the type of indivi­

dualism appropriate to advanced types of social solidarity. 
•
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•
 
The Protestant is far more the author of his faith.
 
The Bible is put in his hand and no interpretation is
 
imposed upon him. The very structure of the reformed
 
cult stresses this state of religious individualism.
 
•
 
••• What best proves that this freedom of inquiry pro­

claimed by the founders of the Reformation has not re­

mained a Platonic affirmation is the increasing multi­

plicity of all sorts of sects so strikingly in contrast
 
with the indivisible unity of the Catholic Church.
 
We thus reach our first conclusion, that the proclivi­

• 
ty of Protestantism must relate to the spirit of free 
inquiry that animates this religion (8:158). 
While granting a certain truth to Durkheim's argument, we need 
not also acquiesce to some of the more questionable tacit pre­
suppositions here--especially the notions that the Reformation 
leaders valued free inquiry for its own sake, or that free and 
• 
open public discourse and a sort of Enlightenment rationalistic 
individualism equally pervades all Protestant denominations to­
• 
day. 
Durkheim's general law of societal and moral evolution-­
that the autonomy of the individual person emerges with pro­
gressive societal differentiation and rationalization (see Book 
• 
One)--governs the next twist in his argument. For he proposed 
that the need for free inquiry arises out of the breakdown of )i 
traditional beliefs. Or, differently put, the erosion of the 1 
all-embracing certainties provided by the shared sacro-magical 
conscience of early culture requires the constant interven­
tion of critical intelligence. The progressive "effacement of 
the segmental type of society" requires the individual to in­
• 
creasingly assume responsibility for his own conduct, since 
past directive norms, so often mechanically invoked, become 
irrelevant to complex, changing circumstances. 
Free inquiry is only the effect of another cause. When 
• 
it appears that men, after having received their faith 
ready-made from tradition, claim the right to shape it 
for themselves, this is not because of the intrinsic 
desirability of free inquiry, for the latter involves 
as much sorrow as happiness. It is because men hence­
forth need this liberty. This very need can have only
•
 
one cause: the overthrow of traditional beliefs (8:158).
 
Thus, Durkheim assumed that modern Protestant man has had this 
individualism thrust upon him by historical necessity. 
•
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Now, I have argued for recognition of the significance 
of Durkheim's ideas concerning the evolution of morality, of 
• conscience and consciousness (see Book One). That socialdi€­
ferentiation and autonomization of the person proceed togeth­
er on the world-historical level is a profound insight. How­
ever, it is, at most, a necessary, though insufficient, com­
• plementary perspective to the far more difficult Weberian 
task of detailed digging into the specific transformations 
generating new forms of autonomy for the person. Of course, 
the Reformation, and especially its secularized aftermath,
• was one of those crucial transformations that rose toW)rld­
historical significance. Hence, we ask: even granting that 
the structural origin of the need for individual free inquiry 
might be the recession of traditional beliefs, what new sour­
• ces of legitimate moral authority broke through this heavy 
and ancient tradition? It is this notion of specific histor­
ical breakthroughs that is so often conspicuous by its ab­
sence from Durkheim's evolutionary outlook (see also Book
• Three). Surely no devout "laic" moralist like Durkheim would 
admit, for instance, that the Catholic Church, to this day 
the predominant congregation in France, simply rolled over 
and acquiesced in ~he historical inevitability demanded by
• the progressive division of social labor. On the contrary, 
it was the very tenacity of this cultural tradition in France 
in face of the centuries-long opposition from Huguenots, Jan­
senists, Enlightenment "philosophes," "laic" reformers, lib­
• erals, socialists, Marxists, and so forth, that makes the 
French tradition so tempestuous and anti-clerical. Unfortun­
ately, Durkheim's positivism and abstracted evolutionism-­
themselves reflections of the process he sought to under­
• stand--barred access here to analyses of specific historical 
challenges to traditional religious legitimations of embedded 
social structures. 
If they [traditional beliefs] still asserted themselves
• with equal energy, it would never occur to men to criti­cize them. If they still had the same authority, men 
would not demand the right to verify the source of this 
•
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authority. Reflection develops only if its development 
becomes imperative, if certain ideas and instinctive 
sentiments which have hitherto adequately guided con­
duct are found to have lost their efficacy. Then re­
. flection intervenes to fill the gap that hasappeared, 
but which it has not created. Just as reflection dis­
appears to~he extent that thought and action take the 
form of automatic habits, it awakens only when accepted 
habits become disorganized. It asserts its rights a­
gainst public opinion only when the latter loses 
strength, that is, when it is no longer prevalent to 
the same extent. If these assertions occur not met'ely 
occasionally and as passing crises, but become chronic; 
if individual consciences keep reaffirming their auto­
nomy, it is because they are constantly subject to con­
fI'ICting Impulses, because a new opinion has notformed 
to replace the old one no longer existing. If a new sys­
tem of beliefs were constituted which seemed as indis­
pensable as the old, no one would think of discussing it 
any longer. Its discussion would no longer be permitted; 
for ideas shared by an entire society draw from this 
consensus an authority that makes them sacrosanct and 
raises them above dispute. For them to have become tol­
erant, they must first already have become the object 
of less general and complete assent and have been weak­
ened by preliminary controversy * (5:158-9). 
To be sure, there are many valuable insights into sociocul­
tural change in this passage. However, one detects beneath 
the surface Durkheim's strongly positivist premises--namely, 
the rationalistic belief that the use of individual reason, 
as a substitute for tradition and collective control, emer­
ges to serve as an evolutionary "need" mechanically created 
(see also Book Three). One cannot help feeling ambivalent 
toward Durkheim's summary statement here: 
••. if it is correct to say that free inquiry once pro­
claimed, multiplies schisms, it must be added that it 
presupposes them, for it is claimed and instituted as a 
principle only in order to permit latent or half-de­
clared schisms to develop more freely (5:159). 
Such theses may accurately describe the historical situation 
in France; however, the complexities and paradoxes of complex 
sociocultural processes lead me to begin to part company with 
Durkheim here. 
Durkheim's generalized propositions are next applied to 
the specific problem of explaining the root reasons for the 
differential in Protestant-Catholic suicide rates. 
•
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... if Protestantism concedes a greater freedom to in­
dividual thought than Catholicism, it is because it has 
fewer cornmon beliefs and practices. Now, a religious so­
ciety cannot exist without a collective credo and the-­
more extensive the credo the more unified and strong-is 
the society. For it does not unite men by an exchange-­
and reciprocity of services, a temporal bond of union 
which permits and even presupposes differences, but 
which religious society cannot form. It socializes men 
only by attaching them completely to an identical body 
of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as this 
body of doctrine is extensive and firm ••.. The greater 
concessions a confessional group makes to individual 
judgment, the' less it dominates lives, the less its co­
hesion and vitality. We thus reach the first conclusion i
that the superiority of Protestantism with respect to 
suicide results from its being a less strongly integra­
ted church than the catholic Church * (S:159). . 
Again, Durkheim presumed that there are two main types of so­
cial solidarity: one based on a segmental society sharing an 
obligatory sacro-magical culture, and the modern complex type 
based upon occupational differentiation. Hence, there are two 
distinct historical paths to 'societal unity: the "repressive" 
type fused together through religious obligations, and the 
"liberal" modern type linked through occupational diversifi­
cation and the market place as nexus. Further, he presumed 
that the more the individual is released from the repressive 
control of the archaic, fused conscience (represented by the 
Catholic Church as an evolutionary holdover in the modern 
era, especially in France), the less cohesion and vitality 
in religious society. But such an explanation has certain 
embedded flaws (eg. see Parsons, 1949). For one can hardly 
believe that the modern social order is devoid of legitimi­
zing ethical foundations. Perhaps this is why Parsons, sensi­
tized to these problems by Weber, continued to insist on the. 
central importance of Durkheim's chapter on ·"Contractual Sol­
idarity" (eg. see Parsons, 1960a). Clearly,· Parsons believed 
that "contractual solidarity" is normatively underpinned by 
the Protestant Ethos. And Durkheim appears to confuse organ­
izational diversity with religio-cultural unity: but these 
are not necessarily congruent. To assert, for instance, that 
Protestant organizational diversity (always a problematic 
•
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situation), was responsible for the emergence of modern reli-)''\ 
gious individualism runs counter to the generally accepted
• 
~-----historical explanation that it was the "Protestant principle" 
itself which underlay the increasing diversity of Protestant 
denominations (eg. see Richard Niebuhr, 1929, William Haller, 
1955) . 
• Let us compare Durkheim's generalizations to those of 
Weber on the same subject. It is not certain, for instance, 
as Durkheim stated, that "The greater concessions a confessiorr 
al group makes to individual judgment, the less it dominates
• lives." For this abstract proposition, derived from Durk­
heim's general evolutionary schemas, neglects the crucial 
historical fact that was so significant to Weber--namely, 
that the "inner-worldly ascetic" of the Protestant sects re­
• presented a New Model Man in world history--the secular monk 
who tamed himself and the world for God's glory. The splin­
tered denominationalism of Protestantism was not the most 
significant fact to Weber; rather, it was the creation of a 
new rationalizing, individualistic order of lay ascetics and 
mystics whose emerging ethos, when progressively secularized 
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, trans­
formed the traditional social, cultural, political, and eco­
• nomic order. Thus, the very core of Weber's theses run coun­
ter to Durkheim's here; the latter's abstracted propositions 
concerning the recession of the archaic common conscience and 
the release of the organic ego are no match for the former's
• historical insight that with Protestantism a new type of in­
depth integration of the personality and internalization of 
sociocultural values was reached. Against Tawney and others, 
Parsons rightly insisted in The Structure of Social Action
• that Protestantism represented not simply the release of the 
individual from traditional control, but also the imposition 
and internalization of a new and even more rigorous type of 
moral discipline and social control. And so significant are
• these ethical sanctions for "inner-worldly asceticism," that 
Parsons added, echoing Rousseau, this enforced freedom--this 
absolute individualism and unending drive for perfection--may 
•
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have become too great a burden for some to bear. 
Now, Weber argued that Catholicism never penetrated 
the personality structure the way Protestantism did (eg. 
1963). While Durkheim's suggestion that Protestantism im­
plies weakness in modern religious organization may seem 
warranted because its splintered denominationalism repels 
centralized control, nonetheless, it also neglects other im­
portant factors. For only in liberal Protestantism is there 
found the type of rationalistic or liberated individual Durk­
heim appears to have had in mind. In fundamentalist Protes­
tantism there is neither the pervasive rationalism nor the 
weak organizational structure. Indeed, many conservative 
sects impose extremes of social discipline and mutual watch­
fulness that might repel a Catholic. In addition, the lack 
of central monocratic religious control does not allow one 
to summarily conclude, with Durkheim here, that religions 
"socialize men only by attaching them completely to an iden­
tical body of doctrine and socializes them in proportion as 
this body of doctrine is extensive and firm." ~tJhile this may 
be true in Durkheim's evolutionary schema of archaic reli­
gion, such a proposition is manifestly not true of modern 
religion, for example in America, the most resolutelyProtes­
tant nation of the "Protestant Era." The absence of an estab­
lished national church, and extreme denominational diversity, 
may simply mask an underlying religio-cultural unity, as in 
in America. Indeed, Weber (1973) himself observed that Pro­
testantism in America pervades almost all aspects of life, 
and comes closest here to be a true "folk religion" in the 
sense of being tacitly shared as a common tradition by all. 
Clearly, then, Durkheim's preliminary propositions 
concerning correlations between centrality of religious con­
trol and degree of religious penetration of society and per­
sonality are questionable. We must, therefore, regard with 
suspicion his first conclusion that the "superiority of Pro­
testantism with respect to suicide results from its being a 
less strongly integrated church than the Catholic." For if 
egoisme, Protestantism, and suicide are li.nked, as Durkheim 
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proposed, it must be for other reasons than that "men kill 
themselves because of loss of cohesion in religious society." 
B.	 The Anomaly of the Jews: High Intellectualism and 
Low Suicide Rates 
Durkheim next considered the seemingly anomalous case 
of the Jews, who combined low rates of suicide with high in­
tellectual achievement, professional status, upward mobility, 
and high economic achievement. As always, Jews appeared to 
out-Protestant the Protestants! However, Durkheim proceeded 
to detect here precisely the same factor protecting Jews 
from suicide that appeared to account fer the Protestant 
proclivity--namely, social integration . 
... the reproach to which the Jews have for so long 
been exposed by Christianity has created feelings of 
unusual solidarity among them. Their need for resist­
ing a general hostility, the very impossibility of free 
communication with the rest of the population, has for­
ced them into strict union with themselves. Consequent­
ly, each community became a small, compact, and coher­
ent society with strong feelings of self-consciousness 
and unity .••. The Jewish church has thus been more 
strongly united than any other, from its dependence on 
itself because of being the object of intolerance. By 
analogy with what has just been observed apropos of 
Protestantism, the same cause must therefore be assum­
ed for the slight tendency of the Jews to suicide .•.• 
Doubtless they owe this immunity to the hostility sur­
rounding them. But if this is its influence, it is not 
because it imposes a higher morality but because it o­
bliges them to live in greater union (S:159-60). 
Faced with the same intervening variable in both Protestan­
tism and Judaism, Dur~heim was here forced to explain how 
this same factor yet arises from different sources. Like We­
ber, then, for analytical purposes Durkheim used Jews as an 
internal check. For while Jews share high intellectualism 
with Protestant groups, Durkheim discovered that the crucial 
differentiating factor between these two religious groups 
having the highest and lowest suicide rates in Europe was 
the varying degree of social integration. Durkheim argued 
that the ostracism to which Jews were subjected in Christian 
Europe reinforced the traditional "mechanical integration" 
•
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of Judaism as an earlier religio-cultural system. 
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Besides, the ostracism to which they are subject is 
only one of the causes producing this result; the very 
nature of Jewish beliefs must contribute largely to it. 
Judaism, in fact, like all early religions, consists 
basically of a body of practices minutely governing all 
the details of life and leaving little room to indivi­
dual judgment (8:160). 
Now, as a "laicized" Jew, Durkheim noted that Judaism, 
in combining modern rationalistic individualism and ancient 
social solidarity, seems singularly free of the "diseases of 
the infinite" plaguing the modern world. Certainly, --it ap­
"--­pear~urkheim himself'was free of these collective 
pathologies; for his philosophy of 
-
"human finitude" (LaCapra, 
. 
1972) and the "gglden mean"
-
(see Book Three) as the norm for 
health and happiness rendered him immune. But one wonders 
whether other "laicized" Jews equally escaped, for it is un­
certain how far Judaism as a sociocultural system retreats 
as Judaism as a religion recedes from the foreground of per­
sonal concern. In any case, in the following explanation of 
Jewish intellectualism, note how much Durkheim's tacit "laic" 
positivist rationalism intrudes, going so far as to slight 
the crucial role of the Law and the rabbi in Jewish tradi­
tion; factors impossible for Durkheim not to be aware of, 
coming as he did from a long line of rabbis! 
The Jew seeks to learn, not in orqer to replace his 
collective prejudices by reflective thought, but mere­
ly in order to be better armed for the struggle. For 
him it is a means of off-setting the unfavorable posi­
tion imposed on him by opinion and sometimes by law. 
And since knowledge by itself has no influence upon a 
tradition in full vigor, he superimposes this intellec­
tual life upon his habitual routine with no effect of 
the former upon the latter. This is the reason for the 
complexity he presents. Primitive in certain respects, 
in others he is an intellectual and man of culture. He 
thus combines the advantages of the Severe discipline 
characteristic of small and ancient groups with the 
benefits of the intense culture enjoyed by our great so­
cieties. He has all the intelligence of modern man with­
out sharing his despair * (8:168). 
Thus, in terms of their similarities--high intellectualism, 
achievement, and upward mobility--Jews differ from Protest­
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tants in the historical conditions generating their respec­
tive desirel~{earning. Here "the exception proves the rule," 
for, in contrast to Judaism as a traditional "pariah reli­
gion," Protestants are forced to think for themselves be­
cuase of the breakdown of previous traditional normative 
direction, according to Durkheim. Indeed, the case of the 
Jews, Durkheim suggested: 
••. proves that if the suicidal tendency is great in 
educated circles, this is due, as we have said, to the 
weakening of traditional beliefs and to the state of 
moral individualism resulting from this; for it disap­
pears when education has another cause and res~onds to 
other needs (S:168). 
In addition, Durkheim held it as axiomatic that the higher 
the intellectual life, professionalization, and upward mo­
bility, the greater the affliction by "diseases of the in­
finite." 
The liberal professions and in a wider sense, the well­
to-do classes are certainly those with the liveliest 
taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual 
life .••• Suicide is undeniably exceptionally frequent 
in the highest classes of society (S:165). 
C.	 Suicide .Increases With Knowledge: An Apparent Correla­
tion 
But Durkheim was faced with another problem: if sui­
cide generally increases with higher intellectualism, are we 
then to conclude that greater knowledge itself is the cause? 
Let us first summarize Durkheim's causal linkages so far. His 
proposed sequence, at this point, goes like this: the uni­
versal social division of labor, ramifying occupational spe­
cialization, and the accompanying progressive social differ­
entiation, coupled with the corresponding "effacement of the 
segmental type of society," and the accompanying recession 
of the fused, sacro-magical collective conscience, means that 
the individual ego is thrown back on its resources. The re­
sult of the erosion of traditional moral and social supports 
is that the individual must, of necessity, bring his ownca­
pacity for reasoning to bear upon the mounting problems of 
existence in complex society (see also Chapter Eight, Book 
• 
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One}; this was part of Durkheim's notion of the increasing 
substitution of individual rational consciousness for ar­
chaic collective consciousness. And, in turn, the exercise 
of individual reason acts a further solvent of traditional 
mores, and thereby increases the need for further self-edu­
cation, in a reenforcing feedback process. 
But the problematics inherent in Durk~eim's symbolic 
equations that individual rational consciousness necessarily 
substitutes for the narrow and automatic dictates of the ear­
lier conscience collective are revealed in this passage: 
Does the craving for knowledge to the degree that it 
corresponds to a weakening of common faith really de­
velop as does suicide? The very facts that Protestants 
are better educated and commit suicide more than Catho­
lics is a first presumption for this (S:164). 
But, having seemed to have made the link between the educa­
ted intelligence of modern man and the type of modern des­
pair which may lead to suicide, Durkheim took pains--as a 
post-Enlightenment liberal--to exonerate free inquiry and 
the individual quest for rational knowledge from blame in e­
roding social solidarity. We shall further investigate the 
inner nature of this apparent correlation in Book Three. 
The taste for free inquiry can be aroused only if ac­
companied by that for learning. Knowledge is free 
thought's only means of achieving its purposes. ~fuen 
irrational beliefs or practices have lost their hold, 
appeal must be made, in.the search for others, to the 
enlightened consciousness of which knowledge is only 
the highest form. Fundamentally, these two tendencies 
are one and spring from the same source. ~ generally 
have the desire for self-instruction only 1nsofar as 
they are freed from the yoke of traditIOii'; for as long 
as the latter governS"Tntelligence it1S alJsufficient 
and jealous of any rival. On the other hand, light is 
sought as soon as customs whose origins are lost in ob­
scurity:no~gercorrespond to new necessitreS.'This 
is why philosophy, the first synthetic form of know­
ledge, appears as soon as religion has lost its sway, 
and only then: and is then followed progressively by 
the many single sciences with the further development 
of the very need which produced philosophy. Unless we 
are mistaken, if the progressive weakening of collective 
and customary prejudices produces a trend to suicide, 
and if Protestantism derives its special predisposition 
to suicide from it, the following two facts should be 
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noted: (1) the desire for learning must be stronger a­
mong Protestants than among Catholics; (2) insofar as 
this denotes a weakening of common beliefs, it should 
vary with suicide (8:162). 
And, of course, Durkheim's rule by which he rescued his cho­
sen cause is apparently confirmed by his statistics on dif­
ferences in popular education in Europe. It is striking that 
both Durkheim and Weber utilized in their classics educa­
tional differentials between Protestants and Catholics as 
supporting evidence for their theses . 
••. the level of primary instruction .•• has a certain 
relevance to the extent of the desire for knowledge of 
a people as a whole. A people must feel this need very 
keenly to try to spread its elements among the lowest 
classes. Thus to place the means of learning within 
everyone's reach, and even to legally forbid ignorance, 
shows a national awareness of the indispensability of 
broadened and enlightened intelligence of the indivi­
dual for the nation's own existence (8:163). 
However, Durkheim's Enlightenment rationalism again in­
trudes on historical reality. Indeed, Durkheim himself knew 
better, as he admitted in the following aside: "Actually, 
Protestant nations have so stressed primary instruction be­
cause they held that each individual must be able to under­
stand the Bible" (8:163). This curious (and accurate) admis­
sion highlights Durkheim's underestimation of the signifi­
cance of the internal logics of different historical reli­
gio-cultural systems. Indeed, Durkheim's causal theses here 
reveal more about his own core cultural commitments than a­
bout the original problem. Durkheim's explanations are them­
selves culture-bound. The goal of these "laic" reforming in­
tellectuals and public moralists was to wrest the schools 
away from clerical control, especially that of the Jesuits, 
and to inculcate there a new anti-metaphysical, rational, 
and "laic" morality (eg. see Henri Peyre, 1960~. H. Tint, 
1957; J.E.S. Hayward, 1960; LaCapra, 1972; Lukes, 1973). The 
crux of their effort centered around building " •.• a nation­
al awareness of the indispensability of broadened and enlight­
ened intelligence of the individual for the nation's own ex­
istence." 
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Having reviewed the logic of Durkheim's argument so
 
far, let us briefly summarize the empirical conclusions de­

• riving from the evidence he had so carefully marshalled from
 
generations of work in European "moral statistics" (see Jack
 
Douglas, 1966~ A. Giddens, 1965; Toby Huff, 1975). First,
 
statistics showed that suicide was chronic and increasingly

• general in the modern era. Second, by almost all accounts,
 
suicide is symptomatic of a basic breakdown in social and
 
cultural solidarity. Third, Protestants appeared to have had
 
the highest suicide rate of the three major European reli­

• gious congregations; Jews had the lowest rate. Fourth, one of
 
•
 
the distinguishing features of Protestantism, as contrasted
 
with Catholicism, is the taste for free inquiry and rational­

istic individualism. Fifth, the urban, educated, well-to-do
 
classes have the highest suicide rates; for some reason, it
 
•
 
appears that "poverty protects against suicide"! Sixth, al­

though Jews share high intellectualism with Protestants,
 
their love of learning derives from other historical necessi­

ties than is true of their more modern counterparts.
 
•
 
Now, true to his own special positivistic cultural com­

mitments, Durkheim began to try to extricate himself from a
 
potential difficulty implied in the preceding empirical con­

clusions. For he next argued that although the quest for 
knowledge and its highest form, modern science, are nominal­
ly associated with higher suicide rates, the apparent corre­
• 
lation is not causa.11y significant. Indeed, according to 
Durkheim, far from reason and the individual representing 
the pathological agents, they are, on the contrary, the only 
real means of remedying European "moral anarchy." 
•
 
••. we see why as a rule suicide increases with know­

•
 
ledge. Knowledge does not determine this progress. It
 
is innocent; nothing is more unjust than to accuse it,
 
and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively.
 
But these two facts result simultaneously from a single
 
state which they translate into different forms. Man
 
seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss
 
of cohesion in religious society; he does not kill him­
self because of his learning. It is ••• not the learning 
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he acquires that disorganizes religioni but the desire 
for learning awakens because religion became~sorgani­
zed. Knowledge is not sought as a means to destroy ac­
cepted opinions but because their destruction has com­
menced .... Faith is not uprooted by dialectic proof; it 
must be already shaken by other causes to be unable to 
withstand the shock of argument * (8: 168-9) • 
Thus, Durkheim suggested that education and suicide are indi­
rectly correlated with a deeper transformation of European 
society: the fading of "mechanical solidarity" and the lack 
of any new and compelling order to replace it. In this situa­
tion of "collective asthenia," the ego has been thrown out, 
alone, on its meager resources. If the isolated individual is 
to survive the birth pangs of the modern world, his reflec­
tive intelligence must play an ever larger role in existence. 
At this point, the outline of Durkheim's first schema 
of suicide is unfolding fairly clearly: as the common con­
science of archaic societies recedes before the pressure of 
the progressive division of labor, the pre-social ego is re­
leased from traditional forms of social constraint and must 
confront the world on its own inadequate terms. As an ardent 
positivist and post-Enlightenment liberal, Durkheirn issued 
an eloquent defense of the importance of knowledge and sci­
ence in the evolving social order, especially against Catho­
lics on the conservative right who trumpeted, in effect, 
"look what has happened--we told you so!" 
Far from knowledge being the source of the evil, it is 
its remedy, the only remedy we have. Once established 
beliefs have been carried away by the current of af­
fairs, they cannot be artificially reestablished. Once 
the social instinct is blunted, intelligence is the 
only guide left us and we have to reconstruct a con­
science by its means. Dangerous as is the undertaking, 
there can be no hesitation, for we have no choice. Let 
those who view anxiously and sadly the ruins of an­
cient beliefs, who feel all the difficulties of these 
critical times, not ascribe to science an evil it has 
not caused but rather which it tries to cure! Beware 
of treating it as an enemy! It has not the dissolvent 
effect ascribed to it, but is the only weapon for our 
battle against the dissolution which gives birth to 
science itself. It is noernanswer to denounce it. The 
authority of vanished traditions will never be restored­
by silencing it; we shall only be more powerless to re­
place them (8:169). 
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Durkheirn concluded his first chapter on egoistic sui­
cide by reiterating his arguments concerning the importance 
of social cohesion in preventing suicides. His next task was 
to begin to spell out some of the reasons why loss of social 
cohesion or low social integration should lead to suicide. 
Characteristically, his explanation was a good deal more sub­
tle than the common summaries or reductions. Noting that "in 
general, religion has a prophylactic effect on suicide," 
Durkheim contended that: 
If religion protects man against the desire for self­
destruction, it is not because it preaches the respect 
for his own person to him with arguments sui generis~ 
but because it is a society. What constitutes this so­
ciety is the-existence of a certain number of beliefs 
and practices common to all the faithful, traditional, 
and thus obligatory. The more numerous and strong these 
collective states of mind are, the stronger the inte-· 
gra~ion of the T.'71IgiouscornrnunITY,. and also thegreat­
er lts preservatlve value. The detal1 of dogmas and 
rItes-are secondary. The essential thing is that they 
be capable of supportIng a sufficiently intense-correc­
trve life. And because the Protestant church has less 
consistency than the others, it has less moderating ef­
fect on suicide * (S:170). 
D. Egoisme as Lack of Social Integration 
Durkheim next proceeded to explore further empirical 
evidence that egoistic suicide results from loss of cohesion 
in society. Specifically, he argued that the greater the de­
gree of integration of domestic and political society, the 
greater their "coefficient of preservation." Of course, he 
was heading for his famous summary that "Suicide varies in­
versely with the degree of integration in society." Let us 
briefly explore Durkheim's causal propositions in chapter 
three of Book Two. 
But if religion preserves men from suicide only because 
and insofar as it is a society, other societies proba­
bly have the same effect. From this point of view, let 
us consider the family and political society (5:171). 
As always, Durkheirn's discussion is complex, and not without 
some problems. I personally do not think that Durkheim's ex­
amples concerning domestic society, for instance, serve as 
•
 
• 
--517-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
the best illustrations of his theses. For Durkheim's doc­
trines concerning marriage and womanhood are often inconsis­
tent; indeed, Barclay Johnson (1965:881) has suggested that 
"So muddla:l and fluctuating a doctrine must have been made up 
as circumstances required, quite after the fact." Barbara 
Cashion (1970) also has been critical of Durkheim's implied 
sociology of women. However, Cashion rightly emphasizes the 
significance of the notion of insatiability underlying Durk­
heim's discussion. She observed that, to Durkheim, the pos­
sibility of divorce--which meant the opening up of potential­
ly unlimited emotional and sexual horizons--itself contribu­
ted to matrimonial anomie. Indeed, Cashion proposed that as 
women become more liberated, they may also become as vulner­
able to anomie as men. With changing sex roles, "open mar­
riage," more divorces than marriages, and so on, Cashion 
makes part of Durkheim's sociology of the family and marriage 
look prescient when she concludes: "The roots of future mari­
tal anomie may be found in the decreasing responsibilities 
and limitations of the marriage partners, and the increasing 
wealth and freedom of the partners" (1970:78). 
In any case, Durkheim chose domestic society as simply 
another empirical confirmation of his basic thesis concerning 
the importance of social integration. In these terms, the 
following passage is one of Durkheim's most cogent statements 
of the sociological principles governing the "laws" of "the 
"coefficient of preservation" in society, whether domestic, 
political, or religious. 
The density of a group cannot sink without its vitality 
diminishing. Where collective sentiments are strong, ~t 
is because the force with which they affect each indi­
VTdual consCIence is echOed in all the others, and re­
ciprocally. The intensity they attarn-therefore~pends 
on the number of consciences which react to them in com­
mon:-:-:-. Consequently, in a family of smallnumber'8"';" com­
mon sentiments and memories cannot be very intense; for 
there are not enough consciences in which they can be 
represented and reinforced by sharing them. No such pow­
erful traditions can be formed there as unite the members 
of a single group, even surviving it and attaching suc­
cessive generations to one another. Small families are 
also inevitably short-lived; and without duration no so­
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ciety can be stable. Not only are collective states weak 
in such a group, but they cannot be numerous; for their 
number depends on the active interchange of views and 
impressions, on the circulation of these views and im­
pressions from one person to another; and, on the other 
hand, this very exchange is the more rapid the more per­
sons there are participating in it. In a sufficiently 
dense society, this circulation is uninterrupted; for 
some social units are always in contact, whereas if there 
are few their relations can only be intermittent and 
there will be moments when the common life is suspended. 
Likewise, when the family is small, few relatives are 
ever together; so that domestic life languishes, and the 
home is occasionally deserted * (8:201-2). 
Essentially, Durkheim proposed here that higher rates of sus­
tained interpersonal interaction act to create and sustain 
both society and individuals. Hence, any factor that serves 
to bind people more closely together through time and space, 
that acts to increase the longevity and intensity of social 
interaction, increases the "coefficient of preservation." 
Thus, group process serves as Durkheim's first analytic~key. 
Nhat remains to be explained, however, as too many sociolo­
gists have ignored, is why Durkheim thought lessened social 
interaction and integration should lead to suicide. 
But for a group to be said to have less common life 
than another means that it is less powerfully integra­
ted; for the state of integration of a social aggregate 
can only reflect the intensity of the collective life 
circulating in it. It is more unified and powerful the 
more active andconstant is the intercourse among its 
members. Our previous conclusion may thus be completed 
to read: just as the family is a powerful safeguard a­
gainst suicide, so the more strongly it is constituted 
the greater its protection * (8:202). . 
Durkheim next extended the same thesis to statistics 
concerning suicides in relation to the integration of polit­
ical society. Basically, Durkheimargued that whenever pas­
sions are aroused by a great event or crisis in the public 
or political life of a people, the tendency to centrifugal 
egoism is checked. Egos are moralized, that is, brought in­
to sustained contact with a public life and ideal higher than 
their own interest. The very act of bringing people together 
thus increases the "coefficient of preservation." 
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... great social disturbances and great popular wars 
rouse collective sentiments, stimulate partisan spirit 
and patriotism, political and national faith alike, and 
concentrating activity toward a single end, at least 
temporarily cause a stronger integration of society. 
The salutary influence which we have just shown to ex­
ist is due not to the crisis but to the struggles it 
occasions. As they force men to close ranks and con­
front the common danger, the individual thinks less of 
himself and more of the common cause. Besides, it is 
comprehensible that this integration may not be purely 
momentary but may sometimes outlive its immediate caus­
es, especially when it is intense (S:208). 
Having explored comparative statistics in three differ­
ent sub-types of society, Durkheim then offered the following 
explicit summaries of his theses. 
Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
 
of religious society.
 
Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
 
of domestic society. ---- --­
Suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration
 
~f pOlitical society .••. ------­
So we reach the general conclusion: suicide varies in­

versely with the degree of integration of the sociar­

groups o~i~the indiVidual forms a part *(S :208-9).
 
This summary proposition is, of course, the most famous of 
Durkheim's explicit theses in Suicide. It has served as the 
basis, for instance, of Halbwachs' (1930) formulation, and 
for Gibbs and Martin's (eg. 1964) later notion of "status 
integration and suicide" (see appendix). Perhaps subsequent 
sociologists have lavished attention on this single concise 
formula because it was Durkheim's only explicit summary of 
his very complex theses, or because it seemed to resonate 
with American sociologists' concern with social integration, 
disorganization, and social control. However, as we shall 
soon discover, Durkheim'~ seminal formula concealed as much 
as it revealed. For Durkheim did not mean by social integra­
tion, for example, what many of his followers presume in u­
sing the same term. Durkheim used "social" to refer not only 
to what present sociologists term as "social," but to cul­
tural life as well. Moreover, the social and cultural spheres 
together represented the "moral life" to Durkheim. Further, 
•
 
•	 
--520-­
Durkheim's critical notion of man as homo duplex meant that
 
if sufficiently high rates of social interaction and cultural

• intensity were not maintained, society itself was in constant
 
•
 
danger of lapsing back into a welter of autistic egos. Clear­

ly, most contemporary sociologists do not share Durkheim's
 
image of human nature. Therefore, for these and other reasons
 
which shall become apparent, their implicit explanations of
 
•
 
why lessened rates of social integration should lead to sui­

cide are often very different (see appendix). Durkheim's ex­

planation of egoisme and suicide, much less anomie, is simply
 
•
 
not yet understood in its full complexity. Let us now atte~pt
 
to unravel the twists and turns in Durkheim's developing the­

ory that suicide rates are inversely related to social inte­

gration.
 
E.	 Egoisme Explained: The Release of the Pre-Social Ego 
From Traditional Constraints 
Society cannot disintegrate without the individual si- ~ 
•
 
multaneously detaching himself from social life, with­

•
 
out his own goals becoming preponderant over those of
 
the community, in a word, without his personality tend­

ing to surmount the collective personality. The more
 
weakened the groups to which he belongs, the less he
 
depends on them, the more he consequently depends only
 
on himself and recognizes no other rules of conduct
 
•
 
than what are founded on his own private interests. If
 
we agree to call this state egoism in which the indivi­

dual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of the
 
social ego and at its expense, we may call egoistic the
 
special type of suicide springing from excessive indi­

vidualism.
 
But how can suicide have such an origin (S:209)? 
•
 
Indeed, how can suicide be caused by the lack of social
 
integration? Why should social isolation precipitate suicide?
 
Contemporary sociologists seem so permeated by the group per­

spective that apparently they assume that the isolated indi­
vidual	 is almost inevitably crushed by the lack of enduring 
social	 supports. But I do not believe that the 'answer is so 
•	 
simple, and neither did Durkheim. For he next began to spell 
out his basic explanatory logics. He began by introducing a­
nother key variable intervening between isolation and suicide 
•
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--namely, the lack of objects or goals for individual action 
(see Giddens, 1971b). The first reason, then, why lack of so­
• cial integration underlies egoistic suicides is that the pre­
social ego becomes demoralized, as it were, and as a result 
egocentricity asserts itself at the expense of the moral life 
found only in society and culture. The individual ego is a­
• moral, only society is moral. The pre-socialized or organic 
ego is unable, by itself, to rise above its own fatally cir­
cumscribed concerns. Let us now explore further how Durk­
heim's doctrine of morality and the dualism of human nature
• underlay his theses on suicide. 
To his own question--nhow can suicide be born of ex­
cessive individualism"--Durkheim gave this reply: 
First of all •.• as collective force is one of the ob­
• stacles best calculated to restrain suicide, i~weaken­ing involves a development of suicide. l~en society is 
strongly integrated, it holds individuals under its con­
trol, considers them at its service, and thus forbids 
them to dispose willfully of themselves. Accordingly, 
it opposes their evading their duties to it through
• death. But how could society impose its supremacy upon 
• 
them when they refuse to accept this subordination as 
regItImate? It no longer then possesses the requisite 
authority to retain them in their duty if they wish to 
desert; and conscious of its own weakness, it even re­
cognizes their right to do so freely what it can no 
longer prevent. So far as they are the admitted masters 
of their destinies, it is their privilege to end their 
lives. They, on the their part, have no reason to endure 
life's sufferings patiently. For they cling to life more 
resolutely when belonging to a group they love, so as 
not to betray interests they put before their own. The 
bond that unites them with the common cause attaches 
them to life and the lofty goal they envisage prevents 
their feeling personal troubles so deeply. There is, in 
short, in a cohesive and animated society a constant in­
terchange of ideas and feelings from all to each and 
each to all, something like mutual moral support, which 
instead of throwing the individual on his own resources, 
leads him to share in the collective energy and sup­
ports his own when exhausted * (S:209-l0). 
Since contemporary sociologists commonly presume that the in­
dividual only becomes fully human when socialized, there 
seems to be little problem in assuming that when the process 
is reversed--when the individual becomes, in effect, deso­
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cialized, that the isolated ego has lost its very reason for 
living. We have little trouble today in positing that social 
• interaction and heightened social intensity energize the in­
dividual. Indeed, it is this tacit consensus which has help­
ed give Durkheim's thesis on suicide its hallowed status as 
a classic over the last three-quarters century. For not only ­
• did his classic Suicide help establish the autonomy of socio­
logy as a separate discipline, but it also provided the very 
paradigm of modern sociological structural theory--namely, 
that breakdown in social structure leads to breakdown in 
• psychological well-being and balance. Would, however, most 
sociologists blink twice if it were pointed out that the very 
pioneer who was later enshrined as a founding father insisted 
that this is only a secondary and insufficient explanation?
• The reasons we have so persistently misrepresented 
Durkheim's theses on suicide are rather simple at base. We 
have neglected both his evolutionary framework and his doc­
trine of the dualism of human nature. We have neglected to
• portray Durkheim as a moral philosopher who worked sociolo­
gically. Specifically, this meant that Durkheim conceived of 
suicide as a process involving two basic processes: the 
breakdown of traditional social control and the breakthrough
• of the directionless and proportionless passions of the pre­
socialized ego. I repeat: the structural factor which most 
sociologists have taken as the decisive element of a socio­
logical explanation of suicide--the breakdown of social in­
• tegration--was not considered by Durkheim to be the critical 
factor. Rather, social isolation, lack of social cohesion, 
low social participation, low status integration, etc.--how­
ever one wishes to state the same reality--acted, in Durk­
• heim's theory, merely as the precipitating or releasing con­
dition of the insatiable and self-centered passions of the 
organic ego. In regard to the breakdown of social integra­
•
 
tion, Durkheim himself insisted:
 
But these reasons are purely secondary. Excessive in­
dividualism not only results in favoring the action of 
suicidogenic causes, but is itself such a cause. It not 
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only frees man's inclination to do away with himself 
from a protective obstacle, but creates this inclina­
tion out of whole cloth and thus gives birth to a spe­
cial SUfcIde which bears its mark. This must be clear­
~nderstood for this is wha~nstItUtes-the-special 
Character of the type o~surcrde just distinguished and 
justifies the name we nave given it. tihat is there then 
in this individualism that explains this result * 
(S:2l0)? 
We might have suspected that something was wrong with most of 
our summaries of his theses, for if in his first type of sui­
cideDurkheim merely meant to refer to structural breakdown, 
why then did he call it by that curious name--egoistic ? 
Clearly, Durkheim meant by this designation to indicate that 
with the loss of social cohesion, the ego grows ascendant, 
and becomes demoralized. Durkheim's first suicidal type, 
then, is, at root, caused by the release of this "excessive 
individualism." But how can this be so? Is this really a so­
ciological explanation? The answer--an embarassing one to 
sociological theory--is: ~, at base, Durkheim'~ seemingly 
purely sociological explanation of the root causes of egois­
tic suicide is not really sociological after all! (See also 
Book Three for further evidence). Durkheim's answer to his 
own question. "What is there in this individualism?" is, in­
stead, derived from moral philosophy. 
In this vein, Durkheim proceeded to consider the oft­
stated notion that man needs a transcending purpose, a rai­
son d'etre. But in its traditional form, Durkheim rejected 
the usual formulation of this problem. To him the dilemma is 
not merely the absence of transcending ideals, but also the 
presence of destructive egocentric passions. 
It has sometimes been said that because of his psycho­
logical constitution, man cannot live without attach­
ment to some object which transcends and survives him, 
and that the reason for this necessity is a need we 
must have not to perish entirely. Life is said to be 
intolerable unless some reason for existing is involved, 
some purpose justifying life's trials. The individual 
alone is not a sufficient end for his activity. He is 
too little. He is not only hemmed in spatially; he is 
also limited temporally. When, therefore, we have no 
other object than ourselves we cannot avoid the thought 
that our efforts will finally end in nothingness, since 
•
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we ourselves disappear. But annihalation terrifies us. 
Under these conditions one would lose courage to live, 
that is, to act and struggle, since nothing will remain
• of our exertions. The state of egoism is supposed to be 
• 
contradictory to human nature and, consequently, too 
uncertain to have chances of permanence (8:210). 
One cannot help but acknowledge that such a position enjoys 
a certain resonance with us, even today. But it was not Durk­
heim's position. 
•
 
As Durkheim proceeded to criticize this common argu­

ment, and to restate it in more acceptable form, we would do
 
well to observe Durkheim here at his rhetorical and dialecti­

•
 
cal best--a moralist philosophizing on the social and cultur­

al dimensions of man, often reaching profound and even poetic
 
insights into the human condition. That such a book as 8ui­

cide should not only be considered a methodological classic,
 
but also a social philosophical classic, is testimony to the 
genius of a founding father who combined, in a natural way, 
what we rent asunder. 
•
 
In this absolute formulation, the proposition is vulner­

able. If the thought of the end of our personality were 
• 
really so hateful, we could consent to live only by 
blinding ourselves voluntarily as to life's value. For 
if we may in a measure avoid the prospect of annihala­
tion, we cannot extirpate it; it is inevitable, what­
ever we do. We may push back the frontier for some gen­
erations, force our name to endure for some years or 
centuries longer than our body; a moment, too soon for 
most men, always comes when it will be nothing. For the 
groups we join in order to prolong our existence by 
their means are themselves mortal; they too must dis­
solve, carrying with them all our deposits of ourselves. 
Those are few whose memories are closely bound enough 
to the very history of humanity to be assured of living 
until its death. 80, if we really thirsted after immor­
tality, no such brief perspective could ever appease us. 
Besides, what of usis it that lives? A word, a sound, 
an imperceptible trace, most often anonymous ••.• It is 
therefore untrue that life is only possible by its pos­
sessing its rationale outside of itself (8:210-11). 
Next, Durkheim imperceptibly shifted the grounds of 
argument. He observed that there are a whole range of func­
tions that pertain only to the individual--namely, organic 
needs. Now, the critical thing to note about such biological 
functions is not only that they are individually circurnscrib­
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ed, but also that they are limited ~ their very nature. On 
the contrary, truly human (that is, sociocultural) functions
• not only have their purpose outside the ego, but also they 
are potentially unlimited. Man's estate, then, and his bur­
den, is to live on these higher "civilizational" levels. 
These functions serve by merely serving him. Insofar
• 
as he has no other needs, he is therefore self-suffi­
cient and can live happily with no other objective 
than living. This is not the case, however, with the 
civilized adult. He has many ideas, feelings, practi­
ces, unrelated to organic needs. The roles of art, mor­
ality, religion, political faith, science itself, are
• 
not to repair organic exhaustion nor to provide sound 
functioning of the organs. All this supra-physical life 
is built and expanded not because of the demands of the 
cosmic environment, but because of the demands of the 
social environment. The influence of society is what 
has aroused in us the sentiments of sympathy and soli­
• 
darity drawing us toward others: it is society Which, 
fashioning us in its own image, fills us with reli­
gious, political, and moral beliefs that control our 
actions. To play our social role we have striven to ex­
tend our intelligence and it is still society that has 
supplied us with tools for this development by trans­
• mitting to us its trust fund of knowledge (S:2ll-~2). 
Thus, man is the cultural animal. The biological ego, once 
moralized, is changed--the human person is born (see Book 
One). Conscience is awakened, a higher mental life begins.
• And since this new moral and intellectual life, what Chardin
 (1961) called the "noosphere," emerges from society and cul­

ture, it continues to focus individual energies on cultural
 
ideals.
 
• Through the very fact that these superior forms of hu­

•
 
man activity have a collective origin, they have a col­

lective purpose. As they derive from society, they have
 
reference to it; rather they are society itself incar­

nated in each of us. But for them to have a raison
 
d'etre in our eyes, the purpose they envisage must not
 
be one indifferent to us. We can cling to these forms
 
•
 
of human activity only to the degree that we cling to
 
society itself. Contrariwise, in the same measure as we
 
feel detached from society, we become detached from that
 
life whose source and aim is society. For what purpose
 
do these rules of morality, these precepts of law bind­

ing us to all sorts of sacrifices, these restrictive
 
dogmas exist, if there is no being outside of us whom 
they serve and in whom we participate? If its only use 
is to increase our chances for survival, it does not 
•
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deserve the trouble it entails. Instinct acquits itself 
better of this role; animals prove this. Why substitute 
for it a more hesitant and uncertain reflection (8:2l2)? 
Not only is man called to this higher life, but, as 
Durkheim observed, this emergent evolution is not without 
costs to the ego. Certainly, there are benefits: the biologi­
cal ego is introduced to a new morally superior and intellec­
tually intense life. But, on the other hand, the higher moral 
life of human civilization is a difficult calling, for it in­
volves not only anxiety and uncertainty, but suffering (see 
also Book Three). Higher life is a trial; if the individual 
loses the focus of this moral life, what purpose has he left? 
Why should the trial be endured? 
~fuat is the end of suffering above all? If the value of 
things can only be estimated by their relation to this 
positive evil for the individual, it is without reward 
and incomprehensible. This problem does not exist for 
the believer firm in his faith or the man strongly bound 
by ties of domestic or poli tical society. Instinctively 
and unreflectively they ascribe all that they are and do, 
the one to his Church or his God, .the living symbol of 
the Church, the other to his family, the other to his 
country or party. Even in their sufferings they see only 
a means of glorifying the group to which they belong and 
thus do homage to it. 80, the Christian ultimately de­
sires and seeks suffering to testify more fully to his 
contempt for the flesh and more fully resemble his di­
vine model. But the more the believer doubts, that is, 
the less he feels himself a real participant in the re­
ligous faith to which he belongs, and from which he is 
freeing himself, the more the family and community be­
come foreign to the individual, so much the more does 
he become ~ mystery ~ himself, unable to escape the ex­
asperating and agoniz1ng question: to what purpose * 
(8:2l2)? 
Of course, one of the classic formulations of man's 
dilemma is the notion of homo duplex. Now, without this cru­
cial distinction between ego and person, and the characteri­
zation of the pre-social ego as inherently egocentric, pas­
sionate, and even insatiable, Durkheim'~ theory of egoisme 
and anomie, and the corresponding need for constant moral 
discipline and goals for individual action makes little 
sense. For the image of man as homo duplex lies at the very 
foundation of Durkheim's sociological theory of morality, 
•
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religion, and knowledge. Civilized man, Durkheim posited, is 
"double," and this dilemma is the source of our troubles. On 
the one hand, there is the organic ego; on the other, there 
is the moralized (socialized) person. Social man is superim­
posed over top of physical man. 
If •.• as has often been said, man is double, that is 
because social man superimposes~mself upon PhYS1caf 
man. Social man necessarily presupposes a society which 
he expresses and serves. If this dissolves, if we no 
longer feel in it existence and action about and above 
us, whatever is social in us is deprived of all objec­
tive foundation. All that remains is an artificial com­
bination of illusory images, a phantasamagoria vanish­
ing at the least reflection; that is, nothing which can 
be the goal of our action. Yet this social man is the 
essence of civilized man; he is the masterpiece of ex­
istence. Thus we are bereft of reasons for existence; 
for the only life to which we could cling no longer cor­
responds to anything actual; the only existence still 
based upon reality no longer meets our needs. Because. 
we have been initiated into a higher existence, the one 
which satisfies an animal or a child can satisfy us no 
more and the other itself fades and leaves us helpless. 
So there is nothing more for our efforts to lay hold of, 
and we feel them lose themselves in emptiness. In this 
sense it is true to say that our activity needs an ob­
ject transcending it. We do not need it to maintain our­
selves in the illusion of an impossible immortality~ it 
is implicit in our moral constitution and cannot be even 
partially lost without this losing its raison d'etre in 
the same degree. No proof is needed that in such-a-Btate 
of confusion the least cause of discouragement may easi­
ly give birth to desperate resolutions. If life is not 
worth the trouble of living, everything becomes a pre­
text to rid ourselves of it *(S:2l3). 
It is not altogether clear whether Durkheim meant that with 
the breakdown of social integration, and the corresponding 
recession of cultural ideals, the moralized person finds him­
self bereft of reasons for existence, or whether the pre-so­
cial ego supersedes its socialized counterpart. It would seem 
that Durkheim would not have named this type "egoistic" if he 
did not mean to imply that, as society and the moralized per­
son fade in intensity and purpose, the individual lapses back 
into the self-centered egoisms of nature. Yet, since both 
meanings seem to be implied here, perhaps we can surmise that 
his underlying doctrine had not yet been fully worked out 
•
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{see especially Book Three}. 
Next, Durkheim added a crucial qualification to this 
notion of social breakdown and cultural anemia--namely, that 
the specific forms taken by egoisme {and anomie} are deter­
mined by cultural or 'hational temperament." This insight 
shall serve as one important foundation for my second schema 
{see Book Three}. 
One of the constitutive elements of every national tem­
perament consists of a certain way of estimating the 
value of existence. There is a collective as well as an 
individual humor inclining peoples to sadness or cheer­
fulness, making them see things in bright or somber 
lights. In fact, only society can pass a collective opin­
ion on the value of human life: for this the individual 
is incompetent. The latter knows nothing but himself and 
his own little horizon: thus his experience is too limi­
ted to serve as a basis for a general appraisal • 
••• On the contrary, without sophistry, society may gen­
eralize its own feelings as to itself, its state of 
health or lack of health. For individuals share too deep­
ly in the life of society for it to be diseased without 
their suffering infection. What it suffers, they neces­
sarily suffer. Because it is the whole, its ills are com­
municated to its parts. Hence it cannot disintegrate 
without awareness that the regular conditions of general 
existence are equally disturbed. Because society is the 
end on which our better selves depend, it cannot feel us 
escaping it without a simultaneous realization that our 
activity is purposeless. Since we are its handiwork, 
society cannot be conscious of its own decadence with­
out the feeling that henceforth this work is of no value 
{S: 2l3-l4} . 
This passage is most significant. For in addition to the sug­
gestion that the tendency to egoisme is connected with cer­
tain "national temperaments," Durkheim here set out in am­
biguous form his underlying causal model. "Society generali­
zes its own feelings of itself," whether healthy or sick. 
Durkheim's profundity, his tendency to anthropomorphize so­
ciety, his Rousseauean undercurrents, all are to be found in 
this provocative passage. Yet it is not clear, again, which 
comes first: does society begin to breakdown, "feel" egos 
detaching themselves and wandering aimlessly around, and 
then 'generalize" its own sickness, in a kind of on-going 
feedback cycle? Or, rather, do egos begin to successfully 
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resist social control and moral direction, break down the so­
cial bond, and so forth? Whatever Durkheim really intended to 
say, his statements are often ambiguous in their deeper im­
port. However, we shall follow Durkheim in assuming that the 
conditions precipitating egoistic suicides are "'felt" on a 
wider societal basis. 
As Durkheim continued developing this line of thought, 
his hypostatizing language ramified and deepened. Instead of 
lone isolated egos, Durkheim spoke of the egoismic condition 
as carried by definite "social currents" (see also Part I, 
Book Three). These "social currents" seem to generalize the 
breakdown of the social bond. 
Thence are formed currents of depression and disillu­
sionment emanating from no particular individual but 
expressing society's state of disintegration. They re­
flect the relaxation of social bonds, a sort of collec­
tive asthenia, or social malaise, just as individual sad­
ness, when chronic, in its way reflects the poor organic 
state of the individual. Then metaphysical systems and 
religious systems spring up which, by reducing these ob­
scure sentiments to formula, attempt to prove to men the 
senselessness of life and that its self-deception to be­
lieve that life has purpose. Then new moralities origin­
ate which, by elevating facts to ethics, commend suicide 
or at least tend in that direction by suggesting a mini­
mal existence. On their appearance, they seem to have 
been created out of whole cloth by their makers who are 
sometimes blamed for the pessimism of their doctrines. 
In reality they ~ an effect rather than a cause; they 
they merely symbo11ze in abstract language and systema­
tic form the physiological distress of the body social. 
[Footnote: this is why it is unjust to accuse these 
theorists of sadness of generalizing personal impres­
sions. They are the echo of a general condi tion] * (8: 214). 
While Durkheim is correct, to a certain extent, to insist on 
a social structural approach to the origin of philosophical 
and ethical perspectives, on the other hand, to insist cate­
gorically that systems of thought and moralities critical of 
life and the world are always and everywhere, at root, simply 
reflections of the "relaxation of social bonds" is to impose 
a positivistic and limited model over the complexities and 
paradoxes of historical process. Although Durkheim's basic 
causal model here observed how changes become "culturally 
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generalized," and feedback to further alter individuals and 
society itself again, he did not here allow the possibility 
that such moral critiques may themselves lead, ultimately, 
to social structural transformations. In other words, he ap­
peared to rule out of court that the causal arrow may just 
as well lead from culture to structure as well as from struc­
ture to culture. 
At many places Durkheim's statements grew more ambig­
uous in terms of causal priority (see also Part I, Book 
Three). Indeed, I shall later marshall evidence from his own 
texts showing Durkheim himself saying that anomie and egoisme 
are caused by collective currents, that is, sanctioned by 
cultural ideals and values. It can hardly be imagined, in 
that case, why society would generalize and idealize these 
"exaggerated individualisms" and "drives for progress and 
perfection" if they lead to its own dissolution. But for 
now, Durkheim had not crossed over this bridge. 
As these currents are collective, they have, by vir­
tue of their origin an authority which they impose u­
pon the individual and they drive him more vigorously 
on the way to which is already inclined by the state 
of moral distress directly aroused in him by that dis­
integration of society. Thus, at every moment that, 
with excessive zeal, he frees himself from the social 
envircrment, he still submits to its influence. However 
individualized a man may be, there is always something 
collective remaining--the very depression and melan­
choly resulting from this same exaggerated individual­
ism. He effects communion through sadness when he has 
no longer anything else with which to achieve it (5:214). 
Almost inevitably, Durkheim's concern as a moral philosopher 
over modern "moral anarchy" and his keen empirical insight 
into the ravages of the modern "infinity sickness" led him 
away from his rather simple mechanical "structural feedback" 
model. Indeed, the contradiction implied in proposing that 
society, in effect, promotes its own destruction through 
self-homicide had apparently not occured to Durkheim. That 
some other factors might be operating here, in a rather dif­
ferent way than Durkheim's explicitly positivistic causal 
model allowed, can be seen by an insightful comment into the 
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empirical sanctioning of egoisme: 
Today neurasthenia is rather considered a mark of dis­
tinction than a mark of weakness. In our refined socie­
ties, enamoured of things intellectual, nervous members 
constitute almost a nobility (5:181). 
The ambiguity of Durkheim's causal theory underlying 
egoistic suicide can also be seen from the followinq summary, 
in which egoisme is seen both as an effect of the "relaxa­
tion of social bonds" and as a cause of this "collective as­
thenia." Moreover, whether this type of suicide is called e­
goistic because the pre-social ego "asserts itself" in the 
face of social ideals, or because the individual has only 
himself and his localized interests to fall back on after 
the "higher existence into which he had been initiated" faded 
is not clear. 
Hence this type of suicide well deserves the name we 
have given it. Egoisme is not merely a contributing 
factor in it~ ~ is its generating cause. In this case, 
the bond attach1ng men to life relaxes because that at­
taching him to society is itself slack. The incidents 
of private life which seem the direct inspiration of 
suicide and are considered its determining causes are 
in reality only incidental causes. The individual yields 
to the slightest shock of circumstances because the 
state of society has made him a ready prey to suicide . 
.•• as thought and activity develop, they increasingly 
overflow antiquated forms. But then he nee~others. 
Because he is a more complex social being, he can main­
tain his equilibrium only by finding more points of sup­
port outside himself, and it is because his moral bal­
ance depends on a larger number of conditions that he 
is more easily disturbed *(5:214-15, 216). 
Durkheim thus concluded this chapter by outlining a balance 
theory of psychological well-being. After being initiated in­
to the higher moral and intellectual existence of human cul­
ture, the person becomes increasingly dependent on more and 
varied types of social and cultural life~ indeed, "all life 
is a complex equilibrium." When this complex balance becomes 
upset, when the myriad points of mutual dependence become al­
tered, the internal psychological balance is correspondingly 
upset. This notion of equilibrium and health and even virtue 
as a balance or "golden mean" is fundamental to Durkheim's 
perspective on normality and pathology. 
•
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Now, whether or not Durkheim's underlying causal model 
here is clear or consistent, one conclusion seems warranted:
• Durkheim's explanation of egoistic suicide is a good deal 
more inflected than most contemporary sociologists have re­
cognized. By no stretch of the imagination can his develop­
ing theory be portrayed in the simplistic terms of the "so­
• cial integration" hypothesis. Further, little has been said 
of the historical or evolutionary framework underlying Durk­
heim's first type. It should be noted, however, that Durk­
heim's entire work presumes an evolutionary perspective in
• which modern pathologies are historically grounded in terms 
of the recession of previous disciplines and the lacuna of 
new ones. But, more to the point, egoisme is relationally 
• 
defined in terms of altruisme, Durkheim's second suicidal 
type, to which we now turn. Clearly, altruisme, by contrast 
with egoisme, serves as an "ideal type" of the kind of moral 
solidarity characteristic of primitive or archaic societies. 
• 
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CHAPTER TWO 
• 
ALTRUISME AS OBLIGATORY SELF-SACRIFICE: CONSCIENCE IN 
MECHANICAL SOLIDARITY AND THE PRIMITIVE SACRAL COMPLEX 
Preface. Altruisme is the opposite of egoisme in a number 
of ways. First, as the terms connote, altruisme refers to a
• condition in which group well-being takes precedence over 
individual self-interest. Second, Durkheim attached specific 
historical significance to these perennial opposites, for he 
used them as "ideal types" to refer to differences in social
• and cultural solidarity at the two ends of history. The in­
dividual in primitive society, according to Durkheim, is more 
or less submerged in group life. The conscience collective 
takes precedence over the rudimentary individual conscience
• in public mores. Indeed, the individual is so permeated and 
penetrated by the conscience collective that if tradition de­
mands self-sacrifice, the altruistic suicide gladly embraces 
self-homicide as a duty, perhaps even a privilege. In con­
• trast to the first type of suicide, the altruistic suicide 
considers self-sacrifice an obligation, a moral duty that 
fulfills his own nature. This obligation is increased by the 
"repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex," in which
• magic and religion pervades all (see Book One). 
Once again, to adequately understand altruisme and e­
goisme one must differentiate between Durkheim's generic and 
genetic-evolutionary notions of the individual (see Giddens,
• 197Ib). As we noted in Book One, on the generic level Durk­
heim viewed man as homo duplex--each individual was split 
between his physical and social selves. Ego is to person as 
body is to soul. However, on the genetic-evolutionary level,
• Durkheim posited that the autonomous person was a historical 
emergent, that is, the notion of the morally autonomous per­
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son with certain "inalienable rights" was a sociocultural 
and historical construction. Basically, Durkheim proposed 
that as the social morphological substratum differentiated, 
the individual took on greater and greater autonomy. In a 
corollary process, as differentiation proceeded, rationali­
ty and abstract thought ramified. Thus, the autonomy of the 
person and the rationalization of the universe of "moral 
discourse" proceeded together on the world-historical level 
(see Book One). 
Those who uncritically embrace the conventional image 
of Durkheim as an abstracted formal theorist searching for 
the generic bases of social order and control (Parsons, 
1949; L. Coser, 1971), may find themselves puzzled by the 
fact that Durkheim did not urge a return to the "value con­
sensus" of primitive society. After all, to Durkheim wasn't 
soceity all and the individual nothing? Isn't this position 
inherently conservative? Space allows me to merely note now 
(however see appendix) that, as an Enlightenment liberal, 
Durkheim's central value was the autonomy and rationality 
of the individual person (see Chapter Eight, Book One). ~~at 
he termed "moral individualism," as embodied in Christian 
ethics, especially in its Protestant varieties and their se­
cularized variants, especially "The Rights of f1an" (eg. see 
"Individualism and the Intellectuals," Jellinek, 1901, Weber, 
1968), was his fundamental positive value. At no time did 
Durkheim urge return to "mechanical solidarity;" at no point 
did his so-called "social realism" ever lead him to urge the 
submergence of the person in the group, as was the case in 
archaic societies. At no point did he yearn to return to the 
"repressiveness" of the "primitive sacral complex;" indeed, 
wasn't this clear from his highly negative early image of 
religion (see Chapter Six, Book One). In short, Durkheim's 
perennial moral dialectic between person, society, and his­
tory led him to seek to balance these relationships in a way 
never before fully achieved--namely, rescuing both the moral 
solidarity of archaic societies and the respect for the per­
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son generated by the progressive division of labor. l1hether 
he successfully resolved this eternal dilemma can only be an­
swered at the end of the present study. 
Characteristically, Durkheim began this section by no­
ting that the dialectical balance he so ardently sought can 
be found neither in the "excessive individualism" of modern 
society, nor in the "insufficient individuation" of "mechani­
cal solidarity." 
In the order of existence, no good is measureless. A 
biological quality can only fulfill the purposes it is 
meant to serve on condition that it does not transgress 
certain limits. So with social phenomena. If ... exces­
sive individuation leads to suioide, insufficient indi­
viduation has the same effects. l~en man has become de­
tached from society, he encounters less resistance to 
suicide in himself, and he does so likewise when social 
integration is too strong * (5:217). 
Drawing his illustrations from a variety of texts on archaic 
societies, Durkheim seized upon customs in which self-sacri­
fice was seen as a moral obligation. In such cases--old men, 
women on their husband's death, servants after a leader's 
passing--are required by ancient and venerable custom to com­
mit self-homicide. 
Now when a person kills himself, in all these cases, it 
it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but, 
on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails in 
this obligation, he is dishonorea-and also punished, u­
sually, by religious sanctions .•.. We have seen that if 
such a person insists on living he loses public respect; 
in one case, the usual funeral honors are denied, in a­
nother a life of horror is supposed to await him beyond 
the grave. The weight of society is thus brought to bear 
on him to lead him to destroy himself * (5:219). 
Further, in contrast to egoistic suicide in modern societies 
which is often legally proscribed, altruistic suicide is pos­
itively enjoined because it is symptomatic of "mechanical sol­
idarity." 
To be sure, society intervenes in egoistic suicide, as 
well, but its intervention differs in the two cases. 
In one case, it speaks the sentence of death; in the 
other, it forbids the choice of death. In the case of 
egoistic suicide, it suggests or counsels at most; in 
the other case it compels and is the author of condi­
tions and circumstances making this obligation coercive (5:219-20). 
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Altruistic suicide is here used by Durkheim as a visible ob­
jective index revealing the inner nature of the social bond 
peculiar to primitive or archaic societies, those groups 
still rooted in ties of "blood and soil." Altruistic suicide 
serves as an an external visible symbol of the interdepen­
dence mandated in "mechanical solidarity." If the social bond 
is broken by death, the remaining relatives~irst obligation 
is to maintain the former social bond as far as possible by 
themselves joining the same condition as the deceased. They 
have no other self-definition or value apart from their as­
signed roles. In death as in life, the social bond remains. 
This sacrifice then is imposed by society for moral 
ends. If the follower must not then survive his chief 
or the servant his prince, this is because so strict 
an interdependence between followers and chief, offi­
cers and king, is involved in the constitution of so­
ciety that any thought of separation is out of the ques­
tion. The destiny of one must be that of the others 
- . (S:220). 
Such "strict interdependence" is more understandable if we 
remember that even today kinship terms are relationally de­
fined--the term "mother" having meaning only in relation to 
the terms "children" or "son" or "daughter." The leaving of 
children from the parental home can still be a traumatic ex­
perience today; there is often the feeling that "everything 
has changed," including oneself, and perhaps even that the 
reason for living may have vanished. This happens, even in so 
attentuated family circumstances as today because these roles 
and statuses are relationally defined, and functionally and 
normatively interdependent; and because these social defini­
tions of self are so deeply internalized that they perma­
nently alter the personality structure. 
Durkheim continued developing this notion of the so­
cially obligatory character of suicide in ?rimitive society, 
observing that it is possible only where the individual is 
submerged in the traditional conscience collective. 
For society to be able thus to compel some of its mem­
bers to kill themselves, the individual personality can 
have little value. For as soon as the latter begins to 
form, the right to existence is the first conceded to it. 
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... But there can be only one cause of this feeble in­
dividuation itself. For the individual to occupy so 
little place in collective life he must be almost com­
pletely absorbed in the group, and the latter, accord­
ingly, very highly integrated. For the parts to have so 
little life of their own, the whole must indeed be a 
compact, continuous mass .•.. As they consist of a few 
elements, everyone leads the same life; everything is 
common to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, be­
cause of the small size of the group it is close to 
everyone and loses no one from sight; consequently, col­
lective supervision is constant, extending to every­
thing, and thus more readily prevents divergences 
(8:220-21) . 
Altruistic suicide, then, is the ultimate expression of 
"mechanical solidarity." The individual, who really has lit­
tle life apart from his group, sacrifices himself when neces­
sary. This extreme sense of moral obligation is~~ot merely to 
the social morphological and structural conditions in which 
the group finds itself, but also to the extreme degree of 
pentration of the conscience collective by sacral and magical 
duties. From Durkheim's perspective, for the individual to e­
merge as a morally valuable and autonomous person in his own 
right, the sacral-magical conscience collective must recede 
as the social morphological substratum differentiates. 
The individual has no way to set up an enviroment of 
his own in the shelter of which he may develop his own 
nature and form a physiognomy that is his exclusively. 
To all intents and purposes indistinct from his compan­
ions, he is only an inseparable part of the whole with­
out personal value. His person has so little value that 
attacks upon it by individuals receive only relatively 
weak restraint. It is thus natural for him to be yet· 
less protected against collective necessities and that 
society should not hesitate .•. to bid end a life it 
values so little (8:221). 
Durkheim then attached a label to this suicide typical 
of "mechanical solidarity,ff defining it in evolutionary con­
trast to egoisme and modern society. 
We thus confront a type of suicide differing by inci­
sive qualities from the preceding one. Whereas the lat­
ter [egoismel is due to excessive individuation, the 
former is caused by too rudimentary individuation. One 
occurs because society allows the individual to escape 
it, being insufficiently aggregated in some parts of 
even in the whole; the other, because society holds him 
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in too strict tutelage. Having given the name of egoisme 
to the state of the ego living its own life and obeying 
itself alone, that of altruisme adequately expresses the 
opposite state, where the ego is not its own property, 
where it is blended with something not itself, where the 
goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one 
of the groups in which it participates. So we call the 
suicide caused by intense altruisme altruistic suicide. 
But since it is also characteristically performed as a . 
duty, we shall call such a type obligatory altruistic 
suicide (5:221). 
Now, even though Durkheim proceeded to state that "not every 
altruistic suicide is necessarily obligatory," he acknowled­
ged that, even in optional situations, it is still a sign of 
prestige or moral virtue. 
Though public opinion does not formally require them, 
it is certainly favorable to them. Since here not cling­
ing to life is a virtue, even of the highest rank, the 
man who renounces life on least provocation of circum­
stances or though simple vainglory is praiseworthy. A 
social prestige thus attaches to suicide, which receives 
encouragement from this fact, and the refusal of this 
reward has effects similar to actual punishment, al­
though to a lesser degree. What is done in one case to 
escape the stigma of insult is done in the other to win 
esteem. When people are accustomed to set no value on 
life from childhood on, and to despise those who value 
it excessively, they inevitably renounce it on the least 
pretext. So valueless a sacrifice is easily assumed. 
Like obligatory suicide, therefore, these practices are 
associated with the most fundamental mor·&characteris­
tics of lower-socret~ As they can only persist if 
the individual has no interests of his own, he must be 
trained to renunciation and an unquestioned abnegation; 
whence come partially spontaneous suicides. Exactly like 
those more explicitly prescribed by society, they arise 
from this state of impersonality, o·r as we have called 
it, altruisme, which may be regarded as a moral char­
acteristic of primitive-man * (S:222-~)~ ---­
"Mechanical solidarity" is thus a "state of impersonality" 
because the person has so little autonomous status there. Im­
personal altruisme was regarded by Durkheim as one of the 
prime "moral characteristics of primitive man" because the 
conscience collective (the impersonal or social part of cul­
ture and personality) pervades and dominates the individual 
conscience and consciousness. ~fuether empirically grounded 
in all traditional societies or not, Durkheim's schema 
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heightened the contrast between modern and traditional socie­
ties by setting up two heuristic lIideal types." 
Now, as Durkheim noted, "altruistic suicide is a spe­
llcies with several varieties (8:222). One of the most reveal­
ing types is mystical or religious suicide . These closely 
correspond with the sacral and magical character of tradi~ 
tional societies. Dominated by religious rationales and mag­
ical etiquettes, the mystical suicide, of which Hindu and 
Buddhist India is lithe classic soil," needs no stark precipi­
tating circumstances as spur on other altruistic suicides to 
their honorable self-homicide. 
In the preceding examples, it [altruisme] caused a man 
to kill himself only with the concurrence of circum­
stances. Either death had to be imposed by society as 
a duty, or some question of honor was involved, or at 
least some disagreeable occurence had to lower the val­
ue of life in the victim's eyes. But. it even happens 
that the individual kills himself purely for the joy 
of sacrifice, because, even with no particular reason, 
renunciation in itself is considered- praiseworthy (8: 22 3). 
Durkheim further noted that such mystical suicides of reli­
gious "virtuousos" are the very prototype of "impersonalized 
altruisme." The pantheistic urge to suppress or eradicate 
the ego because it is an illusion is the opposite of the 
modern attitude in which the ego, autonomous and alone, is 
morally enshrined as an absolute value. In the former, the 
ego is considered unreal; in the latter, the ego alone is 
real: both are absolutized. 
We actually see the individual in all these cases seek 
to strip himself of his personal being in order to be 
engulfed in something which he regards as his true es­
sence ••.• He feels that he exists in it and in it a­
lone, and strives so violently to blend himself with 
it in order to have being. He must therefore consider 
that he has no life of his own. Impersonality is here 
carried to its highest pitch, altruisme is acute (8:225) • 
Let us pause for a moment to reflect on the implications of 
Durkheim's linkage of pantheistic religious drives for the 
eradication of the ego, and the "pantheistic ll organization 
of archaic societies. Now, it is understandable that Durk­
heim would emphasize these points, since to him religion was 
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merely the way in which society collectively represented it­
self to itself. It followed, then, that "mechanically inte­
grated" societies, in which the individual counted for lit­
tle, would tend to express these social and cultural condi­
tions in pantheistic projections. As the individual counted 
for little in society, so, too, the ego counted for little 
in religion. Salvation was neither deliverance nor redemp­
tion (see Weber, 1963), but rather eradication of individual 
suffering through transcendence of the ego's desires. Indeed, 
Durkheim's key insight here would lead us to expect that so­
cieties that had not overcome a segmental base and tribalis­
tic structures of fraternization would probably never con­
struct European notions of the autonomy and moral value of 
the individual person. 
Durkheim next explored some relations between the or­
ganization of primitive societies and primitive religious 
ethics. These passages delineating the correspondence between 
the primitive sacral complex, in which society and culture 
are deeply embedded in religious rationales, and pantheistic 
religious images, reveal the core of Durkheim's evolutionary 
sociology of religion, knowledge, and morality. 
The metaphysical and religious systems which form the 
logical settings for these moral practices give final 
proof that this is their origin and meaning. It has 
long been observed that they coexist generally with 
pantheistic beliefs. To be sure, Jainism as well as 
Buddhism is atheistic, but pantheism is not necessari­
ly theistic. Its essential quality is the idea that 
what reality there is in the individual is foreign to 
his nature, that the soul which animates him is not his 
own, and that consequently he has no personal existence. 
Now this dogma is fundamental to the doctrines of the 
Hindus; it already exists in Brahminism. Inversely, 
where the principle of being is not fused with such 
doctrines but is itself conceived of an individual 
form, that is, among theistic peoples like the Jews, 
Christiams, Mahommetans, or polytheists like the Greeks 
and Latins, this form of suicide is unusual. It is nev­
er found there in a state of ritual practice. There is 
probably a relation between it and pantheism. '~at is 
this relation (S:226)? 
Here Durkheim discovered a profound dialectical relation be­
tween the evolution of the individual person and the develop­
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ment of religious representations centering on shifts in im­
personality and personality (see also Chapter Eight, Book 
One). In general, where the "principle of being" is portray­
ed in impersonal form, the individual ego is accorded little 
reality or value. However, where the individual person is 
valued in his own right, religious representations according­
ly take on, as it were, a personal physiognomy. But why? As 
one might expect, since we know that he treats religious rep­
resentations as projections of society and the fused primi­
tive conscience collective, Durkheim suggested that the un­
derlying reason is that here society itself is structured, 
as it were, pantheistically. 
It cannot be conceded that pantheism produced suicide. 
Such abstract ideas do not guide men, and the course of 
history could not be explained through the play of pure­
ly metaphysical concepts. Among peoples as well as in­
dividuals, mental representations function above all as 
as expression of a reality not of their own making: they 
rather spring from it and, if they subsequently modify 
it, do so only to a limited extent. 
Religious conceptions are the products of the social en­
vironment, rather than its producers, and if they react, 
once formed, upon their original causes, the reaction 
cannot be very profound. If the essence of pantheism, 
then is a more or less radical denial of all individual­
ity, such a religion could be constituted only in a so­
ciety where the individual really counts for nothing, 
that is, is almost wholly lost in the group. For men can 
conceive of the world only in an image of the small so­
cial world in which they live. Religious pantheism is 
thus only a result and, as it were, a reflection of the 
pantheistic organization of society. Consequently, it 
is also in this society that we must seek the cause for 
this special suicide which everywhere appears in connec­
tion with pantheism (S:226-27). 
Again, it is true, socioculturally, that religious concep­
tions are products of the social environment. However, I can­
not fully endorse Durkheim's radically positivistic notion 
that "abstract ideas do not guide men ," since, on the con­
trary, I believe that there is a constant interplay between 
conditions and intentions. Surely Weber taught us that imag­
es and ideas, when strongly sanctioned--that is, when they 
percolate through the imagination and penetrate the will-­
definitely influence human action. In short, there is almost 
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always a constant dialectic between structure, culture, and 
personality systems, not simply the one-way causality here 
suggested by Durkheim when he argued that if religious con­
ceptions "react upon their original causes, the reaction 
cannot be very profound" (see also Part I, Book Three). Durk­
heim's underlying model must be supplemented by Weber's. 
Further, various comments by Durkheim look forward to 
the second schema in which all four types of suicide are 
seen as rooted in extreme forms of moral obligation. For in­
stance, in the following passage, ostensibly devoted to show­
ing that religious dogma per ~ counts for little in produ­
cing suicide, Durkheim acknowledged that Christian doctrine 
itself was significant in raising the moral worth of the in­
dividual person (see also Chapter Eight, Book One). 
... the aversion to suicide professed and inspired by 
Christianity is well-known. The reason is that Chris­
tian societies accord the indi~ual a more important 
role than earlier ones. They assign to him personal du­
ties which he is forbiden to evade; only insofar as he 
has acquitted himself of the role incumbent upon him 
here on earth is he admitted or not to the joys of the 
hereafter, and these joys are as personal as the works 
which make them his heritage. Thus the moderate indivi­
dualism in the spirit of Christianity prevents it from 
favoring suicide, despite its theories concerning man 
and his destiny (5:226). 
Next, Durkheim compared the psychological attitude of 
the egoistic suicide with the altruistic type. He indicated 
two crucial aspects which we shall later retain--namely, that 
the altruistic suicide reveals an active acceptance of his 
collectively sanctioned moral obligation, while the egoistic 
type betrays a passive melancholy, the world-weariness or 
moral exhaustion akin to acedia. I believe, in turn, that 
the active-passive distinction applies equally well in con­
trasting anomie with fatalisme. In ~ second schema, both 
altruisme and anomie are active, while both egoisme and fat­
alisme ~ passive (see Part II, Book Three). 
While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing real 
in the world but the individual, the intemperate altru­
ist's sadness, on the contrary, springs from the indivi­
dual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One is detached 
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from life because, seeing no goal to which he may at­
tach himself, he feels himself useless and purposeless; 
the other because he has a goal but one outside this 
life, which henceforth seems merely an obstacle to him. 
Thus, the difference of the causes reappears in the ef­
fects, and the melancholy of the one is quiteidifferent 
from the other. The former consists of a feeling of in­
curable weariness and sad depression; it expresses a 
complete relaxation of activity, which, unable to find 
useful employment, collapses. The latter [altruisme], 
on the contrary, springs from hope, for it depends. on 
the belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life. 
It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith ea­
gerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by acts of 
extreme energy * (8:225-6). 
By extension, fatalisme also proceeds from the internaliza­
tion of collective sanctions, only here the individual finds 
himself overwhelmed or oppressively regulated by the con­
science collective, and resigns himself passively to his as­
signed fate. Looking ahead to the second schema, then, we 
see that both fatalisme and altruisme proceed from the same 
source; they differ merely in their prime of expression. 
Adding another comparison between egoistic and altrui­
stic suicide, Durkheim again emphasized that different lev­
els of societal complexity and corresponding systems of or­
ganized knowledge and morality are always in the background 
of his discussion. 
One is related to the crude morality which disregards 
everything relating solely to the individual; the other 
is closely associated with the refined ethics which sets 
the human personality on so-nTgh a pedestal that it can 
no longer be subordinated to-arrything. Between the-two 
there is all the difference between primitive peoples 
and the most civilized nations * (8:227). 
Here we see Durkheim moving toward the second schema, in 
which egoisme is generated not simply by the breakdown of 
integration but by cultural sanctions, by modern "ethics set­
ting the individual on so high a pedestal that he may no 
longer be subordinated to anything." 
Observing that "in our contemporary societies, the in­
dividual personality becomes increasingly free from the col­
lective personality" (8:228). Durkheim turned to consider 
the major example of suicide in the modern era in which the 
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the reverse is true. Altruistic suicides in the military 
served, in Durkheim's "ideal typical" schemas, as the major 
example of the evolutionary survival of primitive ethics in 
the modern world. Durkheim finds in the modern soldier the 
same quality of impersonality, of self-abnegation which he 
thought characterized primitive moral solidarity. Unfortun­
ately, those few secondary discussions (eg. Parsons, 1949) 
that mention altruistic suicide also tend to ignore its main 
historical site--narnely, primitive moral solidarity. They 
have thus missed the important fact that Durkheim discussed 
military suicides in the modern world largely as an illus­
tration of the survival of superseded moral patterns, espe­
cially to heighten the contrast with the contemporaneous, 
but very different, egoisme. 
Of all elements constituting our modern societies, the 
army, indeed, most recalls the structure of lower so­
cieties. It, too, consists of a massive, compact group 
providing a rigid setting for the individual and pre­
venting any independent movement. Therefore, since this 
moral constitution is the natural field for altruistic 
suicide, military suicide may certainly be supposed to 
have the same character and derive from the same source 
(S:234) . 
... the causes of military suicides are not only dif­
ferent from, but in inverse proportion to, the most 
determining causes of civilian suicide. The latter 
causes in the great European societies spring from the 
excessive individuation characteristic of civilization. 
Military suicides must therefore depend on the reverse 
disposition, feeble individuation or what we have call­
ed the state of altruisme. Actually, those peoples a­
mong whom the army is most inclined to suicide are also 
the least advanced, those whose customs most resemble 
the customs observed in lower societies. Traditionalism 
[is] the chief opponent of the spirit of individualism . 
.•• As it guards against egoistic suicide, one readily 
understands that where it still has power, the civilian 
population has few suicides. But it. has this prophylac­
tic influence only if it remains moderate. If it ex­
ceeds a certain degree of intensity, it becomes itself 
an original cause of suicide (S:236). 
Surely, Weber and Durkheim would have agreelthat "traditonal­
ism is the opponent of the spirit of modern individualism" 
whic~when gone to extreme, results in egoistic suicide. 
Finally, Durkheim concluded this chapter on altruistic 
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suicide with the crucial observation that "every sort of 
suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of ~ 
• virtue." Clearly shading over now into his second and very 
different schema that anomie and egoisme are caused by ex­
treme modern cultural sanctions, Durkheim next proposed that 
both altruistic and egoistic suicides are perceived as the
• carrying out of moral duties. Ultimately, we shall see that 
all four types of suicide are geneated by extreme cultural 
sanctions--that is, considered in both primitive and modern 
societies as the logical, though extreme, outgrowths of deep­
• ly internalized moral obligations . 
•
 
•.• the motives of certain altruistic suicides reap­

pear in slightly-different forms as the basis £! ~­

tions regarded ~ everyone as moral. But is ego1st1c
 
suicide any different? Has not the sentrment of indi­

vidual autonomy its ownIIiO"raITty as well as the ~­

site sentiment? If the latter serves as a foundat1on 
to a kind of courage, strengthening and even hardening 
the heart, the other softens it, and moves it to pity. 
Where the altruistic suicide is prevalent, man is all 
ready to give his life; however, at the same time, he
• 
sets no more value on that of another~ On the contrary, 
when he rates individual personality above all other 
ends, he respects it in others. His cult for it makes 
him suffer from all that minimizes it even among his 
fellows. A broader sympathy for human suffering suc­
ceeds the fanatical devotions of primitive times. Every
• sort of suicide is ~ merely the exaggerated or de­
• 
flected form of a v1rtue *(5:240). 
Now, we shall consider Durkheim's critical insight 
that "every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated or 
deflected form of a virtue II as an epigrammatic summary of my 
second schema on Durkheim's theories of suicide (see Part 
II, Book Three). Let us now turn to consider Durkheim's most 
famous suicidal type--anomie--and see whether the same am­
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CHAPTER THREE 
ANOMIE AS THE RELEASE OF THE INSATIABLE DESIRES OF THE
 
PRE-SOCIAL EGO FROn TRADITIONAL MORAL DISCIPLINE
 
Preface. Certainly it is true, as Talcott Parsons claims, 
that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly cen­
tral concepts in contemporary social science" (l968a:3l6). 
However, as we have unhappily discovered (see also appendix), 
the origIns and meanings of this paradigmatic concept have 
often been faultily reported. Moreover, its great cultural 
and historical significance has been slighted. Since Durk­
heim's passages on anomie are far from unambiguous, and fur­
ther, since even some of the better secondary interpreta­
tions cannot be fully relied on to accurately reflect Durk­
heim's theoretical framework and historical intentions, 
great caution must be exercised in interpreting the essential 
structure and meaning of Durkheim's first theory of anomie • 
....... - ­
At the outset, we need not engage in complex intellec­
tual convolutions to wrench Durkheim's first schema into line 
with our own predelictions. For, as with egoisme and altru­
isme, we might simply start with the connotations of these 
words themselves. Fatalisme implies a pervasive sense of re­
signation to one's fate. Anomie, by contr.Cist,implies not 
that amorphous and protean term "normlessness" (see appen­
dix), b~t-~·~h;·~~~th·~~-.-unTe:ishirig·Ofdesires beyond all order 
or meaningful limits. Anomie here implies not so much the 
lack of order as the lack of-rimIEs, i~ the sense of classi­
cal G~eek-·a:~d-"ci~i·i~-ti~~·-phi.losophy(eg. see Haydn, 1950). 
Moreover, Durkheim assigned these terms to two extremes at 
the two ends of history. Hence, anomie versus fatalisme re­
presents the historical contrast between the insatiable pas­
sions released in our contemporary transitional era and the 
•	 
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ego's passive resignation to his collectively assigned fate 
in the "repressive" regime of traditional "mechanical soli­
• darity." 
As always, Durkheim's thought moved here on two levels 
simultaneously: the generic and the genetic. On the generic 
level, Durkheim posited the insatiable and egocentric pas­
• sions of human nature. On the genetic-evolutionary level, he 
proposed that at one end of human history, the individual e­
go's naturally insatiablede~ires were held in rigid check 
by traditional subordination to th~fused sacro-magical con-)
• science collective. On the otheihand; in the modern world 
there is no adequate "socrar"'o'r~;it;~~i mechanism w~rkingto 
p.- ._--._-~._--.--- ,_.. "-. --~ •...,--....	 - . 
disciplille individual ego.:tis:tic ~e~ires. Therefore, in the 
modern transitional crisis, prior to the full institutional-I
•	 izatIon-of '''organic solidarity," "di~e..: of the'infinite" 
emerge, and "moral anarchy" threatens to reign over all. Let 
us now explore anomie more carefully. 
•	 
A. Anomie: A Preview 
Even though today anomie may be considered one of the 
paradigmatic concepts of sociology, nevertheless, the origin 
and complexity of Durkheim's arguments underlying his first 
• 
notion of anomie remain misperceived. Instead of a mechani­
cal', ahistorical, baldly sociologistical series of asser­
tions concerning the need for integration of the individual 
into social groups, Durkheim's arguments were subtly inflec­
. -- .' -.~_.. . .~, ,.-.. -,. - ..- . . - ". ­
• 
ted, and historically and philosophically grounded. Lest this 
sUbtlety and'pote-l1t.i.~i-~'ignifi~ancebe lost i~ the welter of 
reductions and textbookish presentations, let us briefly out­
line the developing logic of Durkheim's argument concerning 
• 
anomie. 
• 
(1) Durkheim ass~ed t!2~t,,,,_the,humanego_,isnaturally passion­
a~, undiscipline~'.i~~n(t,i,nbe,rent;I,y _insatiable. Hence, in his 
fir~-sc1ierria-;-he located the source of the self-destructive 
forces of undisciplined insatiable passions in the organic 
or pre-social half of the individual. -, 
--------~.~_.- ...-­
(2) Durkheim further assumed a series of basic dualisms in 
regard to human nature, which mirror other "root dichotomies'~ 
•
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Paralleling a series of dichotomies such as: society/indivi­
dual, sacred/profane, concepts/sensations, normal/pathologl­
• 
cal, science/mysticism, universals/variables, necessary/ con­
tingent, and so forth, Durkheim added another root dichoto­
my: mora-1 ..~t:Yl~.sI.El.~:p.sualapp~:t:i..tes (see also Lukes, 1973, and 
Book One). Of course, Durkheimthe~posi:t;~,~l$.o.cietYCiSthe 
only source v~ discipl:i..ne to 
•
 
prov:;i"ding;::t1"re':-neceEisai~tcolfecti

counterDaIaIlce~}.he inordinate sensual appetites of the inher­

ently:egoceritric and passionate pre-social ego.
 
(3 ) Further, Durkheim ,?tssumed·that-every society_ .regulates 
indiv:iq;ual_satisJ'g9ilon~.through-a.sociCilschedule stratified 
for various groups and oc~upations. This socio-economic 
schedufe'ofthe gratification of wants is, in a relatively 
stable society ,~c=ce.pted_g~nerallyby each as legitimate, and
• 
each Ts-r-ela'tIvely 'fldjusted to his' scheduled ratio of reward. 
This notion.of the<'Aocial schedule is one of the key founda­
tions_o:LtJ'le distribution aspect of economic systems. Durk­
heim's unexplored theorem holds great potential significance 
for theoretical economic sociology. 
• 
(4) Disturbances in social and economic equilibrium weaken 
the hold of·'coTlectIve-rn6ial-d.Isclpllne, fhereby releasing 
the destructive 'energies and desires characteristic of all 
unlimited passions and morbid conditions. Each individual is 
then subjected to a more or, less painful "moral reeducation." 
The moral legitimacy of ratios of expectation, especially the 
• 
discipline holding individuals to their scheduled ratio of 
satisfactiqp, is upset~ and even personal equilibrium is 
thrown out of adjustment.' Contrary to most images. of anomie, 
the consequ,ent deregulation is mere'ly t"he, releasing and sus- " 
taining"condition of Durkheim'scentral concern--the "dis- U' 
eases of the infinite." 
• (5) Finally, Durkheim observed 't-hat.CiDQmie is, chronic in the most progressive segments. of modern socl.ety. lrt :these areas 
the m'o-r-a-l'''legi timacy of 1;.rCiCi:Lti<:mal schedules:i..s most in~is­
tently-repe-aled, "and thus egocentric pa.ssions reign by de­
fault~J3y-CoI1trast~ ihearTier,' more stable societies, tradi­tio~al socia~ schedules, restra~n and reg';llate pote~tially in- f·
• satl.able desl.res. Today, however ,'pasOCl.al rnechanl.sm works to discipline the "diseases ofthe infinite~" hence, we live 
in an age marked by "moral anarchy. II 
Unfortunately, when most contemporary interpreters of Durk­
• 
heim's typology discuss the meaning of anomie, they tend to 
skip the key premises and crucial intervening' steps in his 
argument, and collapse it down to the last condition of "de­
•
 
regulation." But Durkheim's central concern was not so much J,
 
th~ breakdown of norms ~:~'~~'th the breakthou;hof an'I~~:-'-7-\ I '
 
ity of dreams ,and desires." The weakening hold of the collec'­
•
 
tj.ve discipline--o-i traditional norms acted merely as the re­
1 
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leasing and sustaining condition of this egocentricity and 
insatiability. Now, in shifting to his second schema, Durk­
• heim implicitly shifted the location of these egocentric and 
insatiable drives from that useful fiction--the pre-social 
ego--to absolutizing cultural sanctions. For locating such 
destructive drives in the organic ego put Durkheim in some­
• thing of a bind, since then the crucial aspects of human ac­
tion were deriveQfr~~~l~;;~~-U"e.-biological and psychologi­
cal) levels, instead of from society and culture themselves. 
Society in the first schema is reduced to the passive role of
• ( restraining and redirecting organic drives, instead of the 
fully sociological position that society and culture are the 
key sources of the most significant features of human ac­
tion. However, in the second schema, being led to the fully
• sociocultural position that sanctions which become absolute 
can cause tremendous tensions by such insights as "every sort 
of suicide is merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a 
virtue," we see that "drives for progress and perfection,"
• "daily represented as virtues," act as solvents of tradition­
al types of moral authority and social integration, and may 
lead, ultimately, to suicide. 
• 
B. The Generic Need for Limitation of the Passions 
of the Pre-Social Ego 
Durkheim began his section on anomie with this brief 
observation: 
• But society is not only something attracting the senti­ments and activities of individuals with unequal force. 
It is also a power controlling them. Thereisa relation 
between the way this regulative action is performed and 
the social suicide rate (5:241). 
• 
The initial key to explaining anomie and suicide, Durkheim 
suggested, is the lack of regulation or moral discipline (or 
~-----~'",_~_•.>~~.,.~_," J~.' .. _ _ • _ ., _ 
•
 
as it might be said today, with a slightly different meaning,
 
the lack of normative integration). Just as he began his ana­

lysis of egoisme with statistical correlations between this
 
type and Protestantism, education, occupational achievement, 
etc., so, too, did Durkheim began his section on anomie with 
•
 
• 
--550--
important empirical insights correlating rises in suicides, 
commercial activities, and industrial and financial crises. 
• If therefore industrial or financial crises increase su~cides., thiJL._~,:!:,.~",'~,~,.,~,_,?,_,t"_,,?~c::CiusetJ'l~Y ,cause ,poyel:'~Y' since ,7
cr1ses of prosper_~_~y-ha:v:ethesameresult; 1t 1S be-
• 
cause tne~y--are"crises, that is, disturbances of the col- - , 
lective order. Every¢ii§tY-:r1:>ancE! of eqUi:iJ9::r.iull\,E!Y§!Jl ,'-
though it achieves gr_~_e"tg:r:.. CQmf9J:'tal}c:ta h~ighteningof, 
geri~trr·~T~'Y;_~-~:Ci~-an .,i,mpP:l§e. to volunta'ry'-de~t"h~"~ifuen­

• 
ever ser1'6us-readjustments take place iri the 'social or-
der, whether or not due to a sudden growth or to an un-
expected catastrophe, men are more inclined to self-de-
struction. How is this possible? How can something gen-
erally considered to improve existence serve to detach 
men from it (S:246)? 
In ord.~!'~_J:.g,_e.~Rl~j,n.. thJ9 ",C\lri.Qg$9qC\l:r~nq~.:::7"tha. ment 
should take their own lives when things are gettJI1gbetter--
Durkneifu-Y)'ega-i1--'to outii~~'h~'re wh~~ h~ took to be the under-
• lying nature of human nature (see also Book One). He began 
by observing th~t,,~de§.j.X~J?_ ID\lS1;..",~.*WCiy~.. b~.,!?E~~,~:_~~~,,~.~,c:te to r 
what is possible i,fh?ppiness is to be possible.
--"_~•• _ ...'r .•.",_ ..._.. _~.-.-•.:-.~.-.o-.~·.,., _'c'-·.·, -> ..• ' ....<. -" -
No living being can be happy or even exist unless his
• 
needs are sufficiently proportioned to his means .••.  
If his needs require more than can be granted, or even 
merely something of a different sort, they will be un-
der continual friction or can only function painfully.  
Movements incapable of production without pain tend not 
to be reproduced. Unsatisfied tendencies atrophy, and
• as the impUlse to live is merely the result of all the 
• 
rest, it is bound to weaken as the others relax (S:246) • 
Then Durkheim compared the organic needs of animals, which 
are physiologically limited, to the socially and culturally 
generated desires of human beings, --whi;;h-~ because they move 
in the realm of the ideal, are potentially unlimited. 
• 
In the animal, at least in a normal condition, this 
equilibrium is established with automatic spontaneity 
because the animal depends on purely material condi-
tions. All the organism needs is that the supplies of 
substance and energy constantly employed in the vital 
• 
process should be periodically renewed by equivalent 
quantities; that replacement should be equivalent to 
use. When the void created by existence in its own re-
sources is filled, the animal, satisfied, asks nothing 
further. Its power of reflection is not sufficiently 
developed to imagine other ends than those implicit in 
its physical nature (S:246). 
Thus, in contrast to man, organic life lives in ~ more or 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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less mechanically equibbrated balance with material condi­
tions. 
But man has no such built-in limitations. Even though 
we are part an.iitlar;we'are'also persons~ and the major part 
--._~._--_• .......,.. .... ~P""..:....~., •.~~-.~.""'---;~ ......"''' ...~......"~"..:~~,,,.'''-.~-~.~~- •.• ,.~ . . ,_ •.c_: .. _. _.~__ .'
 
of our personhood, as opposed to our egos, is composed of 
impersonal and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture. 
In effect, man defines his own world. Sociocultural desires 
enjoy no such natural automatic constraints. 
This is not the case with man, because most of his needs 
are not dependent on his body or not to the same degree • 
.•• Beyond the indispensable minimum which satisfies 
nature when instinctive, a more awakened reflection sug­
gests better conditions, seemingly desirable ends crav­
ing fulfillment. Such appetites, however, admittedly 
sooner or later reach a limit, which they cannot pass. 
But how determine the quantity of well-being, comfort, 
or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human being? 
Nothing appears in man's organic nor in his physiologi­
cal constitution which sets a limit to such tendencies. 
The functioning of individual life does not require them 
to cease at one point rather than another, the proof 
being that they have constantly increased since the be­
ginning of history, receiving more and more complete 
satisfaction, yet with no weakening of average health 
(S:247) • 
Since "man ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the king­
dom of freedom" through the genetic medium of symbolic cul­
ture, man himself must construct his own social schedule of 
this ever-escalating scale of wants. Every society is thus 
forced to negotiate a variable ratio between organically gen­
erated needs and socioculturally generated desires. 
Above all, how to establish their proper variations with 
different conditions of life, occupations, relative im­
portance of services, etc.? In no society are they e­
qually satisfied on the different stages of the social 
hierarchy. Yet human nature is substantially the same a­
mong all men, in its essential qualities. It is not hu­
man nature which ~ assign the variable lImits nece~ 
sary to our needs. They are thus unlimited so ~ as J'J 
they depend ~ the individual alone. Irrespect1ve of , any 
external regulator¥ force, our capacity for feeling 1S 
in itself an insat1able and:bOttomless abYSs * (S:247T. 
Having thus posited the notion of the pre-social ego as in- 9 
Iherently insatiable (see also Book One), Durkheim proceeded I 
to set up society and cultural norms as the necessary coun­
•
 
I 
---- v 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
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•
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terweight to these generically undisciplined egoistic pas­
sions. Sensual appetites, Durkheim said, can only be con- a 
strained by culturally generated moral rules. Thus, culture J 
(as a kind of social DNA) redirects biological processes. 
Desocialized (that is, demoralized), the individual ego re­
verts back to generic type and, ultimately, destroys itself 
in the fruitless and random passions so often seen in self­
destructive behaviors. 
But if nothing external can restrain this capacity, it 
can only be a source of torment to itself. Unlimited de­
sires are insatiable ~ definition, and insatiability-rs 
rightly considered a sign of morbidity. Being unlimiten, 
the~ constantly and infinitely surpass the means ~ 
the1r command; they cannot be quenched. Inextingu1shable 
thirst is constantly renewed torture. It has been claim­
ed, indeed, that human activity naturally aspires beyond 
assignable limits, and sets itself unattainable goals. 
But how can suchan undetermined state be any more re­
conciled with the conditions of mental life than with 
the demands of physical life * (S:247-8)? 
Having set up the specter of the release of the floods 
of passion inherent in the undetermined and random energies 
of the organic ego, Durkheim then explored the necessity of 
controlling such desires. The first requirement of morality 
and knowledge (see Book One) is discipline and definition of 
these potentially insatiable desires. 
.•. the passions must first be limited. Only then can 
they be harmonized with the faculties and satisfied. But 
since the individual has no way ~ limiting them, ~ 
must be done ~ some force exter10r to him. A regulat1ve 
'f"O"rCemust play the same role for moral---needs which the 
organisrnp"lays for PhY1scaTneeers. This means ~~ 
force can only be moral. The awakening of conSC1ence 1n­
terrupted the state of eqUIlibrium of the animal's dor­
mant existence; only-Conscience,therefOre, can furnISh 
the means to reestab"lish it * (S:248). -­
The expansiveness inherent in such desires, whether or­
ganic or sociocultural, can be likened to the rapid diffusion 
of all forms of energy. Energy, whether it be physical, so­
cial, or cultural, Durkheim argued, indefinitely expands its 
radius of movement. Norms then become containers, as it were, 
of this vital but always potentially dangerous expansion. As 
with physical, so with sociocultural, energies; if desires 
•
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• 
explode rapidly and massively, then destruction inevitably 
results. With the coming of market capitalism, especially, 
the almost infinite expansion of the scope of the market and 
the range and depth of desires and cultural expectations 
~eant that the radius of energies destructive of self, world, 
and society has been greatly expanded. 
Any force unopposed by some contrary one necessarily 
tends to lose itself in the infinite. Just as a body 
of gas, provided no other matter resists its expansion, 
fills the immensity of space, so all energy--whether 
physical or moral--tends to expand itself without limit 
so long as nothing intervenes to stop it. Hence, the 
need for regulatory organs, which constrain the total 
complex of our vital forc7s withi~ appropriate li~itS.)-f1f The nervous system has th1s funct10n for our phys1cal 
being. Tnis system actuates the organs and allocates 
whatever energy is required by each of them. But the 
moral life escapes the physical system. Neither our 
brain nor any ganglIOn can assign limits to our intel­
lectual aspirations or to our wills. For mental life, 
especially in its more' advanced forms;-transcends-the 
the organis~.-.-.-Sensationsand physical appetites ex­
pre"ss only the conditions of the body, not ideas and 
complex sentiments. Only a power that is equally spiri­
tual is able to exer~fruences upon spiritual forces.
 
This spi'ri"tuaIPower resides in theauthority inherent
 
Inlmoral rules * (ME:40-l). ----­
Yet,~urkheim's statements remain ambiguous and confusing at[/ 
many points. A logical point: if, as Durkheim says elsewhere 
"the natural is necessary," and "only the universal is ra­
tional," then how can there be any moral appeal against the 
clearly generic and natural constitution of human nature? I 
had thought that, to Durkheim, what is natural and universal 
could not, by definition, be pathological. However, the same 
logical problem was endemic in the Enlightenment philosophes' 
appeal to nature (see R.R. Palmer, 1947, Ernst Cassirer,
, 
1951). Second, clearly Durkheim began to shade over 
~ 
into his r1 
second schema. For he insisted that the "mental life" as well fJ /tu-t 
as the physical must accept certain constraints. But, on the
..----_..... 
other hand, how can even physical needs be potentially un­
limited? I thought they enjoyed the benefits of an automatic 
equilbrium with the natural environment. If so, then the 
Durkheimian "awakening of conscience" was a social and cul­
•
 
• 
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tural event of the first magnitude; man now became the cul­
tural animal. If any insatiable passions or appetites are to f 
be released, the source can only be society and culture. If• 
the recession of traditional moral discipine over the supposed 
insatiability of the organic ego, especially in terms of e­
conomically expressed desires, releases the "diseases of the ~ 
• infinite," then how can intellectual and moral desires also 
be potentially unlimited but i9nored in the present sociolo­
gical explanation of rising suicide rates? In short, if man 
is, indeed, the cultural animal, and if culture grows in­
• creasingly rationalized, universalized, and more complex in 
evolutionary progress, then how can we avoid the conclusion 
that it is the growth of civili;~ion itself which engenders 
these inf~n~~ aspirations? specifica.llY, how can we continue\;L' 
to slight the fact that, in the West especially, absolute in-·• 
.. --." ---­
dividualism, crusades to master the world for "God's glory," 
and --~ drives for unending and relentless "progress and perfec­
tion" became massively secularized from at least the seven­
• teenth century onward? How can we ignore such crucial cul­
tural historical facts in our investigations of the ravages1 
of the modern "infinity sickness"? What happens when striv-\ 
-~ .~-.~. ----.."- "-­
• 
ing for religious infinities becom5displaced into the fin­
ite, into the "muddly actual"? Durkheim himself observed: 
All man's pleasure in acting, moving, and exerting him­
self implies the sense that his efforts are not in vain 
and that by walking he had advanced. However, one does 
not advance when one walks toward no goal--or what is Q
• the same--when his goal is infinity * (S:248). 
Can we any longer seriously hope to plumb the depths of 
Durkheim's insights unless we pureue, not moralistic philo­
sophies of human nature pitched covertly on biological lev­
els, but properly drawn sociocultural explanations, espe­
cially those couched in cultural-historical terms of the ~ 
.~development in the West of bothabsolutizi~g individualism , 
"--0-_----.._- ----<~ 
and a massive, sustained, and ethically subsidized "march 
'--.... 
toward the infinite"? Such commitments are so deeply embed­
--. . ~ .' 
ded in our wills ~and/imaginations and so dee~.1Y s~imented 
in our institutions and culture, that the universal tendency
._---.......
 
I 
• 
--555--
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
toward lapsing into "historical amnesia" leads us to pitch 
these symbolic drives at the generic bio-psychological lev-
els. Instead, we should undertake a fUll-scale ... eXPloration) 
of how we came to value individualism and"marches to the 
----.-_-. ---
---- -~----- ---
infinite" above all else (see Part II, Book Three). Doubt-
---_. ----- -. - . 
less, there are many surprises here; yet guided by the an-
cient wisdom that virtues, gone to extreme, become vices, 
can we any longer ignore the foundations and paradoxical 
consequences of some of our own deepest commitments? 
In any case, Durkheim must be given full credit for 
his discerning insights, as a pioneering sociologist and 
moral philosopher, into the phe~we~o~al r~~~s ,-"wrought 'I, 
by these "infinities of dreams and desires. 1I
- --"---Since the distance between us and it is always the same, 
whatever road we take, we might as well have made the 
motions without progress from the spot. Even our glances 
behind and our feelings of pride at the distance cover-
ed can cause only deceptive satisfaction since the re-
maining distance is not proportionately reduced. To pur-
sue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to . 
condemn onself to a state of perpetual unhappiness 
(S:248) . 
Durkheim next raised the important question of the~ature 
and role of~QPe in regard to societies where, for whatever 
reason, the "maLC;;:h.~s to infinity" :J;:~ign. Here, hope becomes 
..""."",---,- -
counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue us pre-
cisely when all reason for hope is gone (W. Lynch, 1966). 
Of course, man may hope contrary to all reason, and 
hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable. It may 
sustain him for a time, but it cannot survive the re- .' 
peated disappointments of experience indefinitely. T.vhat"'! 'c 
more can the future offer him than the past, since he / 
can never reach a tenable condition nor even approach 
the glimpsed ideal (S:248)? .,n, 
It is significant that Durkheim introduced the idea of hope,~ \) yt~t 
and its opposite--ho~elessnessor d~air. For unfulfilled ~ 
expectations lie at the basis of revolt and. suicide. As Durk-');~ 
heim noted, infinite expectations are, by def~Eition, unat- I 
tainable. If hope is not for something real and attainabl~, 
if we invest ourselves instead in the hopeless aspiration 
toward infinites while remaining mired in the finite human 
• 
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condition, then inevitably disillusionment and despair ensue. 
Such an aspiration only masks a deeper hopelessness, a deep- L) 
.---- i 
er estrangement, perhaps ev~n aliena~ion. ~ must be for I 
the poss~ble, we must relearn how to imagine the real, if ~ 
hope is to perform its necessary function in human affairs. 
Durkheim continued, almost epigrammatically pinning our 
age in one revealing phrase. 
The more one has, the more one wants, since satisfac­
tI'OnsreceIVed only stIiTiUfa~instead of filling needs. '" 
Shall such action be considered agreeable? First, only y~ 
on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Secondly, 
for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and half-
veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unending mo­
tion must at least always be easy and unhampered. If it 
is interfered with only restlessness is left, with the 
lack of ease which it entails. But it would be a mira­
cle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever encounter­
ed. Our thread of life on this conditions is pretty thin, 
breakable at any instant * (S:248). 
The restlessness we feel, whether it be expressed in econo­
mic, artistic" or moral· terms, is judged by Durkheim to be 
both substantively and functionally irrational (see also La­
Capra, 1972). This lack of fit should lead us to expect that 
they must then be supported by some tacit ethical commitments 
which may have shifted from their original locus and inten­
tion to these inappropriate spheres. Our congenital lack of 
ease--economic, artistic, moral, our dis-ease over the world 
as it is given over to us--is deepl~l>~ed, not so much 
in our biological egos, as in our peculiar Western cultural 
traditions. Because they are so much a pa;t~ u~, llke 
breathing air, they become invisible. 
C. The Social Schedule as the Mechanism Regulating Wants 
But how is this type of generic dis-ease to which Durk­
heim alludes controlled by society? Is there some basic so­
cial or economic mechanism regulating the satisfaction of , 
~ants? That helps set us at ease by scheduling gratifica­
tion? Certainly, suggested Durkheim: 
Physical restraint would be ineffective; hearts cannot 
be touched by physico-chemical forces. So far as the 
appetites are not automatically restrained by physiolo­
•
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gical mechanisms, they can be hal ted only by a limit that 
they recognize as just. Men would never consent to re­
strict their desires if they felt justified in passing 
the assigned limit. But, for reasons given above, they 
cannot assign themselves this law of justice. So they 
must receive it from an authority which they respect, 
to which they yield spontaneously. Either directly and 
as a whole, or thought the agency of one of its organs, 
society alone can ~ this moderating role; for it is 
the ~nly moral power superior to the individual, the au­
thor1ty of which he accepts. It alone has the power ne­
cessary to stipulate law, and to set the point beyond 
which the passions must not go-.-Finally, it alone can 
estima~the reward~be prospectively offered to eve­
~ class of human functIOnary, in the name of common-­
1nterests~ (5:248-9). . 
This passage represents a crucial transition in Durkheirn's 
argument, for he had now begun to translate his abstract 
premises about the need for regulation of egoistic passions 
into a basic sociocultural rule. Since human hearts and 
minds cannot be moved by physical forces, only moral forces 
are adequate to the task. In moralizing the drives of the 
organic ego, and generating the desires of the socially con­
structed person, society constructs parameters for potential 
satisfactions. Desires within these forms and bounds are le­
gitimate, those beyond are proscribed. Th..US' with Max weber,. \ 
Durkheim's basic category of control is not power or con- 1\ 
------=-- ,! 
straint, but rather legitimate moral authority (as Giddens, \ 
........ --..- \
 
1972a notes). For the socioeconomic order to work, for the 
individual to be properly motivated, for culture to keep de­
sires within acceptable limits and meaningful forms, certain 
ratios of satisfaction must be considered legitimate by all. 
Specifically, this means that every society must con­
struct some mechanism, accepted generally as legitimate, .to 
regulate the appropriate levels of. ratios of satisfaction of. 
individuals in terms of a social schedule. This schedule 
will be stratified depending upon degrees of functional con­
tribution and cultural honor. Thus, each status position 
will generally receive the approximate rewards considered 
legitimate, both by the larger society and by the receiving 
stratum itself. 
•
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At every moment of history there is ~ dim perception,
 
in the moral consciousness of societies, of the respec­

tiv~alue of different socIal services, the:Delative
 
reward due to each, and the consequent degree of com­

•
 
fort approprTateOn the average to· workers in each oc­

cupation. The different functions are graded in puplic
 
opinion and a certain coefficient of well-being assign­

ed to each, according to its place-rn the hierarchy.
 
According to accepted Ideas, for example, a certain way
 
of living is considered the upper limit to which a work­

•
 
man may aspire in his efforts to improve his existence,
 
and there is another limit below which he is not will­

ingly permitted to fall unless he has seriously demean­

ed himself. Both differ for city and country workers,
 
for the domestic servant and the day-laborer, for the
 
business clerk and the official, etc. Likewise the man
 
•
 
of wealth is reproved if he lives the life of a poor
 
man, but also if he seeks refinements of luxury over­

much. Economists may protest in vain~ public opinion
 
will always be scandalized if an individual spends too
 
much wealth for wholly superfluous use, and it even
 
seems that this severity relaxes only in times of moral
 
disturbance * (S:249). 
Durkheim here introduced a theorem of major, yet largely un­
explored, significance for sociological and economic theory. 
• In Durkheim's theory of the social schedule underlying econo-' \ , ) 
mic production, distribution, and consumption, ~E~~e and in­ \ 
come ratios are based, to a large extent, on the social con­
tribution and cultural status of different occupations, and 
• 
-------- -. ­
on the belief in the legi;imacy of their status and the ap­
propriate reward accorded each status. 
•
 
A genuine regimen exists, therefore, although not al­

w~y~ legally formulated, which fixes with relative pre­

C1S10n the maximum degree of ease of living to which
 
each s'ocIat class may legiITma::teI'yaspire. However,
 
•
 
there is nothing immutable about such a scale. It
 
changeS-with the increase or decrease of collectrve
 
revenue, and the changes occuring in the moral ideas
 
of society. Thus, what appears to De luxury to one pe­

rrod no longer does so to another~ and the well-being
 
which for long periods was granted to a class only by
 
exception and superogation, finally appears strictly 
necessary and equitable * (S:249-50). 
The Social Schedule of economic satisfaction, then, is aI. ------.­generic socia-economic cultural institution. In turn, signi­
ficant changes in the social schedule should be registered 
in the basic alterations of price and income structures. 
•
 
S: .. 
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Historical inquiries might benefit by including this crucial 
factor	 in the search for underlying causes of inflation or 
"price	 revolutions," for instance. 
Throughout his account, Durkheim emphasized the impor- C/ 
tance of belief in the legitimacy of the sociocultural regle-j 
----,	 -­mentation of wants. Raw power alone is not sufficient to main­
tain the internal order of the social schedule of incomes and 
prices	 (these two factors always being closely related). For 
people	 must believe in the rightness, the moral justness of 
the basic ratios of rankings and rewards. 
But it would be of little use for everyone to recognize 
the JUstice of the hierarc~of functions established by 
public opinion, if he did not also consider the distri­
bution of these functions just. The workman is not in 
harmony~ith his social position if he is not convinced 
that he has his desserts. If he feels justified in occu­
pying another, what he has could not satisfy him. 80 it 
is not enough for the average level of needs for each so­
cial condition to be regulated by public opinion, but 
another, more precise rule, must fix the way in which 
these conditions are open to individuals. There is no so­
ciety in which such regulation does not exist. It varies 
with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the al­
most exclusive principle of social classification~ to­
day it recognizes no other inherent inequality than he­
reditary fortune and merit ...• It is possible every­
where, as a restriction upon individuals imposed by su­
perior authority, that is, by collective authority. For 
it can be established only by requiring of one or ano­
ther group of men, usually of all, sacrifices and con­
cessions in the name of the public interest *(8:250-51). 
Today these are commonplaces of sociology-~for all societies 
combine variable ratios of ascribed and achieved status. But, 
in general, the former predominates in traditional societies, 
while the latter predominates in modern societies. Indeed, 
the modern world is only possible if the highly restrictive 
social	 bonds of fraternization of primitive societies rooted 
in "blood and soil" are progressively set aside in favor of 
more universalistic bonds. In this world-historical process, 
the individual person emerges (see Book One), freed from the 
"too strict tutelage" of sib and ~ult. However, in terms of ~. 
a~e, Durkheim suggested that the contemporary process of 1\ 
freeing or releasing the individual ego from traditional 
•
 
-------~----------.-----­
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• 
• 
• 
moral constraints has gone to extreme; there must be a re­
dress of the balance. 
Against the laissez-faire economic moralists, Durkheim 
countered that the first step toward.real freedom is self­
control and the internalization of moral discipline (see also 
Book One). 
It is not true, then, that human activity can be re­
leased from all restraint. Nothing in the world can 
enjoy such a privilege. All existence being part of 
the universe is relative to the remainder, its nature 
and method of manifestation depend not only on itself 
but on other beings, who consequently restrain and reg­
ulate it. Here there are differences of degree and form 
between the mineral realm and the thinking person. Man's 
characteristic privilege is that the bond he accepts-Is­
not physical,. but moral; that is, ~crar:- He is governed 
notby a mater1al environment brutally imposed on him, 
but £l.a conscience superior to his own, the superIOrity 
of which he feels. Because the greater, better part of 
his existence transcends the body, he escapes the body's 
yoke, but is subject to that of socIety * (S:252).--­
Clearly, even the Durkheim of Suicide was no crude Parsonian 
type positivist. For he insisted that the const!,aiIl.~ =xercised () 
by the external environment is not the key to the human equa- I 
.__ ___.__._ --'--'-1," -""-, 
tion. Rather, man escapes the "body's yoke," and becomes fully 
human only by embracing the "yoke of sgciety," that is,
"...,._'_r.... . . ~_._ 
the 
moral legitimacy of the conscience collective. There is no 
real contradiction in this Rousseauean position that one must 
give up the pr~~~tive anarchy of desires in order to become r:.1 
free through society, fO~--Du~kh~im posits a constant dialectic /~ 
between release and control. One becomes free from the a~ /
- ._- -- -- --- \ 
chic passions of the organic ego only through embracing the I 
moral self-discipline afforded by social norms. Indeed, it is 
true as Evans-Pritchard (1965) said, paraphrasing Engels, 
that Durkheim believed that "man ascends from the kingdom of 
necessity to the kingdom of freedom" (see also Book One). 
In contrast to the moral anarchy of infinite, bound- ~ 
less, or indeterminate desires, Durkheim suggested that the 
socioeconomic schedule helps to regulate, define, or limit hu­
man wants. Desires are given specific and meaningful form. De­
finition here means the same as in the definition of a concept 
•
 
• 
• 
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or word--namely, the staking out of discernible boundaries, 
limiting, giving it, as Shakespeare said, "a name and a local 
habitation ." But Durkheim' s first theory of anomie rests on / f/ 
the perception that the traditional socioeconcmic schedule f 
must have broken down. Why else are we swamped today by an 
"infinity of dreams and desires"? What else could be the 
source of this "infinity sickness," this
----­
"moral anarchy" that 
plagues the economic andiirtistic ethoses especially? Yet, as 
a close look at the paradoxes of Western history reveals, 
there is a basic difference between a system breaking down, 
and a system being broken through, being delegitimized, and 
then a new alternative and more dynamic system being construc­
ted in its place. But here Durkheim was concerned with the 
stability given the person by a stable or slowly evolving so­
cial schedule. 
Under this pressure, each in his own sphere vaguely 
realizes the extreme limit set to his ambitions and 
aspires to nothing beyond. At least if he respects reg­
ulations and is docile to collective authority, that is, 
has a wholesome moral constitution, he feels that is not 
well to ask more. Thus, an end and g0';ll are set to the 
passions. Truly, there is nothing rig1d nor absolute a­
bout such determination-.-The economic ideal assigned ­
each crass of citizens is-rtself confined to certain 
IImrts, withTn which the-deires have free range. But 
it is not infinite. This relativ~mrtationand the 
moderatIOn it involves:makes men contented with theIr 
lot while stimulating them moderately to improve it, 
and this average contentment causes the feeling of calm, 
active happiness, the pleasure in eXISting and ITv~ 
which characterizes health for societies as well as 1n­
dividuals. Each person is then ••• in harmony wi~~his 
condition, and desires only what he may legitimately 
hope for as the normal reward for his activity. 
Besides, this does not condemn man to a sort of immo­
bility. He may seek to give beauty to his life: but 
his attempts in this direction may fail without causing 
him to despair. For, loving what he has and not fixing 
his desire solely on what he lacks, his,wishes a~d hopes 
may fail of what he has happened to asp1re to, w1thcut 
his being wholly destitute. He has the essentials. The .l/j

equilibrium of his happiness is secure because it i-s-­
defined, and a few mishaps cannot disconcert him-*-­
(S:25Qf:'" 
Exonerating himself from imputations of conservatism, Durkheim 
thus made clear his essential kinship with the ancient moral 
•
 
•
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{ 
philosophy of the "golden mean." "Human experience sees the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
condition of happiness~rn-the golden mean" (DL:237). And, of 
course, in the Nichomachean Ethics, a book Durkheim certainly 
knew, Aristotle said: "Evil belongs to the indeterminate, good 
to the determinate .•.• excess and deficiency characterize 
vice, while the mean characterizes virtue" (1962:43, see also 
r-' '	 -.... 
Book Three of the present dissertation). 
D.	 The Release of the Ego'~ Insatiable Passions in the 
Modern Transitional Crisis 
But when society is disturbed by some painful crisis or 
beneficent bUtabrupt transitions, it is momentarily in­
capable of exercising this influence: thence comes the /" 
sudden rises in the curve of suicides ... (5:252). 
Durkheim thus next observed that when the stability of society 
and moral discipline are disrupted, the legitimacy of the so­
cial schedule is also challenged, whether implicitly or expli­
citly,	 and, as a consequence, becomes less able to restrain 
and direct individual desires. Although in normal times, Durk­
heim suggested, people more or less accept the basic ratios 
of reward, in extraordinary or revolutionary times these are 
no longer inevitably regarded as just or legitimate. Raw po­
lice power is then needed to maintain and enforce the inequi­
ties in distribution. Taking his notion of stable and disrup­
ted social equilibrium from Saint Simon I s idea of "organic" 
and "critical societies," Durkheim argued that the latter 
type of period is "abnormal." 
... discipline can be useful only if considered justby 
the peoples subject to it. When it is maintained by 
only customs and force, peace and harmony are illu­
sory: the spirit of unrest and discontent are latent; 
appetites superficially restrained are ready to revolt. 
This happened in Rome and Greece when the faiths under­
lying the old organization of the patricians andpleb­
ians were shaken, and in our modern societies when a­
ristocratic prejudices began to lose their old ascen­
dancy. But this state of upheaval is exceptional: it 
occurs only when society is passing through some ab­
normal crisis. In normal conditions, the collective or­
der is regarded as just by the great majority of per­
sons. Therefore, when we say that an authority is ne­
cessary to impose this order on individuals, we certai~ 
• 
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do not mean that violence is the only means of estab­
lishing it. Since this regulation is meant to restrain 
individual passions, it must corne from a power which 
dominates individuals; but this power must also be o­
beyed through respect, not fear (S:25l-2). 
In short, the socioeconomic schedule of satisfaction of wants 
will inevitably break down if enforced only by raw power. On­
/ 
ly widespread belief in the moral legitimacy of a set of ra­
tios of reward will suffice. Thus, just as contemporary stock 
marke~experience crises of confidence, so, too, the most 
critical times which societies and their economies undergo are 
when there is a widespread doubt or uncertainty concerning the 
dominant system of legitimate authority; of course, revolu­
tions are one outcome. 
However, one can hardly refrain from asking: given 
Durkheim's philosophically and historically based schema of 
r~lease and control, precisely what are the historical sources 
~ 
of the progressive breakdown of moral discipline, and thus the 
release of egocentric and insatiable desires in the modern 
world? Could it also be that the release of such egocentric 
and insatiable desires might themselves be the unanticipated 
result of the extreme development of a certain peculiar type 
of moral discipline? Is there a real historical possibility 
that release of egocentric "infinities of dreams and desires" 
may be normatively or culturally sanctioned? In other words, \~ 
that anomie and egoisme may be the result of the presence, \ 
rather than the absence, of moral discipline? Perhaps there 
are a series of historical paradoxes hidden here which remain 
untapped by Durkheim's rather bland mechanical model underly­
ing his first schema. For it would seem that even Durkheim 
himself might agree, since the legitimacy of moral authority 
was his fundamental category here, that if the socioeconomic 
schedule is basically upset, then its traditional and re­
vered legitimacy must also corne to be fundamentally challenged 
by some group. How can we believe otherwise--that the legiti­
macy of the old ways and ratios of reward were simply eroded 
by the mechanical progress of the division of labor? Often 
these type of challenges are advanced on moral grounds, much 
• 
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as the heralds of the new social and economic order ushered 
in by international market capitalism were themselves moral 
• prophets appealing to a new structure of conscience formed in 
the secularized air of ascetic Calvinism (eg. Adam Smith and 
the Scottish moralists). Such moral challenges--the competi­
tion of one type of charisma against another--are most com­
• plex symbolic sociocultural processes, which are not adequate­
ly portrayed in mechanical terms. For how can mechanical pro­
ceSses include rhetorical processes, questions of moral legit­
imacy, and so forth? If moral challenges to existing legiti­
• mate authority, and the progressive substitution of a new and 
more rigorous system is the central problem, then the question 
of the nature and source of egocentric insatiability might 
change also. In short, why has the traditional social schedule
-broken down? Was it because of the cumulative impacts of the• 
mechanically driven division of labor (see Part II of this 
Book). Or was it, perhaps, due to a long series of rhetorical 
challenges and conflicts between ~ systems of moral 
•
 
----..>
 
authority (see Book Three)? 
Whatever the causes, the result of this breakdown or 
weakening of the moral legitimacy of the traditional social 
schedule of satisfaction of wants is similar. The ratio as­
• signed each group becomes disturbed, uncertain, unsatisfying. 
The individual becomes deregulated, declassified, or, in Durk­
heim's terms, demoralized. Once it is released from cOllec:¥ 
• 
---­~ ~_ L_tive moral discipline, the pre-social ego rever~ type. 
And th; intervening process of Itmoral reeducation~ inevi­
tably painful. 
• 
In the case of economic disasters, indeed, something 
like a declassification occurs which suddenly casts 
certain individuals into a lower state than their pre­
vious one. Then they must reduce their requirements, 
• 
restrain their needs, learn greater self-control. All 
the advantages of social influence are lost so far as 
they are concerned: their moral education has to be 
recommenced. But society cannot adjust them instantan­
eously to this new life and teach them to practice the 
increased self-repression to which they are unaccustom­
ed. So they are not adjusted to the condition forced 
on them; and its very prospect is intolerable: hence, 
•
 
• 
--565-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
the suffering which detaches them from a reduced exis­
tence even before they made a trial of it (S:252). 
Paradoxically, this painful "moral reeducation" commences both 
when things change for the worse and for the better. But why 
should people grow unhappy when things rapidly get better? And,
!~ 
conversely, why shouldn't poverty itself lead to despair and 
perhaps even to suicide? Our economic and materialist presup­
positions regarding the logic of rising human expectations run 
into a brick wall here. Why should wealth--the epitome of in- Jth 
dividual success in modern society--Iead to unhappiness so se­
vere that men can no longer bear the afflictions of affluence? 
It is the same if the source of the crisis is an abrupt 
growth of power and wealth. Then, truly, as the condi­
tions of life are changed, the standard according to 
which needs are regulated can no longer remain the same; 
for it varies with social resources, since it largely 
determines the share of each class of producers. The 
scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediatery 
improvISed. Time is required for the public conscience 
to reclassify men and things. So long as ~ social for­
ces thus freed have not regained equilibr1um, their re­
spectIVe values are unknown and so all regulation is-­
lacking for a time. The limitsare Uii'known betwee!! ~ 
possible and the impossible, what is just and what 1S 
unjust, legItImate claims andllOPesand thO'Se Wh1Chare 
immoderate. Consequently, there is no restraint on as=­
pirations * (S:252-3). -- -- -­
Thus, at the 3~se of Durkheim's theory of~~omie is the pre- \\~ 
sumption that the immoderate desires congenital to human na- ~ 
ture are released when individuals are morally deregulated in
- - ---.:.:.the wake of economic risis or social transformation. ~fuen the 
....... 
change is as fundamental as the wrenching metamorphosis from 
traditional to market society, this "~ationor. 
anomie" becomes chronic. 
If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the 
principles conbolling the distribution of men among 
various occupations. sInCe the relationsbetWeen var­
ious parts of society are neoassarily modified, the 
Ideas expressing these:relations must change. Some par­
ticular class especially favored by the crisis is no 
longer resigned to its former lot and, on the other 
hand, the example of its greater good fortune arouses 
all sorts of jealousy below and about it. Appetites, 
not being controlled ~ ~ public opinion, become dis­
oriented, no longer recognize the limits proper to 
•
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to them.... with increased prosperity, desires increase. fL._-
At the very moment when traditional rules have lost ;-
the~authority, ther1cher prize offered E"i1eSe appe-
• tites stimulates them and makes them more exigent and impatient of cont~ The state of deregulation or a- ) 
nomie is thus further neI"ghtenedoy passions becoming /ij 
less dIScIPlIned, precisely when they need more disci-
IInrng* (8:253). ---- ---- --------
• 
In prolonged disruptions, then, the whole occupational scale 
• 
is upset. Deregulation leads to release of sensual appetites. ~~ 
Individuals and groups act entirely for their own self-inter- .ft 
est. In this sense, anomie refers to the historical socio-eco- / 
nomic condition in which the traditional schedule of expecta-
• 
tioris has broken down so that sensual appetites are not merely 
released but even stimulated. 
Durkheim's sociological concern with the breakdown of 
the traditional social regulation of wants is important. The 
• 
release of constantly escalating demands leads those not simi-
larly favored to resent others' advances. Indeed, perhaps one 
of the key sociological supports underlying the upward wage-
price spiral in modern economies is precisely this pervasive 
deregulation and continuing release of competing collective 
egoisms. Perhaps inflation has a key sociocultural foundation. 
This real possibility might have been explored had we suffi- 11 
• 
_ciently noted Durkheim's thesis that the ratio of scheduled I ~
 
rewards is  relational--that is, relative deprivation is a key 
...= 
motivating force. 
• 
But then their very demands make fulfillment impossible.  
Overweening ambition always exceeds the results obtain-
ed, great as they may be, since there is no warning to 
pause here.  Nothing gives satisfaction and all this a-
gitation is uninterruptedly maintained WIthout appease-
ment. Above all, since this race for an unattainable 
goal can give no other preasurebut that of the race it~ 
• 
self ••• once it is interrupted the participants are 
left empty=handed-.-At the same tIme, the struggle grows 
more violent and painful, both from being less control-
led and because competition is greater. All classes con-
tend among themselves because no establisned classifICa-
tion any longer exists. Effort-grows just when it has 
become less productive. How could the desire to live not
• be weakened under such conditions * (8:253)? 
! propose that insatiable and escalating competition between 
• 
I• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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occupational groups is an_independent contribution to infla­
tion. We would well to remember that market capitalism was 
legitimized by the Enlightenment Utilitarian moralists as a 
projection of the law of nature, the "war of each against 
all," of "nature red in tooth and claw." If unending and un­
restrained competition becomes the accepted norm, then what T~ 
results is ~ kind of sanctioned anarchy, ~ legitimate socio­
economic civil war in which each group practices a kind of 
extortion vis-a-vis other groups~ 
It is most interesting to observe that, contrary to 
Merton and his legions of followers, Durkheim argued that pov­
ert~ to immunize,against anomie because it serves as a ~ 
rest~elf. The moral virtue of poverty which Durk­
heim emphasized, along with traditional religious moralists, 
is that there is no ever-widening gulf between our efforts 
and the hopes aroused by infinite aspirations. There is no 
gulf, and therefore no widening despair, because the infinite 
goals entertained by religious ascetics--by those who embrace 
or "choose poverty" as St. Dominic counseled--are not to be 
satisfied through economic means. Clearly, something crucial 
must have changmor shifted for moral and religious drives 
for "progress and perfection" to have been transformed or 
translated into secular economic action. Normally, for those 
mired in secular poverty there are no infinite aspirations. 
Poverty protects against suicide because it is ~ re­
straint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires have 
to depena-upon resources to some extent; actual posses­
sions are partly the criterion of those aspired to. So 
the less ~ has, ~ less he is tempted to extend tne 
range of his need 1ndefinitely. Lack of power, compel­
ling moderation, accustoms men to it, while nothing ex­
cites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the 
other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into 
believing that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing 
the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests 
the possibility of unlimited success against them. The 
less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limI= 
fatron appearS:-Not without reason, therefore~ave so 
many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value 
of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching ~} 
self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline, 
it prepares us to accept-Collective disCIPline with 
•
 
I• 
:"-568-­
equanimity,	 while wealth, exalting the individual, may 
arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very source 
of immorality. ThiS;- of course, is noreason why humani­
•	 ty should not improve its material condition. But though the moral danger involved in every growth of prosperity 
is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten*(S:254). 
Durkheim as a moral philosopher critical of the modern world 
is clearly in the forefront here. Indeed, in contrast to the 
• 
• traditional Western moral philosophy of "human finitude" and 
the "golden mean" (eg. see LaCapra, 1972; Hadyn, 1950), the 
modern world somehow has come to sanction the legitimacy of 
unlimited aspirations, the rightness of an "infinity of dreams 
• 
and desires." Indeed, the stimulation of infinite desires is 
the very cornerstone of modern economic growth. In this re­
gard it is interesting to recall that Keynes' diagnosis of the 
underlying ills causing the Great Depression of the 1930's was 
that demand was not being sustained on sufficiently massive 
levels to absorb the productive capacity, and thus keep the 
great industrial engine of modern economies going. One of the 
•	 
meanings, therefore, of post-Keynesian economics is that the 
• 
traditional relations between supply and demand have been in­
verted. No longer can manufacturers rely on the practical com­
mon sense of people to recognize that they constantly need 
new and ever-more superfluous consumer goods. Rather, through 
• 
massive, subliminally directed advertising, they seek to con­
vince consumers to believe that they constantly need these 
proliferating product lines. Fashion changes and restyling are 
part of the same process. Hence, one of the secrets underlying 
much of the	 continuous expansion of the American economy since 
World War II is the constant stimulation of an "infinity of 
dreams and desires;" this underlies the high mass consumption 
•
 
economy. (Incidentally, recognition of some of these mechan­

•
 
isms helping to fuel insatiable desires further weakens Durk­

heim's first notion that human nature is inherently insatia­

ble; if that were the case, manufacturers would be relieved
 
of much of the necessity of pumping billions of dollars an­

nually into	 media advertising!) The imperative underlying the 
continual escalation of the contemporary social schedule be­
•
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comes clear: first create demand through advertising and ,r 
other means, then gear up to supply the demand that you have 
• just stimulated. Such an inversion of the traditional rela­
tions between supply and demand also helps to minimize risk 
and uncertainty, the old nemeses of businessmen and bureau­
crats. 
• In a sense, Durkheim the rationalistic "laic" moralist 
was one with traditional metaphysics and moral theology when 
he noted that "the less limited one feels, the more intolera­
ble all limitations appear~" and when he reflected that the 
• "spirit of rebellion is the very source of immorality." It is 
interesting to note that religious philosophers have tradi­
tionally given another name to that type of '''moral immorali­
ty" or "immoral rebellion" which Durkheim perceived at the 
• very heart of anomie--namely, acedia.' Etymologically, ace­
dia means "not to yield," that is, not to yield to the will 
of God or to acquiesce in His system of world-order. Now, 
Merton's historical erudition alerted him to this older usage
• which he assigned, in the case of the medieval monk, to the 
category of "retreatism" (see appendix). In Durkheim's typol­
ogy, this usage would roughly correpond with "fatalisme." 
However, there is another possibility here: for besides pas­
• sive resignation, there is also an alternative drive for ac­
tivemastery and control. Merton, as did Zetterberg (1967) 
after him in speaking of a kind of "academic acedia," (eg. 
in the case of Darwin's or Weber's prolonged melancholia),
• saw the state e.s one of deepening apathy, "anhedonia," and 
'even generalized despair. But the philosopher Josep Pieper 
ha's given another, deeper meaning, to acedia. Pieper proposed 
that the "contrary of acedia is man's happy and cheeful af­
• firmation of his own being, his acquiescence in the world and 
in God" (1963:39). The reason, then, why religious moralists 
have often seen "anomie acedia" as a form of metaphysical re­
bellion is not only because of the challenge to "God's order"
• , in an active sense, but also because of the tacit refusal to 
accept "God's gift" in the more passive sense. So, whatever 
•
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forms an obstacle to the fundamental acquiescence of the self
 
to its natural place in the cosmos--whether these be fundamen­

• tally negative images of world or of self--can lead to acedia
 
as a corollary of anomie. And, of course, systems of cosmolo­

gy and ethics which would deny out of hand that man has any
 
natural place to stand are inevitably linked to various forms

• of anomic self-destruction, also. What matters here most is
 
the possible attitude of primal hostility or fundamental ac­

ceptance of the world. Significantly, Pieper added that idle­

ness and the incapacity for leisure are twins in human des~

• pair.
 
•
 
Leisure is only possible when a man is atone with him­

self, when he acquiesces in his being; whereas the es­

sence of acedia is the refusal to acquiesce in one's own
 
being. Idleness and the incapacity for leisure correspond
 
with one another (1963:40).
 
It is a profound insight into the ravages of the "children of
 
despair" upon the modern mind and soul that there is a funda­

mental commonality underlying these two seemingly opposite and
 
• unrelated states--namely, extreme energy and extreme paralysis.
 
For the instantaneous and the endless are but two sides of the
 
same gnostic coin (eg. see W. Lynch, 1966). Differently put,
 
it comes down to the difference between "unreal city, under
 
• the brown fog of a winter dawn" (T.S. Eliot), and "Soul, clap
 
its hands and sing" (W. B. Yeats).
 
The final element Durkheim added to the first install­

ment of his theory of anomie was that of time and historical
 
• process. The socially and culturally carried moral discipline
 
that once helped constrain passionate desires is no longer
 
effective. For whatever reasons, the ego's sensual appetites
 
are released from the constraining mold of moral reglementa­

• tion. Anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors
 
of the modern world, especially in commerce, industry, the
 
professions, among intellectuals, artists, the upper middle
 
and educated classes, and so on. At these specific sites, the
 
• remaining strength of the traditional social schedules is
 
weakened to the greatest extent. At these locations, where ex­

ternalized desires and inward dreams are most insistently
 
•
 
•
 
--571-­
individualized, the underlying reason is that the 
traditional social schedule is chronically upset, thus releas­
• ing the insatiable egoism inherent in human nature. By histor­
ical contrast, in earlier and more stable soci.eties, tradi­
tional social schedules, enforced by a shifting network of in­
situtions (eg. kinship, religion, government, occupational
• groups, etc.), worked to constrain, regulate, and redirect in­
dividual wants. But today no social or cultural mechanism in 
"market society" works to discipline the always latent "dis­
eases of the infinite." However, the historical situation is
• even further inverted. Whereas in earlier societies deviation 
from the traditional social schedule were punished as illegit­
imate, today no regulation is perceived as legitimate. In 
other words, the market itself became a deus ex machina by
• taking ~ the place of former ethical principles in working 
to regulate desires in ~ mechanical manner through egoistic 
competition. Indeed, this implicit recognition of the legiti­
mization of insatiable desires, of a culturally sanctioned
• "longing for the infinite," lies at the very heart of Du:-t"k­
• 
heim's second schema. When we couple Durkheim'~ keen phenomen­
ological insight with the actual histori.cal fact that the key 
ethical supports for market capitalism first emerged from the 
secularization of Calvinistic moral thought in the Scottish 
• 
Enlightenment, the evidence becomes compelli~: modern anomie 
and egoisme are generated ~ the presence of cultural sanc­
tions for absolute individualism and legitimized insatiability 
(themselves deflections of the earlier Calvinistic ethos). 
Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's notions underlying the 
.- .. j 
•
 
historical transformation from earlier forms .of moral regle­

mentation to modern "moral anarchy."
 
•
 
Durkheim began by emphasizing two important facts. One,
 
anomie is chronic, not intermittent, in the modern world. Two,
 
anomie is most intense in the most advanced areas of commerce,
 
industry, science, and so forth. We should always remember
 
that Durkheim's empirical points of departure were the infin­
ite drives for "progress and perfectiori," the infinities of 
•
 
• 
• 
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aspiration and ego seen in modern economic and intellectual 
culture. 
If anomie never appeared except ... in intermittent 
spurts and acute crisis, it might cause the social sui­
cide rate to vary from time to time, but it would not 
be a regular, constant, factor. In one sphere of social 
life, however--the sphere of trade and industry--it is 
actually in a chronic state (S:254). 
Durkheim noted that in traditional societies several 
social institutions served to regulate satisfaction of indi­
vidual desires through the economic sphere. In medieval and 
early modern European society, for instance, various levels 
of government and occupational groups such as guilds re­
strained competition and thus regulated desires. However, in 
modern societies, religion, government, and guild-like groups 
have lost much of their regulatory power over economic life. 
Indeed, in the Utilitarian doctrine, the political sphere was 
to support and stimulate the market economy, but not to reg­
ulate or constrain it (see especially Elie Halevy, 1955). 
Their heretical heirs, the critical radicals (ie. ~1arxists)., 
merely moved one step further and freely reveled in economic 
control by governments who committed all their resources to 
economic modernization, industrialization, to "Taylorization" 
and "electrification of the nation." Durkheim made the acute 
observation that for all modern nations, socialist and capi­
talist alike, economic growth and industrial prosperity con­
stitute the central goal of economic and social life ( see 
also Part II of this Book). 
For a whole century, economic progress has mainly con­
sisted in freeing industrial relations from all regu­
lation. Until very recently, it was the function of a 
whole system of moral forces to exert this discipline. 
First, the influence of religion was felt alike by 
workers and masters, the poor and the rich. It consoled 
the former and taught them contentment with their lot 
by informing them of the providential nature of the so­
cial order, that the sphere of each class was assigned 
by God Himself, and by holding out the hope for just 
compensation in a world to come in return for the ine- . 
qualities of this world. It governed the latter, recall­
ing that worldly interests are not man's entire lot, 
that they must be subordinate to other and higher inter­
ests, and that they should therefore not be pursued with­
•
 
•
 
--573-­
out rule or measure. Temporal power, in turn, restrain­
• 
ed the scope of economic functions by its supremacy over 
them and by the relatively subordinate role it assigned 
them. Finally, within the business world proper, the oc­
cupational groups by regulating salaries, the price of 
products and production itself, indirectly fixed the 
average level of income in which needs are partially 
based by the very force of circumstances (S:254).
• Later in Suicide Durkheim proposed to reappropriate ,; 
the morality of occupational groups as a remedy for anomie 
~ 
(see Part II of this Book). Durkheim's occupational and eco­
nomic remedies were based on the incisive political insight
• that in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the individual 
became stranded between the huge and the small, between the 
remnants of the family and the modern state, with no effec­
tive intermediary institutions to intervene on his behalf 
• (see Giddens, 1971c; Reinhard Bendix, 196Da). Durkheim's solu­
tion to the historical problem posed by his first schema de­
pended on a structural remedy for both a structural and a 
cultural problem; therein lay its essential weakness. Surely
• we cannot uncritically accept Durkheim's tacit notion that 
structural fusion inevitably leads to normative regulation. 
Here Durkheim took pains to emphasize that he was not an his­
torical reactionary, that the socioeconomic and cultural con­
• text which nourished the guilds had passed. In facing up to 
the enormity of the modern problems of anomie, there is no 
real possibility of resurrecting antiquated forms inadequate 
to the present task.
• We do not mean to propose this organization as a model. 
• 
Clearly, it would be inadequate to existing societies 
without great changes. What we stress is its existence, 
the fact of its useful influence, and that nothing to­
day has taken its place. Actually, religion has lost 
most of its power. And government, instead of regulating 
economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most 
• 
opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme social­
ists, unite to reduce government to the role of a more 
or less passive intermediary among the various social 
functions. The former wish to make it simply the guard­
ian of individual contracts; the later leave it the 
task of doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of 
recording the demands of consumers, transmitting them to 
producers, inventorying the total revenue, and distribu­
ting it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse it 
•
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any power to subordinate other social organs to itself 
and to make them converge toward one dominant aim. On 
• 
both sides, nations are declared to have the single-or 
ChIef purpose of achIeVing industrrar-prosperity~ such 
• 
is the ~lication of the dogma of economic material­
ISm, theoasis of both---apparentlyopposed systems. And 
as these theories merel~ express the state of opinion, 
Industry, instead of be1ngstill regarded as-a means to 
an end transcending itself, has become the-supreme end 
of indTviduals and societies aIrke * (S:255). 
Now, if "industrial prosperity" is the 'bhief aim" of 
modern nations, this goal is itself the outcome of "public 
opinion." Clearly, then, the "dogma of economic materialism"
• must also then be a reflection of some deeply held ethical 
beliefs from which it derived its dogmatic or sacred status. 
In other words, it must be culturally sanctioned. Durkheim 
rightly noted that both the exponents of market capitalism
• and bureaucratic socialism share this underlying dogma, and 
the underlying logics of Utilitarianism. Now, the contrast 
between both these modern socioeconomic systems and all those 
preceding the modern world is most instructive. Karl Polanyi
• (19G8) worked out a schema of the dominant rationales and or­
ganizational logics of different historical types of econo­
mic systems which may be of value here. As Polanyi observed, 
in primitive or "reciprocally" organized economies, this
• sphere of human action was subordinated to the ruling ration­
ales of another institution--the kinship group. In archaic, 
agrarian "redistributive" economies, economic action was gov­
erned by the fusion of political-religious-military ration­
• ales. The unique feature of "market capitalism" is that, for 
the first time in world history, the economy was freed from 
all traditional moral restraints. Purely Utilitarian economic 
rationales (atomism, the logic of means-ends efficiency, in­
• satiability, etc.), and the automatic balance mechanism of 
the ''invisible hand" began instead to dominate all social ac­
tion and cultural values. Everything became subordinated to 
the impersonal, mechanical, natural "iron laws" of the auto­
• matically self-equilibrating market. Instead of economic ac­
tion being the means to the material survival of the group, 
•
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a momentous historical inversion of ruling mora.l rationales 
or dominant motivations took place. Economics, in terms of 
the semi-magical mechanisms of market capitalism, had been 
freed from its instrumental role, and had, instead, become 
elevated to the first rung of the hierarchy of sacred values. 
That this was done in the name of the liberation of the in­
dividual and the potential productive powers of modern socie­
ties does not change this devastating unintentioned (and far 
too often unacknowledged) result. Consequently, modern social 
. institutions have been subordinated to the ethically sanc­
tioned "iron laws" of the automatic market mechanism. The 
market itself became the chief means of social control and 
moral discipline. Moreover, the Utilitarian moralists posi­
tively enjoined "endless strivings." 
Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed 
of any limiting authority. ~ sanctifying them, so to 
speak, this,apotheosis of well-being has placed them 
above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort 
of sacrIlege. For this reason, even the purely utilitar­
Ian regulation of them exercised by the industrial world 
itself through the medium of occupational groups has been 
unable to persist. Ultimately, this liberation of de­
sires has been made worse ~ the very development of in­
dustry and the armost infinite extenSion of the market:" 
So long as the producer could gain his profits only in 
his immediate neighborhood, the restricted amount of 
possible gain could not overmuch excite ambition. Now 
that he may assume to have almost the entire world as 
his customer, how cou'1<rpassions accept their former 
confinement in the face of such limitless prospects * 
- -- -- - -- (S:255-6)? 
Clearly, if the release of sensual appetites is "sanctifie~" 
if their restraint "seems like sacrilege," then they must be 
morally sanctioned~ Durkheim'~ use of sacral metaphors here 
is no mistake. 
Durkheim proceeded with his critical moral phenomenolo­
gy of the despair induced in the economic arena by thefrus­
tration of constantly rising expectations (and one might add 
prices! ) 
Such is the source of the excitement predominating in 
this part of society, and which has thence extended to 
the other parts. There, the state of crisis and anomie 
is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to bot­
•
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•
 
tom of the ladder, greed is aroused without knowing
 
where to fi.nd ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm it,
 
since its goal is far beyond all it can at."E'ain. Real­

ity seems valueless ~ com~arison with the dreams of
 
•
 
feVered imaginations~ real1ty is therefore abandoned
 
but so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn
 
b'eComes-re'aITty. A thirst arises for novelties, unfa­

miliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which
 
lose their savor once known. Henceforth, one has no
 
strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever
 
•
 
subsides and' the sterility of the tumu~is a~parent,
 
and it is seen that all these new sensations 1n their
 
Iilfiilltequantit¥"'Cannot form a solid foundatIOn of
 
happiness to support one dUrIng days of trial. Thewis~
 
man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without hav­

ing constantly to replace them with others, finds in
 
•
 
them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty.
 
But the man ~~ always pinned all his hopes on the
 
future and 11ved w1th his eyes fixed upon it, has noth­

ing in the past asa:-cOIDfort against the preseii'E"'s af­

fITcIToii"S"T fC>'r""tne past was nothing to him but a senes
 
of hastily experrencedstages. What bliiided him-to him­

•
 
self was his expectation always to find further on the
 
h~ppiness he had so far missed. Now he is stopped in
 
h1s tracks~ from now on nothing remains behind or a­

head to fix his gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough
 
to bring disillusionment, for he cannot in the endes­

cape the futility of an endlesS-pursuit ~(S:25~ --,
 
Durkheim constantly expanded on this theme of the psycholo- I~
 
gical ravages of the "yearning for infinity," of the exhaus- )
 
tion of the will and the collapse of the imagination through­

• out his classic monograph on suicide, especially in the
 
chapter on "Individual Forms of Suicide." Durkheim then di­
rectly related this psychoiogical condition to insatiability 
•
 
and suicides in the economic arena.
 
•
 
We may even wonder if this moral state is not princi­

pally what makes economic catastrophes of our day so
 
fertile in suicides. In societies where a man is sub­

jected to a healthy discipline, he submits more read­

ily to the blows of chance. The necessary effort for
 
sustaining a little more discomfort costs him relative­

•
 
ly little, since he is used to discomfort and constraint.
 
But when constraint is hateful in itself, how can closer
 
constrarnt not seem rntolerable~There is no tendency to
 
resignation-rn the feverish impat~ce of men's lives.-­

When there is-no other aim but to outstrTp-COnstantly
 
the point arrived at, how paInfUl to be thrown back!
 
Now this very lack-of organization~hrows the door open 
wide to every sort of adventure. Sipce imagination is 
hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it gropes at random. 
•
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Setbacks necessarily increase with risks, and thus cri­
ses multiply, just when they are becoming destructive 
•
 
* (S:256-7).
 
•
 
Yet, Durkheim admitted that these "thirsts for novel­

ty," for ever-changing stimulation," "when constraint is
 
hateful in itself," are morally legitimized. In historical
 
and cultural terms, Durkheim clearly recognized that these
 
insatiable and egoistic passions cannot be adequately ex- )
 
plained as inherent in human nature. For, contrary to Durk­

heim's underlying causal model in his first schema, if the
 
individual ego is simply released from traditonal moral dis­

•
 
cipline, then why should this amorality become sanctified?
 
No, "eternal dissatisfaction" is not simply due to the re­

lease of the organic ego from traditional reglementation.
 
Rather, embarking upon infinite quests, going back at least
 
•
 
to the ascetics and mystics of the Mediterranean deserts, and
 
to the sedimentation of Christianity in medieval Gothic cul­

ture (see Spengler's notion of "Faustian Man," 1922), have
 
been, and continue to be, preached and morally sanctified by
 
certain leading groups. These culturally and structurally
 
powerfully situated groups socialized masses of people over
 
a long period of time into internalizing these norms and im­

• 
ages, if not as moral virtues at least as the means of suc­

cessful competition. Truly such drives are deeply embedded
 
in our cultural traditions.
 
•
 
Yet these 'dispositions are so inbred that society has
 
grown to accept them and is accustomed to think of them
 
as normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man'~
 
nature to be eternally dissatisfied, constantIf to ad­ I .­
ivance, without relief or rest, toward an indef1nite goal. 
The longin~ ~ infinitY is daily represented as ~.~ 
of moral d1st1nction, whereas it can only appear w1th1n 
unregulated consciences which erevate~a rule the lack
• of rule from which they suffer * (S:25iT.- -- -- --­
Again, if "these dispositions are so inbred that society has 
grown to accept them as normal," and if it is claimed that 
man's nature is to be "eternally dissatisfied," and, indeed,
• if "the longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark 
of moral distinction," how can we escape the conclusion that 
egoisme and anomie are culturally sanctioned? That they are 
•
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themselves the result of moral obligations gone to extreme? 
_.. __z._ 
At this point, however, Durkheim did not deal with the prob­
• lem of the origin of the "longing for infinity," these deep­

ly "inbred predispositions."
 
More importantly, the actual evidence here was forcing
 
Durkheim to shift on his analytical axes. For next he began

• to acknowledge that if the "longing for infinity" comes only / .
 
from "unregulated consciences," nonetheless, these must be I/

i 
considered new rationales of conscience because they, as 
Durkheim ambiguously stated, "elevated to a rule the very
• lack of rule from which they suffer." Thus, contrary to Durk­
heim's initial presumptions, the clear implication that e­
merges from careful review of his own analysis is that these 
new structures of conscience are led by their inherited cul­
• tural norms to actively resist traditional constraints and 
to be self-regulating--to be self-interrogating, to have an 
"internal gyroscope" as David Riesman once suggested of the 
"inner-directed person"--much as the market mechanism that
• supposedly governs all our fates is also supposed to be au­
matically self-equilibrating. The rejection of traditional 
moral control and the elevation of absolute or atomistic in­
dividualism and the pursuit of infinite tasks within the
• world became the new constitutive norms for modern con­
sciences, the very heart and soul of the "New Modern Man" 
pioneering the "Brave New World." Clearly, market capital­
ism, Utilitarian theory, industrialization, professionaliza­
• tion, and so on, as Weber (eg. 1969) demonstrated, have con­
tinuing ethical foundations. Among contemporary sociologists, 
Talcott Parsons has for many years rightly insisted that mod­
ern economies are underlain by secularized Calvinistic ethics. 
• 
• The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress 
has become an article of faith •••• Industrial and com­
mercial functions are really among the occupations 
which furnish the greatest number of suicides. Almost 
on a level with the liberal professions, they sometimes 
surpass them: they are especially more afflicted than 
agriculture, where the old regulative forces still make 
their appearance felt most and where the fever of busi­
ness has least penetrated. Here is best recalled what 
•
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was once the general constitution of the economic or­
der. And the divergence would be greater yet if, among 
the suicides of industry, employers were distinguished 
from workmen, for the former are probably most stricken 
by the state of anomie. The enormous rate of those with 
independent means sufficiently shows that the 90ssessors 
of most comfort suffer most. Everything that enforces 
subordination attentuates the effects of this state. At 
least the horizon of the lower classes is limited by 
those above them, and for this reason their desires are 
modest. Those who have only empty space above them are 
almost inevitably lost in it, if no force restrains 
them (S:257). 
Suicide can be seen as Durkheim's ironic epistle to 
the modern world. In The Division of Labor he refuted the 
Utilitarian's argument that we specialized in order to pro­
duce more in order to increase our happiness, saying that 
"nothing could be less certain." Indeed, much of his later 
analysis was foreshadowed .in his early article "Suicide et 
nata1ite" (1888). In Suicide, Durkheim took this analysis 
several steps further. He asked, in effect, how it can be the 
case that if "drives for progress and perfection" are meant 
to make us happier, they often lead instead to dissatisfac­
tion bordering on a kind of endemic loneliness and rest1ess­
ness--in short, despair? Why is it that "the more we have, 
the more we want"? Is it really man's nature to be "eternal­
ly dissatisfied"? If so, then is it also man's nature to 
face eternal unhappiness? How could such a self-contradic­
tory apparition survive? Durkheim as moralist raised these 
and other questions which we must now explore, keeping in 
mind that we must go beyond Durkheim himself in seeking an­
swers. 
E. ·Matrimonia1 Anomie: Divorce as Deregulation 
A bit later in Suicide, Durkheim turned briefly from 
the mainline of his argument to illustrate yet another in­
stance of anomie deregulation, specifically the release of 
insatiable passions or sensual appetites through divorce and 
other factors mitigating against the strength of the marriage 
bond. Although the specific details are different than in 
•
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economic anomie, matrimonial anomie involved the same basic 
principle--namely, the weakening of moral discipline over 
the insatiable appetites of the organic ego. As a basic so­
cial institution, marriage meant moral regulation of sensual 
appetites to Durkheim. Divorce, on the other hand, "implies 
a weakening of matrimonial regulation." 
The institution of divorce must itself cause suicide 
through its effect on marriage. After all, what is 
marriage? A regulation of sexual relations, including 
not merely the physical instincts which this intercourse 
involves but the feelings of every sort gradually en­
grafted by civilization on the foundation of physical 
desire. For among us love is a far more mental than or­
ganic fact. A man looks to a woman, not merely to the 
satisfaction of the sexual impulse. Though this natural 
proclivity has been the germ of all sexual evolution, 
it has become increasingly complicated with aesthetic 
and moral feelings, numerous and varied, and today it 
is only the smallest element of the total complex pro­
cess to which it has given birth. Under the influence 
of these intellectual elements it has itself been par­
tially freed from its physical nature and assumed some­
thing like an intellectual one. Moral reasons as well 
as physical needs impel love. Hence, it no longer has 
the regular, automatic periodicity which it displays in 
animals. A psychological impulse may awaken it any time: 
it is not seasonal. But just because these various in­
clinations, thus changed, do not directly depend upon 
organic necessities, social regulation becomes neces­
sary. They must be restrained by society since the or­
ganism has no means of restraining them. This is the 
function of marriage. It completely regulates the life 
of passion, and monogamic marriage more strictly than 
any other. For by forcing a man to attach himself for­
ever to the same woman it assigns a strictly definite 
object to the need for love, and closes the horizon 
(5:270) • 
Certainly, Durkheim was right in observing that, on the human 
level, love has many dimensions~ it is at the same time, 
physical, emotional, sociocultural, and moral. But, by the 
very fact that socioculturally generated desires are now re­
cognized as working down to redirect organic needs, can it 
be legitimately claimed that the release of biological desire 
is the central cause of matrimonial anomie? Surely this ques­
tion has become even more urgent today, when there are often 
more divorces (or "dissolutions of marriage") than marriages, 
•
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when "open marriage, "swinging," and one-parent families have 
become the norm for large segments of the population.
• Now, one can hardly wish to maintain that physical sex­
ual relations retain the central position in man as in lower 
animals. For, by definition, man is the cultural animal. Not 
only do culture and society restrict the immediate satiation
• of organic and sexual desires, but they also generate myriad 
other activities that tend to crowd out purely organic activ­
ities from the center stage of human concern. While being 
I ,." .., 
partially weakened in their purely organic state, these lowe~
• level needs are restricted, redirected, and differentially 
stimulated by special social conditions and cultural mandates. 
To maintain Durkheim's two level model of man with insatiable 
and egoistic passions erupting from lower organic levels, and
• controlled or released on higher sociocultural levels, is 
simply sociologically untenable. Rather, the true sociocul­
tural position would be to reverse the causal sequence, and be 
primarily concerned instead with the subtle ways in which so­
• cial influences and cultural ~nctions feedback down and reo­
rient lower biological and psychological levels. 
In terms of the freer (at least traditionally) sexual 
partner--the man--Durkheim's view was that marriage acts to
• regulate and redirect organic urges. With the sociocultural 
transcendence of the periodic or seasonal mating systems of 
higher primates, Durkheim argued, the sexual horizon in man 
has become potentially unlimited. The function of marriage,
• then, is moral--to "regulate the life of passion," "to close 
the horizon." 
• 
This determination is what forms the state of moral e­
quilibrium from which the husband benefits. Being unable 
to seek other satisfactions than those permitted, with­
out transgressing his duty, he restricts his desires to 
• 
them. The salutary discipline to which he is subjected 
makes it his duty to find his happiness in his lot, and 
by doing so supplies him with the means. Besides, if his 
passion is forbidden to stray, its fixed object is for­
bidden to fail him: the obligation is reciprocal. Though 
his enjoyment is restricted, it is assumed and this cer­
tainty forms his mental foundation (8:270-1). 
•
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In contrast to the married man, the unmarried male enjoys no 
such moral reglementation of his sensual appetites. Inevita­
bly, according to Durkheim, his inherently egoistic and insa­
tiable passions are released from moral cont.rol--"he aspires 
to everything and is satisfied with nothing. II This is the 
IIDon Juan ll syndrome. 
The lot of the unmarried man is different. As he has the 
right to form attachment wherever inclination leads him, 
he aspires to everything and is satisfied with nothing. 
This morbid desire for the infinite which everYWhere ac­
companies anomie ~ay as--readily assail this ~.t any other 
part of our conSC10usneSSi it very often assumes a sex­
ual form which was described by Musset. ~~en one is no 
longer checked, one becomes unable to ch~one's-Self. 
Beyond experienced pleasures one senses and desires oth­
erSi if one happens almost to have exhausted the range 
of what rs--possible, ~ dreams of the impossIbIei one 
thirsts for the nonex1ste~t. [Footnote: see the monOIOgue 
of Faust-rn GOethe's work}. How can the feelIngs not be 
exacerbated by such-unending pursuits? For them to reach 
that state, one need not even have infinitely multiplied 
the experiences of love and lived the life of a DonJuan~ 
The humdrum existence of the ordinary bachelor suffices. 
New hopes constantly awake, only to be deceived, leaving 
a trail of weariness and disillusionment behind them. 
How can desire, then, become fixed, being uncertain that 
. it can retain what it attracts: for the anomie is two-­
fol~Just as the person makes no definitive qift of him­
self, he haS-defTnitive title to-nothing. The uncerta~ 
ty of the future plus his own Indeterminateness there­
fore condemns him to constant change. The result of it 
all is a state of disturbance, agitation and discontent 
which inevitably increases the possibilities of suicide 
* (5:271). 
Now, according to Durkheim, divorce has a similar ef­
fect--it releases the potentially insatiable sensual appe­
tites of the ego from matrimonial regulation. Instead of one 
definite object for their attentions, passions are suddenly 
opened up to an infinite series of possibilities with no re­
straining horizon. 
Divorce implies a weakening of matrimonial regulation. 
Where it exists, and especially where law and custom 
permit its excessive practice, marriage is nothing but 
a weakened simulacrum of itself; it is an inferior form 
of marriage. It cannot produce its useful effects to 
the same degree. Its restraint upon desire is weakened; 
since it is more easily disturbed and superceded, it 
controls passion less and passion tends to rebel. It 
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consents less readily to its assigned limit. The moral 
calmness and tranquility which were the husband's 
strength are less: they are replaced to some extent by 
an uneasiness which keeps a man from being satisfied 
with what he has. Besides, he is the less inclined to 
become attached to his present state as his enjoyment 
of it is not completely sure: the future is less cer­
tain. One cannot be strongly restrained by a chain which 
may be broken on one side or another at any moment. One 
cannot help looking beyond one's own position when the 
ground underfoot does not feel secure. Hence, in the 
countries where marriage is strongly tempered by di­
vorce, the immunity of the married man is inevitably 
less. As he resembles the unmarried under this regime, 
he inevitably loses some of his own advantages. Conse­
quently, the total number of suicides rise (8:271-2). 
As always, Durkheim's explanations are ingenious. But we can 
hardly follow him in his sociology of men and women. For, as 
noted earlier, Durkheim's sociology of sex roles is a "mud­
dled doctrine." His sociology of marriage is certainly open 
to serious question. Whereas traditional explanations of the 
marriage bond stress the protection of the woman, and the 
granting of moral and legal guarantees to her, Durkheim con­
tended that marriage actually works for the man's benefit, 
since it helps restrain passions that the male could not 
control otherwise by himself. 
Thus we reach a conclusion quite different from the 
current idea of marriage and its role. It is supposed 
to have been originated for the wife, to protect her 
weakness against masculine caprices. Monogamy, espe­
cially, is often represented as a sacrifice made by man 
of his polygamous instincts, to raise and improve wo­
man's condition in marriage. Actually, whatever histor­
ical causes may have made him accept this restriction, 
he benefits more by it. The liberty he thus renounces 
could only be ~ source of torment to him. Women did not 
have the same reasons to abandon it and, in this sense, 
we may say that by submitting to the same rule, it was 
she who made the sacrifice * (8:275-6). 
After mentioning the supposed sacrifice of the woman's sex­
ual liberty in marriage, and the acceptance of an oftentimes 
oppressive restriction of her horizon of emotional attach­
ment, Durkheim appended his famous footnote on the fourth 
type of suicide--fatalistic--to which we now turn. 
--
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CHAPTER FOUR 
• 
FATALISME AND PASSIVE RESIGNATION IN THE FACE OF 
OPPRESSIVE MORAL REGLEMENTATION 
Surely, fatalisme is the "neglected stepchild" of 
Durkheim's typology. No less a leading light than Talcott
• Parsons, in his famous The Structure of Social Action,mana­
ged to completely ignore fatalisme; the balance had not yet 
been redressed thirty years later in his 1968 Encyclopedia 
of The Social Sciences article on Durkheim. Accordingly,
• Dohrenwend's major task in 1959 was to somehow fit fatalis­
me into a Parsonian or normative framework. However, although 
Durkheim did not help us much in delineating the characteris­
tics of fatalistic suicides, I trust that we can recognize
• how well it fits into his first underlying schema. 
Clearly, fatalisme and anomie are opposites in at 
least two senses. First, as noted earlier, the very terms 
themselves give us strong clues as to their essential mean­
• ing. For just as anomie refers to the release of infinite 
~ .....'-"...--~desires, so does fatalisme refer to a sort of passive resig­
nation to oppressive moral reglementation. I believe- Durk­
heim chose the term fatalisme to imply what we commonly
• mean--narnely, resignation to one's fate, whether it be as­
• 
signed by blind chance or society and history. Fatalisme 
thus implies the extreme confinement of expectations in a 
narrow order, to a "claustrophobic" way of life. On the con­
trary, anomie signifies the ornninous yet tempting presence 
of a constantly expanding horizon of desires, a constantly 
renewed diversity of stimulation, a constantly lifting or 
•
 
receding of constraints. Anomie is "Faustian"--for it pre­

sumes accelerating expansion to infinite horizons. Second, 
anomie and fatalisme are not merely generic opposites, but 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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historical ones as well. As Parsons noted that "altruisme 
is on the same plane as mechanical solidarity," so, too, 
should we note that the opposite of modern anomie is the 
sociocultural and psychological state where the lnandates 
of the traditional collective conscience, rooted ultimate­
ly in sacral and magical rationales, fatally over-burden 
~he individual. With anomie the individual is deregulated, 
with fatalisme he is over-regulated. 
Just as Durkheim used the example of the army as an 
illustration of altruistic suicide in the modern world main­
ly as an evolutionary holdover, so, too, he used the oppress­
ive matrimonial regulation of men and women as an example 
of the survival of an over-bearing traditional collective 
conscience. It must be emphasized, however, that the prime 
historical location of both altruisme and fatalisme is tra­
ditional society (see, for example, Edward Banfield, 1967). 
I repeat: altruisme and fatalisme always have a prime his­
t~ical referent, as do anomie and egoisme. 
•.• there is a type of suicide the opposite of anomic 
suicide, just as egoistic and altruistic suicides are 
opposites. It is the suicide deriving from excessive 
regulation, that of persons with futures pitilessly 
blocked and passions violently choked by oppressive 
disci.pline. It is the suicide of very young husbands, 
of the married woman who is childless. SO for complete­
ness sake, we should set up a fourth suicidal type. 
But it has so little contemporary importance and exam­
ples are so hard to find aside from the cases just men­
tioned that it seems useless to dwell upon it. How­
ever, it might be said to have historical interest. 
Do not~he suicides of slaves, said to be frequent 
under certain conditions, belong to this type, or all 
suicides attributed to excessive physical or moral 
despotism? To bring out the ineluctible and inflexi­
ble nature of a rule against which there is no appeal, 
and in contrast with the expression "anomie" we might 
call it fatalistic suicide * (5:276). 
Indeed, the paucity of textual evidence here 1 leaves 
us little choice other than to simply take Durkheim at his 
word that he included fatalisme mainly for the sake of com­
pleteness and internal consistency. In explaining his appar­
ent lack of concern with fatalisme as a type, Durkheim con­
•
 
!• 
--586-­
tended that it is of "little contemporary importance;" pre­
sumably because there are few sociocultural sites in the mo­
• dern world where the ego is over regulated! Clearly, fatal­
isme is primarily of evolutionary significance. Fatalisme 
and its twin, altruisme, are to be seen as different modes 
of expression of the same fundamental cultural content-­
I. namely, the over-whelming emphasis in primitive or archaic 
societies on the predominance of the collective conscience 
over the individual. The altruistic suicide actively accepts 
the moral demand of self-sacrifice for the group, while the 
• fatalistic suicide passively resigns himself to the inevita­
bility of his collectively assigned fate. He does not strug­
gle with his inexorable destiny, he simply attempts to escape 
from it by usurping his one last right and possession--the
• refusal to live and submit to an awful fate. The altruistic 
suicide thus deprives his oppressive group of its object of 
extreme reglementation. If we apply, in turn, Durkheim's 
crucial notion of the social schedule of satisfaction of
• wants and expectations to altruisme and fatalisme, as did 
Durkheim himself with anomie, a different picture than com­
monly presented emerges. And if we pull together the time 
frames of both sets of suicide the schema again takes on a
• different and perhaps more profound meaning. Indeed, we shall 
• 
undertake this task in Book Three in exploring the foundations 
of Durkheim's second implicit typology of suicide. 
But let us first turn to consider in some detail 
Durkheim's own explanations of the origins of the modern 
crisis of anomie and egoisme. This task shall occupy our at­
tention in Part II of this Book. 
• 
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PART II: THE CONTEMPORARY TRANSITIONAL CRISIS 
•
 
AND MODERN MORAL ANARCHY
 
•
 
We are living precisely in one of those critical,
 
revolutionary periods, when authority is usually
 
weakened through the loss of traditional discipline-­

a time that may easily give rise to a spirit of anar­

chy (ME: 54) .
 
Preface. Against abstracted formalizations of Durkheim's 
schemas of suicide, Anthony Giddens (see especially 1971a, 
b, Cj 1972) has rightly emphasized that anomie and egoisme
• are historically specific. They represent not so much the 
generic possibility of breakdown of social order and control 
(the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"), as the release of the 
organic ego from traditional moral discipline. Giddens ar­
• gues that: 
•.• 'regulation" (society, 
simply be juxtaposed in an 
with "lack of regulation" 
egoisme and anomie must be 
social constraint) cannot 
abstract and universal sense 
(anomie). The notions of both 
understood within the scope
• 
of the general conception of the development of society 
presented in The Division of Labor. Seen in this con­
text, egoisme and anomie are not simply functional prob­
lems facing all types of society in equivalent degree: 
they are stimulated by the very moral individualism 
which is the outcome of social evolution. The dilemmas
• 
facing the modern form of society, Durkheim maintained, 
are not to be resolved through a reversion to the auto­
cratic discipline found in traditional societies, but 
only through the moral consolidation of the differentia­
ated division of labor, which demands quite different 
forms of authority from those characteristic of earlier 
types of society (1971a:117-118).
•
I cannot emphasize enough that Durkheim'~ dialectic of re­
lease and control was always evolutionarily grounded. Anomie 
and egoisme, as twin forms of modern suicide, stand as ob­
• 
jective or outward indices of the social, cultural, and psych­
ological "moral anarchy" plaguing the "critical" or transi­
tional phase of modern society, prior to the full institu­
•
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tionalization of "moral individualism" and "organic solidari­
ty. " 
• Since Durkheim's causal-evolutionary explanation of the 
roots of this transitional crisis is most complex, I shall 
here only sketch its general outlines. The key transforma­
tions underlying his first schema are social structural and 
• morphological in nature. For Durkheim always linked these 
processes: on the general evolutionary level, the progressive 
division of labor, societal differentiation, and individua­
tion are greatly accelerated and even disrupted by two recent 
• historical events of epochal significance. First, there was 
the rapid expansion of industry and the corresponding inter­
nationalization of the market. Second, there was the cata­
clysm of the French Revolution. These "twin revolutions," as 
• Nisbet (1967) calls them, were the prime historical causes 
of the modern transitional crisis. The displacement of secon­
dary groups meant that the individual is caught between the 
centrifugal pull of his egocentric, anarchic passions, on the 
• one hand, and the centralizing bureaucratic despotism of the 
remote modern State on the other. To remedy this "moral anar­
chy," Durkheim proposed to reconstitute "professional groups" 
and their political enfranchisement on the national level. 
• Since we rarely place Durkheim's notions of anomie and 
egoisme in historical perspective, perhaps a brief recap of 
the general evolutionary processes which Durkheim posited as 
underpinning this transitional crisis might be helpful. Re­
• call, first, Durkheim's complex series of sequential equa­
tions intervening between increasing moral density, his law 
of the continuous extension of the "radius of social life," 
and the progressive division of labor, and societal differen­
• tiation. First, greater population density within a given re­
gion (the population/territory ratio), linked together by 
growing transporation and communications networks, leads to 
greater degrees of "dynamic or moral density" or sustained 
• "increases in the quantity, intensity, and diversity of so­
cial relationships" (Alpert, 1939:90-2). On the macro-level, 
•
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increased "moral density" (or sustained social intensities) 
lead, in turn, to greater competition for resources among
• members of the same society. Now, this increased intra-socie­
tal competition leads, in turn, almost inevitably, to greater 
specialization and occupational differentiation. These typi­
cal socioeconomic responses to long-term changes in supply
• and demand often result, as is generally agreed, in greater 
productive efficiencies. Greater total productivity, in turn, 
accelerates the division of labor by increasing the potential 
for population growth and the elaboration and extension of
• technologies, especially the key infrastructura1 transporta­
tion and communication networks. The progressive "extension 
of the radius of social 1ife~' almost inevitably generates 
greater social energies, and, therefore, greater economic and
• sociocultural change. In short, Durkheim postulated a most 
complex, spiralling feedback process (see Book One). Thus 
were Durkheim's notions of progressive social morphological 
and social institutional changes linked on the micro-societal
• and macro-evolutionary levels. 
Further, we should recall that the "progressive efface­
ment of the segmental type of society" and culture 
by these ramifying social morphological and institutional pro­
• cesses led to two additional corollary transformations. The 
breakdown of the early, fused, "sacro-magica1 collective con­
science," led to: (1) the progressive elaboration of increas­
• 
ingly more abstract, rational, and universa1izab1e cultural 
forms, and forms of consciousness; (2) the evolutionary emer­
• 
gence of the individual personality as morally worthy in its 
own right (see especially Giddens, 1971a, b). Indeed, it was 
Durkheim's keen insight, as Nelson (1973a) and Leites (1974) 
have discovered, that the autonomizing of the person, and 
rationalization and universalization in the grounds of moral 
and intellectual discourse proceed together on the wor1d­
• 
historical level. In other words, the very structures and 
logics of rational thought and, in turn, the rationales of 
the autonomous individual person, are simultaneous sociocu1­
•
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tural constructions.
 
Perhaps the Parsonian notion of progressive evolution­

• ary differentiation can initially help to illuminate Durk­

heim's general evolutionary view of the modern transitional
 
crisis. Since Durkheim first indicated that everything pro­

gresses "mechanically," Parsons' mechanistic metaphors of e­

• quilibrium and strain in the differentiating social system
 
are helpful here as guides. What are the proximate causes,
 
according to Durkheim, of the contemporary crisis of anomie
 
and egoisme? And what is the way out of this "moral anarchy?1!

• Now, if the social division of labor normally produces "or­

ganic solidarity," then how is it possible for the contempor­

ary social and economic system to become "pathological"? Es­

sentially, Durkheim argued that two recent transformations

• have radically altered the conditions of social existence in
 
European culture, and thus fatally disrupted the generally
 
beneficial evolutionary differentiation process. First, there
 
was the radical destruction of the ancien regime in the

• French Revolution, plus its uncertain aftermath. Second,
 
there was the Industrial Revolution involving the rapid
 
growth of large-scale industry, and the progressive interna­

tionalization of the market. These "twin revolutions"--the

• French and the Industrial--are the twin historical keys to
 
Durkheim's notion of the contemporary crisis. Nisbet notes:
 
•
 
The breakup of the old order--an order that had rested
 
on kinship, land, social class, religion, local commun­

ity, and monarchy--set free, as it were, the varied ele­

ments of power, wealth, and status that had been consol­

•
 
idated for centuries. Dislocated by revolution, scrambled
 
by industrialism's inexorable march, fomented by the new
 
voices of reaction and radicalism, these elements tumbled
 
across the political landscape of nineteenth century Eu­

rope in search of new and more viable contexts (1965:20).
 
•
 
In his underlying notion of societies marked by an e­

volving and shifting equilibirum and societies torn by crisis
 
--a view of the "historical process as oscillation between
 
varying states of order and chaos" {LaCapra, 1972:202)--Durk­

heim was basically influenced by Saint-SimonIs notion of "or­
ganic" and "critical" societies. LaCapra suggests: 
•
 
•• 
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... Durkheim's concepts of normality and pathology were 
more sophisticated versiom of Saint-Simon's ideas of or­
ganic and critical periods in history. Like Saint-Simon, 
Durkheim believed modern society to be, in significant 
ways, pathological. He discussed at length and with ap­
parent agreement Saint-Simon's model of evolution in 
Western Europe in terms of a growing conflict between a 
religio-military and a scientific-industrial type of so­
ciety. In France, this had culminated in the great Revo­
lution .... The Revolution had destroyed the old order, 
but had miscarried in the creation of the new. It gave 
birth to the highest ideals of modern society, but it 
did not specify and establish these ideals in institu­
tions and rational beliefs. At the start of the nine­
teenth century, after the Revolution had run its course, 
the basic problem of a new social order was presented in 
the same terms as in 1789. Only the problem had become 
more urgent (1972:204-5). . 
It is, however, important to also remember that Durkheim op­
posed neither of these twin transformations, since both rep­
resented, in condensed form, the necessary culmination of 
long-term evolutionary changes. What was bad about them was 
instead the astonishing and violent speed with which they 
destroyed the old order. The basic problem was the destruc­
tive rapidity and massiveness of these changes. Too much had 
happened too fast; as a result, the old ways were justifiably 
gone, but nothing adequate had yet grown up to take their 
place. Modern society was thus caught in a moral and institu­
tional vacuum, a historical void in which the inherent "mor­
al anarchy" of the organic ego was left free to expand . 
... we are going through precisely one of these criti­
cal phases. Indeed, European society records no crisis 
as serious as that in which European societies have been 
involved for more than a century. Collective discipline 
in its traditional form has lost authority, as the diver­
gent tendencies troubling the public conscience and the 
resulting general anxiety demonstrate. Consequently, the 
spirit of discipline itself has lost its ascendancy .... 
For if society lacks the unity that derives from the fact 
that the relationships between its parts are exactly reg­
ulated, that unity resulting from the harmonious articu­
lation of its various functions assured by effective dis­
cipline, and if, in addition, society lacks the unity 
based upon the commitment of men's wills to a common ob­
jective, then it is no more than a pile of sand that the 
least jolt or the slightest puff will suffice to scatter. 
As a result, under present conditions, it is above all 
•
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the faith in a common ideal that we must seek to elicit 
(ME: 101-2) . 
Yet, there could be no question, as the French conser­
vatives and some of the German romantics wished, of reviving 
the old order; it was gone forever, in the blink of an eye, 
as it were. Such nostalgia was foreclosed by the very "mech­
anicalness" of the historical process, according to Durkheim. 
It was neither possible nor desirable to go back. Yet, the 
full depths of the tragedy of modern man, as Durkheim per­
ceived our continuing predicament, is that there was nothing 
viable to take the place of traditional order. Especially, 
there were few secondary groups standing between the central 
State and the lone individual to effectively moralize egos 
as the family, guild, and archaic religions had once done. 
This "malintegration" or lack of effective sociocultural and 
socioeconomic coordination not only "strained" the remaini.ng 
institutional structure, but most importantly, released the 
egoistic and insatiable appetites of the organic ego. In the 
last analysis, anomie refers both to the historical break­
down of traditional moral discipline and direction, and the 
breakthrough and release of the "infinity sickness" of the 
pre-socialized ego. 
Although the specific details of his remedies and the 
tenor of his early optimism changed, from the beginning to 
the end of his career Durkheim rarely wavered from his abi­
ding concern with the destructive dimensions of the modern 
transitional crisis. Indeed, as the crisis deepened, on the 
eve	 of World War I Durkheim melancholically reflected: 
The old ideals and the divinities which incarnate them 
are dying because they no longer respond sufficiently 
to the new aspirations of our day; and the new ideals 
which are necessary to orient our life are not yet 
born. Thus, we find ourselves in an intermediary period, 
a period of moral cold which explains the diverse mani­
festations of which we are, at every instant, the uneasy 
and sorrowful witnesses [1914] (in Bellah, 1973:xlvii). 
At the mid-point of his career (~he period in whic~are pres­
ently most interested), Durkheim argued: "The change in moral 
temperament thus betrayed bears witness to a profound change 
•
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in our social structure. To cure one, therefore, the other 
must be reformed" (S:387). In Suicide, Durkheim attempted 
to determine, in effect, the "moral temperature" of the mod­
ern world. And he found us, in this advanced stage of cri­
sis, to be "pathologically ill," beset by an endemic moral 
"malaise." The high suicide rate of certain groups conclu­
sively demonstrated that this "moral anarchy," although ab­
normal in macro-evolutionary terms, was nevertheless embedded 
in the very nature of the modern world. At the conclusion to 
Suicide Durkheim remarked: 
Thus, a monograph on suicide has a bearing beyond the 
special class of facts which it particularly embraces. 
The questions it raises are closely connected with the 
most serious practical problems of the present time. 
The abnormal development of suicide and the general un­
rest of contemporary societies spring from the same caus­
es. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths 
manifests the state of deep disturbance from which civi­
lized societies are suffering, and bear witness to its 
gravity. It may even be said that this measures it. When 
these sufferings are expressed by a theorist they may be 
considered exaggerated and unfaithfully interpreted. But 
in these statistics of suicide they speak for themselves 
.... The only possible way to check this current of col­
lective sadness is by at least lessening the collective 
malady of which it is a sign and a result (S:39l). 
As with all moral philosophers, Durkheim sought to offer us, 
from a sociologistical perspective on societal health and 
pathology, both what we might call a "theodicy"--an explana­
tion of how we got into our present predicament--and a 
"therapeutic"--or a prescription to remedy our pervasive 
sense of malaise. 
Now, I make no claims here to present new material 
from the corpus of Durkheim's work, or basically new perspec­
tives on this aspect of his work. Rather, I shall primarily 
offer a systematic exegesis of Durkheim's basic series of ex­
planations of the specific historical causes of the modern 
crisis of anomie and egoisme. To a great extent, it has been 
this persistent slighting of the important historical back­
ground of Durkheim's thesis on anomie that has continued to 
lead so many astray (eg. see McCloskey, 1974, 197~. Certain­
p------
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ly, it is strange that we do not yet have a systematic ac-
count of Durkheim's attempt to explain the roots of the mod-
• ern crisis. Further, while Durkheim's analytical and pre-
scriptive work on the modern transitional crisis is largely 
consistent, he continually added new facets to his argument 
over the years. Perhaps it is best, therefore, if we ap-
• proach his developing argument chronologically, starting with 
his analyses of the anomie and forced division of labor. Then 
we shall consider his analysis of socialism as a historically 
specific critical response to the rise of market capitalism.
• Finally, we shall review his remedial proposals for increas-
ing the "moral mechanics" of professional groups, and the en-
franchisement of these intermediate associations on the na-
tional political level. As we proceed, we should pay special
• attention to the deficiencies in Durkheim's causal-historical 
explanation of anomie and egoisme as the release of the pre-
socialized ego from the constraint of traditional moral dis-
cipline in the modern transitional crisis. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
!- -------------------~-~ -
I
• 
• 
• 
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD 
• 
.;Suicide, Durkheim and Weber, Modern Cultural Traditions, 
and the First and Second Protestant Ethos 
• 
! 
I. 
by 
DAVID DANI~L MCCLOSKEY 
• VOTIUME III 
A DISSERTATION 
• Presented to the Department of Sociology 
and the Graduate School of the University of Oregon 
in partial fulfillment 
of.the requirements for the degree of 
"Doctor of Philosophy
• June 1978 
• 
---- ~ 
1 
• 
--595-- . 
• 
CHAPTER FIVE 
•
 
THE ANOMIC DIVISION OF LABOR
 
• 
• 
It has been said with justice that morality is 
going through a real crisis .•.• Profound changes have 
been produced in the structure of our societies in a 
very short time: they have been freed from the segmen­
tal type with a rapidity and in proportions such as 
never have been seen in history .... The morality which 
corresponds to this social type has regressed, but with­
out another developing quickly enough to fill the ground 
that the first left vacant in our consciousnesses. Our 
faith has been troubled: tradition has lost its sway: 
individual judgment has been freed from collective judg­
• 
ment. But, on the other hand, the functions which have 
been disrupted in the course of the upheaval have not 
had the time to adjust themselves to one another: the 
new life which has emerged so suddenly has not been able 
to be completely organized, and above all, it has not 
been organized in a way to satisfy the need for justice 
which has grown more ardent in our hearts (DL:408-9). 
Preface. In Book Three, Chapter One, of The Division of La­
bor in Society, Durkheim presented his analysis of the anomie
• division of labor. This type is the first abnormal form endem­
ic to the contemporary transitional crisis prior to the full 
institutionalization of "organic solidarity" and the "cult of 
the individual." Giddens reminds us:
• The analysis given in The Division of Labor demonstrates 
• 
that organic solidarity-Ts the essential basis of the 
modern social order: there can be no return to the form 
of solidarity which is typical of traditionalism. It is 
fundamentally important to recognize, however, that or­
ganic solidarity, at the present juncture, is emergent, 
rather than fully institutionalized. The modern world 
is still in a transitional phase (1972a:IO). 
While the progressive division of social labor, on the world­
historical level, normally creates unity through diversity-­
• by putting into ever-more dependent contact various special­ized occupations--nonetheless, in contemporary economic life 
this is not the case. Industrial and commercial crises (eg . 
•
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the business cycle, conflict of labor and capital, class con­
flict, etc.) serve as stark testimony to an abnormal disrup­
tion of the normally integrative powers of the social divi­
sion of labor. In parallel fashion, Durkheim noted, the same 
process occurs in the fieid of science, for the unity of 
science is lost as scientific labor grows progressively spe­
cialized. 
Yet, against Comte and others, Durkheim also argued 
that the modern anomic deregulation of industry and the in­
ternationalization of the market are due to "effects inherent 
in the division of labor." Against the Utilitarian econcr­
mists, on the other hand, Durkheim contended that the divi­
sion of labor is not merely material in its effects but moral 
as well. Although agreeing with the Socialists that the modern 
economic world is beset by crisis, internal contradictions, 
ari8 a kind of legitimized egoistic anarchy, Durkheim refused 
to believe that simply tying economic life to the central 
government was an adequate solution, since the "State" is too 
far removed from the daily details of life. Only the "corpor­
ation" (in the French sense) could hope to adequately regu­
late the anti-social (amoral) elements of modern economic ac­
tion. Let us now look more closely at this first installment 
of Durkheim's notion of the modern transitional crisis in 
_._.~_~.. ,. ,--..c.- '_'_'_" ~~__~_~.__._•._ 
terms of the anomic division of labor. 
A. The Moral Creativity of Organic Solidarity 
As a background to the problem of the anomic division 
of labor, however, let us first recall that one whole axis 
of Durkheim's argument in The Division of Labor maintained~.~J
that there are two _basic types of _social solidarity. "1-1echan- tY1'I 
ical solidarity" implied the fusion of individuals into a 
---....'__T~_~-·-~'-~--~-------=------- ------- .­
primitive sacral-magical collectiJz'e consciousness. "Organic" 
. -­
social bonds, on the contrary, implied the progressive dif­
ferentiation of occupational tasks leading to a sort 6f-ram­
----- ---------- .-~-.. _--_. --_. ~--_.- ._. -----_._-~---------._._~ 
ifying interde~pdence. Identity and differentiated interde­
. ...._n._.~_~ __---­
pendence are therefore the two fundamental forms the social 
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bond may take . 
..• this mechanism is not identical with that which 
serves as a basis for sentiments of sympathy, whose 
source is resemblance. Surely there can be no solidar­
ity between others and us unless the image of others 
unites itself with ours. But when the union results 
from the resemblance of two images, it consists in an 
agglutination. The two representations become solidary 
because, being indistinct, totally or in part, they 
confound each other •.. and they are solidary only in 
the measure in which they confound themselves. On the 
contrary, in the case of the division of labor, they 
are outside each other and are linked only because 
they are distinct (DL:62). 
Thus, u~y through id~tity, or unity thro~diversity, 
are the two basic modes of construction of the social bond. 
Although always and everywhere composed of both types (con­
tra Nisbet, 1965), in evolutionary terms the social bond was 
~~-,---
originally based on the first type of relationship, and then 
progressively extended through the second type. In the first 
case, the social bond was highly particularistic or tribal, 
and thus exclusionary (see Nelson, 1969a, 1973a), magically 
\
stereotyped, and so on (see Chapter Six, Book One). On the 
other hand, the world-scale complexity of modern life is on­
ly possible if the social bond is progressively extended 
through the medium of what Durkheim called the "organic" or 
differentiating division of social labor. Here, as elsewhere, 
biological analogies (eg. see P. Hirst, 1973) guided Durk­
heim's "ideal typical" evolutionary constructions. 
The difference between these two types of social ar­
rangements is as great as that which separates the or­
ganization of certain colonies of polyps from that of . 
'superior animals. In the first, each of the associated 
individuals hunts on his account, in his own right; but 
what he catches is deposited in a common store, and he 
cannot have his share of the community wealth, that is 
to say, he cannot eat without all the society eating at 
the same time. On the contrary, among vertebrates each 
organ is obliged in its functioning to conform to rules 
designed to put it in harmony with the others; the ner­
vous system assures this conformity. But each organ, and 
in every organism each tissue, and in every tissue each 
cell, maintain themselves apart, freely, without being 
dependent on the others. Each major part of the organism 
has its own special food. The distance is no less consi­
derable between the two societal concepts which have been 
•
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so frequently likened (Soc:?l). 
As emphasized earlier (see Book One), as the progres­
sive elaboration of ever-more complex social morphological 
structures proceeds on the intra-societal level, Durkheim 
posited a corresponding shift on the inter-societal level. 
The segmental type of social structure breaks down as "tri­
bal" structures coalesce into larger units. As always, Durk­
heim posited a very close correlation between the progres-. 
sive social morphological extension of the social bond, and 
the evolutionary passage from "tribal" to "civilizational" 
symbolism (eg.see Chapter Seven, Book One) . 
..• organized structure, and thus, the division of la­
bor, develops as the segmental structure disappears. 
Hence, either this disappearance is the cause of the 
development, or the development is the cause of the 
disappearance. The latter hypothesisislladmissble, for 
we know that the segmental arrangement is an insurmount­
able obstacle to the division of labor, and must have 
disappeared at least partially for the division of labor 
to appear. The latter can appear only in proportion to 
the disappearance of the segmental structure. To be sure, 
once the division of labor appears, it can contribute 
towards the hastening of the other's regression, but it 
is in evidence only after the regression has begun. The 
effect reacts upon the cause, but never loses its qual­
ity of effect. The reaction it exercises is, consequent­
ly, secondary. The growth of the division of labor is 
thus brought about by the social segments losing their 
individuality, the divisions becoming more permeable. 
In short, a coalescence takes place which makes new 
combinations possible in the social substance (DL:256). 
Normally, the progressive division of labor and the re­
sulting social differentiation, according to Durkheim, is 
healthy and creative, not only because it breaks down the 
( early archaic "repressive," fused, sacral-magical complex, L, 
1 but also because it creates a new and powerful type of social\\ 
\ solidarity. This new type of extended or universalistic so- / 
cial bond also moralizes egos, but in a different way-- in­
stead of fusing them into a conscience collective, it differ­
----~._•.- --'~'.-"'-------'---' 
entiates them into inter-dependent occupational specializa­
tions in the socioeconomic web of modern life. And since the 
only real point of identity we now share in the organic or 
complex type of solidarity is our common humanity itself, the 
-~-----
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"cult of the individual" and "Reason" emerge as the orime
-
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
forms of legitimate moral authority. 
... not only does the division of labor present the 
character by which we have defined morality; it more 
and more tends to become the essential condition of 
(	 social solidarity. As we advance in the evolutionary 
(	 scale, the ties which bind the individual to his family, 
to his native soil, to traditions which the past has 
given him, to collective group usages, become loose. 
More mobile, he changes his enviroment more easily, 
leaves his people to go elsewhere to live a more auto­
nomous existence, to a greater extent forms his own 
ideas and sentiments. Of course, the whole common con­
science does not, on this account, pass out of exis­
tence. At least there will always remain this cult of 
personality, of individual dignity ..• which today is 
the rallying point of so many people (DL:400). 
Although the differentiated unity of the "organic" so-· 
cial bond is extended "mechanically" (that is, social morpho­
logically and institutionally), it also is simultaneously a 
moralizing process. The social division ot labor creates a 
new type of extended social bond, and thus, a new and richer 
base for both intelligence and morality. 
As intelligence becomes richer, activity more varied, 
in order for morality to remain constant, that is to 
say, in order for the individual to remain attached to 
the group with a force equal to that of yesterday, the 
ties which bind him to it must become stronger and more 
numerous. If, then, he formed no others than those which 
come from resemblances, the effacement of the segmental 
type would be accompanied by a systematic debasement of 
morality. Men would no longer be sufficiently obligated; 
ne would no longer feel about and above this salutary 
pressure of society which moderates his egoism and makes 
him a moral being. This is what gives moral value to the 
division of labor. Through it, the individual becomes 
cognizant of his dependence upon society; from it comes 
the forces which keep him in check and restrain him. In 
short, since the division of labor becomes the chief 
source of social solidarity, it becomes, at the same 
time, the foundation of moral order (DL:400-0l). 
At this point, it becomes necessary to introduce a 
little noticed distinction Durkheim made between two types 
of conscience collective and the prime historical referent 
of each (see also Book One). Early in The Division of Labor, 
Durkheim acknowledged that the conscience collective could be 
viewed in at least two different ways--as the generally dif­
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fused value and symbolic system of any society (ala Parsons' 
generic Central Value System), or as the special historical 
situation represented most clearly by primitive "mechanical 
solidarity," in which the logics of moral decision and in- 'j 
tellectual understanding were primarily collective and tradi) 
tional. The distinction is important, yet our failure (eg. 
see Parsons, 1949, Foskett, 1939) to recognize the evolution­
ary dimensionof Durkheim's thought means that we have collap­
sed the latter into the former. Wallwork is one of the few to 
note the importance of Durkheim's distinction between la con­
science collective and la conscience sociale. 
The spontaneous emergence of a co~non life together and 
of shared rules within smaller institutions in oluralis­
tic societies is an exceedingly important subtheme run­
ning through Durkheim's early writings, the theme which 
leads him to draw a careful distinction between la con­
science collective ou commune on the one hand, and la 
conscience sociale on the other. The former refers to 
the system of ideas or norms held in common throughout 
an entire society, while the latter and more inclusive 
term refers not only to beliefs and norms held in common, 
but also to institutionally engendered rules held by 
some but not all of the members of the larger collectiv­
ity (1972:84). 
Durkheim himself remarked on the ambiguity of the term con-\\ 
science collective when he observed: "The word we have em- ~ 
ployed is not, it is true, without ambiguity" (DL: 80), and 
observed, in passing, that it might be better to designate a 
special term for his notion of the "totality of social like­
~_---. 
nesses" whose clearest expression is primitive tribal cul­
"----­
ture. Unfortunately, he did not do so, and thus bequeathed us 
much confusion. Yet, it js worth noting the distinctions 
which Durkheim did make: 
As the terms collective and social are frequently taken 
for one another, one is led to believe that the collec­
tive cOnscience is the whole social conscience, that is, 
that it extends as far as the psychic life of society, 
although, es~ecially in advanced societies! 'it is ~ 
a very restrl.cted part of the social conSCl.ence. 'Junl.­
cial, governmental-~ scientific, industrial, in short, 
all special functions are of a psychic nature, since 
they consist in systems of representations and actions, 
, They are, however, clearly outside the common conscience 
* (DL:80, in Wallwork, 1972:84). 
•
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Wallwork draws out the implications of Durkheim's distinc­
tion for our present task of understanding why Durkheim pla­
• ced such importance on the role of professional groups in 
• 
the modern "organic" or differentiated social division of 
labor. 
Each of these functionally specific groups has its own , 
morality " .•. so that morality is diversified with so- \ 
•
 
cia1 conditions .•. there is one morality for each so­
cial stratum of the society." Gurvitch is essentially ~ ~
 
correct, then, when he states: " ... whereas in mechan- \/"\\r-v­

ica1 solidarity, it is a matter of identical collective . .
 
beliefs, in organic solidarity it is a matter of co11ec- '
 
tive beliefs differentiated in subgroups:' From this ana- '
 
•
 
lysis proceeds Durkheim's observation that subgroups
 
constitute extraordinarily important moral communities-X
 
in advanced societies. Such groups, by spontaneously
 
generating shared norms and enforcing these obligations,
 
by their authority, are, as it were" the moral equiva­
lent in advanced societies of the collective or common
 
•
 
conscience in primitive tribes since these groups are
 
now primarily responsible for the specific duties that
 
regulate most of ourday-to-day activities in the fami­
ly, the workshop, the university, and so forth ...• The
 
rules of such secondary group formations are thus the
 
natural complement of the highly general, abstract prin-'
 
•
 
cip1es shared throughout modern societies, and protec- \
 
ted by public opinion at 1arge~ It is in this way that
 
Durkheim succeeds in demonstratjng that the rise of in­

dividualism, speciali!ation, and differentiation does
 
not necessarily lead to the normally dispersive conse­
quences envisaged by Toennies (1972:84-5).
 
Finally, the evolutionary division of social labor is
 
both necessary and desirable, since our occupational obliga­

tions also serve simultaneously to moralize us. From this
 
• "mechanical" necessity, Durkheim didn't hesitate to derive
 
moral obligation and individual duty. Durkheim's anti-roman­
~-
ticism is evident here; there is no critique of the oppres­
sive forces of "mechanism," and the fragmentation of man 
• through the modern economic process, for example, as there 
was in Marx or Weber. ~ 
••. our duty is not to spread our activity over a ~ 
large surface, but to concentrate it and specialize ) 
it. We must contract our horizon, choose a definite ~ 
• task and immerse ourselves in it completely, instead " of trying to make ourselves a sort of creative master- 'I 
piece; quite complete, which contains its worth in it~ ;' 
self, and not in the services it renders ..•• We do not 
• 
.
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cling to very much when we have no determined objec­
tive, and, consequently, we cannot very well elevate 
ourselves beyond a more or less refined egotism
• (DL:401-2) •
 Thus, in contrast to Weber's latent hoped-for "Faustian" uni­

versality (see Part I, Book Three on his cultural tradition),
 
Durkheim viewed specialization as good because it moralizes if
 
• the ego by attaching it to a group.
 
B.	 The Conflict Between Labor and Capital: The Separation 
of Producer and Worker 
• As the social bond is progressively extended, the in­
tensity of solidarity is also attenuated (Nelson, 1969a). 
This attenuation of the intensity of primary group relation­
ships is especially marked in revolutionary times, when the 
• lingering remnants of the earlier type of solidarity based 
on fused identity are ripped loose from the changing social 
fabric. Moral discipline and social coordination then rapidly 
fade. However, at the beginning of the section on the anomic 
• division of labor,[Durkheim took pains to emphasize that con­
flict and anomic deregulation are not inherent in the pro­
gressive division of social labor. Against Espinas, Comte, 
and others, Durkheim insisted that "division (differentia­
• tion) is not necessarily dispersion." Indeed, since there are 
two basic ways to social unity--primitive fused identity and 
advanced differentiated interdependence--Durkheim always 
searched for phases in the de-collectivization of the struc­
• tures of responsibility which marked the passage from ·the 
first to the second type of solidarity. 
Here Durkbeifu.-"~cknowledged that the division of social 
/	 -......,. 
labor can have negative or. "pathological forms" because coor­
• dinating or integrating links become disrupted in the general 
evolutionary process of de-collectivization. 
• 
Up to now, we have studied the division of labor only 
as a normal phenomenon, but, like all social facts, 
and, more generally, all biological facts, it presents 
pathological forms which must be analyzed. Though norm­
ally the division of labor produces social solidarity, 
it sometimes happens that it has different, and even 
•
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contrary results. Now, it is important to find out what 
makes it deviate from its natural course, for if we do 
• 
not prove that these cases are exceptional, the division 
of labor might be accused of logically implying them. 
Moreover, the study of these deviant forms will permit ) 
us to determine the conditions of existence of the norm­
al state better. When we know the circumstances in which 
the division of labor ceases to bring forth solidarity, 
• 
we shall better understand what is necessary for it to 
have that effect. Pathology, here as elsewhere, is a 
valuable aid to physiology.•.. The first abnormal case 
is furnished by industrial or commercial crises, by 
failures, which are so many partial breaks in organic 
solidarity •.•• Certain social functions are not adjusted 
• 
to one another. But, insofar as labor is divided more, 
these phenomena seem to become frequent .•.• The conflict 
between capital and labor is another example, more strik­
•
 
ing, of the same phenomenon (DL:353-4).
 
In terms of the growing conflict between labor and capital as
 
a "pathological exception" to the normally beneficent pro­

•
 
gress of the division of labor, Durkheim sketched these his­

torical phases. First, in the guild system of the middle
 
ages, worker and employer worked and lived side by sine.Sec­

ond, with the growth of commerce and cities in the fifteenth
 
century: 
• 
.•. the occupational circle is no longer a common or­
ganization, it became an exclusive possession of the 
masters, who decided all matters •. :. From that time, a 
sharp line was drawn between masters and workers .•• 
quarrels became numerous. But, even then, conflict was 
• 
not everlasting. The workshops did not contain two op­
posing classes (DL:354-5). 
Third, in the seventeenth century, with the growth of large 
industry, and international extension of the market: 
• 
••• the third phase of this history of the working 
classes begins •••• The worker is more completely sep­
arated from the employer •••• At the same time that 
specialization becomes greater, revolts become more 
frequent .••• Warfare becomes more violent (DL:355). 
But Durkheim, relying on Levasseur, provided us with only 
the barest overview of this growing conflict. 
•
 
•
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C.	 Durkheim's Polemic Against Comte and the Need for ~ 
Value Consensus to Integrate Industrial Society 
• 
• Durkheim differed from Comte in prescribing solutions 
for the anomic deregulation of industrial relations. Since 
the early segmental type of society had been broken through 
forever, there could be no question of restoring the old so­
cial bond in "mechanical" terms. One could not hope to resur­
rect the conscience collective for modern society (see DL: 
80). Neither would mere overt or external regulation suffice, 
•
 
whether from the government, as the socialists wished, or in­

creased moral regulation, as Comte and other conservatives 
proposed. Only a concrete, living society, such as that pro­
vided by occupational groups which are in continuous contact 
•
 
with both producers and consumers, producers and workers,
 
would be capable of regulating and moralizing these twin sets 
of relations. "In order that the sentiment of our state of 
dependence be effective, it would be necessary for it also to 
•	 
be continuous, and it can be that only if it was linked to 
the very practice of each special function" (DL:361). In con-: 
trast to Comte and others, Durkheim wished no return to the \ 
kind of "repressive" moral regulation characteristic of the \ 
fused, sacro-magical, collective conscience of early "mechan- ~
•	 ical solidarity." To regulate egos and moralize them into , 
- I 
• 
consciences, Durkheim argued that what was needed was not an I 
overarching moral consensus--a Parsonian Central Value Sys- \ 
tem--enforced by some hierarchical institution, whether it 
be the	 Church, a bureaucratic state, or a Saint-Simonian 
Council of Industrialists and Scientists. 
. .. since we have shown that the enfeeblement of the 
•	 
collective conscience is a normal phenomena, we cannot 
consider it as the cause of the abnormal phenomena that 
we are studying. If, in certain cases, organic solidar­
ity is not all it should be, it is certainly not because 
mechanical solidarity has lost ground, but because all .. 
the conditions for the existence of organic solidarity! 
have not been realized (DL:364-5). 
In his	 introduction to Durkheim's lectures on social­•	 
------- --.-.~ .... 
ism, Alvin Gouldner rightly suggested: "Durkheim is unmistak­
--.... 
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ably conducting a polemic against Comte for having overstres­
sed the need for moral consensus in maintaining social sta- 1 
bi1ity" (1958:15). Gou1dner continues: 
In Comte's view, the increasing division of labor in 
modern society threatened its social cohesion. For it 
brought with it a 'fata1 disposition towards a funda­
mental dispersion of ideas, sentiments, and interests' 
••.. The increasing division of labor was, in this ana­
lysis, subversive of social stability because it under­
mined the fundamental requisite of order, namely, the 
consensus of moral beliefs ••.. Comte failed to see that 
the social solidarity produced by the division of labor t 
with its web of interdependence, was gradually being '; 
substituted for the earlier solidarity which had rested 
mainly on shared moral beliefs (1958:13-14). . 
t: 
Actually, in The Division of Labor, Durkheim moved rhetorical­
lyon at least three separate fronts simultaneously in rela­
tion to the question of the creative or disorganizing effects 
of the social division of labor. Besides rejecting Comte's 
and the conservatives' argument for an enforced moral consen­
sus, Durkheim also rejected both the Socialists and the Util­
itarians' positions alike since they both devalued the moral 
aspects of socioeconomic action. Gou1dner rightly notes: 
Durkheim was engaged on several fronts simultaneously: \ 
on the one hand, opposing the socialists and the uti1i-\ 
tarian individualists' neglect of moral elements, and, 
on the other, opposing Comte's overstatement of the con­
temporary significance of moral norms in a society with 
an advanced division of labor (1958:13). 
Durkheim criticized the Utilitarian moralists in these terms: 
••• we are led to consider the division of labor in a 
new light •.•• The economic services it renders are pica­
yune compared to the moral effect it produces, and its 
its true function is to create in two or more persons a 
true feeling of solidarity (DL:56). 
Rather, Durkheim argued that mutual reg1ementations emerged 
in "organic solidarity," acting to pull the new social fabric~ 
together. 
Because they have misunderstood this aspect of the phe­
nomena, certain moralists have claimed that the division 
of labor does not produce true solidarity. They have 
seen in it only particular exchanges, without past or 
future, in which the individual is thrown on his own re­
sources. They have not perceived the slow work of con­
solidation, the network of links which little by little 
•
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have been woven and which marks something permanent of 
organic solidarity (DL:366). 
In this rhetorical context, Giddens provides a useful summa- ~ 
tion (see also Lukes, 1973): 
The modern world is still in a transitional phase. This 
is what has misled both the idealist and utilitarian 
thinkers. The former still cast their eyes back to pre­
vious times, seeking to reestablish the moral consensus 
of traditional societies .... The utilitarians ... have 
developed their theories on the basis of generalizing 
from other areas of society where the traditional moral 
forms have been dissolved but have not yet been replaced 
by new moral prescriptions. This is particularly the case.~ 
with certain sectors of industrial life, which are ano­
mic ... which have broken away from the moral bonds of 
traditionalism, but which have not yet become subject to 
new and more appropriate regulation (1972a:lO). 
Insisting that social scientists put systematic analysis be­
fore instant remedies, Durkheim summed up his argument toward 
the end of his first great book: 
... the remedy for the evil is not to seek to resusci­
tate traditions andpraetICes which, no longe:r~corres­
p6nding~o present condit1ons of society, can only live 
an artificial false existence. l~at we must do to re-;y 
lieve this anomie is to discover the means for making ! 
the organs which are still wasting themselves in discor­
dant movements harmoniously concur by introducing into 
their relations more justice'by more and more extenua­
ting the external inequalities which are the source of 
the evil. Our illness is not then, as has often been be­
lieved, of an intellectual sort: it has more profound 
causes~ We shall not suffer because we no lvnger know on 
what theoretical notion to base the morality we have 
been practicing, but because, in certain parts of its 
functions, this morality is irremaiably shattered, and 
that which is necessary to us is only in process of 
formation .... Because certain of our duties are no long­
er founded in the reality of things, a breakdown has re­
sulted which will be repaired only insofar as discipline 
is established and consolidated. In short, our first 
duty is to make a moral code for ourselves *("DL:409). ~ 
/ 
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D.	 Pre-Organic Solidarity and Deregulation of Relations 
Between Worker and Employer, Consumer and Producer 
• 
• Bu~ today the normal equilibrium between worker and 
employer, between consumer and producer, has been fatally 
disrupted, Durkheim argued. Such inter-dependent groups have 
been separated from one another, thus breaking off the normal 
• 
moral regulation exerted by each upon all. "The relations of 
the organs are not regulated, because they are in a state of 
anomie." Because the economy is caught in a transitional cri-· 
sis, and because old moral relationships, mutual obligations 
and	 duties have been swept away by the impact of the twin 
revolutions, society, too, is affected. 
• 
Today there are no longer any rules which fix the num~ 
ber of economic enterprises, and, in each branch of in- (J 
dustry, production is not exactly regulated on a level 
• 
of consumption .•.• What is-certain is that this lack of 
regulation does not permit a regular harmony of func­
tions. The economists claim, it is true, that this har­
mony is self-established when necessary, thanks to rises 
or declines in prices which, according to needs, stimu­
late or slacken production. But, in every case, this is 
established only after ruptures of equilibrium and more 
or less prolonged disturbances. Moreover, these distur­
bances are naturally more frequent as functions are more 
generalized, for the more complex an organization is, 
the more is the need of extensive regulation felt
• 
(DL: 366-67) • 
Because the intimate links between those who are engag­
ed in different phases of the same overall economic process 
are snapped in modern market economies, not only is there 
• 
conflict between labor and capitalists, but also crises of 
overproduction occur. with the internationalization of the 
market and production for sale instead of production primari­
ly for "household" use (see K. Polanyi, 1968, Weber, 1968), 
• the intimate links between producers and consumers we~also 
snapped. This hiatus leads to the plagues of the business 
cycle, constantly expanding desires, unemployment, recession 
and so forth. 
(The anomic condition of the division of labor, which is•	 l reflec Let~ bofflln occurence of industrial crises and in/1class conflict, is directly connected with the mode in I 
which the expansion of occupational differentiation de­
•
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•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
stroys the integrity of the local community. In the 
traditional community, production is oriented to a 
specific, and known, set of local needs .... With the 
growth of the division of labor, however, and the 
formation of a large-scale market, each of these con­
ditions becomes undermined. A dislocation is intro­
duced between producer and consumer, because there is 
no longer a direct tie between the volume of produc­
tion and the known needs of the market: thus crises 
of overproduction occur (1972a:10). 
Durkheim's insight into the economic and political 
foundations of the modern order was keen. He saw that many 
of our problems stemmed from the unanticipated consequences 
of the breakdown of old moral bonds. The bond of "tribal 
brotherhood" that marked primitive and peasant economies was 
. now broken through~ the "neighborhood ethic" (as Weber call­
ed it, 1968) was dissolved in the rush to modernity. Rapid, 
large-scale industrialization, and the internationalization 
of the market, not only came to dominate economic action, 
but social and cultural life as well. The supposedly self­
equilibrating market was mechanically driven, and this eco­
nomy-as-natural-machine made social relationships mechanical 
in turn. Freed from traditional mutual constraints--the stub­
-' bornly interpersonal ethics of early society--social rela­
tionships became impersonal, abstracted, calculating, uncer­
tain, even anomie. These are among the "costs" we pay in the
 
..--- IJI(
epochal transformation from "tribal brotherhood to universal 
otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a). 
As the market extends, great industry appears. But it 
results in changing relations of employers and employ­
ees. The great strain upon the nervous system and the 
contagious influence of great agglomerations increase 
the needs of the latter. Machines replace men: manufac­
turing replaces hand-work. The worker is now regimented, 
separated from his family throughout the day .••. These 
new conditions of industrial life naturally demand a 
new organization, but as these changes have been accom­
plished with extreme rapidity, the interests in conflict 
have not yet had the time to be equilibrated (DL:370). 
However, even here, Durkheim's primary concern was mor \, 
al. He emphasized that the negative consequence of this ano~ .;/, 
mic deregulation--this lack of constraining and directing, .(­r 
mutual, inter-personal moral discipline--was the release of 
•
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\ 
\ 
egotistic and infinite desires. Thus, even the anomic divi\
 
sion of labor, then, cannot be portrayed simply in terms of
 
• the breakdown of moral consensus or the breakdown of struc­

tural integration. From the first Durkheim saw this structur- I
 
al breakdown as simultaneously also a breakthrough and a re- )
 
lease of the potentially insatiable appetites of the organic

• ego.
 
•
 
•
 
In so far as the segmental type is strongly marked,
 
there are nearly as many economic markets as there are
 
different segments. Consequently, each of them is very
 
limited. Producers, being near consumers, can easily
 
reckon the extent of the needs to be satisfied. Equili­

brium is established without any trouble and production
 
regulates itself. On the contrary, as the organized
 
type develops, the fusion of different segments draws.
 
the markets together into one which embraces almost all
 
society. This even extends beyond, and tends to become
 
universal, for the frontiers which separate peoples
 
•
 
breakdown at the same time as those which separate the
 
segments of each of them. The result is that each indus­

try produces for consumers spread over the whole surface
 
of the country or even of the entire world. Contact is
 
then no longer sufficient. The producer can no longer
 
embrace the market in a glance, nor even in thought. He
 
•
 
~ no longer see its limits, since .it is, so to spea~
 
ll.mitless. Accordingly, production becomes unbridled
 
and unregulated. It can trust only to chance, and in the
 
course of these gropings, it is inevitable that propor­

tions will be abused, as much-rn one directron-as ano­

ther. From this come the crises which periodically dis­

turb economic functions. The growth of local restricted 
crises which result in failures is in all liklihood an 
effect of the same causes * (DL:369-70). 
In regard to the negative aspects of occupational spe­
•
 
cialization--of workers becoming simply cogs in the great e­

conomic machine--Durkheim disagreed with those who argued 
that a generalized education is necessary. Against all human­
istic and Faustian dreams of universality, Durkheim contended ~ 
• 
that specialization was good since it limited the horizons of I 
the undisciplined ego. Over-regulation and deregulation were ! 
bad also; what was needed was the ancient wisdom of the . 
\ 
\ 
"golden mean." Durkheim took care to absolve the division Of't 
•
 
- --~ "..
 
social labor itself from any necessary complicity: "The pre- / . 
ceding has removed one of the most serious charges brought l 
I 
against the division of labor." Durkheim denied that there is 
•
 
• 
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• 
• 
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any inherent contradiction in the division of labor which, 
through progressive occupational specialization, may make 
the worker more interdependent and organically solidary, may 
also make him simultaneously into a mere machine, to degrade 
and dehumanize him. True to his basic conviction that certain 
types of diversity can create unity, and the organic ego 
needs "circumscribed tasks and limited horizons," Durkheim 
argued that what we need to remedy the anomic division of la-
bor is to give the individual worker a clearer and stronger 
sense of the purpose and place of his functional contribution 
to the total "social organism." Greater complexity reauires 
greater organizational clarity. Few would dispute this propo-
sition, merely whether it adequately describes all the key 
aspects of the problem. 
What resolves the contradiction is that, contrary to 
what has been said, the division of labor does not pro-
duce these consequences because of a necessity of its 
own nature, but only in exceptional and abnormal circum-
stances. In order for it to develop without having such 
a disastrous influence on the human conscience, it is 
not necessary to temper it with its opposite. It is ne-
cessary and it is sufficient for it to be itself, for 
nothing to come from without to denature it. For, nor-
mally, the role of each special function does not re-
quire that the individual close himself in, but that he 
keep himself in constant relations with neighboring 
functions, take cognizance of their needs, of the changes 
which they undergo, etc. The division of labor presumes 
that the worker, far from being hemmed in by his task, 
does not lose sight of his collaborators, that he acts 
upon them, and reacts to them. He is, then, nota 
machine who repeats his movements without knowing their 
meaning, but he knows that they tend .•. towards an end 
that he conceives more or less distinctly. He feels that 
he is serving something. For that, he need not embrace 
most portions of the social horizon1 it is sufficient 
that he perceive enough~f it to understand that his ac-
tions have an aim beyond themselves (DL:372-3). 
While there are many possible criticisms· of Durkheim's 
explanations here, Lukes' short summary is especially cogent: 
The only trouble with this account of anomie is that, 
although it pinpointed the central ills of capitalism--
unregulated competition, class conflict, routinized, -\<' 
degrading, meaningless work--i t characterizes all of '" 
them as "abnormal." This procedure tended to hinder any 
full-scale investigation of their causes (which were as-I 
• 
• 
--611-­
• 
sumed not tcR~ndemic), especially given the evolution­
ary optimism Durkheim espoused at this stage. They were 
to be explained by the temporary and transitional lack 
of the appropriate economic controls, the appropriate 
•
 
norms governing industrial relations, and the appropri­

ate forms of work organization--a lack that would in
 
due course be remedied by allowing the operation of in­

terdependent functions to produce its natural conse­

quences (1973:174).
 
But this was not all, for Durkheirn added another chapter 
liOn the Constrained Division of Labor" to which we now turn. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
--612-­
• 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE FORCED DDJISION OF LABOR
• \ 
Preface. The essential problem underlying the "forced or \\ 
constrained division of labor"--the class war--is structured~\ 
• 
\~ 
• 
inequality. Constraint here means inequality in the "external' 
conditions of life." With the progressive effacement of the 
segmental "mechanically integrated" type, the substitution of 
"organic solidarity" signals that fewer inherited inequali­
ties will be crucial in social and economic life. Impersonal 
and universalistic standards are implied in the epochal 
• 
transformation· of "tribal brotherhoods" into "universal other­
hoods" '(Nelson, 196 9a). As the social bond is progressively 
extended, hierarchies rooted in "blood and soil" become less 
• 
salient, and individual merit and achievement supposedly corne 
more to the fore. Most modern sociologists believe this not 
only to be a correct historical analysis, and that such 
changes are inevitable, but also that these are necessary and 
• 
morally right. Justice, a prime concern of both critics of 
the ancien regime and the industrial regime, is only possible 
when the external conditions of existence are equal for all. 
Thus, each person's occupation and functional contribution 
will be spontaneously matched to his inherited abilities. 
Here Durkheim presumed that "all external inequalities endan­
ger· organic solidarity." Steven Lukes helpfully observes: 
•
 
Durkheim conceived of inequality in two broad ways:
 
first, as the misallocation of individuals to social 
roles~ and second, as a lack of reciprocity or equi­
valency in the exchange of goods and services (1973:l75). 
Giddens also usefully summarizes the almost Mertonian aspects 
• 
of this second strand of Durkheim's argument on 
. 
the "patholo­
r 
gical" nature of the modern transitional crisis:':>\' 
• 
• 
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The elimination of the anomic division of labor is \ 
impossible while there are still major ineoualities' 
in the distribution of opportunities for occupational \\ 
achievement. Moral regulation of the division of labor \\ 
qnly becomes adequately developed insofar as it is spon \ 
taneous, which means that individuals have to be able 
to fill occupational positions which accord with their 
talents and capabilities, and which, therefore, they 
will accept as legitimate .•.. But this situation of e­
quality of opportunity cannot prevail where the class 
system inhibits the chances of large masses of attain­
ing positions commensurate with their abilities .... The 
forced division of labor can be abolished if the hered­
itary transmission of property is ended .... Durkheim 
does not envisage a society in which either private 
property or inequality will be eliminated. Both will 
persist, but the existing relation will be reversed: 
instead of of the former determining the latter, access 
to material rewards will be governed by the distribution 
of natural inequalities. There are II internal II (biological) 
inequalities, of capacity and aptitude which, according 
to Durkheim, are ineradicable. "External inequalities," 
on the other hand, can and will become dissolved with 
the further development of the divisio'n of labor--"la­
bor is divided spontaneously only if society is consti­
tuted in such a way that social inequalities exactly ex­
press natural inequalities' (Giddens, 1972a: 11-12). 
Thus, because Durkheim's notion's here are, in a number of 
ways, close to the functionalists' theory of social strati­
fication, it shares many of their limitations. 
In this chapter, Durkheim argued normatively, deduc­
tively, and almost functionally that normally the progressive 
division of labor produces "organic solidarity" and, thus, 
interdependent social health. Durkheim presumed that only un­
der abnormal circumstances was it possible for power to come 
to dominate and distort social and economic organizations. 
(Neither Marx nor Weber similarly deluded themselves that 
domination played so little generic role in human affairs). 
But Durkheim's primary stance as a moral philosopher led him 
always and everywhere to presume that social relations were 
primarily moral relations. If so, then how could obligation 
and legitimate moral authority be rooted in pure power or 
domination? Power was only a secondary aspect of social life 
to Durkheim (however, see M. Richter, 1960~ Bendix, 1960a~ 
•
 
•
 
•
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and Giddens, 1971c). To Durkheim, the social or moral order 
is fundamentallyideal. Applying this basic bias to the study 
of the division of labor, Durkheim argued: 
... For the division of labor to produce solidarity, 
it is not sufficient that each have his task~ it is 
still necessary that this task be fitting to him.... 
If the institution of classes or castes sometimes gives 
rise to anxiety and pain instead of producing solidarity, 
this is because the distribution of social functions on 
which it rests does not respond, or rather no longer re­
sponds, to the distribution of natural talents (DL:375). 
In the forced division of labor, "constraint alone ... links 
them to their functions •.•. Consequently, only an imper~ect . \ 
'.. .. 
and troubled solidarity is possible" (DL: 376). Here ".. .civ-';;~' 
il wars arise due to the manner in which labor is distribu­
ted II (DL: 374) • 
To emphasize the contrast between the pathological 
forms of the anomie and constrained division of labor, Durk­
heim further developed his thesis that in the spontaneous 
division of labor, all functions are harmoniously adjusteq>~ 
to each other. 
The case is quite otherwise when it is established in 
virtue of purely internal spontaneity, without anything 
corning to disturb the initiative of indiv.Buals. In this 
condition, harmony between individual natures and social 
functions cannot fail to be realized at least in the a­
veragecase. For if nothing imoedes or-unduly favors ­
those disputing over tasks, it-is inevitable that only 
those who are the most apt a~each kind of actIVIty-w1ll 
indulgeTn it. The onlycause deterrnrnrngthe manner~ 
which work IS drvrd~then, is the diversItY-of capaCi­
ties. In the-nature of things-,-the apportioningis made 
through aptitudes, since there is no reason for doing 
. otherwise. Thus, the harmony between the const1tutIOnof 
each individual and his condition is realized of itsel~· 
~ Constraint begins when regulation, no longer corres­
ponding to the true nature of things, and accordingly, 
no longer having any basis in customs, can only be va.l­
idated through force ••.. The division of labor produces 
solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in proportion 
as it is spontaneous .•• No obstacle .•• prevents them 
from occupying the place in the social framework which 
is compatible with their faculties. In short, labor is 
divided spontaneously only if society is constituted-rn 
such a way that social-rnequalities exactly express nat­
ural I"nequaIItTes * (DL:376-7). -­
One fears, however, that Durkheim invested here in the pro­
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--615-­
gressive division of labor such virtues that his normal case 
where "harmony between individual natures and social func­
tions cannot fail to be realized" was endowed with special 
magical, life-giving qualities. As Hayward observed: 
Social harmony and solidarity come from below, were 
immanent in the various groups and associations which 
constituted society rather than transcendent and super­
personal. It was spontaneous, implicitly natural and 
rational, rather than the artefact of a hypostatized 
supreme will. It was unity in diversity, the infinite 
complexity of special interests and groups extending· 
far beyond the reach of the state (1960:30). 
Again, Durkheim appeared to have endowed the "naturally har­
monious" division of social labor with spontaneous, self-e­
quilibrating qualities, at least as questionable as those 
which the Utilitarian moralists bestowed upon the "invisible 
hand" of the market. I simply do not believe that either the 
generic or historical evidence demonstrates that any basic 
sociocultural process is marked by such quasi-metaphysical 
and ethical powers. On the contrary, social, economic, and 
cultural life is a "long and a hard row", these on-going 
processes are beset by constant conflict, uncertainty, com­
peting claims for priority, power, and legitimating moral 
authority. Even science, perhaps the only cultural form 
which can truly claim to be cumulative, is won only by much 
trial and error (eg. see Popper, 1963). 
Even Durkheim's qualifications do not basically modify 
the quasi-magical potencies which he seemed to impute to the 
division of labor. Although he insisted that ~erfect spon­
taneity is only possible when the "external conditions of 
existence are equal," nonetheless he also admitted: "It is 
true that this perfect spontaneity is never met with any­
where as a realized fact" (DL:378). 
Perfect spontaneity is, then, only a consequence and 
another form of this other fact--absolute equality in 
the external conditions of the conflict. It consists, 
not in the state of anarchy which would permit men to 
freely satisfy all their good or bad tendencies, but 
in a subtle organization in which each social value, 
being neither overestimated nor·underestimated by any­
thing foreign to it, would be·judged at its true worth. 
•
 
---
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... All external inequality compromises organic soli­
darity (DL:379). 
But if the economic moralists were unjustified in beginning 
with perfectly competitive markets, for instance, as an ana­
lytical baseline, why was Durkheim any more justified in pre­
suming absolute equality and spontaneity in the external con­
ditions of existence as the natural or normal state? Both of
these notions are merely useful, legitimizing fictions for 
the underlying ethical imperative. As Durkheim himself admit­
ted, this normative notion is nowhere to be found in actual­
ity. It is rather, like the self-equilibrating market and 
"civil society," an ideal to be consummated. These notions 
stand not as "ideal types" in the Weberian sense, but rather 
as ideal standards, states of desirabie social or economic 
health, as norms from which all deviations are to be critical­
ly judged. 
Durkheim's normative concerns are seen again~he sec­
tions which follow wherJ~\~ued that the remedial task of 
"advanced societies is a work of justice." Closing the gap 
between the ideal of perfect spontaneity and social harmony, 
and the sad actualities of the transitional crisis is the 
task which many liberals, including Robert Merton (1938) in 
his own way, took as their prime directive program. As Mer­
ton's development of this special aspect of Durkheim's notion 
of anomie demonstrates, this drive to eliminate all vestiges 
of structured inequality has become the implicit social, ed­
ucational, economic, and political program of the liberal so­
cial scientists (see appendix). In this sense at least, Durk­
heim's critique was prophetic. But even here, it is clear that 
this imposition of ever-widening standards of universalism 
has encountered stiff resistance, not only from entrenched 
upper classes in various regions, but especially from lower­
middle strata which feel threatened by this incursion of an 
"interventionist" liberal elite (eg. forced school bussing in 
the 1970's in America). A universal otherhood, a consensually 
based egalitarian society, it must be acknowledged, is the 
normative ideal demanded over the past few centuries bya 
•
 
• 
--617-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
strategically located upper and upper-middle class (see, 
for example, Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975). Universalistic 
cultural logics are not necessarily universally shared. 
As a French positivist moral reformer, and part of 
the contemporary intellectual elite, Durkheim, of course, 
shared many of these same political passions. 
The task of the most advanced societies is, then, a 
work of justice .... Just as the ideal of lower socie­
ties was to create or maintain as intense a common 
life as possible, in which the individual was absorb­
ed, so our ideal is to make social relations always 
more equitable, so as to assure the free development 
of all our socially useful forces .... Because the seg­
mental type is effaced and the organized type develop­
ed, because organic solidarity is slowly substituted 
for that which comes from resemblances, it is indis­
pensable that external conditions become level .... 
Just as ancient peoples needed, above all, a common 
faith to live by, so we need justice (DL~387-8). 
Certainly, Durkheim's first installment of his explana­
tion of the transformations underlying his first schema of 
anomie and egoisme was more complex than commonly perceived. 
LaCapra rightly argues that we should try to recapture the 
"full range of Durkheim's concept of anomie" (l972~136). He 
..---­
also correctly observes that beneath Durkheim's notion of a 
structural and normative breakdown in modern economy and so­
ciety was the image of the release of amoral and insatiable 
passions. 
In the first edition of The Division of Labor, Durk­
heim did provide sufficient grounds for rejecting any 
attempt to identify anomie with a total absence of in­
stitutions, norms, or values--a situation which in 
Durkheim's usage of the term "anomie" constituted only 
an extreme case. The Durkheimian definition of anomie 
was the absence of consensually limiting norms 
(1972:136-7) . 
And, finally, LaCapra also rightly notes how, in historical 
terms, it was the new moral and institutional svstem of West­
. --­
ern Europe and America which itself raised and sanctioned un­
limited economic expectations. This is a crucial insight into 
the second schema of anomie, in which Durkheim fundamentally 
shifted on his analytical axes. 
• 
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... institutions or ideologies might be anomic in the 
sense that they imposed limitless assertion or expan­
sion, which for Durkheim was invariably bound up with
• substantive irrationality in the larqer societv .... In The Division of Labor~ as in Suicide, Durkheim treat­
ed as-anomic an institutional system which structurally 
imposed limitless maximizing activity u~on members of 
society: a profit-oriented market economy * (1972:137). 
•
 
Lukes (1973:172-78) critically reviews Durkheim's theo­

•
 
ries here, including the potent objections of Friedmann and
 
others. As for the present study, the limitations in Durk­

heim's early formulation of the nature and causes of our mod­

ern pathology are that it was really neither institutional,
 
•
 
nor cultural, nor historical. Durkheim provided no detailed
 
historical and structural critique like that of Marx, nor did
 
he offer a cultural analysis of the moral underpinnings of
 
market capitalism as did Weber. Perhaps he neglected to do so
 
•
 
because he was primarily a moralist, and was often forced, by
 
the very logic of his mUltiple polemics,to embrace the faulty
 
notion that the organic division of labor naturally and norm­

ally produces moral solidarity. Durkheim sometimes overbur­

dened his evolutionary metaphysic. As Friedmann remarked, 
h 1S . sangu1ne~correct; an 
• 
h 1S' t ory as not proven h" 1nlt1a. 11y . view d 
indeed, Durkheim himself grew more pessimistic over the years 
(see "Dualism of Human Nature"). In any case, let us follow 
Gidden's insistence that the anomic and forced divisions of 
labor be considered together. 
• 
If his treatment of the forced division of labor is ne­
glected, then his discussion of the anomic division of 
labor is seen in a false light. It is this neglect of 
his analysis of the forced division of labor which has 
helped to foster the misconception that he failed to 
concern himself with the sources of conflict in modern 
societies (197lc: 511). 
• Let us next turn to consider Durkheim's analysis of 
socialism as a historically specific response to the destruc­
tive aspects of the spread of market capitalism. 
•
 
•
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
DURKHEIM'S ANALYSIS OF SOCIALISM: A HISTORICALLY SPECIFIC
• RESPONSE TO THE GROWTH OF MARKET CAPITALISM 
• 
The essential feature of communism is the peripheral 
position it assigns economic functions in social life; 
while socialism places them as centrally as possible. 
The society envisioned by communists is ascetic; while 
socialist society would be essentially industrial. These 
are two opposing attributes that one should always keep 
in mind to prevent confusion (Soc: 107). 
•
 
Preface. Marcel Mauss (1958:32) told us that early on Durk­

•
 
heim had posed his essential sociological problem in terms of
 
the "relationship between individualism and socialism." After
 
finishing his doctoral dissertation, Durkheim turned to study
 
socialism itself as a doctrine (see Mauss in Gouldner, 1958~
 
•
 
also Lukes, 1973). Also, in 1893, Durkheim published a "Note
 
on the Definition of Socialism," and gave lectures on the his­

torical development of socialism at Bordeaux in 1895-6. These
 
lectures, however, abruptly ended with analysis of Saint-Si­

mon, as Durkheim turned his full energies toward developing 
L'Annee sociologique and other demanding tasks. So we are 
left with a tantalizing fragment here. 
•
 
Although incomplete, this effort was still brilliant,
 
•
 
and provides us with invaluable insights into the period and
 
its doctrines, and also into Durkheim's own ambivalent atti­

tudes. Durkheim addressed here a massive and sustained criti­

cism of specific modern structural transformations, centered
 
around the historical relations between economy, polity, and
 
society. Durkheim's abstracted causal-evolutionary model was
 
forced here to come to grips with the complexity of specific
 
• 
modern historical changes. Durkheim focussed in these intro­

ductory lectures on Saint-Simon, the founder of positivism
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--620-­
and sociology, and one of the prime intellectual forces in 
French socialist theory. 
Now, Durkheim often appeared to agree with many of 
Saint-Simonis brilliant schematic analyses of the causes of 
the transformation from medieval to modern society. To Durk­
heim, perhaps the key to Saint-Simonis doctrine was his his­
torical analysis of the modern crisis as involving the break 
down of the old social order and the struggling to be born 
of a new order based on industry and science. Characteristi­
cally, however, Durkheim differed from Saint-Simon on the mo­
ralization and apotheosis of industry. "We know that Saint­
Simon's error consisted in wishing to construct a stable so­
ciety on a purely economic foundation" (Soc: 274). As always, 
Durkheim argued that society must constrain and redirect in­
dividual "anomic" appetites. 
This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him 
it appears that the way to realize social peace is to 
free economic appetites of all restraint on the one 
hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling 
them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For 
such aa:>etites cannot be a~P7ased unless they are. limi­
ted, and they cannot be ll.ml.ted except ~ somethl.ng 
other than themselves. They cannot be regarded as the 
only purpose of society since they must be subordinated 
to some end which surpasses them, and it is only on 
this condition that they are capable of being really 
satisfied * (Soc: 241-2) • 
As always, Giddens provides a useful summary: 
(Socialism) •.• is historically specific, and is tied 
to a very particular combination of social conditions: 
those which are identified in The Division of Labor as 
being the transitional phase between mechanICal and or­
ganic solidarity. Socialism is a response to the state 
of deregulation of industry. Socialism has appeared 
for the reason that "in the most advanced societies 
of present-day Europe, production appears to be unre­
lated to consumption needs" .••• The significance of 
socialism is two-fold: it recognizes that the advanced 
societies are passing through a major stage of transi­
tion which demands the emergence of new social forms; 
and it perceives that some kind of regulation or con­
trol of the "free" play of market forces is necessary 
in the nascent society. The limitation in socialist 
doctrine is that the regulation which it advocates is 
purely economic in character. The conception of the a­
bolition of the "political" and of the disappearance 
•
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•
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of the "state" really implies that the "state" should 
have only economic functions, that in Saint-Simonian 
terms, government should be the "administration of 
things, and not the administration of men." But, in 
Durkheim's view, in advocating this conception, so­
cialism shares the premise of its main opponents, 
utilitarianism and political economy, holding that 
society can be treated as an economic process. The 
only important difference is that, while the latter 
believe that this operates spontaneously, the former 
consider that economic life has to be consciously di­
rected. The disjunctions and conflicts in the division 
of labor are not simply to be explained in terms of 
too much economic regulation (political economy), or 
too little (socialism), but derive from the very pre­
dominance of the "economic" over the "social;" more 
specifically, that not merely economic change, but the 
moralization of economic relationships, is what is de­
manded (1972a:13-l4). 
A. The Dual Nature of Socialism 
Durkheim recognized the dual ambitions of socialism as 
an ethical doctrine and political movement--for it was (is) 
simultaneously an attack upon, and appeal to, structures of 
conscience and consciousness. Resolving to study socialism 
scientifically, Durkheim wisely refused to trade debating 
points with this reform movement, since it represented a 
morality "aspiring to a complete remodeling of the social or­
der." "All these fine refutations are a veritable work of 
Penelope, endlessly beginning again, because they touch so­
cialism from without •••. They blame the effects, not the cau­
ses" (Soc:44). Indeed, it was (is) this duality of ambition 
which marks most socialist doctrines, especially in their 
Marxist-Leninist or Maoist forms, as closed circles of thought 
and action. It is interesting to note that it was precisely 
this impermeability to contradiction which led Karl Popper, 
in his famous The Logic of Scientific Discovery (see also 
1963), to postulate new evidential canons (i.e. "falsifia­
bility") for the conduct of scientific inquiry. Durkheim re­
cognized the simultaneous moral and intellectual drives of 
socialist theory, and wisely declined to enter into their 
closed circle. 
•
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It is a fervor that has been the inspiration of all 
these systems; what gave them life and strength is 
a thirst for a more perfect justice, pity for the 
misery of the working classes, a vague sympathy for 
the travail of contemporary societies, etc. Social­
ism is not a science, a sociology in miniature--it 
is a cry of grief, sometimes of anger, uttered by 
men who most keenly feel our collective malaise. 
Socialism is to the facts which produce it what the 
groans of a sick man are to the illness with which 
he is afflicted, to the needs that torment him (Soc:4l). 
Since their prime point of departure is moral criti­
que, socialists often regard as morally tainted all those 
who decline to embrace their fevered ambitions; for does not 
refusal to enter into their critique and utopia imply accep­
tance of the economic and social evils all around us every­
where? For my own part, I think not; I confess that I agree 
with Durkheim that socialism is hardly the answer to these 
problems. It does not provide a cure, but should itself be 
seen as a symptom (not a cause) of our modern travail. Al­
though socialists pride themselves on being the prime criti­
cal movement of the day (for example, the still lingering 
symbolic equations of radicalism and Marxism in many univer­
sities even today), and many who are not themselves social­
ists also still respond in their conditioned fashion to these 
cliches, I must insist that from a historical and cultural 
perspective, Marxist social theory simply does not ~ far 
enough! It is far too conventional, too loaded down with tra­
ditional symbolic equations, too dependent on its apparent 
enemies for emotional charge and polemical direction, too 
dependent on its opponents for its prime premises, and so on 
and so forth. Perhaps the central flaw of socialist theory 
is that it rhetorically incorporated key premises of its op­
ponents--I mean the Anglo Utilitarian economists. 
Karl Polanyi (1944, 1968) clearly saw that Marx 
made a fatal mistake by incorporating Ricardian economic 
theory into his system. For Marx's economic materialism in­
directly strengthened the key premise of Utilitarian ethics 
and political economy. Polanyi said: "The societal approach 
personified in Marx was sapped by the economistic element in­
•
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herited from the classics" (1968:134). This mistaken rhetor­
ical incorporation was also indirectly strengthened by the 
inverted incorporation of Hegelian dialectic. Durkheim also 
recognized the crucial links between the socialist and in­
dividualist Utilitarian moral and social philosophers; in 
• 
short, between the "philosophical radicals" (see Halevy, 
1955) and their heretical heirs, the "critical radicals." 
• 
Instead of debating the socialists and the Utilitar­
ian individualist and materialist philosophers on their own 
grounds, Durkheim wisely chose to study socialism "from the 
outside. " 
We will regard socialism as a thing, a reality--we 
will attempt to determine what it consists of, when 
it began, what transformations it passed through, and 
• 
what has determined those transformations .•.. We are 
going to study it as we did suicide, the family, mar­
riage, crime, punishment, responsibility, and religion 
(Soc:44) • 
With these cautions in mind, let us turn to Durkheim's 
• very careful definition of socialism, 
communist theory. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
and its difference from 
•
 
--624-­
B. Durkheim's Definition of Socialism 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
Durkheim defined socialism in these terms: "We define 
as socialist every doctrine which demands the connection of 
all economic functions, or certain among them, which are at 
the present time diffuse, to the directing and conscious cen­
ters of society" (Soc:54). This was an unusual and insight­
ful definition, for Durkheim made the relations between the 
economy and polity the crux of his definition. Setting aside 
the discussion of classes as secondary, Durkheim also recog­
nized that there were two types of socialism--depending upon 
whether the demands for linking economy to polity came from 
the top down (eg. Bismarck's Germany) or from the bottom up 
(eg. China). 
Socialism is above all an aspiration for a rear­
rangement of the social structure by relocating the 
industrial set-up in the totality of the social organ­
ism, by drawing it out of the shadow where it was func­
tioning automatically, summoninq it to the light and to 
the control of consciousness. One can see that this as­
piration is not felt uniquely by the lower classes but 
by the state itself which, as economic activity becomes 
a more important factor in the general life, is led by 
force of circumstances, by vital needs of the greatest 
importance, to increasingly supervise and regulate these 
economic manifestations. Just as the working masses tend 
to approach the state, the state also tends to be drawn 
toward them, for the single reason that it is always 
further extending its ramifications, and its sphere of 
influence. Socialism is far from being an exclusively 
workingman's affair! Actually, there are two movements 
under whose influence the doctrine of socialism is form­
ed: one which comes from below and directs itself toward 
the higher regions of society, and the other which comes 
from the latter and follows a reverse direction •••• At 
root, each is only an extension of the other, as they 
mutually imply each other, they are merely two different 
aspects of the same organization ••.• The result is two 
different kinds of socialism: a worker's socialism or a 
state socialism, but the separation is a simple differ­
ence of degree •••• They are varieties of the same genus 
(Soc: 61-2) . 
Durkheim's insight here was keen: he rightly noted that the 
problem with modern societies--a problem deeply felt by so­
cialists and other contemporary social critics--was that the 
economy was fundamentally separated from the polity and from 
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the society. Socialists, of course, wished to link them a­
gain, as did Durkheim though in a different way. This common 
insight is of fundamental historical importance, for the 
great world-historical significance of the "Great Transform­
ation," as Karl Polanyi (1944) suggested, was the unorece­
dented separation of the economy from other basic institu­
tional processes, and, indeed, the inversion of previous mul­
ti-institutional relations that characterized international 
"market capitalism." This unprecedented cleavage and inver­
sion must be neither assumed to be normal or inevitable (cer­
tainly no one would presume that it is unproblematic). Rath­
er, its historical uniqueness cries out to be explained (see 
especially, Polanyi, 1944, 1968, Weber, 1958a,1968; Nelson, 
1969a, 1975a). 
C. The Contrast Between Socialism and Communism 
In addition to his unconventional definition of social­
ism, Durkheim offered an invaluable series of theoretical and 
historical contrasts of the former with communist theory, 
with which it is commonly identified. On the basis of his 
previous definition, Durkheim insisted that socialism appear­
ed rather recently in history. Communism, on the other hand, 
is ancient and generic. Choosing between these two systems of 
thought and moral reconstruction is potentially very impor­
tant, Durkheim argued, for their respective "theodicies" and 
"therapeutics" are very different. 
••. it is highly material to determine the epoch when 
socialism began to appear .••• It is essential to fix 
the moment when thi$ cry was uttered for the first time. 
For if we see it as a recent fact related to entirely . 
new social conditions, or, on the contrary, as a simple 
recurrence--at most a variation of the lamentations that 
the wretched of all epochs and societies have made heard 
--we will judge its tendencies quite differently. In the 
second case, we will be led to believe that these griev­
ances can no more be terminated than human misery can 
end. They will be thought of as a kind of chronic illness 
of humanity ••• (Soc:42-3). 
The initial basic similarity between these two systems of 
thought and moral reconstruction, Durkheim observed, which 
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has often led to their conflation, is their mutual opposi­
tion to economic egoism. 
Both are concerned with the dangers that private inter­
est can present to the general interest. Both are impell­
ed by this double feeling that the free play of egoisms 
is not enough to automatically produce social order, and 
that, on the other hand, collective needs must outweigh 
individual convenience .... In short, communism and so­
cialism have this similarity: they both oppose radical 
and intransigent individualism (Soc:75-6~ see also Lukes, 
1973:250) . 
Let us briefly explore some of the contrasts between so­
cialist and communist theory as seen by Durkheim. Now, Durk­
heim took as prototypes of communist theory such classics of 
political literature as Plato's Republic, Thomas More's Uto­
pia, and so on~ in other words, critical and utopian works 
that have appeared sporadically throughout history. By con­
trast, Durkheim observed that the word "socialism" was only 
coined around 1835, apparently in one of Robert OWen's groups 
in England. To communist theorists, wealth is bad, anti-so­
cial, the very paradigm of egoism. Of Plato's outlook, Durk­
heim said: " .•. wealth and all that relates to it is the pri­
mary source of public corruption. It is the thing that, stim­
ulating individual selfishness, sets citizens to struggling 
and unleashes conflict which ruin states" (Soc:68). Commun­
ist theory, then, to Durkheim, is abstracted, generic, moral­
istic, ahistorical--it is primarily a socio-economic-politi­
cal critique directed at the egoism inherent in human nature. 
It is not a critique directed at the flaws of a historically 
specific socio-economic system, as socialist theory is . 
... the fundamental communist idea ..• is that private 
property is the source of selfishness and that from 
selfishness springs immorality. But such a proposition 
does not strike at any social organization in particu­
lar •.• it applies to all times and all countries ..•. 
Communism holds to a common authoritv of abstract moral­
ity ••.• What it questions are the moral consequences of 
private property in general and not--as does socialism-­
the expediency of a specific economic organization ap­
pearing at a particular time in history (Soc:73). 
As ahistorical moralists, communist moral philosophers 
propose that the cause of social evil and suffering is the 
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generic egoism of human nature. Thus, their theodicy--or ex­
planation of how evil came to reign--is very different from 
that of the socialists. According to Durkheim, the fundamen­
tal question communist theorists ask is: 
What are the sources of selfishness and immorality? 
•.• The question is eternal .•.. Egoism is too essential 
to human nature to be uprooted from it--as desirable as 
that might be. But in the measure that one sees it as 
an evil, one knows that it is a chronic illness of hu­
manity (Soc:74). 
Communist theory attempts to maintain the close-knit inter­
personal ethics of tribal brotherhoods; it wishes to extend 
the primary group, as it were, throughout the whole social 
system. Because this is so difficult, given man's egoism, u­
topias are the prime form of expression of communistic dreams 
(see B. Nelson, 1954, 1958, 1972a). In a tribal brotherhood, 
where each man is a brother to every other, where there is no 
"mine and thine," charity and the ethics of the neighborhood 
reign as dominant inter-personal norms. In a fine phrase, 
Durkheim termed communism a type of "compulsory fraternity" 
(Soc:89), since each is obliged to share with all.
 
To ameliorate misery is not to organize economic life,
 
and communism does naught but push charity to the point
 
of suppressing all property. It arises from a double
 
feeling: pity for the wretched and fear of the anti-so­

cial greed and hate which the spectacle of wealth can
 
rouse in their hearts. Under its most noble form, it
 
expresses a movement of love and sympathy. Socialism
 
is essentially a process of economic concentration and
 
centralization (Soc:89).
 
Durkheim further noted that because of their fundamen­
tal critique of economic egoism and their embrace of "compul­
sory fraternity," communist theorists take as their prime 
model the type of social conditions in which inter-personal 
ethical obligations rule al.1--namely, in primitive tribal so­
ciety. Indeed, obligatory sharing between kinship groups is 
the ruling principle of reciprocity (Polanyi, 1968) in primi­
tive economies. Communist theory, then, is basically retro­
gressive in that it wishes to return to the inter-personal 
obligations of the family and the neighborhood, of the tribal 
brotherhood, a primal ground of undifferentiated unity before 
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the fall. Socialism, on the other hand, realistically accepts 
the modern, impersonal, mass-scale, international order gen­
erated by market capitalism, and seeks to transform this into 
a new type of less oppressive universal otherhood. 
The theoreticians of communism have their entire think­
ing oriented not toward the future, but toward the past. 
They are retrogressive. What they demand is not that one 
hasten the revolution--but that one turn back. It is be­
hind them that they seek their models. Thus, the Platonic 
city does nothing but openly reproduce the ancient organ­
ization of Sparta, that is to say, what was most archaic 
in the constitutional forms of Greece ... the successors 
of Plato have merely repeated the master. It is the prim­
itive peoples whom they offer us as an example (Soc:79). 
Steven Lukes provides the following useful summationof Durk­
heim's outline of communist theory: 
•.. he (Durkheim) contrasted socialism with communism, 
by which he meant utopianism--radical demands for jus­
tice, or equality, occuring sporadically throughout his­
tory, and typified by Plato, More, and Campanella. Com­
munism was anti-industrial (putting 'industrial life out­
side the state'), in favor of private production and com­
munal consumption, ascetically opposed to all wealth and 
abundance, and in favor of slnall-scale homogeneous socie­
ties in which desires are few and horizons narrow 
(1973:250) • 
Rotating his analytical matrix, Durkheim continued to 
build up a series of contrasts between modern socialism and 
timeless communist theory based on "tribal brotherhood." 
Communism views the respective situations of poor and 
rich in general, independent of any consideration about 
the state of commerce and industry, and in the way each 
contributes to it. So its demands apply to all societies 
where inequalities exist, whatever the economic regime. 
Socialists, on the contrary, are concerned only with the 
particular part of the economic machine that we call the 
workers, and with the relationships they maintain with 
the rest of the structure. Communists treat poverty and 
wealth in abstracto, on logical and moral grounds; so­
cialistS-examine the conditions in which the non-capi­
talist workingman exchanges his services (Soc:88-89). 
"To equate socialism and communism is to equate contrary 
things" (Soc:70), Durkheim insists. 
For the first, the~onomic organ must almost become the 
controlling branch of society; for the second, one could 
not be far enough removed from the other .•.• For commun­
ists, the state can fulfill its role only if it is com­
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pletely insulated from industrial life; for socialists 
this role is essentially industrial and the connection 
could not be too complete. To the former, wealth is ma­
levolent and must be put away from society; to the lat­
ter, on the contrary, it is bad only if it is not so­
cialized. Without doubt--and this is deceiving--in both 
there is to be regulation, but it must be noted that it 
operates in opposing ways. Here, it aims to elevate in­
dustry by binding it to the state; there, to elevate the 
state by excluding it from industry (Soc:70). 
Their basically opposed opinion of economic activity, 
then, leads socialism and communism to propose very different 
solutions to the problem of linking society, economy, and 
state. Since communist theorists view economic action as in­
herently egoistic and anti-social, as corrupting public mor­
als, they wish to exclude it from the state and banish its 
baneful influence as much as possible from public life. Pro­
duction is to be private, distribution and consumption pub­
lic, as in some primitive societies. Socialism, on the other 
hand, because of its modern nature and tacit acceptance of 
Utilitarian premises, similarly apotheosizes economic and 
technological growth, and therefore strives to integrate more 
closely the economy, state, and society. 
It is true that both systems allocate types of activity 
to the collective sphere which according to individual­
ist concepts would belong in the private realm, and un­
doubtedly this has contributed to the confusion. But here 
again they are sharply contrasted. According to social­
ism, strictly economic functions--activities productive 
of services (commercial and industrial)--must be socially 
organized, but consumption is to remain private .••. Quite 
to the contrary, in communism there is consumption that 
is communal and production which remains private 
(Soc:70-1). 
Again and again Durkheim drives home the same point--commun­
ism and socialism are two different theoretical and histori­
cal species. 
..• far from being able to contain the two kinds of 
doctrines in one definition, they contradict each other 
in essential characteristics. Whereas communism consists 
of an excommunication of economic activities, socialism, 
on the other hand, tends to integrate them more or less 
tightly into the community, and it is by this tendency 
that it is defined. For one they could not be relegated 
far enough from the essential branches of public life; 
•
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for the other, they had to be its center of gravity. 
For the first, the job of the state is specific, pri­
marily moral, and it can acquit itself only if with­
drawn from economic influences. For the second, it 
must before all serve as a unifying bond between the 
various industrial and commercial relations, for which 
it would act like a commercial sensorium (Soc:72). 
According to Durkheim's unique and insightful con­
trasts, communist and socialist theory are two very different 
types of doctrines corresponding to two different ideals and 
evolutionary levels. Socialism is historically specific:" ... 
it is only countries with developed industry that it im­
pugnes" (Soc:73). Being "heretical" heirs of the Utilitarian 
radicals, the socialists apotheosize economic growth and ra­
tionalization while excoriating industrial and market capital­
ism; communists, on the other hand, anathematize economic ac­
tivity altogether. 
The two sets of problems are entirely different. On one 
side, you set out to judge the moral value of wealth in 
the abstract and deny it; on the other, one asks whether 
a kind of commerce and industry harmonizes with the con­
ditions of existence of the peoples practicing it, and 
if its normal or unhealthy. Thus, while communism con­
cerns itself only occasionally with so-called economic 
arrangements and modifies them only to the degree neces­
sary to place them in keeping with its principles (the 
abolition of private ownership), socialism, inverse]y, 
touches private property only indirectly, to the degree 
required to change it so that it may harmonize with the 
economic arrangements--the essential object of its de­
mands (Soc: 73) . 
To so regulate the productive operations that they co­
operate harmoniously--that is the formula of socialism. 
To regulate individual consumption in such a way that is 
everywhere equal and everywhere moderate--that is the 
formula of communism. On the one side, one wishes to es­
tablish regular cooperation of economic functions with 
each other and also with other social functions, so as 
to lessen friction, to avoid loss of energy, and to ob­
tain the maximum return. On the other side, one seeks 
only to prevent some from consuming more than others. 
On the one case individual interests are organized; in 
the other, they are suppressed. What is there in cornmon 
between these two programs (Soc:88)? 
Durkheim further distinguished between the underlying 
intentions of communist and socialist theoreticians. These 
mounting series of incisive contrasts are illuminating not 
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only because they allow us to distinguish modern from ancient 
characteristics of social criticism, but also because they 
help us to see the commonalities between the two dominant op­
posing socioeconomic systems of the modern world. The common 
opposition of socialism and communism to economic individual­
ism, Durkheim noted: 
•.• gives them a certain family resemblance which ex­
plains the confusion so often created. But in reality, 
the (economic) particularism which these two schools 
oppose is not the same. One school labels anti-social 
everything which is private property in a general way, 
while the other considers dangerous only the individual 
appropriation of the large economic enterprises which 
are established at a specific moment in history. There­
fore, their significant motives are not at all the same. 
Communism is prompted by moral and timeless reasons; so­
cialism by considerations of an economic sort. For the 
former private property must be abolished because it is 
the source of all immorality; for the latter, the vast 
industrial and commercial enterprises cannot be left to 
themselves, as they affect too prcfoundly the entire e­
conomic life of society. Their conclusions are so dif­
ferent because one sees the remedy only in a suppression, 
as complete as possible, of economic interests; the 
other, in their socialization. They only resemble each 
other, therefore, in a vague tendency to attribute to 
society a certain predominance over the individual; but 
there is nothing in common in their reasons for assert­
ing this predominance--nor about the situations produ­
cing these assertions, nor in the ways it is expected 
that such predominance will manifest itself (Soc:75). 
Now, socialism, Durkheim insisted, is historically spe­
cific--it is a critical response to the increasing separation 
of the economy from polity and society in the modern transi­
tional era. Because socialist theory is a massive and sus­
tained criticism of the ill-effects of international market 
capitalism, Durkheim presumed that it responds to a deep and 
divisive gap in the structure of modern societies. 
••• because socialism is bound to a socially concrete 
setting, it reveals itself at once as a social and en­
during tendency. For the sentiments it expresses--being 
general--manifest themselves with persistence so long 
as the conditions which created them have not disappear­
ed. And this is also what gives socialism a practical o­
rientation. The situation to which it corresponds, being 
recent, is too harsh to tolerate or be declared incur­
able. It is not an inveterate disease, like human immoral­
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ity in general .... Right or wrong, men have not yet had 
time to accustom themselves to modern conditions .... 
Thus, in whatever way we view communism and socialism, 
we perceive contrast rather than identity. The problem 
they pose is not the same; the reforms demanded by them 
contradict more than they resemble each other .... These 
are two orders of historical fact which must be studied 
separately (Soc:74-75, 76). 
•
 
Because they arise from different "theodicies," Durkheim cor­

•
 
rectly argued that their respective "therapeutics" are also
 
basically different. However confused these types may become
 
in the popular mind, Durkheim emphasized their prime histori­

cal and theoretical differences. Indeed, because of these
 
crucial differences, "there is a place for both communism and 
socialism precisely because they are not oriented in the same 
direction" (Soc: 91) . 
•
 
In sum, Durkheim always saw the modern crisis histori­

•
 
cally--his problem was not the abstract "Hobbesian dilemma"
 
as Parsons would have it, but rather the release of atomistic
 
individualism and an "infinity of dreams and desires" in the
 
modern transition from mechanical to organic solidarity.
 
must emphasize that, contrary to Parsons (1949), Durkheim
 
did not perceive anomie and egoisme to be caused by the gen­

eric absence of social control or moral discipline over the
 
• 
pre-social ego. Parsons was led astray here, as he was in his
 
mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as a communist thinker (see
 
Part I, Book Three), because he abstracted Durkheim's work,
 
and insisted that Durkheim's prime concern was not change
 
• 
but rather "social statics." Now, Durkheim shared certain as­

pects of both the socialist and communist critiques. With the
 
communists, he too portrayed human nature as inherently ego­

istic and economic activity as amoral (this also led Parsons
 
• 
astray). With the socialists, Durkheim saw the need for prac­

tical measures to socialize egoistic economic activity, espe­

cially as these problems were exacerbated by the historical
 
nature of the modern crisis generated by the separation of
 
• 
the economy from the polity and society. This is why Durkheim
 
talked about politically enfranchising occupational groups.
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D.	 Changes in Eighteenth Century Communist Theory: 
Seeds of Socialism 
How, then, did socialist theory arise from communist 
theory? While contrasting them in many important ways, Durk­
heim next explored some of the key transitional links between 
eighteenth century communist theory and nineteenth century 
socialist theory . 
•.. still we know that, in spite of everything, some 
relationship does exist between these two doctrines. The 
sentiments that are at the root of communism, being of 
all times, are also of ours .... But they do not disap­
pear completely just because they are not vigorous e­
nough to give birth to a system which states them me­
thodically (Soc:89). 
Recall	 first that Durkheim considered socialism to be histor­
ically	 grounded in the separation of the market from occupa­
tional, political, and social control, which occurred in the 
late nineteenth century. More specifically, Durkheim dated 
its emergence to the special conditions generated by the con­
volutions of the French and Industrial Revolutions. Now, one 
of the	 virtues of Durkheim's brief historical sketch here is 
that he portrayed the developmental problem in terms of pre­
conditions and breakthroughs. For example, before socialism 
could emerge, the following conditions must obtain: 
Big industry is in process of development; the impor­
tance attributed to economic life is sufficiently es­
tablished by the fact that economics began to.be con­
sidered a science; the state is secularized and the 
centralization of French society is accomplished (Soc:80). 
Although communism was still the predominant critical 
social	 doctrine of the eighteenth century, Durkheim suggested 
that we encounter there: 
••• the two important seeds of socialism. First, a sen­
timent of protest against traditional social inequali­
ties; and second, a conception of the state which allows 
it the broadest of rights. Applied to the economic or­
der, the first of these factors gave birth to the desire 
to modify the system, and at the same time the second 
furnished the means and the necessary instrument to a­
chieve these modifications (Soc:l07). 
A new note was sounded in eighteenth century communist theo­
ry, Durkheim suggested. Theorists like Rousseau, Morelly, 
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Mably, etc. " ••• were more morally imperative, more saddened, 
disturbed by their own societies, and they betrayed a strong­
er and more generalized concern for social justice" (Lukes, 
1973:251). A few theorists, such as Linguet, Necker, and 
Graslin, turned critical attention to the sad realities of 
modern industrial life, " ... but at first it is only among a 
few rare writers that the feeling of protest ... left the 
sphere of philosophical abstractions to address itself to e­
conomic reality" (Soc:99). And even their conclusions were 
rather "timid and conservative" (Lukes, 1973:251), for they 
assigned the state only a "negative role." 
In short, a hope for a more just social order and an 
idea of the state's rights which, together are the 
seeds of socialism, but which were limited at the time 
to only rudimentary wishes--that is all we find in the 
eighteenth century (Soc:lOl). 
Durkheim then posed two important historical questions: 
(1) "Where does this double seed come from, how was this new 
concept of justice and the state constituted; (2) What pre­
vented it from leading to the socialist consequences it im­
plied?" (Soc:102) The form of these historical inquiries is 
important, for here Durkheim searched not only for the spe­
cific origins and carriers of different values, but also for 
the preconditions acting as obstacles to breakthroughs, a 
typically Weberian procedure. In this way one can build a 
comparative check into studies of historical development. 
Durkheim's answer to the first question is that this "double 
seed" was an outgrowth of the "double movement"--the indivi­
dualist and statist tendencies--of the French Revolution it­
self. 
It is evident that these ideas are none other than the 
two fundamental principles on which all the political 
transformations of 1789 rest. They are the result of 
the double movement from which the Revolution sprang: 
the individualist movement and the statist movement. 
The first resulted in having it admitted as evident 
that the place of the individuals in the body politic 
should be exclusively determined by their personal val­
ue, and consequently of having traditional inequalities 
rejected as unjust. The second had the result that the 
reforms judged to be necessary were considered realiza­
•
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ble, because the state was conceived as the natural in­
strument of their realization. Besides, these principles 
are jointly responsible for each other in the sense that 
the stronger the state is constituted, and the higher it 
• 
is raised above all individuals, of whatever class or o­
rigin, the more, therefore, did all individuals appear 
equal through connection with it. This is where the two 
tendencies sprang from. They were born for the sake of 
the political organization and with a view to modifying 
this organization. They appeared to have so little con­
tact with economic reality because they were formed under 
altogether different influences ...• It is pOlitical i­
deas which are the center of gravity of the system 
(Soc:I02-3). 
• 
But what happened to these dynamic individualist and 
statist forces? Why didn't they immediately produce social­
ist consequences? 
•
 
Arising in connection with the political organization,
 
these two ideas were applied to it, they stimulated the
 
transformations which are the work of the Revolution,
 
•
 
but they were hardly extended beyond it. How is this?
 
Since these tendencies are precisely those from which
 
revolutionary events derived, we might suppose that be­

fore they could cause economic changes they had to
 
transform the political structure •••• For these facts
 
to produce their social or socialist consequences, they
 
• 
had first to produce their political consequences 
(Soc : IO 7, IO 5) . 
Thus, Durkheim's model of explanation, when confronted with 
actual historical problems of interpretation, converged with 
• 
Weber's--for before socialism could demand the closer linking 
of the economy to the central state, these dynamic forces 
first had to transform the political order itself. Given this 
precondition, these same forces then extended their dynamic 
demands to the complex relations between economy and polity, 
on the one hand, and to society on the other. This sort of 
historical reasoning is vastly superior to Durkheim's earlier 
•
 
general evolutionary abstractions in The Division of Labor.
 
We should now hold him to these more adequate forms of ex­
planation in terms of interpreting the sources of anomic and 
egoistic suicide. 
• 
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E. Saint-SimonIs Explanation of the Origins of the Indus­
trial System and the Modern Transitional Crisis 
The entire doctrine of Saint-Simon hinges upon the fol­
lowing problem: 'What is the social system required by 
the present situation of the European peoples?' To ans­
wer this question, Saint-Simon examines history. It re­
veals that modern societies carry within themselves two 
social systems--not only different but contradictory-­
which have been developing in opposite directions since 
the early Middle Ages. One has as its key military force 
and the unreasoned prestige of faith; the other, indus­
trial capacity and the freely accepted authority of the 
learned. Temporally, one is completely organized for 
war, for depravation--the other for peaceful production. 
Spiritually, the former systematically turns men's minds 
away from all that is earthly, whereas the latter cen­
ters them on things of this world. Such an antagonism 
precludes mixing and eclectic solutions .... A society 
cannot be consistent and stable as long as it rests con­
currently on two principles so manifestly contradictory. 
It cannot be in equilibrium unless it is organized com­
pletely in a homogeneous fashion--that is, unless all 
collective forces move in the same direction and around 
a single and identical center of gravity. It is there~ 
fore necessary to choose firmly between the two systems. 
Either wholly restore one, or else extend the other to 
the entirety of social life (Soc:179). 
Preface. Durkheim clearly agreed with much of Saint-SimonIs 
explanation of the origins and problems of the industrial sys­
tem--" ••• it cannot be posed with greater profundity" (Soc: 
160). Durkheim's fulsome praise of Saint-Simon is important 
in itself, but doubly so for our present purposes because 
here Saint-Simon is acknowledged to have provided a brilliant 
historical explanation of the origins and causes of the con­
temporary crisis underlying anomie and egoisme. Indeed, Durk­
heim himself never provided as detailed or subtly inflected 
an historical-causal explanation of the roots of the modern 
crisis. 
According to Saint-Simon, the two key forces growing 
up in the womb of medieval "organic ,. society which were des­
tined to transform it from within were the "commune" and the 
growth of scientific or positive knowledge. The first notion 
represents a significant convergence with Weber (1968), who 
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also pointed out the importance of the Occidental city as an 
"oath-bound confederation." The new Western commune represen­
ted a new structure of human fraternization, and thus a key 
phase in the world-historical extension of the social bond. 
Equally important was the extension and theoretical systema­
tization of scientific knowledge in providing the "positive" 
logics of modern thought and action, instead of hierocratic 
direction and control. In this Saint-Simon showed himself to 
be a true son of the French Enlightenment. As a follower of 
Condorcet, Saint-Simon believed the growth of scientific 
knowledge to be the prime historical mover. Knowledge was 
the causal agent of historical change; the great law of "pro­
gress" ruled man's destiny (eg. see Soc:138-40). In essence, 
Saint-Simon wished to more explicitly link these two related 
historical trends: "To reorganize European societies by giv­
ing them science and industry as bases--that was the objec­
tive he never lost sight of" (Soc:123). 
In contrast to the reforming "critical" philosophies 
of the eighteenth century, however, Saint-SimonIs philosophy 
was to be "positive." 
[The eighteenth century philosophes of the Encyclope­
dia] .•.. were above all critical. It demonstrated that 
the old systems of ideas was no longer in harmony with 
the new discoveries of science, but it did not say what 
it ought to be. It was a weapon of war, made to destroy, 
not to reconstruct. But today reconstruction is needed. 
'The philosophy of the eighteenth century was critical 
and revolutionary, while that of the nineteenth will be 
inventive and organizational' (Soc:130). 
Now, sociology was to be the theoretical instrument to this 
practical end of "positive" social and moral reconstruction. 
Although other sciences were ready to be used, "social phys­
iology," conceived on the model of the natural sciences, had 
to be constructed by Saint-Simon and his great protege, Comte. 
Saint-Simon clearly believed, Durkheim relates, that "In 
times of trouble and crisis, when a new system of common be­
liefs is straining to be worked out, it is philosophy that 
must direct this elaboration" (soc:130). Without this over­
riding intention, French positivism and sociology itself 
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might never have been born. Indeed, Saint-SimonIs typically 
rationalistic belief that thought itself must direct action 
and the new social order is clearly seen: 
'Every social regime is an application of a philosophic 
system, and consequently it is impossible to institute 
a new regime without having previously established the 
new philosophic system to which it must correspond' 
(Soc: 131) . 
Durkheim concluded: 
A definite social crisis had stirred his thought, and it 
was entirely to solve it that his efforts were bent. His 
entire system, consequently, has a practical .•. objec­
tive .•.. Although he was the first to have a really clear 
conception of what sociology had to be and its necessity 
... he did not create a sociology. He didn't use the me­
thod, whose principles he had so firmly stated, to discov­
er the laws of evolution--social and general--but in or­
der to answer a very special question--of entirely imme­
diate interest--what is the social system required by the 
condition of European societies on the morrow of the Rev­
olution (Soc:146)? 
How did the present crisis come to be? To answer these 
and other questions, Saint-Simon turned back to the womb of 
Western culture in the so-called "~{iddle Ages," and proceeded 
to offer a brilliant retrospective analysis of the birth of 
the modern world. Saint-Simon saw European society, especial­
ly after the French Revolution, as caught between two oppo­
sing types of social organization--the lingering structures 
of medieval "organic" society, on the one hand, and the mod­
ern industrial, urban, scientific system still straining to 
be born on the other. The troubles of the contemporary age, 
according to Saint-Simon, were due to the transitional cri­
sis of European society. The notion of alternating "organic" 
and "critical" periods was central to Saint-SimonIs histori­
cal perspective. Thus, the prime point of departure for 
Saint-SimonIs historical explanations of the origins of the 
industrial system and our modern crisis was the religio-mil­
itary system of the "Middle Ages." 
••. the social system revolved completely around two 
centers of gravity, distinct but closely related. On 
the one hand, there were the chiefs of the army, who 
constituted what is since called feudalism, and to whom 
all of secular society was closely subjected. All prop­
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erty was in their hands, and workers ... were dependent 
on them. On the other hand, there were the clergy, who 
controlled the spiritual direction of society generally. 
... Their doctrines and decisions served as guides to 
opinion; but what overwhelmingly established their au­
thority was their absolute mastery over general and par­
ticular education. In other words, the entire economic 
life of society depended on the lords, and all intellec­
tual life on the priests. The first rule supremely over 
productive operations, the second over consciences. Thus 
all collective functions were strictly subordinated ei­
ther to military power or religious authority, and this 
double subjugation constituted the social organization . 
••• This two-pronged supremacy was based on the nature 
of things (Soc:148). 
Taking this as his original analytical anchor, Saint­
Simon then began to detect contrary forces growing up within 
the bosom of the older religio-military system. After Saint­
Simon, Durkheim enunciated the following hermeneutical prin­
ciple: "It is a general rule that the apogee of a social 
system coincides with the beginning of its decadence. In the 
eleventh century, spiritual and temporal powers were defin­
itely established; never was the authority of clergy and 
lords more undisputed" (Soc:149). 
But coming into existence at that very moment were two 
new social forces. Being opposed to the preceding ones, 
they entered into struggle with them, gradually destroy­
ing them, and thus disintegrated the system whose parts 
had been bound together only because they were all sub­
jected to the all-powerful action of the double author­
ity. These two forces were the free commune and exact 
science (Soc:149). 
As Weber did in his monograph on ~he City (1968), Saint-Simon 
focussed on the emerging social organization of the oath­
bound confederations, the new urban economic and political 
entities. Starting first in the eleventh and twelfth century 
Renaissance (centered in France), Saint-Simon observed: 
••• with the twelfth century began the great movement 
of the emancipation of the commune. Villages ••. were 
freeing themselves from seigneurial tutelage. And they 
were totally composed of artisans and merchants. A whole 
segment of theeconomic structure thus found itself de­
tached from the others who until then were forcing their 
control on it. Transformed into a special, relatively in­
dependent organ, henceforth the villages were going to 
live their own lives, to pursue their particular inter­
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ests--outside of any military influence ..•• Liberated 
industry was going to be able freely to realize its own 
nature •..• A new force, sui generis, had entered the 
heart of the social body, and as by nature and origin 
it was foreign to theold organization--and could only 
disturb it--it was inevitable that its very presence 
would disconcert the latter's functioning, and would 
develop only by destroying it (Soc:149-50). 
Among the important aspects of the Renaissance of the twelfth 
century was the re-introduction of classical literature and 
philosophy. The Arabs were the prime conduits for the trans­
mission of Greek philosophy, and their oftentimes sophisti­
cated development of this classical tradition helped generate 
a "rational structure of consciousness" (see Nelson, 1973a) 
within the old feudal system. In the new urban confedera­
tions, a new institution and professional group was arising 
--namely, the university and the scholastic philosophers. 
Gradually, in opposition to the clergy, a new body was 
forming, which like the preceding one aimed at direc­
ting the intellectual life of society. These were the 
scholars who, in their relation to the clerical class 
were exactly in the same situation as were the enfran­
chised communes--that is, the corporation of artisans 
and merchants--vis-a-vis feudalism. Thus two seeds of 
destruction were introduced into the theological feudal 
system, and from that moment the two forces which were 
the source of its strength began to grow weaker (Soc: 150). 
For centuries, these "seeds of destruction"--the urban 
commune as a new form of voluntaristic fraternization, and 
rational philosophy--continued growing in strength, until 
the massive dislocations and religious wars of the sixteenth 
century. "Although the conflict never ceased, it was some 
time before it produced visible results. The old system was 
too solidly entrenched, and too resistant, for obscure caus­
es to immediately manifest their action through exterior and 
apparent effects" (Soc:150). Saint-Simon's keen insight into 
the complexities and dialectics of sociocultural process led 
him to recognize these crucial "subterranean processes" run­
ning beneath the long-distorted Enlightenment images of the 
so-called "dark ages." Durkheim noted: "He (Saint-Simon) 
keeps repeating that this arrangment of European societies 
establishes itself spontaneously because it alone correspond­
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ed to the state of civilization ll (Soc:148). Indeed, Saint­
Simon not only granted the medieval period its due in the 
rise of Western civilization, but he insisted that in its 
social organization it fitted the needs of the day, and, 
moreover, represented a necessary phase in human progress. 
Along with later sociocultural historians such as Fustel de 
Coulanges, Saint-Si~on, said, Durkheim, saw the real under­
lying creativity of this period (see also Durkheim, 1938). 
Durkheim gave to Saint-Simon the honor of being one of the 
first post-Revolutionary thinkers to view the middle ages 
objectively, without the partisan polemic so characteristic 
of French and other reformers. 
It is through failing to recognize the importance of 
this subterranean process that one so often sees the 
Middle Ages as a dark era in which a veritable intel­
lectual night reigned, and that consequently nothing 
about it was related to the period of light which fol­
lowed. In reality, it was the Middle Ages which paved 
the way for modern times. It contained them in embyro 
(Soc:150). 
Rightly sensing the moral and religious component in these 
developing changes, Saint-Simon saw the Protestant Reforma­
tion (rather than the Italian Renaissance) as the crucial 
opening wedge in the fundamental reorganization of the II mor ­
alities of thought and logics of action ll underlying European 
social and cultural order. Especially important here was the 
individualistic IIProtestant principle ll (eg. see Tillich, 
1948) of free examination in matters of faith and conscience . 
•.. it was only in the sixteenth century that the for­
ces anatagonistic to the old system found themselves 
strong enough to come into the open ••.. At first these 
forces were directed against theological rule; Luther 
and his co-reformers upset pontifical authority as a 
power in Europe. At the same time in a general way, they 
undermined theological authority by 'destroying the prin­
ciple of blind faith, by replacing it with the right of 
examination which--restrained at first within quite nar­
row limits--was to inevitably increase and ... finally 
embrace an indefinite area.' This two-fold change opera­
ted not only among peoples converted to Protestantism, 
but even among those who remained Catholic. For once the 
principle was established, it extended well beyond the 
conditions where it had first been proclaimed. As a re­
sult, the bond which tied individual consciences to the 
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ecclesiastical power--although not shattered--was loosen­
ed and the moral unity of the social system definitely 
unsettled (Soc:15l-2). 
Saint-Simon also clearly perceived the spread of seculariza­
tion of this Protestant individualism into political revolu­
tion. In a curiously parallel movement, both this individual­
istic drive and the trend toward political centralization 
proceeded together,' especially in France and England. 
The entire sixteenth century was seized by this great 
intellectual revolution. But it was at its close that 
the struggle--begun against spiritual power--proceeded 
against temporal power. It took place almost at the. 
same time in France and England. In both countries it 
was led by the common people, with one of two branches 
of temporal power as leader. With the English, feudal­
ism placed itself at their head to combat royal author­
ity; in France, royalty made itself their ally against 
feudal strength.... Here Richelieu, then Louis XIV shat­
tered seigneurial power; there, the Revolution of 1688 
broke out, limiting royal authority as much as possible 
without overturning the old organization. The final re­
sult of these events was a weakening of the military 
system in its entirety (Soc:152). 
Eventually, as the struggle deepened, the new "Protes­
tant principle"-~the new "moralities of thought and logics 
of action"--of freedom of conscience and rationalistic in­
dividualism which accompanied it, were extended to their 
outer limits. Such a process of dialectical polarization is 
almost as inevitable as the routinization of charisma. Thus, 
we see the progressive extension of individualism as an ab­
solute principle into the. legitimized egoism at the base of 
modern economies and modern art and philosophy that Durkheim 
attacked so relentlessly with his notions of anomie and ego­
isme. 
In the eighteenth century, the shocks had gone so deep, 
the feudal order's resistance became so weak, that the 
attack on it became generalized, and directed against 
the whole of its organization. One then sees the princi­
ple of the right of examination---rIl reITgI'OUS matters ex­
tended to its extreme limit *(S:153) .. 
Durkheim summed up Saint-SimonIs account of the separation 
or differentiation out of these new elements crucial to the 
emerging social order in these terms: 
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The history of the old system .. up to the eve of the 
Revolution, shows us a spectacle of an uninterrupted 
decadence. But at the same time that this regressive 
progress was developing, another was occuring in re­
verse direction with no less significance. Industrial 
and scientific forces, once formed, did not manifest 
themselves exclusively by destructive effects, that is, 
by overthowing the old social order they gave rise to 
another. They did not limit themselves to detaching 
consciences and individual wills from the center which 
until then .•• had made a single body of them. But to 
the degree they acquired more energy, they themselves 
became foci of common action and centers of organiza­
tion. Around them gradually formed the social elements 
which the old forces--more or less powerless to keep 
them subordinate--were allowing to escape. Under these 
new influences, a new social system was slowly arising 
in the bosom of the old, which was disintegrating. 
As long as the arts and crafts had been narrowly subor­
dinated to the theological and military authority, hav­
ing to serve as instruments for ends which were not 
their own, they had been impeded in their progress. But 
as soon as they began to be free--thanks to the libera­
tion of the common people--they took flight and aevel­
oped so quickly that they soon became a social force to 
be reckoned with. Little by little all society fell in­
to dependence upon then, because nothing was any longer 
possible without them. Military force itself was subjec­
ted to them, once war became a complex and costly thing, 
once it demanded not merely native courage and a certain 
disposition of character, but money, machines, arms. 
More and more, improvements in industry, the inventions 
of science, and finally, wealth, were proving more vital 
to success in arms than innate bravery (Soc:153-4). 
Focussing on these rising middle classes, the prime 
carriers of the new religious individualism, capitalism, and 
urban life, Saint-Simon further observed that the bourgeoisie 
increasingly became part of, and then progressively trans­
formed, the administrative apparatus of political and legal 
institutions. 
But when a class acquires greater importance and re­
spect, when the functions it fulfills become more es­
sential, it is inevitable for it to wield greater in­
fluence on the direction of society and increased po­
litical authority. This is in fact what occured. Little 
by little, one sees representatives of industry admit­
ted to governmental councils, playing a greater and 
greater part, and as a result having a larger share in 
determining the general course of society. It is in Eng­
land that this phenomena manifests itself. Gradually, 
the common people--the classes which fulfill only econo­
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mic functions--obtain first a voice in the tax vote, 
then a deliberative voice, and then the exclusive right 
to vote on budgets. They substitute themselves for the 
old temporal power in one of its most important functions, 
and are able henceforth to act in conformity with their 
own interest in the direction of society; they modify 
its orientation, since they have altogether different 
ends than the military classes. In other words, the so­
cial system began to revolve around a new center 
(Soc:154-5) .
. 
In addition to the administrative control over tax revenues, 
the growing cities began to gain control over their own sys­
tem of the administration of justice inthe municipal tribun­
als. 
Once the villages were freed, one of the rights consid­
ered most important to achieve was the administration 
of justice ..•. From this moment the industrial class had 
a judiciary organ which was its own, in harmony with its 
special nature, and which contributed to complete the 
system which was in process of formation •..• This spon­
taneous organization ... extended to every detail of 
collective life, to the whole mass of population which 
it affected in an entirely new way. Before the libera­
tion of the communes, the people--in secular matters-­
had as their only continuing leaders the chiefs of the 
army. But with enfranchisement, they gradually became 
detached, and organized under the leaders of the arts 
and crafts (Soc:155). 
Further, Saint-Simon emphasized the importance of the changes 
in the technology of warfare and the innovation of national 
armies in this overall development . 
.•• It is especially due to the institution of permanent 
armies that this new grouping of social forces could 
separate itself completely from the old and become inde­
pendent •... From this moment on, the task of soldiering 
was a special function, separated from the remainder of 
the population. As a result, the 'mass of people had no 
longer any connection with the military heads. It was 
organized only industrially' (Soc:155-6). 
Science, too, became increasingly separated from its 
prime locus--scholastic theology; gradually, natural and mor­
al philosophy became autonomous. Scientific scholars increas­
ingly moved to the center stage by becoming advisers to the 
new national monarchs, who required their skills in govern­
ing and in military and public works projects (eg. Leonardo 
da Vinci's involvement with Ludovico Sforza and Caesare Bor­
• 
--645-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
gia}. Out of this liason between scientists and monarchs, 
scientific academies--the first modern scientific institu­
tions--were eventually born. Saint-Simon took this close al­
liance as a model for his ideal "positive" society. 
Just as with industry, science, as it grew, developed 
an organization appropriate to its own character, and 
very different, consequently, from that permitted by 
theological authority. Scholars became esteemed person­
ages whom royalty more and more made a habit of consult­
ing. It is as a result of these repeated consultations 
that great scientific bodies were gradually established 
at the pinnacle of the system. These were the academies 
(Soc:IS6) . 
Durkheim (after Saint-Simon), summed up these twin socio-eco­
nomic and religio-cultural developments in this way: 
The results of this double evolution can be summarized 
as follows: in the measure that the ancient social sys­
tem gave way, another was formed in the very bosom of 
the first. The old society contained within itself a 
new society, in process of formation and everyday acquir­
ing more strength and consistency. But these two organ­
izations are necessarily antagonistic--they result from 
opposing forces and aim at contradictory ends. One is 
essentially aggressive and warlike; the other, essen­
tially pacifist .••• One has conquest for its aim, the 
othe4 production. Similarly, in spiritual affairs the 
first calls on faith and imposes beliefs which it puts 
beyond discussion. The second calls on reason and even 
trust--it requires a type of intellectual subordination 
essential to rationality. Thus, these two types of so­
cieties could not exist without contradicting each other• 
•.. The old morality and law were discredited in the 
new world which was arising; but a new juridical and 
moral order, without which the new system could not be 
considered organized, did not come into being automati­
cally. Thus, scientific industrial society reached out 
for an appropriate social organization which was not 
yet in existence. To succeed, it had both to overcome 
the inertia of the~ld and to Shape-the ne~ As long 
as this two-fold result wasnot achieved-;-Tt was inevi­
table that disorganization and conflict would be severe 
and would affect the whole of society * (Soc:157; IS8). 
I must emphasize that Durkheim enunciated here a crucial in­
sight which I should like to hold him to in later causal ex­
planations--namely, that the old order must be broken through 
by a new innovation, a new way whether it be techological or 
ethical, and then subsequently spread and become institution­
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alized, as the old system begins to break down under the 
pressure. Lack of recognition of this Weberian principle 
often leads historians astray, as it does Durkheim's abstrac­
ted general evolutionism (see Part I, Book Three). We must 
lay aside the old notion of slow, inevitable progress. Our 
real challenge here is to marry general and specific evolu­
tionary explanations in sociological theory; specifically,
. 
this means linking Durkheim and Weber (see Part I, Book 
Three). One cannot hope, for instance, to adequately explain 
the origins and significance of anomie and egoisme except by 
seeing them against the background of the breakthrough of old 
medieval casuistries of moral decision (see Nelson, 1969a, 
1973a, 1973b) by the new Protestant "moralities of thought 
and logics of action" (see Part II, Book Three). Hence, on 
the mainline of world-historical evolution, our interpretive 
image should be of breakthroughs and breakdowns. 
However, the French Revolution's net effect was de­
structive, observed Saint-Simon. It was necessary, but not 
sufficient, for while it broke down the old order, it failed 
to create something new and viable in its place. Thus, the 
transitional crisis between the two types of social order was 
prolonged and even exacerbated. 
Such was the situation on the eve of the Revolution, and 
out of it the Revolution was born ••.. 'A civil and moral 
revolution which had gradually developed for more than 
six centuries engendered and necessitated a political 
revolution •... If one insists on attributing the French 
Revolution to one source, it must be dated from the day 
of the liberation of the communes, and the cultivation 
of exact sciences began.' A two~fold need gave rise to 
it: the need of being extricated from the past, and the 
need to organize the present; the Revolution met only 
the first of these needs. It succeeded in striking the 
final blows at the old system. It abolished all that re­
mained of feudalism--even royal authority--and all that 
survived from the old temporal power. It gave to freedom 
of conscience the juridical consequences it implied, 
whereas before it had only the weight of moral sanction 
(Soc : 15 8-15 9) • 
The incompleteness of the Revolution, Durkheim explained in 
his Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, was the prime rea­
son why France to his day continued to oscillate back and 
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forth between individualism and despotic monarchies. In 
sweeping away the past, its influence was largely negative; 
what was next needed was "positive" social action. Our con­
temporary crisis deepens, for the old way is gone forever, 
but the new order is not yet mature. 
But on the land thus cleared, the Revolution built noth­
ing new. It asserted that no one was obliged to accept 
the old beliefs but did not attempt to elaborate a new 
body of rational beliefs that all minds could accept. 
It destroyed the foundations on which political author­
ity rested, but failed to establish others of any sta­
bility. It proclaimed that political power was not to 
belong to those who had monopolized it until then, but 
did not assign it to any definite organ. In other words, 
it neglected to state what it was for •.•• An action so 
exclusively destructive, far from attenuating the cri­
sis which had given rise to it, could only make the e­
vil more acute and intolerable. For the absences of or­
ganization from which industrial society suffered be­
came far more per~eptible once all that remained of the 
old had disappeared. The weak cohesion of this dawning 
society became a much graver social peril once the old 
social bonds were completely destroyed .... 'No longer 
having anything that was agreed upon, people separated 
and became enemies. It was a struggle of all whims, a 
battle of all imaginations' ..•. This was one indication 
of the partial miscarriage of the Revolution. As a so­
ciety so disoriented cannot live, one soon sees reborn 
from their ashes certain of the destroyed institutions. 
Royal authority was reestablished. But these revivals 
of the past did not constitute a solution. So the prob­
lem is posed on the morrow of the Revolution, at the 
start of the nineteenth century, in the same terms as 
on the eve of 1789, only it has become more pressing. 
The denouement is more urgent if one does not wish to 
see each crisis produce another, exasperation the 
chronic state of society, and finally, disintegration 
more or less the result. One must take a stand. Either 
completely restore the old system or organize the new. 
It is precisely this that is the social question 
(Soc:159-60). 
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F.	 Durkheim's Critical Reflections on Saint-SimonIs Doc­
trine: Economics as Amoral Activity 
Durkheim repeatedly acknowledged Saint-SimonIs histori­
cal analysis of the historical roots of our contemporary cri­
sis as profound (eg. Soc:160); however, he also insisted 
that it contained a basic flaw. For, Durkheim charged, Saint­
Simon sanctified the very type of activity that was sym~tom­
atic of modern "moral anarchy." Saint-Simon wished to dereg­
ulate economic appetites, he apotheosized economic desires. 
Saint-Simon wished to enshrine the very amoral element a­
gainst which Durkheim's "philosophy of finitude" (LaCapra, 
1972) was fundamentally opposed. In these terms, the problem 
Durkheim next set himself was outlining the kind of decen­
tralized democratic socialism which, through the social in~ 
teractional medium of occupational groups, would act to re­
strain and morally discipline these egoistic and insatiable 
appetites. Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's critique of 
Saint-SimonIs doctrine, for it reveals, once again, the depth 
of Durkheim's concern with anomie and egoisme as an "infini­
ty of dreams and desires." 
Granting Saint-SimonIs historical insight, Durkheim re­
stated his generalized moral argument, and his philosophy of 
"human finitude" versus the insatiable appetites of the or­
ganic ego. He carried this critique and philosophy through 
at least four major books--The Division of Labor, Socialism, 
Suicide, and Moral Education. 
As we view it, it cannot be posed with greater profund­
ity. The originality of this historic analysis is that 
Saint-Simon very correctly felt that the changes spon­
taneously produced in European societies since the Mid­
dle Ages had not simply acted upon this or that parti­
cular characteristic ... but that the social organism 
had been affected to its very foundations. He understood 
that the liberal movement of which the Revolution was 
only the culmination, but which had been incubating for 
centuries before it--had not merely the effect of un­
chaining citizens from burdensome shackles as an end in 
itself. He saw the dissolution of the old order of things 
that had resulted, that this dissolution had not solved 
the central problem, but was making such a solution more 
immediately necessary. He understood that to reorganize 
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society it was not enough to destroy the old system of 
forces which united it, and that once this destruction 
is accomplished social equilibrium itself--as essential 
as it might otherwise be--in its turn becomes precar­
ious, is maintained only by a miracle, and can fall 
with the slightest wind. Consequently, it is necessary 
to rebuild on new foundations according to a plan which 
is not simply a reproduction of the old. Thus the great 
contemporary questions are found to be related to the 
whole course of our historical development (Soc:160) .
. 
Again, Durkheim took pains to acknowledge that Saint-
Simon was the first major liberal thinker in France after 
the Revolution to offer a critically objective view of the 
Revolution, while still resolving to carryon its work. 
Saint-Simon judges the work of the Revolution with in­
dependence--sometimes every severity •.. (yet) it would 
be a mistake to see a condemnation in his criticism. 
First, he postulates the principle that it was necessary 
and inevitable; our history ... is but its long prepara­
tion. Further, he reproaches the men of the Revolution 
for having overthrown the ancient institutions without 
determining what to put in their place •... In short, he 
objects not its having been, but to its not having been 
all that it might (Soc:161). 
In a fascinating account (Soc:161-4) which we cannot include 
here, Durkheim reviews Saint-SimonIs explanation of why the 
Revolution miscarried, or rather, stopped halfway. "What pre­
vented it from ending on positive results?" In essence, 
Saint-Simon blames the influence of a specific occupational 
group--the lawyers, a group he personally encountered in 
jail during the Revolution and Reign of Terror. Their mental­
ity was too critical, too linked to the past, too abstract to 
generate a truly "positive society." 
Now, Saint-SimonIs life-task was to get the new system 
up "on its feet." Thus, at the root of his historical analy­
ses, was a very practical problem: "Granted that our present 
societies contain within them two different, and even contra­
dictory social systems--one which is becoming weaker and 
weaker, and the other emerging more and more--how can the 
crisis resulting from their antagonism be solved" (Soc:167) 
The complex details of Saint-SimonIs cascade of reform pro­
posals need not detain us here. What is most important for 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--650--
our present purposes is that Saint-Simon proposed that indus-
try and economic activity must become sanctified and central-
ized. "Society must become a vast production company" (Soc: 
173). However, instead of arguing for laissez-faire (the se-
paration of political from economic functions), Saint-Simon 
strove to link the economy much more closely with the polity. 
At the same time, the State's role was not to repress indus-
. 
tria: activity, but to socialize it. 
This is where Saint-Simon distinguished himself from the 
sy,stem of the classic economists. For them economic life 
is completely outside politics; it refers wholly to the 
individual. For Saint-Simon it is the whole substance of 
politics; not only is there a politics of economic inter-
ests, but there is no other. 'Politics is the science of 
production' (Soc:179). 
Durkheim acknowledged some important similarities between in-
dividualist and socialist theory; but in the end, they dif-
fered on the proper relations between society, economy, and 
polity. 
Historically, socialism does not spring from economics, 
but is derived from a similar source. Born at almost 
the same time, the two systems should obviously corres-
pond to the same social state they express differently . 
... Not only did we find in both the same tendency to 
cosmopolitanism, the same sensuous and utilitarian ten-
dency, but further, the fundamental principle on which 
they rest is identical. Both are industrialist; both 
proclaim that economic interests are social interests. 
The difference is that Saint-Simon, and all subsequent 
socialists, conclude that since economic factors are the 
substance of common life, they must be organized social-
ly, whereas the economists refuse to subject them to any 
collective control and believe they can be arranged and 
harmonized without prior reorganization (Soc:238). 
According to Durkheim, Saint-Simon saw correctly, along with 
the Utilitarian individualist economists, that industrial ac-
tivity could no longer be subordinated to the remnants of the 
traditional social and political order. But he erred in apo-
theosizing this dynamic, even demonic, force. 
Saint-Simon demonstrated that the powers which had dom-
inated industry until the present were going into de-
cline and that this decline was inevitable. From this 
he concluded that it did and should tend toward complete 
enfranchisement, toward absolute liberation, that it was 
no longer to be subordinated to anything which would 
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surpass it, that henceforth it was to be its own end, 
and draw from itself its own rule (Soc:239). 
Durkheim next launched into his chief objection against 
this apotheosis of amoral economic activity. He emphatically 
rejected the notion that such activity can be self-regulatin~ 
Hence, the central postulate of a self-equilibrating market 
mechanism balancing production and consumption, supply and 
demand, was also ruled out of court. Nothing in nature,Durk­
heim contended, can be freed of the need for limitation. 
But this conclusion was premature. To assume that the 
particular state of subjection in which industry had 
formerly been held could not be in agreement with the 
new conditions of collective life, does not imply that 
every other type of dependence would be devoid of rea­
son. It can well be that the transformation now neces­
sary does not consist in suppressing all subordination, 
but in changing its form--not in making industrial in­
terests a kind of unlimited absolute beyond which there 
is nothing, but rather in limiting them in a different 
manner and spirit than formerly. Not only does this hy­
pothesis deserve examination, but in fact is easy to 
understand that in any social organization, however 
skillfully ordered, economic functions cannot cooperate 
harmoniously nor be maintained in a state of equilibrium 
unless subjected to moral forces which suppress, contain, 
and regulate them (Soc:239). 
Unfortunately incorporating the portrayal of economic motiva­
tion and action projected by his opponents--the Utilitarian 
ethical economists--Durkheim took economics as the very pro­
totype of amoral, egoistic activity (see also Part I, Book 
Three). If there can be no question of the organic ego disc~ 
plining its own egoistic and insatiable sensual appetites, 
how can there be any question that economic action based on 
this ego can really be self-regulating? (Of course, to the 
Utilitarians, the conclusion was precisely the opposite-­
because the generic individual was self-guiding, possessed 
of an innate "moral sense," the prime arena of individualis­
tic activity--the economy--would also be self-regulating, if 
only the medieval state could be set aside. To them economic 
demands were moral demands, while they were inherently amoral 
to Durkheim). The very basis of Durkheim's "philosophy of hu­
man finitude" was that the insatiability of the pre-social 
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ego must always be constrained by moral discipline . 
... It is ~ general law of all living things that needs 
and appetites are normal only on the condition of being 
controlled. Unlimited need contradicts itself. For need 
is defined e.Y. the goal it aims at, and if unlimr:ted has 
no goal--since there is no limit. It is not true aim to 
seek constantly more than one has--to work in order to 
overtake the point one has reached, with a view only to 
exceeding the point at which one will have arrived. From 
another point of view, one might say that the persis­
tence of a need or appetite in a living body can be ex­
plained only if it secures some satisfaction for the be­
ing who experiences it. But an appetite that nothing can 
appease can never be satISfied * (Soc:239-40). -­
. It is important to recognize that Weber (1958a,1968) agreed 
that functionally rational economic action (eg. Utilitarian 
or pragmatic logics) is substantively irrational; and here 
Durkheim made this absence of substantive or goal-directed 
behavior one of the inner meanings of a-nomie as purposeless 
in the sense of limitless action. t~y so many would strive 
so hard for "infinitely receding" goals with so little hope 
of satisfaction is a most curious ethos, one which is wholly 
inexplicable by Durkheim's notion of man as homo duplex, but 
which was powerfully and brilliantly dissected by Weber. If 
Weber explained the historical origins of the modern ethos 
better than Durkheim, nonetheless, the latter provided a por­
trait, perhaps unsurpassed even by Freud, of the phenomeno­
logical torment implied in living out the mandates of modern 
cultural traditions. 
Insatiable thirst can only be ~ source of suffering. 
Whatever one does, it is never slaked. Every being 
likes to act,~move,-and movement is life. But he 
must feel his action serves some purpose--that by 
walking he goes forward. But one does not advance when 
he proceeds without a ~oal--or what comes to the same 
thing--toward a goal s1tuated in infinity. The distance 
is always the same, whatever the road, and no matter 
what the pace, one seems to be simply marking time. It 
is well-known that insatiability is a sign_of morbidi­
~. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has taken 
a certain amountcf nourishment; it is the glutton who 
cannot be satisfied. Healthy people enjoy motion, but 
at the end of exercise, they like to rest. The deambu­
latory maniac experiences the need of perpetually mov­
ing without stop or rest; nothing satisfies him. In 
its normal state sexual desire is aroused for a time, 
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then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there are no 
limits * (Soc:240). 
If only Durkheim had turned from his brilliant insights, in­
stead of reducing this substantively irrational "moral anar­
chy" to organic "pathologies," to the sociocultural-histori­
cal level which he seemed to champion, he might have broken 
consciously through to the second schema. But his biological 
analogies, and his genetic equation of society with rational­
ity and moral discipline led him in the wrong direction here. 
Once again, it must be noted, however, that Durkhel.T!\'s 
own doctrine was ambiguous on this point. Man, he observed, 
is less fettered by instinct than animals. A new life is a­
wakened in man, which cannot be satisfied by the old minimum 
sustenance of innate drives. Even so, Durkheim admitted, 
man's appetites are limited (see also Part I, Book Three). 
For beyond this indispensable minimum--which satisfies 
the need on the instinctive level--reflection, more a­
lert, glimpses better conditions which appear as desir­
able ends and which invite activity. Yet it is clear 
that appetites of this kind sooner or later meet a boun­
dary they cannot overstep (Soc:24l). 
But socially and culturally generated desires face no such 
inherent biological limitations. That which is generated ~ 
society can only be constrained and redirected ~ society. 
Certainly Durkheim would have spared us much trouble had he 
made this central fact clearer, instead of portraying the 
source of insatiable desires as the organic ego. For if so­
ciety is the ultimate source of values which encourage abso­
lute individualism and insatiable desires, then Durkheim's 
dark doctrine of man as homo duplex falls into the back­
ground. Our prime sociological task here would then be to 
discover the different ways in which historical types of so­
cieties energized, expressed, or repressed the limitless 
possibilities of human culture. The way would then be open­
ed to the second schema. 
But how to fix the quantity of well-being, comfort, 
luxury, that a human being ought to possess. Nothing 
is found either in the organic or psychological con­
stitution of manlWhICh sets a lImit to such need~ 
The functioning of an individual life-requ1res only 
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that he halt here rather than there, that he satisfy 
himself at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that 
such needs have continued to develop in the course of 
history, and have found increasingly complete satisfac­
tion, and nevertheless the average state of health has 
improved, and average happiness has not diminished. But 
as there is nothing within an individual which con- --­
strains these appetites, they must surely be contained 
by some force exterior to him, or else theY-would become 
Insa'tIable--that is, morbicr:-Either, knOWIng no limits, 
they become a source of torment for man, irritating and 
plaguing him in a pursuit without possible end, or there 
must be, outside the individual, some power capable of 
stopping them, disciplining them, fixing a limit that na­
ture does not * (Soc:24l). 
All of this Durkheim laid against Saint-SimonIs apo­
theosis of industrial economy. Saint-Simon did not seem to 
have understood, argued Durkheim, that by unleashing and 
sanctifying these sensual appetites, he actually would have 
fed the fires of "moral anarchy." His remedy would have only 
aggravated the evil! 
This is what seems to have escaped Saint-Simon. To him 
it appears that the way to realize social peace is to 
free economic appetites of all restraint, on the one 
hand, and on the other to satisfy them by fulfilling 
them. But such an undertaking is contradictory. For 
such appetites cannot be appeased unless they are lim­
ited, and they cannot be limited except by something 
other than themselves. They cannot be subordinated to 
something which surpasses them, and it is only on this 
condition that they are capable of being really satis­
fied (Soc:24l-2). 
Speaking to our ideal of affluence for all, our highest e­
conomic and democratic dream, Durkheim suggested that such 
an ideal is an illusory and self-deceptive dream. For what 
is the final standard of affluence? When shall we have 
reached utopia? When is enough enough? Since these desires 
are socially and culturally generated, and since society is 
inevitably structured in some sort of hierarchy, the pheno­
mena of rising expectations, coupled with the sense of rela­
tive deprivation, creates a strong sociological pressure to­
ward constant inflation. Durkheim asked us to: 
Picture the most productive organization possible and 
a distribution of wealth which assures abundance to 
even the humblest--perhaps such a transformation, at 
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the very moment it was constituted, would produce an 
instant of gratification. But this gratification could 
only be temporary. For desires, though calmed for an in­
stant, will quickly acquire new exigencies. Unless it is 
admitted that each individual is equally compensated ... 
there will always be some workers who will receive more 
and others less. So it is inevitable that at the end of 
a short time, the latter find their share meager compar­
ed with what goes to the others, and as a result new de­
mands arise, for all levels of the social scale. And be­
sides, even apart from any feeling of envy, excited de­
sires will tend naturally to keep outrunning their goals, 
for the very reason that there will be nothing before 
them which stops them. And they will call all the more 
imperiously for a new satisfaction, since those already 
secured will have given them more strength and vitality. 
This is why those at the very top of the hierarchy, who 
consequently would have nothing above them to stimulate 
their ambition, could nevertheless not be held at the 
same point they had reached, but would continue to be 
plagued by the same restlessness that torments them to­
day (Soc:242). 
This "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville 
spoke (eg. see Nisbet, 1966, 1974), is the modern analogue of 
what medieval "physicians of the soul" had called acedia, or 
as Josef Pieper (1963) puts it, the "inability to acquiesce 
in one's own being." As a moral philosopher, Durkheim saw 
that rather than the root problem being the lack of affluence 
as the Utilitarians argued, or even the burden of structured 
inequality as Marxists and liberals like Merton (1938, see 
appendix) argued, in the last analysis the problem is one of 
moral legitimacy and of substantive rationality. The prior 
question is: to what end shall we direct our lives, our ac­
tions, our thoughts, our desires? To what purposes, to what 
end? These are the substantively rational questions that 
Durkheim raised, and that we fail tOfanswer in our daily mod­
ern anomie strivings. 
What is needed if social order is to reign is that the 
mass of men be content with their lot. But what is need­
ed for them to be content is not that they have more or 
less but that they are convinced that they have no right 
to more • And for this, it is absolutely essential that 
there be an authority whose superiority they acknowledge 
and which tells them what is right. For an individual 
committed only to the pressure of his needs will never 
admit he has reached the extreme limits of his rightful 
•
 
• 
--656-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
portion. If he is not conscious of a force above him 
which he respects, which stops him and tells him with 
authority that the compensation due him is fulfilled, 
then inevitably he will expect as due him all that he 
demands. And since in our hypothesis, these needs are 
limitless, their exigency is necessarily without limit. 
For it to be otherwise, a moral power is required whose 
superiority he recognizes, and which cries out 'You 
must go no further' * (S:242-3). 
Durkheim here explicitly acknowledged his subterranean hypo­
thesis of man as homo duplex, but again he seems to have mix­
ed the two different possible sources of insatiability. For 
if i tiE socially and culturally generated, then it has already 
been legitimized, especially in modern society. Our attention 
should then shift to uncovering the specific rationales man­
dating and legitimizing insatiable strivings and aspirations; 
from focus on the absence to the presence of norms--in s~ort, 
from the first to the second schema. 
Now, clearly the moral power above the individual that 
cries out "You must go no further" in traditional societies 
is very strong indeed. In traditional societies, the social 
schedule of satisfaction counseled the precedence of collec­
tive over individual interests, and resignation to one's col­
lectively assigned lot, rather than insatiable individual 
striving. But, as noted earlier {see Part I of this Book) ,in 
modern society egoism and insatiability (whatever their 
source), are released from moral constraint and meaningful 
direction. 
This is precisely the roleplayed in ancient dociety 
by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint­
Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be con­
tent with their situation, at the same time that it 
taught them that the social order is providential,that 
it is God Himself who has determined each one's share, 
and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of another 
world where everything will be balanced, whose prospect 
made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped them from 
feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, precisely because 
it held economic functions under its domination, con­
tained and limited them. But even a priori, it is impos­
sible to suppose that for centuries it was in the nature 
of economic interests to be subordinated but that in the 
future the roles will becomes so completely reversed. 
This would be to admit that the nature of things could 
•
 
• 
--657-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
I 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
be completely transformed in the course of evolution. 
undoubtedly, one can be certain that this regulatory 
function can no longer be exercised today in the same 
manner or spirit as formerly. The industrial organ, 
more developed, more essential than before to the so­
cial organism, can no longer be contained within the 
same bounds, subjected to a position so subordinate. 
But it does not follow from it that it should be freed 
of all regulation, liberated from all checks (Soc:234). 
Durkheim then posed the historical problem created by the 
recession of traditional moral controls over the egoistic 
and insatiable desires of individuals in these terms: "What 
forces today play the moderating role of former times?" 
The problem is to know, under the present conditions 
of social life, what moderating functions are neces­
sary and what forces are capable of executing them. 
The past not only helps us to pose the problem--it 
also indicates the direction in which the solution 
should be sought. What, in fact, were the temporal 
and spiritual powers that for so long moderated indus­
trial activity? Collective forces •..• They had the 
characteristic that individuals acknowledged their su­
periority, bowed voluntarily before them, did not deny 
them the right to command. Normally, they were imposed 
not through material violence, but through their moral 
ascendancy. This is what accounted for the efficacy of 
their action. So today, as formerly, there are social 
forces, moral authorities which must exercise their 
regulating influence, and without which appetites be­
come deranged and economic order disorganized. And, in 
fact, from the moment that this indispensable curb does 
not come from the inherent nature of individuals, it 
can only come from society. Society alone has the ca­
pacity to constrain and only it can do so without per­
petually making use of physical constraint--because of 
the moral character in which it is clothed. In short, 
society, through the moral regulation it institutes and 
applies, plays, as far ~ superorganic ~ is concern­
ed, ~~ role that 1nstinct fills w1th respect to 
phys1cal eX1stence. It determines, and it rules what is 
left undetermined. The system of instTnets is the dis=­
crpIine of the organISm, just as moral discIPlIne rs­
the instIncITVe system ofSQ"Ciil life * (Soc: 24 3-4~ 
Moving from his classical notion of the "golden mean" 
(see also Book Three), Durkheim counterposed his philosophy 
of human finitude to Saint-Simonis apotheosis of amoral eco­
nomic ac tion • 
Now, it can be seen what, according to us, is Saint­

Simonis mistake. He described perfectly the present
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situation, and made a careful history of it. He showed: 
(I) that industry had been, up to the present, placed 
under subordination to powers which rose above it; (2) 
that these powers retrogressed irretrievably; (3)-that 
this situation was unhealthy and is the cause of the 
crisis from which we suffer .... But did Saint-Simon 
properly interpret it? Noting the progressive weakening 
of the old powers, he concluded that our modern uneasi­
ness is due to the fact that, not having disappeared, 
they still disturb industrial activity. It followed that 
their downfall had only to be hastened in order to as­
sure industry the supremacy it had a right to, and that 
industry should be organized without subordinating it to 
anything--as if such an organization were possible. In 
short, it seems to us that he was mistaken about what, 
in the present situation, is the cause of the uneasiness, 
and in having proposed as a remedy, an aggravation of 
the evil (Soc:244-5). 
Saint-Simon's basic error, argued Durkheim, was uncritically 
accepting that abstract=:"on "economic man," which leads us to 
presume that social and economic activity are identical. 
Durkheim rightly rejected this reduction of society to econo­
my, and thus reintroduced the key question of ends and legit­
imate goals, which the positivists' reduction of government 
to technical questions (the "administration of things, not 
men"), had obscured. One can only wish that Durkheim had been 
able to further free himself (see Book Three) from the econo­
mistic fallacy (see especially Karl Polanyi, 1944, 1968). 
We know that Saint-Simon's error consisted in wishing 
to construct a stable society on a purely economic 
foundation. As he began by postulating in principle 
that there are only industrial interests, he was obliged 
to grant that they could be balanced through skillful 
management, but without the intervention of any factor 
of a different nature. It was sufficient to organize so­
ciety in such a way that, by producing as much as possi­
ble, it could satisfy the various requirements as com­
pletely as possible. For it assumes that men's desires 
can be satisfied by a certain quantity of comfort, that 
in themselves they have a limit and are appeased once it 
is reached. But in reality all needs exceeding simple 
physical necessities are unIImited, for there is nothing 
within the organism that imposes a boundary. Therefore, 
in order for them not to be without end--that is, so 
that they are not forever unsatisfied--there must be for­
ces outside of the individual, in society, which hold 
them in check, and with authority acknowledged by all-­
indicate what is the proper standard. And in order to 
thus contain and regulate economic forces, forces of 
•
 
• 
--659-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
another nature are required. It is indispensable that 
there exist in society powers other than those deriving 
from industrial capacity. These are moral forces * 
(Soc:274-5) . 
Durkheim rightly noted that the reduction of society to a­
moral economic action also seemed to bother Saint-Simon him­
self, or to capture only part of his own sense of need for 
moral reform which he later expressed in his emphasis on re­
ligion. 
We saw that Saint-Simon, toward the end of his life, 
had become aware of the inadequacy of his system on this 
point, and had accentuated its religious character. The 
considerable development of religion in Bazard's system 
demonstrates that the School understood more and more 
the need to complete purely industrial organization by 
another which would rise above it. Actually, one of the 
functions of religion has always been to place a rein on 
economic appetites (Soc:275). 
In all of Saint-SimonIs doctrine, Durkheim exclaimed, 
"Where is the bridle that curbs passions" (Soc:276)? Durkheim 
explicitly rejected the notion that structural inequalities 
alone are at the basis of ~ contemporary crisis. What was 
needed, ratper than simple structural reform, is the "estab­
lishment of moral powers capable of disciplining individuals' 
(Soc: 279) .
 
... if it is admitted that the most essential thing is
 
to refuse all social sanction to hereditary inequali~
 
ties, that this should be the basis of social reorgani­

zation, then needs are unleashed which cannot be satis­

fied and new dissatisfactions created at the very moment
 
when everything was believed pacified (Soc:278). 
Therefore, Merton's (1938, 1949, 1957) anomie--which had 
seemed supported by Durkheim's argument concerning the for­
ced division of labor--can now be seen to have been rejected 
by Durkheim himself. For the problem of anomie is far deeper 
than structured inequality (see appendix). 
Speaking in terms that apply to Utilitarians, Marxists, 
socialists, and liberal reformers alike, Durkheim incisively 
recognized that each of these groups, no matter how violently 
they might seem opposed, are actually prisoners of the same 
historical premises. Rather than an epic struggle between the 
forces of light and the forces of darkness, today left, mid­
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dIe, and right are actually only warring bedfellows! 
When one starts with the maxim that there are none but 
economic interests, one is their prisoner and cannot 
rise above them. Bazard tried in vain to subject them 
to a dogma which dominates them. But this dogma merely 
exposes them in another tongue ...• When passions are 
overtly sanctioned, how can there be a question of lim­
iting them? If they are hallowed they should be permit­
ted to exist .... (Bazard) has strengthened industrial­
ism instead of subordinating it. Such a doctrine could 
only end in a mystical sensualism, in an apotheosis of 
comfort, in the sanction of excess * (Soc:279). 
Is it not ironic that Durkheim, who is mistakenly portrayed 
as a conservative by left (eg. L. Coser, 1960, John Horton, 
1964) and right (eg. Nisbet, 1965, 1974) alike, actually 
transcended the rhetorical frames of his opponents and de­
livered a more far reaching critique of the modern world 
than either? 
Alas, Durkheim didn't seem to have recognized the full 
implications of his mounting critique. His proposals for re­
form were largely structural and piecemeal. Had he reached 
full clarity and seen that anomie and egoisme ~ culturally 
sanctioned ~ various forms of the constitutive modern ethos 
(eg. the Protestant Ethos), and had he as great an eye for 
historical irony as Weber, he might have concluded that, in 
the modern world, our virtues become our vices! 
••. One will ask where, today, are the moral forces 
capable of establishing, making acceptable, and main­
taining the necessary discipline? •. Among the institu­
tions of the old regime there is one that Saint-Simon 
does not speak of but which perhaps, if transformed, 
could suit our present state. These are the profession­
al groupings or corporations. In all times they played 
the role of moderator, and moreover, if one takes into 
account the fact that they were suddently and violently 
destroyed, one has the right to ask whether this radi­
cal destruction was not one of the causes of the evil. 
In any event, the professional grouping could well fit 
all the conditions we have set. On the one hand, because 
it is industrial, it will not weigh down industry with 
too burdensome a yoke~ it is close enough to the inter­
ests it will have to regulate not to heav1ly repress 
them. In addition, like every group formed of individuals 
united by ties of interests, ideas, and feelings, it is 
capable of being a moral force over the members who com­
pose it. Let it be made a definite agency of society, 
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whereas it is now merely a private association. Transfer 
certain rights and duties to it which the State is less 
and less capable of exercising and assuring. Let it be 
the administrator of affairs, industries, arts, that the 
• 
State cannot manage through its remoteness from indus­
trial things. Grant it the power necessary to resolve 
certain conflicts, to apply the general laws of society 
according to the variety of labor, and gradually, through 
the influence it will exercise, through the rapprochement 
that it will produce in the work of all, it will acquire 
the moral authority which will permit it to play this 
role of restraint--without which there could be no econo­
mic stability (Soc:245-6). 
It almost seems as if Durkheim had not followed out the full
• ramifications of his own deepening critique, as if he stopped 
short, and seized upon an answer that much of his own pheno­
menological and sociocultural anatomies of anomie and egoisme 
had already set aside. In the following declaration, for in­
• stance, Durkheim lapsed back into the framework of his first 
schema. 
•
 
(This solution) declares, in the interest of both the
 
necessity of a curb from above which checks appetites,
 
and so sets a limit on the state of disarrangment, ex­

citement, frenzied agitation, which do not spring from 
social activity, and which even make it suffer ...• It 
is a question not of money or force~ it is a question 
of moral agents. What dominates it is not the state of 
our economy, but much more, the state of our morality
•
 
(Soc:246-7) .
 
Let us now turn to consider his concrete proposals for struc­
tural reform that would lead to the elimination or control 
of anomie and egoisme in the modern world. 
• 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
• DURKHEIM'S THERAPEUTIC FOR THE MODERN CRISIS OF ANOMIE AND
 
EGOISME: THE "MORAL MECHANICS" OF OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
 
•
 
The change in moral temperament ... bears witness to
 
a profound change in our social structure. To CUl'e one,
 
therefore, the other must be reformed (S:387).
 
•
 
Preface. How could Durkheim, although close to the second
 
schema that the twin forms of our modern crisis--anomie and
 
egoisme--were culturally sanctioned, have failed to break­

through to explicit recognition of this ironic twist? What 
held him back? Why did Durkheim persist in his first schema 
that anomie and egoisme were generated by the slow evolution­
•
 
ary release of egoistic and insatiable passions, only recent­

ly compounded by the twin revolutions of the modern era? Not
 
only logic but Western history before and after Durkheirn de­

monstrates the essential incompleteness of his first "theodi­

• 
cy" and his only explicit "therapeutic." As Durkheim correct-'
 
ly saw in his first implicit schema, the roots of our contem­
porary crisis run so deep--to the very constitutive logics, ~~
 
models, and world-images of Western civilization--that the
 
• 
"moral mechanics" -~f---occupational-groupsare impotent to 
stem the tide. One cannot hope to "mechanically" draw the 
ego out of its state of "moral isolation," especially not 
when our cultural models have sanctioned this extreme indivi­
• dualism which we see in anomie and egoisme in the first 
place! 
To the present day, our crisis has continued to deepen; 
and, if anything, it has been the Vietnam War and the pro­
• longed ~nvironmental and energy crises which have finally be­ \)"))gun to bring home, at least to Americans, Durkheim's wisdom 
of our essential finitude. Our "Faustian" and "Promethean" 
• 
• 
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aspirations shrink before this new limited horizon. In a cer­
tain fitting irony, just as the most ''Promethean'' nation (ex­
• cepting China, perhaps) of the modern world broke through 
the	 space barrier and landed men on the moon, so, too, did 
fixed horizons of many sorts spring to life on this lim­
_.~ " ...­
ited planet. 'As "Faustian" morality depends on unlimited hor­
• izons and infinite resources, so, too, the end of infinite 
horizons marks the end of an era in human culture. 
One might offer many possible answers to explain why 
Durkheim failed to breakthrough--for instance, his embedded­
• ness in the Franco-Laic Positivist Cultural Tradition, his 
ninetg~.!1!:J!.....cent:tI~y liberal republicanism, his own personali­
~'~""" -----_.-~. -.~_.. ,.,. 
ty, or various other core commitments. But such reasons lead, 
in turn, only back to reconsideration of certain key premises
• that held Durkheim back--for example, his basic causal or ex­
planatory model, his image of man as homo duplex, his mater­
ialist emphasis on social morphology and a naive faith in 
"moral_mechanics," his devotion to biological 
~ -. 
analogies, his 
• notion that micro-structural processes were the ultimate 
sources of moral life, his lack of a notion of cultural tra­
ditions on the civilizational level, and so on (see also 
Book One and Part I, Book Three). In any case, it is not un­
• common for men of great vision to become prisoners of the 
very premises which constitute the virtue of their particu­
lar perspective. "A way of seeing is also a way of not see­
ing'i wrote Kenneth Burke. In the end, of course, short of
• interrogating Durkheim himself, or at least watching over 
his shoulder as he worked, we shall never know the reason 
why. All we can now do is simply indicate how this road was 
seen, but never taken.
• Since in the succeeding section I shall systematically 
analyze key limitations in Durkheim's logic, model, and spe­
cific arguments (see Book Three), at this point I shall ad­
dress only his structural "therapeutic" for curing the tran­
• sitional crisis of modern "moral anarchy." In barest outline, 
Durkheim proposed a structural-social interactional remedy for 
•
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moral reform. Reconstituted "corporations" (guild-like occu­

pational groups), which would be close to worker and indus­

• trialist, to producer and consumer alike, would work to reg­

ulate economic conflict and social aspirations.
 
•
 
In place of the class struggle and economic crises which
 
were the symptoms of capitalism's inability to reconcile~
 
the needs of the individual and the prevailing social
 
order, Durkheim advocated a reformist syndicalism...•
 
•
 
Durkheim looked to the professional association rather
 
than to the state to provide ..•• economic organization .
 
... He looked to the professional associations to regu­

late wages and conditions of work, provide pensions, and
 
welfare services in diverse ways appropriate to the con­

ditions prevailing in each profession (Hayward, 1960:32).
 
Due to their beneficent interactional or micro-struc­

tural processes, these socio-economic organizations would be­

come part of the formal political life of the nation. As the

• base of a whole new network of publicly constituted secondary
 
or intermediate groups, they would replace territorial habi­

tation as the base of national representation. The state it­

self was incapable of exercising such moral reglementation,

• because it was too large, too distant. Hayward observed:
 
•
 
Durkheim appreciated that though in its capacity as the
 
defender of the rights and interests of all its citizens
 
from group tyrannies, the state effectively prevented
 
piecemeal despotisms, unless its power was counterbal­

anced, it too could become despotic .•.• This led him to
 
conclude in Prudhonian vein that the power of the state 
'should be limited by other collective forces, i.e. by 
secondary groups •.•. And it is out of the conflict of 
social forces that individual liberties are born 
(1960: 36, #45).
• The family, on the other hand, has become too weak. Raymond 
Aron sums up well here: 
• 
The state is no longer capable of exercising this moral \ 
function because it is too remote from individuals. The 
family, on the other hand, has become too narrow and has . 
lost its economic function; economic activity normally 
• 
proceeds outside of the family, the place of work is not 
identified with the place of residence. Therefore, 
neither state nor family can exercise the controlling 
influence over economic life; it is professional groups, 
reconstituted corporations, which will serve as inter­
mediaries between individuals and the state and which 
will be endowed with the social and moral authority to 
reestablish discipline, without which men give way to 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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the infinity of their desires * (l970:92). 
Thus, Durkheim's sociology of morality, politics, and 
social and cultural process meshed in his structural propo­
sals for the national political reconstruction of occupation­
al groups as the basis for moral reform. LaCapra provides the 
following summary of Durkheim's position: 
Essential to his vision of modern social normality was 
a triangular model of the state, the corporative group, \ 
and the individual, existing in a dialectical balance. 
Durkheim's conception of the situation and needs of mod­
ern society was based upon an analysis of historical e­
volution in Western Europe. Corporative groups such as 
the commune, the guild, and the estate had become in­
creasingly restrictive at the same time that their im­
portance declined with the growing power of the central 
state. At first, the conflict between the state and the 
corporative groups had a positive function. For it was 
the concrete historical basis of individual rights. 'It \ 
is from the conflict of social ~ that individual 
liberties are born.' But the extreme development of this ~r,~A~J 
proce~sing state power and ~nd1viaual ema~ation y/ 
from 1ncreasingly opQfessive secondary groups tfireatened 
to have negative consequences. It unintentionally culmin­
ated in a social situation in which the State, as the 
sole significant organized power, confronted the atomized 
individual. This confrontation 'had long since been pre­
pared by progressive centralization under the ancien re­
gime.' But 'the great change which the French RevolutIOn 
accomplished was to carry this levelling process to a 
point hitherto unknown.' Without the counter-vailing pro­
tection of secondary groups, the individual liberties 
first won through the intervention of the State became 
both of dubious existential value and of uncertain dura­
tion in the face of state power. 'Thus, by a series of 
endless oscillations, we pass alternately from authori­
tarian regulation, which excessive rigidity makes impo­
tent, to systematic abstention which cannot last because 
of the anarchy which it provokes.' Simultaneously, the 
largely uncontrolled development of the economy gave 
rise to classes whose relations were not based upon con­
sensually accepted norms but upon unequal market power. 
The problem of modern society, according to Durkheim, 
was to create consensual institutions which viably re­
alized the democratic values brought to the forefront 
of consciousness during the classical revolutions of 
the past (l972:2ll-l2). 
The professional or corporative group was the crux of ~,.,'., 
Durkheim's idea of a possible means of creating a tense
 
balance amonq the elements of social justice and health
 
in modern society •... Through functional decentraliza­
•
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tion, the corporative group could simultaneously pro­
vide a counter-weight to the central state and a social 
context in which communitas and a more cumulative arti­
culation of social and cultural experience might deepen. 
Acting in accordance with the fundamental economic and 
occupational functions of modern society, the corpora­
tive group would also have a role in the inheritance of 
wealth, education, economic regulation, welfare servi­
ces, political representation and artistic creation. 
Most important, it would be a center of genuine communal 
commitment--a real existential group--withmoral power 
to restrain anomie and transcend egoism. In the corpora­
tive group, people would come to know one another and 
enjoy what might be called a supplementary kinship 
(1972:216-17) . 
Now, Durkheim's recipes for resolving the modern crisis 
of anomie and egoisme evolved over many years. Apart from his 
early review work (see Giddens, 1970), Giddens (197lc:488) 
observes that " •.. the first edition of The Division of Labor 
already contained a fragmentary analysis of the role of occu­
pat~onal association" (eg. DL:227). Thereafter, his develop-'­
----.­
ing proposals are to be found, in sequence, in his lectures 
"Physique des moeurs et du droit," translated in 1957 as 
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, which were first de­
livered in 1896, and repeated at intervals up to 1912 (see 
Lukes, 1973), but reached definitive form in 1898; his con­
clusion to Suicide published in 1897; and his famous preface 
on occupational groups to the second edition of The Division 
of Labor in 1902. Other works may contain relevant passages, 
but these shall act as prime references for our present 
study. 
Hence, Durkheim's thought concerning possible struc­
tural reforms for resolving our modern crisis of anomie and 
egoisme crowded around a decade (roughly 1892-1902) in the 
middle of his intellectual career. It is striking to note 
that in the fifteen years after his famous preface in 1902, 
Durkheim gave little attention to his earlier reform propos­
als. As his interest in the evolving structures of knowledge, 
morality, and religion deepened, his concern--perhaps because 
of some subterranean effects of his insights into the second 
schema of suicide--became deeper and shifted. As several ob­
•
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servers have noted, Durkheim became increasingly pessimistic 
over our ability to resolve the modern crisis, as did his 
great contemporar~Max Weber. In 1912, in !he Elementary 
Forms of the Religious Life, Durkheim seerredto assuage his 
melancholy by relying on historical inevitability (in­
cidentally, it was this passage that led Parsons to mistaken­
ly conclude that Durkheim entertained a cyclical vision of 
historical process; see also Bellah, 1973, for great emphasis 
on Durkheim's hopes for moral reconstruction through collec­
tive effervescence) . 
... We are going through a state of transition and moral 
mediocrity .•.. The old gods are growing old or already 
dead, and others are not yet born. This is what rendered 
vain the attempts of Comte with the old historical sou­
venirs artificially revived: it is life itself, and not 
a dead past which can produce a living cult. But this 
state of incertitude and confused agitation cannot last 
forever. A day will come when our societies will know 
again those hours of creative effervescence, in the 
course of which new ideas arise and new formula are found 
which serve for a whole as a guide to humanity; and when 
these hours shall have been passed through once, men will 
spontaneously feel the need of reliving them from time to 
time in thought, that is to say, of keeping alive their 
memory by means of celebrations which regularly reproduce 
their fruits (EF:475). 
As they both grappled separately at ever-deeper and 
wider levels, trying to uncover the world-historical roots of 
our contemporary crisis, perhaps both Durkheim and Weber came 
to see our predicament in terms of an ironic double-bind-­
namely, that the very elements which make us different in 
cultural-historical terms may also be the prime cause of our 
contemporary malaise. I do not think it over-stepping the 
evidential bounds to speculate, even strongly suggest, that 
toward the end of their lives both Weber (see, for example, 
Mitzman, 1969) and Durkheim came to see the essential truth 
of that old and wise aphorism: "Virtues, pushed to extreme, 
become vices. II 
Let us now briefly explore Durkheim's concrete propos­
als for practical reform--the reconstitution of occupational 
groups in national economic, political, and social life. We 
•
 
--------
• 
--668-­
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
shall begin with the reiteration of his thesis concerning 
the spontaneous creation of morality through social interac­
tion. 
A. "Moral Mechanics" and Group Life 
Since Durkheim's proposals for practical reform presum­
ed that moral regulation was spontaneously generated through 
social interaction, let us first take another look at Durk­
heim's basic premises in this regard (see also Book One). The 
theory of small-group processes that Durkheim neglected to 
spell out in the conclusion to Suicide, or in the second edi­
tion preface to The Division of Labor, can be found briefly 
stated in his lectures translated as Professional Ethics and 
Civic Morals. It is a "law of moral mechanics," Durkheim ar­
gued, that putting individuals into close and sustained con­
tact inevitably generates moral reglementation. Indeed, to 
Durkheim, society itself is a new level of association that 
generates new products--collective representations and indi­
vidual conscience and consciousness. 
Man is only man because he lives in society. Take away ~ 
from man all that has a social origin and nothing is ~ 
left but an animal .••• It is society that has raised 
him to this level above physical nature: it has achieved 
this result because association, by grouping the indivi­
dual psychic forces, intensifies them. It carries them 
to a degree of energy and productive capacity immeasur­
ably greater than they could achieve if they remained 
isolated one from the other. Thus, a psychic life of a 
new kind breaks away which is richer by far and more 
varied than one played out in the single individual a­
lone .•.. The life thus freed pervades the individual 
who shares in it, and so transforms him. It is precise­
ly because the group is a moral force greater to this 
extent than its parts, that it tends of necessity to 
subordinate them to itself .... Here is a law of moral 
mechanics * (PECM:60). 
In short, given a long interactional sequence (see Book One), 
in the end the new life created is the source of legitimate 
moral authority that orients, regulates, and guides indivi­
dual thought and action. In a sense, of course, Durkheim was 
correct, for intense and repeated social interaction does 
tend to create an ethos--the "T groups," "encounter," and 
•
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"marathon" sessions so popular in the late 1960's and early 
1970's testifies to this generic fact. And certainly, cultur­
al models at least partially reflect group structure. Yet, 
the main question here is whether or not Durkheim's basic 
model is complete, and exhaus~all other major factors and 
sequences; especially whether the "law of moral mechanics II is 
adequate to resolve the mounting crisis of anomie and egoisma 
It is interesting that Durkheim started these lectures 
by reemphasizing the importance of the link between social 
morphological or micro-interactional processes, and collec­
tively representational (both normative and cognitive) sym­
bolic processes. 
In general, all things being equal, the greater the 
strength of group structure, the more numerous are the 
moral rules appropriate to it, and the greater the au­
thority tRey have over their members. For the more 
closely t e group C01ieres, the closer and more---rrequent 
the contact of the individuals, and, the more frequent 
and intimate~hesecontacts and the more exchange there 
is of ideas and sentiments, the more does a public opin­
IOnspread to cover ~ greater num""""b"er of thTngs. ThiS"TS 
precisel~ because a greater number of things is placed 
at the dl.sposal of all * (PEC~1: 7) • 
Durkheim asks us to picture, on the contrary, a structural 
situation in which there is no direct and symbolic interac­
tion; that is, where moral rules have no material or social 
morphological link. 
Imagine, on the other hand, a population scattered over 
a vast area, without the different elements being able 
to communicate easily; each man would live for himself 
alone, and pUblic opinion would develop only in rare 
cases entailing a laborious calling together of these 
scattered sections. But when the group is strong, its 
authority communicates itself to the moral discipline 
it establishes, and thus, it follows, is respected to 
the same degree. On the other hand, a society lacking 
in stability, whose discipline is easy to escape and 
whose existence is not always felt, can communicate 
only feeble influence to the precepts it lays down .... 
(PECM: 7) • 
A system of morals is always the affair of a group, and 
can operate only if this group protects them by its au­
thority. It is made up of rules which govern individuals, 
which compels them to act in such and such a way and 
which imposes limits to their inclinations, and forbids 
•
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them to go beyond. Now there is only one power--moral, 
and hence common to all--which stands above the indivi­
dual and which can legitimately make laws for him, and 
that is collective power. To the extent the individual 
is left to his own devices, and freed from all social 
constraint, he is unfettered too by all moral con­
straint (PEC~:6-7). 
Underneath Durkheim's notion of the "law of moral me­
chanics" there lies hidden, of course, his doctrine of man 
as homo duplex, and its portrayal of the pre-socialized in­
dividual as inherently recalcitrant to moral reglementation. 
There is no form of social activity which can do without 
the appropriate moral discipline ••.• The interests of 
the individual are not those of the group he belongs to 
and indeed there is often a real antagonism between the 
one and the other. These social interests that the in­
dividual has to take into account are only dimly per­
ceived by him: sometimes he fails to perceive them at 
all, because they are exterior to himself and because 
they are the interests of something that is not himself 
He is not consistently aware of them, as he is of all 
that concerns and interests himself. It seems, then, 
that there should be some system which brings them to 
mind, which obliges him to respect them, and this sys­
tem can be no other than a moral discipline. For all 
discipline of this kind is a code or rules that lays 
down for the individual what he shoulddo so as not to 
damage collective interests and so as not to disorgan­
ize the society of which he forms a part. If he allows 
himself to follow his bent, there would be no reason 
why he should not make his way--regardless of everyone 
in his path (PECM:14). 
Without direct social interaction, there can be no moral 
discipline. Without moral reglementation, the pre-social ego 
is left prey to anomie and egoisme. 
It is this discipline that curbs him, that marks the 
boundaries that tells him what his relations with his 
associates should be, where illicit encroachments be­
gin, and what he must pay in current dues towards main­
tenance of the community. Since the precise function 
of this discipline is to confront the individual with 
aims that are not his own, that are beyond his grasp 
and exterior to him, the discipline seems to him--and 
in some ways is so in reality--as something exterior 
to himself and also dominating him. It is this tran~ 
scendent nature of morals that finds expression in pop­
ular concepts when we find them turning the fundamental 
principles of ethics into a law deriving from a divine 
source. And the bigger the social group becomes, the 
more this making of rules becomes necessary. For, when 
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the group is small, the individual and the society are 
not far apart; the whole is barely distinguishable from 
the part, and each individual can therefore discern the 
interests of the whole to those of each one. But as the 
society expands, so does the difference become more mark­
ed. The individual can take in no more than a small 
stretch of the social horizon; thus, if the rules do not 
prescribe what he should so to make his actions conform 
to collective aims, it is inevitable that these aims will 
become anti-social (PECM:14-l5). 
A few brief reflections seem warranted here, especial­
ly in regard to Durkheim' s presumption, as Gouldner has noted, 
"that patterns of social interaction form the basis upon 
which moral beliefs spontaneously develop" (1958:26). Among 
other things, it is this continuing micro-social or interac­
tional foci that repeatedly led Durkhemastray. Contrary to 
Marks (1974, 1976), had Durkheim moved beyond this narrow in­
sistence that social interaction is the ultimate source of 
cultural phenomena (see McCloskey, 1976a), he might have also 
broken through explicitly and systematically to the second 
schema. Certainly, his developing interest in civilizational 
processes (see Chapter Seven, Book One), could have led to a 
very different heuristic for interpreting the origin and de­
velopment of anomie. Had he begun to systematically anchor 
his "theodicies" and "therapeutics" on the cultural-histori­
cal level, Durkheim might have explicitly broken through to 
the second schema, and left us with a different, and perhaps 
more profound, heritage. 
B. "Moral Particularism" and Occupational Groups 
Durkheim next observed that, in every society, there 
appear two sets of moralities (see also Wallwork, 1972:84-5). 
First, there are general rules pertaining to the whole so­
ciety--the common or "collective conscience." Then, second, 
there are moral rules specific to each group. 
There are as many forms of morals as there are different 
callings •••• These different forms of morals apply to 
entirely different groups of individuals. These differ­
ences may even go so far as to present a clear contrast . 
••• We find within every society a plurality of morals 
that operate on parallel lines (PE~M:5). 
•
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As always, Durkheim saw moral particularism in evolutionary 
terms; thus, not only is it mistaken to accuse him of over­
emphasizing normative consensus and ignoring normative con­
flict, but also (far from abstracting norms ala Parsons) 
Durkheim always historically grounded values. 
Now, this "moral particularism" of increasingly spe­
cialized occupational groups constantly appearing in the pro­
gressive division of social labor poses a complex problem re­
garding the dual sets of relations between these multiple 
moral realities--this "moral polymorphism" and the central 
"social conscience" on the other. For Durkheim observed that 
the generalized public morality regards these specialized 
moral dilemmas and therapeutic recipes for resolving doubt 
with great unconcern. 
The distinctive features of this kind of moral and what 
differentiates it from other branches of ethics is the 
sort of unconcern with which the public consciousness 
regards it. There are no moral rules whose infringement 
... is looked on with so much indulgence by public o­
pinion. The transgressions which have only to do with 
the practice of the profession come in merely for a rath­
er vague censure outside the strictly professional field. 
They count as venial •••• They cannot be of deep concern 
to the common consciousness precisely because they are 
not common to all members of the society and because ... 
they are outside the common consciousness. It is exactly 
because they govern functions not performed by everyone, 
that not everyone is able to have a sense of what these 
functions are, of what they ought to be, or of what spe­
cial relations should exist between the individuals con­
cerned with applying them. All this escapes public opin­
ion in a greater or lesser degree or is at least partly 
outside its immediate sphere of action. This is why pub­
lic sentiment is only mildly shocked by transgressions 
of this kind. This sentiment is stirred only by trans­
gressions so grave that they are likely to have wide 
general repurcussions (PECM:5-6). 
Specific situations and specific moralities, general socie­
tal concerns and a societal "common consciousness"--these 
are the two poles of the moral life of complex societies 
(see also C.P. Wolff, 1970). The main problem Durkheim set 
himself in this regard, then, was how to first regulate pre­
viously deregulated spheres of modern life such as economic 
activity, and second, how to link or integrate all these 
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distinct special group moralities and needs with the "common 
conscience." He tried to resolve these conflicts with his 
proposal for national political enfranchisement of occupa­
tional associations • 
••• Whilst common morality has the mass of society as 
its sole substratum and only organ, the organs of pro­
fessional ethics are manifold. There are as many of these 
as there are professions: each of these organs--in rela­
tion to one another as well as in relation to society as 
a whole--enjoys a comparative autonomy, since each is 
alone competent to deal with the relations it is appoint­
ed to regulate •••• We see in it a real decentralization 
of moral life. Whilst public opinion, which lies at the 
base of the common morality, is diffused throughout so­
ciety, without our being able to say exactly that it lies 
in one place rather than another, the ethics of each pro­
fession are localized within a limited region. Thus, cen­
ters of a moral life are formed which, although bound up 
together, are distinct, and the differentiation in func­
tion amounts to a kind of moral polymorphism (PECM:7). 
Hence, each occupational situation demands its own spe­
cial rules for regulating desire and conflict: if no regle­
mentations emerge, it is because there is no sustained pat­
tern of social interaction. Further, if no sustained inter­
action regulated by norms emerge, the insatiable desires of 
the pre-social ego are bound to be released. 
It is not possible for professional ethics to escape 
the fundamental condition of any system of morals. 
Since society as a whole feels no concern in profession­
al ethics, it is imperative that there be special groups 
in society within which these morals may be evolved, and 
whose business it is to see that they be observed. Such 
groups are and can only be formed by bringing together 
individuals of the same profession or professional 
groups •••• It can be said that professional ethics will 
be the more developed, and the more advanced in their . 
operations, the greater the stability and the better the 
organization of the professional groups themselves 
(PECM:7,8). 
Now, there is one arena of social life that has devel­
oped so explosively, thrown off all traditional constraints, 
and rejected all new attempts to regulate its life as the 
very principle of its existence, that the lack of moral reg­
ulation may be truly called anomic. And, of course, this a­
nomic area is the economic and industrial arena. 
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c. Economic Deregulation as Anomic Norm 
As we have already seen, Durkheim noted how modern in­
dustrial and economic life has become progressively freed 
from its traditional embeddedness in kinship, religious, and 
political controls (see also K. Polanvi, 1968). In Durkheim's 
day (prior to the advent of the welfare state), lack of regu­
lation of economic action--between producer and consumer, 
worker and entrepeneur--had, of course, crucial societal con­
sequences . 
... There is a whole category of functions that do not 
satisfy this condition [of moral life] in any way: these 
are the economic functions, both industry and trade .... 
There is no corporate body set above all members of a 
profession to maintain some kind of unity, to serve as 
the repository of traditions and common practices and 
see they are observed at need. There is no organ of 
this description, because it can only be the expression 
of a life common to the group, and the group has no life 
in common •.. at least, not in any sustained way .... 
Now, this lack of organization in the business profes­
sions has one consequence of the greatest moment: that 
is, that in this whole sphere of social life, no pro­
fessional ethics exist •••• Thus, there exists today a 
whole range of collective activities outside the sphere 
of morals and which is almost entirely removed from the 
moderating effects of obligations (PECM:9-l0). 
The curious thing about this disengagement of economy from 
polity and kinship, and the consequent release of infinite 
desires, is that it is ideologically sanctioned. Such anomie 
does not simply represent the breakdown¥moral controls over 
the ego; it cannot be represented simply as the result of 
social breakdown, because it has been repeatedly sanctioned 
by the most dynamic cultural traditions of the modern world. 
The Utilitarian and individualist economists, observed Durk­
heim, have sanctioned what he saw as amoral economic activi­
ty; moreover, this is true of classical economists and so­
cialist thinkers alike. 
Is this state of affairs a normal one? It has the sup­
port of famous doctrines. To start with, there is the 
classical economic theory according to which the free 
play of economic arrangements should adjust itself and 
reach stability automatically, without its being neces­
sary or even possible to submit it to any restraining 
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forces. This, in a sense, underlies most of the social­
ist doctrines. Socialist theory, in fact, like classical 
economic theory, holds that economic life is equipped to 
organize itself and to function in an orderly way and in 
harmony, without any moral authority intervening; this, 
however, depends on a radical change in the laws of pro­
perty, so that things cease to be in exclusive ownership 
of individuals or families and instead, are transferred 
to the hands of society. Once this were done, the State 
would do no more than keep accurate statistics of the 
wealth produced over given periods and distribute this 
wealth amongst the associate members according to an a­
greed formula. Now, both these theories do no more than 
raise a de facto sta~f affairs which is unhealthy, to 
the lever-of a de jure state ••.. It is not possible for­
a social function to exist withou~moral discipline.--­
Otherwise, nothing:remains but individual appetites, and 
since they are ~ nature boundless, and insatiable, i~ 
there is nothing to control them they will not be able 
to control themselves * (PECM:IO-II). 
This is a most revealing passage! Moreover, the main cause 
of the contemporary crisis of anom~ is precisely this public 
sanctioning of commercial and industrial action as the high­
est activity of society, along with the unprecedented expan­
sion of trade in the last hundred years or so. 
And it is precisely due to this fact that the crisis 
has arisen from which the European societies are now 
suffering. For two centuries economic life has taken 
on an expansion it never knew before. From being a se­
condary function, despised and left to inferior classes, 
it passed on to one of the first rank. We see the mili­
tary, governmental, and religious functions falling back 
more and more in the face of it. The scientific func­
tions are alone in a position to dispute its ground, 
and even science has hardly any prestige in the eyes of 
the present day, except in so far as it may serve what 
is materially useful, that is to say, serve •.• the 
business professions (PECM:IO-II). 
This unprecedented apotheosis of industrial and commer­
cial activity, freed from all previous moral discipline, 
means that anomie--or an anarchy of insatiable warring ego­
isms--dominates the day. Indeed, market capitalism is a kind 
of restrained civil war; legitimized extortion, a war of 
"each against all." However, the important fact to here note 
is that both the individual drive for infinite perfection and 
the sanctification of economic activity in the modern world 
can hardly be attributed to the egoism of human nature. For 
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it is precisely the peculiarly modern nature of economic ego­
ism and insatiability which needs to be explained, as Weber 
saw, and not simply explained away. 
A form of activity that promises to 
in society taken as a whole cannot 
occupy such a 
be exempt from 
place 
all 
precise moral regulation, without a state of moral anar­
chy ensuing. The forces thus released can have no guid­
ance for their normal development, since there is noth­
ing to point out where a halt should be called. There 
is a clash when the moves of rivals conflict .... The 
stronger succeed in crushing the not so strong, or at 
any rate in reducing them to a state of subjection. But 
since this subjection is only a de facto condition sanc­
tioned by no kind of morals, it is accepted only under 
duress until the longed-for day of revenge. Peace treat­
ies signed in this fashion are always provisional forms 
of truce that do not mean peace to men's minds .... If 
we put forward this anarchic competition as an ideal we 
should adhere to ... then we should be confusing sick­
ness with a condition of good health .... A state of or­
der or peace amongst men cannot follow of itself from 
any entirely material causes, from any blind mechanism . 
... It is a moral task (PECM:II-12). 
The dream acted out by the Utilitarian moral philosophers 
was, of course, that the impersonal and universalistic self­
equilibrating market mechanism would itself act as the prime 
instrument of social control and moral discipline of the in­
dividual. For what turned out to be the "moral anarchy" of 
modern anomie was itself originally fashioned as a moral 
task £l these very same moralists! Indeed, the role of the 
Scottish Presbyterian moral philosophers, and the English 
non-conformists, in translating or secularizing Calvinistic 
ethics into social and political norms simply has not yet 
been fully understood; even Weber did little to help here. 
Even though he did not perceive these Weber ian-type 
anchors for anomie, Durkheim had keen insight into the ram­
ifications of basing a society on the atomistic and ration­
alizing logics of the Anglo Utilitarian moral philosophers. 
From yet another point of view, this amoral character 
of economic life amounts to a public danger. The func­
tions of this order today absorb the energies of the 
greater part of the nation. The lives of a host of in­
dividuals are passed on the industrial and commercial 
sphere. Hence, it follows that, as those in this milieu 
have only a faint impress on morality, the greater 
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part of their existence is passed divorced from any 
moral influence. How could such a state of affairs fail 
to be a source of demoralization? If a sense of duty is 
to take strong root in us, the very circumstances of our 
life must serve to keep it always active. There must be 
a group about us to call it to mind .... If we live amor­
ally for a good part of the day, how can we keep the 
springs of morality from going slack in us? We are not 
naturally inclined to put ourselves out or use self­
restraint: if we are not encouraged at every step to 
exercise the restraint upon which all morals depend, 
how should we get the habit of it? If we follow no rule 
except that of clear self-interest, in the occupations 
that take up nearly the whole of our time, how should 
we acquire a taste for any disinterestedness, or self­
lessness or sacrifice? Let us see, then, how the unleash­
ing of economic interests has been accompanied by a de­
basing of public morality. We find the manufacturer, the 
merchant, the workman, the employee, in carrying out his 
occupation, is aware of no influence set above him to 
check his egotism: he is subject to no moral discipline 
whatever, and so he flouts any discipline at all of this 
kind (PECM:12). 
Clearly, Durkheim seenedhere able to conceptualize the source 
of egoism and insatiability only in terms of the release of 
the pre-socialized individual or organic ego from traditional 
moral discipline. But the very sanctification of economic in­
dividualism by the leading spokesman of Western culture in 
the last two centuries demonstrates that such explanations 
are misleading, or at best, seriously incomplete. What is 
needed, rather, is a notion of a two-step process of break­
through and breakdown. First, the initial breakthrough, both 
normative and structural--for example, the Weberian notion 
of the "New Model Man," the visible saints of ascetic Protes­
tantism breaking forth from the medieval cloister to master 
self, society, and the world for God~s greater glory. It 
been . ­
could only have~some such unprecedented and maSS1ve and sus­
tained breakthrough to "inner-light, inner-worldly asceti­
cism and mysticism" that could have produced the modern world. 
Only after the secularization and institutionalization of 
various Protestant themes and sanctions do we find, as an un­
anticipated and extreme consequence, Durkheim's "isolated and 
amoral action" on a massive scale. The second phase of this 
dual process of breakthrough and release came with two dif­
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ferent sets of groups and their experiences: (a) either the 
running down or secularization of Protestant norms and sanc­
tions; (b) non-Protestant and non-Western groups whose way 
of life and prime cultural values were disrupted by the in­
fluence of this powerful new ethos, or among those who come 
to be permeated or unconsciously embrace aspects of the Pro­
testant Ethos. While Durkheim's critique of classical econo­
mic theory is insightful, his "theodicy" and "therapeutic" 
are limited to describing the ravages of the second process. 
Rightly noting that the new sanctification of the impersonal 
and atomizing market mechanism as the new nexus of "civil so­
ciety" has broken through old moral norms, he unfortunately 
concluded that the lack of sustained, direct social interac­
tion was the prime cause. On the contrary, in actual histori­
cal fact, the seeming lack of moral rules due to lack of 
group cohesion is itself only a result; it is, at most, a 
secondary and derived cause, not an original motive force . 
••. no professional activity can be without its own 
ethics ••.. It is the functions of the economic order 
alone that form an exception..•. This moral anarchy 
has been claimed, it is true, as a right of economic 
life. It is said that for normal usage there is no 
need of regulation. But from what source could it de­
rive such a privilege? How should this particular so­
cial function be exempt from a condition which is the 
most fundamental to any social structure? Clearly, if 
there has been self-delusion to this degree amongst-­
the classicar-economists, it is beCause the economic 
fUnctions were studied as If they were an end in them­
selves, withOUt considerrng-what further-reactIOn-rhey 
might have on the whole social order. Judged in thrs-­
way, proa-uctrve output seemed to be the sole primary 
aim in all industrial activity~.-.-In some ways, it 
migh~appear that output, to be intensive, had no need 
at all to be regulated; that, on the contrary, the best 
thing were to leave individual businesses and enterprIS­
es of self-Interest to excite and spur one-another in 
hotco~ition, instead of tryrng~curb and keep­
them within bounds. But production IS not aIr; ana-if 
I'iidUstry can on~y brIIi"g its output to this---pI"tch Ex.-­
keeping a chron1c state of warfare, and endless d1ssat­
isfaction amon~st the prOducers, there-is nothing to 
balance the eV11 it does * (PECM:IS-16)-.- -­
As a moral philosopher, Durkheim noted that Utilitarian 
"moralities of thought and logics of action" are not substan­
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
--679-­
tively rational; for they have no meaningful or achievable 
goals in sight. For as many have discovered, functional ra­
tionality and the logics of efficiency and infinite growth 
can be used to further any end whatsoever--it offers an in­
discriminate calculus for "progress." Trul~ the ideal of 
classical Utilitarian economic theory is goalless and thus, 
substantively irrational, for, as Weber (1958a,1968) showed, 
it is believed to be a valuable moral exercise in itself! 
Even from the strictly Utilitarian viewpoint, what is 
the purpose of heaping up riches if they do not serve 
to abate the desires of the greatest number, but, on 
the contrary, can only rouse their impatience for gain? 
That would be to lose-sight of the fact that econo~ 
fliIiCtions are notanend in tnemseJ.~ EUtonly a means 
to an end;tli"at they are one of the orga~ofSOcTal 
ITfe; and tIi'atsOCIaI lifeTsa:bO'Ve all a harmonious 
COiTi'iUunI'tY of endeavors, whenminds and wTlls come to­
gether to work for the same aim ..•. society has no­
justification if it does not bring a little peace to 
men--peace in their hearts and peace in their mutual 
intercourse. If, then, industry can be productive only 
by disturbing their peace and unleashing warfare, it 
is not worth the cost * (PECM:16). 
It is a strangely superficial notion--this view of the 
classical economists--to whom all collective discipline 
is a kind of tyrannous militarization. In reality, when 
it is normal and what it ought to be, it is something 
very different. It is at once the epitome and the gov­
erning condition of a whole life in common which in­
dividuals have no less at heart than their lives 
(PECM: 29) • 
Thinking that it was primarily the erosion of tradi­
tional moral discipline over the organic ego that released 
anarchic and insatiable desires, Durkheim presumed that if 
strong enough patterns of structural integration could be 
built, then the organic ego could once again be socialized. 
Demoralized and thus, desocialized, egos were, it must be 
remembered, the result of the modern transitional crisis. 
Hence, anomie and egoisme could be overcome if the anomic 
deregulation of economic action could be structurally remed­
ied. To this end, Durkheim turned to the task of reconstitu­
ting the professional group as the new basis of social, eco­
nomic, and political organization. 
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It is therefore extremely important that economic life 
should be regulated, should have its moral standards 
raised, so that the conflicts that disturb it have an 
end, and .further, that individuals should cease to live 
within this moral vacuum where the life-blood drains 
away even from individual morality. For in this order 
of social functions there is need for professional eth­
ics to be established, nearer the concrete, closer to 
the facts, with a wider scope than anything existing 
today. There should be rules telling each of the work­
ers his rights, and his duties, not vaguely in general 
terms, but in precise detail, having in view the most 
ordinary day-to-day occurence (PECM:12-l3). 
Since moral rules express the life of a group, Durkheim pre­
sumed that where group life was strong, moral rules would 
also be so; where social cohesion is low, normative direc­
tion and discipline also suffer. Therefore, since the eco­
nomic arena was so clearly anomic, the remedy was to restore 
stability to the ~corporations" (in the French sense). 
A system of ethics, however, is not to be improvised. 
It is the task of the very group to which they are to 
apply. When they fail, it is because the cohesion of 
the group is at fault, because as a group its existence 
is too shadowy and the rudimentary state of its ethics 
goes to show its lack of integration. Therefore, the 
true cure for the evil is to give the professional 
groups in the economic order a stability they do not 
now possess. Whilst the craft man or corporate body is 
nowadays only a collection of individuals who have no 
lasting ties with one another, it must become or return 
to being a well-defined and organized association. Any 
notion of this kind, however, comes up against histori­
cal prejudices that make it still repugnant to most, 
and on that account it is necessary to dispel them 
(PECM: 13) . 
Durkheim hoped that such professional "corporations" would 
become veritable IImoral milieux ll for anomic, demoralized 
egos. 
When we wish to see the guilds reorganized •.• it 
is not simply to have new codes superimposed on those 
existing; it is mainly so that economic activity should 
be permeated by ideas and needs other than individual 
ideas and needs, in fine, so that it should be social­
ized. It is, too, with the aim that the professions 
should become so many moral milieux and that these 
(comprising always the various organs of industrial 
and commercial life), should constantly foster the 
morality of the professions. As to the rules, although 
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necessary and inevitable, they are but the outward ex­
pression of these fundamental principles. It is not a 
matter of coordinating any changes outwardly and mechan­
• ically, but of bringing men's minds into mutual under­standing. Moreover, it is not on economic grounds that 
the guild or corporative system seems to me essential 
but for moral reasons. It is only through the corpora­
tive system that the moral standard of economic life 
can be raised (PECM:29).
• On the other hand, Durkheim made it clear that, for him 
at least, there could be no question of going back--it is 
neither possible nor desirable to restore the old repressive 
• 
other-worldly discipline of archaic religious culture. But 
clearly, Durkheim's view of the possible relations of reli­
gious attitudes toward economic activity was limited; for in­
stance, the ironic logic of Weber's thesis does not seem to 
cross the threshold of consciousness here.
• ..• Religion, which once partially assumed this role, 
• 
would now be unadapted to it. For the essential prin­
ciple of the only regulation to which it can subject 
economic life is contempl for riches. If religion ex­
horts its followers to be satisfied with their lot, it 
is because of the thought that our condition on earth 
• 
has nothing to do with salvation. If religion teaches 
us that our duty is to accept with docility our lot as 
circumstances order it, this is to attach us exclusive­
ly to other purposes, worthier of our efforts, and in 
general, religion recommends moderation in desires for 
the same reasons. But this passive resignation is incom­
• 
patible with the place which earthly interests have now 
assumed in collective existence. The discipline they 
need must not aim at relegating them to second place, 
and reducing them as far as possible, but at giving 
them an organization in harmony with their importance. 
The problem has increased in complexity, and while it 
• 
is no remedy to give appetites free rein, neither is it 
enough to suppress them in order to control them. Though 
the last defenders of the old economic theories are mis­
taken in thinking that regulation is not necessary today 
as it was yesterday, the apologi~ts of religion are wrong 
in believing that yesterday's regulation can be useful 
today. It is precisely its lack of present usefulness 
which causes the evil (5:383). 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--682-­
D. The Lacuna of Intermediate Groups in the Modern Crisis 
In Suicide, Durkheim briefly explored alternative reme­
dies for restoring social cohesion and resocializing the ano­
mic ego. In one of his typical "arguments by elimination," 
both modern political and familial organization are judged 
inadequate to his task, because they are either too large 
and remote (the State), or too small and closely-knit (the 
family). Too large and too small, the State and the family 
are not suited to the new and difficult task of generating 
"moral milieux" and reglementation for the industrialized 
masses. Durkheim here reiterated the basic problem facing us 
in egoistic suicide. 
Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is 
not sufficiently integrated at all points to keep all 
its membemunder control •... It is because society, 
weak and disturbed, lets too many persons escape too 
completely from its influence. Thus, the only remedy­
for the ill is to restore enough consistency to social 
groups for them to obtain a firmer grip on the indivi­
dual, and for him to feel himself bound to them. He 
must feel himself bound to them. He must feel himself 
more solidary with a collective existence which pre­
cedes him in time, which survives him, and which encom­
passes him at all points. If this occurs, he will no 
longer find the only aim of his conduct in himself, he 
will see that he is the instrument of a purpose greater 
than himself, he will see that he is not without signi­
ficance. Life will resume meaning in his eyes, because 
it will recover its natural aim and orientation (S:373). 
As always, Anthony Giddens sums up Durkheim's position well: 
In Durkheim's conception, the State must playa moral 
role as well as an economic role; and the alleviation 
of the malaise of the modern world must be sought in 
measures which are in general moral rather than econo­
mic. The dominant position of the authority of religion 
in former times provided religious strata with a hori­
zon for their aspirations, counselling the poor to ac­
cept their lot and instructing the rich in their duty 
to care for the less privileged. While this order was 
repressive, containing human actions and potentialities 
within narrow bounds, it nevertheless gave a formal un­
ity to society. The characteristic problem facing the 
modern age is to reconcile the individual freedoms 
which have sprung from the maintenance of the moral con­
trol upon which the very existence of society depends 
(197Ia: 99) • 
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Now, what groups, Durkheim asked, are best suited to­
day to take on the task of lire impressing on man this salu­
tary sentiment of solidarity?" He first examined, but rejec­
ted, political society as too big and distant from everyday 
experience • 
... Our great modern states are too far removed from 
the individual to effect him uninterruptedly and with 
sufficient force. Whatever connection between our daily 
tasks and the whole of public life, it is too indirect 
for us to feel it keenly and constantly. Only when mat­
ters of serious import are at stake do we feel our de­
pendence on the body politic strongly (S:374) . 
•.. It remains true that the State itself has important 
functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose the sentiment 
of general utility and the need for organic equilibrium 
to the particularism of each corporation. But we know 
that its action can be useful only if a whole system of 
secondary organs exist to diversify their action. These 
secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384). 
Durkheim then considered the family, but concluded that its 
functions have been fundamentally altered by the change in 
the size or scale of modern organizations. 
Changes have occurred in the constitution of the family 
which no longer allow it to have the same preservative 
influence as formerly. While it once kept most of its 
members within its orbit from birth to death and formed 
a compact mass, indivisible and endowed with a quality 
of permanence, its duration is now brief. As soon as the 
children's first growth is over, they often leave to com­
plete their education away from home; moreover, it is 
almost the rule that as soon as they are adult they es­
tablish themselves away from their parents and the hearth 
is deserted. For most of the time, at present, the fami­
ly can be said to be reduced to the married couple alone, 
and we know that this union acts feebly against suicide. 
Consequently, since it plays a smaller role in life, it 
no longer suffices as an object for life. Not, certain­
ly, that we care less for our children; but that they 
are intertwined less closely and continuously with our 
existence and so this existence need some other basis 
for being. Since we have to live without them, we also 
have to attach our thoughts and acts to other objects 
(S:376). 
Indeed, not only is the family now unsuited to the new task 
of moral discipline on the societal level, but it is precise­
ly the breakdown of such intermediate organs of public life 
that has intensified the contemporary crisis of anomie and 
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egoisme. 
But it is especially the family as a collective being 
which this periodic dispersion reduces to non-entity. 
Formerly, domestic society was not just a number of in­
dividuals united by bonds of mutual affection; but the 
group itself, in its abstract and impersonal unity. It 
was the hereditary name together with all the memories 
it recalled, the family house, the ancestral field, the 
traditional situation and reputation, etc. All this is 
tending to disappear. A society momentarily dissolving, 
only to reform elsewhere but under wholly new conditions 
and with quite new elements, has not sufficient continu­
ity to acquire a personal aspect, a history of its own, 
to which its members may feel attachment. If men do not 
replace this age-old objective of their activity, as it 
little by little disappears from among them, a great 
void must inevitably appear in existence •.•. Once when 
each local environment was more or less closed to others 
by usages, traditions, the scarcity of communications, 
each generation remained in its place of origin, or at 
least could not move far from it. But as these barriers 
vanish, as these small environments are levelled and 
blended with one another, the individuals inevitably 
disperse in accordance with their ambitions and to fur­
ther their interests into the wider spaces now open to 
them. No scheme can therefore of~et this inevitable 
swarming of the bees and restore the indivisibility 
which was once the family's strength (5:377-78). 
Having set aside both political and domestic society 
as too large and too small, respectively, to cope with the 
problem of moral discipline of the anomic ego on a massive 
societal scale, Durkheim continued searching for a group of 
appropriate scale, closeness to economic life, and interac­
tional intensity. In short, he sought intermediate groups 
between the central State and the isolated and demoralized 
ego. "Is this evil incurable?" Durkheim asked: 
••• While religion, the family, and the nation are 
preservatives against egoistic suicide, the cause of 
this does not lie in the special sort of sentiments 
encouraged by each. Rather, they all owe this virtue 
to the general fact that they are societies, and they 
possess it only in so far as they are well-integrated 
societies (5:378). 
The essential problem here, then, was what type of intermed­
iate group shall be the most interactionally cohesive, and 
hence the most effective in constantly resocializing and 
moralizing egos. 
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.•• Nothing but a moral power can set a law for men~ 
but this must also be sufficiently associated with af­
fairs of this world to be able to estimate them at their 
value. The occupational group has just this two-fold 
character. Being a group, it sufficiently dominates in­
dividuals to set limits to their greed~ but sees too 
much of their life not to sympathize with their needs. 
Of course, it remains true that the State itself has 
important functions to fulfill. It alone can oppose 
the sentiment of general utility and the need for organ­
ic equilibrium to the particularism of each corporation. 
But we know that its action can be useful only if a 
whole system of secondary organs exist to diversify the 
action. These secondary organs must be encouraged (S:384). 
In his political sociology (see especially Professional 
Ethics and Civic Morals), Durkheim expounded his perception 
of the void created by the disappearance of traditional in­
termediary groups between state and family. Of course, the 
growth of the modern state and the modern economy are closely 
intertwined (see Karl Polanyi, 1944) on the one hand, and in­
versely related to the shrinkage of familial functions on the 
other. In Moral Education, Durkheim offered a brief summary 
of this development. 
•.. We are living under quite special conditions. In­
deed, with the exception of the school, there is no 
longer in this country any society intermediate between 
the family and the state--a society that is not merely 
artificial or superficial. All the groups of this kind, 
which at one time ranged from domestic society and poli­
tical society--provinces, communes, guilds--have been 
totally abolished or at least survive only in very at­
tenuated form. The provinces and the guild are only 
memories~ communal life is very impoverished and now 
holds a secondary place on our consciousness (ME:232). 
Durkheim further observed that it was the two-fold thrust of 
the French Revolution--the collectivist state-oriented drive 
on the one hand, and the individualist drive on the other-­
that actively worked to root out the traditional intermediate 
groups. In this historical process, the men of the Revolution 
only completed the work begun by the French monarchy. 
The causes of this situation are well-known. In order 
to achieve political and moral unity, the monarchy 
fought all forms of moral particularism1 it strove to 
reduce the autonomy of towns and provinces, to weaken 
their moral individuality so as to fuse them more easi­
ly and completely into the great collective personality 
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of France. In this regard, the Revolution continued and 
completed the work of the monarchy. All groupings that 
were opposed to this great movement of national consol­
idation--which was the essence of the revolutionary 
movement--anything that was an obstacle to the unity and 
indivisibility of the Republic was broken. Moreover, 
the spirit that animated the men of the Revolution became 
quite hostile toward intermediate groupings (ME:232-3). 
Surely Rousseau expressed both the collectivist and indivi­
dualist antipathy toward traditional intermediary groupings 
like parish, guild, commune, etc. In other words, what Durk­
heim's linkage of intermediary groups in European societies 
showed was that the old anchors of social life in which both 
individual personality and collective norm were simultaneous­
ly embedded needed to be reconstituted on the national level. 
Here, Durkheim always held in the back of his mInd the speci­
fic historical situation in the France he knew so well--name­
ly, the disappearance of local intermediate groups as viable 
factors in social organization. 
Now this state of affairs constitutes a serious crisis. 
For morality to have a sound basis, the citizen must 
have an inclination toward collective life. It is only 
on this condition that he can become attached ••• to 
collective aims that are moral aims par excellence. 
This does not happen automatically; above all, this.in­
clination toward collective life can only become strong 
enough to shape behavior by the most continuous prac­
tice. To appreciate social life to the point where one 
cannot do without it, one must have developed the habit 
of acting and thinking in common •••• If, on the con­
trary, we are used only infrequently to acting like so­
cial beings, it is impossible to be very interested in 
an existence to which we can adapt ourselves only im­
p~rfectly (ME:233). 
The remoteness of the central, bureaucratic State, 
the lack of intermediate groups, the smallness of the fami­
ly, all these factors and more converged toward the same end 
--namely, the modern type of individualism, leaving us "in­
clined to a more suspicious isolation," "to acting like 
lone wolves." 
If, then, with the exception of the family, there is 
no collective life in which we participate, if in all 
the forms of human activity--scientific, artistic, pro­
fessional, and so on, in other words, all that consti­
tutes the core of our existence--we are in the habit of 
•
 
• 
• 
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acting like lone wolves, our social temperament has only 
rare opportunities to strengthen and develop itself. 
Consequently, we are inevitably inclined to a more or 
less suspicious isolation. Indeed, the weakness of the 
spirit of association is one of the-characteristICs-of 
our natIOnal temeerament. We have a marked inclination 
toward a fierce 1ndividualism, which makes the obliga­
tions of social life appear intolerable to us * 
(ME: 233-34) • 
It is worthy to note, once again, that when Durkheirn began to 
reflect upon the actual cultural-historical situation in Eu­
rope, inevitably he acknowledged that extreme individualism 
is itself normatively sanctioned in the modern world. Al­
though it accompanied, and even accelerated, the passing of 
traditional intermediate groups and moral order, £l no 
stretch of the historical imagination can this sanctification 
of individualism and economic growth be portrayed simply as 
the mechanical result of the breakdown of social integration 
and the release of the organic ego from traditional moral 
discipline. Once again, we see the structure of Durkheim's 
first schema beginning to breakdown from within, especially 
whenever he considered the actual cultural logics involved 
and historical evidence. 
Let us next turn to consider his first explicit propo­
sals which appeared in Suicide, concerning the virtues of na­
tional political enfranchisement of professional groups as 
the remedy for the contemporary crisis of anomie and egoisme. 
E.	 The "Moral Mechanics" of Professional Groups as the Na­
tional Solution to the Crisis of Anomie and Egoisme 
Having first put Durkheim's proposals for the reconsti­
tution of occupational groups in his own theoretical and his­
torical perspective, let us now briefly examine his first 
outline of reform proposals which appeared in Suicide. Durk­
heim began here by observing that because of the closeness of 
of the occupational group to the daily tasks of people, it is 
ideally suited as an intermediary group to take on the mas­
sive task of moral reconstruction. Because it is already a 
life lived in common, it also acts as a rea9y-made "moral 
•
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milieux. II 
Since it consists of individuals devoted to the same 
tasks, with solidary or even combined interests, no 
soil is better calculated to bear social ideas and sen­
timents. Identity of origin, culture, and occupation 
makes occupational activity the richest sort of material 
fora common life. Moreover, in the past the corporation 
has proved that it could form a collective personality, 
jealous, even excessively so, of its autonomy and its 
authority over its members; so there is no doubt of its 
capacity to be a moral environment for them. There is 
no reason for the corporative interest not acquiring in 
its worker's eyes the respectable character and suprem­
acy always possessed by social interests, as contrasted 
with private interest, in a w~ll-organized society. 
From another point of view, the occupational group has 
the three-fold advantage over all others that it is om­
nipresent, ubiquitous, and its control extends to the 
greatest part of life (5:378-79). 
In contrast to the great centralized, bureaucratic states of 
the modern era, Durkheim suggested, occupational group~ in­
fluence is continous and deep. The corporation is the inter­
mediate association most likely to be able to successfully 
draw "the ego out of his state of moral isolation." 
Its influence on individuals is not intermittent, like 
that of political society, but it is always in contact 
with them by the constant exercise of the function of 
which it is the organ and in which they collaborate. 
It follows the workers everywhere they go; which the 
family cannot. Wherever they are, they find it envelo­
ping them, recalling them to their duties, supporting 
them at need. Finally, since occupational life is almost 
the whole of life, corporative action makes itself felt 
in every detail of our occupations, which are thus given 
a collective orientation. Thus, the corporation has ev­
erything needed to give the individual a setting, to 
draw him out of his state of moral isolation, and faced 
by the actual-rnadequacy o~the other groups, it alone 
can fulfill this indispensable office * (5:379). 
Durkheim then proposed that, in order to have this 
beneficial influence, corporations must be given a regular 
and legitimate role in national political life. 
But for it to have this influence, it must be organized 
on wholly different bases from those of today. First, it 
is essential that it become a definite and recognized 
organ of our public life, instead of remaining a private 
group, legally permitted, but politically ignored. By 
this we mean that it must necessarily be made obliga­
tory, but it must be so constituted as to playa social 
• 
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role instead of expressing only various combinations 
of particular interests. This is not all. For the frame 
not to remain empty, all the germs of life of such a
• ,nature as to flourish there must find their place in it. For this grouping to remain no mere label, it must be 
'given definite functions, and there are some which it 
can fulfill better than any other agency (S:379). 
Durkheim was highly critical of the meaninglessness of 
• the frequent oscillations in French society during the past
 
few centuries in swinging back and forth between its two
 
modern poles--between authoritarian, collectivistic, bureau­

cratic "Caesaristic" regimes (eg. Napoleon), and the anarchy

• of "fierce French individualism." In effect, Durkheim asked:
 
how should economic life be regulated? Instead of a top-down
 
control of the anarchy of economic life, Durkheim character­

istically sought a via media between these two extremes, by

• opting for the regulation of economic life from within the
 
professional groups themselves.
 
At present, European societies have the alternative of
 
leaving occupational life unregulated, or of regulating
 
it through the State's mediation, since no other organ

• exists which can play this role of moderator. But the
 
•
 
State is too far removed from these complex manifesta­

tions to find the special form appropriate to each of
 
them. It is a cumbersome machine, made only for general
 
and clear-cut tasks. Its ever-uniform action cannot ad­

just itself to the infinite variety of special circum­

stances. It is therefore compressive and levelling in
 
•
 
its action. On the other hand, we feel how impossible
 
it is to leave unorganized all the life thus unattached.
 
In so doing, by an endless series of oscillations we al­

ternately pass from authoritarian regulation made impo­

tent by its excessive severity to systematic abstention
 
which cannot last forever because it breeds anarchy.
 
•
 
Whether the question is one of hours of work, or health
 
or wages, or social insurance and assistance, men of
 
good will constantly encounter the same difficulties.
 
As soon as they try to set up some rules, they prove
 
inapplicable to experience because they lack plausibil­

ity; or at least, they apply to the matter for which they
 
•
 
are made only by doing violence to it. The only way to
 
resolve this antinomy is set up a cluster of collective
 
forces outside the State, though subject to its action,
 
whose regulative influence can be exerted with greater
 
variety (S:379-80).
 
Now, these newly reconstituted "corporations" would be­
come an extended family, as it were, within the bosom of mod­
•
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ern economic life, for they would take on the old "carita­
tive" functions of the kinship community and the neighbor­
• hood. 
• 
To them falls the duty of presiding over companies of 
insurance, benevolent aid and pensions, the needs of 
which are felt by so many good minds but which we right­
ly hesitate to place in the hands of the State, already 
powerful and awkward; theirs it should be likewise to 
preside over the disputes constantly arising between 
• 
branches of the same occupation, to fix conditio~with 
which contracts must agree in order to be valid, in the 
name of the common interest to prevent the strong from 
exploiting the weak, etc ••.• Here, in broad outlines, 
is what corporations should be in order to render the 
services rightly expected of them. tihen their present 
• 
state is considered, of course, it is hard to conceive 
of their ever being elevated to the dignity of moral 
powers. Indeed, they are made up of individuals attach­
ed to one another by no bond, with only superficial and 
intermittent relations, even inclined to treat each other 
as rivals and enemies rather than as cooperators. But 
• 
when once they have so many things in common, when the 
relations between themselves and the group to which 
they belong are thus close and continuous, sentiments 
of solidarity as yet almost unknown will spring up, and 
the present cold moral temperature of the occupational 
environment, still so external to its members, would 
necessarily rise .••• Thus, the social fabric, the mesh­
es of which are so dangerously relaxed, would tighten 
and be strengthened throughout its entire extent 
(5:380-1).
• However, Durkheim observed, his proposals for the res­
toration of professional groups on the national level ran 
into long-standing prejudices, stemming especially from the 
Revolution's antipathy toward guilds and other traditional 
• intermediary groups. But Durkheim argued that the very uni­
versality of intermediate groups throughout Western history 
confirms their present necessity. Now, the key limitation 
to the old guilds was their predominantly urban base. D~rk­
• heim then proposed that this be overcome by making them an 
• 
integral part of the national political organization. The 
following passage sums up many of his theses here: 
This restoration, the need of which is universally 
felt, unfortunately has to contend with the bad name 
left in history by the corporation of theancienre­
gime. Yet is there not proof of their indispensabTIity 
in the fact that they have lasted not merely since the 
•
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the Middle Ages but since Greco-Roman antiquity, than 
of their uselessness in the fact of their recent abro­
gation? If occupational activity has been corporatively 
organized, except for a single century (the nineteenth), 
is it not probable that such organization is necessary, 
and that if it was no longer equal to its role a hun­
dred years ago, the remedy was to restore and improve, 
not radically to suppress it? Certainly, it had finally 
become an obstacle to the most urgent progress. The old, 
narrowly local corporation, closed to all outside influ­
ence, had become an anomaly in a morally and politically 
unified nation1 the excessive autonomy it enjoyed, making 
it a state within a state, could not be retained while 
the governmental organ, ramifying itself in all direc­
tions, was more and more subordinating all secondary or­
gans of society to itself. So the base on which the in­
stitutions rested had to be enlarged, and the institu­
tion itself reconnected with the whole national life. 
But if similar corporations of different localities had 
been connected with one another, instead of remaining 
isolated, so as to form a ••• single system, if all 
these systems had been subject to the general influence 
of the state, and thus kept in constant awareness of 
their solidarity, bureaucratic despotism and occupation­
al egoism would have been kept within proper limits •.•• 
But ~ overthrowing existing order without putting any­
thrng in its place, corporative e~oism has only been re­
placedlby-a-stil1 more corrosive 1ndiviaual-egDiS:m77.-.­
By dispersTng the only groups which could persistently 
unite individual wills, we ourselves have broken the 
appointed instrument of our moral reorganization * 
(5:3&1-2). 
Contrary to symbolic equations current among contemporary 
liberals, Durkheim rightly saw that suicide and our modern 
malaise does not spring wholly from the difficulties of con­
temporary existence. Rather, anomie and egoisme are often 
embraced1 this acedia or moral alienation is self-chosen. 
••• Just as suicide does not proceed from man's diffi­
culties in maintaining his existence, so the means of 
arresting its progress is not to make the struggle less 
difficult and life easier. If more suicides occur today 
than formerly, this is not because, to maintain ourselves 
we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our legit­
imate needs are less satisfied, but because we no longer 
know ~ limits of legitimate needs nor perceIve-the 
d1rect10n of our efforts. Competition is of course becom­
ing keener-every day, because the greater ease of com­
munication sets a constantly increasing number of com­
petitors at logger heads. On the other hand, a more per­
fected division of labor and its accompanying more com­
plex cooperation, by multiplying and infinitely varying 
•
 
• 
--692-­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
the occupations by which men can make themselves use­
ful to other men, multiplies the means of existence, 
and places them within reach of a greater variety of 
persons. The most inferior aptitudes may find a place 
here. At the same time, the more intense production re­
sUlting from this subtler cooperation, by increasing 
humanity's total resources, assures each worker an amp­
ler pay and so achieves a balance between the greater 
wear on vital strength and its recuperation. Indeed, 
it is certain that average comfort has increased on all 
levels of the social hierarchy, although not perhaps 
always in equal proportions. The maladjustment from 
which we suffer does not exist because the objectIVe 
causeslDf sufferrng-have increased in number or inten­
sity: i~bears witneSSlnot to greater economiC-poverty, 
but to an alarming povertY of morality * (5:386-7). 
Accordingly, Durkheim argued that these structural re­
forms to alleviate our "alarming poverty of morality" are not 
only urgent but, indeed, required by the whole sweep of our 
historical development. 
The latter's chief characteristic is to have swept clean­
ly away all the older social forms of organization. One 
after another, they have disappeared either through the 
slow usury of time, or through great disturbances, but 
without being replaced. Society was originally organi­
zed on the family basis: it was formed by the union of 
a number of smaller societies, clans, all of whose mem­
bers were or considered themselves kin. This organiza­
tion seems not to have remained long in a pure state. 
The family quite soon ceases to be a political division 
and becomes the center of private life. Territorial 
grouping then succeeds the old family groupings. Indi­
viduals occupying the same area gradually, then indepen­
dently of consanguinity, contract common ideas and cus­
toms which are not to the same extent those of their 
neighbors who live farther away. Thus, little aggrega­
tions come to exist with no other material foundations 
than neighborhood and its resultant relations: each one, 
however, with its own distinct physiognymy: we have the 
village, or better, the city-state and its dependent 
territory. They become confederated, combine under var­
ious forms and thus develop more complex societies 
which they enter however without sacrificing their per­
sonalities. They remain the elemental segments of which 
the whole society is merely an enlarged reproduction. 
But bit by bit, as these confederations become tighter, 
the territorial surroundings blend with one another and 
lose their former moral individuality. From one city or 
district to another, the differences decrease. The great 
change brought about by the French Revolution was pre­
cisely to carry this levelling to a point hitherto un­
known. Not that it improvised this change: the latter 
•
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had long since been prepared by the progressive central­
ization to which the ancient regime had advanced. But 
the legal suppression of the former provinces and the 
creation of new, purely artificial and nominal divisions 
definitely made it permanent. Since then the development 
of means of communications, by mixing the populations, 
has almost eliminated the last traces of the old dispen­
sation. And since what remained of occupational organi­
zation was violently destroyed at the same time, all se­
condary organs of social life were done away with 
(S:388-89) • 
Durkheim's general evolutionary thinking comes through clear­
ly here. After the Revolution, he observed, only the central 
State survived and grew stronger. Collective life was then 
caught between these two opposing forces--the central bureau­
cratic State and the anomic, dispersed ego. And these oppos­
ing poles of modern life "fed off each other" as it were. 
Only one.collective form survived the tempest: the State. 
By the nature of things this therefore tended to absorb 
all forms of activity which had a social character, and 
was henceforth confronted by nothing but an unstable 
flux of individuals. But then, by this very fact, it was 
compelled to assume functions for which it was unfitted, 
and which it has not been able to discharge satisfactor­
ily. It has often been said that the State is as intru­
sive as it is impotent. It makes a sickly attempt to ex­
tend itself over all sorts of things which do not belong 
to it, or which it grasps· only by doing them violence. 
Thence the expenditure of energy which the State is re­
proached, and which is truly out of proportion with the 
results obtained. On the other hand, individuals are no 
longer subjected to any other collective control but the 
State's, since it is the sole organized collectivity. 
Individuals are made aware of their society and of their 
dependence upon it only through the State. But since it 
is far from them, it can exert only a discontinuous in­
fluence over them~ which is why this feeling has neither 
the necessary constancy of strength. For most of their 
lives, nothing about them draws them out or-themselves 
and imposes restraint on them. Thus, they:1nevitably 
lapse back ~ egoism or anarcny:-Man cann~t become at­
tached to h1gher aims and submit to a rule 1f he sees 
nothing above him to which he belongs. TO free him from 
all social pressure is to abandon him to himself and de­
moralize him. These are really the two characteristics 
of our moral situation. While the State becomes inflated 
and hypertrophied in order to Obtain a firm enough grip 
uJ?on individuals, bUt without succeedTng, the latter, 
w1thout mutual relationships, tumble over one another 
like so many liquid molecules, encounterIng no central 
energy to retain, fix, and organize them * (S:389). 
•
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The vacuity of the modern organizing principle has seldom 
been portrayed in such compelling images. 
• As always, Durkheim's overriding concern was to find a 
workable, historically and philosophically grounded, via me­
dia, a way of reconciling the antimonies of modern collectiv­
ism and individualism. Whether he succeeded or whether the 
• forces of bureaucratic despotism and anomic egoism have prov­
ed too strong, the only true measure of Durkheim's greatness 
was the difficulty of the task he undertook. Indeed, I be­
lieve his historical argument concerning the disappearance
• of intermediary groups, the need to restore their role in 
economic life, and the portrait of the oscillations between 
the two opposing poles of modern life to be far more profound 
and compelling than his abstract, theoretical argument con­
• cerning the spontaneous "moral mechanics" of occupational 
groups. 
Many would agree with Durkheim that the scale of modern 
economic and political life has grown so large that decen­
• tralization is necessary. But Durkheim was careful to argue 
that the only useful kind of decentralization would be "one 
which would simultaneously produce a greater concentration 
of social energies." Hence, the theoretical model we explored
• in Book One always underlies Durkheim·s specific reforms. 
• 
• 
To remedy this evil, the restitution to local groups of 
something of their old autonomy is suggested. This is 
called decentralization. But the only useful decentral­
ization is one which would simultaneously produce a 
greater concentration of social energies. Without loos­
ening the bonds uniting each part of society with the 
State, moral powers must be created with an influence, 
which the State cannot have, over the multitude of in­
dividuals. Today, neither the commune, nor the depart­
ment nor the province has enough ascendancy over us to 
exert this influence, as we see in them conventional la­
• 
bels without meaning ••.• We may regret the past, but in 
vain. It is impossible to resuscitate a particularist 
spirit which no longer has any foundation •••. The only 
decentralization making possible this mUltiplication 
of centers of communal life without weakening unity is 
occupational decentralization. For, as each of these 
cadres would be the only focus of a special limited ac­
tivity, they would be inseparable from one another and 
the individual could form attachments without becoming 
•
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solidary with the whole. Social life can be divided, 
while retaining its unity, only if each of these divi­
sions represents a function •••• The corporation must 
become more than an assemblage of individuals who meet 
on election day without any common bond. It can fulfill 
its destined role only if, in place of being a creature 
of convention, it becomes a definite institution, a col­
lective personality, with its customs and traditions, 
its rights and duties, its unity. The great difficulty 
is not to decree that the representatives shall be se­
lected by occupation and what each occupations share 
shall be, but to make each corporation become a moral 
individuality. Otherwise, only another external and ar~ 
tificial subdivision will be added to the existing ones 
which we wish to supplant * (5:390-1). 
Characteristically (and this is what many have missed), 
beneath his model of "moral mechanics" and his proposals for 
structural and moral reform, lay Durkheim's image of man as 
homo duplex, and the organic ego as inherently egocentric 
and even insatiable. The disappearance of secondary groups, 
the hypertrophy of the State and the release of the desires 
of the organic ego, and the consequent breakdown of social 
cohesion--all this is ultimately important only because to­
gether they lead to "IOOral anarchy," to the "morbid fevers" 
of anomie and egoisme in modern society • 
••• The chief role of corporations, in the future as 
well as in the past, would be to govern social func­
tions, especially economic functions, and thus to ex­
tricate them from their present state of disorganiza­
tion. Whenever excited appetites tended to excel all 
limits, the corporation would have then to decide the 
share that should equitably revert to each of the coop­
erative parts. Standing above its members, it would have 
all necessary authority to demand indispensable sacri­
fices and concessions and impose order upon them. By 
forcing the strongest to use their strength with moder­
ation, by preventing the weakest from endlessly multi­
plying their protests, by recalling both to the sense 
of their reciprocal duties and the general interest, and 
by regulating production in certain cases so that it 
does not degenerate into a morbid fever, i~wOUId moder­
ate one set of passi~ another, and permit their ap­
peasement ~-assigning them limits. Thus, a new sort of 
moral disc1pline would be established, witho~whICh -­
all the scientific discoveries and economic progress in 
the world could produce only maICOntents * (5:382-83)-.­
Of course, Durkheim's explanation of suicide was in­
tended as an objective examination of the results of this 
•
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breakdown of secondary groups; for suicide offered an extern­
al sign which objectively revealed the internal moral change.
• Suicides were thus portrayed as indices of the "cold moral 
temperature" of contemporary societies. And, therefore, the 
only real "way of checking the current of collective sadness 
is by lessening the collective malady of which it is a sign
• and result." 
• 
The abnormal development of suicide and the general un­
rest of contemporary societies spring from the same 
causes. The exceptionally high number of voluntary deaths 
manifest the state of deep disturbance from which civi­
lized societies are sUffering, and bears witness to its 
gravity. It may even be said that this measures it •... 
• 
The only possible way, then, to check this current of 
collective sadness is by at least lessening the collec­
tive malady of which it is a sign and a result. We have 
shown that it is not necessary, in order to accomplish 
this, to restore, artificially, social forms which are 
outworn and which could be endowed with only an appear­
ance of life, or to create out of whole cloth entirely 
new forms without historical analogies. We must seek in 
the past new germs of life which it contained, and has­
ten their development (S:39l).
• At the conclusion to Suicide, however, Durkheim purposely 
did not go into great detail concerning the shape of the past 
history of professional or occupational groups, nor into the 
shape of their possible futures. "Only after a special study
• of the corporative regime would it be possible to make the 
conclusions more precise" (S:39l). 
• 
once the existence of the evil is proved, its nature and 
its source, and we consequently know the general features 
of the remedy and its point of application, the important 
thing is not to draw up in advance a plan anticipating 
• 
everything, but rather to set resolutely to work (S: 
(S:39l-2) • 
And "set resolutely to work" Durkheim did, with his lectures 
on Socialism and Saint-Simon, and his lectures Professional 
Ethics and Civic Morals. But the culmination of this effort 
--the analysis of the historical nature of the corporation 
and its possible future--appeared only in 1902 with Durk­
•
 
heim's preface to the second edition of The Division of La­

bor in Society, to which we now turn. 
•
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F. "Quelques Remarques sur les Groupements Professionels" 
• 
Durkheim's classic preface--translated by Simpson as 
''Notes on Occupational Groups"--to the second edition of The 
• 
Division of Labor is important for a number of reasons. 
First, he elaborated there the nature and historical devel­
opment of professional groups, which fulfilled his promise 
at the conclusion of Suicide. Moreover, he admitted certain 
• 
limitations in the theoretical outlines of his earlier argu­
ment. Not only must intermediate groups be brought together 
on a sustained basis, Durkheim now argued, but if moral rules 
are to work effectively to regulate anomic economic activity 
they must be considered as morally legitimate and binding by 
• 
collective authority. Thus, his emphasis shifted from the 
"latent" benefits of "moral mechanics" to questions of the 
centrality of legitimate moral authority. Here, too, as with 
• 
• 
his historical analyses, Durkheim moved closer to Weber. 
He began by noting that his basic "theodicy" and "ther­
apeutic" had developed since the first edition of The Divi­
sion of Labor. 
There is an idea undeveloped in the first edition, 
which it will be useful to bring into light and fur­
ther determine, for it will clarify certain parts of 
the present work. It is the question of the role that 
occupational groups are destined to play in the con­
•
 
temporary order (DL:l).
 
He recalled to our attention the fact that modern economic
 
life is afflicted by a "state of juridical and moral anomie."
 
No occupational ethics govern economic life~ thus, the insa­

tiable desires of the amoral ego are released from moral 
discipline and direction. In terms reminiscent of Veblen 
(see Merton, 1949), Durkheim noted the ambiguity of the 
•
 
great stress placed upon individual success.
 
•
 
We repeatedly insist in the course of this book upon
 
the state of juridical and moral anomie in which eco­

nomic life actually is found. Indeed, in the economic
 
order, occupational ethics exist only in the most rudi­

mentary state ..•• The most blameworthy acts are so often
 
absolved by success that the boundary between what is
 
permitted and what is prohibited, what is just and what 
is unjust, has nothing fixed about it, but seems suscep­
tible to almost arbitrary change by individuals. An 
•
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ethic so imprecise and inconstant cannot constitute a 
discipline. The result is that all this sphere of col­
• 
lective life is, in large part, freed from the modera­
ting action of regulation. It is this anomic state that 
is the cause •.. of the incessantly recurrent conflicts, 
and the multifarious disorders of which the economic 
world exhibits so sad a spectacle. For, as nothing re­
strains the active forces and assigns them limits they 
are bound to respect, they tend to develop haphazardly,
• 
and come into collision with one another, battling and 
• 
weakening themselves (DL:I-2). 
In contrast to his earlier summary formula in Suicide, Durk­
heim now observed that greater social cohesion alone is not 
sufficient. To restrain human passions the moral rules that 
• 
emerge with structural integration must also become legiti­
mate, that is, they must be accepted as the bases of moral 
authority. 
Human passions stop on~y before ~ moral power they 
respect. If all author1ty of this kind is wantIng; 
•
 
the law or-the strongest prevaIlS, and Latent or ac­

tive;-£he-state of war is necessariry-chronic.'fhat
 
such anarchy is an unhealthy phenomenon is quite evi­

dent, since it runs counter to the aim of society,
 
which is to suppress, or at least moderate, war among
 
men, subordinating the law of the strongest to a high­

•
 
er law. To justify this chaotic state, we vainly praise
 
its encouragement of individual liberty. Quite on the
 
contrary, liberty •.• is itself the product of regula­

tion. I can be free only to the extent that others are
 
forbidden to profit from their physical, economic, or
 
other superiority to the detriment of my liberty. But
 
only social rules can prevent abuse of power. It is now 
known what complicated regulation is needed to assure 
individuals the economic indepetlence without which 
their liberty is only nominal * (DL:3).
• In historical terms, one of the most striking things 
to note about this "Hobbesian" war of "each against all" is 
that this type of "moral anarchy," rather than being ancient 
or generic, is actually rather recent. It is not so much a 
• generic flaw of human nature; one cannot simply blame that 
old standby, the organic ego, for the "social costs" of the 
modern economic and political order, for these ~ unique 
in cultural eVOlution. Hobbes, for instance, took the easy
• way out, blaming generic human nature for the aftermath of the Puritan Civil War in England, as did Durkheim after the 
•
 
•
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French Revolution • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•.. What brings about the exceptional gravity of this 
state •.• is the heretofore unknown development that 
economic functions have experienced for about two cen­
turies. Whereas formerly they played only a secondary 
role, they are now of first importance. We are far from 
the time when they were disdainfully abandoned to the 
inferior classes. In the face of the economic, the ad­
ministrative, military and religious functions have be­
come steadily less important. Only the scientific func­
tions seem to dispute their place, and even science has 
scarcely any prestige save to the extent that it can 
serve practical occupations, which are largely economic . 
..• Society is Lnow] •.. essentially industrial (OL:3). 
Since economic life has gravitated to the very center of 
modern society, the crisis resulting from its anomic deregu­
lation deepens. 
A form of activity which has assumed such a place in 
social life evidently cannot remain in this unruly state 
without resulting in the most profound disasters. For, 
precisely because the economic functions today concern 
the greatest number of citizens, there are a multitude 
of individuals whose lives are passed almost entirely 
in the industrial and commercial world. From this it 
follows that as that world is only feebly ruled by mor­
ality, the greatest part of their existence takes place 
outside the moral sphere (OL:3-4). 
Once again, it is evident that Ourkheim had been so taken by 
his virtual identification of moral and social processes that 
wherever he perceived the lack of the former, it could only 
have been due to the paucity of the latter. Perhaps Ourkheim 
had become fixed on the second process subsequent to the 
breakthrough of the individualistic, vocationally ascetic, 
functionally rational ethos of modern capitalism. In many 
ways, his lack of insight into the first (Weberian) process 
obviated his discovery of the full implications of the second 
schema of suicide which I have outlined, and shall soon ex­
plore. His committment to affixing the burden on homo duplex 
barred recognition of the variability and historical unique­
ness of our modern moral and sociocultural dilemmas. 
Naturally, we are not inclined to thwart and restrain 
ourselves; if then, we are not invited, at each moment, 
to exercise this restraint without which there is no 
ethic, how can we learn the habit? If in the task that 
occupies almost all our time we follow no other rule 
•
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than that of our well-understood interest, how can we 
learn to depend upon disinterestedness, on self-forget-
• 
fulness, on sacrifice? In this way, the absence of all 
economic discipline cannot fail to extend its effects 
beyond the economic world, and consequently, weaken 
• 
public morality (DL:4). 
Durkheim next admitted a crucial limitation in his ear-
lier core argument in the first edition of The Division of 
Labor.Group moral discipline only becomes effective if it is 
consecrated with the moral authority of the group, which must 
be embraced as legitimate . 
• 
..• We have especially insisted upon showing that the 
division of labor cannot be held responsible--that it 
• 
does not necessarily produce dispersion and incoherence, 
but that functions, when they are sufficiently in con-
tact with one another, tend to stabilize, and regulate 
themselves. But this explanation is incomplete. For, if 
it is true that social functions spontaneously seek to 
adapt themselves to one another, provided they are reg-
• 
ularly in relationship, nevertheless, this mode of a-
daptation becomes a rule of conduct only if the group 
consecrates it with its authority •.•• Only a constitu-
ted society enjoys the moral and material supremacy 
indispensable in making law for individuals, for the 
only moral personality above particular personalities 
is the one formed by collective life (DL:4-S). 
But, in the last analysis, Durkheim's notion of "moral 
mechanics"--that moral rules spontaneously emerge from sus-
• 
tained patterns of social interaction--proved too strong for 
him to break away from. Integrate the amoral ego into social 
groups, and moral reglementation will inevitably emerge--this 
was Durkheim's unshakable belief, and the basis of his hope 
• 
for social and moral reconstruction in the modern age. 
• 
••• If anomie is an evil, it is above all because socie-
ty suffers from it, being unable to live without cohe-
sion and regularity ...• For anomie to end, there must 
then exist, or be formed, a group which can constitute 
the system of rules actually needed. Neither political 
society in its entirety, nor the State can take over 
• 
this function: economic life, because it is specialized 
and grows more specialized everyday, escapes their com-
petence and their action. An occupational activity can 
be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate e-
nough with it to know its functioning, feel all its  
needs, and able to follow all their variations. The 
only one that could answer all these conditions is the 
one formed by all the agents of the same industry, uni-
• 
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ted and organized into a single body ... the corpora­
tion or occupational group (DL:4). 
• G. The Nature and History of Professional Groups in 
European Society 
•
 
The only way to fully understand Durkheim's reform pro­

posals for the national political enfranchisement of profes­

•
 
sional groups is to put these notions into their historical
 
context. The usual symbolic equation of the Enlightenment,
 
for example, was that guilds and other such intermediary
 
groups could only be retrogressive, that is, stand against
 
the mainline of social and economic progress. 
• 
For the establishment of an occupational ethic and law 
in the different economic occupations, the corporation, 
instead of remaining a confused aggregate, without uni­
ty, would have to become again a defined, organized 
group; in a word, a public institution. But any project 
of this sort runs afoul of a certain number of prejudi­
ces which must be forestalled or dissipated (DL:7). 
But Durkheim never proposed to "resuscitate the old corpora­
•
 
tion of the Middle Ages." For the old guilds were city based,
 
•
 
while, on the contrary, the new economic and political organ­

izations of the modern age are national and international in
 
scope. The municipal guilds were fiercely autonomous, inde­

pendent organizations, while the modern world is highly iu 

terdependent. Hence, there were some basic changes to be 
made in the form of professional groups before they could 
become reconstituted as vital public institutions. 
• 
Now, in the economic order, the occupational group does 
not exist any more than occupational ethics. Since the 
eighteenth century rightfully suppressed the old corpor­
ations, only fragmentary and incomplete attempts have 
been made to bring them back with new foundations 
(DL: 5) . 
• Durkheim next considered the history of the profession­
al group as a secondary institution in the life of European 
societies. Noting its existence in both the ancient socie­
ties of Greece and Rome, and throughout much of the Middle 
• Ages and the modern world up until the late eighteenth cen­
tury, Durkheim once again argued from the apparent univer­
•
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sality of an institution to its present necessity: "So per­
sistent an institution cannot depend upon a contingent and 
• accidental existence" (DL:9). "If from the origin of the 
city up to the zenith of the Empire, from the dawn of Chris­
tian societies up to modern times, they have been necessary, 
it is because they answer durable and profound needs" (DL: 9). 
• But, as always, Durkheim took care to point out that the eco­
nomic services rendered by such corporations as regularly 
constituted loci of social interaction and, thus, as a moral­
izing milieux that they are most important.
• If it is indispensable, it is not because of the econo­mic services it renders, but because of the moral influ­
ence it can have. What we especially see in the occupa­
tional group is a moral power capable of containing in­
dividual egos, of maintaining a spirited sentiment of 
common solidarity in the consciousness of all workers,
• of preventing the law of the strongest from being bru­
• 
tally applied to industrial and commercial relations* 
(DL:lO). 
In outlining the historical "multifunctionality" of the 
Roman corporations, as not only economic and occupational as­
sociations, but al~o religious and mutual aid societies, 
Durkheim observed that once such groups are formed, inevita­
blymoral rules grow up to encompass the whole of the social 
microcosm.
• Once the group is formed, a moral life appears natural­

•
 
ly carrying the mark of the particular conditions in
 
which it has developed. For it is impossible for men to
 
live together, associating in industry, without acquir­

ing a sentiment of the whole formed by their union, with­

out attaching themselves to that whole, preoccupying
 
•
 
themselves with its interests, and taking account of that
 
in their conduct, This attachment has in it something
 
surpassing the individual. This subordination to the gen­

eral interest is, indeed, the source of all moral activ­

ity. As this sentiment grows more precise and determined,
 
applying itself to the most ordinary and the most impor­

tant circumstances of life, it is translated into defin­
itive formula, and thus, a body of moral rules is in 
process of establishment (DL:l4-lS). 
Durkheim argued that the corporations of guilds of the medie­
•
 
val commune also constituted a moral milieu for their members.
 
In evolutionary terms, Durkheim argued that the "corporation 
has been an heir to the family" (DL:l7). This is a most impor­
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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tant insight, complementing (as noted earlier) Weber's em­
phasis on the medieval city as an oath-bound confederation. 
It was a crucial phase in widening out the structures of 
fraternization in the West. In short, with the emergence of 
the voluntary medieval commune, a new community of occupa­
tional interests took the place of older communities of 
"blood and soil" as the base of social organization; in 
short, it represents a momentous extension of the social 
bond. 
Trades demand cities, and cities have always been 
formed and recruited principally from the ranks of im­
migrants, individuals who have left their native homes. 
A new form of activity was thus constituted which burst 
from the old familial form ••• it substituted for the 
family in the exercise of a function which had first 
been domestic, but which carried no longer this char­
acter .••• Just as the family has elaborated domestic 
ethics and law, the corporation is now the source of 
occupational ethics and law (DL:17-18). 
But how should corporations be transformed to fit con­
temporary conditions? Essentially, Durkheim observed that, 
since the medieval guild was municipal--that is, based on 
city trade--now occupational groups should be enfranchised 
on the national political level since economic life has be­
come, to such a great extent, national and international in 
scope. Since the internationalization of the market is the 
dominant trend, it follows that the old system of territor­
ial representation should give way to national occupational 
representation as the base of the political process. 
But to succeed in getting rid of all the prejudices, 
to show that the corporative system is not solely an 
institution of the past, it would be necessary to see 
what transformation it must and can submit to in order 
to adapt itself to modern societies, for evidently it 
cannot exist as it did in the Middle Ages (DL:18). 
Looking back, Durkheim noted that in Rome, the corporations 
eventually were annexed to municipal adminstration, and thus 
lost their independence. However, in the Middle Ages, the in­
dependent, VOluntaristic commune and guild were the economic 
anchors of the new rising bourgeoisie. Citoyen and citizen 
were synonymous. Durkheim's convergence with Weber on the 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
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question of the importance of the medieval commune as a key 
intermediate step in the progressive evolutionary extension 
of the social bond is most significant . 
..• Their place in the Middle Ages is quite another mat­
ter. There as soon as the corporation appears, it is as 
the normal mould for that part of the population called 
to play such a considerable role in the State: the bour­
geoisie or the third estate. Indeed, for a long time, 
the bourgeoisie and tradespeople are one and the same . 
..•• The organization of trades and commerce seems to 
have been the primitive organization of the European 
bourgeoisie. When the cities freed themselves from the 
seigneurial power, when the commune was formed, the body 
of trades which had preceded and prepared this movement 
became the foundation of the communal constitution ..•. 
We know from the history of our societies that the com­
mune has become their cornerstone .... Since it was a 
combination of corporations, and was formed on the style 
of a corporation, it is the latter, in the last analysis, 
which has served as foundation for all the political 
system which has issued from the communal movement 
(DL:20-1). 
The reason that the medieval corporation could not sur­
vive the birth throes of the modern world, Durkheim reasoned, 
was that it was too narrowly based, too closely bound to the 
peculiar economic structure of the independent city. As na­
tional industry grew, and the scope of the trading market in­
ternationalized, the guild or corporation as the prime secon­
dary organ became outmoded, retrogressive. Although the scale 
had changed, the guild lingered on, fiercely trying to retain 
its former autonomy. But because its municipal anchor no 
longer fit the new scale of economic and political action, 
the guild was rightly suppressed by national monarchies and 
revolutionaries alike. 
In the Middle Ages, it was narrowly bound to the organ­
ization of the commune. This solidarity was without in­
convenience as long as the trades themselves had a com­
munal character .... But it was no longer the same once 
great industry was born •.. its field of action is limi­
ted to no determined region~ its clientele is recruited 
everywhere. An institution so entirely wrapped up in the 
commune as was the old corporation could not then be 
used to encompass and regulate a form of collective ac­
tivity which was so completely foreign to the communal 
life .••• But if the corporation, as it then existed, 
could not be adapted to this new form of industry, and 
if the State could not replace the old corporative dis­
•
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cipline, it does not follow that all discipline would 
be useless thenceforward. It simply meant that the old 
corporation had to be transformed to continue to fill 
its role in the new conditions of economic life 
(DL: 22-3) • 
The key to the future of the professional corporation, then, 
argued Durkheim, is that it must simultaneously have both 
constant relations with economic life and with the political 
and administrative apparatus of the modern nation-state. 
What the experience of the past proves above all, is 
that the ••. framework of the occupational group must 
always have relations with the framework of occupation­
al life. It is because of this lack of relationship that 
the corporative regime disappeared. Since the market, 
formerly municipal, became national and international, 
the corporations must assume the same extension. Instead 
of being limited only to the workers of a city, it must 
enlarge in such a way as to include all the members of 
the occupation scattered over the territory, for in what­
ever region they are found, whether they live in the 
city or in the country, they are all solidary, and par­
ticipate in a common life. Since this common life is, 
in certain respects, independent of all territorial de­
terminations, the appropriate organ must be created that 
expresses and regularizes its function. Because of these 
dimensions, such an organ would necessarily be in direct 
contact with the central organ of the collective life 
(DL:24) • 
State regulation of economic activity and occupational 
self-regulation must remain separate, Durkheim contended. 
For only the occupational association is itself close enough 
to the problems and details of occupational life to know them 
intimately, and thus, choose the appropriate remedies. 
If the function of making general principles of indus­
trial regulation belongs to the governmental assemblies, 
they are incapable of diversifying them according to the 
different industries. It is this diversification which 
constitutes the proper task of the corporation. [Foonote: 
This specialization could be made only with the aid of 
elected assemblies charged to represent the corporation. 
.•. ] Economic life would thus be regulated and determin­
ed without losing any of its diversity (DL:24-5). 
Instead of annexing the professional association to the 
State, as both the old regime and the socialists wished to do, 
Durkheim argued that its insertion into national political 
life as a linked network of independent secondary organs is 
•
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not only possible but necessary. The new scale of socioeco­
nomic life demands a new corresponding countervailing force: 
and the proposed transformation of the occupational group 
and its national political enfranchisement removes the old 
objections to its retrogressive behavior, which Durkheim ar­
gued was merely a reflection of its earlier municipal ori­
gins. 
For that very reason, the corporative regime would be 
protected against that tendency towards immobility that 
it has often been charged with in the past, for it is 
a fault which is rooted in the narrowly communal char­
acter of the corporation. As long as it was limited to 
the city, it was inevitable for it to become a prisoner 
of tradition as the city itself. As, in a group so re­
stricted, the conditions of life are almost invariable, 
habit exercises a terrific effect upon people, and even 
innovations are dreaded. The traditionalism of the cor­
porations was thus only an aspect of the communal tra­
ditionalism, and had the same qualities. Then once it 
was ingrained in the mores, it survived the causes which 
had produced and originally justified it. That is why, 
when the material and moral concentration of the coun­
try, and great industry which is its consequence, had o­
pened minds to new desires, awakened new needs, intro­
duced into the tastes and fashions a mobility heretofore 
unknown, the corporation, which was obstinately attached 
to its old customs, was unable to satisfy these new exi­
gencies. But national corporations, by virtue of their 
dimension and complexity, would not be exposed to this 
danger (DL:25). 
Durkheim went even farther, and suggested that the "or­
ganized occupation or corporation should be the essential or­
gan of public life" in the future. In this way, "organic sol­
idarity" would become fully institutionalized, and the tran­
sitional crisis finally overcome. 
There is even reason to suppose that the corporation 
will become the foundation of one of the essential ba­
ses of our political organization •••• Now that the com­
mune, heretofore an autonomous organism, has lost its 
place in the State, as the municipal market did in the 
national market, is it not fair to suppose that the cor­
poration also will have to experience a corresponding 
transformation, becoming the elementary division of the 
State, the fundamental political unity? Society, instead 
of remaining what it is today, an aggregate of juxtapos­
ed territorial districts, would become a vast system of 
national corporations. From various quarters it is asked 
that elective assemblies be formed by occupations, and 
•
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not by territorial divisions; and certainly, in this 
way, political ssemblies would more exactly express the 
• 
diversity of social interests and their relations •..• 
But to say that the nation, in becoming aware of itself, 
must be grouped into occupations--does this not mean that 
the organized occupation or corporation should be the 
essential organ of public life (DL:27)? 
And, of course, Durkheim saw this massive and integral insti­
• tutionalization of the logic of "organic" or occupational 
solidarity at the very heart of modern social organization to 
be demanded by our very history: "Thus, the great gap in Eu­
ropean societies ... would be filled. It will be seen, in­
• deed, how as advances are made in history, the organization 
which has territorial groups as its base (village, city, dis­
trict, province, etc.) has become steadily effaced" (DL: 27) . 
Thus, attempting to deal realistically and historicalgwith
• the modern crisis of anomie and egoisme, Durkheim, as a posi­
tivist moral philosopher, issued a call for us to embrace a 
new type of extended social bond, a new form of "universal 
brotherhood." The basic question remains, however: was this
• solution adequate to the moral crisis of anomie and egoisme? 
For many reasons, I think not. 
To the end, Durkheim believed that his solution was a­
dequate because it created moral milieux for the undisci­
• plined organic ego. And, to the end, he believed that it was 
the generic ego--man as homo duplex--that lay at the heart 
of our problems. Can we today allow ourselves to be similar­
ly misled?
• ••. it must not be thought that the entire function of 
• 
the corporation is to make rules and apply them. To be 
sure, where a group is formed, a moral discipline is 
formed too. But the institution of this discipline is 
only one of the many ways through which collective ac­
tivity is manifested. A group is not only a moral au­
thority which dominates the life of its members; it is 
also a source of life sui generis. From it comes warmth 
which animates its members, making them intensely human, 
destroying their egotisms (DL:26). 
•
 
•
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FOOTNOTES 
• BOOK TWO 
*1,	 pg. 543--1 shall focus exclusively on Durkheim's ration­
ales here, rather than on his statistics, in contrast to 
W. Pope (197 6) . 
• #1,	 pg. 630--Barclay Johnson has discovered other apparent 
references to fatalisme (1965:887, #14); see also 
Cashion (1970). 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
BOOK THREE
• ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND THE MODERN WORLD 
Synopsis. In this Book,we shall critically reexamine the un­

derlying presuppositions of Durkheim's first schema of sui­

• cide by comparing and contrasting them with the evolving
 
structure of Durkheim's thought which we delineated in Book
 
One: then, on the basis of this reexamination, we shall move
 
to his second schema of suicide.
 
•
 
• In Part I, we shall first criticize Durkheim's doctrine
 
of homo duplex in terms of the location of egoism and insa­

tiability. I propose that Durkheim's early image of the erup­

tion of egoistic and insatiable passions breaking through
 
•
 
the restraining moral discipline of sociocultural rules was a
 
mistake rhetorically, biologically, sociologically, histori­

cally, and culturally. Even Durkheim himself shifted away
 
from this inadequate image in later years.
 
•
 
Then we shall review several shifts in Durkheim's caus­

al model away from his early positivistic notions of mechan­

istic, one-way causality toward the autonomization of collec­

tive representations. When this double task is completed, I
 
propose that we shall conclude that the first schema of sui­
cide, implicitly resting on these early notions of homo du­
plex and abstracted, mechanistic causality, should be set a­
•
 
side not only because such premises are logically flawed,
 
• 
but also because they were later abandoned or modified by 
Durkheim himself. 
Next, we shall explore various transitions in Durk­
heim's work which reveal a progressive shift toward "cultural 
realism" which are directly relevant to the second schema. 
Further, because of the lack of historical specificity in 
•
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Durkheim's abstracted general evolutionism, we shall explore 
possible complementarities and convergences between his work 
• and that of Max Weber. Hence, we shall assume a synthetic 
Durkheimian-Weberian analytical perspective before we begin 
to address the second schema. Then, we shall outline some 
criteria for a more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's 
• schema of suicide. Finally, we shall explore other observers' 
insights into Durkheim's second schema. 
In Part II of Book Three, we shall explore all four 
types of suicide as the "exaggerated or deflected forms of 
• 
• virtues." Both historical sets proceed from common sources; \ 
they differ in their prime mode of expression. In traditional I 
societies, the common content of altruisme and fatalisme is 
absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social schedule 
of satisfaction. Altruisme represents the active acceptance 
of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice for the wel­
fare of the group. Fatalisme represents the opposite role of 
passive resignation to one's collectively assigned fate. 'f 
•
 
• Now, in modern societies caught up in the transitional ~
 
crisis (pre-organic solidarity), both anomie and egoisme pro­

ceed from common sources--absolutizing individualism and le­

gitimized insatiability--precisely the reverse of the values
 
of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoisme passive. 
When extreme individualism and unending drives for "progress 
and perfection" are turned against the external world, we 
• 
see anomie--the "infinity of desires"--and the collapse of 
the will in frustration, as seen in suicides in the economic 
arena. This ethos is supported by what I call the Anglo Util­
itarian CUltural Tradition. 
• 
When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism 
and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the 
self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams"--and col­
lapse of the will and imagination in isolation and exhaustion 
• 
seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals, etc. This 
ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior" in which 
suicide becomes a vocation is sanctioned by what I shall call 
..
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the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural Tradition.
 
Together, these twin expressions of some of our highest

• callings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anar­

chy" and "diseases of the infinite" which represent the two
 
halves of the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "hu­

man finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "gold­

• en mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are
 
pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our
 
prime vices.
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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• 
PART I 
• A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S KEY PREMISES 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE LOCATION OF EGOISM AND INSATIABILITY: A CRITIQUE 
• OF DURKHEIM'S DOCTRINE OF HOMO DUPLEX 
Preface. The problem of the location of egoism and insatia­
bility, "Ie mal de l'infini," which Durkheim empirically en­
• 
countered on such a massive scale in the modern world, is 
central to his schema of suicide. As we discovered in Book 
One, the docrine of homo duplex--the generic opposition be­
tween ego and person, between sensual appetites and moral 
• 
rules, between percepts and concepts--lies at the very heart 
• 
of Durkheim's sociological method, his sociology of morality 
and religion, and his sociology of knowledge (see also Lukes, 
1973:10). Clearly, in his first schema of suicide Durkheim 
grounded egoistic individualism and insatiable desires in the 
pre-socialized half of human nature--the organic ego. But, as 
we have discovered in Book Two, at various points Durkheim's 
theses also ambiguously suggest that egoism and insatiability 
• 
derive as much from the presence of modern cultural sanctions 
• 
as from the absence of traditional moral controls over the
pre-social ego in the modern era. Let us now explore the ir­
retrievable flaws in Durkheim's early image of the dualism 
of human nature as these informed his first schemaofsuicije. 
• 
Logically, how does Durkheim's notion of the supposed 
insatiable passions of the organic half of that strange and 
divided creatur~~omo duplex--stand up? Can we accept this 
part of Durkheim's explanatory model underlying his first 
schema in Suicide? I think not. I propose that Durkheim's 
image of the eruption of egoistic and insatiable sensual pas­
•
 
•
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sions breaking through the restraining moral discipline of 
sociocultural rules--his rhe-:.orically inspired "brittle syn­
thesis ll as Giddens (1971b:22) terms it--was a mistake rhe­• 
-- ­
torically, biologically, sociologically, historically, and 
culturally. Even Durkheim shifted away from this inadequate 
image in his later years. Let us now critically explore 
these limitations in Durkheim's doctrine of man as homo du­• 
--­
plex as a prelude to our reformulation of his schemas of 
suicide. 
However, let me first limit the potential scope of my
• criticism here. I do not wish, for instance, to deny the 
self-evident fact that man is a creature composed of multi­
ple realities--for we are simultaneously physical, biologi­
cal, psychological, sOCiocultural, moral-intellectual, and
• spiritual beings. Man is inherently ambiguous; man is a mys­
tery. Certainly, in these and other related terms I would a­
gree with Durkheim, and a whole tradition of thought, that 
man is, indeed, homo duplex or mUltiplex. Yet, I find Durk­
• heim's early postulate of the inherent insatiability of the 
organic ego unacceptable. And, therefore, his corresponding 
schema portraying anomie and egoisme as the release of the 
•
 
ego from traditional social control, while still very in­

sightful as a description of a secondary phase process, 
needs to be reformulated. 
• 
Finally, I do consider Durkheim's later shift from the 
anomic to the alogic ego acceptable and even profound. For 
it means that, instead of assigning the presence of self­
• 
destructive drives to the generic organic ego, Durkheim mere­
ly imputed to it the absence of universalizable moral rules 
and rational concepts. Indeed, the reversal of the presencel 
• 
absence polarity is crucial to the reformulation of these 
two very different schemas. In any case, I simply wish to 
put the reader on notice that my criticisms directed toward 
the underlying postulate of schema one do not alter my con­
viction that Durkheim's distinction between ego and person 
remains a foundation theorem for the human sciences. 
•
 
• 
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A. Homo Duplex as ~ Rhetorical Mistake 
•
 
To my mind, Durkheim should never have incorporated,
 
•
 
at the very heart of his first schema, key images and prem­

ises of his opponents. While it is true (see, for example,
 
R:l2l-4) that Durkheim took pains to distance himself from
 
both the utilitarians like Hobbes and ROmantic pioneers such
 
•
 
as Rousseau, nonetheless, he retained certain crucial aspects
 
of their view of the pre-socialized, generic human ego. I be­

lieve, therefore, that Anthony Giddens is quite right when
 
he states:
 
••• Although Durkheim's attempt to detach moral from
 
methodological individualism is much more subtle and
 
profound than has been assumed by many of his critics,
 
what results is a brittle synthesis and essentially an
 
unsatisfactory one. The ambiguities, and the very ser­

• ious deficiencies which run throughout his works, how­
ever, have to be understood in the light of this at­

tempt. As so often happens with a writer whose works
 
are so strongly polemical in tone, ultimately he was
 
unable to abandon certain of the very premises-of-which
 
he was most critical in the-wrrtings o~ his opponents

•
 
- -- --- -- -- -r(197lb :222).
 
Let us next briefly explore the prime example of this mista­
ken rhetorical incorporation~-namely, Durkheim's view of the 
economy as the prime arena for egoistic and amoral activity.
• 1. Economic Deregulation as Anomic Norm: Durkheim's Devalua­
tion of the utilitarian Economy 
The rhetorical incorporation and denial of value to the 
• essential premises of his opponents was especially damaging 
to Durkheim's implicit sociology of economic life. Although 
ambiguous at several points, in the main Durkheim himself 
greatly neglected analysis of economic action, and treated 
• it as the very paradigm of egoistic and amoral activity. 
This might seem surprising in light of Durkheim's sanguine 
view of the benefits of the organic division of social labor. 
But we must remember that even here Durkheim's central inter­
• est was not with the technological and economic aspects of 
the progressive division of labor. Rather, his prime con­
•
 
•
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cern lay always with the beneficent effects of "moral mech­
anics" for occupational groups, and with the progressive ex­
• tension, universalization, and rationalization of the social 
bond on the civilizational level. Durkheim was no social eco­
nomist like Weber. 
• 
But why did Durkheim anathematize economic action as 
• 
the very prototype of egoistic amorality? Because, as we dis­
covered in Book One, as a moral philosopher Durkheim seized 
upon the ancient doctrine of man as homo duplex for his own 
special purposes. In so doing, he infused the two halves of 
• 
this dichotomy with his own sociologistical and the indivi­
dualist Utilitarian doctrines, respectively. Here Durkheim's 
tacit rhetorical strategy apparently was to invert the high 
valuation of that abs~ct,self-interested, calculating ego 
• 
known as "economic man" in Utilitarian moral theory and poli­
tical economy by identifying it with the insatiable sensual 
appetites of the organic ego. By uncritically incoporating 
this apotheosis of the secularized ascetic, the post-Reform­
• 
ation "New Model Man"--the isolated ego floating in the mech­
anical world of the self-equilibrating market--Durkheim ac­
cepted the historically unique Utilitarian image of economic 
action as a universal norm, much as the classical theorists 
themselves proclaimed. However, Weber's achievement lay in 
revealing the historical uniqueness of the ethos of market 
•
 
capitalism, and in revealing its unique normative presuppo­

sitions.
 
•
 
For example, in Socialism (53-4), Durkheim took the
 
historically unique separation of the economy from polity
 
and society as a generic given. But as Weber, Polanyi (1944,
 
1968), Nelson (1969a), and others have shown, this segrega­

•
 
tion of the different aspects of sociocultural process from
 
one another is not universal,and thus not to be presumed
 
but to be explained. Further, while Durkheim was certainly
 
familiar with the works of many French, English, German
 
and other economists, in Socialism he justified his neglect 
of economic categories and processes in these terms: 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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We may speak of "economic things or functions" with­
out having previously said what they consist of, or 
by what external sign one may recognize them. The 
fault is due to the science of economics, which has 
not clarified its own fundamental concepts better 
(Soc: 57) . 
This neglect of economic action is more understandable 
if we recognize that by his rhetorical incorporation and in­
version of the Utilitarian ego into his positivist moral so­
ciology, Durkheim effectively banished it from the social 
and moral life. Due to his own peculiar polemical and cultur­
al commitments, Durkheim symbolically equated the sacred with 
social norms and the moralized person, and the profane with 
dispersed egos engaged in mundane, self-centered,and purely 
utilitarian tasks. In The Elementary Forms, for instance, 
Durkheim postulated the existence of two very different worlds 
of human experience: ordinary days spent by self-calculating 
egos in dispersed practical activity, versus the extraordi­
nary feast days spent by moralized persons in concentrated 
"collectively effervescent" ceremonial. 
On ordinary days, it is utilitarian and individual avo­
cations which take the greater part of the attention. 
Everyone attends to his own personal business: for 
most men, this primarily consists in satisfying the 
exigencies of material life, and the principal incen­
tive to economic activity has always been private in­
terest .••. On feast days, on the contrary, these pre­
occupations are necessarily eclipsed: being essential­
ly profane, they are excluded from these sacred per­
iods. At this time, their thoughts are centered upon 
their common beliefs, their common traditions, the mem­
ory of their great ancestors, the collective ideal of 
which they are the incarnation: in a word, upon social 
things (EF:389-~O). 
Now, I propose that Durkheim made a basic rhetorical 
mistake when he equated the ego and economic action, which 
thus banished common, practical, economic action from the 
all-important sphere of the moral and social. One of the few 
secondary interpreters who has clearly seen this problem is 
Gianfranco Poggi, who contends: 
Durkheim's view of labor as wholly profane, indivi­
dual, and non-social, and his distaste for the mater­
iality characteristic of the non-social realm --these 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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two tendencies bias even his approach to what he con­
siders the proper social realm by making it difficult 
to deal adequately with social objects (1971:248). 
Of the portion deleted from the preceding passage (EF:390), 
Poggi says: 
It appears from this passage that for Durkheim, la­
bor, i.e. productive activity, is inherently preso­
cial and antisocial, it is socialized only margin­
ally, through the inertia of associations and habits 
acquired in the properly social realm, which, how­
ever, have in principle no direct bearing on econo­
mic activity (1971:246). 
Further, Poggi rightly sees that Durkheim's master equation 
governing these symbolic alignments is his polar opposition 
between the sacred and the profane. The essence of the dual­
ism of human nature (to Durkheim) is this sacred/profane di­
chotomy--ego is to person as body was to soul. Poggi sees 
that homo duplex was a rhetorical mistake: 
•.• Durkheim puts individual behavior per se on a 
wholly different plane from the social plane on which 
institutions function; it appears as a destructive or 
at best disruptive element in that functioning. Only 
by transcending his own individuality, by surrender­
ing to the superiority of the norm and of society, can 
the individual correctly confront the social (norma­
tive) realm.••• Since he has equated the social with 
the normative, whatever opposes norms must be anti­
social or non-social .••• In fact, Durkheim is compel­
led to argue, albeit mostly implicitly, that anomic 
behavior is .•• mindless, expressing the blind vora­
city of lithe flesh. 1I Noncompliance issues, in the 
last analysis, from the extent to which that ultimate 
embodiment of individuality, the physical organism, 
breaks through the layer of social/moral representa­
tions laid over it by society. In deviance ••• the 
beast within man bares his teeth, the lowest, vilest 
part of man attacks and negates the benevolent and 
austere authority of society •••• Durkheim contemplates 
this subversion of the proper order of things with a 
moralistic shudder, and is led at times to speak of 
society's mission as that of freeing man from the hold 
of natural forces, of delivering him from the mindless 
greed of his senses. A kind of Cartesian mind/body 
dualism seems to lie behind this imagery ...• An impli­
cit naturalistic monism thus struggles in his thought 
with an implicit dualism, or perhaps even an implicit 
spiritualistic monism (1971:246-7-8). 
Indeed, not only is Poggi's general critique well taken, but 
•
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also his concluding characterization of Durkheim's basic 
philosophical position reveals clearly the multiplicity of
• perspectives from which Durkheim's doctrine may be judged, 
and the difficulty of finally placing him in any useful 
category except perhaps that of master moral dialectician. 
Unfortunately, Durkheim's polemical overstatement led
• him to tacitly embrace theses running directly counter to 
some of his own basic premises. Surely his unjustified re­
mark that "The principal incentive to economic activity has 
always been private interest" (EF:390) serves~~ prime illus­
• tration. Such a thesis is acceptable only if economic action 
is to be primarily regarded from the biological or purely 
Utilitarian perspective. Even in biological terms it may be 
too reductionistic and mechanistic, as ethologists begin to
• systematically report on the complex structures underlying 
animal societies (see, for example, Wynne-Edwards, 1968). 
I believe that Durkheim's rhetorical incorporation of the 
apotheosized image of economic individualism as first devel­
• oped by the Utilitarian wing of the Scottish moral philoso­
phers and English non-conformists to have been a fundamental 
mistake. Instead of inc6porating their moralization of atomis­
tic and mechanistic images of economy and society, and thus
• far too easily serving his own polemical purposes by banish­
ing everyday practical activity from the realm of the moral, 
Durkheim should have developed a fully sociological position 
• 
which would have rejected both the premises and the valuation 
of egocentric economic activity as forwarded by the Utilitar­
ian reformers. Durkheim would then have found himself in the 
position to re-incqporate the economic individual into socie­
ty, culture, and history. In sum, instead of accepting the
• Utilitarian~ apotheosis of modern economic deregulation as 
anomic norm, Durkheim should have moved to a fully sociologi­
cal view of economic action. LaCapra has criticized Durkheim's 
• 
infusion of his doctrine of man as homo duplex into economic 
action in these memorable terms: 
• 
• 
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in Durkheim's conception of economics, the mind­
body dualism functioned to relegate economic activi­
•	 ty to the sphere of the literally material and the 
individual. By the end of his life, Durkheim consi­
dered economic activity to be the profane par excel­
lence. His entire conception of the problem not only 
failed to offer insight into the nature of economic 
institutions; it also ignored the moral and religious 
•	 aspects of modern economic activity which Max Weber 
treated in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1972:83). --- --­
2. ~ Properly Durkheimian View of the Economy 
• It is significant that those members of the Annee 
school who worked as economic sociologists--I mean Francois 
Simiand, Maurice Halbwachs, and even Marcel Mauss--did not 
do their best work under the influence of Durkheim's early
• doctrine of homo duplex. For economic sociology simply be­
comes impossible if one brands economic action as inherent­
ly egotistic, utilitarian, and generically asocial--in a 
word, profane. Durkheim's mistaken rhetorical tactic unfor­
• tunately thus banished the economy from cultural and moral 
influence. However, had Durkheim followed consistently his 
own methodological postulates, he might have helped build 
a better theory of social economics (eg. see Neyer, 1960:
• 65). Again, it is important that those French economic so­
ciologists such as Simiand and Halbwachs were mainly influ­
enced by Durkheim's seminal remarks that economic wants and 
value are ultimately determined by public opinion--that is,
• culture. 
But even Durkheim's occasional remarks on the social 
and cultural foundations of economic norms ran into consi­
derable opposition from economists. And, in contrast to fre­
• quent pronouncements on the need for rapprochement between 
history and sociology, it is striking that Durkheim made few 
overtures to economics as a discipline. Lukes reports on one 
unhappy exchange in 1908:
• The economists, still largely hostile to the intru­
sive claims of sociology, were equally critical of 
Durkheim's methodological views. At a meeting of the 
•
 
•
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Societe d'Economique Politique in 1908, Durkheim ad­
vanced his views concerning the nature of economic 
phenomena and the relation of economics to the other 
social sciences. It was clear, he argued, that the 
scientific study of morality, of law, of religion, 
and art, were concerned with ideas. Was political eco­
nomy any different: did it deal with phenomena "in­
dependent of opinion?" He maintained that economic 
facts could also be considered as matters of opinion, 
though this did not mean that they did not operate 
according to laws. The value of things depended not 
only on their objective properties but also on the 
opinion held concerning them. For example, religious 
opinion could affect the exchange value of certain 
goods, as could changes in taste. Again, wage-rates 
were a function of a basic standard of living, but 
this standard itself varied from period to period as 
a function of opinion. And certain forms of product­
ion (for instance, cooperation), expanded not be­
cause of their objective productivity but because of 
certain moral values ascribed to them by opinion. 
Thus, economics lost its preponderance and took its 
place beside the other social sciences and in close 
relation to them (1973:499-500). . 
Needless to say, Durkheim's reception was not enthusiastic, 
with some economists objecting that the "eternal laws of 
supply and demand" were not swayed by mere "public opinion." 
In addition, in The Elementary Forms, after the summa­
tion that " ••• nearly all the great institutions have been 
born in religion," Durkheim appended a famous footnote con­
taining seminal research suggestions: 
Only one form of social activity has not yet been ex­
pressly attached to religion: that is economic activi­
ty .••• Economic value is a sort of power or efficacy, 
and we know the religious origins of the idea of power. 
Also, richness can confer mana; therefore, it has it. 
Hence, it is seen that the ideas of economic value and 
of religious value are not without connection. But the 
question of the nature of these connections has not 
yet been studied (EF:466, #4). 
At least one member of the Annee school, however, followed 
up on this seminal footnote. In his justly famous Annee mono­
graph, The Gift, Marcel Mauss (1967) specifically referred 
to this suggestive footnote in proferring his work as " ••• an 
answer to the question already posed by Durkheim concerning 
the religious origin of the notions of economic value" (1967: 
•
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70). And Durkheim himself, in the same Elementary Forms, 
proposed what I believe to be a properly sociological view 
• of economic activity: 
• 
Even the material interests which these great reli­
gious ceremonials are designed to satisfy concern 
the public order and are therefore social. Society 
as a whole is interested that the harvest be abun­
dant, that the rain fall at the right time and not 
excessively, that the animals reproduce regularly. 
So it is society that is in the foreground of every 
consciousness; it dominates and directs all conduct; 
that it is more living and active, and consequently 
more real, than in profane times (EF:390). 
• And Neyer (1960:76) rightly notes that in one of his last 
papers, "Judgements of Reality and Judgements of Fact," Durk­
heim explicitly suggested that the social (normative) foun­
dations of economic value become one of the main fields for 
• future sociological development. "In one of Durkheim's last 
papers ••. economic value takes its place as one form of the 
"ideal" whose investigation constitutes the chief business 
of sociology, along with other systems of "value"--religious,
• moral, legal, and aesthetic." Neyer further observes that 
reconciling some of Durkheim's early and later views on the 
roots of economic value might prove difficult. 
But perhaps the most explicit and useful of Durkheim's 
• theses on the sociocultural roots of economic value and act­
ion can be discovered as early as Suicide (1897). Strangely, 
Durkheim's significant insights here have been largely ignor­
ed (except see the work of Simiand, Halbwachs, and Mauss),
• even by contemporary sympathetic sociologists interested in 
the normative foundations of economic action and theory (see, 
for example, Parsons, 1949; and Parsons and Smelser, 1955). 
As I argued earlier (see Book Two), Durkheim's thesis of the 
• SocioEconomic Schedule of Satisfaction (see S:248-50) holds 
great unexplored potential significance for fundamental theory 
in economic sociology and comparative social systems. 
The key passages in Suicide represent a crucial transi­
• tion in Durkheim's argument concerning the source and opera­
tion of anomie and the insatiable passions of the pre-social­
•
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ized ego, for there he translated his abstract premises about 
the need for "reglementation" into a basic sociological rule. 
• In moralizing the ego, and directing the desires of the so­
cially constructed person, society and culture generate para­
meters for potential satisfaction. Basically, Durkheim propo­
sed that every society utilizes some sort of mechanism, ac­
• cepted as legitimate, to regulate the ratios of satisfaction 
of individuals in terms of a socioeconomic schedule of want 
satisfaction. This social schedule is stratified for various 
groups and occupations depending upon relative degrees of 
• functional contribution and/or cultural honor. This socioeco­
nomic schedule of the generation and regulation of desires 
is, in a relatively stable society, accepted generally by each 
person as legitimate, and each is comparatively adjusted to 
• their scheduled ratio of satisfaction. In contemporary socie­
ty, the workings of the socioeconomic schedule are made clear­
er by the universality of credit and automatic, electronic 
accounting; for example, each month an employee may have his 
• paycheck automatically deposited in his bank account. The 
amount received represents a more or less standard alloca­
tion of purchasing power to a worker in that occupation, 
skill level, and so forth. Thus, each station in life re­
• ceives approximately the rewards considered legitimate, both 
by the larger society and by the group itself. 
Now, the thesis of the importance of the Social Sched­
ule is one of the key sociocultural foundations of the dis­
• tribution phase of economic process; it is a prime, generic 
socioeconomic institution just as much as markets. If we ask, 
for example, how are the productive, distributive, and con­
sumptive phases of economic process to be coordinated? How 
• are they to be directed? And, how are ratios and sequences 
between different classes, groups, institutions, and sectors 
to be negotiated? How is such agreement reached and conflict 
resolved on a regular basis? To answer, as Utilitarian econo­
• mists did for many years, in terms of homogenizing supply/ 
demand price mechanisms in ideally competitive markets is 
•
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to give no real, empirical answer at all. Economic sociolo­
gists should instinctively connect the legitimacy of wages
• and prices to institutions, to governing socioeconomic ra­
tionales, and ultimately, to long range cultural values. 
In short, the SocioEconomic Schedule is the generic price 
and income making institution. 
• Further, the social schedule can be viewed as a key 
variable mediating between various spheres of economic act­
ion and their societal bases. In essence, between the econo­
mic system and the cultural value system stands the strati­
• fication system. The social schedule serves to translate va­
lues into prices, and then, in turn, feedsback prices and 
production/distribution ratios into values. Price and income 
are based in Durkheim's theory of the social schedule on the 
• degree of functional contribution of various groups, on their 
differential social and cultural status, on the belief in the 
legitimacy of these invidious ranks and the appropriate re­
ward due each, and so on and so forth. If, in general, one 
• grants the fact that wants are, in part, based upon sociocul­
turally generated desires, and the values of goods and ser­
vices rest upon group preferences, then at some point we must 
turn to explore the social schedules in which these desires 
• and legitimizing values are embodied. 
Space does not allow us to consider here such important 
questions as the degree of implicitness or explicitness of the 
social schedule, the bases of relative legitimacy (past, pre­
• sent, future), specialization and monopolies as ways of rais­
ing one's own groups percentage of the schedule, the economy 
as a symbolic process, and so forth. In regard to our present 
concerns, it is sufficient to note the crucial historical var­
• iations in the content of the social schedule, for as we noted 
in Book Two, Durkheim's four types of suicide are rooted in 
two very different types of social schedules in different so­
cieties at the two ends of history.
• 
•
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3.	 Ego and History: Parsons' Mistaken Image of Durkheim 
as a Communist Theorist 
• 
•
 
Even so brilliant an analytical theorist as Talcott
 
Parsons was unwittingly tripped by complications stemmming
 
from Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex. In his magisterial
 
~he Structure of Social Action, Parsons asserted that Durk­

•
 
heim was best considered " ••• a communist [theorist] rather
 
than socialist" (1949:341). Parsons' portrayal of Durkheim
 
as an abstracted, ahistorical theorist like himself, possess­

ed by a negative image of human nature, and searching for
 
•
 
the eternal essence of human society (Parsons' Central Value
 
System), led him to identify Durkheim as a communist theor­

ist. Curiously, Parsons' misportrayal of Durkheim as a com­

munist and the popular misperception of Durkheim as a con­

• 
servative (eg. see John Horton, 1964; Lewis Coser, 1960) 
are intimately related. 
But clearly, Parsons' assertion is mistaken, as Mel­
vin Richter (1960:208, #77) and Giddens (197lc:5ll) have in­
•
 
sisted. But what misled Parsons, and others after him? At
 
root, what is wrong here is that Durkheim's anti-individual­

ist polemic has not been explicitly connected with his doc­

trine of man as homo duplex, and his evolutionary perspect­

•
 
ive. Remember first that Parsons had portrayed Durkheim pri­

marily as a social theorist like himself--that is, concern­

ed with "social statics," not "dynamics;" one who searched
 
for the generic bases of social order and control (see also
 
the appendix). Since Durkheim viewed co~qnist utopias, as 
t' t f th h' t '11 'fpr1tf1q~ed' 1 ' d ' rom e 1S or1ca y spec1 1cAo 1n ustr1a SOC1e­
• 
1S 1nc 
ties by socialist theorists, as an eternal response to the 
egoism inherent in human nature, Parsons naturally slipped 
over into the misportrayal of Durkheim as standing theoreti­
cally with the communist camp. 
An additional factor which led Parsons astray was that 
• 
Durkheim apparently agreed with communist theorists that the 
root problem underlying economic anarchy (see Book Two) is 
the insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego. But what 
•
 
•
 
--725-­
Parsons apparently did not see was the extent to which Durk­
heim tried to transcend both the communist and socialist
• theorists, on the one hand, and the utilitarian individual­
ists on the other. As a positivist moral philosopher work­
ing sociologically, Durkheim's prime intention was to dia­
lectically resolve impasses between opposing polarities in
• a new and compelling synthesis. Now, while Parsons did see 
that Durkheim rejected the doctrinal claims of both the 
Utilitarian economists and the socialists on the grounds 
that they similarly apotheosized the very moral anarchy to
• which he was so opposed, Parsons neglected to see that Durk­
heim agreed with the socialists that our present transition­
al crisis was historically specific, and derived basically 
from the modern separation of the economy from the polity.
• Durkheim spent many pages, as we have in part two of Book 
Two, comparing and contrasting communist and socialist theo­
ry, and specifically set aside communist "theodicies" and 
"therapuetics" as unsuited to the historical specifics of
• our modern crisis. So, misled by his neglect of Durkheim's 
historical perspective, Parsons seized upon Durkheim's gen­
eric doctine of homo duplex,failed to see its genetic 
framework, and then mistakenly insisted that Durkheim em­
• braced an ethical and political position which Durkheim him­
self explicitly rejected. But, as we have discovered, the 
fault does not lie with Parsons alone, for Durkheim's doc­
trine of the insatiability of the sensual appetites of the
• organic ego was also fundamentally flawed. 
4. Conclusion 
In truth, Durkheim's polemics against opposing cultural
• traditions were incomplete--I mean he simply did not go far 
enough in rejecting their shared images of the pre-sociali­
zed ego. Instead of acquiescing in the rhetorical bifurca­
tion of man	 into egoistic organic and moral-social halves,
•	 Durkheim's dial~tical sociologism should have led him to 
reject this cornerstone of modern thought altogether. But, 
•
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here as elsewhere, Durkheim's inherited Cartesian dualism 
was reenforced by the oppositions between individual and so­
• ciety embraced by Utilitarian and Romantic alike. And back 
of these common oppositions may be detected the gnostic gulf 
between Geist and Welt which permeates almost all these dis­
cussions. Unfortunately, Durkheim took over the notion of 
• the pre-socialized individual of his opponents, and simply 
inverted the valuation. 
Now, we would do well to recall that the intimate link­
age between "Reason" and the "Individual" in Utilitarian and 
• Rationalist philosophy, and between the "Individual" and the 
subjectivity and emotional inner feeling of angst in Romantic 
and Idealistic philosophy, both placed enormous emphasis upon 
the generic elements of the abstracted, generic individual. 
• This was also true of French philosophy--Durkheim spoke of 
his countrymen sometimes as "lone wolves," given to a suspi­
cious isolation and "fierce individualism"~ this was especial- i 
ly true of the radical wing of the Enlightenment philosophes.
• But what these cultural traditions, in their common opposi­
tion to the social organicism and inter-personal ethics of 
the lingering Catholic cultural tradition, had raised so high, 
Durkheim placed low. Yet, like them, Durkheim retained the
• "cult of the (moralized) person" as the prime source of value 
integration in modern "organic solidarity." Instead. of the 
pre-socialized individual as the prime carrier of modern val­
ues, Durkheim polemicized against the generic ego, the lower 
• and lesser half of homo duplex, as inherently amoral, egoist­
ic, driven by insatiable passions, and as irrefrangibly des­
tructive. As noted earlier, in this process Durkheim demon­
strated the possibility of derivation of autonomous indivi­
• dualism from "realistic" rather than "nominalist" premises. 
However, in the last analysis, it is generally a prime 
rhetorical mistake, especially when engaged in as significant 
a civilizational debate as Durkheim was, to tacitly incorpor­
• ate crucial premises of your opponents. For then the very 
same premises one seeks to destroy in one's opponents come 
•
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back to haunt you also. Rhetorical incorporation is thus a 
two-edged sword. The only real alternative is to refuse to 
• even to begin to enter into the other's closed conceptual 
world, to reject crucial misleading premises altogether, 
and to start to build up another world independently. I 
propose that it only undermined Durkheim's radical new start 
• to incorporate the notion of the organic ego as the crucial 
category, even if he did invert his opponents valuation £l 
assigning it demonic qualities. Ultimately, even though it 
was a clever but misconceived rhetorical device, Durkheim's 
• rhetorical incorporation of a negative image of the pre-so­
cialized ego admitted in the backdoor some of the very ele­
ments against which he had so resolutely taken up arms in the 
first place. As a consequence, Durkheim's highly significant
• attempt at dialetical resolution failed on its own terms. Un­
fortunately, much of the rest of Durkheim's system suffered 
as a result; especially his first explanation of the sources 
of egoism and insatiability underlying modern forms of sui­
• cide. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
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B. Homo Duplex as a Biological Mistake 
Everyone recognizes that the needs of the body are \
•	 limited •.• physical pleasure cannot increase inde- . 
finitely (DL:238). 
• 
Although his doctrine was not unambiguous, Durkheim 
often equated the pre-socialized individual with the organ­
• 
ic ego, with the bio-psychological level of existence. As 
has often been said, man's inheritance is double--both bio­
logical and cultural. But Durkheim hypothesized (eg. see 
Soc:242) that the source of limitless desires is the organ­
• 
ic ego. At various points (see Moral Education), Durkheim 
characterized the infant, driven by passionate and egotist­
ic desires, as an undisciplined being, almost an animal. 
Durkheim's two-storied image of man tended to locate our 
dark and self-destructive drives in the lower story, in the 
organic ego. Thus, Durkheim often tended to revert back to 
• 
the very position which his own sociologistic logics had 
previously confuted--namely, that the source of this crucial 
• 
"infinity of dreams and desires" was biological. In short, 
Durkheim's positivist analogy with the older moral notions 
of sin and evil anchored the' latter in the sensual appetites. 
However, clearly this notion of a pre-socialized in­
dividual is	 as much an abstraction as the more virtuous En­
lightenment images of the generic individual in the "state 
of nature."	 Indeed, Durkheim's polemics against the utili­
•
 
tarian and Romantic individualists apply equally to his own
 
•
 
first image of man as homo duplex. And if this deeply nega­

tive and accusatory image of human nature was a rhetorical
 
mistake, it is also a biological mistake as well. Why? First,
 
because this doctrine assumes that the organic ego is gener­

ic--that is, it is the same across all forms of life. But 
if.the ego is the organic entity which seeks first and fore­
most the survival of the organism, how can it be self-des­
•
 
tructive? Is life itself destructive, unharmonious? In gener­

al, I see little to be gained by anchoring explanations of 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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our present troubles retroactively in the self-destructive­
ness of either human or organic nature. Moreover, I see lit­
tle to be gained in anchoring explanations of specifically 
human action in lower biological categories, largely because 
biological phenomena are not specific to man. r~nerally speak­
ing, biology is a constant for man. One cannot then hope to 
explain specifically human action in non-human terms; this 
would be illogical. For what would be one's previous differ­
entia specifica of man-as-man? 
If pressed, I would propose that the defining charact­
eristic of man as an evolutionary species is culture. Man is 
the cultural animal; man is the creature who dwells in his 
own images. To uncritically identify the human ego, much less 
the human person, with animal egos, with the generic biologi­
cal ego as such, with the very vital source of life itself, 
advances our understanding of ourselves and our rather uni­
que predicaments very little. How can we ignore the evident 
evolutionary fact that if, indeed, man is a separate, highly 
complex, and powerful species, then this multiple bio-psycho­
socio-cultural achievement must necessarily have radically 
changed our organic egos? Even our organic constitutions have 
been changed in this evolutionary process. In sum, reduction­
ism must be set aside, here and elsewhere. I repeat: man's 
essence cannot be equated with the biological ego as such, 
for such a symbolic equation does little or nothing to ex­
plain the uniqueness of man himself. 
In truth, reductionistic explanations are largely 
pseudo-answers, for they are too easy; instead of illumina­
ting, they merely explain away problems. One has the answer 
before one begins; it is not necessary to penetrate the act­
ual details if one already possesses (or is possessed by) 
THE ANSWER. Biological reductionism is so illogical because 
it is so univocal--all the diversity of reality is forced 
into one mold. Moreover, reductionism is non-empirical (un­
der the guise of a radical empiricism) because it simply ig­
nores the evidence; it constantly makes unwarranted jumps 
•
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from lower levels to higher levels and back again. Is it not 
ironic that biological reductionism crept in the backdoor,
• unseen, in one of the pioneering works of the very sociologi­
cal theorist who insisted that we recognize the emergent and 
sui generis nature of society and culture? 
Most important for our present purposes, however, is 
• the fact that Durkheim himself acknowledged that biological 
needs are capable of being satisfied. Indeed, the instinc­
tually based sensual appetites, whether for food, sex, or 
whatever, are the very model of satiability.
• Among animals this limitation comes of itself because 
• 
the animal's life is essentially instinctive. Every in­
stinct, in fact, is part of a chain of connected move­
ments which unfolds its links under the impulse of a 
determinate stimulant, but which stops when it comes to 
an end. All instinct is bounded because it responds to 
purely organic needs and because these organic needs 
• 
are rigorously defined. It is always a matter either of 
eliminating a definite quantity of useless or harmful 
substances which encumber the organism, or of introdu­
cing a definite quantity of substances which repair what 
the functioning of the organs has destroyed. The power 
of assimilation of a living body is limited and this 
• 
limits the corresponding needs. This limitation is there­
fore built into the organism and controls its behavior. 
Moreover, the animal has no way of evading this pattern. 
The power of reflection is not yet developed enough to 
symbolize what is or what was and to set new goals for 
activity beyond those spontaneously achieved. This is 
whyexcesses are rare. When beasts have eaten enough to 
satisfy hunger, they seek no more. When sexual desire 
is met, they are in repose (Soc:240-1). 
In the same vein, Durkheim repeatedly observed (eg. S:246)
• that the organic needs of animals are physiologically and e­
cologically limited. That is, needs on the level of the or­
ganic ego are both formed and constrained by the amount of 
resources available in any given environment, and by the in­
• herent limitations in processing ability of any given organ­
ism. Thus, Durkheim rightly observed that animals live in a 
state of equilibrium or relative balance both in terms of 
their own built-in limitations, and the possible resources
• or "carrying capacity" of their supporting habitats. There­
• 
•
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fore, I oppose one of Durkheim's theses to another, and pro­
pose that the disruptive element of insatiable desires cannot 
legitimately be blamed upon the organic ego and its sensual 
appetites, since they are doubly restricted. 
Moreover, Durkheim noted that it is only when sensual 
appetites become morbid that they become insatiable. In the 
normal case, when needs are met, they become temporarily ex­
tinguished, as the rat psychologists say. How much, for exam­
ple, can anyone of us eat? (It makes little sense to argue 
that since eating is a regularly recurring need, that it is 
therefore potentially insatiable). Now, those who eat beyond 
all reason (satiation) are soon faced with illness; they are 
treated medically in terms of glandular deficiencies, and so 
on. In the popular vernacular, the rhetorical question is: 
"ya got a tapeworm in there, buddy?" Those who pursue sexual 
stimulation beyond normal limits are also suspected of psycho­
biological imbalance, Durkheim argued: 
It is well-known that insatiability is a sign of mor­
bidity. Normal man ceases to be hungry when he has ta­
ken a certain amount of nourishment; iiik~ the glutton 
who cannot be satisfied. Healthy peopleAmotion, but at 
the end of a period of exercise they like to rest. The 
demabulatory maniac experiences the need of. perpetual­
ly moving about without stop or rest; nothing satisfies 
him. In its normal state sexual desire is aroused for 
a time, then is appeased. With the erotomaniac there 
are no limits (Soc:240). 
As the "marginalists" in psychology and the theory of 
economic wants noted in the late nineteenth century, in the 
normal case each additional increment of "pleasure units" 
further extinguishes desire, so that one may plot a curve of 
rl.sl.ng and then rapidly falling economic "want." Influenced 
by the analogy with biological and psychological morbidity 
--that is, the lack of satiability or "marginal incremental­
ism" of wants--when Durkheim encountered an ethos of insatia­
ble desires on such a massive scale in the modern world, his 
deep affinity with biological analogies led him to mistaken­
ly assume that modern "moral anarchy" must be due to the same 
order of cause. But, if insatiability is indeed a sign of 
morbidity, can this legitimately be considered as due to the 
•
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• 
insatiable sensual appetites of the organic ego breaking 
through the upper-level of social constraint and moral dis­
• 
cipline? Or, on the contrary, is the only legitimate socio­
cultural mode of explanation to explore the historically 
specific sources of the presence of cultural sanctions for 
absolute individualism and a legitimized "infinity of dreams 
and desires?" 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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C. Homo Duplex as ~ Sociological Mistake 
• Preface. Not only was Durkheim's first installment of his 
doctrine of man as homo duplex a rhetorical and biological 
mistake, but I believe it to have been a basic sociological 
mistake as well. Why? Because if human conscience is basi­
• cally different from animal instinct, then we ought to sear­
ch for the sources of egoism and insatiability in varying
than .
cultural mandates ratherA 1n terms of a res1dual hangover 
from the biological order. Because sociologists ought to
• reverse the causal order, and instead of acquiescing in the 
old 11otion of the determination of human action by biology 
and psyche, we should be demonstrating instead the ways 
culture impinges on biological structure and processes. Be­
• cause we ought to generate a sociological way of looking at 
the generation of needs and desires, especially as these un­
derpin economic action. Because the progress of social sci­
ence depends upon the substitution of sociocultural explana­
• tions for psychological and biological reductions. And be­
cause Durkheim himself later shifted his emphasis from the 
insatiability of the ego to its privatized autistic exist­
ence. We shall explore this critical shift from anomos to
• alogos in the following chapter. Let us now briefly explore 
the sociological flaws in Durkheim's early doctrine of man 
as homo duplex. 
• 1. Animal Instinct Versus Human Conscience 
At various points in Suicide and other works, Durkheim 
contended that man is not governed by the automatic, built-in, 
limitations of animals' instinctually-based needs. While the
• organic appetites of animals are constrained ~ internal ~­
siological or ecological equilibrium, the socially and cul­
turally generated desires of human beings are, because they 
move in the realm of the ideal, potentially unlimited. The
• relations of man to his environment ~' for the most part, 
socially and culturally defined, and thus, without built-in 
•
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automatic, natural limits. Even though we are part animal, 
we are also part persons at the same time, and the major
• part of our personality, as opposed to the privatized de­
sires of the organic ego, is composed of those impersonal 
and ideal elements embodied in symbolic culture. Sociocul­
tural desires thus enjoy a freedom unknown to nature, for
• to a great extent, man defines his own world. 
In a particularly cogent series of passages in So~ial­
ism, representative of his oft-repeated statements, Durkheim 
observed that man was not limited in the same way as animals
• because instinct does not play such an overweening role in 
man's life. Rather, the "awakening of reflection," of con­
science, means that human desires are generated on another 
level--the sociocultural historical level.
• But it is not the same with man, precisely because
 
•
 
instincts play a lesser role in him. Strictly speak­

ing, the quantity of material nourishment absolutely
 
necessary for the physical sustenance of human life
 
could be considered definite and determinable, al­

though its determination is less precise than in the
 
preceding cases and there is more room for a free com­

•
 
bination of desires. For beyond this indispensable
 
minimum--which satisfies the need on the instinctive
 
level--reflection, more alert, glimpses better condi­

tions which appear as desirable ends and which invite
 
activity. Yet it is clear that appetites of this kind
 
sooner or later meet a boundary theymnnot overstep.
 
•
 
But how to fix the quantity ofwell-being, comfort, lux­

ury, that a human being ought not to pass? Nothing is
 
found either in the organic or psychological constitu­

tion of man which sets a limit to such needs. The func­

tioning of an individual life requires only that he
 
halt here rather than there, that he satisfy himself
 
•
 
at little cost or otherwise. The proof is that such
 
needs have continued to develop in the course of his­

tory, and have found increasingly complete satisfact­

ion, and nevertheless, the average state of health has
 
not diminished. But as there is nothing within an in­

•
 
dividual which constrains these appetites, they must
 
surely be contained by some force exterior to him, or
 
else they would become insatiable--that is, morbid.
 
Either knowing no limits, they become a source of tor­

ment for man, irritating and plaguing him in a pursuit
 
without possible end, or there must be outside the in­

dividual some power capable of stopping them, disciplin­
ing them, fixing a limit that nature does not (Soc:241). 
•
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Further, Durkheim observed that in man's world, because it 
is not physically limited, the goals we embrace are poten­
• tially limitless. One of the hidden problems here, of cour­
se, is that if society is the only possible constraining 
force, it is equally true that society and culture are also 
the very source of the potentially insatiable desires in the
• first place! For through the "hyper-spiritual" medium of 
society, as we discovered in Book One, man "ascends from the 
kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom." 
In short, society, through the moral regulation it
• institutes and applies, plays, as far as supraorganic life is concerned, the same role that instinct fills 
with respect to physical existence. It determines and 
it rules what is left undetermined. The system of in­
stincts is the discipline of the organism, just as mo­
ral disclp"lIne is the instInctiVe system of social ITfe*
• (Soc: 244) . Our basic problem then becomes: what is the nature and 
source of these needs? If these are said to be biological in 
nature, they are relatively unproblematic: and in any case, 
• we have already set this possibility aside. For organic needs 
are the very paradigm of satiability, of "marginal increment­
alism." Alternatively, was it Durkheim's main view that be­
cause of man's higher level moral and intellectual existence, 
• potentially insatiable organic needs are released from lower 
level instinctual controls? But this premise ("since in our 
hypothesis these needs are limitless"--Soc:242) simply pre­
sumes that organic needs are also potentially insatiable. 
• But we have just seen that they are not: only in a morbid 
state can organic needs become limitless. Then did Durkheim's 
guiding premise become that it is not organic needs after all 
erupting from lower levels that is the problem, but rather 
• that the root of our problem is an entirely new set of needs, 
not biological at all, but sociocultural in origin? Durkheim 
himself never made his position entirely consistent or clear. 
For example, he stated: 
• But in reality all needs exceeding simply physical ne­cessities are unlimited, for there is nothing within 
the organism-that imposes ~ bounda~ Therefore, in 
order for them not to be w1thout end--that is, so that 
•
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they are not forever unsatisfied--there must be for­
ces outside of the individual, in society, which 
hold them in check, and, with authority acknowled­
•	 ged by all, indicate what is the proper standard * (Soc: 27~). 
But, again, why are all needs exceeding physical necessi­
ties unlimited? I repeat: what is the source of this insa­
• tiability? Is it because organic needs, freed from strict in­
stinctual and ecological control in man, erupt and disorient 
human egos? Or is it because there is an entirely new set of 
supraorganic (sociocultural) desires, which overlay and re­
• 
direct human strivings? Only the second possibility is socio­
logically significant. 
Only the second possibility makes real sense if we remem­
ber that Durkheim himself insisted on grounding his argument 
• on the level of man's generic species essence--that is, man­
as-man, in contrast to lower biological forms, is character­
ized by an "awakened reflection," the growth of conscience 
and consciousness, the striving for higher ideals than mere 
• survival, in short, all that marks the intense new sociocul­
tural life of this distinctive species. I wish to emphasize 
that £y first theoretically grounding his argument on the le­
vel of society and culture as general evolutionary emergents,
• Durkheim indicates that these potentially insatiable desires 
are not to be reduced to lower level organic needs. Rather, 
the "awakening of conscience" signifies that such desires 
are not idiosyncratic but are culturally generated, that is, 
• they are generally mandated aspirations. After all, man is 
the cultural animal. 
In sum, how can we hope to reconcile the social and 
moral origins of the human individual with its supposed insa­
• tiability? How can Durkheim legitimately seek to maintain 
his stark dichotomy between the individual (as the amoral 
source) and the social (as the source of moral rules), when 
he himself argued that the very foundations of the human in­
• dividual emerges in evolutionary terms only from sociocultur­
al processes? Durkheim simply cannot have it both ways, and 
indeed, his opposition is much more consistent when he spoke 
•
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as if the amoral passions derived from the organic ego, that 
the pre-socialized child is little better than an animal • 
In that	 case, however, as noted earlier, I see little virtue 
in identifying the human ego with the biological ego as such, 
and thus pursuing the limited idea that our modern troubles 
are really endemic to the human condition itself. Let us next 
cast the explanatory problem in better terms. 
2.	 Which Way the Causal Arrow: From Biology to Culture 
or From Culture to Biology? 
Durkheim's ascetic preoccupation with repressing the 
inordinate desires of the "enemy within" usurped recognition 
of potentially more significant wider conceptual horizons. 
Given the logic of his theoretical grounding of man's evolu­
tionary status as the first and only sociocultural historical 
animal, any invidious dichotomization between culture and bio­
logy is hereafter subject to critical review by the crucial 
fact that, by definition, man's sociocultural ~chievement has 
changed the very structure of his organic inheritance. What 
we perhaps sometimes forget when we repeat the old formula 
that man's inheritance is double--both biological and cultural 
--is the critical fact that the sociocultural level of man's 
achievement feedsback down and alters even his psycho-biolo­
gical makeup and processes. 
In other words, the proper sociological procedure should 
be to reverse the causal arrow traditionally leading from bio­
logy to culture, for higher levels do influence lower levels. 
Thus, even in terms of his biological constitution, man is 
not simply an organism like any other, for even his organic 
form and internal processes have been socioculturally alter­
ed. Unlike the many plants and animals which man has bred, 
however, man has made himself. It used to be assumed, for exam­
ple, that the autonomic nervous system functioned independent­
ly of the central nervous system, which is why it was so named. 
But we now know that mental concentration can alter and bring 
under the control of the subject his heart beat rate, blood 
• 
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pressure, even brain rhythms, and so on. But the spiritual 
technologies first worked out by "other-worldly ascetics"
• such as the Hindu yogis might have better alerted us to the 
empirical fact that culture does influence biology. If man 
is, by definition, the sociocultural animal, then we ought 
to search for the ways in which our culturalness impinges
• upon our naturalness; in short, the varied ways in which cul­
ture redirects biological form and processes. Not only does 
culture and society restrict the immediate satiation of or­
ganic needs, but it also generates myriad other desires and
• activities that tend to crowd out simply organic acts from 
the center stage of human experience. In large part, these 
same organic needs, while their imperiousness is weakened 
(rather than being intensified £l being released from pre­
• vious instinctual controls), are redirected and rearticula­
ted ~ specific social conditions and changing cultural as­
pirations. To maintain Durkheim'~ two level model of man, 
with insatiable and egoistic passions erupting from lower
• organic levels, and either controlled or released on higher 
sociocultural levels, is simply sociologically untenable. 
Rather, the true sociocultural position would be to reverse 
the causal flow and specify the social and symbolic mechan­
• isms which feedback down and reorient lower psychological
 
•
 
and biological processes. Mauss's work, for example, on tech­

niques of the body (1973) is a largely ignored pioneering
 
work in this direction, as is the well known study by Zborow­

ski-- "Cultural Components in Responses to Pain" (1951). 
On a theoretical level, McCluhan (1962, 1964) has offered 
some important insights into the cultural and historical pat­
• 
terning of sensory ratios, and on the impacts of changing 
technological media on society and the image of man. And, of 
course, Weber, in his Sociology of Religion (1963, 1968), and 
his classic article "Religious Rejections of the ToVorld and 
• 
Their Direction" (1946) provides invaluable leads along these 
lines. Further, much valuable information can be found in 
the ethnological reports of anthropologists on the social pat­
•
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terning of organic activities, as well as from the phenomeno­
logical philosophers and social scientists.
• In retrospect, we need not feign surprise that, even as 
a pioneer sociologist who rightly insisted that social facts 
be explained socially, Durkheim's other concurrent role as a 
positivist moral philosopher led him to surreptitiously con­
• travene the very basic methodological rules that he himself 
laid down as the foundation of the Durkheimian school. For, 
by a sort of covert operation in the underground of his thought, 
Durkheim's positivism led him here (however much he roay have
• rejected the religious identification) to link in his system 
the source of modern human suffering to the "original sin" of 
our biological inheritance embodied in the inordinate desires 
expressed in the sensual appetites (the "world" and the
• "flesh"). What is surprising is that so few have noticed how 
inconsistent, especially in terms of his own methodological 
strictures, Durkheim was in regularly assigning some of the 
most dynamic elements of human action to that very abstraction
• --the lone, isolated, organic ego--which he had so powerfully 
criticized in the contract theorists and Utilitarian indivi­
dualists. Indeed, Durkheim's early dark doctrine got him in­
to the serious bind, as it does to all social thinkers who
• unwittingly insist on basing society and culture on biologi­
cal reductions, of proposing that the most significant and 
generative sources of human action are to be derived primar­
ily from such lower, non-human, or non-sociocultural levels.
• Besides running directly counter to his own notion of socie­
ty as an evolutionary emergent, and social facts as sui gen­
eris phenomena irreducible to lower levels of reality, Durk­
heim's sociologically inadmissible image of human nature as
• darkly destructive, egoistic, and insatiable, implicitly re­
duced society to the relatively passive role of constraining 
or redirecting the really critical biologically innate de­
sires.
• Perhaps Durkheim's multiple commitments here--extend­
ing a key Cartesian logic embedded in his own cultural tradi­
•
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tion, and rhetorically inverting the high valuation of the 
lone individual so insistently proclaimed by his constant 
polemical opponents, all the while advancing the claims of 
positivist moral science--barred complete and unconditional 
embrace	 of the fully sociological position. The ~ fully 
sociological position consistent with Durkheim's own stated 
methodology is that society and culture are to be considered 
as the crucially important generative and directive sources 
of the most significant aspects of human action. In sum, des­
pite the evident cultural and polemical functions served by 
this doctrine of the dualism of human nature, and the acknow­
ledged potency of his ever-proliferating series of "root di­
chotomies," originally anchored in the same image, nonethe­
less, Durkheim's other role as a positivist moral philosopher 
intruded too strongly here for us to follow him in his funda­
mental doctrine of the individual half of human nature as in­
herently insatiable. 
3.	 A Brief Sociological Look at the Generation of Needs and 
and Desires 
Since man "ascends from the kingdom of necessity to the 
kingdom of freedom" (see Book One) through the "hyper-spiri­
tual" genetic medium of symbolic culture, we make ourselves, 
in part, by constructing social schedules of the satisfaction 
of wants. Every society is engaged in negotiating a variable 
ratio in terms of available resources and the legitimacy of 
stratified wants, between organically generated needs (eg. 
food) and socioculturally generated desires (eg. status honor 
or charisma). For example, economic psychologies should be­
come more sociocultural by contrasting two aspects of the gen­
eral category of wants--I mean needs and desires. In general, 
needs can be considered "givens," which are relatively con­
stant, and thus comparatively fixed in their origins and po­
tential limits, while desires are socioculturally generated 
and, therefore, more variable from one society to another. 
Further, the character of the motivation behind each of these 
• 
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types of wants differs markedly--for wants in relation to 
survival needs may be viewed as stemming from "because of" mo­
tives, while sociocultural desires should·be seen as "in or­
• 
der to motives" (see Alfred Schutz, 1962). Thus, with needs 
we act "because of" some antecedent condition depriving us or 
forcing us, while with desires we act intentionally "in order 
to" consummate some future wish. Figure 5 graphically depicts 
these possibilities: 
~ needs Wants ~ desires 
• The squiggly line drawn between needs and desires indi­
cates that every society is constantly engaged in negotiating 
a variable ratio between the "given," relatively constant, and 
limited subsistence needs, and its own self-generated, special,
• and comparatively limitless cultural and social desires. It is 
this multivalency of human motivation that creates so much of 
the mystifying complexity o~ human action. In many societies, 
for example, much economic effort is directed not only toward
• subsistence needs but also toward the achievement of differen­
tial status and prestige. Even simple societies, sU9ported by 
little more than subsistence economies, regularly find enough 
surplus to devote to religious and ritual sacrifice, and even
• agonistic display (eg. the NorthY'lest Coast Indian "Potlatch"). 
Indeed, many have suggested over the years (eg.see Norman O. 
Brown, 1959, or Gerhard Lenski, 1974) that the authority of 
the sacred was necessary for the accumulation of economic sur­
pluses. On the other hand, even in our affluent economy, dom­
inated as we are by the almost unlimited and instantaneous 
gratification of desires, at least one quarter of our pOPt~la-lon 
lives precariously on the subsistence margin. ~or the rest,
• perennial problems such as food shortages, energy crises, in­
flation, and other unpleasant~ies of international market cap­
italism, rudely intrude,sometimes disastrously, upon the 
reveries of the American Dream. In sum; the central proposi­
• tion here again is that all societies are continuously enga­
ged in negotiating a variable ratio between organic needs 
•
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and sociocultural desires. Our sociocultural problem then be­
comes explaining the differential ways in which different ty­
pes of societies through history have negotiated these ratios, 
and the differential evolutionary outcomes. 
4. The Progress of Social Science Depends on the Substitution 
of	 SocioCultural Explanations for Biological and Psycho­
logical Reductions of Human Action 
As the first to teach a sociology course in France, as 
the founder of the first modern school of sociology, as the 
one who rightly insisted on the sui generis nature of social 
facts, as one of the pioneers who rightly rejected biological, 
psychological~ and philosophical claims on human action so suc­
cessfully as to help establish sociology as a fundamental dis­
• cipline, should we not have expected Durkheim to have been 
among the first to recognize that sociology cannot progress 
by being untrue to its main task? This is especially true in 
regard to Durkheim's failure to bring full clarity to the un­
certain relation between his doctrine of homo duolex and his 
schema of anomic and egoismic suicides in the modern world. 
Indeed, this irony is compourled if we recall that the concept 
of anomie in Suicide was hailed, along with the book itself,
• as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration of the au­
•	 .. 
tonomy of social facts. The irony is trebled if we remember 
that several decades later Merton used Durkheim's anomie (or 
at least his own minimally related version) to wage, once a­
• gain, polemical battle against biological and psychological 
red&tions of social behavior; especially against the Utilitar­
ians, the instinct theorists and the behaviorists, and even 
the Freudians (see the appendix to this dissertation). The
• concept of anomie has been repeatedly em910yed in the cause 
of attaining disciplinary autonomy by sharply criticizing 
the non-sociological and "transparently defective" explana­
tions of social action. The great hidden irony, of course,
• is that anomie itself has so often been based on either a 
biological or psychological reduction! 
•
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Indeed, was it not one of Parsons' essential theses 
in his great The Structure of Social Action that the advance 
of social science depends upon the progressive over-corning 
of "naturalistic" (ie. physical, biological, psychological, 
geographical, etc.) reductions of human action? Instead of 
invoking easy answers that ignore more than they illumine, 
social science only truly grows through explanations drawn 
properly in terms of sgecific sociocultural elements. 
Strangely, Durkheim's concept of anomie has become thorough­
ly psychologized. Should we not, on the contrary, follow 
• Durkheim's own advice to "explain the social socially," and 
thus attempt to account for anomie and egoisme in soci.ocul­
tural terms, rather than smuggling in subterranean biolo~i­
cal and psychological categories?
• This need to explain the social socially is especially 
great in terms of economic theory. Consider, for exa~ple, the 
almost universal presum9tion that economic action depends 
upon material scarcity, and the corresponding inability to
• satisfy many basic needs. Although most economists include 
scarcity of resources of material goods in their basic defi­
nitions of economic processes, many unfortunately seem to 
miss some of the deeper relations between scarcity and afflu­
• ence, between natural conditions and social "givens." It is 
not a law of nature that economically desirable goods must 
be scarce, for as we have discovered, the Scientific Techno­
Cultural Revolution of the twentieth century (see Nelson,
• 1968; Daniel Bell, 1973, among others) hes changed, to a 
great extent, this so-called "iron law." In an interesting 
article "Nature, Culture, and Scarcity," ~1anfred Stanley 
observes:
• If one were to ask for an expression, in a single sen­
• 
tence, of the main accomplishment and direction of the 
social sciences to date, a fair answer would be the 
progressive substitution of sociocultural explanations 
for those stressing the determinative influence of phys­
ical nature. It is thus ironic that so much of the ex­
plicit discussion of scarcity should still rest on the 
physical notion of natural resource deficiencies (1968: 
855) • 
•
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Even where material affluence abounds, socially desired and 
culturally valued goods and symbols shall probably be scarce. 
That is, socioculturally generated and directed desires, as 
opposed to organically given needs, precisely because thev 
are "ideal" and thus potentially unlimited, work in various 
ways to limit and make scarce these potent values and symbols. 
Inevitably, there are varying degrees of social participation 
in the collective "sacred fount of being." In short, it is in 
the very nature of social values and cultural symbols to be 
more or less scarce, to imply invidious distinctions, and 
thus to be differentially distributed. 
Indeed, there are two basic ways any group may attempt 
to raise their schedule of rewards: specialization and mono­
polization. The former concerns moral legitimacy, the latter 
structural position and material leverage. The first has to 
do with "social stocks of knowledge," and control of social 
"territories," while the second concerns control over natural 
resources and physical territories. Indeed, specialization 
and monopolization can be considered as two ohases of the 
same overall socioeconomic process--namelv, the resolution 
of comoetition and conflict in terms of the creation of ma­
terial, "human capital," or symbolic scarcity. Through spe­
cialization one attempts to make "human capital" (knowledge 
and skills) scarce, while through monopolization one attempts 
to make natural environmental or technological resources, 
especially key communications and transportation nets, scarce. 
And, of course, one of the prime "latent functions" of so­
cial hierarchy or stratification systems is to make symbol­
ically validated deeds or even one's own "being" "sacred." 
Therefore, the notion of perennial economic scarcity 
must shift--for it does not seem quite as necessary tha.t ma­
terial goods and services be as scarce as constitutive sym­
bols and values. In other words, above the level of needs as 
generic biological givens, one major function of material 
goods and even some services is to satisfy higher-level de­
sires, to symbolically validate one's "pipeline to charisma." 
• 
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Of course, when certain material goods and privileges corne 
to symbolize key values, then they too shall probablY under­
• go forced or artificial scarcity. Herein lies an important 
key to an in-depth understanding not only of primitive and 
archaic economies, but also to the great progress of modern 
economic systems. Hopefully, this shift in persgective con­
• cerning the deeper origins of scarcity should help to remove 
us from the humanly constructed "iron cages" of the reduct­
ionistic determinism plied by both the critical radicals 
(Marxists) and the Utilitarians. As Stanley suggests" ...
• any shift away from nature to culture in mode of eX9lanation 
involves a retreat from the assumption of "iron determinism" 
toward that of relative freedom of choice" (1968: 855-6) • 
The economy may thus be viewed as a kev nexus between
• the material ann symbolic spheres of society. In sum, every 
economv is simultaneously engaged in the production and dis­
tribution of desired goods, services, privileges, and valued 
symbols. All economies thus have dual functions, for through
• the economy we witness the allocation of desired material and 
svmbolic resources. In these ways, societies cr~ate scarcitv 
of various sorts, and so intensify mandaten desires that may 
feedback and even take on the imperative psychoph~'sical sta­
• tus of organic needs. Therein lies a key to the second schema 
of suicide as sanctioned by extreme cultural values. 
• 
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D. Durkheim's Shift From Anomos to Alogos 
•
 
My discovery of Durkheim's shift from a schema of ano­

• 
mie and egoisme as caused by the absence of social constraint 
toward one based on the presence of cultural sanctions, is 
paralle~dby the discovery of Durkheim's shift in emphasis 
in his doctrine of homo duplex away from the presence of 
insatiable desires in the pre-socialized ego to simply the 
absence of moral rules and rational concepts. In terms of 
the doctrine of homo duplex, then, the organic ego is more 
• 
significant for Durkheim's suicide schemas not so much as 
the source of the crucial disorganizing insatiable nrives, 
but rather as merely representing the absence of universal­
izable moral rules and abstract concepts. The latter premise 
•
 
is more acceptable to my mind, and, indeed, this is the di­

rection in which Durkheim's thought tended to develop. Thus, 
there is an inverted correlation between these two parallel 
• 
~olarities of presence and absence of insatiable desires 
and cultural sanctions; for as Durkheim moved away from lo­
• 
cating insatiable desires in the organic ego, the way was 
opened to locate them in cultural values themselves. 
As we discovered in Book One, while Durkheim originally 
grounded insatiablity in the pre-socialized ego, later he 
•
 
tended to argue that the suffering inherent in the human con­

dition derives mostly from the impossibility of simultaneous­

ly satisfying the desires of both halves of human nature.
 
While egocentricity represented a constant negative factor
 
•
 
in both Durkheim's early and later notions of the dualism
 
of human nature, the origins and nature of this anomic or
 
alogical factor differed basically in the two versions. In
 
his early formulation, Durkheim anchored insatiability--as
 
•
 
the absence of determinate form and natural limit (the sine
 
qua non of morality)--in the dark and destructive desires
 
of the organic or pre-socialized ego. tVhereas the earlier
 
notion implied the over-coming of the demonic drives of the
 
isolated organic ego, Durkheim's later doctrine (see DHN) 
grew more pessimistic, tracing the source of the endemic 
•
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dis-ease of the human condition to the two warring halves 
of human nature. Further, in the early doctrine, the insa­
tiable passions represent a chaotically expansive force, 
while in the latter version the purely idiosyncratic ego 
represented an inward turning, privatized existence, which 
can only be pulled from its localized orbit by the intense­
ly powerful and impersonal energies of society and culture. 
Now, in the first installment of this crucial doctrine, 
the anomie of the amoral ego represented the active "contra­
diction of all morality" (DL:431). It seemed that sociocul­
tural nomos was actively opposed by anarchic, anti-nomian 
forces bubbling up from the organic ego. In the latter form­
ulation, the relatively passive alogic of the pre-socialized 
individual is opposed not so much to sociocultural nomos as 
to the universal logos. Perhaps Durkheim's guiding metaphors 
early in his career were order and chaos, or more precisely, 
his root analogy was society is to the individual as order 
is to chaos. As so often happens, however, the very process 
of unfolding new applications of a guiding analogy leads, by 
the very nature of the ever-more diverse empirical properties 
encountered, to progressive shifts in the connotational or 
metaphorical "load." Toward the end of his career, especial­
ly in terms of The Elementary Forms and "The Dualism of Human 
Nature," Durkheim's guiding rhetorical polarity seemed to 
have shifted on its metaphorical axes from order versus 
chaos to universality versus particularity:or, in other 
words, from nomos "ersus anomos, to logos versus alogos. 
Thus, instead of the anomic ego, in the latter version we 
may speak of the alogic ego. 
In the process of extending his root dichotomies (see 
Book One), Durkheim's model shifted slightly but significant­
lyon its rhetorical axes. One of the first consequences 
relevant to our present interests is that insatiability was 
no longer the simple characteristic product of the inherent­
ly insatiable inordinate desires of the pre-socialized ego. 
Rather than acting as the source of destructive desires, the 
•
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organic ego came to be portrayed primarily as circumscribed 
by its own inherent limitations, which are insurmountable 
• without the intense fusion with society and energization by 
symbolic culture. The antagonism between the two halves of 
human nature was, of course, still present and even heighten­
ed. Now, rather than the insatiability of the non-social
• half of human nature being the cause of man's endemic inner 
torment, however, it was instead the impossibility of simul­
taneously satisfying the conflicting demands of both the 
physically privatized organic ego and the claims of society
• on the moralized and rationalized person. These dee?ening 
oppositions between the privatized physical sensations and 
sensual appetites of the autistic experience of the organic 
ego versus publicly communicable collective representa­
• tions, expressed in terms of universalizable moral rules and 
rational concepts, moved to the center stage of Durkheim's 
thought. While his earlier concern with the insatiability of 
the pre-socialized ego faded in the background, it was por­
• trayed instead as simply fatally circumscribed in its own 
private orbit. 
To Durkheim, since physical sensations and appetites 
are necessarily rooted in the organism, this self-limiting
• particularity meant that they cannot, by definition, there­
by rise above their purely private sensational level to wider 
and higher validity. By contrast, since intellectual concepts 
and moral rules are collective both in their origin and na­
• ture, they tend to become universalized. Note that Durkheim 
specifically acknowledged that biological needs--thirst, hun­
ger, etc.--can be satisfied; yet by virtue of their purely 
physical base, such need satisfactions remain egocentric and
• thus irrefrangibly privatized. 
Thus, the outlines of Durkheirn's later tragic vision 
of the human condition emerged, reminiscent in its pathos to 
the earlier emphasis on insatiability, but now directed in­
• stead to the inevitable discord between the two warring hal­
ves of our own nature. Rather than portraying the ego and 
the person, the physical and the moral, the private and the 
•
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public, the concrete and the universal halves of our beings 
as complementary, Durkheim saw these forces as waging an e­
•
 
ternal struggle for ascendancy over our inner lives. As Durk­

• 
heim deepened the tension in man's inner life by insisting 
that the this antinomy is irreconcilable, he came round again 
to the problem of insatiability, though in a different way. 
For now man's predicament is that he is caught in almost a 
fatal "double bind." Now man's inner torment comes from his 
inability to simultaneously satisfy both the biological and 
cultural halves of our inheritance. The only path from the 
•
 
eros of the autistic ego to the universal logos is to tran­

•
 
scend our isolated and limited physical existence through
 
the "hyper-spiritual" medium of society, culture, and his­

tory. I must emphasize, once again, that the earlier key prob­

lem of insatiability had been reformulated, and was rooted
 
in the later installment of Durkheim'~ doctrine of homo duplex 
in the eternal contradiction and inner division between the 
• 
two halves of our natures, 
E!Y. one side--the organic. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
rather than, as formerly, in sim­
•
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CHAPTER TWO 
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF DURKHEIM'S CAUSAL MODEL 
Preface. Besides critically reviewing Durkheim's early no-
tion of anomic insatiability as stemming from the release 
of the appetites of the organic half of homo duplex, we shall
• next submit Durkheim's explanatory or causal model to criti-
cal scrutiny. l~en this double task is completed, I suggest 
that we shall conclude that the first schema of suicide, 
which implicitly rested on these early parallel notions of
• homo duplex and abstracted, general evolutionary mechanistic 
causality, should be set aside not only because these premi-
ses were logically flawed, but also because they were later 
abandoned or modified by Durkheim himself. In Book One, I con-
• structed a new and viable portrait of Durkheim's evolving mo-
del, which was couched primarily in terms of the elementary 
forms. Wher9as I concentrated there on elucidating his theory 
of generic symbolic process, now I wish to focus attention
• primarily, upon his causal model in its more general aspects. 
Now, no less a leading light than William Runciman 
(1969) contends that Durkheim's causal model, in contrast to 
that utilized by Weber in his sociology of religion for exam-
• ple, was "fundamentally misconceived. II While I remain uncon-
vinced that Runciman and others have perceived precisely 
what Durkheim's causal model actually implied (see Book One), 
nonetheless, both the general confusion and perennial criti-
• cismlead me to agree with Durkheim himself that such univer-
sality of opinion cannot be wholly mistaken. 
In terms of the causal model underlying Durkheim's first 
schema of anomie and egoisme, what I find most flawed are the
• mechanistic and anti-phenomenological premises, and the lack 
of historical specificity. Indeed, as we shall discover, these 
• 
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perspectives are related. While not rent by the serious er­
rors so often attributed to him, nevertheless, Durkheim's 
early	 dominant notion of a rather one-way causality running 
from material substructure to symbolic superstructure, his 
positivistic slighting of phenomenological processes, his 
general evolutionary abstractness and neglect of specific 
types	 of historical breakthroughs and transformations, irre­
trievably flawed his first implicit causal explanation of 
anomic and egoismic suicides as he described them in the mo­
dern world. 
Let us first briefly outline Durkheim's causal model 
in its more general and evolutionary aspects which are rele­
vant to our reconstruction of his specific schemas of sui­
cide. Let us also compare and contrast Durkheim's model with 
others in his own day--I mean those of Levy-Bruhl, Marx, and 
Simmel. Then we shall critically review an interrelated set 
of three theses which held Durkheim back in 1897 from break­
ing through to full and clear recognition of the revolution­
ary theoretical and historical significance of his second 
schema for the human sciences. 
A. A	 Brief Review of Durkheim's Causal Model 
1.	 Substructural Social Morphological Processes Linked With 
Superstructual Cultural Processes 
Contrary to prejudicial portrayals of him as Platoni­
zing or hypostatizing "social realist," one of the basic me­
thodological rules of Durkheim's school was always to anchor 
analysis of social facts in a geographically determinable 
substratum. 
One of the rules we follow is that, in studying social 
phenomena •.•• we take care not to leave them up in 
the air, but always to relate them to a definite sub­
stratum--to a human group occupying a determinate por­
tion of geographically representable space (1971:809). 
In Book One, we explored at considerable length how Durkheim 
undertook to link social morphological processes with collect­
ively symbolic processes. We saw that Durkheim posited social 
•
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energies and moral implosions as key intervening variables 
between "material" substructures and "ideal" superstructures.
• We saw that Durkheim sequentially proposed that social mor­
phological implosions moralize egos, that social life tends 
to become organized around the two different communal and 
economic or individualist phases. Then this regular alterna­
• tion of sociocultural "currents" of energy generates funda­
mental tensions in the whole symbolic and phenomenological 
fields between the sacred and the profane which serve to 
further organize and energize life in terms of a mounting
• series of classificatory polarities. Then, Durkheim suggest­
ed, we discover that these sacred and 9rofane polarities 
become extended to all spheres of life in a multi-levelled 
system of resonating symbolic equations. Finally, Durkheim
• suggested that regular transformations between these two 00­
posed spheres occur in terms of rituals which serve to res­
tore harmony to a divided and sufferinq microcosm. 
Now, Durkheim's dialectical genius in over-coming long­
• standing dichotomies led him here to embrace both a "mater­
ia1istic" factor (the social morphological base) and an "ideal­
istic" factor (the focus on moral and symbolic processes). 
l~i1e he anchored his analyses of social facts in an empiri­
• cally verifiable material social body, much of the ambiguity 
in Durkheim's causal model comes because his central concern 
was clearly always with the "second level" moral and symbol­
ic processes. In this regard, Lukes observes:
• Durkheim's view of religion as socially determined led him to seek to establish causal connections be­
tween (morphological) features of the social struct­
ure and the content of religious beliefs and ritual 
practices--an attempt seen most clearly in his ac­
• 
count of the alleged social determination of the 
fundamental categories and forms of classification 
(1973:463-4) • 
Durkheim's later seminal works--such as Primitive 
Classification and The Elementary Forms-- clearly reveal 
• Durkheim's emerging causal model of the generic relations between social and cultural processes. We would do well to 
• 
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remember, in addition, that these generic links were also 
primarily genetic and evolutionary ones. Thus, the specific 
relations between structural and cultural phenomena changed 
in the	 course of societal evolution. Aware that he had been 
called	 a "materialist", as well as the "idealist" which oth­
ers like Parsons later would make of him, Durkheim himself 
responded in these terms: 
..• in order for collective representations to be in­
telligible, it is certainly necessary that they should 
originate from something, and since they cannot form 
a closed circle upon itself, the source from which 
they derive must be outside of them. Either the con­
science collective floats in a void, a kind of indes­
cribable absolute, or else it is connected to the rest 
of the world by a substratum upon which, consequently, 
it is dependent. Moreover, what can this substratum 
be made up of, if it is not the members of society, 
as they are combined socially-{-in-G~dden-s7--l-9-7-2a~-I--S-9-)-.---
2.	 Generic and Genetic-Evolutionary Relations Between Sub­
Structure and Superstructure 
In addition to his fundamental causal sequence of gen­
eric sociocultural process, it is absolutely critical to 
recognize that Durkheim'~ social morphological/collectively 
representational model was simultaneously anchored in a 
world-historical perspective which was both genetic and evo­
lutionary. Durkheim himself justified his genetic investiga­
tions (likening them to Descartes' "first circle" of certain­
ty) because he thought they were the only empirical way to 
reveal the fundamental generic and evolutionary relations 
between society, culture, and personality. Only in terms of 
the most elementary forms could we discover the generic so­
ciocultural factors fused with the genetic factors. 
Every tim6that we undertake to explain something human, 
taken at a given moment in history--be it a religious 
belief, a moral precept, a legal principle, an aes­
thetic style or an economic system--it is necessary to 
commence by going back to its most primitive and simple 
form, to try to account for the characteristics by 
which it was marked at that time, and then to show how 
it developed, and became complicated little by little, 
and how it became that which it is at the moment in 
question (EF:15). 
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Cartesian in influence, we should see Durkheim's genetic 
method of investigation as the sociological equivalent of 
that most potent weapon of modern philosophy--systematic 
doubt as the sure road to certainty. 
Further, we should not fail to recognize that by fus­
ing his generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations, Durk­
heim sought to find a paradigmatic ~-study in which there 
would be ~ one-to-one correspondence, as it were, between sym­
bolic forms and social forms, between the material substratum 
and the ideal superstructure. Where collective representations 
are deeply fused with the very structures of the group itself, 
Durkheim felt that he had found the "mono-cellular" form of 
sociocultural life, the template, as it were, which all sub­
sequent forms merely elaborated. As always, biological analo­
gies were very important to Durkheim (see Bellah, 1959: also 
Paul Hirst, 1973). 
Finally, in the broad, macro-evolutionary passages from 
"mechanical" to "organic solidarity," Durkheim perceived a 
whole series of fundamental sociocultural shifts, more or 
less corresponding to the underlying social morphological 
differentiations, in the content, form, and direction of 
development of collective symbolic forms. As early as 1893 
in The Division of Labor, Durkheim postulated a progressive 
tranformation of the fused, primitive, collective "sacro­
magical" consciousness into ever-more differentiated, auto­
nomous, abstract, universalistic, and rational collective 
symbolic forms. 
I must insist that those who persist in reading Durk­
heim's fundamental investigations as if they were solely or 
even primarily abstract, ahistorical, functional proposi­
tions, must ignore Durkheim's insistence that the intimate 
relations between society, culture, and the person are gen­
etically and historically constructed. Giddens rightly points 
out in this regard: 
••• Durkheim takes some pains to emphasize that the 
theory set out in The Elementary Forms is not to be 
•
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regarded as merely another version of "mechanical ma­
terialism," in which ideas are treated as "reflections II 
of social reality and hence are mere epiphenomena. 
There is no universal relationshio between systems of 
ideas and~heir infrastructures: the nature of this:re­
lationShrp is contingent upon the-revel of adVancement 
of society* (1972a:26-7). 
Seen another way, Durkheim's causal model was proces­
sual through and through; it rested upon a complex series of 
sequential equations. Durkheim was always primarily concern­
ed with the relations between long-term changes, and their 
short-term consequences, between social morpholoqical oroces­
ses and symbolic and moral processes. This processual ap­
proach was couched on both the micro and macro levels. Now, 
Durkheim's concern with the emergence of collectively symbol­
ic representations out of social morphological implosions 
on the micro social psychological level led him to postu­
late, on the macro-evolutionary level, a close and contin­
uing parallel between social morphological differentiation 
and the differentiation of symbolic forms. These parallel 
and spreading evolutionary differentiations out of the 
primitive sacral complex--which served as the womb of socie­
ty and culture--implied a series of key processual trans­
formations in symbolic culture. These included the progres­
sive movement from concrete to abstract symbolism, from 
particularistic, parochial or "tribal brotherhoods ll toward 
ever-widening structures of fraternization, toward the ex­
tension of the social bond and universalizable symbolic 
forms which became the basis of the civilizational bond,etc. 
This movement also implies a shift from the fused embedded­
ness of symbols and persons in the primitive sacral complex 
to their progressive autonomization and differentiation in 
complex societies, and so forth. In short, just as Durkheim 
postulated a horizontal continuum ranging from more or less 
fluid to crystallized (institutionalized) representations, 
so too he postulated a vertical or evolutionary continuum 
of sociocultural progress ranging from the most elementary, 
micro-level, fused, primitive, "sacral-magical ll collective 
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representations to the most differentiated, universalizable, 
autonomous, and rational symbolic forms on the world-histor­
• ical level. 
3. Durkheim Versus Levy-Bruhl 
• 
It is instructive to compare Durkheim's fusion of his 
• 
generic and genetic-evolutionary investigations in his causal 
model with another classic paradigm emerging from the same 
school--namely, Levy-Bruhl's characterization of the gap be­
tween primitive and modern mentality. Rather than contrast­
• 
ing and dichotomizing primitive (or tribal) and modern (or 
civilizational) thought and morality, as we might have expect­
ed him to do, and as his learned colleague Levy-Bruhl did, 
instead Durkheim emphasized their evolutionary continuity! 
As always, Durkheim sought to reconcile logical unity and 
historical diversity through the evolutionary notions of 
differentiation and universalization. 
For example, in a little known passage in The Elemen­
tary Forms, Durkheim argued of the relations between primi­
tive and modern symbolic forms: 
It is far from true that this mentality has no connec­
tion with ours. Our logic ~ born of this logic . ~ .
• 
between the logic of relig10us thought and the log1c 
of scientific thought there is no abyss. The two are 
made up of the same elements, thOugh inequally and 
differently developed*(EF:270-l). 
Almost alone among contemporary sociocultural thinkers, Robin 
• Horton has begun to properly emphasize this crucial aspect 
of Durkheim's thought. Speaking of a most important review 
by Durkheim, in the 1912 L'annee sociologique, of Levy-Bruhl's 
book Les Fonctions mentales dans les societies inferiures, and 
• comparing it to the formers'own Elementary Forms, issued in 
the same year, Horton suggests: 
Durkheim notes that both Levy-Bruhl and himself are 
concerned to explore the sense of the distinction 
commonly made between "primitive" and "modern" thought.
• Both are in agreement about the social determinants of all thought; and about the essentially religious 
nature of "primitive" thought. Beyond this point, how­
ever, they part company. Thus Levy-Bruhl sees "primi­
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tive" and "modern" thought as antithetical, and the 
movement from one to the other as the replacement 
of one pattern by its opposite. Durkheim: on the oth­
er hand, sees "primitive" and "modern" thought as 
two stages in a single, evolutionary process, the 
latter developing out of the former. At many points, 
where Levy-Bruhl finds contrast and discontinuity, 
Durkheim claims that a closer look would reveal a 
fundamental continuity (1973:267-8). 
Horton further suggests the following generalizable 
terms for comparing Durkheim's model with Levy-Bruhl's -­
the latter entertained a contrast/inversion schema, while 
the former postulated a continuity/evolution schema. 
To put it in a nutshell, Levy-Bruhl sees the relation 
between "primitive" and "modern" in terms of contrast, 
and the transition between them as a process of inver­
sion, whilst Durkheim sees the relation in terms of 
continuity, and the transition as a process of evolu­
tion (1973:270). 
Significantly, Horton echoes my criticism (and that of others) 
that Durkheim's causal model lacks historical specification: 
"It is surprising to find that Les Formes Elementaires in­
cludes no clear suggestion as to the broad determinants of 
the transition from the religious to the scientific conscious­
ness" (1973:266). 
Happily, we have just recently been provided with a 
translation of Durkheim's review of Levy-Bruhl's book by 
Anthony Giddens. Since this represents a most illuminating 
confrontation between two giants of French sociology, I shall 
now cite key sections in extenso. 
There is no need to state that there are fundamental 
principles which we share in common with Levy-Bruhl. 
Like him, we believe that different types of mental­
ity have succeeded each other in history. We also ac­
cept--and we have tried to establish this through 
factual analysis--that primitive mentality is essen­
tially religious~ that is to say, that the notions 
which dominate the movement of ideas are created in 
the very midst of religion. Moreover, since the main 
objective of the book is to show that the origins of 
religion are social, it follows that these notions 
and the corresponding logic have the same origin. This 
is what we strove to demonstrate in detail •••• 
However, our point of view is somewhat different from 
that taken by Levy-Bruhl. Since the latter is above 
all occupied with differentiating this mentality from 
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ours ,he has gone so far as to sometimes present these 
differences in the form of a real antithesis. Reli­
gious thought on the one hand, and scientific and mo­
dern thought, on the other, are contrasted as oppo­
sites. In one, the principle of identity and the sov­
ereignity of experience are seen as unquestioned; in 
the other, there appears to hold sway an almost com­
plete indifference to the lessons of experience and 
to contradictions. 
We consider, by contrast, that these two forms of hu­
man mentality, however different they may be, far from 
deriving from different sources, are created one by the 
other, and are two moments in the same evolution. We 
have shown, in point of fact, that the most essential 
ideas of the human mind--ideas of time, space, type, 
and form, force and causality, and personality--those 
in short, to which philosophers have given the name 
of "categories," and which dominate all logical acti­
vity, were elaborated within the very center of reli­
gion. Science has borrowed them from religion. There 
is no gulf between these two stages in the intellect­
ual-rife of mankind. -- -- -­
At the same time as we established the religious ori­
gins of the categories, we showed that they were impreg­
nated with social elements, that they were, indeed, 
created in the image of social phenomena. Physical 
space was originally constructed on the model of social 
space, that is to say, the territory occupied by the so­
ciety, such as it is represented by society; time ex­
presses the rhythm of collective life; the idea of type 
was at first only another aspect of the idea of the hu­
man group; the collective force and its power over minds 
served as the prototype of the notion of force and cau­
sality, etc. It might appear, it is true, that, because 
of these origins, these fundamental representations ne­
cessarily lack all objective validity, and can only con­
sist in artificial constructions which have no founda­
tion in reality. For society is generally seen as an a­
logical or illogical entity, which is in no way capable 
of satisfying conceptual needs. Thus, it is not at first 
apparent how ideas which are the product of society, 
and which express it, could be qualified to play such 
a preponderant role in the history of thought and sci­
ence. 
But we endeavored to show that, contrary to how it may 
appear, logical life has had its initial source in so­
ciety. The distinguishing feature of the concept, as 
compared to a sensation or an image, is its impersonal­
ity: it is a representation which, to the degree to which 
it preserves its identity, is common and communicable. 
It can pass from one mind to another; it is by means of 
concepts that intellects communicate. Now a representa­
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tion can only be common to all the members of a sin­
gle group if it was elaborated by them in common, if 
it is the work of the community. And if conceptual 
thought has a very special value for us, it is pre­
cisely because, being collective, it is replete with 
all the experience and science that has been accumu­
lated by the community over the course of the centur­
ies. The intellectual capacity of society is infini­
tely greater than that of the individual, for the sole 
reason that it is the result of the convergence and 
collaboration of a vast number of intellects, and 
even of generations .... It is society which has taught 
man there was another point of view than that of the 
individual, and which made him see things from the 
perspective of the whole. 
Although, therefore, human mentalit¥ has chan~ed and 
evolved over the centuries in relat~on to soc~ety, 
the different types which it has successively manifest­
ed have each given rise to the other. The higher and 
more recent forms are not opposed to the lower and 
more primitive forms-but are created out of the-ratter. 
Indeed, certain of the contrasts which have been point­
ed out need to be toneq down. We have shown, by the use 
of examples, that if the primitive mind tends towards 
confusion, it nonetheless recognizes defined antitheses, 
and often applies the principle of contradiction in an 
extremely definite way. Conversely, the law of partici­
pation is not specific to primitive mentality: today 
as in other ages, our ideas share common characteris­
tics. This is the very condition of all logical acti­
vity. The difference is above all the way in which the 
participation takes place*(from L'Annee sociologique, 
1912:33-7; translated by Giddens; 1972a: 247-9). 
In sum, Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema empha­
sized an important evolutionary point, but fundamentally mis­
conceived the generic relations between society and symbol. 
Further, Durkheim's continuity/evolution schema is basically 
correct, but its importance is limited because of lack of 
historical specification. Therefore, it is logical to turn to 
Weber's work in order to retain both Levy-Bruhl's contrast 
insights, and to further complement Durkheim's correct theo­
retical insights with descriptions of key evolutionary break­
throughs, such as Weber provided at every turn in his Socio­
~ of Religion (1963). We shall return to discuss conver­
gences between Durkheim and Weber later in this section. 
•
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B. Autonomization of Collective Symbolism 
• When individual minds are not isolated, but enter into 
close relation with, and act upon each other, from their 
synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life (SP:91). 
Even in his early phase, one of Durkheim's most insist­
• ent methodological rules was that social relationships and 
cultural symbols are sui generis and autonomous products 
emerging from the fusion of egos into moralized persons. As 
we discovered in Book One in terms of Durkheim's penetration 
• of the Australian materials, in generic sociocultural process 
symbols always tend to grow autonoreous. Although it was not 
until The Elementary Forms that Durkheim took care to empiri­
cally specify these processes, let us now briefly explore 
• the parallel logic pervading Durkheim's early methodological 
proclamations. 
Now, although the fundamental rule of the Durkheimian 
school was to always ground analyses of collective represen­
• tations in a material social body, instead of in some suppo­
sed notions of the human mind and nature, Durkheim's socio­
10gism meant that the links were to be drawn primarily, not 
from individual mind to symbol, but between symbols and so­
• ciety (see Evans-Pritchard, 1965). However, the relationships 
postulated between symbolic superstructures and material sub­
structures were neither simple nor direct. It would be mis­
leading, for instance, to claim that in Durkheim's sociology 
• of knowledge cultural symbols are merely one-to-one project­
ions of their generating substratum. For Durkheim's causal 
model is rather more complex. And before I proceed to exten­
sively criticize fundamental limitations in Durkheim's ex­
• planatory model as it underlay his first schema of suicide, 
I believe we have a responsibility to articulate more clear­
ly what Durkheim did and did not propose. 
Durkheim's explanatory model, while always linking
• "social physiological processes" to "social morphological 
processes," nonetheless, tended increasingly to grant co11ect­
•
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ive symbols at least partial autonomy, with feedback power. 
He further recognized their changing character in terms of 
social and cultural evolution. In any but the most element­
ary case, one cannot simply draw a connecting line from so­
cial morphological states to social physiological represen­
tations, for as Durkheim himself proposed: 
... it is easy to foresee that the latter must be More 
numerous than the former, for the vital manifestations 
are by far more varied and complex than are the morpho­
logical conditions which are their fundamental condi­
tions (1960: 362-3) . 
Once the sociocultural process is unden~ay, Durkheim's causal 
model suggests, a certain incommensurability between these 
two sets of facts ensues. For although collective represen­
tations are originally generated and sustained by specific 
types of social morphological conditions, nevertheless, col­
lective symbolizings are not limited to their generating con­
ditions. Rather, they autonomize--that is, they increasingly 
develop according to their own related but different laws. 
Perhaps Durkheim would have agreed with ~veber that "Ne are 
inserted into separate spheres of existence, each with their 
own laws" (1946:123). Inevitably, cultural symbolic forms 
proliferate far beyond the constraints of their original 
foundations. As always, Steven Lukes provides a concise sum­
mary of this aspect of Durkheim's doctrine: 
... "once a primary basis of representations has been 
formed," they become "partially autonomous ·realities 
which live their own life," with the "power to attract 
and repel one another and form syntheses of all kinds" 
and engender new representations. Hence, for instance, 
the "luxuriant growth of myths and legends, theogonic, 
and cosmological systems, etc." and hence the "ways in 
which religious ideas ... combine and separate and are 
transformed into one another, giving rise to contra­
dictory complexes." There should be~ Durkheim argued, 
a special branch of sociology (he called it "social 
psychology") devoted to studying the "laws of collective 
ideation," investigating "by the comparison of mythi­
cal themes, popular legends and traditions, and lang­
uages the ways in which social representations attract 
and exclude one another, how they fuse together or be­
come distinct, etc" (1973:8). 
•
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Let us now briefly compare Durkheim's causal model with that 
of Marx, and then explore in more detail the actual elements 
of Durkheim's doctrine of synthesis and the autonomization 
of collective representations. 
1. Durkheim 17 ersus Marx 
• It can hardly have escaped attention that Durkheim's
 
•
 
early explanatory model shares certain similarities with that
 
of Marx--or at least what passes for Marx's model among his
 
contemporary epigoni. One essential similarity is that both
 
shared the general explanatory causal logic of a material
 
•
 
substructure and an ideal or projected symbolic superstruct­

ure. But, as Durkheim himself pointed out, this same explan­

atory logic was widely prevalent in the nineteenth century,
 
•
 
and cannot be exclusively claimed by either Marxian or Durk­

heimian doctrine. Can Durkheim's model then legitimately be
 
termed "Marxist"? I believe not. Contrary to actual differ­

ences between these theorists, and to Durkheirn's correct ob­

•
 
servation that this same logic was "in the air," however,
 
some with radical inclinations still put forward claims for
 
and against Durkheim's identification with Marxist causal
 
logic.
 
•
 
For instance, largely under the influence of Parsons'
 
mistaken portrayal of Durkheim as an abstracted theorist con­

cerned with ahistorical proble~of generic social order and
 
control, John Horton (1964) attempted to polarize Durkheim's
 
'supposed conservatism to Marx's supposed radicalism. And 
over the years, the question of the relations between Marx 
and Durkheim have been raised repeatedly by Georges Kagan 
•
 
(1938) and Armand Cuvillier (1948), who compared and con­

trasted their doctrines. More recently, Anthony Giddens 
• 
(197la: 96-98, 196-205, 216-223) in an excellent work has 
compared and contrasted their views, as does Lukes more brief­
ly (1973:231-2,246, 314, 319, 343). Giddens rightly notes: 
Durkheim dissociated himself from a theory of know­
ledge which soecifies a unilateral relationship be­
tween ideas and their social base. This has to be 
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placed in the forefront when considering how far Durk­
heim's thesis does in fact differ from that establish­
ed in Marx's writings (197la:2l8). 
Lukes adds: 
The socialist historian of German thought, Charles 
Andler, objected to Durkheim's social realism (call­
ing it "mysticism"), observing that it was just a so­
ciological version of the mistaken economic choisme 
of Marx. [Footnote: Durkheim replied in l896--where 
he rejected "absolutely the ideas which M. Andler at­
tributes to me"] (1973:314). 
Now, although we cannot ignore certain similarities 
between the causal logics of Durkheim and Marx, there are 
also so many points of difference between them that it would 
take powerful alchemies indeed to transmute Durkheim into a 
Marxist. For Durkheim's prime concern was not with forms of 
domination, but with morality, with structures of conscience 
and consciousness. I believe that Giddens was right when he 
said that for both Durkheim and Weber the fundamental socio­
logical problem was the changing grounds of legitimate moral 
authority. Durkheim differed, of course, from Weber in that 
he wished to con~truct a new positive science of morality 
out of his systematic study of moral facts, an endeavor 
which \'leber emphatically rejected in his famous "vocational 
addresses" (1946). 
As primarily a moral philosopher who worked sociologi­
cally and "positively," Durkheim criticized repeatedly the 
"materialist" socialists for reenforcing the very moral 
evil that caused our modern travail in the first place. For 
Durkheim rightly perceived that the "critical radicals" shar­
ed certain fundamental ideological premises (eg. material­
ism, the labor theory of value, tecHblogical progress, Ricard­
ian economic theory, etc.) with their prime opponents, the 
"philosophical radicals" (see Halevy, 1955) from whom they 
emerged as a heretical offshoot. Durkheim's "laic" positi­
vism led him both to seek to anchor moral life in an empir­
ically verifiable material substratum and to train his power­
ful analytical focus on the symbolic and moral processes ~­
merging from this material substratum. I prefer to consider 
• 
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Durkheim, in terms of his allegiance to his own cultural tra­
dition, as an "unrepetant rationalist," a French positivist 
• who devoted his life-work to building a new "laic" or secular 
morality. As with all positivist moral reformers, he sought 
moral reconstruction based upon rationally organized evidence 
and "laic" rational (that is, non-metaphysical and thus non­
• hierocratic) principles and premises. Indeed, isn't it clear 
that if one of his prime historical cultural opponents was 
the Catholic Hierocratic-Metaphysical CUltural Tradition, 
that Durkheim could not base his critical analyses and pro­
• grams for moral and social reconstruction on super-empirical 
revelation or purely personal inspiration? His model had to 
be simultaneously material and moral if it was to serve his 
special multiple purposes. 
• While Durkheim's differences with Marx involved the 
problem of "latency" or unintended functions of cultural phe­
nomena, I cannot here devote sufficient space to deal with 
the complex ways in which Durkheim and Marx proposed to en­
• code and decode various levels of symbolic equations. I mere­
ly wiSh to emphasize now that one key difference between them 
lay in the degree of autonomy granted to collective represen­
tations, and the lack of unilateral and direct relations be­
• tween sub- and superstructure. As noted earlier, it may come 
as a surprise to some sociologists who, following Parsons, 
have consistently idealized Durkheim's Elementary Forms, that 
Durkheim felt constrained there to defend himself against the 
• possible charge of "historical materialism"! 
• 
... it is necessary to avoid seeing in this theory of 
religion a simple restatement of historical material­
ism: that would be misunderstanding our thought to an 
extreme degree. In showing that religion is something 
essentially social, we do not mean to say that it con­
fines itself to translating into another language the 
material forms of society and its immediate vital neces­
sities. It is true that we take it was evident that so­
cial life depends upon its material foundation and bears 
• 
its mark, just as the mental life of an individual de­
pends upon his nervous system. In order that the form­
er may appear, a synthesis sui generis of 
•
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particular consciousnesses is required. Now this syn­
thesis has the effect of disengaging ~ whole world of 
• 
sentiments, ideas and images, which once born, obey 
laws a~l their own. They attract each other, repel 
•
 
each other, unite, divide themselves, and multiply,
 
though these combinations are not commanded and ne­

cessitated £l the condition of the underlying real­

ity. The life thus brouqht into being even enioys so
 
great an independence that it sometimes indu1qes in
 
manifestations with no purpose or utility of any sort,
 
for the mere pleasure of affirming itse1f*{EF:471}.
 
But perhaps the most direct and definitive statement
 
of the differences which Durkheim himself drew between his
 
• own causal model and that of Marx is to be found in his re­

view of Antonio Labriola's exposition of historical mater­

ia1ism--Essais sur 1a conception materia1iste de l'histoire-­

which appeared in the Revue Phi10sophique in 1897. Fortuna­

• tely, Anthony Giddens has again recently provided us with
 
an excellent translation of key parts of this review, which
 
I again cite in extenso, because of its theoretical signi­

ficance and lack of previous recognition.

• We believe it to be a fruitful idea that social life
 
should be explained, not in terms of the conception 
which its participants hold of it, but by reference 
to underlying causes which escape consciousness~ and 
we also think that these causes have to be sought 
•
 
principally in the way in which associated indivi­

duals are grouped. 
•
 
It seems to us that it is indeed on this condition,
 
and on this condition alone, that history can become
 
a science and, in consequence, that sociology can exist.
 
For in order for collective representations to be in­

telligible, it is certainly necessary that they should
 
originate from something, and since they cannot form a 
closed circle upon itself, the source from which they 
derive must be outside them. 
• 
Either the cons9ijIce collective floats in a void, a 
kind of indescr1b e absolute, or else it is connected 
to the rest of the world by a substratum upon which, 
• 
consequently, it is dependent. Moreover, what can this 
substratum be made up of, if it is not the members of 
society, as they are combined socially? The proposi­
tion seems to us to be obvious. But we see no reason 
to link this, as the author does, to the socialist move­
ment; it is totally independent of it. 
We ourselves arrived at it before knowing Marx, who has 
not influenced us in any way. The fact is that this con­
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ception is the logical end-result of all the develop­
ments in history and psychology over these last fifty 
years. Historians have long perceived that social evo­
lution has causes which the authors of the historical 
events in question were not aware of. It is under the 
influence of these ideas that the role of great men 
either tends to be denied or to be limited, and that, 
in developments in literature, law, etc. there is a 
search to express collective thought which no definite 
individual embodies completely. 
At the same time, and above all, individual psychology 
has recently taught us that the consciousness of the 
individual is often no more than a reflection of the 
underlying state of the organism: that the cause of 
our ideas is determined by causes which are not known 
to the subject. 
It was natural that, from there, this conception became 
extended to collective psychology. But it is impossible 
for us to see what part the unhappy conflict of classes 
which we witness today can have had in the elaboration 
or the development of this idea. No doubt this idea ap­
peared at its given time and when the necessary condi­
tions for its emergence were established. It was not al­
ways possible •.•. When Labriola asserts that it was cal­
led forth "by the full, conscious, and continuous devel­
opment of modern technology" ... he states as evident a 
thesis for which there is no proof. Socialism has been 
able to make use of this idea for its own profit: but 
it has not created it and, most importantly, acceptance 
of it does not imply acceptance of socialism. 
It is true that if this objective conception of history 
were necessarily bound to the doctrine of economic ma­
terialism, as our author asserts, one could accept that 
the former was established under the same influence and 
inspired by the same spirit, as the latter certainly 
has socialist origins. 
But this assmilation is completely without foundation: 
and it is important to ~ an end to it. These two 
theories are completely independent, and their scienti­
fic value is singularly different. Just as much as it 
seems to us to be that the cause of social phenomena 
must be sought outside of individual ideas, so it seems 
to us to be false that they derive ultimately from the 
state of industrial technology: and that the economic 
factor is the source of progress .... Not only is the 
Marxist hypothesis unproven, but it is contrary to facts 
which seem to be established. Sociologists and histor­
ians are tending increasingly to reach common agreement 
that religion is the most primitive of all social pheno­
mena. All other manifestations of collective activity-­
law, morality, art, science, political formation, etc.-­
•
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have emerged from it, by a series of transformations. 
In the beginning everything is religious. Now we know 
of no way of reducing religion to the economy, nor of
• any real attempt which has been made to effect this
 reduction. No one has yet shown under what economic
 
influences naturalism developed out of totemism, by
 
what series of changes in technology it became in one
 
place the abstract monotheism of Jahwe, and in another
 
Graeco-Latin polytheism, and we strongly doubt that

• anyone could ever succeed in such an enterprise. More
 generally, it is indisputable that at the outset, the
 
economic factor is rudimentary, while religious life
 
is by contrast, luxuriant, and all-pervading. Why
 
could it not follow from this, and is it not probable
 
that the economy depends much more upon religion than

• the former does on the latter?
 
•
 
There would be no need, moreover, to push the prece­

ding ide~to such an extreme that they lose all valid­

ity. Psycho-physiology, after having drawn attention to
 
the foundation of psychic life in the organic substra­

tum, often made the mistake of denying any reality to
 
the latter. This was the source of the theory which re­

•
 
duces consciousness to nothing more than an epipheno­

menon. The fact was lost sight of, that if ideas depend
 
originally upon organic states, once they are formed
 
they are, by that token, realities sui generis, they
 
are autonomous, capable of being causes in their turn,
 
and of producing new phenomena.
 
•
 
Sociology must take care to avoid the same error. If
 
the different forms of collective activity also have a
 
substratum from which, in the last instance, they derive,
 
they become in turn original sources of action, with
 
their own specific effects, and they react upon the
 
•
 
very causes which they stem from. We are thus far from
 
holding that the economic factor is simply an epipheno­

menJ~ once it exists, it has its own particular influ­

ence, and can partially modify the very substratum from
 
which it results.
 
But this is not reason to confuse it in any way with 
• 
this substratum, in order to make of it something espe­
cially fundamental. Everything leads us to believe, on 
the contrary, that it is secondary and derived. From 
which it follows that the economic changes which have 
taken place during the course of the century, the sub­
stitution of large-scale for small-scale industry in no 
way necessitates a disruption and radical reorganization 
of the social order; and indeed that the malaise from 
which European societies may be suffering does not ori­
ginate in these changes (in Giddens, 1972a:159-162).
• Let us now explore Durkheim's definitive statement of this 
position in 1898. 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--768-­
2.	 The Autonomization of Cultural Forms as Synthesis and 
Synergetic Emergence 
It is not widely enough understood that Durkheim's 
drive for the autonomy of sociology as a separate science 
depended, in large part, on his parallel insistence upon 
the autonomy of collective representations as prime social 
facts. Only if socially generated symbols, concepts, moral 
rules, etc. are irreducible to individual psyches could so­
ciology gain a separate and significant subject matter for 
itself. Indeed, Durkheim'~ campaign against biological and 
psychological reductionism depended on the proposition that 
social and cultural process is a synthesis, that this socio­
cultural synthesis is synergetic, and that the emergents 
are sui generis, irreducible, autonomous products. Durkheim's 
biographers regularly attribute this notion of levels and 
emergents to the influence of Durkheim's teacher, Emile Bou­
troux, although some add Renouvier's name to the list also. 
It is not our task here to trace the genealogy of this idea1 
it is sufficient here to note that a similar movement was 
going on in biology at about the same time. Philosophically 
inclined biologists such as C. Lloyd Morgan, Hans Driesch, 
Jan Smuts, Samuel Alexander, and so on, all elaborated the 
logic of biological levels, "holism," and "emergent evolu­
tion." In additi0n, the breakdown of the atomistic-mechan­
istic Newtonian world-view at about the same time, and its 
reconstruction in terms of the Romantically and Idealistical­
ly inspired organic and processual view of reality, reenfor­
ced the same general trend. 
It is interesting to note that one of Durkheim's ardent 
defenders, Celestin BougIe, took pains to absolve Durkheim 
of the attacks of both materialist and idealist social phil­
osophers in his introduction to Sociology and Philosophy. 
There is no doubt that in his earlier works Durkheim 
took pleasure in insisting upon the close relation­
ship that appeared between the beliefs and the act­
ual form of their social milieu. Accordinq as the 
size of the group, the density and mobility 
of the component individual minds varies and the 
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beliefs which the former sanctify become less effect­
ive and finish by giving place to the cult of indivi­
dualism. Thus, "social morphology" helps us to under­
stand this process of evolution. Once formed, collect­
ive representations combine, attract, and repel each 
other according to their own particular •.• laws. Durk­
heim is very concerned to point out that men's reli­
gious ideas ••• and scientific notions, are very far 
from being simple reflections of the social forms them­
selves. He was thus very far from wishing to impose 
upon sociology explanations of a materialistic tenden­
cy (1953:xxxvii-xxxviii). 
In addition, Giddens claims to have discovered a certain 
relationship between Durkheim's notion of autonomization, syn­
ergetic synthesis, and emergent social products with Weber's 
more multivalent ideas concerning "cause and effect" (1970: 
182, #50). Giddens also provides a useful summary of Durkheim's 
doctrine here as we approach his first definitive statement 
in 1898. 
We must not fall into the trap of treating ideas as 
mere epiphenomena, however much it is true that they 
are causally influenced by basic characteristics of 
social organization. Once ideas and beliefs are es­
tablished, "they are, in virtue of this, realities 
sui generis, autonomous, capable of being causes in 
their turn and of producing new phenomena" (1970:182). 
Now, as is well-known, the first definitive statement 
of Durkheim's doctrine of emergent, synergetic, autonomizing 
symbolic cultural forms was contained in his highly contro­
versial article "Individual and Collective Representations," 
published in 1898. Durkheim took pains there to criticize 
in detail the illogic of associationist psychology, which 
derived from the atomistic and mechanistic premises of the 
Anglo Cultural Tradition. Especially absurd was the rather 
extreme notion that ideas were attached to cells, as if 
"Mom" was here, "the flacj' over there, and "apple pie" there. 
Today, after much search, neurophysiologists recognize that, 
as with all other phenomena, mental life is a field of rela­
tionships through time; perhaps it is even governed by the 
so-called "law of mass action." Just as mind is not brain, 
Durkheim argued, so too culture and society, and the imper­
sonal concepts and universalizable moral rules which emerge 
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are not products of isolated minds. Rather, these crucial 
human products are emergents, they are new sui generis so­
ciocultural products resulting from the synergetic, inter­
generational symbolic interaction of individuals. Let us now 
briefly explore Durkheim's analogy between the irreducibil­
ity of mental and cultural re9resentations. 
Durkheim observed: 
Society has for its substratum the mass of associated 
individuals. The system which they form by uniting to­
gether, and which varies according to their geographi­
cal disposition, and the nature and the number of their 
channels of communication, is the base from which social 
life is raised. The representations which form the net­
work of social life arise from the relations between 
the individuals thus combined or the secondary groups 
that are between the individuals and the total society. 
If there is nothing extraordinary in the fact that in­
dividual representations, produced by the action and 
reaction between neural elements, are not inherent in 
these elements, there is nothing surprising in the fact 
that collective representations, produced by the action 
and reaction between individual minds that form the so­
ciety, do not derive directly from the latter and conse­
quently surpass them. The conception of the relationship 
which unites the social substratum and social life is 
at every point analogous to that which undeniably exists 
between the physiological substratum and the psychic life 
of individuals (SP:24). 
Now, when Durkheim argued that among the defining criteria by 
which distinctively social "facts" can be discovered is "ex­
ternality," he referred to this special notion of social syn­
thesis. At no time did "externality" mean that symbols were 
spatially and physically separate entities from individuals. 
Clearly, such a position would have necessitated the very 
Platonic, hypostatized deus ex machina so often laid (mista­
kenly) at his door. Rather, sociocultural process must be sim­
ultaneously "internal" as well as "external," for the social 
bond is based on collective, public symbols which are intern­
alized in conscience and consciousness. "Externality" simply 
meant that the explanatory line was not to be drawn primar­
ily from individual mind to public symbol, but rather in 
terms of the intervening social process; symbolization is 
inherently a collectively representational process, in both 
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sensesof this term. This is what Alpert meant when he right­
ly argued that Durkheim was actually only a "moderate Durk­
heimian," a "relational social rea1ist"~ for social reality 
is not to be grasped in either the individual parts alone 
or in some hypostatized entity floating in sociological space. 
Rather, social life is only to be found in a complex, com­
pounding series of interpersonal and intergenerationa1 rela­
tionships • 
..• If one can say that, to a certain extent, collect­
ive representations are exterior to individual minds, 
it means that they do not derive from them as such but 
from the association of minds, which is a verv differ­
ent thing. No doubt in the making of the whole each con­
tributes his part, but private sentiments do not become 
social except by combination under the action of the 
sui generis forces developed in association. In such a 
combination, with the mutual alterations involved, they 
become something else. A chemical synthesis results 
which concentrates and unifies the synthesized elements 
and by that transforms them. Since this synthesis is the 
work of the whole, its sphere is the whole. The result­
ant surpasses the individual as the whole the part. It 
is in the whole as it is by the whole. In this sense, 
it IS exterior to the indIViduals (SP:25). 
Durkheim's instinct led him rightly, for cultural symbols are 
phenumeno10gica1 relationships through time. Symbols are not 
things, but those who would deny their reality or significance, 
Durkheim argued, would do better to grant them an equivalent 
existential status as they grant so easily to physical objects. 
This was Durkheim's point when he insisted that "social facts" 
be treated as if they were choises (see Peter Berger & T. Luck­
mann, 1966). It should be noted that Kenneth Burke's "symbol­
ic realism" also argues that man is best interpreted as a sym­
bolic animal. In sum, Durkheim was quite right, in my judge­
ment, when he argued that the social whole, especially in 
terms of symbols, is greater than the sum of its parts, that, 
social and cultural reality is to be found in relationships 
through time. Indeed, social science is simply not possible 
if these facts are not accredited! 
The prime focus, then, of the nascent science of socio­
logy was to be these "total social facts," as Mauss later ca11­
•
 
•
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ed them. Although some might think that Durkheim argued too 
closely from lower level analogies, I believe that he correct­
ly seized upon the essential principle of "relational real­
ism" and "emergent evolutionism" which informs all these dif­
ferent levels. Today in physical theory, for instance, an 
atom--the very image of irreducible reality to nineteenth 
century materialists--is viewed not as a thing, a hard, ir­
reducible rock, but rather is seen as an event in a time­
space continuum (see Capek, 1961). Durkheim himself felt con­
strained to reject the specious objections of those who ac­
cused him of hypostatizing la Societe. 
Those, then, who accuse us of leaving social life in 
the air because we refuse to reduce it to the indivi­
dual mind have not, perhaps, recognized all the conse­
quences of their objection. If it were justified it 
would apply just as well to the relations between 
brain and mind, for in order to be logical they must 
reduce the mind to the cell and deny mental life all 
specificity (SP:28). 
Durkheim then argued that such "relational social real­
ism" necessarily implied that the synergetic cultural emer­
gents are sui generis autonomous processes, generated not by 
isolated "social atoms" bouncing off one another as in the 
atomistic and mechanistic world-view, but by the long-term 
interactions of the whole sociocultural field. Collective re­
presentations, once created, tend to take on a life of their 
own. Indeed, Durkheim even suggested, at the end of the fol­
lowing passage, a kind of Mertonian multi-functionality • 
••• as the association is formed, it gives birth to 
phenomena which do not derive directly from the na­
ture of the associated elements, and the more ele­
ments involved and the more powerful their synthesis, 
then the more marked is this partial independence. No 
doubt it is this that accounts for the flexibility, 
freedom, and contingence the superior forms of real­
ity show in comparison with the lower forms in which 
they are rooted •.•. When a way of doing or being de­
pends upon a whole without depending immediately upon 
the parts which compose that whole, it enjoys, as a 
result of this diffusion, a ubiquity which to a cer­
tain extent frees it. As it is nut fixed to a particu­
lar point in space, it is not bound by too narrowly 
limited conditions of existence. If some cause induces 
•
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a variation, that variation will encounter less resis­
tance and will come into existence more easily because 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
it has, in a way, a greater scope for movement. If cer­
tain of the parts reject it, certain others will form 
the basis necessary for the new arrangement without, 
for all that, being obliged to .rearrange themselves. 
That at least is how one can conceive how it is that 
one organ is able to perform different functions, dif­
ferent parts of the brain can substitute for each other, 
and one social institution can successively further the 
most varied ends (SP:30). 
In The Division of Labor. (page 333 ), Durkheim also remarked 
upon the flexibility of organic process, and the autonomiza­
tion of function from structure. 
In one of the most succinct summaries of his thesis that 
that relations between social substructure and symbolic super­
structure become progressively more autonomous, Durkheim in­
sistently argued: 
... while it is through the collective substratum that 
collective life is connected to the rest of the world, 
it is not absorbed in it. It is at the same time de­
pendent on and distinct from it.~. As it is born-of 
the collective substratum the-rorms which it manifests 
at the time of its origin, and which are consequently 
fundamental, naturally bear the marks of their origin. 
For this reason the basic matter of social conscious­
ness is in close relation with the number of social 
elements and the way in which they are grouped and dis­
tributed--that is to say, with the nature of·the sub­
stratum. But once a basic number of reoresentations has 
been created, they-become ... partIally autonomous real­
ItLes with therr-0wn way of life. They have the power-­
to attract and repel" each-ot~and to form amongst 
themselves various syntheses, which are determined by 
their natural affinities, and not by the conditions· of 
their matrix * (SP:30-3l). 
As with his criticism of the Marxist model, it is most signi­
ficant for our present purposes that Durkheim took his stand 
on the autonomous nature of religious symbols. 
As a consequence, the new representations born of these 
syntheses have the same nature; they are immediately 
caused by other collective representations and not by 
this or that characteristic of the social structure. 
The evolution of religion provides us with the most 
striking examples of this phenomenon. It is perhaps 
impossible to understand how the Greek or Roman pan­
theon came into existence unless we go into the con­
stitution of the city, the way in which the primitive 
•
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clans slowly emerged, the organization of the patriarch­
al family, etc. Neverthe~ess, the luxuriant growth of 
myths and legends, theogonic and cosmological systems, 
etc. which grew out of religious thought, is not direct­
lY related to the particular features of the social 
morphology--thus, it is that the sociar-nature of reli­
gion has so often been misunderstood. It has often been 
believed that it is formed to a great extent by extra­
social forces because the immediate link between the 
greater part of religious beliefs and the organization 
of society has not been perceived*(SP:31). 
Now, as we discovered in Book Two, in Suicide in 1897 
Durkheim was still unclear on these problems; thus his waver­
ing between a structural and a cultural explanation of sui­
cide. In contrast to his earlier assertion that suicide var­
ies inversely with the degree of structural integration of 
individuals into groups, later in the book Durkheim often 
seemed to be saying that the source lay not simply in lack 
of integration but in the belief system of society. In short, 
cultural values predisposed some to suicide. For Durkheim 
then observed: 
The social environment is fundamentally one of common 
ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them to 
impart themselves thus to individuals, they must some­
how exist independently of individuals; and this ap­
proaches the solution we suggested. For thus its im­
plicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective 
inclination to suicide from which individual inclina­
tions are derived, and our whole problem is to know 
of what it consists and how it acts (S:302). 
In 1902, in his preface to the second edition of The 
Rules of Sociological Method, Durkheim again sounded the 
keynote to his program for sociology. It is interesting to 
note that even though he was most concerned there with estab­
lishing the logical canons governing the new science of socio­
logy, and thus justifying its existence as an autonomous 
field, he did not couch his argument in the first edition of 
1895 in terms of synergetic emergence. Clearly, however, this 
perspective, which emerged only after 1897, provided a power­
ful reenforcement for his anti-reductionistic polemic. In­
deed, I shall soon criticize Durkheim's first schema of sui­
cide, in 1897, as not fully incorporating his growing recog­
•
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nition of the autonomizing nature of sociocultural processes.
 
Even in 1902, Durkheim was still taken by the analogy with
 
• life emerging from certain chemical syntheses~ the profound
 
"just-so story" (as Evans-Pritchard, 1965, calls it) in The
 
Elementary Forms was still a long way away •
 
•
 
... the common sense view still holds that sociology
 
is a superstructure built upon the substratum of the
 
individual consciousnesses and that otherwise it would
 
•
 
be suspended in a social vacuum.••. What is so readily
 
judged inadmissible in the matter of social facts is
 
freely admitted in the other realms of nature. Whenever
 
certain elements combine and thereby produce, by the
 
fact of their combination, new phenomena, it is plain
 
that these phenomena reside not in the original ele­

•
 
ments but in the totality formed by their union.
 
The living cell contains nothing but mineral particles,
 
as society contains nothing but individuals. Yet it is
 
patently impossible for the phenomena characteristic
 
of life to reside in the atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, car­

•
 
bon, and nitrogen. How could the properties of life ex­

ist in inanimate elements? How would the biological pro­

perties be divided among these elements? These proper­

ties could not exist equally in all the elements because
 
the latter are dissimilar by nature .••. It is equally
 
inadmissible that each of the principal characteristics
 
•
 
of life be resident in a certain group of atoms. Life
 
could not be thus separated into discrete parts~ it is
 
a unit, and consequently its substratum can be only the
 
living substance in its totality and not the element
 
parts of which it is composed. The inanimate particles
 
of the cell do not assimilate food, reproduce, and in a
 
word, live~ only the cell itself as a unit can achieve
 
these functions (R:xlvii--xlviii).
 
Surely Durkheim was right to insist that life is irreducible
 
to the component elements which go to make it up, for life
 
• can only really be understood as a series of relationships
 
through time, not a self-contained atom floating in absolute
 
Newtonian space. I wish that contemporary biologists, for
 
instance, would more consistently apply these established
 
• relational and processual principles, and stop repeating
 
the old formula that the cell is the basic unit of life.
 
This can be true only in the case of unicellular organisms.
 
Clearly, the cell is not the basic unit of life in terms of
 
• more complex organisms having a multi-cellular division of
 
labor; it is most certainly not true of man. On the contrary,
 
•
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•
 
the organism is itself the only irreducible unit of life, 
and the organism is perhaps best understood, as the struct­
uralists suggest, as a pattern that endures, "a systematic 
whole of self-regulating transformations" (Piaget, 1971:44). 
Further, if we wished to more fully apply relational and 
processual principles, we would say that a set of organisms 
in relation to a set of environments is the minimum unit 
of life. For how else could these exist, reproduce, perdure, 
and evolve without being situated in a complex series of re­
lationships through time and space? Indeed, defining life, 
like defining society, would require ecological and evolu­
tionary perspectives. In short, life, whether organic or 
sociocultural, is always relational and processual--a com­
plex series of emergent relationships through time and space. 
Durkheim applied these basic rules of synergetic emer­
gence to society. He rightly insisted that even though the 
levels of complexity are different in the great breakthrough 
from bio-chemical to sociocultural phenomena, nonetheless, 
the same principle of emergence applies. 
Let us apply this principle to sociology. If, as we 
may say, this synthesis constituting every society 
yields new phenomena, differing from those which take 
place in individual consciousness, we must indeed, ad­
mit that these facts reside exclusively in the very 
society itself which produces them, and not in its 
parts, i.e. its members ..•. These new phenomena can­
not be reduced to their elements without contradict­
ion in terms, since, by definition, they presuppose 
something different from the properties of these ele­
ments. Thus we have a new justification for the sepa­
ration which we have established between psychology, 
which is properly the science of the mind of the in­
dividual and sociology. Social facts do not differ 
from psychological facts in quality only: they have 
a different substratum; they evolve in a different 
milieu; and they depend on different conditions. This 
does not mean that they are not also mental after a 
fashion, since they all consist of ways of thinking 
or behaving. But the states of the collective con­
sciousness are different in nature from the states 
of the individual consciousness; they are "represen­
tations" of another type. The mentality of groups is 
not the same as that of individuals; it has its own 
laws. The two sciences are thus as clearly distinct 
as two sciences can be (R:xlvin-xlix). 
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Durkheim then defined collective representations as " ••• the 
ways in which the group conceives of itself in relation to 
objects which affect it." 
That the substance of social life cannot be explain­
ed by purely psychological factors, i.e. by the states 
of the individual consciousness, seems to us to be most 
evident. Indeed, what the collective representations 
convey is the way in which the group conceives itself 
in relation to objects which affect it. The group dif­
fers from the individual in its constitution, and the 
things which affect it are therefore of a different 
nature. Representations or concepts that reflect neither 
the same objects nor the same subjects cannot be traced 
to the same causes. To understand the way in which a 
society thinks of itself and of its environment one must 
consider the nature of the society and not that of in­
dividuals. Even the symbols which express these concep­
tions change according to the type of society. 
If, for example, it claims descent from a totemic ani­
mal, it is conceived as one of those special groups call­
ed "clans." If the animal is replaced by a human, but 
equally mythical, ancestor, this concept of the clan must 
also be modified. If, over and above local or family 
divinities, it postulates others on which it believes 
itself to be dependent, it follows that the local and 
family groups of which it is composed have tended to 
concentrate and unite, and the degree of unity which 
the divinities present correponds to the degree of unity 
attained at the same moment by the society. If the clan 
condemns certain modes of conduct, it is because they 
violate certain of its fundamental sentiments which are 
derived from its constitution, as. those of the indivi­
dual derive from his physical temperament and his men­
tal organization. ThUS, even if individual psychology 
has no more secrets for us, it could not give us the 
solution for any of these problems, since they relate 
to orders of facts concerning which it can have nothing 
to offer (R:xlix-l). 
Now, clearly for our present purposes Durkheim's focal 
emphasis was shifting from external indices and social mor­
phology to the problematics of social physiology in terms of 
the autonomizing of collective representations. For Durkheim's 
1902 preface to the second edition of The Rules was immedia­
tely followed in 1903 with Durkheim's first systematic explor­
ation of a specific category of collective representations-­
namely, his seminal Annee monograph , written with Mauss, 
"De quelques formes primitives de classification: contribu­
tion a l'etude des representations collectives." Primitive 
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Classification, translated under Evans-Pritchard's inspira­
tion by Rodney Needham, presages the classic Elementary Forms, 
which, as Alpert reminds us, was: 
••• originally entitled the "The Elementary Forms of 
Thought and Religious Life" •••• The introduction to 
Les Formes Elementaires which •.• first appeared in 
1909, was the Declaration of Principles of the socio­
logical theory of knowledge, and, along with other 
sections of the volume, outlined specific analyses 
of such concepts as space, time, genus, force, total­
ity, personality, and causality. And shortly before 
the publication of the volume itself, Durkheim offer­
ed a sociological explanation of the origin of values 
and ideals in a paper read before the Fourth Interna­
tional Congress of Philosophy at Bologna (1939:55,56-7). 
In Primitive Classification, Durkheim and Mauss began 
to speak of the feedback power of collective representations 
in these terms: 
••• in many cases where these classifications are not 
immediately apparent they are nevertheless found, but 
in a different form from that which we have described. 
Changes have taken place in the social structure w~ich 
have altered the economy of these systems, but nO~A~he 
point of making it completely unrecognizable. Moreover, 
these changes are due in part to the classifications 
themselves, and might thus even reveal them. 
What characterizes the latter is that the ideas are 
organized on a model which is furnished by the society. 
But once this organization of the collective mind exists, 
it is capable of reacting against its cause and of con­
tributing to its change. We have seen how species of 
things, classed in a clan, serve it as secondary or sub­
totems~ i.e. within a clan or particular group of in­
dividuals, under the influence of causes which are un­
known to us, comes to feel more specially related to 
certain things which are attributed, in a general way, 
to the whole clan. The latter, when it becomes too 
large, then tends to segment, and this segmentation 
takes place along the lines laid down by the classifi­
cation. We must beware of thinking, in fact, that these 
secessions are necessarily the products of revolution­
ary or tumultuous movements. More often ..• it seems 
that, in a large number of cases, the moieties were form­
ed and then split into clans (PC:3l-2). 
Now, in a sense, the whole of The Elementary Forms 
was devoted to analyzing the processes by which collective 
representations not only emerge from society, but most im­
portantly, come to constitute society in the first place. 
• 
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In his last great book, Durkheim enunciated the famous pro­
position concerning the autonomization of symbols which led 
Parsons to portray him as an idealist in his later phase. 
There is one division of nature where the formula of 
idealism is applicable almost to the letter: this is 
the social kingdom. Here, more than anywhere else, 
the idea is the reality. Even in this case, of course, 
idealism is not without modification. We can never es­
cape the duality of our nature and free ourselves com­
pletely from physical necessities: in order to express 
our own ideas to ourselves, it is necessary that we fix 
them upon material things which symbolize them. But here 
the part of matter is reduced to a minimum. The object 
serving as support for the idea is not much in compar­
ison with the ideal superstructure, beneath which it 
disappears, and also, it counts for nothing in the sup­
erstructure (EF:260). 
On the same page, in a footnote Durkheim took care to distance 
his causal model, once again, from the reductionist material­
ist models of political geography and political economy . 
... Thus we see how erroneous those theories are which, 
like the geographical materialism of Ratzel seek to de­
rive all social life from its material foundation (ei­
ther economic or territorial). They commit an error 
precisely similar to the one committed by Maudsley in 
individual psychology. Just as this latter reduced all 
the psychical life of the individual to a mere epiphe­
nomenon of his physiological basis, they seek to reduce 
the whole psychical life of the group to its physical 
basis. But they forget that ideas are realities and 
forces, and that collective representations are forces 
even more powerful and active than individual represen­
tations (EF:260). 
In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim summed up his notion 
of the autonomization of collective symbolic forms in terms 
of the great ascent "from the kingdom of necessity to the 
kingdom of freedom" (see also Evans-Pritchard, 1965). Symbol­
ic culture, which moralizes and directs egos, is the genetic 
medium and energizing source for this great ascent of man 
out of the biological cage. 
There really is a part of ourselves which is not pla­
ced in immediate dependence upon the organic factor: 
this is all that which represents society in us. The 
general ideas which religion or science fix in our 
minds, the mental operations which these ideas sup­
pose, the beliefs and sentiments which are at the ba­
sis of our moral life, and all these superior forms 
•
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• 
of psychical activity which society awakens in us, 
these do not follow in the trail of our bodily states, 
as our sensations and our general bodily consciousness 
do .... This is because the world of representations in 
• 
which social life passes is superimposed upon its ma­
terial substratum, far from arising from it; the 
determinism which reigns there is much more supple than 
the one whose roots are in the constitution of our tis­
sues and it leaves with the actor a justified impres­
sion of the greatest liberty. The medium in which we 
• 
thus move is less opaque and less resistant: we feel 
ourselves to be, and we are, more at our ease there. 
In a word, the only way we have of freeing ourselves 
from physical forces is to oppose them with collective 
forces (EF:307). 
Changing structures of conscience and consciousness are, of 
course, the self-made instruments of man's sociocultural li­
beration from the organic cage. The ascent of man is self­
•
 
propelled. Therefore, one key to understanding cultural trans­

formations are crucial shifts in the anchors of legitimate 
moral and intellectual authority. Would, then, Weber or Durk­
heim have blinked at the suggestion that our modern self-im­
•
 
prisonment in an "iron cage" and the resulting forms of sui­

cide are intimately related to modern culturally sanctioned 
forms of conscience and consciousness? We shall explore this 
possibility in the second half of this book. 
• 
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CHAPTER THREE 
•	 
TRANSITIONS: DURKHEIM'S GROWING CULTURAL REALISM 
• 
Preface. The key transitions in Durkheim's work supporting 
the second rather than the first schema of suicide can all 
be summed up in terms of a progressive shift toward the au­
tonomization of cultural symbolic forms. This transition 
• 
was first anatomized by Parsons (1937) as a shift away from 
positivism toward idealism; and even though he was largely 
mistaken about the content and dating of Durkheim's stages, 
there is now emerging general agreement that Durkheim's 
thought increasingly focussed on superstructural symbolic 
processes, and the autonomization of collective representa­
•
 
tions (eg. Giddens, 1971a, 1972a; Lukes, 1973:10, 233-6~
 
• 
Wallwork, 1972:48,113; Parsons, 1975a:l06; t~itney Pope, 1973: 
410, 1975a:112,114). This same shift has been described as 
Durkheim's deepening "social· realism" by Jack Douglas (eg. 
1967:45). Indeed, almost any serious observer who reads 
• 
Durkheim deeply and systematically can hardly fail to be 
struck by the widening and deepening exploration of collect­
ive representations in the latter phases of Durkheim's career. 
Acknowledgement of the growing autonomy and significance of 
the "ideal"	 factors--that is, symbolically real--represents 
the mainline of Durkheim's later development. I term this 
fundamental	 shift in focus Durkheim's growing "cultural real­
•
 
ism. "
 
Some key elements	 in Durkheim's work constituting this 
massive and sustained shift which are relevant to our present 
reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide include: 
• 
(1) His notion in Suicide that anomie and egoisme are 
generated, or at least carried by "social currents" 
or "pools of meaning," as J. Douglas (1967) suggests. 
These modern forms of "moral anarchy" are seen as 
culturally sanctioned just as much as altruisme and 
• 
•	 
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• 
fata1isme are sanctioned in primitive "mechanical 
solidarity." 
(2)	 His notion that a "marginal leaven of anomie," as La­
Capra (1972) terms it, is a necessary creative factor 
in sociocultural progress. 
Combining points one and two, then, we may surmise 
that modern anomie and egoisme might be culturally 
sanctioned by modern progressive ideals and concepts. 
(3)	 His growing emphasis on the importance of religion 
as the prime cultural form and evolutionary matrix, 
which we have traced f~om his early interests to the 
self-acknowledged "brea,,"through" of 1895, to the semi­
nal section in Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, 
to the Annee preface and monograph of 1899, and so on. 
(4)	 Durkheim's repeated acknowledgement of the cultural 
and institutional creativity of Christianity, especially 
in terms of its Protestant and rationalist varieties, 
as a prime source of modern values, especially indivi­
dualism. 
Indeed, with our critical analysis of Durkheim's first 
schema and causal model, and our recognition of his 
seminal thesis of the emergence of the person through 
history, coupled with the compounding shifts outlined 
above, the question of the historical relations between 
Christianity, and especially Protestant forms of in­
dividualism, and modern egoisme and anomie as cultur­
ally sanctioned becomes critical. 
(5)	 Durkheim's fine, but little known, history of educa­
tion in France, which, as Lukes (1973) notes, empha­
sized cultural influences, especially "collective as­
pirations, values, beliefs, and ideals." 
(6)	 Durkheim's seminal Annee "Note," written with Mauss, 
on the significance of civilizations as the macro­
level of sociocultural processes. 
One might be tempted to cite occasional comments, and 
other details, or even the mainlille of the subsequent, post­
Durkheimian development of the Annee school. But for our 
present purposes, these shifts in emphasis and content should 
suffice to demonstrate that Durkheim was indeed progressively 
moving toward a broad and sustained new program in granting 
collective symbolic forms and meanings independent causal sig­
nificance. And I believe, as Parsons did in another way, that 
the implicit schemas in Suicide played an important role in 
•
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in this inner transformation of his thought. Let us now ex­
•
 
plore some of these progressive shifts.
 
A.	 "Social Currents" as Energetic Carriers of Modern Anomie 
and Egoisme 
•	 
In Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide, Durkheim began 
to speak of "suicidal currents" as causing suicides. These 
"social currents," akin to thermodynamic processes on the 
•
 
physical level (as Halbwachs suggested, see Douglas, 1967:21),
 
raise or lower the "moral temperature" of society. It is stri­

king that this new metaphor, which later carne to prominence in 
The Elementary Forms where Durkheim spoke of the sacred as a 
sort of "charismatic electricity" which flows in and out of 
•
 
things, emerged here when Durkheim insisted: "Collective ten­

dencies have an existence of their own: they are forces as 
real as cosmic forces" (S:309). One recent observer, missing 
the significance of these metaphorical shifts away from the 
•
 
more mechanistic images of The Division of Labor toward therm­

•
 
odynamic images, went so far as to lamely satirize Durkheim's
 
notion of "suicidogenetic currents" in these unfortunate terms:
 
"Individuals were felled by "suicidogenic" social forces act­

ing like some fantastic death ray" (LaCapra, 1972:149).
 
•
 
Now, it is significant for our present purposes that
 
Jack Douglas (1967), in searching Durkheim's classic for a
 
sense of "shared meanings" as phenomenological causes of sui­

cide, cited these "suicidogenetic currents" as examples of
 
•
 
"pools of meaning" crucial to Durkheim's growing "social real­

ism." However one wishes to express this important fact, it
 
is generally established that the shift occurred. Since I
 
shall anchor the second schema, in part, on this notion of
 
"social currents" as energetic carriers of modern anomie and 
egoisme,	 and because space is limited and others have provi­
ded useful reviews, hereafter I shall simply hold it as estab­
•
 
lished that this metaphorical shift occurred and is most sig­

nificant for our reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of sui­
cide. 
•
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B.	 A "Marginal Leaven of Anomie," Charismatic and Creative 
Deviants, and SocioCultural Progress
•	 To dare to shake off the yoke of traditional discipline, 
one should not feel authority too strongly (ME:53). 
• 
LaCapra (1972:158, 240, 295, etc.) . repeatedly employs 
the useful phrase "a marginal leaven of anomie" to describe 
• 
Durkheim's important qualification of his seemingly authori­
tarian sociologistic doctrine. Some might be as surprised by 
Durkheim's statement that "one should not feel authority too 
strongly" as by his qualification of his abstracted doctrine 
of homo duplex: "The entire morality of !,rogress and perfect­
ion is inseparable from a certain amount of anomie" (S:364). 
Although one might suppose that Durkheim's root dichotomy-­
•	 
normality/pathology--would lead us to treat the first as 
good and general, and the latter as bad and exceptional, this 
relation was neither exclusive nor wholly abstract. Rather, 
Durkheim's opposition had an evolutionary dimension as well, 
•
 
and this evolutionism sometimes necessarily implied the in­

version of the normal notion of homo duplex. LaCapra had some 
insight into this seemingly paradoxical situation when he 
suggested that this dichotomy and the evolutionary tree of 
•
 
social life served as Durkheim's key guiding metaphors. Pro­

•
 
gress, says LaCapra, " ... required a certain measure of change
 
which corres!,onded to the destructive and creative margin of
 
anomie" (1972:295). Indeed, a certain balance of anomie and
 
egoisme is indispensable not only for normal stability (eg.
 
• 
see J. Douglas, 1967), but also for progressive moral evolu­
tion. 
Given the contrast between Durkheim's general evol~on­
ism and his seemingly abstract oP?osition between the normal 
and the pathological, this aspect of Durkheim's thesis might 
seem paradoxical to some. But his notion of the necessity of 
a creative "marginal leaven of anomie" served Durkheim as a 
•	 
crucial deus ex rnachina helping him escape the horns of this 
dilemma. For while anomie and egoisme clearly remain patholo­
gical, nevertheless, they are still seen as necessary, in 
•
 
-•
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• 
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small doses, for general evolutionary progress. Perhaps the 
appearance of such a deus ex machina was inevitable, given 
the weakness of Durkheim's canons (see The Rules) for distin­
guishing between the normal and the pathological. Indeed, 
little has come of this curious dichotOMy, even though it was 
central to much of Durkheim's work. However, LaCapra, Doug­
las, and others rightly observe that Durkheim's notion of a 
normal society implies a certain amount of anomie. Indeed, 
we might have expected this proposition, for in this dichot­
omy, as with sacred/profane and all the others, the terms are 
relational--I mean one term has meaning only in relation to 
the other pole. 
The normal society would also contain a dynamic leaven 
of anomie •••. But anomie would be limited to a margin­
al aspect of personality and to marginal groups in so­
ciety. Either extreme of the bell-shaped curve of moral 
practice would reveal marginal categories of culture­
bearing idealists (or perfectionist deviants) at one 
end, and of criminal deviants at the other. In the norm­
al society, deviants presenting ideological challenges 
to the existing order might attain ritual status, and, 
invested with ambivalent sacred values, become the ob­
ject of dangerous fascination (LaCapra, 1972:242). 
Let us next explore some of Durkheim's theses in this regard. 
In The Division of Labor, for example, Durkheim noted 
that the intensity of collective life must be in balance with 
the "state of the social organism, if health is not to be com­
promised" (DL:340). But this state of wholeness or health is 
not static, for as Durkheim himself once said, "structure it­
self is always encountered in becoming." Durkheim, therefore, 
acknowledged: 
•.• if the ideal is always definite, it is never defin­
itive. Since progress is a consequence of chanqes in 
the social milieu, there is no reason for supposing 
that it must never end. For it to have a limit, it would 
be necessary for the milieu to become stationary at some 
given moment (DL:34l). 
Since collective ideals and men change because of varying mil­
ieu (DL:344), there are some whose present deviance might be­
come basic to the future shape of society, indeed, to progres­
sive moral eVOlution and the education of mankind. 
•
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••• among peopleswhere progress is and should be rapid, 
rules restraining individuals must be sufficiently pli­
able and malleable: if they preserved all the rigidity 
they possess in primitive societies, evolution thus im­
peded could not take place promptly enough (8:364). 
Indeed, Durkheim saw an enlargening role for a "creative lea­
ven of anomie" to play in sociocultural evolution as we move 
more rapidly away from the repressive stereotyping of thought 
and behavior in primitive "mechanical solidarity" where the 
prescriptive etiquettes demanded rigid adherence to the ta­
boos and sanctions of what Nelson (1973:1) calls the "sacro­
magical collective conscience." Here, LaCapra suggests: 
A measure of anomie corresponds to an element of "free 
play" in society and personality: anomic indeterminacy 
and daring risk were conditions of progress and prere­
quisites of an ability to respond creatively to changes 
in relevant conditions of existence (1972:158). 
While Durkheim himself observed: 
We are not obliged to bow to the force of moral opin­
ion. We are even in certain cases justified in rebel­
ling against it. It may, in fact, happen that .•. we 
shall feel it our duty to combat moral ideas that we 
know to be out of date and nothing more than survivals 
the best way of doing this will be to oppose these i­
deas not only theoretically, but also in action (in Gid­
. dens, 1972a:122). 
It is helpful, as LaCapra suggests (1972:242), to dis­
tinguish between different forms of crime and deviance. What 
Durkheim had in mind, LaCapra suggests, was something akin to 
a bell-shaped curve of moral practice, with "marginal cate­
gories of culture-bearing idealists at one end, and criminal 
deviants at the other." The former possibility will consti­
tute another important anchor of the second schemaof suicide. 
Nisbet (1974) has also fruitfully explored the "vital rela­
tions" which Durkheim posited between certain forms of devi­
ance and progress. Morally creative deviance, Durkheim con­
tended, play an important "latent" role not only in static 
functioning, but also in energizing and directing moral evolu­
tion. Instead of an all-powerful conscience collective,there 
must be an on-going renegotiation of the self-society equili­
brium as society differentiates and the complex relationsof 
•
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the division of labor continue to ramify. Nisbet (1974:219) 
draws attention to some key passages in this regard in The 
Rules. Durkheim's "philosophy of human finitude ll led him to 
insist that even the moral authority of society must itself 
be restricted and held in a kind of dynamic balance. 
Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited ex­
tent. The authority which the moral conscience enjoys 
must not be excessive, otherwise none would dare cri­
ticize it, and it would too easily congeal into an im­
mutable form (R:71). 
Indeed, as LaCapra notes, Durkheim here assigned a fundamen­
tal, but little noticed, role to exceptional individuals in 
advancing the cause of moral progress; for the challenges of 
charismatic leaders to the inherited structures of conscience 
and consciousness cannot be explained merely in terms of ab­
stract "moral mechanics." 
Durkheim seemed to attribute a greater causal import­
ance to the exceptional individual in the normal state 
of society, for in this context his hybris would cor­
respond to the element of possibly creative anomie in 
experience (1972:240). 
Durkheim himself remarked: 
To make progress, individual originality must be able 
to express itself. In order that the originality of 
the idealist whose dreams transcend his century may 
find expression, it is necessary that the originality 
of the criminal, who is below the level of his time, 
shall also be possible. One does not occur without 
the other (R:71). 
This general perspective led to Durkheim's famous the­
sis that "crime" is necessary. 
.•• it happens that crime itself plays a useful role 
in this evolution. Crime implies not only that the 
way remains open to necessary changes but that in 
certain cases it directly prepares these changes. 
Where crime exists, collective sentiments are suffi­
ciently to take ona new form, and crime sometimes 
helps to determine the form they will take. How many 
times, indeed, is it only an anticipation of future 
morality--a step toward what will be (R:71)! 
Like so many others, Durkheim took Socrates as the ideal typi­
cal illustration of the morally creative deviant--namely, as 
one who is ideologically, rather than egotistically, motivated, 
• 
• 
• 
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and thus, one who seeks a wider and deeper way of life and 
of social being. 
According to Athenian law, Socrates was a criminal, 
and his condemnation was no more than just. However, 
his crime,namely, the independence of this thought, 
rendered a service not only to humanity, but also to 
his country. It served to ?repare a new morality and 
faith which the Athenians needed, since the traditions 
by which they lived until then were no longer in har­
mony with the current conditions of life. Nor is the 
case of Socrates unique: it is reproduced periodically 
in history. It would never have been possible to estab­
lish the freedom of thought we now enjoy if the regula­
tions prohibiting it had not been violated before be­
ing solemnly abrogated. At that time, however, the vio­
lation was a crime, since it was an offense against 
sentiments still very keen in the average conscience. 
And yet this crime was useful as a prelude to reforms 
which daily became more necessary. Liberal philosophy 
had as its precursors the heretics of all kinds who 
were justly punished by secular authorities during the 
course of the Middle Ages and until the eve of modern 
times (R:7J-2). 
In Moral Education, Durkheim elaborated the same argu­
ment, emphasizing the creative deviance of individual persons 
who take us farther along the road to a universalizable and 
rational perception of reality--in other words, the mainline 
of sociocultural evolution. In Weberian terms, "charismatic" 
leaders (eg. prophets) proclaim a "new and mighty objective 
certainty and subjective certitude" which leads to a new and 
more compelling " rationalization" of daily existence. As no­
ted before, Durkheim's essential thesis, here illuminated by 
categories from Weberian sociology of religion, that the para­
llel autonomization of collective representations and of the 
morally autonomous person is accompanied, on the world-his­
torical level, by a progressive rationalization and univer­
salization in the constitutive grounds of moral and intellect­
ual discouse (eg. see E. Leites, 1974: B. Nelson, 1973~~ is 
a most significant interpretive perspective in the human sci­
ences. In short, Durkheim proposed that progressive moral e­
vOlution depended upon morally creative deviance leadil!g to 
greater rationality and respect for moral personage. 
In primitive societies, Durkheim noted, moral solidari­
•
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• 
ty is mechanical--that is, taboos and prescriptive etiquettes 
are automatically enforced by society much as an automatic 
• 
mechanism carries out its foreordained task. But as sociocul­
tural existence becomes more complex, ever-wider spheres of 
action are opened up to the reflective rationality, growing 
intellectual autonomy, and moral responsibility of the per­
son. Indeed, the very complexity of fast-paced modern life 
would prove impossible without this rational flexibility of 
moral rules. 
• 
The more societies become complex, the more difficult 
for morality to operate as a purely automatic mechan­
• 
ism. Circumstances are never quite the same, and as a 
result the rulesof morality require intelligence in 
their application. Society is continually evolving: 
morality itself must be sufficiently flexible to change 
gradually as proves necessary. But this requires that 
morality need not be internalized in such a way as to 
• 
be beyond criticism or reflection, the agents par ex­
cellence of all change. Individuals, while conforming, 
must take account of what they are doing--thus, it does 
not follow from a belief in the need for discipline must 
involve blind and slavish submission. Moral rules must 
be invested with that authority without which they would 
be ineffective. However, since a certain point in his­
tory it has not been necessary to remove authority from 
the realm of discussion, converting it to icons to which 
man dare not, so to speak, lift his eyes (ME:52-3). 
• 
Thus, did the positivist moral reformer Durkheim reconcile 
the generic need for moral discipline with the genetic-evolu­
tionary need for progressive enfranchisement of independent 
and critical reflection. Here Durkheim invoked his deus ex
• 
--­
machina--the morally creative and exceptional deviant who 
foreshadows the future forms and rules necessary for the e­
merging society. 
•
 
We have contended that the erratic, the undisciplined,
 
are morally incomplete. Do they not, nevertheless, play
 
a useful part in society? Was not Christ such a deviant,
 
as well as Socrates? And is it not thus with all the 
historical figures through which humanity has passed? 
Had their feeling of respect for the moral rules char­
acteristic of their day been too lively, they would not 
• 
have undertaken to alter them. To dare to shake off the 
yoke of traditional discipline, one should not feel 
authority too strongly (ME:53). 
•
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Granting Durkheim his qualifying thesis, it is legiti­
mate, however, to ask as Nisbet did: "How do we distinguish 
between the creative deviant--the Socrates and the Christ-­
and those for whom deviance is no more than a form of assault 
on social order (1974:2201'? In answering in terms of the op­
position betwee~~~triving for higher morality (more universal 
and rational) of the morally creative deviant, and the crimi­
nal whose action is egoistic or regressive, Durkheim was for­
ced to subdivide his first category. He further distinguished 
between those moral reformers whose action leads to new and 
more creative kindsof universalizable moral rules, and those 
who may start out as moral reformers but whose only real con­
sequence is to release egoistic desires and to enshrine moral 
anarchy. This opposition between two kinds of moral reformers 
is the closest Durkheim came to Weber's distinction between 
the "ethics of responsibility" and the "ethics of ultimate 
disposition." 
However, if in critical and abnormal circumstances the 
feeling for the rule and for discipline must be weaken­
ed, it does not follow that such impairment is normal. 
Furthermore, we must take care not to confuse two very 
different feelings: the need to substitute a new regula­
tion for an old one; and the impatience with all rules, 
with the abhorrence of all discipline. Under orderly 
conditions, the former is natural, healthy, and fruit­
ful; the latter is always abnormal since it prompts us 
to alienate ourselves from the basic conditions of life. 
Doubtless, with some of the great moral innovators, a 
legitimate need for change has degenerated into some­
thing like anarchy. Because the rules prevailing in 
their time offended them deeply, their sense of the 
evil led them to blame, not this or that particular and 
transient form of moral discipline, but the principie 
itself of all discipline (ME:53). 
As noted in Book One, Durkheim's points here are well taken, 
for from at least the Enlightenment on, we moderns have so 
often conceived of freedom in wholly negative terms--as the 
release of the individual from all previous irrational con­
straints and servitudes--that there comes a time in many move­
ments when this opposition to specific forms and rules imper­
ceptibly slides over into a generic and permanent protest a­
gainst all forms in general, against definition itself. Ro­
•
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mantic egoism, cultural and political nihilism, and so on, 
are but a few of the forms taken by such generic protest 
(ultimately gnostic), which is based upon a largely negative 
view of freedom as release from control rather than harmony 
with the generative and directive sources of being and becom­
ing. 
The morally creative deviant, Durkheim continued, nei­
ther seeks things for himself, as the criminal does, nor does 
he embrace infinite horizons under the specious mask of a 
metaphysical pathos of cosmic oppression (gnostic or Roman­
tic dualism). Rather, the morally creative deviant personally 
embraces a more rational, more universalizable, impersonal 
ideal. He acts in the name of a higher goal, which points to­
ward the future mainline of moral evolution. 
... because society is beyond us it constitutes the 
only possible goal of individual conduct. For precise­
ly because this goal is beyond our individual goals, 
we cannot seek to achieve it without elevating our­
selves in the same measure beyond ourselves--without 
surpassing our individual nature, which is the highest 
ambition that man can pursue or ever has pursued. That 
is why the major historical figures, those who seem to 
us infinitely greater than all the others, are not the 
great artists, or the men of profound wisdom, or states­
men, but those who have achieved--or are thought to have 
achieved--the greatest moral triumphs: Moses, Socrates, 
Buddha, Confucius, Christ, Mohammed, and Luther, to men­
tion only a few of the greatest names .... In our mindsthey 
identify themselves with the impersonal ideal that they 
embodied and the great human groupings that they per­
sonified, we see them as raised beyond the condition 
of human beings and transfigured (ME:93). 
Indeed, selfless devotion to a supra-personal ideal--was this 
not the ethic of both Durkheim and Weber? Both demanded that 
eros and ego give way to logos and the universalistic moral­
ity of the self-disciplining person. The very necessity of 
their prophetic calls (eg. the liThe Dualism of Human Nature ll 
and Weber's II vocational addresses ll ), however, demonstrates 
that rationalization and autonomization ultimately depended 
upon human reflection and intentions. Therefore, as we obser­
ved earlier, this enlargement of the basic structures of con­
science and consciousness--the sine qua non of progressive 
•
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moral evolution--is a basic phenomenological process on the 
world-historical level.
• If we pull together Durkheim's insight that modern sui­
cides may be caused by "social currents," and that a "margin­
al leaven of anomie" and egoisme among morally creative char­
ismatic leaders who proclaim a new and universalistic ideal
• is necessary for progressive moral evolution, are we not then 
justified in further speculating that anomie and egoisme may 
be culturally sanctioned by progressive modern forms of con­
science and consciousness? Indeed, Durkheim himself suggest­
• ed this possibility when he acknowledged: "The entire moral­
ity of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from a 
certain amount of anomie" (S: 364). 
• 
c. Durkheim'~ Growing Emphasis on Religion 
Having already explored Durkheim's sociology of reli­
gion at great length (see Book One especially), I now merely 
note: close to the core of Durkheim's growing "cultural real­
• ism" was his ramifying analysis of religion as society's 
prime constitutive symbolic mode. Indeed, as we have seen, 
Durkheim's thesis of the progressive autonomization of col­
lectively symbolic representations often cited as its prime
• exhibit the growing multivalency of religious images and doc­
trines (see his review of Labriola cited earlier). Durkheim 
himself acknowledged, as is generally known, that one of the 
key turning points in hi~ intellectual career came after
• reading the British anthropologists of religion, especially 
Robertson Smith, around 1895. This rare biographical reflect­
ion came in response to a charge that his doctrine was simp­
ly imported from Germany. Of his lecture course on religion
• in 1895, Lukes tells us that Durkheim himself reflected: 
It was not until 1895 that I achieved a clear view 
of the essential role played by religion in social 
life. It was in that year that, for the first time, 
• 
I found the means of tackling the study of religion 
sociologically. This was a revelation to me. That 
course of 1895 marked a dividing line in the devel­
opment of my thought, to such an extent that all my 
previous researches had to be taken up afresh in or­
•
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der to be made to harmonize with these new insights 
••.• (This reorientation) was entirely due to the stu­
dies of religious history which I had just undertaken, 
and notably to the reading of the works of Robertson 
Smith and his school (Lukes, 1973:237). 
Lukes (1973:240) suggests that there are two main stages 
in Durkheim's developing sociology of religion--marked by the 
essay "On the Definition of Religious Phenomena" (1899) and 
by The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912). As 
did in Book One, I wish to note the existence of a third sta­
ge, in which the course of 1895 and the seminal section in 
Book Three, chapter one, of Suicide (1897) are among the most 
notable statements. Further, is is highly significant for our 
present purposes that, when in 1897 in Suicide, Durkheim be­
gan to speak of "social" or "suicidogenetic currents" as cau­
sing suicides, this is placed in the context of his emerging 
"cultural realism," and this occurs also when his seminal the­
ses on religion appear for the first time in print. Thereaft­
er, beginning with his Annee preface and article of 1899, 
Durkheim further proposed not only that religion is the funda­
mental form in which society conceives of itself, but also 
that religion served as the prime matrix--the cultural-gene­
tic medium--from which all other basic symbolic forms progres­
sively emerged. Religious representations thus carne eventual­
ly to constitute the central substantive core of Durkheim's 
causal model. 
Now, since the awakening and guidance of conscience 
and consciousness--as prime phenomenological processes--came 
to be seen by Durkheim as dependent upon religious symbolic 
forms, should we not, then, seek out the changing foundations 
of structures of legitimate moral and intellectual authority 
in changing religious sanctions? Further, should we not look 
to specific religious variables as potentially causal factors 
in the cultural sanctioning of modern anomie and egoisme as 
extreme individualistic drives for "progress and perfection" 
as these were led by the descendants of charismatic founders 
of the modern world? 
•
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D.	 Durkheim'~ Emphasis on the Civilizational Significance 
of Christian Culture 
One of Durkheim's more important historical observa­
tions was his repeated emphasis on the civilizational signi­
ficance of the moral creativity of Christian culture (see al­
so Chapter Eight, Book One). It is also striking that Durk­
heim made little effort to explain the origin and impact of 
Christian culture in the West from within the framework of 
his general evolutionary mechanical-morphological model. Per­
haps he did not do so because it is obvious that there was 
no real mechanical-evolutionary necessity forcing the emer­
gence of this particular religious doctrine and ethos out of 
specific social morphological contexts in the ancient world, 
which Christianity might then symbolize. In both content and 
origin, then, Christian individualism should be viewed as a 
volitional doctrine, a moral and spiritual orientation only 
remotely connected with evolutionary necessity. 
Although it cannot be explained in terms of his only 
explicit causal model, Durkheim's emphasis on the moral crea­
tivity of Christian cUlture, and especially Protestant indi­
vidualism, reenforces his general thesis of the evolutionary 
emergence of the person through history (see Book One). In 
cultural and phenomenological terms, Christian individualism 
was a powerful, even decisive, force in sanctioning an auto­
nomous sphere for the individual person, arer against the tra­
ditional collective claims of "blood and soil." For, as Nel­
son (1973a) observed, the world-historical significance ·of 
Christianity was that it broke decisively through the tribal 
sacral-magical collective conscience of the archaic "sacral 
complex," and extended the socio-religious bond to all 
"brothers" in the faith. It is striking that both Durkheim 
and Weber converged in their estimate of the significance 
of this awakening of new depths of conscience. The deepening 
of personal obligation, in regard to both abstract impersonal 
ideals and to inter-personal obligations, was seen to be of 
prime importance in the construction of new in-depth person­
•
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allty structures. Indeed, Weber emphasized that " •.. the in­
creased importance of an ethical attachment of individuals to 
• a cosmos of obligations, making it possible to calculate what 
the conduct of a given person may be •.. has the greatest im­
portance" (1963:3S-6). The progressive awakening of con­
science, the deepening internalization of moral and ethical 
• obligations, and the growing centrality of a more or less sys­
tematic phenomenology of intentions (especially from Abelard 
on, see Luscombe, 1971, Nelson, l~73a, Leites, 1974), were 
all of critical significance in the evolutionary construction 
• of the moral individualism so revered by Durkheim. 
Now, if we rotate our analytical matrix slightly, what 
we see here is another facet of the master process of ration­
alization so central to Weber's historical sociology. Through
• the progressive internalization of ethical-legal norms in so­
cialization, the personality structure becomes more integral, 
more consistent, and, hence, more predictible and reliable. 
Further, in identifying the emergence of the individual con­
• science with the construction of a new level of in-depth in­
tegrated personality structures, Weber also included, as a 
corollary process, the growing autonomization of facts and 
individuals, and the greater degree of calculability and thus 
• universalizability which emerges from these simultaneous pro­
cesses. This represents a significant convergence between 
Durkheim and Weber, for Durkheim also believed that the auto­
nomization of the person and rationalization and universali­
• zation i.n the grounds of moral and intellectual discourse 
proceeded together on the world-historical level. Recently, 
Edmund Leites has described this crucial double dialectical 
process with particular cogence:
• .•• two of the most decisive advances in the philoso­
• 
phic and theoretical development of the norm of moral 
and religious autonomy occurred in tandem with an ex­
traordinary extension (in moral and religious matters) 
of "univasalities in terms of reference and communities 
of discourse" •••• Major advances in the articulation of 
the norm of autonomy have gone along with rejections of 
moralities and modes or argumentation are believed to 
be parochial, limited by allegiances to specific cultures 
•
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and traditions. What is sought are ways of deciding mor­
al and religious matters which all reasonable men, what­
ever their history and culture, would accept and would 
have to accept, given the correctness of the procedures. 
... There are important cultural and civilizational 
linkages between: (1) the struggle for universalities in 
terms of reference, and argumentation in moral and reli­
gious matters, and (2) the development of norms of indi­
vidual autonomy (1~74:97-8). 
Indeed, didn't the positivist Durkheim himself link ration­
alism and individualism in evolutionary terms? 
Rationalism is only one of the aspects of individual­
ism: it is the intellectual aspect of it. We are not 
dealing here with two states of mind; each is the con­
verse of the other. When one feels the need of libera­
ting individual thought, it is because in a general way, 
one feels the need of liberating the individual. Intel­
lectual servitude is only one of the servitudes that in­
dividualism combats. All development of individualism 
has the effect of opening moral consciousness to new i­
deas and rendering it more demanding. Since every ad­
vance that it makes results in a higher conception, a 
more delicate sense of the dignity of man, individualism 
cannot be developed without making apparent to us, as 
contrary to human dignity, as unjust, social relations 
that at one time did not seem unjust at all. Convasely, 
rationalistic faith reacts on individualistic sentiments 
and stimulates it. For injustice is unreasonable and ab­
surd, and, consequently, we are the more sensitive to it 
as we are more sensitive to the rights of reason. Conse­
quently, a given advance in moral education in the direc­
tion Jf greater rationality cannot occur without also 
bringing to light new moral tendencies, without inducing 
a greater thirst for justice, without stirrlng the public 
conscience by latent aspirations (ME:12). 
Let us explore a few representative passages which il­
lustrate Durkheim's growing emphasis on the civilizational 
significance of Christian culture, especially its rational­
ism and individualism. For instance, early in his career, 
even though he was critically disposed to treat religion as 
repressive and thus regressive, nonetheless, the positivist 
Durkheim had a few kind words to say for the evolutionary 
progressiveness of Christianity vis-a-vis other archaic reli­
gions. 
Christianity has often been reproached for its intoler­
ance. From this point of view, however, it relaized con­
siderable progress over preceding religions .•.. Every­
body knows that the Christian religion is the most i­
•
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dealistic that has ever existed. Thus, it is made up 
of articles of faith which are very broad and very gen­
•
 
eral, rather than of particular beliefs and practices.
 
That is how it carne about that the dawn of free thought 
• 
under Christianity [especially Abelard, see Durkheim's 
L'Evolution pedagogique en France] was relatively pre­
cocious. Since its origin, schools have been founded, 
and even opposing sects. Hardly had Christian societies 
began to organize themselves ln the Middle Ages than 
scholasticism appeared, the first systematic effort of 
free thought, the first source of differences. The 
rights of discussion were from the first recognized 
(DL: 16 3-4) . 
Indeed, this idealistic and individualistic character of 
• Christianity was the source, as Durkheim observed, of the se­
cond great transformation in the structures of conscience and 
consciousness which Nelson (1973a) has described as the tran­
sition from "faith structures" to "rational structures of 
• consciousness. II And, as Durkheim noted, it was the scholastic 
philosophers, especially with Abelard, that successfully ra­
tionalized the contents of faith, and made personal inten­
tionality the new logical and evidential basis for sin and 
• responsibility, a momentous shift in cultural evolution. 
Further, in his lectures on the evolution of Western 
education, the creative correlation of the culture of Chris­
tian inwardness, classical rationalism, and increasingly u­
• niversalistic frames of reference are clearly implied as 
Durkheim summarized much of his earlier writings on reli­
gious evolution. 
The religions of Antiquity are, above all, systems of 
• 
rites, the essential objective of which is to assure 
• 
the regular working of the universe. For the wheat to 
spring up and yield an abundant harvest, the gods of 
the river, and the gods of the stars must sUbsist, and 
it is the rites which allow them to do so. If they ceas­
ed to take place on the established days, and in the 
prescribed manner, the life of the universe would corne 
to an end. It is understandable that the attention of 
the Greek should be entirely directed towards the out­
side, where, according to him, the principle of exis­
tence is to be found. By contrast, Christian religion 
is centered in man himself, in the soul of man. An es­
• 
sentially idealistic religion, its god aspires to reign 
over the world of ideas, over the spiritual world. and 
not that of the body. To worship the gods of Antiquity 
was to maintain their material life with the help of 
•
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offerings and sacrifices, since their life depended on 
that of the world; the god of the Christians, on the 
• 
other hand, wishes to be worshipped, as the phrase ex­
presses it, in spirit and in truth. For him, to be is 
to be believed, to be thought, to be loved 
(in Giddens, 1972a:239-40). 
Harmony with the Christian God, then, is an interior rela­
•
 
tionship.
 
Everything thus inclines the Christian to turn his 
thoughts towards himself: I mean the true life, that 
which counts most in his eyes, the life of the spirit . 
• 
•.. The most common rite is prayer; and prayer is an in­
ternal meditation. Since for the Christian virtue and 
piety do not consist in material acts, but in internal 
• 
states of the soul, he is obliged to keep a perpetual 
surveillance over himself. Since he is obliged to per­
petually examine his conscience, he must learn to ques­
tion himself, to analyze himself and scrutinize his in­
tentions: in short, to reflect upon himself. Thus, of 
the two possible poles of all thought, nature on the one 
hand, and man on the other, it is necessarily around the 
second that the thought of the Christian societies,and 
also consequently their system of education, has come to 
gravitate (in Giddens, 1972a:239-40). 
• 
In addition, Wallwork speaks of Durkheim's reliance on 
the differential content of religious doctrines to explain 
the differences in pedagogical ideals in Western culture, and 
then cites the following passage from Durkheim's L'Evolution 
•
 
pedagogique en France.
 
•
 
If Greek reflection was first and exclusively directed
 
toward the world, this was because the world was then,
 
in the esteem of public opinion, an excellent and holy
 
thing. The world, in fact, was considered divine, or
 
rather the domain of the gods. The gOds were not out­

side the world, they were in things, and there was noth­

•
 
ing in which they did not reside •••. It is man, the hu­

man spirit, which was then considered as profane and of
 
little value; this is what Socrates himself teaches and
 
it is upon this profane character that he lays claim to
 
the right to speculate with complete independence; here,
 
he says, thought ought not to be expressed with complete
 
•
 
liberty, for it does not risk encroaching upon the domain
 
of the gods. For Christianity, on the contrary, it is the
 
mind, the conscience of man, that is the sacred and peer­

less thing: for the souL, the principle of our interior
 
life, is a direct emanation of the divine. Between the
 
mind and things, there is all the difference which sep­

arates the spiritual from the temporal. Thus God has dis­
dainfully abandoned the world to the free utilization of 
men, traditit mundum hominum disputationi (1972:140). 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
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Lukes gives the latter passage a slightly different sense: 
For Christianity ••• it is the mind, the conscience 
of man which is sacred and incomparable; for the soul 
is •.• a direct emanation of divinity .•.. With Christ­
ianity the world loses the confused unity it had prim­
itively; there is, on the one hand, the world of thought, 
of the conscience, of morality, of religion; and, on the 
other hand, the world of matter, unthinking, amoral, and 
are1igious (1973:387,#39). 
Thus did Durkheim pursue these matters of the differential in­
fluence of Christian culture, vis-a-vis other preceding reli­
gious traditions, which lay at the creative core of the emer­
ging European civilization from about the eleventh century on­
ward. 
Now, Christian education, Durkheim argued, touched the 
very depths of the human soul. For example, the very process 
of Christian conversion reconstructed the individual's nascent 
conscience and consciousness far more profoundly than adherence 
to the religious cultures of Antiquity. 
In Antiquity, intellectual education had the objective 
of communicating to the child a certain number of de­
fined talents. These were either considered as a sort 
of ornamentation, designed to elevate the esthetic val­
ue of the individual, or else they were seen, as was 
the case in Rome, as instruments of action, as tools 
which an individual needed in order to play his role 
in life. In each case, it was a matter of inculcating 
into the pupil certain hapits and items of knowledge 
.... It was not a question of influencing the person­
ality in terms of what makes for its fundamental unity, 
but in clothing it in a sort of external framework, the 
different parts of which could be created independently 
.... Christianity, by contrast, very early on acquired 
the conception that there is in each of us an underly­
ing mode of being from which fbrms of intel­
ligence and sensibility derive, and in which they find 
their uni~y; and that it is this underlying mode of be­
ing which has to be reached if one really wants to car­
ry out the work of the educationalist and to produce a 
lasting effect. According to Christian belief, to shape 
a man is not to embellish his mind with certain ideas 
or to allow him to acquire certain specific habits, 
but to create in him a general attitude of the minn and 
the will which makes him see reality in general in a 
definite perspective. And it is easy to understand how 
Christianity came to hold this view. It is because ... 
in order to be a Christian, it is not enough to have 
learnt this or that particular item, to know how to 
• 
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discriminate between certain rites or pronounce certain 
formulas, or to know certain traditional beliefs. Chris-
tianity consists essentially in a certain attitude of 
soul, in a certain habitus of our moral being. To foster 
this attitude in the child is thus the essential goal of 
education (in Giddens, 1972a:206-0J). 
This "certain habitus of the entire moral being," this com-
mitment to influencing the total personality, was based upon 
the Christian notion of "the unity and intrinsic moral value 
of the self" tWallwork, 1972:132) . 
... the goal of Christian education always involved di-
recting the basic orientation of the self as a unified 
whole .... The important thing was the general disposi-
tion of the mind and the will of the whole personality. 
In Durkheim's view, this fundamental Christian concept 
of training the total personality distinguishes the 
whole of Western pedagogical instruction (Wallwork, 
1972:132). 
Modern Western education, though now largely secularized, 
Durkheim observed, continues this Christian emphasis on the 
total personality, and on penetrating with value and moral 
habits the "inner, deep recesses of the soul." 
For us the principal object of education is not to pro-
vide the child with a greater or lesser degree of items 
of knowledge, but to create within him a deep-lying dis-
position, a kind of perspective of the soul which ori-
ents him in a definite direction, not only during child-
hood, but for life •... Our conception of the goal has 
become secularized; consequently, the means employed 
must themselves change. But the abstract schema of the 
educational process has not altered. It is still a mat-
ter of descending into depths of the soul which Anti-
quity was unconscious of tin Giddens, 1972:207-8). 
Similarly, in terms of the second schema ot suicide, we 
might wonder whether, and to what extent, a certain form of 
Christian individualism became secularized into extreme 
sanctions which became unbearable to many. 
Indeed, the religio-cultural sanction of individualism 
and the interior life which came with Christianity served as 
an indispensable source for the modern "cult of moral indivi-
dualism" which Durkheim and other Enlightenment liberals and 
positivists held dear. 
Christianity, and Protestantism more specifically, is 
the immediate source from which modern moral indivi-
•
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dualism is derived .... Christian ethics provided the mor­
al principles upon which the "cult of the individual" is 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
founded, but now Christianity is becoming supplanted by 
sacred symbols and objects of a new sort. This is most 
clearly exemplified, Durkheim says, in the events of the 
French Revolution, where freedom and reason were glori­
fied ..•. The French Revolution gave the most decisive 
impetus to the growth of moral individualism in modern 
times (Giddens, 1971a:115-16). 
At the height of the Dreyfus Affair, when Durkheim rose to 
defend the modern apotheosis of Reason and the Individual, 
he rhetorically invoked the origins of western individualism 
from Christian doctrine to invert the attacks of Catholic 
conservatives against the "laic" Third Republic intellectuals 
and moral reformers. 
Are we to ignore the fact that the originality of Chris­
tianity consisted precisely in a remarkable development 
of the individualistic spirit? Whereas the religion of 
the ancient city-state was quite entirely made up of ex­
ternal practices, from which the spiritual was absent, 
Christianity demonstrated its inner faith, in the per­
sonal conviction of the individual, the essential condi­
tion of piety. First, it taught that the moral value of 
acts had to be measured according to the intention, a 
preeminently inward thing which by its very nature es­
capes all external judgments and which only the agent 
could competently appraise. The very center of moral 
life was thus transported from the external to the in­
ternal, and the individual thus elevated to be sovereign 
of his own conduct, accountable only to himselt and to 
his God ••.. If this restrained individualism which is 
Christianity was necessary eighteen centuries ago, there 
is a good chance that a more fUlly developed individual­
ism is indispensable today ..•. It is therefore a singu­
lar error to present the individualist ethic as the an­
tagonist of christian morality. Quite the contrary .•. 
the former derived from the latter. By attaching our­
selves to the first, we do not deny our past; we only 
continue it (in Bellah, 1973:52-3). 
Similarly, in Moral Education, Durkheim suggested that 
in the world-historical evolution of morality, Christian in­
wardness, the shedding of externality, the enshrinement of 
individual subjectivity, and thus, Christianity's resulting 
nature as "an essentially human religion," played an impor­
tant role in the autonomization and secularization of the 
world (see also Bellah, 1973:52-3). 
•
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Gradually things change. Gradually human duties are 
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•
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•
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•
 
multiplied, become more precise, and pass to the first 
rank of importance; while others, on the contrary, tend 
to become diminished. One might say that Christianity 
itself has contributed most to the accleration of thiR 
result. It is an essentially human religion, since its 
God dies for the salvation of humanity. Christianity 
teaches that the principle duty of man toward God is 
to love his neighbor. Although there are religious du­
ties--rites addressed only to divinity~-the place they 
occupy and the importance attributed to them continually 
diminish .... Thenceforth, our duties become independent, 
in large measure, of the religious notions that guaran­
tee them but do not form their foundation. With Protes­
tantism, the autonomy of morality is still more accentua­
ted by the fact that ritual itself diminishes. The moral 
functions of divinity becomes its sole raison d'etre. 
It is the only argument brought forward to demonstrate 
its existence. Spiritualistic philosophy continues the 
work of Protestantism. But among the philosophers who 
believe in the necessity of supernatural sanctions, 
there are none who do not admit that morality could be 
constructed qUite 1ndependent of any theological concep­
tion. Thus, the bond that originally united and even 
merged the two systems has become looser and looser. It 
is therefore certain that when we broke that bond defin­
itively we were following in the mainstream of history. 
If ever a revolution has been a long time the making, 
this is it (ME:6, 7). 
Finally, we see Durkheim, like Weber, attributing to 
Protestant thought an important role in scientific education, 
and, in general, revaluing the "this-worldly" aspect of reli­
gion and moral action. 
It was in Protestant circles, and particularly in Ger­
many, that this new pedagogical conception emerged for 
the first time; it is in the German countries, moreover, 
that it has remained widespread .... The fact is that 
there was in Protestantism a sense of the lay society 
and its temporal interests which Catholicism did not, 
and would not, possess (in Giddens, 1972a:214). 
In sum, if, as Durkheim emphasized, our modern ethos 
of individualism is ultimately derived from the belief sys­
tem and continuing phenomenological sanctions of Christian­
ity in general and Protestantism in particular, then how can 
we accept his earlier contention that social morphological 
evolution is the prime cause of the modern individualism 
which underlays anomie and egoisme? Can we still accept the 
•
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implicit causal model underlying Durkheim'sthesis that the 
growth of moral individualism is an "unceasing development
• in history"? How can these be more or less automatic reflec­
tions of the underlying social morphological differentiation? 
Contrary to the implications of Durkheim's early theses, and 
in line with his latter theses which we are exploring in
• this section, hereafter I shall hold it as established for 
our present purposes that Christian-Protestant culture rep­
resents an independent and perhaps crucial contribution to 
the modern ethos of individualism and the drives for "pro­
• gress and perfection" Which characterize modern culture. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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E .	 Durkheim's Cultural Account of the History of Education 
in France 
Having repeatedly criticized Durkheim's methodology for 
its abstracted general evolutionism, and having pointed out 
the need for it to be supplemented by Weberian notions of 
specific evolution and breakthroughs, it is significant for 
our present purposes that Durkheim came closest to analyzing 
Western society in these terms in a series of lectures~ I 
refer especially to Durkheim's lectures on Socialism and 
Saint-Simon, and to his analysis of the development of West­
ern civilization in his lecture course, repeated annually 
at the Ecole Normale Superieure from 1904 to 1913, which was 
published in French under the title L'Evolution pedagogique 
en France (for secondary accounts, see J. Floud, 1965; Wall­
work, 1972; Lukes, 1973). This specific historical account 
of pedagogical institutions and "Western Pedagogical Ideals" 
in terms of the changing "moral milieu" of Western culture 
is important for our present purposes. For here Durkheim's 
general evolutionary morphological model faded in terms of 
causal significance in the face of the act~al cultural com­
plexes directing the shape of Western education. Halbwachs 
called this cultural history "a vast and bold fresco cover­
ing ten centuries of history ••• a sort of continuous dis­
course on the progress of the human mind in France" (in Lukes, 
1973:379, #2). Wallwork also observes: 
Durkheim writes on an extremely broad canvas. Starting 
with an analysis of Christian pedagogical ideals in 
the early Middle Ages, he traces these ideals through 
the High Middle Ages, the Renaissance, and the Enlight­
enment to the modern period. In the process, Durkheim 
sketches not only the historical development of peda­
gogical ideals, but also the historical evolution of 
the differing concepts of man and his environment with 
which these ideals have been inexorably linked since 
the emergence of Western culture from the chrysalis 
of the Christian Weltanschauung (1972:130). 
Indeed, in ~'Evolution pedagogique en France Durkheim 
entertained multiple themes and variable ways of interpreting 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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. 
the causes and courses of complex social and cultural change. 
Wallwork again provides a useful summary: 
The Christian Weltanschauung that emerged during the 
early Middle Ages was an intellectual synthesis sui 
generis; the concepts of man and his environment en­
shrined in this unique religious world-view have de­
cisively molded all Western moral values, including 
the secular moral concepts of contemporary culture; 
the history of Western pedagogical ideals cannot be 
understood apart from this cultural framework and 
hi storical variations Wl tnln i t,for pedagogical ideals 
invariably derive from fundamental beliefs regarding 
the nature of man and his environment; and, as peda­
gogical ideals emerge from altered beliefs about man 
and nature, educational institutions, and practices 
are created or altered in conformity with these ideo­
logical innovations. In short, the history of pedago­
gical ideals is inseparable from the history of com­
prehensive religious or philosophical beliefs and val­
ues (Wallwork, 1972:130-31). 
Thus, beyond the often brilliant cascade of insights, 
Durkheim's cultural historical account here is valuable be­
cause his encounter with the actual empirical details of the 
development of his own civilization ied Durkheim to a many­
sided mode of explanation. Clearly, in terms of the varied 
details of Western evolution, at least from 1904 on Durk­
heim recognized, at least tacitly, that his earlier, more 
dogmatic, quasi-mechanical and rather one-way model of ex­
planation would no longer suffice. Lukes summarizes the 
shift in Durkheim's explanatory logics for us in these terms: 
Durkheim's method was "historical and sociological" 
in that it went beyond the analysis of successive ed­
ucational institutions and practices, and the exposi­
tion of educational doctrines: he continually sought 
to explain why particular ideas and ideals, practices, 
and institutions arose, survived during certain per­
iods, disappeared and, in some cases, reappeared. His 
explanatory scheme was neither mono-causal nor one­
sided; the explanations advanced were always complex 
and stresses different factors at different points. 
Sometimes the main factors were cultural, or "repre­
sentational", at others geographical, or political, 
or economic (1973:381). 
Here Durkheim came the closest to letting the actual histori­
cal constellations of events, conditions, and intentions de­
termine the ruling explanatory principles. Indeed, it is 
•
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highly significant for our present purposes that Lukes goes 
so far as to suggest: 
If there is an explanatory bias, it is perhaps in the 
direction of the cultural, the factors he tended to 
find especially fruitful in the explanation of edu­
cational developments were collective aspirations, 
values, beliefs, and ideals (1973:386). 
F. Durkheim'~ Move Toward Civilizational Analysis 
It is significant for our present purposes that Durk­
heim moved increasingly toward the notion of civilizations 
and inter-civilizational process asanecessary interpretive 
strategy in the human sciences. Although from his first to 
his last great book Durkheim was concerned with the broad 
evolutionary passages from the simplest levels of sociocul­
tural process to modern complex levels, it was only toward 
the end of his life that he felt compelled to spell out the 
need for the analytical perspective of civilizations, which 
appeared in ~Iannee sociologique in 1913; the article was co­
authored by Marcel Mauss. 
We should first note that, in the preceding year in his 
magnum opus, Durkheim had considerably widened out his basic 
explanatory model to include only morphological but institu­
tional and even cultural variables as intimate parts of a 
deeper causal structure. 
If .•. the categories are ... essentially collective 
representations •.. they should show the mental states 
of the group; they should depend on the way in which 
this is founded and organized, upon its morphology, 
upon its religious, moral and economic institutions, 
etc. (EF:28). 
Further, we might note that Durkheim's macro-processual or 
evolutionary sensitivity to society as not only an interact­
ional but also an intergenerational, and thus historical, 
phenomena, led him to emphasize the progressive "sedimenta­
tion" Or layering down and incorporation of collectively 
symbolic representations into the complex evolving "tree of 
social life." At various points in various works, Durkheim 
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referred to key constitutive collective representations 
such as, for example, Christian individualism, the spirit 
of the medieval scholastic university, Cartesian rational­
ism, the spirit of the French Revolution, and so forth, 
which had become historically sedimented into Western civi­
lization. This notion of progressive sedimentation was al­
ready implied in the multilineal overtones of his root meta­
phor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural life (see 
Book One). In The Elementary Forms, Durkheim referred to 
inter-generational or historical-cultural sedimentation of 
cultural elements into a new, working civilizational complex 
in these terms: 
Collective representations are the result of an im­
mense cooperation, which stretches out not only into 
space but into time as well; to make them, a multi­
tude of minds have associated, united, and combined 
their ideas and sentiments; for them, long generations 
have accumulated their experience and their knowledge 
(EF: 29) • 
And in ~'Evolution pedagogique en France Durkheim spoke in 
the following terms of the way in which the educational crea­
tivity of the Middle Ages, especially in the scholastic cul­
ture of the Universities, came to be incorporated and sedi­
mented into Western educational and cultural life: 
And although all of these specific institutions ori­
ginally stemmed directly from conditions specific to 
medieval life, they became so firmly hardened at that 
time that they have continued up to our day. Certain­
ly, we do not regard them in the same way as our for­
bears: we have infused them with a different spirit 
(Although) our educational life has been trans­
formed ••. it continues to flow in the channels which 
were created by the Middle Ages (in Giddens, 1972a:210). 
In short, just as Durkheim posited a horizontal continuum 
ranging from more or less fluid to crystallized or institu­
tionalized collective representations, s~ too he came to pos­
it a vertical continuum of sociocultural process ranging from 
the most elementary, micro, fused, primitive collective re­
presentations to the most differentiated, autonomous, and 
universalizable constitutive cultural symbolic forms on the 
•
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civilizational and world-historical levels. 
Having just completed detailed analyses of the key 
intra-societal origins and functions of collective represen­
tations in The Elementary Forms, and having there only brief­
ly sketched the emergence of increasingly abstract, autono­
mous, rational, and universalizable symbolic forms, Durkheim 
turned his attention in the following year to a fuller ela­
boration of the inter-societal, inter-cultural, inter-temp­
oral horizons involved in the passage toward modernity. With 
this shift in attention from the micro to the macro level of 
generic sociocultural process, the growing recognition of 
the importance of civilizational matrices of complex cultural 
forms marks a new and most important phase in Durkheim's con­
tinuing intellectual development. 
For instance, Durkheim and Mauss began their important, 
yet little known, "Note on the Notion of Civilization" by ob­
serving that if their general causal theorem of linking sym­
bols to specific social bodies was applied too narrowly, then 
the crucial inter-societal matrices of universalistic symbols 
may be lost to view. 
There are ..• phenomena which do not have such well­
defined limits: they pass beyond the political fron­
tiers and extend over less easily determinable spaces. 
Although their complexity renders their study diffi­
cult, it nonetheless behooves us to acknowledge their 
existence and to indicate their place within the bounds 
of sociology •.•. Social phenomena that are not strict­
ly attached to a determinate social organization do 
exist: they extend into areas that reach beyond the na­
tional territory or they develop over periods of time 
that exceed the history of a single society. They have 
a life of their own which is in some ways supranational 
(1971:809-10) . 
In other words, the Durkheimian's previous insistence on 
linking every social process with a specific social body lo­
cated in geographical space began to break down under the 
growing pressure of their evolutionary concerns. But this im­
portant recognition of potential limitations in the basic ex­
planatory rule of their school represented not so much an a­
bandonment of this rule as a crucial turning point, an inspir­
•
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ed extension of their basic interpretive logics to new and 
highly significant levels of complexity. In essence, the
• problem was to find some more specific links between micro­
societal, macro-societal, and evolutionary processes. Now, 
Durkheim had previously prepared the way for this important 
extension by his earlier insistence that increasingly ab­
• stract, universalizable, and rationalizable collective sym­
bols take on greater significance in sociocultural evolution 
precisely because they come to symbolize the new internation­
al life which progressively emerges. In short, universaliza­
• ble symbols constitute the foundation of the extended or civ­
ilizational social bond. 
Using the world-wide spread of Indo-European languages 
as a prime illustration of these processes, Durkheim and
• Mauss assigned the designation "civilizational" to these cru­
cial higher order trans-local and trans-temporal "social facts." 
They defined it in this way: "A civilization constitutes a 
kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations,
• each national culture being only a particular form of the 
whole" (1971:811). However, I believe the inclusion of nation­
al cultures as the component elements making up the "moral 
milieu" of a civilization to have been a mistake. First, it
• is by no means certain that modern political and national 
boundaries reproduce societal and cultural differences and 
unities. Thus, identifying civilizational "moral milieu" with 
those of mod~rn nation states does little to address these
• problems since the latter is merely a convenient unit drawn 
for interests often unrelated to our present concerns. More­
over, the gap between so-called "national culture" and civi­
lizations neglects the crucial fact, which first compelled
• Durkheim and Mauss to seek a higher level interpretive per­
spective in which to anchor long-term, complex sociocultural 
processes, and which they had just themselves emphasized as 
absolutely crucial to their own emerging civilizational per­
• spective--namely, the inter-societal, inter-national, inter­
temporal, inter-cultural exchange, sedimentation, and pro­
•
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gressive universalization of cultural symbolic forms. If, 
indeed, civilizations result from these supra-national, su­
• pra-societal symbolic interactions, then how can modern na­
tion states remain our basic analytical unit? Once again, 
these are merely political units, while we are primarily in­
terested in sustained cross-cultural interactions. Even Mauss
• and Durkheim themselves recognized this fact when they remark­
ed upon the differential susceptibility of various structur­
al and cultural elements to incorporation and sedimentation 
into sociocultural process on the civilizational level (1971:
• 812). They rightly noted that political institutions are 
" part of the specific character of each people," and, 
as such, do not lend themselves as easily to diffusion as do 
cultural symbolic forms. Indeed, it is precisely the power of
• of certain cultural forms such as, for example, the Arabic­
Hindu decimal system, or modern Western science and~chnolo­
gy, to rise above political confines and tribal boundaries 
which is significant for us. These prime symbolic forms come
• to collectively represent thisrranscendence and dialetical 
emergence of new universal "symbolic frontiers." The extend­
ed social bond of complex civilizations--of "organic soli­
darity" in Durkheim's earlier terms--is possible only if
• this universalizability and symbolic transcendence is also 
possible. 
Therefore, I suggest that we set aside national-politi­
cal boundaries as our key analytical unit, and seek instead
• to fashion a hermeneutical strategy more appropriate to des­
cribing these massive and sustained supra-personal, supra­
tribal, supra-national, inter-generational symbolic interact­
ions. It is these interactions themselves which must be con­
• sidered the basic units of civilizations. A key mediating 
• 
variable intervening between living societies and those com­
plex symbolic matrices called civilizations are cultural-his­
torical traditions. If Durkheim's theory of civilizational 
process is not to merely "float in the air," as is so often 
mistakenly charged against his notion of "social facts," it 
•
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must be complemented by the notion of cultural traditions.
 
In sum, we should strive to anchor our ana­

•
 
lyses not in terms of things or material social bodies but
 
rather in terms of sociocultural processes. Or is our current
 
philosophy of science still too dominated by latent material­

ist and mechanist premises?
 
•
 
With the notion of cultural traditions as the key con­

stitutive elements of civilizations, we can then more fully
 
utilize Durkheim's notion (after Ratzel) of widening "symbol­

ic frontiers," and the degree of sedimentation and universal­

•
 
izability of symbolic forms across these ever-widening fron­

tiers. Those cultural forms that rise to the civilizational
 
level, then, are carried by dynamic cultural traditions, by
 
active "dialogues across the centuries" as Nelson (1965a)
 
poetically suggests. Those cultural traditions competing for 
civilizational ascendancy, as Nelson (1973~ reminds us, do 
so by successfully extending their spatial and temporal gen­
•
 
erality (eg. see EF:482), while simultaneously attempting to
 
•
 
universalize the scope and significance of their prime sym­

bolic forms. The extension of the social bond in ever-widen­

ing degrees of universalism requires cultural traditions act­

ively elaborating and rationalizing universalizable symbolic
 
forms. This differential ability of cultural traditions to 
extend and universalize their prime collective representa­
tions, and to incorporate and sediment these symbolic forms 
• 
into civilizational processes, represents an analytical key 
to understanding the differential rates of acceleration in 
sociocultural evolution. In the succeeding chapter, I shall 
• 
utilize this notion of cultural traditions to illuminate 
some of the differences between Durkheim and Weber's work. 
In Chapter Ten we shall further explore this crucial interpre­
tive perspective of cultural traditions to illuminate some 
possible ways in which anomie and egoisme are influenced by 
•
 
dominant cultural traditions in the modern world.
 
•
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• 
CHAPTER FOUR 
THE CONVERGENCE BETWEEN DURKHEIM AND WEBER 
Preface. Throughout this dissertation I have repeatedly 
compared and contrasted Durkheim and Weber's explanatory 
logics, especially concerning extreme cultural sanctions 
• in the modern world as they might influence suicides. As 
a prelude to the second schema which integrates Durkheim's 
insights into modern suicide and Weber's insights into the 
secularization of religious sanctions, I wish first to more
• systematically explore some basic complementarities and con­
vergences between Durkheim and Weber's causal models and 
historical cultural analyses. 
Two recurrent interpretive problems stand in our way.
• First, it is important to distinguish between a summary of a 
pioneer's thought in some area and an in-depth interpretive 
exegesis of a thinker's fundamental premises as these inform­
ed all his work. The difference here is between "topographic"
• inquiry and "stratigraphic" exegesis of the paradigmatic or 
"nuclear structure" of a great thinker's life-work. Far too 
often we perform a summary exegesis (eg. Harks, 1974), but 
neglect to systematically understand the deep or "nuclear
• structure" of Durkheim or Weber's work. Second, a related 
problem is the common failure to adequately distinguish be­
tween a thinker's methodological prescriptions and his act­
ual evolving "logics in use." It is a common observation
• that one is better advised to follow what a great thinker 
did rather than what he may have said or set out in terms 
of "prescriptive logics." unfortunately, this is as true of 
Durkheim as of Weber, for neither the former (despite The
• Rules) nor the latter (despite the preface to Economy and 
Society and Parsons' best efforts in The Theory of Economic 
•
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and Social Organization) developed systematically and expli­
citly methodological statements which adequately described
• their own complex theoretical and historical investigations. 
Neither fully described their own rapidly evolving interpre­
tive "logics-in-use." Simply opposing prescriptions from The 
Rules or Economy and Society as Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg
• (1975c) do, will not suffice. The real question is: how, in 
actual fact, did Durkheim and Weber carry out their respect­
ive programs? Many surprises abound here. 
Now, surely one of Parsons' greatest contributions to
• sociological theory has been his steadfast attempt to unify 
our heritage by demonstrating significant methodological and 
theoretical convergences in the paradigms of our founding fa­
thers. I believe this represents a legitimate attempt to
• "consolidate ll sociological theory, an effort which Robert K. 
Merton has advocated for years. The unwary reader of Pope 
and friends' (1973,1975a,b,c) often successful three-pronged 
attack on Parsons' charter for American sociology may be led
• to conclude that, since the foremost attempt at synthesizing 
Durkheim's and Weber's work seems to have broken down, these 
two pioneers cannot be said to have converged on any signifi­
cant substantive matters. Whether or not, however, their
• general complementarity and specific convergence are to be 
illuminated under Parsons' aegis can now be separated from 
the still more important question: can we unify our heritage, 
and generate more powerful paradigms, or must we stand for­
• ever "two souls in one body twain?" 
Although much of the evidence forces me to agree with 
Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg that: (a) Parsons' account of 
Durkheim (see also the appendix to this dissertation) is oft­
• en rent by serious errors, and (b) that Parsons' account of 
Weber is often highly selective, nevertheless, I must part 
company with these critics' unfortunate conclusion that" •.. 
the vast difference in basic perspective separating Durkheim
• from Weber belies the thesis that they converged upon any 
single explanation of social behavior" (1975c:426). Why is it 
•
 
•
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that we suspect that this was Pope et aI's premise as well 
as their conclusion? Is the attack here not so much on the
• Durkheim-Weber convergence thesis as upon Parsons' preemi­
nence itself? Indeed, why we must we continue to forego whole­
ness, a more unified socio-logic, as Bendix (1971) counsels 
us? Setting aside the possibility of "absorption" of Weber
• into the supposed Durkheim-Parsons axis, does the position 
assumed by Bendix, Roth, and Pope and his collaborators ne­
cessarily mean that a forever divisive kind of "cognitive 
dissonance" is built into the growth of scientific knowled­
• ge? That we are as much chained to a neurotic cycle of col­
lective monologue and mutual impenetrability as to the 
"wheel of progress" of which Bendix (1971) speaks? Given com­
munally shared paradigms and discipline, which alone bestow
• conceptual unity on empirical diversity, how is it possible 
to carry out our chosen life-tasks in any coherent way if 
our inherited models, our prime symbolic guidance systems 
irretrievably conflict? I propose that it is unacceptable
• for the rightful demands of autonomy and the necessary dis­
trust of received authority to bar access to the unification 
of our heritage, and thus, to subsidize dualistic philoso­
•
 
phies.
 
Now, one way of viewing the present dissertation is as 
•
 
an attempt to rewrite The Structure of Social Action--that is,
 
by returning to a systematic, in-depth exegesis of the same
 
paradigmatic sources, to reorient some of our crucial sub­

stantive questions and methodological presumptions. By re­

turning to a detailed exegesis of Durkheim's work, I hope 
to simultaneously build upon and recast Parsons' charter for 
• 
contemporary sociological theory. Once again, the questions 
of the relations, past and potential, between these two giants 
of classical sociology--Durkheim and Weber--becomes central 
to our quest. Specifically, I suggest that their mature cau­
• 
sal models be treated as complementary. Further, Durkheim's 
linkage of suicides with modern sanctions for individualism 
and drives for infinite "progress and perfection" and with 
•
 
•
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Protestantism, is as significant for our present purposes as 
was Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the most dy­
• namic characteristics of the modern world. Finally, in their 
later work, both sadly interrupted, Durkheim and Weber tended 
to substantively converge in their concern with universali­
zing, rationalizing, and autonomizing processes on the wor1d­
• historical level. Let us now briefly explore some convergen­
ces between Durkheim and Weber. 
A. Tiryakian'~ Mystery Problem: The Mutual Unawareness of 
• 
Durkheim and Weber 
Why did Emile Durkheim and Max Weber ignore each other? 
This is the intriguing question posed by Edward Tiryakian in 
his "A Problem for the Sociology of Knowledge: The Hutua1 Un­
• awareness of Emile Durkheim and Max l'Jeber" (l966). It is 
• 
strange that Cohen, Hazelrigg, and Pope should have ignored 
this important "mystery problem" (which Bendix, 1971:283 did 
not fail to cite) which would have appeared to greatly streng­
then their case against Parsons' thesis of convergence. Him­
self one of Parsons' students, perha~s Tiryakian was led by 
what had become Parsonian orthodoxy on the question of con­
vergence to wonder out loud: if it is so clearly established
• that Weber's and Durkheim's work converged in such an epochal 
synthesis, then how was it possible that these twin pioneers 
of sociological theory remained so unconcerned with each oth­
•
 
ers work? Not only is this a puzzle in light of Parsons' fam­

ous claims, but it also raises a generic problem in the para­
digmatic history of any intellectual discipline, or, indeed, 
any major cultural form based upon multiple and shifting in­
•
 
stallments of "charisma on deposit" (see McCloskey, 1974).
 
First, we should note some uncertainty in the litera­
• 
ture concerning Tiryakian's claim that Durkheim and Weber to­
tally ignored each other in print. In response to Tiryakian's 
"mystery problem," Lukes (1973:397) contended that Durkheim 
did refer to Weber in a three page report on "Le premier con­
gres allemand de socio~ogie" in the 1913 edition of L'annee 
•
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sociologique. But, in an exchange with Tiryakian (1974),
 
Lukes acknowledged that the note in question was unsigned.

• And Lukes (1973:397) tells us that Georges Davy told him
 
•
 
that Durkheim II ... connaissait tres mal les oeuvres de Weber. II
 
Conversely, while Weber never acknowledged Durkheim's work
 
in print, Raymond Aron, noting the similarities between parts
 
of Weber's and Durkheim's sociology of religion, recalled the
 
•
 
following anecdote from Marcel Mauss: "When I went to see Max
 
Weber (in Heidelberg), I found a complete set of L'Annee so­

ciologique in his studyll (1967:271). And Tiryakian himself
 
•
 
reports that Mauss had claimed (to Aron) that "\'oJeber had bor­

rowed many ideas from Durkheim and his students" (1966:332, #7).
 
Even granting Mauss's partisanship, surely this is an astound­

ing claim for the intellectual heir of Durkheim to make! If,
 
•
 
as Bendix, Pope and friends seem to assert, there is no real
 
basis for either methodological convergence between Durkheim
 
and Weber, then what would have prompted the leader of the
 
Durkheim school to claim that Weber had IIborrowed" his socio­

•
 
logy of religion from the Durkheimians? If no meaningful com­

parisons are possible, then why should Mauss, who knew the
 
literature on primitive religions as well as Durkheim and
 
better than Weber, forward such a surprising claim? The plot
 
thickens. Tiryakian cites a few other tantalizing indirect 
connections, such as Durkheim's review of a book by Weber's 
wife, but these serve only to intensify the mystery: why 
• 
did Durkheim and Weber, who certainly knew of each others 
existence, so persistently slight each others work? Tirya­
kian's question is still significant, and the challenge re­
mains. 
• B. Conflicts Over Comparisons and Contrasts Between Durkheim 
and Weber 
• 
Comparing and contrasting the work of Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim has become one of the favorite pastimes in 
the history of sociological theory. The list, by no means 
exclusive, includes Parsons (1949) of course, who has been 
•
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joined by Raymond Aron (1967), s. Fenton (1968), Giddens 
•
 
(1971a), Bendix (1971), LaCapra (1972), Wallwork (1972),
 
•
 
Nelson (1972a, 1973a), Whitney Pope (1973, 1975a), and so
 
on. From the critical side, Bendix and Pope especially have
 
attempted to refute Parsons' account and his claim for con­

vergence. Let us first begin, however, with Tiryakian's sum­

• 
mary of some of the common denominators between Durkheim and 
Weber. 
There are some striking biographical parallels to be 
noted. For Durkheim and Weber were contemporaries in adjacent 
• 
countries, both edited major social science journals in their 
respective nations, both were professors at major universities, 
and "both achieved a national reputation in intellectual cir­
cles." And " •.• each in his own way (was) a victim of World 
• 
War I" (Tiryakian, 1966:330). There are, of course, also some 
important biographical differences. Obviously, one was French, 
the other German--two groups at war twice within their own 
lifetimes. Durkheim was a laicized Alsatian Jew of rabbinical 
• 
parentage, while Weber was an anguished "religiously unmusi­
cal" virtuouso caught between his Lutheran and Calvinistic 
heritages (Mitzman, 1971~ Marianne Weber, 1975). "Durkheim 
worked his way through an outwardly uneventful academic car­
• 
eer in France, finishing with the attainment of the ambition 
of all French academic people, a professorship at the Univer­
sity of Paris" (Parsons, 1949:301), while Weber's life was 
often politically engaged and fraught with emotional torment 
• 
and psychic crisis so disabling that for years he was forced 
to live the life of a private scholar. Durkheim built a 
school around himself in the Annee sociologique (see espe­
cially Terry Clark, 1973), while Weber worked alone, founded 
no school, fell out of intellectual favor in his own country 
after his death, and had to be imported later from America, 
largely through Parsons re-interpretation. In short, using 
• 
terms borrowed from the sociology of religion, which seems 
appropriate in characterizing these pioneers, Durkheim may 
be seen as a secular "priest," while Weber acted as a lone 
•
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• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
virtuoso, a "prophetic" figure committed to a "metaphysic
 
of human heroism" (Mi tzman, 1971).
 
Now, in regard to comparing and contrasting the work 
of Durkheim and Weber, it is striking to note that two giants 
of contemporary sociology have chosen to oppose each other on 
precisely the question of the degree of significant conver­
gence between our classical founding fathers--I refer to Par­
sons on one side and Bendix on the other. Bendix (1971a) 
and Pope, Cohen, and Hazelrigg (19 7:c) have been the most in­
sistently critical of Parsons' claim for convergence. Where­
as Parsons claimed methodological convergence, Bendix and 
Pope draw the contrast between Durkheim and Weber very sharp­
ly indeed. So sharply, in fact, that Parsons was moved to re­
buke Bendix's (1971a) characterization as "a caricature of 
Durkheint' (Parsons, 1972b: 200; see also 1973: 177). I am inclin­
ed to agree with Parsons on this score. For Bendix presumes 
that the key difference between these pioneers is their atti­
utde toward functional analysis; yet Bendix failed to cite 
Albert Pierce's (1960) attempt to dissolve the retroactive 
claims of the functionalists on Durkheim. Bendix generally 
fails to illumine the differences between these pioneers be­
cause he tacitly uses Durkheim as a rhetorical foil to attack 
Parsons' hegemony. Indeed, Bendix's thinly-veiled polemic sim­
ply makes Durkheim the tool of his invidious comparison of 
the supposed Weber-Bendix versus Durkheim-Parsons alignment. 
Ironically, one of the reasons Bendix's brief review fails to 
illumine is that his attack on Parsonian functionalism (using 
Durkheim as a symbolic third term) unwittingly presumes Par­
sons' own very special interpretation of Durkheim in the first 
place! Had Bendix's real purpose been to illumine the past 
and potential relations between the work of Max Weber and 
Emile Durkheim, he might have begun by questioning Parsons' 
orthodox account, instead of tacitly embracing it, and mere­
ly inverting the valuation as so many of Parsons' rhetorical 
opponents are wont to do (eg. see John Horton, 1964). Had 
Bendix undertaken an independent, full-scale, in-depth com­
•
 
• 
• 
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parison and contrast, he could not have failed to note the 
very real convergence between Durkheim and Weber on Bendix's
• own ground--namely, historical sociology! Had they posed the 
question in these open terms, rather than accepting Parsons' 
account, Bendix and Pope and friends might have spared us 
their unfortunate conclusion that sociological theory must
• remain forever sundered between these two giants and their 
• 
contemporary epigoni (eg. see Bendix, 197f:298; Pope et aI, 
1975c:426) . 
Undoubtedly, the fundamental source of the very real 
and numerous differences between Durkheim and Weber, which 
• 
cannot be attributed primarily to "temperament and circum­
stance" as Bendix suggests, must be sought in some notion of 
two different traditions. Although I differ from both of their 
conceptions of precisely how to characterize these differing 
traditions, both Bendix and Parsons agree that Durkheim and 
Weber came from two different traditions. But exactly to 
what types of traditions should we attribute "une opposition 
sourde" of Durkheim and Weber, their mutual unawareness? To 
national-political traditions? But we have already critici­
zed this common and questionable practice in the preceding 
• 
chapter. To intellectual traditions? This is what Bendix 
and Parsons seem to propose, albeit in different ways. A se­
•
 
cond important question is: even granting these crucial dif­

ferences of experience, orientation, and purpose, do such
 
loyalties to variant traditions necessarily preclude signi­

ficant methodological and substantive complementarity and 
convergence crucial to the re-unification of sociocultural 
theory? 
• 
Perhaps we would do well, first, to recall Tiryakian's 
• 
delicate rephrasing of our present problem. "One way we could 
interpret their mutual unawareness as judged from their wri­
tings is that this may have been not so much a case of mutual 
ignorance as a case of ignoring each other" (1966:334-5). 
It does not really suffice here to suggest that Weber 
was not really considered a sociologist at the time that 
•
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Durkheim was so regarded, for Durkheim was extremely wide 
read, and his ~'Annee sociologique contained reviews of 
many different types of literature in the human sciences. 
No, the problem is best posed sociologically--it is not a 
question of the lack of knowledge, but rather a tacit silen­
ce in which both parties apparently conspired. Now, while 
plausible, neither Tiryakian's nor Bendix's conjectures a­
bout background factors of "temperament and circumstances" 
mitigating against direct acknowledgement are sufficient. 
Our solution to Tiryakian's mystery problem, and our resolu­
tion of the Parsons-Bendix debate, should be based upon deep­
er reasons, upon sociological reasons. Even though neither 
Durkheim nor Weber shied away from controversy, neither even 
attempted to engage the other in open critical review or de­
bate. For instance, as Lukes observes, Durkheim " ... offer­
ed abundant argumentative refutations of general sociological 
approaches and methods that differed from his own--such as 
those of Marx, J. S. Mill, Espinas, Tarde, Simmel, Giddings, 
Albion Small, Ludwig Gumplowicz, Alfred Vierkandt, Gaston 
Richard, and very many others--in fact, those of all his con­
temporaries" (1973: 404-5) --with the single exception of the 
greatest of them all, Max Weber. For his own part, Weber's 
combativeness is well-known. However illuminating such a 
clash might have been, we are left only with the fact that 
such a confrontation never took place. Whether it never oc­
curred because nothing was felt to be at stake, or whether 
too much, remains pure speculation. Thus, as Tiryakian him­
self acknowledges, Durkheim and Weber's non-relationship 
should be assigned a different meaning from the revealing 
antagonisms between, say, Leibnitz and Newton. 
Still, the question remains: to what types of tradi­
tions should we attribute Durkheim and Weber's "une opposi­
tion sourde?" Tiryakian first speculates that "nationalism" 
and a kind of "Olympian aloofness" may have been at the heart 
of their apparent duet of silence. Raising again the question 
of the sociological salience of silence, Tiryakian asks, if 
•
 
• 
--821-­
we encounter unexpected massive and sustained silence, is 
this not due:
• •.. to the fact that mental products are so related 
• 
to their sociocultural setting that even the towering 
figures of the same social science may operate from 
sufficiently different presuppositions concerning so­
cial reality, and concerning what is socially relevant, 
that they will know of each other without knowing each 
other (1966:336)? 
Yes, of course, generally that is the question here. But pre­
cisely what mental products are related to what elements in 
the sociocultural setting, and to what types of presupposi­
• tions, so that silence shades over into ignorance? Let us 
briefly explore Parsons and Bendix's opposing answers. 
Parsons, of course, portrayed Durkheim and Weber ~s mo­
ving inexorably toward Parsons' own general systems synthesis,
• as each pioneer overcame the limitations in their respective 
• 
traditions--positivism and idealism (see also H.S. Hughes, 
1958). While much truth remains in this claim, unfortunately 
Parsons, like Robert Merton (see B. Nelson, 1972b), seldom 
returned to develop some of the profound themes of his youth. 
Had he returned to a full-scale revision, Parsons would have 
had to acknowledge that the dialectical tensions in Durkheim's 
• 
thought came from his being rhetorically involved on multiple 
polemical fronts simultaneously against three major opposing 
• 
cultural traditions (see also Giddens, 1972a; Lukes, 1973). 
And almost no one has yet adequately clarified the opposition 
between Durkheim's own tradition--the Franco-Latin Positivist 
("laic") Cultural Tradition--and the preceding Catholic Hier­
• 
ocratic-Metaphysica1 Cultural Tradition. One does not adequate­
ly describe this tradition simply by calling it "Cartesian" as 
Parsons does (see also 1968a}.Consequent1y, Parsons would have 
had to reconstruct the very crux of his story--name1y, the 
misportraya1 of positivism as synonymous with modern science. 
(This identification seriously misled Pope, 1973, who only 
•
 
compounded Parsons' error when the former denied that Durk­

heim was a positivist). 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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Bendix, in opposition to Parsons, and what they have 
both taken to be Durkheim's doctrine, argued that Durkheim 
and Weber belonged to two different intellectual traditions 
--the Baconian or Saint-Simonian, on the one hand, and the 
Burckhardtian or Tocquevillian, respectively. But it is un­
clear from Bendix's association whether these earlier think­
ers directly and fundamentally influenced our twin sociolo­
gical pioneers, or merely whether they can be usefully clas­
sified, for certain purposes, as independently following in 
the same general stream of thought. Since the latter appears 
to be the case, I do not find the classification very reveal­
ing. 
c.	 Dialogues Across the Centuries: Durkheim and Weber's 
Cultural Traditions 
In contrast to both Parsons and Bendix, I propose that 
we both explain sociologically the differences between Durk­
heim and Weber, and then use sociologically this analytical 
tool to illumine their prime points of convergence and their 
lasting significance. I suggest that structures of conscious­
ness as deeply rooted and felt as those of Durkheim and Weber's 
are generally intimately related to structures of conscience. 
Therefore, I propose that we first seek out the fundamental 
roots of these twin structures of conscience and conscious­
ness in religio-cultural, rather than purely intellectual, 
traditions. Specifically, I propose that we connect Weber and 
Durkheim to partially opposing cultural traditions. 
I shall view cultural historical traditions as a 
basic explanatory unit, comparable to classes or socio-econo­
• 
mic status. As such, macro cultural traditions cross-cut na­
tional boundaries, time periods, and cultural spheres, on the 
one hand, and act as key links between societies and civili­
zations on the other. As one observer suggested about the re­
lations between Marx and Weber: " ..• they need to be under­
stood in the light of the universes of meaning from which 
they drew their sustenance and to the progress of which they 
•
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• 
hoped to make lasting contributions" (B. Nelson, 1965:150). 
These deep loyalties to culturally assigned life-tasks are 
perhaps best understood as "dialogues across the centuries,lI 
as Nelson suggests. 
Now, Durkheim embraced his life-task within the con­
text of the Franco-Latin Positivist (lIlaic ll ) Cultural Tradi­
• tion. Perhaps Durkheim is best characterized, therefore, as 
a positivist moral philosopher who worked sociologically, as 
a lIlaic" intellectual reformer who sought to construct socio­
logically a new base for secular morality, an lIunrepentant
• rationalist ll who dreamed of dialectically resolving the evo­
• 
lutionary dilemmas (see Giddens, 1971a, 1972a) of modern man 
in a transitional era, and so on and so forth. The origins, 
sanctions, and continued moral and intellectual sustenance 
of the former's structure of conscience and consciousness 
can be found in the continuing and mounting "laic ll reaction 
to the lingering medieval hierocratic control of European 
• 
life by the Catholic Cultural Tradition. Its preparatory 
phase dates from Abelard on (eg. see B. Nelson, 1973a,b), 
and the successful scholastic sedimentation of rationality 
•
 
and a kind of autonomy of the individual intellect and con­

science into European and especially French life. This was
 
followed much later by alate medieval and Renaissance inter­

lude (eg. with the varied efforts of Rabelais, Montaigne, 
Bodin, etc.) The second and early modern stage begins, of 
•
 
course, with Descartes, as the founder of the modern ration­

alist stream, and with Pascal (a Jansenist--a kind of Calvin­
istic Catholicism), as the model of the ascetic and mystic 
strains of "laic morality" and existentialism in French cul­
•
 
ture. The enigmatic Pierre Bayle stands as a paradoxical, but
 
•
 
in many ways paradigmatic, transitional figure from the ear­

lier religious stress on conscience to the emerging emphasis
 
on the independent critical, rational intellect. This inter­

lude was succeeded by the first fully modern phase--that bril­

liant, massive, and sustained series of Enlightenment genera­
tions of French "laic" intellectualistic moral reformers--I 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
refer to men such as Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau (a sem­

inal figure because he was a direct link between the progres­

sive Enlightenment and the Romantic reaction), Oiderot, Tur­

got, Condorcet, and so on, a list far too long for this page.
 
Then came another crucial phase, with the turn away from the
 
critical or negative thrust of the Enlightenment and the ex­

•
 
cesses of the French Revolution, with the emergence of "posi­

tivism" with Saint-Simon as the prescient prophet of social
 
and moral reconstruction. The pioneer of positivism was fol­

lowed, of course, by his more systematic disciple Comte, who
 
•
 
combined in characteristic fashion (to the puzzlement of many
 
purely intellectual historians) both the scientific and moral
 
reformist strains so pervasive in French culture. This great
 
second phase was accompanied by the brilliant incisiveness of
 
•
 
thenostalgic realist Tocqueville, the right-wing, fully nos­

talgic, but even themselves curiously empirical Catholic react­

ionaries such as de Bonald and de Maistre, and the left-wing
 
realists and positivists, among whom were Balzac, Renan, Taine,
 
• 
Tarde, and so on. 
In sum, Ourkheim, coming with the following generation, 
can be considered as a brilliant and almost ideal-typical re­
presentation of these uniquely contending "collective repre­
sentations" in French culture--the rationalist, individual­
ist, and intellectualist streams on the one hand, and the 
"laic" moral reformist stream on the other. This deeply em­
•
 
bedded strategem of the non-religious laity arguing critical­

•
 
ly and anti-metaphysically for the moral reform of both the
 
hierocracy and the nation's morals is a phenomenon peculiar
 
to what I have come to call the Franco Positivist (anti-meta­

physical, yet rational) "Laic" (secular moral reformist) Cul­

tural Tradition. It is curious that few have noticed that 
positivism is a "dis-ease" most often emerging in Catholic 
culture areas. It is even more curious that positivism, de­
• 
fined basically as a world-view rooted in a split between 
faith and reason or between reason and experience, was first 
first constructed by the hierocracy itself (nominalism, 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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"fictionalism," "probabilism, tI --see Kolakowski, 1968) in 
an attempt to secure the "deposit of faith" by walling it 
off from doubt and wayward attack. As so often happens, how­
ever, ideas get away from their pioneers. For centuries, the 
French moral and intellectual reformers were engaged in an 
epic struggle with the hierocracy over the legitimate founda­
tions of moral authority and intellectual decision. Positive 
science served as a tool in their struggle to disengage from 
traditional claims on man, and as the tool by which they 
sought to construct a "laic" morality. Transcendental truth 
claims had to be rejected out of hand, for such "essential­
ist" appeals blocked the reformers' "laic" drive to construct 
"existentially" rooted structures of conscience and conscious­
ness. Against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," to 
use Weber's term, the French and Latin "prophets" and "laic" 
moral reformers, whether from left or right, raised the coun­
ter-claims of "Individual Conscience" and "Reason," both 
based upon the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" em­
bedded deep within each individual, and upon the "Book of 
Nature." The dual insistence on science and moral reform was 
not an anomaly in Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim, for it 
was precisely this insistent linkage which lay at the heart 
of this particular cultural tradition. Indeed, how else are 
we to understand Durkheim's drive to construct a "science of 
the moral life," his key role in "laic" educational training 
in the Third Republic, and his assiduous pursuit of sociolo­
gy as the modern form of societal self-consciousness destined 
to replace religion itself? 
Neber, on the other hand, emerged out of a "dialogue 
across the centuries" within the last major modern tradition 
to crystallize--namely, the Romantic-Idealist ("mystic") Cul­
tural Tradition. Perhaps Weber is best characterized as a 
tragic existential world-historical anatomist of the dilem­
mas of the opposing forces of charisma and rationalization, 
as an intellectualistic, "religiously unmusical," virtuoso, 
caught between Romantic-Lutheran and Calvinist religio-cul­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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tural streams, a "Sisyphean hero of an age of ultimate 
trials" (Nelson, 1965a:163), a moral realist committed to 
"meeting the demands of the day" with a 'metaphysic of hu­
man heroism" (Mitzman, 1971) and so~~nd so forth. Weber's 
subjectivity, his sense of "utmost inwardness," combined 
with his rigorous ascetic rational intellectualism, his op­
position to the fragmentation of man and the lack of inte­
gral wholeness in the modern world stemming from the latent 
hoped for Faustian universality, his Pauline-Lutheran-Roman­
tic opposition between Geist and Welt, between Spirit and 
Mechanism, Life and Death, his virtuoso encyclopedic per­
sonal knowledge, and his ransacking of the universe of hu­
man history for illumination on dilemmas posed by these gen­
eric polarities these and other traits mark Max Weber, with 
a character indelibilis, as an ambivalent member of what I 
have come to call the Romantic-Idealist Cultural Tradition. 
As Benjamin Nelson has suggested: "However they may oppose 
one another, both Weber and Marx are the heirs, executors, 
and gravediggers of the German Idealist Tradition" (1965a: 
153). Further, Nelson notes: "Weber's Pauline accents pre­
sent the sharpest contrast to Marx's Johannine vision" (1965a: 
163). And again, " ... Weber reminds one of Luther's reluct­
ant heirs ...• He is a faithful helmsman remaining at his 
post though the landmarks are gone. His ultimate antagonists 
are the confident paragons of the everyday world" (Nelson, 
1965a:163). In short, the very structure of Weber's work is 
-- ------=- - - -- ­
ironic and cautionary in a prophetic mode, while that of 
Durkheim's work is dialectical in a priestly and positivist 
mode. 
Just as the prime rhetorical opponent of Durkheim's 
tradition was the preceding Catholic tradition, so too the 
clearest opponent of Weber's cultural tradition was (is) what 
I have come to call the Anglo Utilitarian-Empiricist ("ascet­
ic") Cultural Tradition. Thus, Durkheim's notion of the in­
timate intertwining of structures of conscience and conscious­
ne~s and their sociocultural bases, and Weber's opposition 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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between "priests" and "prophets" together with the "laity" 
on the one hand, and between "mystics" and "ascetics" on the 
other, serve as my prime analytical anchors by which to clas­
sify modern cultural traditions. 
Now, clearly the prehistory of this tradition goes back 
at least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before that to 
the late medieval mystics, to thinkers such as Cardinal Nicho­
las of Cusa, to the tertiary urban sects, especially the bro­
therhoods and sisterhoods scattered along the Rhine and the 
Low Countries. This religio-cultural stream accompanied the 
proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian structures of con­
science in the Lutheran Reformation, especially in terms of 
its central experience of the angst and deep inner anguish 
of the "faith-crisis." This aspect of the Reformation was ac­
companied by a half-invisible, but critically important 
stream--the intellectualistic and pietistic mysticism of 
"utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of Sebastian 
Franck, Schwekenfeld, Valentin Weigel, and especially that 
ideal-typical representative of the "personal charisma" of 
an II inner-worldly mystic"--I mean Jacob Boehme. This religio­
cultural stream was continued and redirected later by the 
full-blown Pietism of Spener, Frank, Count Zinzendorf, etc. 
and a host of similar "world-retreating" Protestant sects. 
Now, this cultural tradition enjoyed its early prime philo­
sophical expression in the classically influenced Leibnitz, 
the outstanding polymath of his day. Leibnitz delivered the 
first fundamental critique of the Anglo atomistic and mech­
anistic tradition as embodied in Newton's world-vision; but, 
Newton's philosophy won the day, Leibnitz died almost unno­
ticed, only to gain final victory three centuries later when 
German thinkers revolutionized modern physical theory and 
restricted Newtonian physics. This religio-cultural tradi­
tion reached its first classical phase with the Enlighten­
ment generation of Pietists such as Kant, Hamann, and the 
great Herder. It then exploded in its definitive form of 
conscience and consciousness with the succeeding generations 
•
 
• 
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of Goethe, Fichte, Hegel, Schliermacher, Schelling, the von 
Humboldts, and so forth. Indeed, it is striking that this 
massive intellectual and artistic outpouring, in many ways 
even greater than that of the key generations of the French 
Enlightenment, was so delayed. Yet, when it finally came, 
the German reaction to the progressive and disruptive tend­
encies of the French and Scotch-English cultures was so mas­
sive and so rapid, that the Romantic reaction followed the 
German Enlightenment (i.e. Lessing, Kant, Herder, etc.) so 
closely as to be almost simultaneous with it rather than se­
quential. The generation of Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, and 
so on, was followed by that of Dilthey, F. Brentano, Wundt, 
Hartmann, Nietzsche, Windelband, and so forth. Next came the 
generation of Toennies, Husserl, Weber, Sirnmel, Troeltsch, 
etc., which was followed by Cassirer, Spengler, Scheler, and 
later Mannheim. In sum, emerging first in Germany in the lat­
ter half of the eighteenth century, and then spreading across 
Europe and America, the Romantic cultural tradition crystal­
lized out of the progressive secularization of the continuing 
mysticism of the "spiritual radicals" and their descendants, 
the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith crisis," assorted 
oriental and gnostic theosophies, Leibnitzian rationalism, 
and the later pietistic cult of inwardness and anguished sub­
jectivity as these ethical and experiential orientations 
were secularized or translated into art, poetry, music, phil­
osophy, and social thought. The Romantic reaction against 
the "progressive" trends of the modern world continues to 
inform countercultural movements to this very day. 
Seen in this way, Durkheim embraced a very different 
cultural and historical task than did Weber. This is why, 
as Carl Becker observed in his classic The Heavenly City of 
the Eighteenth Century Philosophers: 
... it is true of ideas, as of men, that they cannot 
fight unless they occupy the same ground: ideas that 
rush toward each other on different levels of appre­
hension will pass without conflict or mutual injury 
because they never establish contact, never collide 
(1932 :122-23). 
•
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With this brief review (see Part II of this Book also), 
• 
I believe that we can more adequately address and resolve a 
•
 
legitimate and most intriguing question in the history of
 
sociology: namely, why did the two most significant pioneers
 
of modern sociological theory not make contact, much less
 
collide? Now, is this lack of paradigmatic contact among our
 
•
 
pioneers one reason why today we still lack a unified doc­

trine? That our discipline is still split between seemingly
 
closed contending factions? Peace treaties, such as Bendix
 
counsels, which hermetically seal off one aspect of reality
 
•
 
will not suffice. For if the goal of science is integrated
 
truth and in-depth, universal significance, then how has it
 
been possible for both contemporary and classical sociologists
 
to sustain such massive "ignorance"? Ultimately, the mystery
 
•
 
lies, of course, in man himself. Such questions are fundamen­

tal and the problem is eternal. It is the sociocultural coun­

terpart to the perennial problem of "theodicy" in religion.
 
If God is good, then why does He allow evil to pervade our
 
lives--why do the good die young, why is life a veil of 
tears, how are we to distinguish good from evil when they 
are so often bound up together? Here we ask: if the explana­
•
 
tory principles of our human science are universal, and gen­

eric human and historical experience comparable, they why 
cannot we agree on its meaning? In both cases, we must ex­
plain why unity and harmony has not been attained; what are 
• 
the obstacles blocking our path? How was it possible for 
highly sophisticated sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber, 
who roamed the world of history and philosophy, to entertain 
evidential canons so incommensurable that they permitted them­
•
 
selves to ignore each others work? How could their "relevan­

•
 
cy of knowledge" structures, their "root metaphors" and "dic­

tionaries," their procedural and applicability canons be so
 
different? In short, how could their paradigms differ so rad­

ically?
 
No such easy answers, which conceal more than they re­
veal, such as "temperament and circumstance," will suffice. 
•
 
•
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For such differences are not superficial or idiosyncratic; 
•
 
rather, they are fundamental. Only loyalties and orienta­

tions concerning the most basic meanings of existence can 
have this wide, deep, and sustained effect. Only "collect­
ive representations" which constitute the very foundations 
of conscience and consciousness can be this important. Only 
• 
I • their deep and abiding loyalties to their own religio-cul­
tural traditions begins to explain why our founding fathers 
spoke so directly and meaningfully to us, but managed to 
ignore each other. 
Therefore, my first answer to Tiryakian's "mystery 
problem"--what explains the "mutual unawareness" of Durkheim 
and Weber--is that they worked out of fundamentally different 
•
 
(though related) cultural historical traditions. They embra­

•
 
ced very different life-tasks; thus, their basic perceptions,
 
analytical oppositions, problems, case-studies, intentions,
 
and so on stood apart. Indeed, perhaps their clear and strong
 
commitments to their culturally inherited prime tasks helps
 
•
 
explain why both Durkheim and Weber continue to appeal so
 
strongly to us today. For these thinkers provided us with a
 
series of classical statements conveying many of the crucial
 
insights generated by their respective religio-cultural tra­

•
 
ditions into the dilenunas of social existence and the signi­

ficance of the curious turnings taken by sociocultural evo­

lution. In other words, both Durkheim and Weber can be taken
 
as almost ideal-typical representatives of the best their
 
•
 
respective cultural traditions have to offer the sciences of
 
man. Perhaps this is why Durkheim and Weber have become con­

stitutive symbols, veritable "collective representations,"
 
for modern sociology.
 
Now, the second, and even more compelling reason why 
both Durkheim and Weber continue to exercise such a hold 
over the sociological imagination is precisely because they 
• 
offer us a way beyond the partialities of rhetoric to the 
unifying universalities of dialectic. For while serving as 
ideal typical representations of the best insights of their 
•
 
•
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cultural traditions into the dilemmas of modern existence, 
•
 
their personal acknowledgement (see Michael Polanyi, 1958)
 
• 
of the truths they discovered inevitably transcended the 
limitations of their very different heritages. Although Durk­
heim and Weber worked out of different cultural traditions, 
both made it their central life's work to address apparent 
• 
antinomies and historical ironies. And both of them pursued 
these dilemmas so assiduously that inevitably they broke 
through the restrictive definitions placed upon these re­
ceived problems by their own cultural traditions. In this 
• 
way, the work of both Durkheim and Weber rose to a new level 
of universal significance and truth. In short, the same faith­
fulness to resolving fundamental dilemmas that revealed them 
as exemplars of the best of their respective cultural tradi­
tions, also led them, by the very logic of their quest, to 
transcend the limitations of their cultural inheritance by 
rising to a new level of universal significance. It is this 
• 
profound achievement which ultimately makes both Durkheim 
and Weber so significant for the future of the human sciences. 
• 
D. A Partial Inventory of Important Complementarities and 
Convergences in the Work of Durkheim and Weber 
One of the first problems we face in this regard is 
the lack of systematic and deeply informed comparisons and 
contrasts of the special sociologies of Durkheim and Weber;
• for example, their sociologies of religion or law 1. In ad­
dition, the complexity of both pioneer's thought, their de­
votion to empirical truth, the multitude of topics each suc­
cessively addressed, and their commitment to irony or resol­
• ving traditional antinomies, meant that both the work of Durk­
heim and Weber is literally bursting with apparent contra­
dictions, inconsistencies, "loose ends," apparent dilemmas. 
Indeed, as Lukes (1973) notes, today there abound "many dif­
• ferent Durkheims," as there are "many Webers." Sometimes it 
seems as if any set of claims on either Durkheim or Weber 
can be more or less effectively countered by textual evidence 
•
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to the contrary. As with Scripture, each pioneer's "charis­
• 
ma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974) can be cited for everyman's 
own special purpose. But, after all, is this not the ironic 
fate of all exemplars, all guiding paradigms? While we may 
• 
wish that universality should be the prime characteristic 
of all constitutive models, the very same ability to encom­
• 
pass ever-more diverse aspects means that, often as not, para­
digms almost necessarily become protean, capable of eliciting 
myriad meanings. Might we not call this phase of the eternal 
dialectic of "merger and division" (K. Burke, 1969) the "pro­
teanization of paradigms?" 
•
 
Now, instead of tacitly acceptinq Parsonian orthodoxy
 
on Durkheim, ~n1 then resolutely polemicizing against the for­

mer's convergence thesis, as has been Bendix's and Pope and
 
•
 
friends' rhetorical ploy, I would argue, on the contrary, that
 
Parsons' special generic focus held him back from making his
 
claim for convergence as strong as it might have been. In the
 
final analysis, Parsons must be given his due, for the work
 
•
 
of Weber and Durkheim did converge in many significant ways.
 
Tronically, as suggested earlier, the strongest basis of con­

vergence is in terms of historical and cultural sociology,
 
Bendix's own grounds. Doubtless, there are many differences
 
between Durkheim and Weber, as Bendix, Pope, and others have 
informed us. But let us next explore some of the unrecognized 
ways in which they carne to fit together. 
• 1. Some Important Methodological Complementarities Between
 
Durkheim and Weber
 
•
 
Let us first inventory some of the points of methodolo­

gical complementarity between Durkheim and Weber. Complemen­

• 
tarity is here regarded as a relationship in which one part 
completes or fills out the other. Each perspective thus mu­
tually supplies what is lacking in the other, so that an in­
tegral whole emerges. Out of this mutuality a ccmplete and 
adequate interpretive model may emerge. 
• 
•
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a. Durkheim's general evolutionism is complemented by We­
• 
ber's concern with specific evolution. The former's focus on 
continuity is complemented by Weber's focus on transforma­
tions and difference. More specifically: 
• 
i. Durkheim's general evolutionary perspective allows 
us to set asidp. Weber's professed nominalism (which 
Weber didn't allow to severely restrict him, see 
•
 
Gerth and Mills, 1946). For when Weber came to give
 
his work an explicit theoretical framework, he unfor­

tunately took over the Simmelian interaction para­

digm (Nelson, 1969a). This micro-interactional per­

spective blocked Weber off from recognizing the sig­

nificance of his own developing "logics in use," as
 
•
 
he came to pioneer an "in-depth comparative and his­

torical differential sociology of sociocultural pro­

cess." Specially important for our present purposes
 
is their growing use of the civilizational perspective
 
as a necessary tool in their wide-ranging investiga­

tions.
 
•
 
ii. Durkheim's generic and genetic-evolutionary emphasis
 
on the primitive sacral complex as the womb of society,
 
culture, and the person serves as a much-needed com­

plement to Weber's slighting of ethnographic evidence,
 
and his almost exclusive concern with civilizational
 
scale morphologies (eg. the world-religions) . 
•
 
iii. Durkheim's emphasis on the continuity of sociocultural
 
process between primitive and modern societies (eg.
 
versus Levy-Bruhl's contrast/inversion schema), pro­

vides a much-needed complement to Weber's almost ex­

clusive emphasis on the major evolutionary differen­
tiations and breakthroughs from one morphological type 
to the next. 
• 
iv. Conversely, Weber's proper and profound concern with 
specific evolution, with actual historical break­
•
 
throughs, involving the specific complex of transform­

ations that led from one type to the next on the main,
 
secondary, and even stable peripheral lines of socio­

cultural evolution, complements Durkheim's far more
 
limited general evolutionism. Even though Durkheim's
 
metaphor of the evolutionary tree of sociocultural
 
•
 
life was multilineal in that it implied lower branches
 
and survivals, nonetheless, Durkheim maintained an ab­

stracted "birds eye view" of general evolutionary pro­

cesses and the resulting mainline. Many have critici­

zed Durkheim's lack of historical specification.
 
While Durkheim provides us with a processual or gen­
eral evolutionary perspective, Weber provides us with 
untold analytical insights into breakthroughs and de­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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velopmental polarities--in short, a differential so­
ciology of sociocultural process. 
It	 was precisely this lack of comparison cases, this 
lack of comparative and differential sociology, which 
led William Runciman to flatly declare that Durkheim's 
sociology of religion was "fundamentally misconceive~" 
It	 was not, however, for Runciman simply did not per­
ceive Durkheim's logic of returning to the primitive 
sacral womb. But Durkheim's model is incomplete, and 
it	 is only when we combine both Durkheirn and Weber's 
interpretive frameworks in this regard that we may ap­
proach a necessary and sufficient model. 
b. Weber's phenomenological approach provides a much needed 
complement to Durkheim's rather positivistic, early mechanis­
tic model of one-way causality. Conversely, Durkheim's concern 
with the elaboration of generic symbolic processes as deeply 
embedded "structures" (as in the structuralists, ego see Pia­
get, 1971) complements Weber's typological morphologies. Fur­
ther, the multi-valency of Weber's "logics-in-use" complement 
Durkheim's less complex analyticm approaches. Weber's constant 
rotating of his analytical matrix supplements Durkheim's more 
straightforward analyses. Durkheim's careful preliminary phil­
osophical posing of his problems supplements Weber's reluctance 
(eg. see opening pages of his Sociology of Religion) to enter 
into definitional problems. Finally, Weber's ironic view of 
unintended consequences~~ocioculturalprocesses complements 
Durkheim's dialectical view of history. 
2. In terms of historical process, Durkheim and Weber sub­
stantively converged in a number of ways, including: 
a.	 Their central concern with the changing grounds of 
legitimate moral authority. Both Durkheim and Weber 
believed that the origin and transformation of moral 
rules and intellectual concepts were linked with the 
structure and process of collectivities. Both believed 
that changes in the structures of conscience generally 
preceded changes in the structures of consciousness. 
b.	 Both were basically concerned with the long-term de­
cOllectivization of the rUling legitimate structures 
of conscience and consciousness, especially in terms 
of the passage from traditional to modern forms. 
•
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c.	 Both were fundamentally concerned with ever-widen­
ing	 structures of social fraternization, and the ex­
• 
tension of the tribal bond to more universalistic 
brotherhoods. The progressive extension of the social 
bond as it increasingly cross-cut previously closed 
or restrictive in and out-groups constitutes a basic 
focus in both Durkheim's and Weber's work. 
• 
d. As a corollary, both perceived that the progressive 
extension of the social bond depended upon the univer­
salization of collective symbolic forms. Both Durkheim 
and Weber thus saw a progressive passage in cultural 
evolution from concrete, tribal, fused collective sym­
bolism toward increasingly abstract, universalizable,
• 
internally consistent, and rational symbolic forms. 
In short, universalizable and rationalizable symbols 
constitute the basis of complex civilizational bonds. 
As societies evolve, so too must their prime symbolic 
guidance systems. 
•	 e. Durkheim's insights into the importance of the "col­
• 
lective conscience" and "mechanical solidarity" in 
terms of what I have called the "primitive sacral 
complex" is complemented by Neber's insights into 
sacral-magical stereotyping in the "enchanted garden" 
of primitive and archaic societies. Recently, Benjamin 
Nelson (1973a) has combined the mutually reinforcing 
insights of Durkheim and Weber in this regard in 
terms of what he calls the first basic world-histori­
cal	 structure of consciousness--the "sacral-magical 
collective conscience." 
•	 f. In evolutionary terms, one of the prime 90ints of con­
• 
verging interest between Durkheim and Weber was their 
powerful emphasis on the formative influence of reli­
gious ethical-legal systems on the construction of 
an in-dept h integration of personality structures 
through a progressively deepening attachment of the 
individual to an ever-growing "cosmos of obligations." 
•
 
g. Both Durkheim and Weber had equally significant in­

sights into the intimate relationships between the
 
evolving autonomy of the person, and progressive uni­

versalization and rationalization in the grounds of
 
"moral discourse" (see Leites, 1974; Nelson, 1973a).
 
The	 development of the intellectually and morally au­
tonomous personage on the world-historical level de­
pends upon a corresponding autonomization, rational­
ization, and universalization in the legitimate 
grounds of moral and intellectual authority on the
•	 civilizational and inter-civilizational level. 
h.	 Therefore, Durkheim and Weber both fo~ussed much of 
their analytical energy on the significance of chang­
•
 
-----~~~~~-
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ing rates and lines of development of major cultural 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
forms--especially law and religion (see Nelson, 1972a, 
1973a; Parsons, 1975b). Both of these pioneers were 
concerned throughout much of their work with unravel­
ing the complex and changing interconnections between 
these collective moral and intellectual normative 
structures and personality, institutional, and cul­
tural processes. 
i.	 Further, we should not fail to recognize their joint 
emphasis on the world-historical significance of 
Christianity in these terms as it transformed ~est­
ern European civilization. Especially important here 
was their estimate of the uniquely powerful impact 
of Calvinism, and its later secularized forms. 
j.	 Finally, in the face of the impending doom of World 
War I in Europe, both Durkheim and Weber, from oppo­
site sides of the conflict, issued urgent calls in 
their own ways for the sacrifice of ego and eros and 
the imperative need for universal logos if our civili­
zation was to survive. 
E. Durkheim and Weber, Anomie and Protestantism 
Although almost forty years ago Parsons based his repu­
tation on the convergence between Durkheim and Weber--focus­
sing especially on what he called the epochal significance 
of his discovery of the inner links between the internalization 
of moral sanctions and anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant 
Ethos--it is curious that few others have pursued this line 
of thought. Perhaps we haven't pursued the question of the 
degree of significant historical and cultural relations be­
tween anomie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos because of 
the pervasive nominalism of our own culture. 
Although many secondary observers have compared and con­
trasted various aspects of the work of Durkheim and Weber, 
few ha~~~h~ general convergences just enumerated. Fewer 
still have realized the potential significance of these links 
between anomie and Protestantism. For our own purposes Durk­
heim's linkage of modern suicides with Protestant individual­
ism and modern drives for progress and perfection is as im­
portant as Weber's linkage of Protestantism with some of the 
most dynamic and stressful features of the modern world. In 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
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contrast especially to Durkheim's uncritical incorporation 
of the abstracted pre-socialized ego of the Anglo Utilitar­
ians and the Romantics alike, however, Weber'sachievement 
here lies precisely in first having shown the historical 
and cultural uniqueness of the ethos of market capitalism, 
and in revealing its fundamental normative presuppositions. 
Clearly, Weber penetrated far deeper into the inner heart 
of Protestantism and its cultural impact on the modern world, 
into Western development generally, and into the comparative­
historical differential sociology of the world-religions, 
problems hardly addressed by Durkheim. 
Because of my high expectations engendered by his 
generally excellent work, one of the more disappointing fail­
ures to me was Anthony Giddens' 1971(a) book Capitalism and 
Modern Social Theory. Giddens' excellent reviews of Durkheim's 
thought, and his illuminating comparative exegesis of Durk­
heim, Marx, and Weber prepared the way, but this particular 
pay-off never came. Satori never dawned; the "starry winged 
messenger" present at creation never visited. To my mind, 
a young intellectual historian, with whom I might often dis­
agree, ha~~Jfoser than most to recognizing the significance 
of the potential convergence between Durkheim and Weber in 
terms of anomie and the Protestant Ethos. Dominick LaCa­
pra was a student of H. Stuart Hughes, the Harvard intellect­
ual historian who followed Parsons in his well-known study 
of the reorientation of turn-of-the-century European thought, 
Consciousness and Society (1958). Led by these direct, sem­
inal background relations, LaCapra seized upon these poten­
tial relations between our pioneers. In speaking of Durkheim 
and Weber, LaCapra rightly observes: 
If asked to name the sociological classic par excel­
lence, most sociologists would hesitate between Sui­
cide and The Protestant Ethic. B1 t the extent to which 
these two books are complementary as contributions to 
the analysis of modern social and cultural history has 
been little recognized (1972:177). 
Now, in reviewing Tiryakian's mystery problem, itself 
probably suggested by the curious lack of development of what 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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was claimed to be the Parsonian consensus, and noting the 
contrasts in their style of their work, LaCapra reflects: 
liThe apparent paradox ... is that on the basis of such anti­
thetical assumptions, Durkheim and Weber arrived at largely 
complementary research interests and specific analyses in 
their investigation of culture and societyll (1972:179). This 
is especially true of Neber's observations on lithe unprece­
dented inner lon1iness of the individual II in the IIProtestant 
Era,1I for as LaCapra, after many others, notes: IIProtestant­
ism reduced to a minimum the nexus between the symbolic cult 
and the existential community which Durkheim was later to 
present as the essence of the religious phenomena II (1972: 
179) . 
Where Durkheim stressed the role 0f anomie in modern 
history, Weber emphasized the birth of a new nomos 
or ethic. But Weber himself tended to situate the 
new "nomie" on the forma11v rational level of the ad­
justment of means to endsi-and he perceived a certain 
type of institutionalized anomie on the level of ends 
in modern society (LaCapra, 1972:181). 
I believe that LaCapra is right, and the ambiguous combina­
tion of two different types of anomie begins to indicate the 
nature of the inner relations between anomie and the Protes­
tant Ethos. It was the final and irretrievable snapping of 
the once-intimate links between microcosm and macrocosm 
that relegated post-Protestant man to substantive irration­
ality or purely faith-structures of consciousness when faced 
with ultimate questions. The inner connection here is between 
the " ••. element of institutionalized anomie or limitless­
ness on the level of ends which, according to Durkheim, was 
the negation of substantive rationality" and the " ... com­
bination of institutionalized limitlessness on the level of 
ends and the fundamentally rational discipline on the level 
of means which seemed to be the truly distinctive cri~erion 
of the Capitalist ethos in Weber's mind" (LaCapra, 1972: 182). 
Further, we should notice that, in terms of Durkheim's 
suicide schemas, Weber's insights into the substantive irra­
tionality of Utilitarian ethical dogma, the very paradigm of 
•
 
•
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functional irrationality, whose calculus can be more or 
• 
less mechanically applied to any goal whatsoever, closely 
• 
complements Durkheim's view that such a cultural logic sanc­
tioning an "infinity of dreams and desires"is anomic. Some­
how, just as we have lost a sense of balance or proportion 
in the scale and speed of our everyday lives, so too have 
• 
we "disenchanted" modern men, having repudiated tele<iogy 
and metaphysics as necessarily a part of the "enchanted 
garden" we have heroically forsworn, lost a clear and com­
pelling sense of substantive rationality. To what purpose, 
to what end do we direct our lives? That is the agonized 
question which both Durkheim and Weber raised. Who else 
• 
but Weber explained how our religiously and culturally 
sanctioned "infinity of dreams and desires," sedimented 
into the structure and phenomenology of everyday life, 
could corne to this--I mean the "unprecedented inner lonli­
ness of the individual," and finally, the "iron cage" which 
•
 
lies at the heart of the closed, infinite world of suicide?
 
In shor~, the lack of proportion in our desires and daily 
lives, and the loss of substantive rationality are two key 
underlying links between anomie and the secularization of 
•
 
the Protestant Ethos.
 
•
 
Finally, I wish to emphasize again that it has not
 
yet been sufficiently recognized that Durkheim's prime point
 
of departure in Suicide was always a deep concern with the
 
"infinity sickness" of the modern world. Thus, Durkheim's
 
"philosophy of human finitude" (LaCapra, 1972), and his 
classically inspired notion of the "golden mean" as the 
source of health, wholeness, and well-being served as coun­
•
 
terweights to what he perceived to be modern "moral anar­

chy." Indeed, after criticizing Durkheim's doctrine of homo 
duplex, I find his concern with anomie and egoisme as the 
"infinity of dreams and desires" culturally and historical­
• 
ly inexplicable without reference to Weber's notion of the 
crucial importance of Protestant ascetics and mystics em­
brace of infinite tasks within the world. 
•
 
•
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CHAPTER FIVE 
•
 
TOWARD DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA
 
Preface. Granting certain ambiguities and flaws in Durk­

heim's first schema, and granting crucial shifts in the gen­

eral grounds of his argument, how shall we now set about re­

• constructing his schema of suicide? Now, almost everyone who
 
•
 
has explored his classic work, Suicide, has recognized that
 
Durkheim's theses require extensive interpretation. Indeed,
 
interpreting and reconstructing Durkheim's schemas of sui­

cide has become a minor sociological industry (see the appen­
dix to the present dissertation). 
• 
Yet, there is little agreement concerning the meaning 
of anomie and egoisme (see appendix). Present research utili­
zing so-called anomia scales is not only severely flawed, but 
hardly related to Durkheim's original ideas (see McCloskey, 
1974). Let us, then, first ex~lore Durkheim's schema of sui­
• 
cide as a paradigm in crisis from the ~erspective of the 
philosophy of science. We shall look at the process underly­
ing this breakdown in terms of the II routinization of charis­
ma on deposit ll (McCloskey, 1974). Then, out of both these 
•
 
philosophical reflections and a detailed examination of al­

ternative competing reconstructions of the meaning of anomie 
and egoisme found in the appendix, I shall briefly outline 
certain general and specific criteria for a more adequate 
reconstruction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Next, 
shall very briefly lodge some further historical objections• 
I 
against Durkheim's first schema which we examined in Book Tvro. 
Fourth, I shall briefly explore other observers' insights in­
•
 
to Durkheim's second schema. Fifth, I shall explore rather ex­

tensively Durkheim's argument regarding the social element in 
suicide, especially in terms of cultural " suicidogenetic cur­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
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rents." Finally, I shall conclude by outlining the essential 
logics underlying the second schema of suicide. 
A.	 ~ Paradigm in Crisis: Which Way Out? 
What does anomie mean, 9recisely? Is anomie synonymous 
with normlessness? And what does normlessness mean, anyway? 
Is anomie equivalent to anarchy, to the so-called "Hobbesian 
dilemma?" Does anomie refer to a psychological, a structural, 
or cultural condition? Or to all three? What are the relations 
between anomie and egoisme? Between these and altruisme and 
fatalisme? If anomie especially has become a protean word 
(see appendix), conjuring up what we will, can we restore 
its significance by giving it truer form and definition, by 
assigning it a "name and local habitation?" If anomie and eqo­
isme truly constitute one of the fundamental paradigms in mo­
dern sociology, then how is it possible that we still strug­
gle so to bring them into clear and consistent focus? 
Further, is there a way out of the crisis o~ conflict­
ing interpretations of the logic and meaning o~ Suicide? How 
are we to success~ully reconcile the ever-mounting ~lethora 
of diverse and even opposing secondary interpretations? Is 
there a way we could bring together, for example, both those 
who wish to reduce Durkheim's typology down to one lowest com­
mon denominator, and those, on the other hand, who wish to 
rescue the distinctness of all four types of suicide (see 
a9pendix)? 
Now, clearly the uncertain fate of anomie (and egoisme) 
serves as prime examples of a paradigm in crisis. But which 
way out? As always, the question of an appropriate "therapeu­
tic" rests unon some prior "theodicy,"--an ex~lanation of 
how we "got into the mess in the first place." In this case, 
I suggest we explain the source of our paradigmatic crisis 
in terms of the "routinization of charisma on deposit" (see 
McCloskey, 1974; also appendix). This means that as Durkheim's 
fundamental notion of anomie was accepted, incorporated into 
mainline sociology, and then extended, it underwent various 
•
 
•
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metamorphoses in meaning, until it became routinizen into 
•
 
the practice of everyday social science in terms of success­

• 
ive anomia scales. In this process of progressive routiniza­
tion or running down, however, Durkheim's original meanings 
became trivialized or lost. 
Now, t.hose who would engage in "normal science" should 
stand ready,	 at all times, to respond to a fundamental ques­
tion. Can you effectively demonstrate that your conceptuali­
zation and testing of the "founding father's" paradigm, on 
•
 
which you base your research and claim our attention, is le­

• 
gitimate? There appear here to be two acceptable responses: 
either set the question aside by constructing one's own new 
independent paradigm, or justify one's own new version of the 
the famous paradigm in terms of a systematic, and historical­
• 
ly informed exegesis? 
There is, of course, a third alternative unfortunately 
favored by a seeming majority of "scientific sociologists" 
these days. Perhaps the tacit canons of this expression of 
"normal science" favor this option because it is less ard­
uous, affords a guaranteed legitimacy, and insures an immed­
• 
iate claim on our attention. Here, the unwritten strategy 
for gaining instant legitimacy, without doing the real work, 
• 
is disarmingly simple, and so universally practiced these 
days as to now constitute an unquestioned canon of "normal 
science" in sociology. First, simply begin by usurping some 
"founding father's" mantle of charisma for one's own efforts, 
thereby gaining immediate access to our attention. Then, 
pay one's respects in brief ritual obeisance, and cursorily 
review the more or less questionable secondary literature. 
•	 
Next, fasten upon some measuring instrument (itself derived 
from the secondary or even tertiary literature).And then 
proceed to the "real" task of "scientific sociology" as 
"normal science"--extending and criticizing others' empiri­
•	 
cal results through the favored tools of surveys and other 
statistical methodologies. Seldom do these so-called "scien­
tific sociologists" explicitly and systematically justify 
•
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the conceptual foundations of their version of. the borrowed 
•	 
paradigm. Nor do they often place the claimed significance 
• 
of their results in terms of the intentions or intellectual 
and historical context generating the original paradigm. 
Nor do they often pauae to recognize the critical histori­
cal processes on which the original paradigm rested. Far 
too often we	 bandy about the terms Protestant and Catholic, 
for instance, as if they were eternally fixed entities, im­
• 
mune to change. In short, the micro, social psychological, 
ahistorical, abstracted, largely atheoretical, positivistic 
biases of contemporary survey research make it almost im­
possible to recognize the crucial large-scale sociocultural, 
• 
historical, and phenomenological differences intervening be­
tween a founding theorist's original formulations and the 
• 
complex realities of the present day. 
Now, it is important to recognize that the traditional 
philosophy of science does little to help us understand these 
processes and find an acceptable way out of the crisis in 
•
 
anomie theory. For our present crisis concerning the origin­

al meaning and potential significance of anomie was not the
 
outcome of a systematic "testing of hy:,?otheses," as tradi­

tional positivist philosophies of science seem to suggest.
 
Nor was it caused by the accumulation of "anomalies" by 
"puzzle solving normal scientists" as even the now classic 
•
 
account by Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) suggests. On the contrary,
 
fundamental scientific models are neither born nor die be­

cause of minor empirical error~ many scientists would sim­
ply reaffirm	 their faith in their doctrine, and say with 
Durkheim, as	 one story goes, "well, then the facts are 
•
 
wrong." Rather, the Weberian forces of. charisma and ration­

alization are at work in scientific processes as well as 
others. Thus, if scientific revolutions are based upon the 
charisma of some cultural model, then the dissatisfaction 
•	 
with the aimless drift and trivialization of these once 
compelling paradigms in normal science is an initial pre­
requisite for the re-charisrnatization of a new scientific 
•
 
•
 
--844-­
revolution. Equally important is a fundamental critique of 
•
 
the postulates of the depreciated paradigm.
 
•
 
Indeed, conventional wisdom in the philosophy of sci­

enEdominated by positivist prejudices has persistently mis­

portrayed the process of the growth of science in terms of
 
the slow, aggregative notion of "consolidation" and "codi­

•
 
fication" (ala Merton) of "practical reason," as suggested
 
by their underlying formalistic "hypothetic-deductive" mo­

del (eg. see Norman Campbell, 1920). It was against this
 
gradual building block image of the growth of science that
 
•
 
Kuhn originally directed hi.s notion of scientific revolu­

tions, and the distinction between "normal" and "revolution­

ary science." Yet, Kuhn has recently been forced to mini­

mize the sharp earlier contrasts between the two phases
 
•
 
(see especially Lakatos & Musgrave, 1970). As far as the
 
history of sociology is concerned, the picture is far from
 
clear, especially because we lack detailed case-studies of
 
how revolutions in theory and practice come about.
 
•
 
Fortunately, however, today we possess at least two
 
complementary studies related to the origin and fate of
 
Durkheim's work on anomie--Toby Huff's (1974, 1975) review
 
of the logic of Durkheim's discoveries in Suicide, and my
 
•
 
detailed review of the shifts in the paradigm of anomie,
 
especially Merton's version, in the section appended to
 
the present dissertation. Huff demonstrates that Durkheim's
 
achievement in Suicide rested neither on the inductive and
 
•
 
multivariate use of statistics, nor upon deduction from ab­

stract principles. Rather, there is a third kind of logic
 
operating at the root of scientific discoveries--name1y,
 
abduction or retroduction (see also N.R. Hanson, and the
 
works of C.S. Pierce). As Huff rightly argues, the problem 
faced by Durkheim was not theory testing, but theory find­
• 
ing~ in short, the process of discovery which involves a 
"gestalt switch" as Hanson suggests. Durkheim's great inno­
vation in Suicide was thus first theoretical, not statisti­
cal, for it was a series of theoretical innovations of. the 
•
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first magnitude. 
I. 
• 
Huff's account is extremely valuable for our present 
• 
purposes in that he provides us with the first systematic 
theoretical review of the underlying logic of Durkheim's 
discovery, which was, of course, very different than that 
often implied. The common portrayal of the significance of 
• 
Durkheim's Suicide is as the first real breakthrough to 
scientific (i.e. positivist) sociology (se~ for example, 
John Madge, 1962, Hanan Selvin, 1965). Indeed, Merton him­
self suggests that Durkheim was led to his theory through 
• 
examination of suicide statistics. Selvin and others would 
have us suppose that Durkheim constructed his paradigms 
through the inherent virtues of multivariate statistical 
inductive analysis. But Huff rightly notes: "In none of 
these accounts ... is Durkheim's innovation treated as an 
abductive inference" (1974:2). All such accounts " •.. run 
the risk," Huff argues, "of substituting the logic of 
• 
proof (or justification) for the logic of discovery." On 
the contrary, Huff suggests that: 
•
 
.•. if all the crucial variations in the rates of
 
suicide were known to Durkheim (and others) long be­

fore 1897 ... then it seems doubtful that the inno­

vative quality of Durkheim's work stems from multi­

variate analysis or induction by enumeration (1974:3). 
Instead, Huff argues correctly, it seems to me, that: 
• 
Durkheim began with puzzling and problematic data 
and he proceeded abductively, not inductively, to 
find in" them a new pattern and order which would 
• 
suggest the conditions responsible for the varia­
tions in rates of suicide ..•. What Durkheim sought 
to discover was a set of social factors of a higher 
degree of generality and simplicity, which would 
give a greater order to the data at hand, and there­
by provide a more compelling explanation (1974:3). 
Now, as I have demonstrated in my detailed review of 
Durkheim's first schema (see Book Two), Huff is probably 
correct in arguing against Douglas' (1967:25) thesis that 
• 
Durkheim began with, and worked within, a preconceived frame­
work. Rather, it should be clear that Durkheim's own theoretic 
reorganization of puzzling data was often shifting and ambig­
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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uous. An additional reason for characterizing Durkheim's 
achievement as one of abduction or theoretical discovery 
in terms of a kind of gestalt switch is precisely because 
his theory was in the process of being discovered, con­
structed, and reconstructed again. That is why we find it 
shifting grounds at so many points, for Durkheim had not 
really settled upon one pat answer to explaining the under­
lying reasons for patterns in suicide rates. It is only ~ 
secondary summaries of Durkheim'~ theories which are clear 
and neatly consistent. 
Indeed, this process of cleaning up or repackaging, 
or even bowderlizing difficult, inconsistent, or potentially 
embarassing paradigms is a constant and seemingly inevitable 
sociocultural process characteristic of the "routinization 
of charisma on deposit." Today Durkheim's suicide paradigms 
have become institutionalized in sociological normal scien­
ce, and as they are drained of meaning, they are made accep­
table for public consumption and to neophytes entering the 
brotherhood. Yet, ideology, situated power positions, and 
the pressure of cultural traditions play a greater role in 
these processes than most textbooks on the history and phil­
osophy of science might care to admit. Indeed, as Kuhn (1962), 
Huff (1975), Nelson (1967), M. Polanyi (1958), among others, 
have rightly argued, the history of scientific development 
is so often falsified (knowingly or not) that one must make 
it a basic rule to always return to a systematic exegesis of 
the pioneer's work. We must return to his generating life­
context, in order to begin to understand precisely what the 
problems perceived were, the logics in use, the gestalt 
switches leading to discoveries and breakthroughs, and thus 
wherein lies the founding father's lasting significance. 
This is why I have eschewed yet another neat summary of 
Durkheim's doctrine in Suicide in terms of some fallacious 
formula, and have opted instead for an exhaustive review of 
the texts in question. 
I•
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I maintain a way out of the morass of collective mono­
logue and amnesia concerning interpretation of the meaning
• of anomie and Durkheim's suicide paradigms shall not come 
through more rigorous statisical testing of Durkheim's 
theory. The way out of the crisis confronting anomie theory 
does not depend upon the development of a more adequate sca­
• ling technique. Nor shall it come about through a superfi­
cial criticism of the reliability of Durkheim's official 
sources of suicide statistics (eg. see Douglas, 1967). In 
sum, none of the commonly approved methods of "puzzle sol­
• ving" in "normal science" will help rescue us from our pre­
sent predicament. Why? Largely because it was these very 
same routinizations which got anomie theory in such a bind 
in the first place! I repeat: the theoretical crisis con­
• ' h f" f of d'f ront1ng t e pro eSS10n 1n terms 0 one~our root para 19rns 
has not been precipitated by anomalous empirical findings, 
but by the ever-widening gap between Durkheim's own origin­
al paradigm and the conflicting interpretations and sloppy
• researeh operationalizations of his explanatory model. Rath­
er, it is a crisis of drift, of theoretical entropy, of the 
"routinization of charisma on deposit" (McCloskey, 1974). 
Now, conflicts in interpretation of a doctrine so com­
• plex and multivalent as Durkheim's can only be resolved in 
terms of a basic conceptual breakthrough in understanding 
the fundamental "nuclear structure" of his thought. Accord­
ingly, my strategy has been to systematically compare and
• contrast an in-depth interpretive exegesis of Durkheim's 
fundamental paradigms or deep "nuclear structure" of his 
thought with a systematic review of his special sociology 
• 
of.suicide. Thus, my stratigraphic inquiry in Book One was 
extended with my topographic inquiry in Book Two. Further, 
in the first part of Book Three, we reviewed changes in 
Durkheim's basic premises, and now are about to bring these 
• 
two overlapping explorations together by reconstructing 
Durkheim's schema of suicide. By these painstaking means, 
I have sought to re-enact the process of abduction or ges­
•
 
•
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talt switching which Durkheim may have himself experienced 
as he discovered, constructed, and reshaped his arguments
• in the first place. 
consistent, clearer, 
•
 
•
 
• 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Hopefully, our outcomes shall be more 
and at least as profound as his. 
•
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• 
c. Some criteria for a ~1ore Adequate Reconstruction 
of Durkheim's Schema of Suicide 
While many have noted that Durkheim's typology in 
Suicide is far from unambiguous (eg. see Giddens, 1965, 
1971b:2l5; Dohrenwend, 1959:467; Lukes, 1973:218), never­
• theless, it continues to command attention to this day. 
Sociologists of varying persuasions persist in attempts 
to clarify, reformulate, extend, and operationalize Durk­
heim's schema of suicide. Others attempt to distill the 
• essential meaning and ~ignificance of his pioneering ef­
forts for the philosophy of science (eg. see Huff, 1975). 
However, the famous paradigm of anomie has become a pro­
tean concept, capable of meaning almost anything, allow­
• ing us to conjure up what we will. Today anomie is utili­
zed almost as a world metaphor, and, consequently, has be­
come incredibly elastic, devoid of scientific precision. 
Anomie--the first sociological concept irrefutablv demon­
• strating ,the autonomy and significance of "social facts"-­
is beset by crisis. 
One way to respond to this paradigmatic crisis is to 
set some initial logical and evidential canons for all those
• who might wish to review the evidence and enter the debate 
in the future. Indeed, is this not the way of science, the 
secret key by which we rise above the divisiveness of part­
isan rhetori.c and endemic conflict and then move to the uni­
• ties 0 f dialectic? Only by agreeing upon ever-more rigorous 
standards of logic and evidence can we hope to successfully 
resolve the cacophany of competing claims and counter-claims 
or refutations. Paraphrasing Karl Popper (1963), the growth
• of science is fundamentally structured in terms of claims 
• 
and refutations, ascending through ever-more rigo!busagreed­
upon rules or canons for resolving conflict. Without these 
governing norms, the ascent of science proves impossible. 
The very cumulative nature of science, as opposed to other 
cultural forms, lies precisely in such unifying norms that 
•
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all parties to the debate consent on constantly "raising 
• 
the ante" to ever-higher levels of universality of evidence 
• 
and principle. Indeed, as we discovered in Book One, Durk-
heim himself pioneered analysis of the essentials of this 
process of universalization and rationalization on the 
world-historical level. 
• 
At the outset, I feel bound to sound the following 
cautions. I must insist that the following conventional er-
rors in reconstructing Durkheim's typology of suicide sim-
ply will not suffice; they should be set aside, once and 
for all. Anomie cannot be simply equated with "normlessness" 
• 
(whatever that means, precisely). Nor can anomie be transla-
ted baldly as structural-cultural "malintegration," nor as 
"strain in the relational system of society," nor as 30-
• 
called "alienation," a feeling of lostness, generalized des-
pair, or a whole host of other "states of. mind." Anomie can-
not be simply collapsed to "social disorganization," the 
"lack of structural integration," or "lack of social part- 
• 
icipation." 
Egoisme cannot be ignored, nor rendered virtuous, ala 
Parsons. Egoisme and anomie cannot be justifiably collapsed 
down into one category, nor can anomie and egoisme be accura-
• 
tely located as two extremes on two continuums of integra-
tion--structural and normative. Nor can altruisme and fatal- 
isme be ignored, or deprived of their prime historical refer-
ents. Such partial accounts slight both Durkheim's doctrine 
of human nature as homo duplex, and his image of historical 
• 
development, two crucial factors which we have critically 
reviewed in the preceding section in so far as they under-
lay Durkheim's first schema of suicide. In all these ver-
sions (see especially the appendix), Durkheim's discussion 
of the source of insatiable and egoistic passions, and his 
critical assessment of the broad world-historical processes 
• 
transforming the basic relations between society, culture,  
and the person simply drop from view. In short, no egoism 
and insatiability, and no transforming historical processes, 
• 
•
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no egoisme or anomie! 
Let us now move to outline some canons or prerequi­
• sites for a more adequate re-interpretation of Durkheim's 
typology in Suicide. First, anyone wishing to enter the 
lists should meet, or at least revise or challenge, the 
general hermeneutical canons outlined in the ap?endix.
• For our immediate purposes, we may distinguish between gen­
eral and specific requirements. Besides some truly general 
canons of science such as consistency, symmetry, truth, sig­
nificance, and so forth, we may now enumerate the following
• general requirements forced upon us by our systematic exe­
gesis of the underlying logic of Durkheim's paradigmatic or 
"nuclear structure." 
• 
1. General Paradigmatic Requirements 
Any more adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's under­
lying schema of suicide must focus on several key proolems, 
including: 
• 
• a. The source of egoism and insatiability--the pri~e 
sources of these key destructive forces must be explored. 
Especially important is a critical review of Durkheim's 
early doctrine of homo duplex--his notion of the inherent 
egoism and insatiability of the pre-socialized individual 
or the organic ego. 
•
 
b. Durkheim's causal model--flaws and shifts in Durk­

heim's early model as it underlay his first schema of sui­

cide. Transitions in Durkheim's work should then be brought 
to bear on reconstructing the schema of suicide. 
• 
c. The evolutionary-historical matrix--since Durkheim's 
thought was evolutionary to the core, reconstructed typolo­
• 
gies must be inherently evolutionary, not abstracted and 
formal. Thus, comparisons and contrasts of the dominant 
"ideal types" of morality, and the specific types of suicide 
associated with them in societies at the two ends of history 
must serve as anchors of a reconstructed schema. 
•
 
•
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• 
d. All four types--none of Durkheim's four types can 
be ignored. Successful reconstructions should attempt to re­
• 
solve the contradictions between various "reductions" and 
"rescues 'l (see appendix) by simultaneously interrelating 
the four types, yet maintaining their distinctness. In 
other words, a new adequate schema must reveal both a fun­
damental unity and an empirical-historical diversity. The 
four types should remain distinct, yet linked together in 
a meaningful gestalt or evolutionary pattern. 
• 
e. Durkheim'~ polemical thrust--Durkheim's critical or 
• 
~olemical thrust, which was ubiquitous in his work, and which 
lay behind his choice of suicide as a battleground,must be 
included. Especially important as an anchor for his two mod­
ern types was his life-long polemic against opposing domi­
nant cultural tl'adi tions in the modern world. 
Now, we have already met the first three requirements, and 
will add the last two to our reconstruction of Durkheim's 
• schema of suicide. 
2. Specific Requirements for A New Schema of Suicide 
a. Parsons' insights--Talcott Parsons' very real insights
• (see appendix) that egoisme and altruisme are generated by 
• 
the presence of strong cultural sanctions for individualism 
and collectivism respectively should be included. Almost a­
lone among contemporary sociologists, Parsons has rightly 
recognized that Durkheim emphasized the positive relation be­
tween egoisme and Protestant norms as sanctioning the new 
model man--that is, the inner-worldly ascetic and mystic who 
• 
is totally self-reliant and devoted to unending service in 
the name of an infinite, super-personal ideal. 
• 
b. Protestantism and anomie and egoisme--as Parsons and 
others (eg. LaCapra) have recognized, but left undeveloped, 
both Durkheim and Weber linked Protestantism with some of 
the most dynamic and significant features of the modern world, 
including suicide. Indeed, Parsons (1975a~I06) recounts how 
•
 
•
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he was struck by Durkheim's statistics on the puzzling rela­
• 
tion between Protestantism and suicide while also "deep in 
•
 
study of Weber's work." Indeed, this striking convergence,
 
unaccountably unexplored by Parsons, serves as a key to the
 
reconstruction of Durkheim's schema of suicide. Therefore,
 
any adequate reinterpretation of Durkheim's schema of sui­

cide should attempt to systematically and explicitly link 
these two famous paradigms of classical sociocultural theory. 
• 
c. Giddens' exegesis--reconstructions should pay close 
attention, as we did in the second section of Book Two, to 
Anthony Giddens' important review of Durkheim's notion of 
anomie and its causes in historical perspective, especially 
in terms of structural problems (see also appendix). 
• 
d. Merton'~ insights into American culture--any adequate 
•
 
reconstruction should take into account Robert Merton's very
 
important insights (see appendix) into the inordinate empha­

sis placed upon individual success ideologies in modern so­

ciety, especially in the economic arena of American culture.
 
• 
e. Egoisme and the Romantic artists--new schemas should 
contain reference to the other sources of Durkheirn's second 
notion of egoisrne, especially the Romantic artists and poets. 
This important cultural and historical kinship has been seen, 
• 
for example, by Giddens, 1965, Jack Douglas, 1967, and by 
Grana, 1967. In other words, any adequate reconstruction 
should also seek to explain the sociocultural historical 
sources of modern suicide among the "IitteratEtIricides" where 
suicide is treated as a vocation (see Alvarez, 1972). 
Let us next turn to consider other observers' insights 
which approximate mine into the foundations and outlines 
• of the second schema. 
•
 
•
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D.	 Other Observers' Insights into Durkheim's Second 
Schema of Suicide
• 
In the recent renaissance of Durkheim studies, sever­
al observers have recorded insights similar to mine in re­
gard to ambiguities or multivalencies in meaning of Durk­
• heim's explanation of the relations between suicidal ten­
sions and sociocultural sanctions. I consider it a strik­
ing convergence that different observers, possessed of 
very different casts of mind and perspectives on Durkheim,
• should nonetheless, within a span of about five years or 
so, have independently discovered that Durkheim also sug­
gested that the four suicidal types could be generated by 
the presence of extreme cultural sanctions. This insight
• is especially applicable to the relations between anomie 
and egoisme and modern values concerning individualism and 
autonomy. 
Let us, by way of preface, briefly review what we
• learned in the concluding sections of the first part of 
this book. "Social currents" were considered to be carriers 
of suicidal tensions. Further, since we acknowledge that a 
"marginal leaven of anomie" is necessary for drives for
• "progress and perfection," we may initially conclude that 
there is some real possibility that anomie and egoisme may 
be culturally sanctioned by some of the most progressive 
ideals and callings in the modern world. Further, since,
• in general, religious sanctions are often important in 
informing historical development, and since, more specifi­
cally, in Western civilization Christianity and especially 
Protestantism have played key roles in sanctioning morally
• autonomous individualism, we may speculate, therefore, 
that there ~s a strong probability that anomie and egoisme 
are religiously and culturally sanctioned. with these pre­
liminary speculations in mind, let us explore some others'
• insights into the emerging logic of the second schema. 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
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First, Anthony Giddens notes that the ambiguities 
in the relations posited by Durkheim between moral indivi­
dualism and anomie parallel, in effect, the two very dif­
ferent logics of the two distinct schemas I am outlining. 
The positive connections between the conceptions of 
moral individualism and anomie, apart from the early 
formulation in The Division of Labor, were nowhere 
explicitly stated in any detaIl by Durkheim and thus 
tended to be among the most frequently misunderstood 
parts of his writings (197Ib:215). 
He (Durkheim) clearly recognizes that what the (con­
crete) individual is depends upon "internalized norms" 
which are, in part, the condition of freedom of action. 
But his treatment of this matter involves definite in­
consistencies. This can be seen quite clearly in his 
various discussions of egoisme. In his earlier wri­
tings, egoisme has reference to the utilitarian model 
of self-interest. In Durkheim's view, this presupposed 
a '~re-social" man, and his critique of this ·conception 
in Les Regles takes this as its foil. But he evidently 
soon came to perceive that, according to the position 
which he had taken in criticizing utilitarian indivi­
dualism,egoisme itself must be a product of society 
.•. there can be socially-created self-interest •... 
Mor&individualism, he emphasizes, does not derive 
from egoism; but the growth of moral individualism 
nonetheless produces, as an Offshoot, an expansion in 
~. range of egoistic IncITnations: "even our egoism 
1.S 1.n large part a product of society" *(197Ib:220). 
But Giddens goes on to observe that elsewhere, when 
Durkheim spoke of individualism, he reverted to the first 
notion that egoisme is due to the pre-social half of homo 
duplex. 
Yet, in other writings, Durkheirri reverts to a concep­
tion of egoisme which counterposes it in a direct 
way to social learning, as if the two are necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Man, he argues, everywhere con­
ceives of himself as homo duplex, as being composed 
of two beings, which are usually represented in reli­
gious thought as the body and the soul. This corres­
ponds to a psychological division between sensations, 
on the one side, and concepts and moral activity on 
the other. ·Sensations and sensory needs, according 
to Durkheim, are necessarily egoistic because they 
originate from, and refer to, conditions of the bio­
logical organism. Conceptual thought and moral acti­
vity are impersonal, they are social products, and 
do not belong to any particular person who uses them. 
These, therefore, are two opposed aspects of person­
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
--856-­
ality. They are not merely separate from one another, 
but are in constant conflict. Egoisme is thus identi­
fied solely with the "pre-social" and is portrayed 
as wholly foreign to the "penetration of the indivi­
dual by society" (197Ib:220-1). 
Thus, did Durkheim confute these two very different notions 
of the "individuaf"--one as "pre-social," as the organic 
ego, and the other as socially and culturally constructed. 
Giddens further notes how these two underlying schemas di­
verge in Durkheim's work. 
The individual in society is not simply a passive im­
print of social forms, but an active agent. But, even 
while he recognizes this, he relies upon the holistic 
standpoint in working out his critique of utilitarian 
individualism. From each of these two aspects, histor­
ical and methodological, this rests upon the proposi­
tion that society is not a creation of the (pre-social) 
individual, but exists prior to him and molds him. How, 
then, is it possible that the (concrete) individual is 
an active agent? It is at this point that the two di­
mensions, the historical and the methodological, diver­
ge in Durkheim's thought, The answer which he reaches 
via his study of the evolution of solidarity, and his 
analysis of moral conduct more qenerally, is that it 
is possible because the cognitive and motivational 
structure of the personality is shaped by social learn­
ing. He is not just molded by society~ the active orien­
tation of his conduct is framed by internalized moral 
norms. 
But there is a second answer, to which his thought con­
stantly tends to revert, and which is undoubtedly a de­
rivative of his preoccupation with utilitarianism. This 
is what is actively willed by the individual is a "pre­
social" impulsion. In other words, in seeking to reject 
utilitarianism, Durkheim tends to deal with it-rn its 
own terms. Society cannot be conceived as the-outcome 
of pre-formed individual wills because society makes, 
and must make, demands upon the individual which are 
foreign to his own wishes! Hence we reach the position 
that there is an irremediable conflict between the ego­
istic inclinations of the individual, and the moral de­
mands which society enjoins upon us. Durkheim never 
managed adequately to reconcile these two stands of 
his thought * (l97lb:223). 
I agree with Giddens in this regard, and accordingly divided 
these seemingly irreconcilable strands of thought into two 
different schemas of suicide. 
Steven Lukes follows up the same line of thought. In 
• 
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exploring Durkheim's root dichotomy of homo duplex, Lukes 
•
 
observes that Durkheim's concern for the development of mor­

al individualism led him in quite another direction. 
•
 
Durkheim saw that autonomy was itself socially gener­

ated and correlative with the development of the in­

dividual personality, social differentiation, and the
 
morality of individualism or the "cult of the indivi­

dual." But this, given his extreme social determinism,
 
•
 
led him towards the position that the individual's
 
personal, spontaneous private or egoistic desires and
 
activities are, themselves, socially generated, rather
 
than "rooted in the organism." This issue arises esp­

ecially clearly in the discussion of anomie in Suicide,
 
where Durkheim maintains that the individual's anarchic
 
•
 
and unrestrained passions are rooted in his organism,
 
but also half-sees that they are social or cultural
 
Pre"mI"SeS 0 f a partiCUlar type of society:-And, in the
 
same work, does egoisme result from the absence, or the
 
presence of-sQCial causes * (1973:23rr- -- --­
•
 
This raises my question precisely: can we view anomie and
 
egoisme as resulting from the presence as well as the absence
 
of social causes? Since Durkheim seems to answer both ways,
 
I have divided these two different answers into two different
 
schemas of suicide. The clear implication of the second pos­
sibility is that both anomie and egoisme, as well as primi­
tive and traditional altruisme and fatalisme, emerge as un~ 
•
 
anticipated consequences of different, though related, types
 
•
 
of extreme moral obligation in societies at the two ends of
 
history. Reviewing these very same pages in Lukes' book,
 
Giddens aptly observes: "But his (Durkheim's) very sociolo­

gical analysis of moral individualism forced him to recog­

• 
nize that egoistic desires are themselves socially condi­
tioned or socially generated" (1974:158). 
In addition, Robert Nisbet has remarked about the dif­
ferences between the two notions of individualism in Durk­
heim's doctrine. 
•
 
It is interesting to note an apparent contradiction in
 
Durkheim's concept of individualism. At times indivi­

dualism is made to appear as non-society, as the mode
 
of behavior or thought that ensues when man is divor­

ced from society. It is, in this view, the very oppo­

site of social. 
• 
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But there is another view of the matter, one that 
arises from his sweeping insistence that everything 
above the level of physiology derives from society. 
And in this second view, individualism becomes along 
with the collective conscience itself, something so­
cial in origin. Individualism, Durkheim maintains, is 
..• the result of society: of society's substitution 
of what he calls the cu]t of the individual for the 
traditional religious cult leading to an attribution 
to man of qualities that were formerly vested in reli­
gion. It is the second view that is more consistently 
DurkheImian ~ that is~nsistent not:onlv with his 
premise but also with the full body of his··work * 
(1974:123-4) . 
Again, my comparison and contrast of Durkheim's "nuclear 
structure" with a topographic exegesis of his sociology of 
suicide has demonstrated that Nisbet is correct when he says 
that it is the second view which more adequately represents 
Durkheim's more profound line of development. Nisbet goes on 
to add an important historical and cultural dimension to 
this more consistently Durkheimian and more significant view • 
••• Ages of history, or societies, overwhelmingly 
characterized by cul~ural emphasis upon the self, 
the ego, and these states of mind in philosophy, 
literature, and art which are recurrently associated 
with such emphasis, are invariably ages, Durkheim 
concludes, of sharp rises in suicide rates (1974:231). 
The suicide who, at first glance, seems to have brok­
en by his act from society ••• Durkheim tells us, has 
simply become obedient to those social currents which 
have put high, even extreme value, upon individualism, 
upon the "cult of the individual" (1974:212). 
All of these important observations shall be incorporated 
into our second schema of suicide. 
Further, as noted in the conclusion to the preceding 
section of this book, Dominick LaCapra offers us several 
insightful observations on the nature of anomie and its rela­
tion t5~rotestant Ethos. LaCapra rightly sees anomie as lim­
itlessness, and clearly sees that these extreme types of in­
dividualism and insatiability are culturally sanctioned in 
the modern world. 
Anomie signified the absence of an institutionally 
grounded and ideologically legitimated sense of sub­
stantive limits in society and the personality .•.. 
•
 
• 
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•
 
Egoisme referred ••• to a state in which the princi­

ple of individuation was carried to the extreme of .
 
particularistic and self-centered atomistic indivi­

dualism•••• Egoisme in modern societies was an exces­

sive development of the cardinal emphasis on indivi­
dual rights and personal responsibility (1972:156-7,8). 
LaCapra further observes: 
• 
••• a little noticed aspect of Durkheim's argument 
was crucial. He went beyond the ideas of structural 
• 
contradictions and gaps to a notion of institution­
alized or ideological anomie. ~~ere institutional and 
ideological anomie existed, limitless assertion was 
actually prescribed or lauded ••• he saw this form 
of "Ie mal de l'infini" in numerous aspects of modern 
culture (1972:162). 
Besides Romantic literature, LaCapra goes on to cite the 
"dogma of economicmaterialisrn" legitimating "ruthless and 
rapid progress" as paradigm cases of "institutionalized
• and ideological anomie." 
Further, Alvin Gouldner has noted that certain norms 
may act as both stabilizing and disruptiv~ fprces, depend­
l.nsl.ghting upon the context. This is an importantAWhl.ch we shall
• also incorporate at the heart of the second schema. 
• 
In his ••• Suicide, Durkheim stresses that Protestant 
norms actually induce a higher rate of suicide. He 
stresses that normlessness (or anomie) is not the only 
source of social disorganization or the only stimulant 
to a high suicide rate. A commitment to Protestant be­
liefs may also induce a disorganizing egoisme, Durk­
heim argues. And he regards anomie and egoisme as hav­
ing a close connection, a "peculiar affinity" for each 
other (1958:16). 
•
 
It is a clear lesson from the historical sociology of reli­

gion, for instance, that religious conflict can and often 
has led to social disorganization. Perhaps the classic case, 
upon which so much modern social and political theory rests 
• 
was, of course, the Puritan Civil War in England during the 
1640's. Just as clearly, the descendants of the Puritan sects, 
the ascetic branches of Protestantism, were among the prime 
carriers of the modern ethos of individualism (eg. Quakers). 
•
 
Finally, this implicit, ambivalent critique of Protest­

antism in Durkheim's doctrine led some members of the Annee 
circle to rebel against Durkheim. 
• 
•
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This is especially true of Gaston Richard, one of the lead­
•
 
ing sociological thinkers of the time in France.
 
The evolution of Richard's ideas indicated that the 
Annee school had its internal critics. Richard in 
time became one of the most hostile critics of Durk­
heim, and a source of the idea that his thought was 
riddled with contradictions. The key issue that an­
•
 
tagonized Richard (himself a Protestant) was the in­

creasingly critical edge in Durkheim's sociology of 
religion which came down most negatively upon Protes­
tantism (LaCapra, 1972:146,#1)~ 
While other testimony could be cited, I trust that 
• 
this brief inventory of some other observers' insights into 
the emerging logic of Durkheim's second schema has shown: 
(a) that others have also recognized the ambiguities in Durk­
heim's doctrine of anomie and egoisme and their relation to 
• moral individualism, (b) that anomie and egoisme may also be generated by the presence of extreme modern cultural sanc­
tions, and (c) that there is a high probability that Protes­
tantism, as the basis of the modern value system, bears some 
• important relation to anomie and egoisme, as yet largely un­
specified. With these observers' insights in mind, let us 
next turn to explore Durkheim's growing sociocultural real­
ism in terms of his insistence that suicide is generated by 
• the presence of "social currents." 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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E.	 The Social Element of Suicide: Durkheim's Growing Socio­
Cultural Realism and the Causal Significance of 
PSuicidogenetic Currents" 
The conclusion from all these facts is that the so~ 
cial suicide-rate can be explained only sociologi­
cally. At any given moment the moral constitution 
of society establishes the contingent of voluntary 
deaths. There is, therefore, for each people a col­
lective force of a definite amount of energy, im­
pelling men to self-destruction. The victim's acts 
which at first seem to express only his personal 
temperament are really the supplement and prolonga­
tion of a social condition which they express ex­
ternally (S:299). 
Preface. In Book Three, chapter one of Suicide, Durkheim 
left his formidable array of statistics behind, and turned 
to elaborate the guiding rationales underlying his earlier 
explanations of modern suicide rates. The very heart of Durk­
heim's argument that suicide, seemingly the most isolated of 
human actions and the very negation of society, is socially 
caused, was the cultural and symbolic significance of socie­
ty, of "moral mechanics." Since it is the "moral life" 
which matters first, last, and always, then the most signi­
ficant aspects of this higher inter-generational social life 
were cultural symbolic patterns providing meaning and di­
rective systems to persons and groups. Now, the "social cur­
rents" which acted as the energetic carriers of modern sui­
cidal tensions were not merely structural--that is, the 
lack of organizational or normative integration into a warm 
and cohesive group. For these causes were cultural and syrn­
bolic~phenomenological--as well. This important insight 
meant that, whatever the original sanction for suicidal ten­
sions, these "social currents" also served as core consti­
tutive "pools of meaning", as Douglas (1967) suggests, which 
orient and guide behavior which may lead up to suicidal act­
ions. This does not necessarily imply, however, that these 
symbolically validated and culturally carried "pools of mean­
ing" directly recommended suicide as an answer to human prob­
•
 
• 
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lems, but rather simply that certain extreme cultural sanc­
• 
tions which, generating overwhelming tensions, may lead to 
suicidal consequences. 
• 
Therefore, I suggest that we should search for certain 
"social currents" and symbolically carried cultural "pools 
of meaning" which had suicide, not as their prime focus, but 
as their ironic or unanticipated outcome. And as we search 
for cultural sanctions underlying these powerful and ironi­
• 
cally destructive "pools of meaning," we would do well to 
recall Durkheim's seminal thesis that even "the features of 
our immorality are also the features of our morality." This 
basic proposition should be combined with the ancient wis­
dom which guided Durkheim himself--namely, the notion that 
• 
health, harmony, happiness, and virtue rest on a "golden 
mean," and thus, that vices ~ virtues pushed to extreme. 
Once again setting aside any necessary correlation be­
tween suicide rates and cosmic or biological phenomena, Durk­
• heim insisted that "the social rate of suicide corresponds 
to a collective tendency." Precisely what is the nature of 
this collective tendency, however? Now, on the basis of his 
extensive comparative statistical arrays, Durkheim first ex­
• plored the differential susceptibility of different groups 
to suicidal actions. He even remarked that it was " ..• no 
mere metaphor to say of each society that it has a greater 
or lesser aptitude for suicide." Then Durkheim continued: 
• Each social group really has a collective inclination for the act, 9uite its own-;-and the source of all in­
d'IVicrual-ui"clJ.nation;-rather-""tllan their resUlt:-It1S 
made ~ of the currents of egOIS:me, altruisme, or-ano­
~runnrng--:throughthe society under consideratro~ 
with the tendencies to languorous melancholy, active
• renunCIation or exasperated weariness, derivative from 
• 
these current~ These tendencies of the whole sociar-­
body, £y affecting individuals, cause them to commit 
suicide. The private experiences usually thought to 
be the proximate causes of suicide have only the influ­
ence borrowed from the victim's moral predisposition, 
itself an echo of the moral state of society .••• His 
sadness comes to him from without in one sense, how­
ever not from one or another incident of his career, 
but from the group to which he belongs * (S:299-300). 
• 
--
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Through cultural symbolic processes, society informs con­
science and consciousness. Thus, suicide cannot be caused 
• 
• merely by the absence of some important social element, 
for as soon as Durkheim stated his underlying rationale 
this early and over-sim~le answer must be set aside. It 
now becomes clear that the problem is precisely reversed. 
• 
~or it now becomes not so much the question of the absence 
but rather the presence of sociocultural sanctions which 
generates group differentials in suicide rates. To some ex­
tent, egoisme and anomie, like altruisme and fatalisme, 
• 
must be caused somehow by some extreme tension inducing mo­
dern cultural sanctions which submit conscience and con­
sciousness to great stress. The lack of collective moral 
discipline underlying the first schema now shifts to the 
• 
problem of too much collective discipline of a very differ­
ent sort. Absence/presence', too little/too much--these are 
the key analytical axes around which Durkheim's theory of 
suicide revolved. And, as we discovered in part one of 
this book in our critical review of Durkheim's doctrine of 
man as homo duplex, when it is no longer a question of the 
' 
• 
presence of egoistic and insatiable desires in the organic 
ego in the face of the absence of collective moral disci­
pline, then we are left only with the more significant 
notion that these destructive desires are anchored in so­
ciety ~nd culture itself. 
• 
Durkheim hammered away at this crucial thesis that 
• 
the statistical differentials in suicide rates of groups 
through time can only be explained socially. Thus, each 
group was distinguished by a more or less marked aptitude 
toward suicide, and this aptitude must be correlated some­
how to the "moral constitution of the group." Collective, 
rather than individual, causation implies that: 
There must be some force in their common environment 
inclining them all in the same direction, whose great­
• er or lesser strength causes the greater or lesser number of individual suicides. Now the effects re~ 
vealing this force vary not according to organic and 
cosmic environments but solely according to the state 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--864-­
of the social environment. This force must then be 
collective ..•• Each people has collectively an in­
clination of its own to suiCIde upon which" the SIze 
of its contribution to-voluntary deaths depends * 
(8:305) . 
Against individualistic explanations which fly in the face 
of the compelling implications of group differentials in 
the suicide rates, Durkheim addressed the following question: 
How does it happen that a given, supposedly stable, 
society always has the same number of disunited fam­
ilies, of economic catastrophes, etc.? This regular 
recurrence of identical events in proportions con­
stant within the same population but very inconstant 
from one population to another would be inexplicable 
had not each society definite currents impelling its 
inhabitants with a definite force to commercial and 
industrial ventures, to behavior of every sort like­
ly to involve families in trouble, etc. (8:306). 
Durkheim went so far as to reject the nominalistic 
notion that when collectivities are spoken of, this refer­
ence remains metaphorical, and does not rest upon any system 
of real relationships. Indeed, if only parts are real and 
not relationships, how can society and culture be anything 
more than mere metaphor? But Durkheirn's emergent relational 
realism led him to insist that these collective tendencies 
are "forces as real as cosmic forces," (but workinq, of 
course, in a different way). 
Usually when collective tendencies or passions are 
spoken of, we tend to regard these expressions as 
mere metaphors and manners of speech with no real 
signification but a sort of average among a certain 
number of individual states. They are not consider­
ed as things, forces sui generis which dominate the 
consciousness of singre-individuals. Nonetheless, 
this is their nature, as is brilliantly shown by 
statistics of suicide. The individuals making up a 
society change from year to year, yet the number of 
suicides is the same so long as the society itself 
does not change (5:307). 
Brilliantly developing the implications of his system­
atic statistical evidence, Durkheim next suggested that since 
these suicidal rates are historical phenomena, it is reason­
able to suppose that these "collective tendencies" must also 
be traditional in some way. Although we shall save consid­
•
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eration of Durkheim's reflections on cultural traditions 
for the next book, clearly such long-term collective ten­
• dencies must be closely connected with the historical 
"pools of meaning ll of the group. 
• 
The causes which thus fix the contingent of volun­
tary deaths for a given society or one part of it 
must then be independent of individuals, since they 
retain the same intensity no matter what particular 
• 
persons they operate on. One would think that an un­
changing manner of life would produce unchanging ef­
fects. This is true, but a way of life is something 
and its unchanging character requires explanation. 
If a way of life is unchanged while changes occur 
constantly among those who practice it, it cannot 
derive its entire reality from them (S:307).
 
Therefore, we may begin to speak of a national or cultural
 
physiognomy--that is, a traditional and distinctive way of
 
• life which predisposes its members to greater or lesser sui­

cidal tensions.
 
From this point of view there is no longer anything 
mysterious about the stability of the suicide rate, 
any more than its individual manifestations. For
• since each society has its own temperament, unchange­
• 
able within brief periods, and since this inclination 
to suicide has its source in the moral constitution 
of groups, it must differ from group to group, and 
in each of them remain for long periods practically 
the same. It is one of the essential elements of so­
cial coenesthesia. Now thiscoenaesthetic state, among 
collective existences as well as among individuals, 
is their most personal and unchangeable quality, be­
•
 
cause nothing is more fundamental. But then the ef­

fects which spring from it must have both the same
 
personality and the same stability (S:305).
 
Since the distinctive way of life of each society is ob­
viously intergenerational as well as interactional, then 
this historical aspect means that something like cultural 
•
 
traditions may be among the crucial carriers of this long­

term IImoral milieu." 
• 
Although Durkheim spoke constantly of the "moral life ll 
in The Division of Labor, he approached it indirectly through 
analysis of changing juridical obligations as external indi­
ces. Now, perhaps for the first time, Durkheim directly ar­
gued: 
• 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
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The social environment is fundamentally one of com­
mon ideas, beliefs, customs, and tendencies. For them 
to impart themselves thus to individuals, they must 
somehow exist independently of individuals; and this 
approaches the solution we suggested. For thus is im­
plicitly acknowledged the existence of a collective 
inclination to suicide from which individual inclina­
tions are derived, and our whole problem is to know 
what it consists of and how it acts (S:302). 
Thus, Durkheim's main problem, and ours after him, is to 
understand the nature of these collective tendencies, these 
"social currents," how they are carried, how they affect con­
science and consciousness, and so forth. And in Book One, of 
course, we discovered the precise directions in which his 
developing interest in the "social physiology of the moral 
life", in "collective representations," led him by The Ele­
mentary Forms of the Religious Life. Criticizing Tarde's 
notion of simple "social imitation," Durkheim began here to 
define the nature of these internalized normative sanctions 
and energies. Such sociocultural and intergenerational fact­
ors, Durkheim insisted, are as real in their origins and con­
sequences as physical forces. 
Collective tendencies have an existence of their own~ 
they are forces as real as cosmic forces, though of 
a different sort; they likewise affect the indivi­
dual from without, though through different channels. 
The proof that the reality of collective tendencies 
is no less than that of cosmic forces is that this 
reality is demonstrated in the same way by the uniform­
ity of effects (S:309). 
Remember that these collective tendencies, though resting on 
"social morphological" bases, are first and foremost "moral 
realities." Although resting on material factors, however 
(see Book One and Two), the "mechanics of the moral life" 
move in the realm of the ideal, of the symbolic, of the phe­
nomenological. This is the province not of population statis­
tics alone, but most importantly of shifts in the legitimate 
collective anchors of conscience and consciouseness. 
Since ••• moral acts such as suicide are reproduced 
not merely with an equal but a greater uniformity, 
we must likewise admit that they depend on moral for­
ces external to individuals,. Only, since these forces 
•
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must be of a moral order and since, except for indivi­
dual men, there is no other moral order of existence 
in the world but society, they must be social. But 
whatever they are called, the important thing is to 
recognize their reality and conceive of them as a to­
tality of forces which cause us to act from without, 
like the physico-chemical forces to which we react. 
So truly are they things sui generis and not mere verb­
al entities they may be measured .••• Thus, the basic 
proposition that social facts are objective, a propo­
sition we have had the opportunity to prove in another 
work (Rules) and which we consider the fundamental prin­
ciple of the sociological method, findsa new and espe­
cially conclusive proof in moral statistics and above 
all in the statistics of suicide (S:309-10). 
Indeed, after Kenneth Burke and Robert Bellah (1970), might 
we not term Durkheim's growing sociocultural realism a move 
toward "symbolic realism" (see also Book One & l'hree)? Durk­
heim himself here contended that this " ••• world is nothing 
if not a system of realities" (S: 310). And he further defined 
this "moral world" as made up of "collective representations." 
••• it is clear that essentially social life is made 
up of representations. Only these collective represen­
tations are of quite another character from those of 
the individual. We see no objection to calling socio­
logy a variety of psychology, if we carefully add that 
social psychology has its own laws which are not those 
of individual psychology (S:312). 
And, of course; the prime type of "collective representation" 
upon which Durkheim so often based his argument for the auto­
nomous causal significance of symbolic reality was none other 
than religion (see part one of this book). On page 312 of 
Suicide, Durkheim outlined his new sociological theory of 
religion (see also Book One) which was later to form the ba­
sis of The Elementary Forms. It is important for our present 
purposes to explicitly recognize that all these arguments ap­
peared together for the first time here: I mean the emergent 
nature of social and cultural reality, the causal nature of 
"social currents" and long-term "suicidogenetic forces," and 
the nature of religion as the prime cultural symbolic form 
informing structures of conscience and consciousness. 
Durkheim proceeded to spell out further his emerging 
theory of culture which was, as we saw in Book One, to move 
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to the center stage of his later thought. Here, he observed, 
for instance, that technologies are culturally influenced, 
that the "social fact" is "materialized and made an element 
of the external world" (S:313). For example, a "definite 
type of architecture is a social phenomenon; but it is par­
tially embodied in houses and buildings of all sorts which, 
once constructed, become autonomous realities, independent 
of individuals" (S:313-14). 
It is the same with the avenues of communication and 
transportation, with instruments and machines used in 
industry or private life, which express the state of 
technology at any given moment in history, of written 
language, etc. Social life, which is thus crystallized 
and fixed upon material supports, is by so much extern­
alized and acts upon us from without (8:314). 
The process of "crystallization" of cultural forms is, of 
course, historical or intergenerational by its very nature. 
And the fate of "routinized" "crystallizations" is also in­
timately involved with historical processes--witness the 
prime illustrations of cultural charisma losing significance 
and legitimacy, and then being retrieved and revitalized 
by later generations far removed from the original genera­
ting contexts. 
A child's taste is formed as he comes in contact with 
the monuments of national taste bequeathed by previous 
generations. At times such monuments ev~n disappear 
and are forgotten for centuries, then, one day when 
the nations which reared them are long since extinct, 
(they) reappear and begin a new existence in the midst 
of new societies. This is the character of those very 
social phenomena called Renaissances. A Renaissance is 
a portion of social life which, after being, so to 
speak, deposited in material things and remained long 
latent there, suddenly reawakens and alters the intel­
lectual and moral orientation of peoples who had had 
no share in its construction (S:314). 
In these ways, key elements constituting cultural traditions 
are constructed, diffused, and sedirnented into civilizational 
processes. 
Indeed, a special significance should be attached to 
the historical and sedimented nature of these highly crystal­
lized symbolic cultural forms, especially those naturally 
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distinguished by high degrees of potential universalizabil­
ity (see also Book One). 
The same remark applies to the definite formula into 
which the dogmas of faith are precipitated, or legal 
precepts when they become fixed externally in a con­
secrated form. However well digested, they would of 
course remain dead letters if there were no one to 
conceive their significance and put them into prac­
tice. But though they are not self-sufficient, they 
are nonetheless in their own ways factors of social 
activity. They have a manner of action of their own. 
Juridical relations are widely different depending 
on whether or not the law is written. Where there is 
a constituted code, jurisprudence is more regular but 
less flexible, legislation more uniform but also more 
rigid. Legislation adapts itself less readily to a 
variety of individual cases, and resists innovations 
more strongly. The material forms it assumes are thus 
not merely ineffective verbal combinations but active. 
realities, since they produce effects which could not 
occur without their existence. They are not only ex­
ternal to individual consciousness, but this very ex­
ternality establishes their specific qualities. Be­
cause these forms are less at the disposal of indivi­
duals, individuals cannot readily adjust them to cir­
cumstances and this very situation makes them more re­
sistant to change (5:314-15). 
Thus did Durkheim begin to spell out his theory of institu~ 
tionalization and sociocultural process. 
Now, in addition to these more "crystallized" or in­
stitutionalized forms, Durkheim remarks that there are also 
highly fluid sociocultural forms, or rather processes • 
••• not all social consciousness achieves such ex­
ternalization and materialization. Not all the es­
thetic spirit of a nation is embodied in the works 
it inspires: not all morality is formulated in clear 
precepts. The greater part is diffused. There is a 
large collective life which is at liberty; all sorts 
of currents corne, go, circulate everywhere, cross, 
and mingle, in a thousand ways, and just because 
they are constantly mobile are never crystallized 
in an objective form ••.• And all these eddies, all 
these fluxes and refluxes occur without a single mod­
ification of the main legal and moral precepts, immo­
bilized in their sacrosanct forms. Besides, these 
very precepts merely express a whole subjacent life 
of which they partake: they spring from it but do 
not supplant it. Beneath all these maxims are actual, 
living sentiments, summed up by these formula but 
only as in a superficial envelope. The formula would 
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awaken no echo if they did not correspond to definite 
emotions and impressions scattered through society. 
If, then, we ascribe a kind of mqrality to them, we 
do not dream of supposing them t~~he whole of moral 
reality. That would be to take the sign for the thing 
signified (S:3l5). 
Thus, as we saw in Book One, collective representations can 
besub-divided into fluid and crystallized forms. And these 
fluid social or suicidogenetic currents are the prime car­
riers of anomic and egoismic tensions which may generate 
the ultimate act of suicide. Such collective representations 
precede and exceed their individual manifestations. 
Because this part of collective life has not enough 
consistency to become fixed, it nonetheless has the 
same character as the formulated precepts •••• It is 
external to each average individual taken singly ••.• 
There is not one of all the single centers of con­
sciousness who make up the great body of the nation, 
to whom theco'lIe"Ctive Cli'rrent is not aIm'Q"St wholly 
exterior, since each consciousness contains only a 
spark of it *(S: 315-16). -- ­
Having shifted his guiding metaphors from mechanics 
to thermodynamics (see also Book One) in speaking of "social 
currents," energetic "social forces," "sparks," and so on, 
Durkheim next utilized another significant analogy to drive 
home his point with greater emphasis. Switching from physi­
cal to biological phenomena, Durkheim suggested a bold 
and stimulating cross-level analogy between the genetic and 
directive systems of biological organisms and the "social 
currents" which culture persons in human society. Thus, 
Durkheim has to be credited with being one of the first, 
as far as I know, to suggest that culture acts as a kind 
of social DNA (see also Book One). Parsons also saw this 
important cross-level analogy (1973), but supposed that 
Durkheim did not hit upon the connection until 1912 in The 
Elementary Forms. 
Such a way of considering the individual's relation 
to society also recalls the idea assigned the indiv­
idual's relation with the species or the race by con­
temporary zoologists. The very simple theory has 
been increasingly abandoned that the species is only 
the individual perpetuated chronologically and gener­
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a1ized spatially .••• The distinctive characteristics 
of the race change in the individual only as they 
change in the race in general. The race has some real­
ity whence comes the various shapes it assumes among 
individual beings, far from it consisting simply of 
a generalization of these beings ..•• It is enough for 
us to show that our sociological conceptions, without 
being borrowed from another order of research, are in­
deed not without analogy to the most positive sciences 
(5:320). 
Just as the gene pool of the species is the real locus of 
genetic-evolutionary change, thus, so too is society and 
culture the real locus of societal and phenomenological 
evolution. Viewing culture as social DNA is helpful because 
it directs our attention to the ways in which crucial pro­
grams of information are encoded and decoded on various 
levels of phenomena. 
Durkheim next extended this insight even further. Durk­
heim suggested that, if one follows out consistently the lo­
gic of this position, then perhaps society and culture feed 
back down to the organismic level, as when, for example, 
culturally generated desires take on the imperative status 
of organic needs. Obviously, such feedback power may vitally 
affect health, not only in terms of wholeness and har­
mony, but even~the nervous system and physiology themselves. 
••• the causes determining the social currents af­
fect individuals simultaneously and predispose them 
to receive the collective influence. Between these 
two sorts of factors there is a natural affinity, 
from the very fact that they are dependent on, and 
expressive of, the same cause: this makes them com­
bine and become mutually adapted. The hypercivi1iza­
~ which breeds the anomic tendency and the egois­
t~c tendency also refines nervous systems, mak-
Ing them exceSSIVely de1icate~ through this very fact 
they are less capable of firm attachment to a defin­
ite object, more impatient of any sort of discipline, 
more accessible both to violent irritation and to ex­
aggerated depression. Inversely, the crude, rough cul­
ture implicit in the excessive altruism of primitive 
man develops a lack of sensitivity which favors re­
nunciation. In short, just as society largely forms 
the individual, it forms him to the same extent in 
its image. Society cannot lack the material for its 
needs, for it has kneaded it with its own hands* (5: 323). 
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To all students of suicide, Durkheim began here to outline 
a potentially profound medical culturology, for the fatal 
dis-ease known as suicide can now be seen as due to the in­
ternalization of extreme cultural sanctions and social norms 
that become destructive. Stress, anxiety, and self-destruct­
ion may be socially and culturally, as well as or~anically, 
induced. 
Moving from the group level to that of the individual, 
how shall we explain why some individuals within groups with 
differential susceptibilities to suicidal tensions are more 
susceptible to such tendencies than others in the same group? 
Obviously, even within groups with high rates not everyone 
commits suicide. Setting aside the clinician's notion of 
individual pathology (eg. nervousness, insanity, etc.), Durk­
heiI!l spoke of a "collective inclination," a cultural tradi­
tion, in effect, which predisposed members of a group to a 
greater or lesser extent toward engaging in the kind of. act­
ivities and embracing those aspirations which may generate 
suicidal anxieties. Put one way, differentially located in­
dividuals vary in their ability to resist the destructive 
energies carried by these "suicidogenetic currents." Or put 
another way, differentially located individuals vary in their 
depth of internalization of potentially self-destructive ex­
treme cultural sanctions. 
The role of individual factors in the or1g1n of sui­
cide can now be more precisely put. If, in a given 
moral environment, for example, in the same religious 
faith or in the same body of troops, or in the same 
occupation, certain individuals are affected and cer­
tain others not, this is undoubtedly, in great part, 
because the affected individuals' mental constitution, 
as elaborated by nature and events, offers less resis­
tance to the suicidogenetic current. But though these 
conditions may share in determining the particular per­
sons in whom this current becomes embodied, neither 
the special qualities nor the intensity of the current 
depends upon these conditions. A given number of sui­
cides is not found annually in a social group just be­
cause it contains a number of neuropathic persons. Neu­
ropathic conditions only cause the suicides to succumb 
with greater readiness to the current. Whence comes 
the qreat difference between the clinician's point of 
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view and the sociologist's. The former confronts ex­
clusively particular cases, isolated from one another. 
He established, very often, that the victim was either 
nervous or an alcoholic, and explains the act by one 
or the other of these psychopathic states. In a sense 
he is right .... But in a general sense this motive 
does not cause people to kill themselves, nor, espe­
cially cause a definite number to kill themselves in 
each society in a definite period of time. The product­
ive cause of the phenomenon naturally escapes the ob­
servation of individuals only: for it lies outside in­
dividuals. To discover it, one must raise his point of 
view above individual suicides and perceive what gives 
them unity. Only certain.ones are called•.•• These are 
the ones who through circumstances have been nearer the 
pessimistic currents and who consequently have felt 
their influence more completely (8:323-4). 
Finally, as Jack Douglas (1967), among others, has 
rightly noted, Durkheim proposed that egoisme, altruisme, 
and anomie are involved in a complex balance in each society. 
Indeed, in each society they are intimately related to the 
predominant morality of the group. 
No moral idea exists which does not combine in propor­
tions varying with the society involved, egoisme, al­
truisme, and a certain anomie. For social life assumes 
both the individual has a certain personality, that he 
is ready to surrender it if the community requires, 
and finally, that he is to a certain degree sensitive 
to the ideas of progress. This is why there is no peo­
ple among whom these three currents of. opinion do not 
co-exist, bending men's inclinations in three differ­
ent and even opposing directions. Where they offset 
one another, the moral agent is in a state of equili­
briumwhich shelters him against any thought of sui­
cide. But let one of them exceed a certain strength 
to the detriment of others, and as it becomes indivi­
dualized, it also become~ suicidogenetic (8:321). 
Therefore, assuming that these "currents of opinion" are in 
some way connected with social norms and cultural sanctions, 
our next task becomes to seek out the ways in which a heal­
thy balance is disrupted by a pervasive and powerful cul­
turally sanctioned counter-thrust. In primitive societies, 
therefore, we should look for the ways in which egoisme and 
anomie are overcome by the overwhelming strength of sacro­
magical collective rationales. In modern societies, conver­
sely, we should look for the ways in which altruisme (and 
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by implication, fatalisme) are overcome by the powerfully 
pervasive sanctions for absolute individualism and unending 
drives for "progress and perfection." Let us now turn to con­
sider these new and potentially powerful considerations. 
•
 
•
 
• 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
•
 
• 
• 
--875-­
• 
P}URT II 
• DURKHEIM'S SECOND SCHEMA: SUICIDE AS GENERATED BY 
THE PRESENCE OF CULTURAL SANCTIONS 
• 
"Every form of suicide is merely the exaggerated 
or deflected form of a virtue." 
(Emile Durkheim, Suicide: 240) 
• 
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• 
Preface 
Durkheim'~ Second Schema: All Four Suicidal Types ~
• Generated £y the Presence of Extreme Cultural Sanctions 
If the essence of Durkheim's first implicit schema was 
that anomie and egoisme are caused by the absence of moral
• control over the organic ego in the modern transitional cri­
sis, the essence of his second implicit schema is that all 
four suicidal types are generated ~ the presence of extreme 
cultural sanctions. Thus, the essential problem is reversed
• in the two schemas: for the lack of collective moral disci­
pline leading to modern anomie and egoisme (in schema one), 
now becomes precisely the opposite problem--I mean the pres­
ence of too much collective self-discipline of quite another
• sort. I repeat: absence/presence, too little/too much, 
these are the analytical axes around which schemas number 
one and two revolve. 
Let me briefly summarize some of the specific shifts
• in the logic of argument which prepare the way for Durk·~ 
heim's second schema. First, he recognized a long-term shift 
away from extreme emphasis on the traditionally assigned 
satisfactions of one's special status group and the sacro­
• magical collective conscience to a modern legitimation of 
the potentially infinite desires of individuals. Second, we 
see that Durkheim rather ambiguously recognized (see Book 
Two) that the modern economy did not simply emerge~\ new so­
• cioeconomic order through the breakdown of the past, but al­
so rested on new, and powerfully unique, models of legitimate 
authority. Hence, we detect another subterranean shift cor­
• 
responding to the first--namely, from the moral legitimacy 
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of desires and scheduled rewards based on traditional col­
lective regulation to an international market economy based 
on "laissez faire, l' which not only leaves the individual 
alone in determining his desires but also positively rejects 
collective intervention in regulation, and positively en­
joins insatiable consumer demand to match the unlimited in­
ternational extension of the market. Third, Durkheim began 
to shift the location of insatiability and egoism (as we 
have seen in Book One and the first part of this Book) from 
the organic half of homo duplex. For his key insight here 
was that the modern "infinity of dreams and desires" is sup­
ported by a new and different morality, and thus a new type 
of culturally shaped conscience and consciousness. There­
fore, the source of insatiability and egoism is now to be 
located primarily in a historically specific society and 
. culture, instead of in the generic qualities of some ab­
stract image of human nature. Thus, these shifts from the 
historical emphasis on the collectivity to the individual, 
from the legitimacy of traditional constraint to the legit­
imacy of laissez-faire, and the conceptual shift from human 
nature to culture as the source of insatiability, consti­
tute some of the crucial foundations of Durkheim's emerging 
explanation of sociocultural causation of suicide in evolu­
tionary perspective. 
For a number of reasons, schemat!~ demonstrably more 
consistent, and more profound than schema one. For we can 
set aside Durkheim's misleading early image 0 f man as homo 
duplex which underlies his first schema. As a corollary, 
we have widened out Durkheim's causal model, as his growing 
sociocultural realism demands. Third, we shall pull together 
the same historical types in the same historical~t (i.e. 
instead of the opposition being egoisme versus altruisme, 
anomie versus fatalisme, we shall shift to altruisme and 
fatalisme versus anomie and egoisme). Fourth, now all four 
types--primitive and modern--are seen to be causally rela­
ted to culturally induced tensions. In other words, all four 
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•
 
suicidal types are ultimately generated by overwhelmingly
 
strong cultural sanctions. "Every sort of suicide is mere­

ly the exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue" (5:240).
 
•
 
Now, although the content and direction of expression
 
of these cultural norms differ in the primitive and modern
 
case and, in turn, within each of these sets, nevertheless,
 
•
 
all four types are generated by the presence of exceeding­

ly strong sanctions which disrupt the necessary human bal­

ance--I refer to the Aristotelian "golden mean" as norm of
 
health and virtue which Durkheim embraced. Durkheim's "phil­

osophy of human finitude," instead of being directed at the 
organic element of human nature as before, now becomes a 
truly important sociocultural insight into the exceedingly 
• 
powerful sanctions which different cultures place on their 
members so that a healthy and creative balance is lost. A 
special virtue or goal is elevated above else and becomes, 
in truth, absolutized. Human proportion is then lost in 
• 
daily life, and substantive rationality, which attempts to 
integrate contrary virtues and conflicting claims toward a 
united and meaningful goal, is similarly lost to view. Spe­
cifically, this means that Durkheim's important, but pre­
• 
viously ignored, notion of the social schedule of rewards 
• 
and satisfactions comes to underlie all four suicidal 
types. The importance of this sociocultural underpinning 
is clearly recognized if, instead of classifying these types 
primarily in terms of abstract oppositions, we classify 
• 
them in terms of their prime evolutionary anchor. Thus, the 
related but opposite types in "mechanical solidarity" are 
altruisme and fatalisme, while the related but opposinq 
types in modern society are anomie and egoisme. Each set 
is supported by the same general type of modern cultural 
sanctions. The newly orchestrated relations between these 
four types are set out in the following chart. 
• 
Thus, in the second schema all four suicidal types 
are the "exaggerated or deflected forms of virtues." Both 
historical sets proceed from common sources: they differ 
•
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Figure 6 . Durkheim's Second Schema: Suicide Caused by the Presence of Cultural Sanctions 
Axis I: The Generic Power of Cultural Sanctions (a) in sociocultural Evolution (b) 
Axis IIa: Mechanical Solidarity (Traditional Societies) 
Axis IlIa:
 
Absolutizing Collectivism and
a. Common Cultural The	 Traditional Social Schedule of satisfactionContent 
b. Different Modes Active ~  Passiveof Expression 
Axis IVa: Dominant Altruisme Fatalisme
 
Suicidal Types
 
Axis	 lIb: The Modern Transitional Crisis 
Axis IlIb:
 
Absolutizing Individualism and
a. Common Cultural 
Legitimized InsatiabilityContent 
b. Different Cultural Anglo Cultural Tradition Romantic Cultural TraditionTraditions 
c.	 Different Modes Active, External Passive, Internal
 
of Expression "The Infinity of Desires" "The Infinity of Dreams"
 
Axis	 IVb: Dominant 
Anomie	 EgoismeSuicidal Types 
I
 
I
 
0:>
 
-...J
Axis	 IIc: The Future: Organic Solidarity via Cultural Shifts 
1.0 
The "Golden Mean"	 II 
• 
--880-­
in their prime mode of expression. In traditional societ­
ies, the common content of altruisme and fatalisme is ab­
• solutizing collectivism and the traditional social sched­
ule of satisfaction. Altruisme represents the active ac­
ceptance of these cultural norms through self-sacrifice 
for the group. Fatalisme represents the opposite pole of
• passive resignation to one's collectively assigned oppres­
sive, traditional fate. Now, in modern societies, caught 
up in the transitional crisis, both anomie and egoisme pro­
ceed from common sources--absolutizing individualism and
• legitimized insatiability, precisely the inverse of the 
values of primitive societies. Anomie is active, egoisme 
passive. When extreme individualism and unending drives 
for "progress and perfection" are turned against the ex­
• ternal world, we see anomie--the "infinity of desires"-­
and the collapse of the will in frustration, as seen in 
suicides in the economic arena. This ethos is supported 
by what I shall call the Anglo Utilitarian Cultural Tradi­
• tion. When these twin sanctions for absolute individualism 
and legitimate insatiability are turned inward against the 
self, we witness egoisme--the "infinity of dreams"--and 
•
 
collapse of the will and imagination in isolation and ex­

•
 
haustion seen in suicides of artists, poets, intellectuals,
 
and so forth. This ethos of angst and the "journey into
 
the interior," in which suicide becomes a vocation, is
 
sanctioned by what I call the Romantic Cultural Tradition.
 
Together these twin expressions of some of our highest cal­
lings and ideals are "chronic" forms of the "moral anarchv"
whi ch .. 
and "dis-eases of the infinite""represent two halves of 
• 
the modern soul. Durkheim's moral philosophy of "human 
finitude" and health and happiness as rooted in the "gold­
en mean," leads us to recognize that when our virtues are 
pushed to extremes, they may also become, ironically, our 
•
 
prime vices.
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• 
CHAPTER SIX 
• ALTRUISME, FATALISME, AND ABSOLUTIZING COLLECTIVISM AND THE TRADITIONAL SCHEDULE OF SATISFACTION 
The individual kills himself at the command of his 
conscience; he submits to an imperative. The domi­
• nant note of his act is the serene conviction de­rived from the feeling of duty accomplished (S:283). 
Preface. One of the keys to reconstructing Durkheim's 
schema is that extremes of human experience leading to sui­
• cide in primitive societies were already recognized as pro­
• 
ceeding Ultimately from cultural sanctions. Even in the 
first schema, altruisme and fatalismewere portrayed as the 
result of overwhelmingly strong emphasis on group loyalties; 
these types of suicide occurred wherever the group took pre­
cedence over the individual. In the second schema, I shall 
deliberately heighten the contrast between primitive and 
• 
modern societies, as did Durkheim, by saying that the first 
key determinant of both altruisme and fatalisme was the pre­
sence of a strong "sacro-magical collective conscience" (Nel­
son, 1973a). Here, traditional tribal rationales, embedded 
•
 
in magic and religion, are absolutized. Thus, noting Durk­

heim's notion of a sense of balance in the healthy indivi­
dual and society, we may speak, conversely, of an absolu­
tizing individualism underlying modern suicides. 
•
 
In both historical sets, we may view destructive ten­

sions as paradoxically proceeding from prime cultural values 
which become so sacred that they take on the character of 
all-consuming absolutes. Like the snake in Oriental mythology, 
• 
they corne to devour themselves. Further, since primitive and 
archaic societies were supposed to be mired in the "thick 
cake of custom," as early observers remarked, for heuristic 
• 
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purposes we may heighten again the contrast between primi­
•
 
tive and modern by noting that in the former type the at­

tainment of such desires--these cultural virtues which be­
come absolutized--is governed by what we shall call a "tra­
•
 
ditional social schedule of satisfaction." This implies
 
that a person's access to these prime or constitutive sa­

•
 
cred values is often largely determined by his ascribed sta­

tus. How much may one hope for? As much as your father be­

fore you, comes back the answer, and no more. On the con­

trary, in modern societies, not only are such traditional
 
•
 
ascribed schedules of legitimate aspirations set aside, but
 
all men, regardless of their origin or station in life, are
 
positively enjoined to seek the heights of perfection. Mod­

ern culture is universalistic in its norms (if not its act­

•
 
ions). And it is this notion that we are all "inoculated
 
with the precepts of progress and perfection," that all are
 
called, but few are chosen, which lay behind Merton's re­

writing of Durkheim's notion of anomie.
 
•
 
Let us now turn to briefly explore the two types of
 
suicide characteristic of overwhelmingly strong cultural
 
mandates in "mechanical solidarity." Since we have already
 
reviewed these types at length in Book Two, and since they
 
•
 
have not greatly changed their content from schema one to
 
schema two, and as our main concern now is explaining the
 
problematic origins of the sanctions for anomie and egoisme
 
in the modern world, I shall only briefly indicate the norm­

ative structure of these early types here. 
• 
• 
• 
•
 
--883-­
A. Altruisme as the Active Acceptance of the Overwhelming 
Mandates of the Primitive Sacro-Magical Collective
• Conscience 
I have designated altruisme as the prime example of 
the active acceptance of ovewhelmingly strong cultural man­
• dates toward self-abnegation in primitive "mechanical soli­darity." It must be emphasized that Durkheim attached speci­
fic historical importance to these typological designations. 
For altruisme ~ not only the abstract valuational pole 
• of egoisme, but its historical opposite as well. Altruisme 
implied that many individuals in primitive and archaic so­
cieties with a low degree of segmentation, and governed by 
traditional sacro-magical rationales, may be led to sacri­
• fice themselves for the group as both a duty and a desira­
ble end. Self-sacrifice for the good of one's tribe or kin­
ship group was considered an honor; it granted the martyr 
a special "pipeline to charisma" as Weber (1963) suggested.
• Indeed, even after the tragedy of the Vietnam War, was it 
still not said that self-sacrifice for one's country should 
be honored? 
Now, in primitive society, or so Durkheim thought, the 
• individual is more or less submerged in the group, especial­
ly in the kinship group. Thus, the traditional collective 
conscience takes precedence over the rudimentarily indivi­
duated conscience and consciousness. The individual who is 
• constantly counseled to sacrifice self for the primary good 
of his own special groups' survival will meet with a simi­
lar end (suicide), but differently expressed, as the modern 
person who is constantly counseled self-sacrifice for supra­
• personal, universalistic ideals which lie at the heart of 
the modern world (eg. the capitalist ethos or revolutionary 
socialism). In the former case, the individual, by virtue 
of the structural location of his cultural "charismatic"
• endowment, may become so penetrated by the collective con­
science that if tradition demands self-sacrifice (triggered 
•
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of course, by specific events), the altruistic suicide may 
enthusiastically embrace self-homicide as a justifiable act, 
even an honor granting virtue. While the altruist believes 
self-sacrifice for his group to be both an obligation and 
a good in itself, the modern egoistic suicide does not di­
rectly embrace self-homicide as a duty in the way his ear­
lier counterpart does. Rather, the egoist comes to his last 
end by so deeply internalizing the self-reliant mandates 
that these special sanctions create, as Weber saw, such 
weighty burdens and unbearable tensions that despair becomes 
our lot. Both altruisme and egoisme are considered moral du­
ties and goods which fulfill in the deepest way possible 
our real human natures. 
Whereas egoisme is due to excessive individuation 
the former is caused by too rudimentary individua­
tion.One occurs because society allows the indivi­
dual to escape it ••• The other because society 
holds him in too strict tutelage. Having given the 
name of egoisme to the state of the ego living its 
own life and obeying itself alone, that of altruis­
me adequately expresses the opposite state, where 
the ego is not its own property, where it is blend­
ed with something not itself, where the goal of con­
duct is exterior to itself (5:221). 
The moral obligation in such societies leading to 
altruistic suicides is intensified by the general repres­
siveness of the rootedness of the sacro-magical collective 
conscience in what I have called the "primitive sacral com­
plex" (see Book One). Conversely, the modern obligation to 
build, direct, maintain, and alter oneself in accordance 
with extreme supra-personal ends, must then also be sanc­
tioned by an equally strong, though reversed, force. 5peak­
ingof a type of altruistic suicide in which this psycholo­
gical extreme can be seen, Durkheim observed: 
When altruisme is at a high pitch ••. the impulse is 
more passionate and unthinking. A burst of faith and 
enthusiasm carries the man to his death. The enthus­
iasm itself is either happy or somber, depending on 
the conception of death as a means of union with a 
beloved deity, or as an expiatory sacrifice, to ap­
pease some terrible hostile power. There is no resem­
blance between the religious fervor of the fanatic 
•
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who hurls himself joyously beneath the chariot of 
his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia, or 
the remorse of the c~iminal who puts an end to his 
days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these super­
ficially different appearances, the essential fea­
tures of these phenomena are the same. This is an 
active suicide, contrasting it with the depressed 
suicide (i.e. egoisme) (S:283). 
Of course, the type of religion having simultaneously the 
greatest impact on the development and direction of the 
modern west, and unalterably opposed to the sacral-magical 
ruling rationales of the "primitive sacral complex" is the 
type of ascetic Protestantism investigated by Max Weber. 
Thus, I have proposed that both primitive altruisme 
and modern egoisme are culturally sanctioned by their res­
pective cultures at the two ends of history. Both altruisme 
and egoisme (and fatalisme and anomie,too,as I shall soon 
show), proceed from the presence of extreme cultural sanc­
tions leading directly or indirectly to self-homicide. In 
both, focus on the self, whether denying it or developing 
the true self, is seen as duty and virtue. 
Suicide in lower societies .•. is not an act of des­
pair, but of abnegation •••• If the widow of the In­
dian did not survive her husband, nor the Gaul the 
chief of his clan, if the Buddhist has himself torn 
on the wheels of the carriage carrying his idol, it 
is because moral or religious prescriptions demand 
it. In all these circumstances, man kills himself, 
not because he judges life bad, but because the ideal 
to which he is attached demands the sacrifice. These 
voluntary deaths are therefore no more suicides, in 
the common sense of the word, than the death of a 
soldier or a doctor exposing himself knowingly because 
of duty (DL:246). 
Durkheim used as additional illustrations of altruistic sui­
cide various customs from archaic societies in which old men, 
women on the funerals of their husbands, warriors, mystical 
virtuosos, and so forth, are required by ancient and vener­
able custom to sacrifice their own lives, to "give the full 
measure of devotion," for their group. 
No~ when a person kills himself, in all these cases, 
it is not because he assumes the right to do so, but, 
on the contrary, because it is his duty. If he fails 
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in this obligation, he is dishonored, also punished, 
usually by religious sanction .... If such a person 
insists on living, he loses public respect (8:219). 
Because altruistic suicides are positively enjoined by prim­
itive cultures in custom, and sometimes even by rudimentary 
legal and spiritual codes, altruistic suicide was utilized 
by Durkheim as a visible or objective index revealing the 
inner structure of the ~ype of social body specific to prim­
itive or archaic societies--that is, to all societies still 
rooted in the ruling rationales of "blood and soil." 
Precisely because the strict subordination of the in­
dividual to the group is the principle on which they 
rest, altruistic suicide is there ... an indispensable 
procedure of their collective discipline .... There is 
a close connection between this sort of suicide and 
the moral organization of this sort of suicide (8:363). 
Thus, true to his positivist methodology, altruistic suicide 
served Durkheim as a visible symbol of the interdependence 
needed in "mechanical solidarity." If, for example, the so­
cial bond is snapped by some irretrievable event like unfor­
seen death, then at certain times the remaining relatives 
obligation may be to maintain the former social bond as far 
as possible by themselves joining immediately with the de­
ceased. In death as in life, the same bond continues. 
Durkheim continued developing the socially obligatory 
character of primitive altruistic suicide by showing that 
such an extreme duty is possible only where the individual 
is submerged in the traditional "collective conscience." 
For society to be able thus to compel some of its 
members to kill themselves, the individual person­
ality can have little value. For as soon as the lat­
ter begins to form, the right to existence is the 
first conceded to it ..•. But there can only be one 
cause of this feeble individuation itself. For the 
individual to occupy so little place in collective 
life he must be almost completely absorbed in the 
group, and the latter, accordingly, very highly in­
tegrated. For the parts to have so little life of 
their own, the whole must indeed be a compact, con­
tinuous mass .••. As they consist of few elements, 
everyone leads the same life; everything is common 
to all, ideas, feelings, occupations. Also, because 
of the small size of the group it is close to every­
•
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one and loses no one from sight~ consequently, col­

lective supervision is constant, extending to every­

thing, and thus more readily prevents divergences
 
•
 
(S:220-l) •
 
Altruistic suicide is thus the ultimate expression, albeit
 
an "exaggerated" one, of the cultural mandates found in
 
"mechanical solidarity." The individual who really enjoys
 
little of an independent existence of his own sacrifices 
• 
himself for the well-being and wholeness of his group. This 
overriding sense of moral obligation is due not only to the 
very real survival constraints put upon the group by diffi­
cult economic and ecological conditions, but also to the 
deep penetration of the collective conscience by sacral and 
magical rationales. In Durkheim's doctrine, for the indivi­
•
 
dual to emerge as a full-fledged entity in his own right-­

that is, as an intellectually responsible and morally auto-
n_?m?~~_J)_~!~~:r1_=-",,:_~~~_~as:ral-ma_gi~~.1,_~~C!~litio_n~l ~-~----
• 
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etiquettes must recede. 
The individual has no way to set up an environment 
of his own in the shelter of which he may develop 
• 
his own nature and form a physiognomy that is his 
exclusively. To all intents and purposes indistinct 
from his companions, he is only an inseparable part 
of the whole without personal value. His person has 
so little value that attacks upon it by individuals 
receive only relatively weak restraint. It is thus 
natural for him to be yet less protected against 
collective necessities and that society should not 
hesitate •.. to bid him end a life it values so lit­
tle (S:22l). 
• 
Even though Durkheim acknowledged that' altruistic 
suicide is " •.• a species with several varieties," in each 
it is the "pantheistic" organization of society and reli­
gious culture which determines the lack of individual resis­
• tance to obligatory self-sacrifice, whether actually consi­dered as suicide or not. Since religion is, to Durkheim, 
essentially the symbolic way in which society collectively 
represents its collective existence to itself (see Book One), 
• then religion was interpreted as the way in which societies 
first attained self-consciousness. It follows, then, that 
"mechanically integrated" societies, in which the indivi­
•
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dual counts for little and the group for all, should ex­
press these social and cultural realities in terms of pan­
• theistic religious projections. When the individual counted 
for little in society, so too did the ego count for little 
in religious culture. Here, salvation was not deliverance 
or redemption, but the transcendence of individual suffer­
• ing through the eradication of the ego, the prime source 
of disharmony and evil. Durkheim's insights suggest that 
societies that have not extended their social bond suffi­
ciently to overcome the sacral and magical ruling ration­
• ales of their segmental structural base and the tribal 
structures of fraternization might never breakthrough to 
modern notions of the autonomous person. Conversely, we 
might expect that societies and cultures which have moved 
• 
• farthest beyond the segmental base and universalized their 
logics of social fraternization, will also be those having 
the least pantheistically and most atomistically and mech­
anically organized cultures. Once again, all analytical 
• 
roads lead to the same fateful historical destination-­
namely, the very special type of ascetic Protestantism so 
powerfully anatomized by Max Weber in his Sociology of 
Religion (1963, 1968), and his special studies on The Reli­
• 
gion of China (1964), The Religion of India (195Sb),and 
Ancient Judaism (1952). 
Durkheim himself noted the uniqueness of Christianity 
(see also the first section of this Book) in its aversion 
to suicide, which was ultimately interpreted as a lack of 
charity to oneself and society, and also as a usurpation 
of divine authority • 
• 
••• The aversion to suicide professed and inspired 
by Christianity is well known. The reason is that 
• 
Christian societies accord the individual a more 
important role than earlier ones. They assign to 
him personal duties which he is forbidden to evade; 
only insofar as he has acquitted himself of the role 
incumbent upon him here on earth is he admitted or 
not to the joys of the hereafter, and these joys 
are as personal as the works which make them his 
heritage. Thus, the moderate individualism in the 
•
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• 
spirit of Christianity prevents it from favoring 
suicide, despite its theories concerning man and 
his destiny (S:226). 
• 
Further, archaic religions acted to hold down indivi­
dual aspirations, to direct them into formal and public ri­
tual expression. When this restraining collective "lid" was 
lifted, especially by the displacement of Catholicism by 
Protestantism in the most progressive and dynamic sectors 
• 
of the modern world, it meant not only that the traditional 
ceiling was taken off individual aspirations, but, more im­
portantly, that new and potentially infinite supra-personal 
• 
aspirations were positively enjoined. Of the type of collect­
ive moral discipline which repressses individual desires in 
primitive societies dominated by "Consciousness I", Durkheim 
remarks: 
• 
This is precisely the role played in ancient society 
by the powers whose progressive dethronement Saint­
Simon notes. Religion instructed the humble to be 
content with their situation, at the same time that 
it taught them that the social order is providential, 
that it is God himself who has determined each one's 
• 
share, and giving them glimpses beyond this earth of 
another world where everything will be balanced, whose 
prospect made inequalities less noticeable, it stopped 
them from feeling aggrieved. Secular power, too, pre­
cisely because it held economic functions under its 
dominance, contained and limited them (Soc:243). 
Now, the power of cultures to inculcate, repress, di­
rect, and alter individual aspirations is a fascinating and 
complex subject. In this regard, we should recall that Durk­
• heim proposed (see especially S:249-25l) that each society 
regulates individual want satisfactions through the mechan­
ism of a social schedule. Such a social schedule of satis­
faction of wants, and the allocation of material rewards
• and cultural honors, is stratified in terms of individual 
contributions, class level, -and status group. When each in­
dividual is relatively adjusted to his scheduled ratio of 
reward, then there is relative calm, social harmony, and
• individual health. When the scheduled ratios of reward are 
thrown out of kilter, or when individuals are placed either 
• 
• 
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under the oppressive weight of their meager rewards, or
 
when they are so stimulated by the cultural ideals to seek
 
•
 
reward or honor beyond all hope of reasonable satisfaction,
 
then tensions so extreme may be set up that self-sacrifice
 
becomes imperative or, perhaps, the only way out. Further,
 
Durkheim observed that there are two fundamentally differ­

ent types of social schedules at the two ends of history. 
In primitive society, the portion allocated each is tradi­
tional, meager, and stratified in terms of ascribed status 
•
 
or inherited or claimed charisma; the social schedule is,
 
in short, rather repressive. "Primitive peoples live in a 
stationary state from which they do not even think of emer­
ging. They aspire to nothing new" (DL:252). In modern so­
•
 
cieties, on the contrary, the social scheduJe counsels in­

•
 
dividual rather than collective priorities, and legitimizes
 
insatiability rather than resignation to one's traditionally
 
assigned portion. Indeed, throughout Suicide, Socialism and
 
Saint-Simon, Moral Education, The Division of Social Labor,
 
and The Elementary Forms, Durkheim continued to note how 
wants seem to expand in history. For the Australian abori­
ginal Arunta, the level of needs and aspirations is rather 
rudimentary.
• ... the Australian, while leading a miserable exist­
ence as compared with other civilized peoples, de­
mands so little of life that he is easily content­
ed. All that he asks is that nature follows its nat­
ural course, that the seasons succeed one another,
• 
that the rain fall at the ordinary times, in abund­
ance and without excess (EF:452). 
Given this rudimentary ecological base-line, Durkheim 
recognized that human wants have continued to increase with 
the division of social labor. He posited a kind of feedback 
cycle in the generation and satisfaction of wants. 
• 
If we have an ever-more compelling need for various 
activities, if we are less and less satisfied with 
the rather slow and dull life that man leads in less 
developed societies, it is because our society re­
quires more and more intensive labors, and more and 
1ndustry so that it has become habitual, and, through 
time, habit has become a need. But there is nothing 
•
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elemental in us that incites us to this continual 
and painful effort (ME:70-1). 
Thus, habit becomes need. Modern expanding economies re­
quire constantly expanding levels of wants, and to simul­
taneously fuel and satisfy these expanding wants, we must 
constantly work harder and specialize more. As we "progress" 
more and become increasingly affluent, and less worried a­
bout traditional subsistence, the greater the burdens we 
daily assume and the greater the tensions we must live with. 
Life becomes harder, not easier, as one might expect. One 
might term this the paradox of affluence and progress. "If 
the savage knows nothing of the pleasures of bustling life, 
he is (also) immune to boredom, that monster of cultivated 
minds" (DL:242). As always, the Garden of Eden was innocent. 
As Durkheim established, there is so simple and direct cor­
relation between increase in per capita income and education 
and happiness: for did not poverty protect against suicide? 
Here is another paradox of progress, for Durkheim himself 
sadly reflected: "Suicide has been called the ransom money 
of civilization" (S:367). 
The historical anchors of these polar suicidal types 
always lay in the background of Durkheim's schema. Different 
levels of societal complexity, and the corresponding systems 
of conscience and consciousness, influence the common content 
and different mode of expression of the dominant cultural 
mandates in societies at the two ends of history. Of altruis­
me and egoisme, Durkheim remarked: 
One is related to the crude morality which disre­
gards everything relating solely to the individual: 
the other is closely associated with the refined 
ethics which sets the human personality on so high 
a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinatedto 
anything. Between the two is, therefore, all the 
difference between primitive peoples and the most 
civilized nations (S:227). 
We see, therefore, the truth of Durkheim's incisive reflect­
ion that "Every sort of suicide is merely the exaggerated 
or deflected form of a virtue" (S:240). Thus, viewed as po­
lar members of the same evolutionary set, altruisme and fa­
•
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talisme proceed from a common souxce--the absolutizing of 
collective rationales and the traditionalism of the social
• schedule of the satisfaction of wants. These two types dif­
fer in their prime mode of expression and perhaps the struct­
ural and cultural locations of individuals fatally exposed 
to these powerful mandates and resulting tensions. For the
• altruist actively embraces his destiny, while the fatalist, 
• 
as the name clearly implies, becomes passively resigned to 
his pitiable fate. One is great, the other sad~ the first 
serves to inspire people to excel in the approved virtues 
and to stand steadfast by their collectively assigned moral 
obligations~ the second serves to remind us of the frailties 
of man and the darkness of our arbitrarily assigned fates. 
• 
Thus, just as we discovered that the key axes of anomie 
and egoisme in the first and second schema were absence/ 
presence, too little/too much, so now we discover that the 
• 
key analytical axes of altruisme and fatalisme in both the 
first and second schema are active/passive, and perhaps 
even inspirational/cautionary. Let us next briefly consider 
fatalisme as the other category of suicides in primitive 
societies. 
• B. Fatalisme as Passive Resignation to Oppressive Regle­
mentation ~ the Collective Conscience and the Tradi­
tional Social Schedule 
• 
Fatalisme is the valuational opposite of anomie, as 
altruisme is of egoisme. In historical terms, fatalisme can 
also be considered a polar category to altruisme in proceed­
ing from the same cultural source but, for various reasons, 
• 
manifesting itself in an opposed mode. If anomie implies an 
externalized "infinity sickness," then fatalisme clearly im­
plies a pervasive sense of passive resignation to one's col­
lectively assigned fate. Historically considered, anomie 
• 
versus fatalisme represents the evolutionary contrast between 
the insatiable passions either released or sanctioned in our 
E 
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contemporary era, contrasted with the individual's passive 
resignation to his fate in the traditional repressive regime 
of "mechanical solidarity." 
In his famous footnote, that "neglected stepchild" 
fatalisme is described in these terms: 
It is the suicide deriving from excessive regulation, 
that of persons with futures pitilessly blocked and 
passions violently choked by oppressive discipline . 
•..• It might be said to have historical interest. 
Do not the suicides of slaves ••• belong to this 
type, or all suicides attributed to excessive phys­
ical or moral despotism? To bring out the inelucta­
ble and inflexible nature of a rule against which 
there is no appeal, and in contrast with the expres­
sion anomie, we might call it fatalistic suicide 
(S:276) • 
In explaining his relative lack of concern with fatalisme, 
Durkheim remarked that it is of "little contemporary import­
ance," presumably because there are few sociocultural sites 
in the modern world where the ego is over-regulated. Since 
Durkheim did not directly compare fatalisme with altruisme 
or even anomie, we shall have to look for indirect compari­
sons. For example, in the chapter on "The Individual Forms 
of the Different Types of Suicide," Durkheim compared the 
characteristic psychological consequences of these types: 
They (the characteristics of altruisme) are the op­
posite of those characterizing egoistic suicide, as 
different as altruisme itself from its opposite. The 
egoistic suicide is characterized by a general depres­
sion, in the form either of melancholic languor or 
Epicurean indifference. Altruistic suicide, on the 
contrary, involves a certain expenditure of energy, 
since its source is a violent emotion. In the case 
of obligatory suicide, this energy is controlled by 
the reason and the will. The individual kills himself 
at the command of his conscience; he submits to an im­
perative. Thus, the dominant note of his act is the 
serene conviction derived from the feeling of duty 
accomplished; the death~ of Cato and of Commander 
Beaurepaire are historical types of this. 
When altruisme is at a high pitch, on the other hand, 
the impulse is more passionate and unthinking. A burst 
of faith and enthusiasm carries the man to his death. 
This enthusiasm itself is either happy or somber, de­
pending on the conception of death as a means of union 
with some terrible, probably hostile power. There is 
• 
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no resemblance between the religious fervor of the
 
fanatic who hurls himself joyously beneath the char­

iot of his idol, that of the monk overcome by acedia,
 
or the remorse of the criminal who puts an end to
 
•
 
his days to expiate his crime. Yet beneath these su­

perficially different appearances, the essential fea­

tures of the phenomenon are the same. This is an act­

ive suicide, contrasting, accordingly, with the de­

pressed suicide discussed above (5:283).
 
•
 
Therefore, as the altruistic type is an active form
 
of suicide, involving " ••. energy of passion or will: with
 
calm feeling of duty, mystic enthusiasm, peaceful courage"
 
(5:293), so the fatalistic suicide must represent the pas­

•
 
sive and apathetic pole like the egoistic type, and yet ir­

ritated and disgusted like the anomic type. Both altruisme
 
and anomie are active types, while both fatalisme and ego­

isme are passive types. And, of course, altruisme and fat­

•
 
alisme are twins, though expressed in opposite modes, for
 
they are merely different expressions of the same cultural
 
dominance of the repressive traditional sacro-magical col­

lective conscience. The fatalistic suicide does not sacri­

fice himself directly for the good of the group: it is 
true, nonetheless, his despair indicates the strength and 
elevation in which the sacro-magical collective traditional 
conscience is held. Here, such cultural power is so strong 
• 
• thal~€hose oppressively regulated by it, especially those 
in structurally disadvantaged positions, there may simply 
be no other alternative, no other way out. Thus, as with 
modern suicides, fatalisme is the indirect result of the 
overwhelming strength of certain ruling rationales. And, 
of course, in all four types in the second schema, the 
lack of balance and proportion between the multiple values 
•
 
results in one mode becoming absolutized, leading to po­

tential self-destruction. 
• 
• 
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• 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
• 
ANOMIE, EGOISME, AND MODERN CULTURAL SANCTIONS FOR 
ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY 
• 
Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar 
affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. 
We know that they are usually two different aspects 
of one social state (S:288). 
Unlimited desires are insatiable by definition, and 
insatiability is rightly considered a siqn of morbid­
ity •.•• Inextinguishable-thirst 1S constantly renewed 
torture (S: 247) • 
•
 
Suicides of both types suffer from ••• diseases of
 
the infinite. But the disease does not assume the
 
same form in both cases. In one,reflective intelli­

gence is affected and immoderately overnourished; in
 
the other, emotion is over-excited and freed from all
 
restraint. In one ,thought , by dint of falling back up­

• on itself, has no object left; in the other, passion,
 no longer recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The
 
former [egoisme] is lost in the infinity of dreams,
 
the second [anom~], in the infinity of desires (S:287).
 
•
 
Now, anomie and egoisme are polar opposites, histori­

•
 
cally as well as generically, of altruisme and fatalisme.
 
And if the latter both proceed from a common source--namely,
 
absolutizing collectivism and the traditional social sche­

dule of satisfaction--then is it not reasonable to conclude
 
that the former set also proceeds from a common, though in­
verted,cultural source? I propose, therefore, that the com­
mon cultural elements underlying anomie and egoisme, as but 
•
 
"two different aspects of the same social state," are abso­

lute individualism and legi~imized insatiability. Just as 
altruisme and fatalisme proceed from a common source, so too 
do anomie and egoisme both proceed from extreme cultural 
• 
sanctions which absolutize individualism and legitimize a 
socioeconomic schedule of potentially infinite expectations. 
• 
• 
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Pulling together the suicidal types into the same his­
torical set (i.e. altruisme and fatalisme versus anomie and
• egoisme), rather than leaving them mere abstract oppositions, 
helps to emphasize their deeper evolutionary meanings. Fur­
ther, we now see the location of insatiability shifting from 
the organic half of homo duplex to modern culture itself.
• As was true of the powerfully repressive culture of primitive 
societies, so too must this energizing power characteristic 
of the path-breaking cultures of the modern world have been 
capable of driving masses of people to feats and tensions
• wholly undreamed by any lone, isolated ego. The wholly uni­
que achievement of man in primitive society, and in modern 
complex society, could only have come from within society 
and culture itself. The very logic of comparison and contrast,
• as Durkheim's statistics and Weber's universal historical 
searches reveal, suggests that the second schema is more con­
sistent and potentially more profound. If these cross-cutting 
sets are thus placed in their proper evolutionary contexts,
• then we may preliminarily conclude that: (1) all four types 
• 
are culturally sanctioned, and (2) that the two modern types 
invert the two primitive types. 
Following out the notion that anomie and egoisme pro­
ceed from similar cultural sanctions in the modern world-­
•
 
namely, absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability-­

then the major differences between them may be discovered
 
in the typical social locations most vulnerable to these
 
•
 
tensions. Differences in mode of expression most probably
 
result from these different locational susceptibilities.
 
With anomie, or the "infinity of desires," absolute indivi­

dualism and insatiability are externalized and actively turn­

•
 
ed against the world. Men are "inoculated with precepts of
 
progress and perfection." With egoisme, or the "infinity of
 
dreams," culturally sanctioned streams of individualism and
 
insatiability are turned inward against the self. Here,
 
"consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man ••• it poses 
as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself" (8:280). 
• 
Xl 
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Sharing "kindred ties" based upon the same extreme cultural 
• 
sanctions, these tension inducing streams affect different 
• 
structural locations. When absolute individualism is act­
ively embraced, we witness the "infinity of desires" of 
those involved in commerce, industry, technology, and so 
forth. When absolutizing individualism and culturally sanc­
tioned "longing for the infinite" are internalized and turn­
ed against the self, and the self becomes passive, almost 
paralyzed, we witness the "infinity of dreams" and suicidal 
•
 
tensions most often seen in artists, poets, intellectuals,
 
and so on. 
•
 
Now, the above combination of common sources and dif­

ferent modes of expression has the additional virtue of re­

conciling the two opposing camps concerning the "right" in­

•
 
terpretation (see the appendix) of Durkheim's typology of
 
suicide. Of course, generally I have sided with the "res­

cuers" rather than the "reductionists." Schema two recon­

ciles the problem of conceptual unity and historical diver­

sity in one integrated and significant schema. In sum, the 
commonality of all four types is that they are culturally 
sanctioned; the mid-point of balance is that both the prim­
• 
itive and modern sets are based upon different opposing 
cultural historical sanctions. And finally, all four types 
are wholly different from the others in their specific 
mode of expression. In short, the four types are doubly cross­
• matrixed--generically and historically.
 For example, Durkheim took pains throughout the lat­

ter part of Suicide to reconcile the differences and estab­

lish similarities between the modern types of anomie and
 
• egoisme. Setting aside his insistence in Book Two of Suicide
 
upon the absence of moral constraint, we find Durkheim sug­

gesting:
 
•
 
Certainly, this (anomic) and egoistic suicides have
 
kindred ties. Both spring from society's insufficient
 
presence in individuals. But the sphere of its absence
 
is not the same in both cases. In egoistic suicide, it 
is deficient in truly collective activity, thus depri­
• 
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• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
ving the latter of object and meaning. In anomic sui­
cide, society's influence is lacking in the basically 
individual passions, thus leaving them without a check­
rein. In spite of their relationship, therefore, the 
two types are independent of each other. We may offer 
society everything social in us, and still be able to 
control our desires; one may live in an anomic state 
without being egoistic, and vice versa. These sorts 
of suicide, therefore, do not draw their chief recruits 
from the same social environments; one has its princi­
pal field among intellectual careers, the world of 
thought; the other, the industrial or commercial world 
(5:258) . 
Thus, both anomie and egoisme proceed from the same source, 
whether it be due to absence or presence of social norms. 
But they are independent of each other because they affect 
different strata and occupational sites. As a corollary, 
they differ from each other in their prime mode of expres­
sion and phenomenological outlook. Durkheim also suggested 
in addition that with egoisme the person lacks an "object 
and meaning" beyond himself, while the anomic individual 
lacks a "check-rein" to his appetites (see also Giddens, 
1966,197Jb). Durkheim later clarified further these diverging 
psychological manifestations. 
Anomie partially results from the same state of dis­
aggregation from which the egoistic currents also 
springs. But this identical cause produces differ­
ent effects, depending on its point of incidence and 
whether it influences active and practical functions, 
or functions which are representational ..•. The form­
er it agitates and exasperates; the latter it dis­
orients and disconcerts. In both cases, the remedy is 
the same (5:382). 
Noting that there are "mixed types of suicides," where 
"widely different fevers may coexist in one person and con­
tribute each in its own way to raising the ~emperature of 
the body," Durkheim further suggested: 
Two factors of suicide have a peculiar affinity for 
one another: namely, egoisme and anomie. We know that 
they are merely two different aspects of one social 
state; thus it is not surprising that they should be 
found in the same individual. It is almost inevitable 
that the egoist should have some tendency to non-reg­
ulation; for since he is detached from society, it 
has not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him. If, 
•
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nevertheless, his desires are not usually excited [iti~ . 
because he is wholly introverted, and not attracted 
by the world outside. But he may be neither a com­
plete egoist nor a pure victim of agitation ••. he 
may play both roles concurrently. To fill up the 
gap he feels inside himself, he seeks new sensations; 
he applies ••• less ardor than the passionate temp­
erament ••• but he also wearies sooner and this wear­
iness casts him back upon himself, thus reinforcing 
his original melancholy. Inversely, an unregulated 
temperament does not lack a spark of egoism; for if 
one were highly socialize1 one would not rebel at 
every social restraint. Only this spark cannot devel­
op in cases where the action of anomie is preponder­
ant; for by casting its possessor outside himself it 
prevents him from retiring into himself (5:288). 
Further, on page 293 of Suicide, Durkheim provided 
one of his few schematic sununaries, a "morphological class­
ification of the individual forms assumed by the basic so­
cial types," to supplement his earlier causal or "aetiolo­
gical ll explanations of his statistics. Here he observed 
that the fundamental psychological character of egoistic 
suicide is "apathy, with an indolent melancholy and self­
complacence" or the "sceptics' disillusioned sangfroid ll 
as secondary varieties. The basic psychological character 
of altruistic suicide is thus lIenergy of passion or will," 
with II cal m feelings of duty,1I and II mystic enthusiasm II or 
IIpeaceful courage ll as secondary varieties. The basic char­
acter of anomic suicide is lIirritation and disgust,1I and 
II v iolent recriminations against life in general,' or II vio­
lent recriminations against one person ll (homicide-suicide). 
The "mixed types ll include: (1) the egoistic-anomic suicide 
characterized by a "mixture of agitation and apathy; II (2) 
the anomic-altruistic suicide is characterized by an "exas­
perated effervescence;1I while (3) the egoistic-altruistic 
suicide is marked by a IImelancholy tempered with moral fort­
itude II (5 : 29 3) • 
In addition, Durkheim concluded that the actual forms 
of death chosen by the suicide are not essential or reveal­
ing. My schema and his summary table suggest instead that 
the general characteristics and common cultural sources be 
•
 
--900-­
established before the idiosyncracies of each event are re­
viewed. 
Such are the general characteristics of suicide, 
that is, those which result directly from social 
causes. Individualized in particular cases, they 
are complicated by various nuances depending on 
the personal temperament of the victim and the spe­
cial circumstances in which he finds himself. But 
beneath the variety of combinations thus produced, 
these fundamental forms are always discoverable 
(S:294) • 
Finally, I prefer, as a summary passage, Durkheim's 
following description of the fundamental sources of unity 
and difference between modern egoisme and anomie. 
Suicides of both types suffer from •.• the disease 
of the infinite. But the disease does not assume 
the same form in both cases. In one, reflective in­
telligence is affected and immoderately overnour­
ished: in the other, emotion is over-excited and 
freed from all restraint. In one, thought, by dint 
of falling back upon itself, has no object left; 
in the other, passion, no longer recognizing bounds, 
has no goal left. The former is lost in the infinity 
of dreams, the second in the infinity of desires * 
(S:287) • 
In sum, when those who live by virtue of their own inner 
creative powers--artists, intellectuals, poets, and so on-­
develop their own subjectivity to an extreme by introject­
ing an "infinity of dreams," there results an egoisme so 
strong and destructive that it may result in suicide. When 
those who live through their managerial or manipulative 
powers, such as businessmen, technologists, industrialists, 
and so forth, develop their objective LaLionalizing powers 
to an extreme by releasing an "infinity of desires" upon 
the external world, there results an anomie so strong and 
destructive that it may result in suicide as well as eco­
cide. 
Moreover, Durkheim's resolution of unity and differ­
ence in terms of the second schema is significant for our 
present purposes because we do not usually connect such 
seemingly opposed states of mind as anomie and egoisme. 
Indeed, in everyday thought, what do states of extreme 
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energy and extreme paralysis of the will and imagination 
have in common? Durkheim's method and powerful insight al-
low us to answer confidently: everything. Extreme energy 
and lack of energy, extreme willfulness and the paralysis 
of the will, almost neurotic fixation or lack of imagina-
tion and the revelling in inner fantasies, hope in hope and 
the lack of hope or despair--these and other apparent oppo-
sites may actually be intimately related. Perhaps, in terms 
of different expressions of the same underlying tensions re-
sulting from peculiar warps of conscience and consciousness, 
endless willing and endless waiting, wishing for everything 
and wishing for nothing, the instantaneous and the endless 
are but two faces of the same gnostic coin, the base of 
modern symbolic "currency." Both anomie and egoisme are, 
thus, two faces of the modern "dis-eases of the infinite" 
which plague our lives. As Josef Pieper (1963) wiselv ob-
serves, idleness and the incapacity for leisure are twins 
in causing human despair. In such cultures where, for what-
ever reasons, "dis-eases of the infinite" rage, where hope 
becomes counterfeit, unfulfilled infinite expectations lie 
at the root of despair, angst, revolt and even suicide. 
It shall be our task to here explore more fully Durk-
heim's descriptions of these two faces of the modern soul. 
We shall then turn, finally, to explore the cultural 
and historical anchors of this modern "infinity sickness." 
We shall then attempt to discover whether these two forms, 
being analogous, are homologous as well. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT
ANOMIE AS THE ACTIVE EXTERNALIZATION OF ABSOLUTE
INDIVIDUALISM AND LEGITIMATE INSATIABILITY
As soon as men are inoculated with the precept that
their duty is to progress, it is harder to make them
accept resignation; so the number of malcontented and
disquieted is bound to increase. The entire morality
of progress and perfection is thus inseparable from
a certain amount of anomie (S:364) .
•.. Human conduct •.• loses itself in the void, the
emptiness of which is disguised and adorned with the
specious label of the infinite (ME:48).
Insatiable thirst can only be a source of suffering
(Soc:240) .
Preface. Marked by "exasperation and irritated weariness"
(S:357), anomie is generated by the active externalized em-
brace of absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatia-
bility. When culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and
perfection," daily represented as virtue, are externalized
and turned against the world, we see the "infinity of de-
sires" characteristic of the commercial and industrial world.
Noting that "poverty protects· against suicide," but that a-
nomie is chronic in the most progressive sectors of modern
economy and society, Durkheim criticized this "moral anar-
chy" as endemic to the modern world. From the perspective
of his "philosophy of human finitude," and health and vir-
tue as the "golden mean," Durkheirn insisted that "unlimited
need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), that "insatiable thirst
can only be a source of suffering" (Soc:240), and therefore,
such "insatiability is a sign of morbidity" (Soc:240).
Now, if anomie is culturally sanctioned, then what
are some of the inner historical connections between this
particular form of modern insatiability and the economic
••
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arena? Unfortunately, up to this point we have slighted an
important initial clue which Durkheim himself offered--name-
ly, his notion of the social schedule of wants. In tradition-
al societies, marked by a "segmental" social structure, and
the dominance of the "sacro-magical collective conscience,"
satisfaction of needs and desires is determined by ascribed
status. How, then, was this traditional schedule inverted?
How did economic rationality, utility and efficiency, high
productivity and consumption displace their traditional op-
posites? If insatiability cannot be adequately explained
in terms of the organic ego, and if altruisme and fatalisme
imply the historical uniqueness of our modern "infinity of
desires," how did men then become "inoculated with the pre-
cept that their duty is to progress n .and drive toward per-
fection? How did the "longing for the infinite" become a
"veritable mark of moral distinction?" How was this new "de-
mand" factor generated? And once started, how was it so mas-
sively sustained?
Clearly, such a dynamic ethos had to be morally sanc-
tioned. The prime modes of expression of this ethos were, of
course, democratic individualism and free market capitalism.
Durkheim himself recognized the importance of this egalitar-
ian ethos.
Abc've all, in democratic societies like ours, it is
essential to teach the child this wholesome self-con-
trol. For, since in some measure the conventional re-
straints are no longer effective--barriers which in
societies differently organized rigorously restrict
people's desires and ambitions--there remains only
moral discipline to provide the necessary regulatory
influence. Because, in principle, all vocations are
available to everybody, the drive to get ahead is
more readily stimulated and inflamed beyond all meas-
ure to the point of knowing almost no limits*{ME:49).
Durkheim's notions here echo Tocqueville's insights into
the levelling effect of democratic release of individualism,
which accompanied the modern "revolution of rising expecta-
tions," the "restlessness amidst prosperity."
More specifically, the. prime intellectual carriers of
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this new economic and social ethos were the Utilitarian mor-
alists. Indeed, Durkheim took special care to refute the u-
tilitarian doctrines sanctioning this new anomic ethos of
extreme individualist drives for "progress and perfection."
The multiple links between anomie, the stimulation of new
and insatiable desires, the ethos of market capitalism, the
doctrines of the Utilitarian moralists, and the tensions and
restlessness of modern man, especially in regard to the eco-
nomic arena of contemporary life, constitute a clear and sig-
nificant connection between Durkheim's theory of anomie and
Weber's work on the Protestant Ethos. Let us now explore some
of these themes and potential linkages.
A. The Psychological Characteristics of Anomie
Anomie results, Durkheim said, from " ••• man's activi-
ties lacking regulation and his consequent sufferings" (8 :258).
Lack of regulation and sUffering is, in turn, a consequence of
the active externalization of extreme individualism and an
"infinity of desires." It is this sense of the lack of norma-
tive limits which makes economic anomie "one of the springs
from which the annual contingent of suicides feeq,s."
Anomie, therefore, is a regular and specific factor
in our modern societies; one of the springs from which
the annual contingent feeds. 80 we have a new type to
distinguish from the others. It differs from them in
its dependence, not on the way in which individuals
are attached to society, but on how it regulates them.
Egoistic suicide results from man's no longer finding
a basis for existence in life; altruistic suicide, be-
cause this basis appears to man situated beyond life
itself. The third sort of suicide (anomie) ••• results
from man's activities lacking regulation and his conse-
quent sufferings. By virtue of its origin we shall as-
sign this last variety the name of anomic suicide (8:258).
In psychological terms, this active externalization of
absolutizing individualism and legitimized insatiable desires
begets a "state of exasperation and irritated weariness" (8:
357). The externalizing thrust of anomic desire is blocked
by some obstacle; frustration, anger, and ultimately, the col-
lapse of the perpetually taut will ensues.
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There is, finally, a third sort of persons who com-
mit suicide, contrasting with the first variety in
that their action is essentially passionate, and
with the second (altruisme) because this inspiring
passion which dominates their last moment is of
a wholly different nature. It is neither enthusiasm,
religious, moral or political faith, nor any of the
military virtues~ it is anger, and all the emotions
customarily associated with disappointment •••• Very
many expressed primarily irritation and exasperated
weariness •••• Sometimes they contain blasphemes, vio-
lent recriminations against life in general, sometimes
threats and accusations against a particular person
to whom the responsibility for the suicide's unhap-
piness is imputed (S:284).
Thus, the suicide due to frustration of anomic strivings
turned against the external world is marked by a collapse
of the will in isolation and exhaustion. In his war time
tract "Germany Above All," Durkheim spoke of the spiritual
state underlying Germany's drive for European hegemony as
as " ••• a morbid hypertrophy of the will, a kind of will-
mania" (1915:44). He further observed:
But it is not possible to subdue the world. lihen the
will refuses to recognize the limitations and restrict-
ions from which nothing human is exempt, it is inevi-
table that it should be carried away by excesses which
exhaust it, and that sooner or later it should dash it-
self against superior forces which will shatter it
(1915 : 46 -7) •
Since it is derived from active virtues, such a moral
deformation expresses itself actively and externally, in
sharp contrast, for instance, to the suicide due to the ex-
treme introspection known as egoisme.
The suicidal egoist never yields to such displays of
violence. He too at times regrets life, but mournfully.
It oppresses him, but does not irritate him by sharp
conflicts. It seems empty rather than painful to him.
It does not interest him, but it also does not impose
positive suffering upon him. His state of depression
does not even permit eX9itement. As for altruistic
suicides, they are quite different. Almost by defini-
tion, the altruistic suicide sacrifices himself and
not his fellows (S:285).
We find, Durkheim proposed, a third psychological form of
suicide, distinct from the others, in that it proceeds from
the love of power or progress gone mad.
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Lacking proportion between achievement and infinite
expectation, an individual beset by anomic desires, when fa-
ced with seemingly insurmountable obstacles, may find the
necessary vista of an infinite horizon interrupted by a door
of reality rudely slammed in his face.
Unregulated emotions are adjusted neither to one ano-
ther, nor to the conditions they are supposed to meet;
they must therefore conflict with one another most
painfully. Anomie, whether progressive or regressive,
by allowing requirement to exceed appropriate limits,
throws open the door to disillusionment and consequent-
ly to disappointment. A man abruptly cast down below
his accustomed status cannot avoid exasperation, at
feeling a situation escape him of which he thought him-
self master, and his exasperation naturally revolts a-
gainst the cause, whether real or imaginary, to which
he attributes his ruin. If he recognizes himself as to
blame for the catastrophe, he takes it out on himself;
otherwise, on someone else ••••
It is precisely the same whenever •.• a person is im-
pelled in the reverse direction, constantly to surpass
himself, but without rule or moderation. Sometimes he
misses the goal he thought he could reach, but which
was really beyond his powers; his is the suicide of
the man misunderstood, very common in days when no re-
cognized social classification is left. Sometimes, aft-
er having temporarily succeeded in satisfying all his
desires and craving for change, he suddenly dashes a-
gainst an invincible obstacle, and impatiently renoun-
ces an existence henceforth too restrictive for him.
This is the case of Werther, the turbulent heart he
calls himself, enamored of infinitv, killing himself
from disappointed love (5:285-6).
The same anomic ambitions to be freed from all mundane
restraints, to instantaneously consummate one's infinite
dreams or desires, may lead to varying phenomenological man-
ifestations. The " ••• vain excitement of the hopeless pur-
suit" of an infinitely receding goal leads to a sort of "mel-
ancholyexhaustion."
There are yet others who, having no complaint to make of
men or circumstances, automatically weary of a palpa-
bly hopeless pursuit, which only irritates rather than
appeases their desires. They then turn against life in
general and accuse it of having deceived them. But the
vain excitement to which they are prey leaves in its
wake a sort of exhaustion which prevents their disap-
pointed passions from displaying themselves with a
••
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violence equal to that of the preceding cases. They
are wearied, at the end of a long course, and thus
become incapable of energetic reaction. The person
lapses into a sort of melancholy resembling somewhat
that of the intellectual egoist but without its lang-
uorous charm. The dominating note is more or less dis-
gust with life. This state of soul was already obser-
ved by Seneca: "The evil which assails us ••. is not
in the localities we inhabit but in ourselves. How
many invoke death when, after having tired of every
sort of change, they find themselves reverting to the
same sensations, unable to discover any new experience."
In our own day one of the types which perhaps best in-
carnates this sort of spirit is Chateaubriand's Rene.
While Raphael is a creature of meditation who finds
his ruin within himself, Rene is the insatiate type
"Is it my fault if I find everywhere limits, if every-
thing once experienced has no value for me" (S:286-7)?
Seneca's ancient wisdom could not more perfectly express the
ironic point of Durkheim's second schema, for truly "the evil
which assails us is not in the localities which we inhabit,
but in ourselves." For anomic and egoismic aspirations are
culturally sanctioned. Tensions deriving from such values
are not simply imposed mechanically by the external world,
as if it were some natural necessity that alienates man
from creation. Rather, ~ anomie and alienation result
from extreme duties which we impose on ourselves.
As we discovered earlier, anomic and egoismic striv-
ings share many similarities, and in the preceding passage,
Durkheim shaded over into common points of phenomenological
convergence with egoisme. Chateaubriand's writings, some of
the earliest French Romantic literature, contain both types,
that is, Raphael " ....~ creature (egoist) of meditation who
finds his ruin within himself" is complemented by the anomic
Rene who externalizes his insatiabiltiy. In both cases,
alienation is self-generated. It is the same with one of the
leading heroes of contemporary fiction--namely, Herman
Hesse's Harry Hillier in Steppenwolf. And Durkheim himself
cited the following "mixed" possibility.
If anomie is less intense, however, it may permit
egoisme to produce certain characteristic effects.
The obstacle, against which the victim of insatia-
ble desires dashes may cause himself to fall back
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upon himself and seek an outlet for his disappoint-
ed passions in an inner life. Finding there nothing
to which he can attach himself, however, the melan-
choly inspired by this thought can only drive him
to new self-escape, thus increasing his uneasiness
and discontent. Thus are produced mixed suicides,
where depression alternates with agitation, dream
with action, transports of desires with reflective
sadness (5:288).
Since we have already cited other illuminating passa-
ges, and shall soon cite more in this regard, I trust we
have begun to established the psychological character of
the suicidal tensions resulting from anomic strivings. I
propose that in Suicide Durkheim, over and above his path-
breaking use of statistical inference, provided us with
one of the most profound phenomenological portraits of the
two halves of the modern soul. Indeed, anomie and egoisme
should be seen as Weberian "ideal types" of the two seeming-
ly heroic faces of modern man: extreme agitation and ex-
treme depression, inner dream and exterior action, desire
and sadness, an "infinity of dreams and desires." As Par-
sons would say, the problem here lies with the internaliza-
tion of norms so extreme that they may end up driving us to
despair and self-destruction because we cannot live up to
the perfectionistic standards of "visible saints." The prob-
lem here is with the inner nature of these tension inducing
motivations, or as the phenomenologists would say, with the
nature and unanticipated consequences of our intentions.
Anomie and egoisme are, therefore, in phenomenological terms,
the ironic outcomes of extreme tensions induced by the pe-
culiar structures of modern conscience and consciousness.
For just as Weber spoke of the "unprecedented inner lonli-
ness of the individual" in the modern world, so too did Durk-
heim describe the phenomenological consequences of the "iron
cage" in which we unwittingly imprison ourselves.
••
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The Prime Modern SocioCultural Sites of Anomic Desires
In one sphere of social life--trade and industry--
anomie is actually in a chronic state (S:254).
•
•
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Contrary to common presumptions, suicidal tensions
and outward objective suffering are not directly related,
according to Durkheim.Rather, in contrast to the promise
of the Utilitarians and other harbingers of modern ration-
alistic progress, Durkheim argued that "Poverty protects
against suicide." Indeed, the higher, more successful clas-
ses, are also those most susceptible to anomic strivings,
to a culturally enjoined "infinity of desires." "Indust-
rial and commercial functions are really among the occupa-
tions which furnish the greater number of suicides" (S:257).
Against those who argued that we choose rationally to pro-
gress in order to increase our standard of living (see also
The Division of Labor), and thus, become happier, Durkheim
introduced what may appear, at first, to be a cruel para-
dox.
we have shown that those who suffer most are not
those who kill themselves most. Rather, it is too
great comfort which turns a man against himself. Life
is most easily renounced at the time and among the
classes where it is least harsh (S:298).
Thus, anomie affects those relatively well-placed persons
who " ••• having no (objective) complaint to make of men or
circumstances," weary of chasing an infinitely elusive goal.
"Anomie occurs in large numbers only at special points, where
industrial and commercial activity are very great" (S:358).
In short, the "moral anarchy" of anomie is chronic in the
more progressive sectors of the modern world.
Now, contrary to the Utilitarians' and other'Enlight-
ened" doctrines of rationalistic progress, those who are
less progressive are also those apparently least affected
by these self-destructive currents of collective sadness,
according to Durkheim's turn-of-the-century statistics. Para-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--910--
doxically, poverty protects against anomie and suicide be-
cause it provides an objective restraint against potentially
limitless ambitions.
Poverty protects against suicide because it is a re-
straint in itself. No matter how one acts, desires
have to depend upon resources to some extent; actual
possessions are partly the criterion of those aspired
to. So the less one has the less he is tempted to ex-
tend the range of his needs indefinitely. Lack of powe~
compelling moderation, accustoms men to it, while noth-
ing excites envy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on
the other hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us in-
to believing that we depend on ourselves only. Reducing
the resistance we encounter from objects, it suggests
the possibility of unlimited success against them. The
less limited one feels, the more intolerable all limrta-
tion appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so
many religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value
of poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching
self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline,
it prepares us to accept collective discipline with e-
quanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may
always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very
source of immorality. This is, of course, no reason why
humanity should not improve its material condition. But
though the moral danger involved in every growth of pros-
perity is not irremediable, it should not be forgotten *
(S:254) •
If anomie and egoisme are but two faces of the same underly-
ing modern pathology, then Suicide can be viewed as Durk-
heim's "cautionary tale" or even "epistle" to the modern
world. Our highest aspirations, our culturally mandated
drives for "progress and perfection," our daily "longing for
the infinite"--in short, our virtues are also the paradoxi-
cal source of our vices, of our collective unhappiness. Durk-
heim as a positivist moralist invoked the ancient wisdom of
many religious and cultural tradition when he suggested that
poverty and self-denial have virtue in themselves, for they
caution the individual to remember his small status as only
a limited point in creation, only a part of the whole. Would
Durkheim have blinked at the suggestion, however, that it
was a very rigoristic kind of sustained self-denial which
landed us in this crisis in the first place?
The solution to the modern chronic "moral anarchy" of
the "infinity of desires" is, certainly, not to make life
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easier, to blindly accelerate economic and industrial "pro-
gress," not to promise, for the millionth time, affluence
for all forever. Rather, we ought to turn toward a new type
of balanced goal which may be humanly satisfying. Instead
of appeasing some modern deus absconditus, instead of throw-
ing ourselves upon some invisible "pyramids of sacrifice"
(Peter Berger, 1974), we should strive to regain a certain
necessary proportion and harmony in our daily lives •
••• Just as suicide does not proceed from man's dif-
ficulties in maintaining his existence, so the means
of arresting its progress is not to make the struggle
less difficult and life easier. If more suicides oc-
cur today, this is not because, to maintain ourselves,
we have to make more painful efforts, nor that our le-
gitimate needs are less satisfied, but because we no
longer know the limits of legitimate needs nor per-
ceive the direction of our efforts. Competition is be-
coming keener every day~ecause the greater ease of
communication sets a constantly increasing number of
competitors at loggerheads •••• The maladjustment from
which we suffer does not exist because the objective
causes of suffering have increased in number or inten-
sity; it bears witness not to greater economic pover-
ty, but to an alarming poverty of morality (5:386).
Is it not ironic, then, that the once-ascetic Protestant
Ethos should metamorphose, especially after the Depression
in America and the Keynesian revolution, into its opposite
--a positive ethos of high consumption, reenforcing
an "infinity of desires?" Indeed, was it not most unusual,
in terms of traditional religious attitudes toward wealth
and the moral virtue of poverty, that those who were among
the first to systematically preach the gospel of the modern
expanding economy, the economic doctrine of material pro-
gress, were themselves Scottish Presbyterian Calvinists?
I refer, of course, to the Scottish Moralists such as
Hutcheson, Ferguson, Smith, and so on, who, to further
compound the irony, preached this new seemingly anti-asce-
tic gospel of economic progress for what, I believe after
Weber, were primarily moral, ascetic, disciplinary reasons.
What could be more outwardly mystifying than the ascetic
Bentham legislating a morality based on pleasure and pain
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for all mankind? Indeed, with the revolutionary emergence
of international market capitalism in the nineteenth cen-
tury, the universalistic, homogenizing, ~lf-regulatingmar-
ket mechanism became the prime means of moral discipline
of the self, and mass discipline for society, replacing
the older forms of social control such as the community
and church.
Alas, economic progress has not led to the millenium,
but to ecocide and suicide! The Utilitarians argued that
free markets make free men; is it not ironic, then, that
the instrument of liberation of the rising middle classes
should become the impersonal instrument of mass discipline
of the modern age, so that we are all now imprisoned in this
"ir6n cage?" Clearly, after the "twin revolutions"--the In-
dustrial and the French--Durkheim's statistics showed that
the suicide rate increased two, three, even four times with-
in the nineteenth century. Observing that "Suicide is most
widespread everywhere in the most cultivated regions" (S:
367), Durkheim noted that "It (suicide) has been called
the ransom money of civilization. Certainly, it is general
in Europe and more pronounced the higher the culture of the
European nations" (S:367). But Durkheim also noted that
" ••. suicide had developed only slightly until the eight-
eenth century" (S:368). ~ihat is the meaning of this preci-
pitous rise in collective sadness? As a "laic" moral re-
former himself, Durkheim insisted that "progress (itself)
was not the cause of so ciuch bloodshed"(S:368). Instead of
blaming the "tremendous aggravation during the nineteenth
century" (S:367), and the "moral pathology" this represents
in terms of the rationalistic idea of progress, Durkheim
rhetoricized: "Is it not probable, then, that the course of
our civilization and that of suicide do not logically in-
volve one another, and that suicide may accordingly be check-
ed without stopping progress simultaneously" (S:368)?
Thus, we may believe that this aggravation springs
not from the intrinsic nature of progress but from
the special conditions under which it occurs in our day
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and nothing assures us that these conditions are norm-
al. For we must not be dazzled by the brilliant devel-
opments of sciences, the arts and industry of which we
are the witnesses; this development is altogether cer-
tainly taking place in the midst of a morbid efferves-
cence, the grievous repurcussions of which each one of
us feels. It is, then, very possible and even probable
that the rising tide of suicide originates in a patho-
logical state just now accompanying the march of civi-
lization without being its necessary condition. The
rapidity of the growth of suicides really permits no
other hypothesis; in less than fifty years, they have
tripled, quadrupled, even quintupled depending on the
country (5:368).
Perhaps a viable balance could be reached; indeed, is this
not what all reasonable men hope for today? But if we are
truly to reach a viable balance, must we not also begin to
recognize, as Durkheim himself realized, that " ... the en-
tire morality of progress and perfection is inseparable
from a certain amount of anomie"?
For our present purposes, it is intriguing to note
that as early as The Division of Labor, when Durkheim began
to counter the doctrine of the economic progressives with
his own philosophy of "human finitude" and health as the
"golden mean," he observed, in a memorable passage, that
the " .•• the true suicide, the sad suicide, is in an endem-
ic state with civilized peoples."
He is even distributed geographically like civiliza-
tion. On the charts of suicide, there is seen a dark
spot over all the central region of Europe between
forty-seven and fifty-seven degrees latitude, and
twenty and forty degrees longitude. That space is
the favorite place for suicide; according to Morsel-
Ii's expression, it is the suicidogenous zone of Eu-
rope. There are also "found the countries where scien-
tific, artistic, economic activities are carried to
their maximum: Germany and France. On the contrary,
Spain, Portugal, Russia, the Slav peoples of the
south are relatively immune. Italy, born only yester-
day, is still somewhat safe, but its immunity is lost
as it advances. England alone is an exception ••••
Everywhere suicide rages more fiercely in the cities
than in the country. Civilization is concentrated in
the great cities, suicide likewise. It has even been
viewed sometimes as a contagious disease which has as
its sources of irradiation the capitals and important
cities, and which, from there, spreads over the rest
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--914--
of the country. The proofs could be mUltiplied. The
classes of the population furnish a quota proportion-
ate to their degree of civilization. Everywhere the
liberal professions are the hardest hit, and agri-
culture the least. It is the same with the sexes
(DL: 247) .
As a "moral statistician," Durkheim seized upon this mass-
ive and striking evidence of a paradoxical inversion of our
highest aspirations, for instead of leading to utopia, the
modern "moral milieu" turns out to be pathological.
One observes it everywhere .... Agriculture is less
affected than industry, but the quota it furnishes
to suicide is always increasing. Thus, we are before
a phenomenon which is linked not to some local and
particular circumstances, but to a general state of
the social milieu. This state is diversely refracted
by special milieu (eg. provinces, occupations, reli-
gious confessions, etc.). That is why its action can-
not be felt everywhere with the same intensity, but
its nature does not change on that account ..•. What
the mounting tide of voluntary death proves .•. (is)
that the general happiness of society is decreas-
ing.••• What statistician would hesitate to see in
the progress of general mortality in the midst of a
determined society a sure symptom of the weakening
of public health (DL:249)?
Thus, the general unhappiness accompanying rational-
istic economic progress, Durkheim concluded, is due to the
weakening of the several moral milieu which have tradition-
ally nourished European society (see especially part II,
Book Two of this dissertation). And these main currents of
anomie and egoisme are "diversely refracted by special mil-
ieu." The special milieu most susceptible to the pleasure
and pain of an "infinity of dreams and desires" are the
more progressive sectors of modern society. Indeed, in gen-
eral, the higher the educational level, per capita income,
Protestant, intellectual or artistic, urbanized, profess-
ional, and so on, the greater the tendency toward inclusion
in the "suicidogenous zone" of Europe where the "suicido-
genetic currents" of anomie and egoisme flow deepest and
strongest.
••
•
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Insatiabi1itv: Modern Man's Dis-ease of the Infinite
-----_..........= -- - ---- - -- ---.......;.,..:....
The more one has, the more one wants, since satis-
factions received only stimulate, instead of filling
needs (5:248).
One does not advance when one walks toward no goal--
or what is the same--when his goal is infinity (5:248).
To pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable
is to condemn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappi-
nes s (5 : 24 8) •
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Objectively measured in terms of "moral statistics,"
the "moral anarchy" chronic in the more progressive sectors
of the modern world signifies that anomic passions or insa-
tiable expectations reign as legitimate in modern economies
and societies. Indeed, from the Industrial Revolution on,
our modern, constantly expanding economies depend upon the
presumption that wants in the form of consumer demand will
continue to expand to absorb the constantly expanding tech-
nological productivity. Constantly expanding productive ca-
pacity requires greater markets; greater markets, in turn,
demand greater mass consumption, and so on and so forth,
in a self-accelerating feedback cycle. Thus, a kind of in-
satiability is built into ~ institutional apparatus of
the modern world. And, as we are discovering to our chagrin,
ecocide is one result, as was suicide when Durkheim wrote.
Perhaps the true lesson of the world's interdependence
and finiteness, coupled with man's own finiteness, does not
really come home to us unless we first begin to recognize
that infiniteness is itself a moral virtue in the modern
world! In contrast to the utopian promises held out to us,
especially by the Utilitarian moralists and political econo-
mists--namely, a golden land of high productivity and con-
sumption, a democracy of small entrepeneurs equitably ,ex-
changing goods through a self-regulating market mechanism
where reward was to be directly proportional to effort and
thus, to virtue, the notion that free markets make free men,
and so forth--it seems a cruel lesson that suicide and eco-
cide should be the unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome.
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But, as Durkheim counseled us, it is a lesson we must learn.
Again and again, Durkheim sounded the same moral re-
frain: "One does not advance when one walks toward no goal,
or what is the same, when his goal is infinity" (5:248).
One might not expect a seemingly hard-line positivist like
Durkheim to be concerned with the ravages of these "marches
to infinity." Nonetheless, Durkheim should be given full
credit for deep insight into the phenomenology of these ex-
treme socioculturally generated "dis-eases of the infinite."
Since the distance between us and it is always the
same, whatever road we take, we might as well have
made the motions without progress from the spot. Even
our glances behind and our feelings of pride at the
distance covered can cause only deceptive satisfact-
ion, since the remaining distance is not proportiona-
tely reduced. To pursue a goal which is by definition
unattainable is to condemn oneself to a state of per-
petual unhappiness (5:248).
Pinning our age in one fundamentally revealing epigram, Durk-
heim continued exploring the modern "dis-ease of the infin-
ite," as expressed in the progressive economic arena of Eu-
rope.
The more one has the more one wants, since satisfact-
ions---receIVed c;mly stI'in\ila~instead of filling needs.
Shall such act10n be considered agreeable? First, only
on condition of blindness to its uselessness. Second-
ly, for this pleasure to be felt and to temper and
half-veil the accompanying painful unrest, such unend-
ing motion must at least always be easy and unhampered.
If it is interfered with only restlessness is left,
with the lack of ease which it entails. But it would
be a miracle if no insurmountable obstacle were ever
encountered. Our thread of life on these conditions
is pretty thin, breakable at any instant * (5:248).
Is it not curious that although such an "infinity of
desires" must surely be actively embraced, it serves no
reasonable, even useful purpose? Where a substantively ir-
rational "dis-ease of the infinite" enjoys moral subsidy,
and a unique kind of "moral anarchy" ensues, then hope be-
comes counterfeit, an emergency virtue, invoked to rescue
us precisely when all reason for hope is gone (see Lynch,
1966). Indeed, when both the world and our own imaginations
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seem to conspire to deprive us of some reasonable advance
toward our goals, then we are forced to fall back upon the
plaintive homilies of "hope in hope," of the strange cer-
tainty that comes "beyond belief. II
Of course, man may hope, contrary to all reason,
and hope has its pleasures even when unreasonable.
It may sustain him for a time, but it cannot sur-
vive the repeated disappointments of experience
indefinitely. What more can the future offer him
than the past, since he can never reach a tenable
condition nor even approach the glimpsed ideal (5:248)?
Here hope is cruelly, almost obscenely satirized, for at
the very time we need it most, this virtue is transformed,
as if by some powerful inner alchemy, into its opposite.
The extremity of our values turns hope into hopelessness,
and delivers us, not into utopia,but into the "slough of
despond and despair." Did not Durkheim himself suggest that
the features of our immorality are also the prime features
of our morality?
••• There is nothing surprising in the alikeness we
observe in the features of morals and of immorality.
Indeed, we know that they are facts of the same na-
ture and that they throw light one on the other. Im-
morality is not the opposite of morality any other
than sickness is the opposite of health, both being
forms of one and the same state--two forms of the
moral life, two forms of physical life (PECM:119).
Thus, if our values become so absolutized that we destroy
ourselves and our world, whom have we to blame? If hope is
not for the humanly possible, for the humanly desirable,
if our spirits continue to expire on "pyramids of sacrifice,"
then whom have we to blame? If our perpetual restlessness
without purpose leads to acedia, then whom have we to
blame? If we continue to strive for an elusive moral per-
fectionism meant to appease some deus absconditus, as Weber
should have spoken of Benjamin Franklin's scheme for moral
perfection in his Autobiography, must we not be willing to
pay the price? How can we any longer fail to recognize the
ironic relation between our prime constitutive values, and
our own peculiar dis-eases? In short, if we cannot imagine
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the real, if we persist in distorting analogical relations
between all levels of reality by pursuing destructive val-
ues under the specious aegis of "longing for the infinite,"
if we continue to absolutize fragments of human experience,
and if we forget the essential purposefulness of existence,
then hope cannot play its central role in human affairs.
Unfulfilled expectations lie at the heart of modern despair.
There is no more potent recipe for the despair of
modern suicide than the feeling of extreme isolation, of
being abandoned and absolutely alone, coupled with the bur-
den of being faced with an impossible, unending, Sisyphean
task. Although Durkheim the "laicized" Jew, the ascetic mo-
ral philosopher, seemed himself largely immune to the mo-
dern dis-eases of the infinite (eg. see his treatment of
the Jews in Suicide, also see part I of Book Two of this
dissertation), another pioneer sociologist learned through
personal tragedy what it meant to live in the modern "iron
cage" of our own making--I mean Max ltJeber. Weber explored,
both personally and historically, the phenomenological pri-
son of conscience in which one's own consciousness colla-
borates with one's cultural inheritance to seal all exits,
and tighten inexorably certain excruciating "double binds."
Weber, who sat for hours on end as if paralyzed, learned,
in his worst moments of "scientific and moral acedia" (see
Zetterberg, 1967), what it meant to grapple with the "inner
demons which hold the very fibers of our lives." Weber knew
what it meant, because of the conflicting mandates of his
Pauline-Lutheran and Calvinist heritages, to attempt to
both "meet the demands of the day" and the demands of "ut-
most inwardness" (Marianne lieber, 1975: Mitzman, 1971).
Indeed, Mitzman rightly speculates that Weber's own Prome-
thean labors can be interpreted as a self-imposed ascetic
therapeutic by which he began to rescue himself from the
"iron cage" unwittingly bequeathed by his forebearers.
Now, the moral restlessness which Durkheim's statis-
tics documented, and which Weber tragically experienced
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and historically anatomized in The Protestant Ethic as a
way to exorcise his own inner demons, is very similar to
that "restlessness amidst prosperity" of which Tocqueville
often spoke in his reflections on America (see especially
Nisbet, 1966,1974). This acedia was a general condition
of the modern age, which many early sociological thinkers
tried to come to terms with in one way or another. Durkheim
and Weber, from different sides, both came to see this "dis-
ease of the infinite" as culturally sanctioned, and further,
as substantively irrational. "Durkheim saw the unlimited de-
sires for worldly goods as a prominent instance of modern
social pathology" (LaCapra, 1972:83). This pervasive sense
of restlessness, this lack of fit between our ever-rising
levels of expectations and actual rewards, leads us to per-
ceive such anomic strivings, since they are not substantive-
ly rational, as supported by some tacit yet powerfully sanc-
tioned cultural commitments. Perhaps what has happened here,
as Weber saw in a slightly different connection, is that
the original moral sanction remains strong, even though it
has fundamentally shifted from its original sphere of in-
tended application. Such a "displacement of goals" is a com-
mon sociocultural process, one that affects institutions
and personality structures as well as styles of life. In-
deed, this is precisely the thesis which I have embraced
here, with Weber's inspiration, to help explain Durkheim's
notion of anomie and egoisme as a curious type of "moral
anarchy" which is, paradoxically, the outcome of an extreme
type of moral discipline. ! find Durkheim's notion of an
"infinity of dreams and desires" historically and cultural-
!l inexplicable without reference to Weber's insights into
the powerful and unprecedented consequences of Protestant
ascetics' and mystics' embrace of infinite tasks within
the world. Thus, our chronic modern "diseases of the infin-
ite," our endemic struggle with our selves, our lack of
harmony with society, with the past, and with the natural
world, is deeply embedded, not so much in our generic organic
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ego, as in our peculiar modern cultural traditions. For
the individual cannot be, as Durkheim first supposed, ac-
curately described as an insatiable ego driven by propor-
tionless passions. Rather, at most, the individual, by vir-
tue of his inter-generational passage, is simply an histor-
cial amnesiac.
Many more passages have been, and will be, cited to
establish beyond any reasonable doubt that Durkheim's cen-
tral concern with anomie was always with insatiable desires
externalized in terms of economic processes. How can there
be any question that anomie refers primarily not to Parson-
ian and Mertonian "normlessness," whatever that means pre-
cisely, but to infinite n0rmative expectations? Again and
again, Durkheim insisted that these modern desires fueling
economic progress were only half-constituted needs, for a
"complete need comprises two terms: a tension of the will
and a certain object" (DL:255). To Durkheim, "unlimited
need contradicts itself" (Soc:239), "insatiability is a sign
sign of morbidity" (Soc:240), and finally, "inextinguish-
able thirst is constantly renewed torture" (S:247).
D. Durkheim's Philosophy of Human Finitude: Health and
Virtue as Coming From a "Golden Mean"
All excess is bad as well as all insufficiency (DL:340).
Health consists in a mean activity (DL:237).
It is not without reason that human experience sees
the condition of happiness in the "golden mean" (DL:237).
Dominick LaCapra rightly observes that " ••• the ele-
mentary postulate of Durkheim's philosophy was the finite
nature of all life" (1972:243). Indeed, the notion of virtue
(arete) as the "golden mean" stems largely from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics. There Aristotle defined the essence of
his moral theory in these terms: "Evil belongs to the inde-
terminate, good to the determinate.... Excess and deficiency4,
characterize vice, while the mean characterizes virtue (eg.
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1962:43). LaCapra saw this crucial rootedness of Durkheim's
notion of anomie and his philosophy of "human finitude" in
classical Greek moral philosophy.
For Durkheim, as for Aristotle, a vice was ••• an
excessive development of a virtue. In fact, the con-
cept of anomie in its primary meaning of an absence
of a sense of legitimate limits recalls the notion
of hybris. And implicit in Suicide and its typology
was an optimal point of intersection of Durkheim's
variables which corresponded to the Greek idea of a
golden mean. Nowhere else was Durkheim's indebtedness
to the classical tradition of Western philosophy more
telling. And nowhere else was the vision of his own
France--with its insistence on mesure--as the guard-
ian of what was valid in this tradition more apposite.
In the normal society, the golden mean--incarnated in
the conscience co11ective--wou1d restrict hybris to
the exceptional individual or the extraordinary feat
(1972:158).
For the normal person in the normally evolving socie-
ty, the "golden mean" implies that there is a satisfying
degree of "goodness of fit" between effort and reward, be-
tween level of aspiration and level of achievement. The mu-
tual proportion between goals and means is thus substantive-
ly rational. Now, as we discovered earlier (see Part I of
this Book), Durkheim believed that a creative "marginal
leaven of anomie," as LaCapra nicely puts it, was necessary
for progressive moral evolution. Indeed, this isthe meaning
of his somewhat puzzling acknowledgement that the "entire
morality of progress and perfection is inseparable from a-
nomie." In the section on the "forced division of labor"
in his first great book, for instance, Durkheim reflected:
It will be said that it is not always sufficient to
make men content, that there are some men whose de-
sires go beyond their faculties. This is true, but
these are exceptional and ••• morbid cases. Normally,
man finds happiness in realizing his nature; his needs
are in relation to his ~eans (DL:376).
And earlier in the same book, Durkheim observed:
There are, to be sure, individuals whose need for the
new attains exceptional intensity. Nothing existent
satisfies them, they thirst for the impossible. They
would like to put in the place of imposed reality ano-
ther. But these incorrigible grumblers are unhealthy,
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and their pathological character only confirms what
we have just said.... We must not forget that this
need is intrinsically indeterminate. It attaches us
to nothing precise, since it is a need of something
which does not exist. It is then only half-consti-
tuted, for a complete need comprises two terms: a
tension of the will, and a certain object. As the
object is not given without, it can have no other
reality than that which imagination lends it (DL:254-5).
And, in terms that apply equally well to egoisme as to
anomie, Durkheim continued:
This process is half-representational. It consists
more in combinations of images, in a sort of intimate
poetry, than in an effective movement of the will.
It does not take us out of ourselves; it is scarcely
more than an internal agitation seeking a way out not
yet found. We dream of new sensations, but it is a
bodyless desire floating about. Consequently, even
where it is most energetic, it cannot have the force
of firm and defined needs •.. directing the will
always in the same direction and by well-beaten paths
(DL: 255) •
By definition, a "marginal leaven of anomie" is local-
ized and contained, for it is abnormal, pathological, in a
word, "profane." .On the other hand, by definition, health
is based upon balance among the many competing claims to
human virtue. Health, the baseline of all comparisons of
"insatiable morbidity" and pathological excess, is anchored
in the "golden mean."
Health consists in a mean activity. It implies •.•
a harmonious development of all functions, and func-
tions can develop harmoniously only by virtue of mo-
derating one another, by being mutually contained
within limits beyond which sickness begins and pleas-
ure ceases (DL:237).
Conversely:
••• An inability to restrict one's self within deter-
minate limits is a sign of disease--with respect to
all forms of human conduct and, even more generally,
for all kinds of biological behavior. With a certain
amount of nourishment a normal man is no longer hun-
gry: it is the bulimiac who cannot be satisfied (ME:38).
Now, Durkheim's vision of all aspects of the modern
world as dominated by the omnipresence of extremes is re-
flected negatively in cases as widely divergent as war-time
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Germany's "will mania" (see Germany Above All, 1915), and
even in the intricacies of philosophical and sociological
method. In his Rules, for example, Durkheim went so far as
to equate the anomie of the modern will and imagination with
Bacon's notion of "idols of the mind."
••• (these) ideas are those notiones vulgares or
~renotiones which he points out to be the basic
1deas of all sciences, where they take the place
of facts. These idola, which are illusions that
distort the real aspect of things, are neverthe-
less mistaken for the things themselves. There-
fore, the mind, encountering no resistance in this
imaginary world and conscious of no restraint,
gives itself up to boundless ambitions and comes
to believe in~e-possibilityof reconstrUcting
tne world by vIrtue of its own-resources exclusive-
lY and at the whim of its desires*(R:17).
While Descartes was not an idealist, surely this founder of
Durkheim's own cultural tradition cannot be absolved from a
degree of complicity in this fundamental enshrinment of mo-
dern subjectivity. For almost all the pioneers of the modern
world--Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Leibnitz,
Locke, among others--each in his own way, ·institutionalized
subjectivity as the foundation of legitimate moral and in-
tellectual authority. Had any great Western philosopher be-
fore Descartes, for example (and herein we glimpse the e-
pochal nature of his achievement), dared to doubt all re-
ceived truth and, in beginning de novo, attempted to ground
the existence of reality and even of God Himself in his
own indubitable "inner certitude"?
By contrast, the objectivism of Durkheim's own socio-
logical methodology was grounded precisely in his insistence
on the objective nature of "social facts, "and on the limit-
ations of unrestrained subjectivity. Whatever its flaws, in
The Rules Durkheim sought to give both a legitimate object
and defined limit to sociological investigation, a charter
that has remained valid, in its general outlines, to this
very day. Against the extreme nominalism of the Utilitarian's
moral and mental calculus of efficiency, Durkheim argued
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for a rather different notion of conscience and conscious-
ness.
Our method, however, has the advantage of regulating
action at the same time as thought. If the social val-
ues are not subjects of observation but can and must
be determined by a sort of mental calculus, no limit,
so to speak, can be set for the free inventions of
the imagination in search of the best. For how can
one assiqn perfection a limit? It escapes all limita-
tion, bv definition. The goal of humanity recedes
into infinity, discouraging some by its very remote-
ness, and arousing others who, in order to draw a lit-
tle nearer to it, quicken the pace and plunge into re-
volutions. This practical dilemma may be escaped if
the desirable is defined in the same way as is health
and normality, and if health is something that is de-
fined as inherent in things. For then the object of
our efforts is both given and defined at the same time.
It is no longer a matter of pursuing desperately an ob-
jective that retreats as one advances, but of working
with steady perserverance to maintain the normal state,
of reestablishing it if it is threatened, and of redis-
covering its conditions if they have changed. The duty
of the statesman is no longer to push society toward
an ideal that seems attractive to him, but his role is
that of the physician: he prevents the outbreak of ill-
nesses by good hygiene, and he seeks to cure them when
they have appeared (R:75).
Now, as we discovered in Book One, in Moral Education
Durkheim most fUlly spelled out his philosophy of "human
finitude" in terms of the nature of society as moral disci-
pline. Since we have explored many of these passages at
great length earlier, now we merely recall their signifi-
cance. There, Durkheim observed that energy, whether it be
physical, social or cultural, naturally tends to indefini-
tely expand its radius of movement. In the first schema of
suicide, social norms became the containers, as it were, of
the vital but always potentially explosive energies and pas-
sions of the pre-socialized organic ego. In the second
schema, however, cultural norms themselves become the prime
sources of this energy. If legitimized, and if previous
traditional constraints fade, then new socioculturally sanc-
tioned desires may explode massively and rapidly. And if
expectations soar far beyond what is possible, then des-
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truction may result. with the coming of market capitalism,
in particular, this is precisely what happened. For the in-
ternationalization of the trading market, and the corres-
ponding expansion of the range of desires and culturally
sanctioned expectations, meant that the radius of energies
potentially destructive of self, society, and world was
chronically released from legitimate control. In Moral Ed-
ucation, for example, Durkheim argued:
A need, a desire, freed from all restraint, and all
rules, no longer geared to some determinate object-
ive, and, through this same connection, limited and
contained, can be nothing but a source of constant
anguish for the person experiencing it. What grati-
ficatio~ indeed, can such desires yield, since by
definition, it is incapable of being satisfied? An
insatiable thirst cannot be slaked. If certain act-
ions are to give us pleasure, we must feel that they
serve some purpose, that is to say, bring us progres-
sively closer to the goal we seek (ME:39-40).
Man can only hope to be happy when there is a mutual
and meaningful proportion between means and ends; when sub-
stantive, instead of formal and functional, rationality
prevails. Freedom and hope, as with so much else in the mo-
dern world, suffer from being conceived of primarily in neg-
ative terms.
In order to have a full sense of self-realization,
man, far from needing to see limitless horizons un-
ravelling before him, in reality finds nothing as
unhappy as the indeterminate reach of such a pros-
pect. Far from needing to feel that he confronts a
career without any definite terminus, he can only
be happy when involved in definite and specific
tasks. This limitation by no means implies, however,
that man must arrive at some fixed position. where
ultimately he finds tranquility. In intermittent
stages one can pass from one special task to others
equally specific, without drowning in the dissolv-
ing sense of limitlessness. The important thing is
that behavior have a clear-cut objective, which may
be grasped and which limits and determines it (ME:40).
Indeed, LaCapra tells us that Durkheim's philosophy of
health and virtue as the "golden mean" appeared in .one of
his earliest (1887) publications:
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How I prefer the words of the old sages who recommend
before all else the full and tranquil possession of
oneself. No doubt, the spirit as it develops needs to
have before it vaster horizons; but for all that it
does not change its nature and remains finite (LaCapra:
1972:170).
Further, LaCapra rightly remarks:
Durkheim's concept of achievement cannot be identi-
fied with a generalized performance principle in so-
ciety. Limitless competitive striving was for him a
conspicuous case of anomie. Achievement in Durkheim's
normal society had the very classical meaning of ful-
filling one's nature in ways complementary to the
self-fulfillment of others. Limitless striving would
be restricted to a marginal aspect of the average per-
sonality, and to marginal groups of exceptional indi-
viduals (1972:140).
Now, the key to Durkheim's philosophy of "human fini-
tude," that "all excess is bad as well as all insufficiency,"
rested on the premise that "life itself is a complex equil-
ibrium. "
In order to live, we have to confront the multiple
requirements of life with a limited reserve of vital
energy. The amount of energy that we can and should
devote to achieving each particular goal is neces-
sarily limited. It is limited by the sum total of
the strength at our disposal, and the relative sig-
nificance of the ends we pursue. All life is thus a
complex equilibrium whose various elements limit one
another; this balance cannot be disrupted without
producing unhappiness or illness. Moreover, these
activities in whose favor the equilibrium is disrupt-
ed become a cause of pain to the person--and for the
same reason: the disproportionate development accord-
ed them (ME:39-40).
Indeed, Durkheim proposed that: "Man ••• is made for life
in a determinate, limited environment, however extended it
may be." All of this derived from his "relational realism."
To live is to put ourselves in harmony with the phys-
ical world surrounding us and with the social world
of which we are members; however extended their realms,
they are nevertheless limited. The goals we normally
seek are equally delimited, and we are not free to
transcend the limits without placing ourselves at odds
with nature. At each moment of time, our hopes, our
feelings of all sorts must be within bounds. The func-
tion of discipline is to guarantee such restraint. If
such necessary limits are lacking, if the moral forces
••
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surrounding us no longer contain or moderate our pas-
sions, human conduct--being no longer constrained--
loses itself in the void, the emptiness of which is
disguised and adorned with the specious label of the
infinite (ME:48).
Durkheim never wavered from this philosophy of fini-
tude. Indeed, when he came to criticize Germany's "will
mania," he grounded his opposition in his country's ene-
mies violation of the very structure and logic of the world.
The normal healthy will, however vigorous, accepts
the necessary relationship of dependence inherent
in the ndture of things. Man is part of the physi-
cal system which supports, but at the same time
limits him, and keeps him in a state of dependence.
He therefore submits to the laws of this system,
for he cannot change them; he obeys them, even when
he makes them serve his ends. For to free himself
entirely of these limitations and resistances, he
would have to make a vacuum around him, to place
himself ••. outside the conditions of life (1915: 44) .
The finitude of nature is matched internally, for " .•. there
are limits based on the nature of things, that is to say, in
the nature of each of us" (ME:49). Thus:
... the way to be happy is to set proximate and
realizable goals, corresponding to the nature of
each person, and not to attempt to reach object-
ives by straining neurotically and unhappily to-
ward infinitely distant and consequently inaccess-
ible goals (ME:49).
If we are not to invest ourselves in self-destruction,
how can one disagree with Durkheim's philosophy of health
and virtue as the "golden mean?" LaCapra sums up this phil-
osophy in these terms:
Society and personality as complementary integrated
wholes whose finite fullness ~as activated and agi-
tated by a marginal leaven of anomie: this was Durk-
heim's essential vision throughout his life (1972:171).
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E. Marginalism and Regression to the "Golden ~fean"
Our capacity for happiness is very limited (DL:235).
Pleasure loses its intensity through repetition.
If it becomes too continuous, it disappears com-
pletely (DL:252).
Nothing is good indefinitely and to an unlimited
extent (R:71).
It is interesting to note that Durkheirn's philosophy
of the "golden mean" found reinforcement in the theory of
"marginal ism" developed in economics and psychology in the
latter half of the nineteenth century. The revolution in
psychological theory led by men such as Fechner and Weber,
and in economic psychology by Gossen and others, was basi-
cally simple, but very significant. These men finally recog-
nized that one can describe a curve of increasing and then
decreasing want or pleasure, that each additional increment
of stimulus or pleasure beyond a certain point of satiabil-
ity or sensitivity becomes, in the same proportion, less ef-
fective as motivation. Hence the term "marginalism," for
beyond the margin of satiation, each additional increment
or "pleasure unit" becomes decreasingly, or marginally, ef-
fective.
Now, it is striking that Durkheim's resurrection of
the ancient wisdom of the "golden mean" as the basis of
health and virtue also emphasized this crucial psychologi-
cal fact. Durkheim's philosophy of "human finitude" and his
notion of life as "a complex equilibrium," led him to pro-
pose that "our capacity for happiness is very limited." In
other words, there are definite parameters, minimums and
maximums, beyond which both pleasure and pain cannot pass.
Indeed, it is a truth generally recognized today
that pleasure accompanies neither the very intense
states of consciousness, nor those of the very feeb-
le. There is pain when the functional activity is
insufficient, but excessive activity produces the
same effects ..•• Pleasure is, then, situated between
these two extremes. This proposition is, besides, a
••
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corollary of the law of Weber and Fechner .•.• They
have removed doubt from at least one point. It is
that the variations of intensity through which a
sensation can pass are comprised within two limits.
If the stimulus is too feeble, it is not felt; but
if it surpasses a certain degree, the increase pro-
duces less and less effect, until they cease to be
felt. Now, this law is equally true of the quality
of sensation called pleasure. It was even formulated
for pleasure and pain long before it was for other
elements of sensation. Bernoulli applied it directly
to the most complex sentiments, and Laplace, inter-
preting it in the same sense, gave it the form of a
relation between physical fortune and moral fortune.
The gamut of variations through which the intensity
the same pleasure can run is thus limited (DL:235-6).
Instead of the absoluteness of constantly expanding
wants tacitly presumed by the Utilitarian economists, Durk-
heim, along with the marginal theorists, observed that the
standard of value is relative to the level of aspiration,
and historically to the degree of sociocultural and moral
evolution .
.•• If the states of conscience whose intensity is
moderated are generally agreeable, they do not all
present conditions equally favorable to the product-
ion of pleasure. In the region of the lower limit,
the changes through which agreeable activity passes
are too small in absolute value to determine senti-
ments of pleasure of great energy. On the other hand,
when it approaches the point of indifference, that is,
its maximum, the magnitude developed has too feeble
a relative value. A man who has very little capital
cannot easily increase it in proportions significant
to change his condition perceptibly. That is why eco-
nomies carry too little joy with them; they are too
petty to improve the situation. The insignificant ad-
vantages procure do not compensate for the privations
they have cost. In the same way, a man whose fortune
is excessive finds pleasure only in exceptional bene-
ficence, for he measures its importance by what he al-
ready has. It is quite otherwise with average fortunes.
Here, both the absolute size and the relative size of
the variations are in best condition for production
of pleasure, for they are sufficiently important, and
yet it is not necessary for them to be extraordinary
to be estimated at their worth. The standard measur-
ing their value is not yet so high as to result in
strong depreciation. The intensity of an agreeable
stimulus can then increase usefully only between lim-
its still more closely related than we first said,
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for it can only produce its full effect in the inter-
val which corresponds to the average part of the a-
greeable activity. Above and below that, pleasure
still exists, but it is not proportional to the cause
producing it, whereas, in the limited zone, the least
oscillations are felt and appreciated. Nothing of the
energy of the stimulus converted to pleasure is lost
(DL:236) •
The two main variables of stimuli--intensity and repetition--
are both contained within parameters, within the "golden
mean."
What we have just said of the intensity of each stim-
ulus could be repeated of their number. They cease
to be agreeable when they are too many or too few,
as when they surpass or do not attain a certain de-
gree of vivacity. It is not without reason that hu-
man experience sees the condition of happiness in
the golden mean (DL:236-7).
Durkheim's philosophy of finitude and the "golden
mean" thus flew in the face of the Utilitarian ethos which
assumed that "more is better," that functional efficiency,
high productivity, high consumption, in short, "progress,"
would not only have few ill side-effects, but that it was
both possible and desirable. But was Durkheim not closer
to the truth when he suggested:
••• pleasure ••. loses its intensity through ~epeti­
tion. If it becomes too continuous, it disappe~e com-
pletely .••• To the extent that we accustom ourselves
to a certain type of happiness, it flees from us, and
we are obliged to throw ourselves into new underta-
kings to recapture it. We must bring the extinguish-
ed pleasure to life again by means of more energetic
stimuli, that is, multiply or render those which we
have more intense. But that is possible only if work
becomes more productive and, consequently, more divi-
ded. Thus, each realized advance in art, science, in-
dustry, would necessitate new advances, so as not to
lose the fruits of the new preceding advance (DL:252).
Hence, we embark upon the treadmill of modern existence,
where one must advance simply to keep from falling back.
If this really represented generic human experience, one
might be tempted to agree with Norman O. Brown's dictum
that "Man is a disease of history"!
The equilibrium time destroys cannot be reestablished,
nor can happiness be maintained at a constant level
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without attempts which are the more disagreeable as
they approach the higher limit of pleasure, for in
the region adjoining the maximum point the increases
are steadily lower than the corresponding stimuli.
More trouble must be taken for the same reward. lihat
is gained on one side is lost on the other, and loss
is avoided only through new expenditure. Consequent-
ly, for the operation to be profitable, this loss
would at least have to be important, and the need
for reparation strongly felt. But, in fact, it has
only a very mediocre energy, because simple repeti-
tion brings nothing essential to pleasure (DL:253).
Nor, as some suggest, does constant novelty substi-
tute for the marginality of repetition of pleasure. Indeed,
Durkheim took pains to point out that it is " .•• necessary
not to confuse the claim of variety with that of novelty."
The first is the necessary condition of pleasure,
since an uninterrupted enjoyment disappears or is
changed into pain. But time alone does not suppress
variety; continuity must be added to it. A state oft-
en repeated, but in discontinuous manner, can remain
agreeable, for, if continuity destroys pleasure, it
is either because it makes it unwitting, or because
the play of each function demands an outlay which,
prolonged without interruption, is exhausting and
becomes painful. If, then, the act, in becoming ha-
bitual, returns only at separated intervals, it will
continue to be felt, and the expenditures will be re-
placed in the intervals. That is why a healthy adult
always sleeps, eats, drinks, every day. It is the
same with the needs of the spirit, which are, also,
periodic as the psychical functions to which they
correspond. The pleasures that music brings, or the
arts, or sciences, are integrally maintained provi-
ded they alternate (DL:253).
By no means can the periodicity of regular needs be consi-
dered a source of potential insatiability. Time simply de-
mands that regular needs shall be more or less regularly
satisfied; but these needs are largely determinate, as are
the satisfactions.
If continuity can do what repetition cannot, it does
not inspire us with a need for new and unforeseen
stimuli. For, if it totally abolishes the conscious-
ness of the agreeable state, we cannot discover that
the pleasure attached to it has vanished at the same
time. It is replaced by the general feeling of well-
being accompanying the regular exercise of functions
normally continued which is not their least worth •...
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There is, then, nothing in the way in which time af-
fects the fundamental element of pleasure that can
provoke us to some sort of progress. It is true that
it is otherwise with novelty, whose attraction is not
durable. But if it gives greater freshness to pleas-
ure, it does not constitute it. It is only one of
its secondary and accessory qualities (DL:253).
Now, what is really striking about these notions
that the standard of value is relative, and that there is
no absolute beckoning us on to progress through constant
increase of wants, and that the schedule of wants is social-
ly constructed, is not the painfully obvious fact of the
satiability or "marginality" of wants, but rather: how could
the utilitarians have tacitly presumed that the opposite
was true? The question is analogous to my incredulity at
the naivete of the famous Hawthorne experiments, for instead
of enshrining this case as a classic, my question is:how
could the original experimenters have been so blind? In
both cases, we should invert the meaning of the so-called
"revolution" in theory which supposedly resulted, for what
truly requires explanation is the original hidden biases
which held these "pioneers" back! As always, it was their
materialist and atomist predispositions which led the Util-
itarians astray. In terms of the materialist account of
the origins and expression of human economic wants, for in-
stance, we are left helpless to explain the insatiability
of the drives dominating so much of economic action. For
on the physical level, as Durkheim himself established,
wants are relatively fixed and constant; indeed, organic
needs serve as the very paradigm of satiability (see part
I of this Book). The really curious fact, then, is how the
Utilitarian theorists could blithely ignore such an obvious
fact when their own root rationale of "common sense" might
have immediately revealed that organic wants are inherent-
ly limited. For if economic wants are primarily material,
then they are also limited. On the other hand, if one re-
cognizes that not nature alone but society too is the sour-
ce of economic motivations, then the symbolic nature and
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imperative character of so many such economically expressed
desires becomes more understandable. Since the economy is
the nexus between the natural and cultural spheres, the
"ideal" or potentially insatiable character of economic
desires, as opposed to fixed and limited organic needs, be-
comes clear.
In this manner, the Utilitarians unwittingly placed
a difficult obstacle in the path of progress of their own
economic theory. For if one presumes materialism and atom-
ism, after each has satisfied his own individual material
survival needs, isn't our continued and seemingly unending
quest for material satisfaction substantively irrational?
But this is, in effect, precisely what classical economic
theory presumed, since labor was the fount of all economic
value, and unending methodical work was the visible char-
acter of an upright character structure (eg. see Parsons,
1949 on Marshall), men would continue to constantly strive
to increase the technical efficiency of production and,
thus, indirectly but almost automatically increase the scale
of consumption. For wouldn't more material goods make us
happier? The Utilitarians' implicit assumption of the abso-
luteness of material wants and their potentially infinite
satiability, was a fatal flaw that had to be resolved before
economic theory could progress (eg. the Austrian school,
Walras, Pareto, and many others developed the implications
of the basic insights of "marginalism"). Further, I believe,
after Weber and Parsons, that these insistent claims can
only be fully understood, in the last analysis, as a sym-
bolic assertion of over-riding ethical demands. Indeed,
was this not Parsons' purpose in examining Marshall's no-
tion of the insatiability of wants in relation to charact-
er structure (eg. see Parsons, 1949: 5l4)?
Now, "margir.'3.lism" in economic theory was important
not only because it helped to resolve formal theoretical
problems in relating so-called "exchange values" to "use
values," as Parsons (1949:130) suggests, but also because
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for the first time the stubborn and incontrovertible fact
was finally explicitly and and systematically recognized
that each additional increment beyond a certain point di-
minished, rather than increased. further desire. The sig-
nificance of this finally obvious conclusion could not be
evaded forever. Indeed, I believe that it was only ethi-
cally driven desires for "progress and perfection," ori-
ginally moral and spiritual but now displaced, that could
have sanctioned this massive and sustained irrationality
at the very heart of economic rationality. It is no sur-
prise that Gossen's discovery was first known as "the law
of satiability of wants." The simple and obvious law of
diminishing returns on effort and stimulation counteracts
the tacit ethically drivenpresumption that wants and stim-
ulation are potentially infinite, that the more we have,
the more we want, and that this infinite stairway upward
can continue forever. Thus, "marginalism" has come to be
considered a major revolution in economic and psychologi-
cal theory in the latter part of the nineteenth century.
But, clearly, Durkheim, still largely unaffected by the
utilitarian biases, had little trouble in independently re-
cognizing the importance of the "marginal" perspective and
regression to the "golden mean."
Indeed, when placed in proper historical perspective,
what is so striking is that we could have resolutely for-
gotten the ancient moral wisdom which counsels that health,
virtue, and happiness are rooted in the "golden mean." For
it was this classical insight, so conspicuous by its ab-
sence from the ethics of the modern era, which led Durkheim
and other moral philosophers, such as Camus, to see that
human life and health, while swept up in a constantly pro-
gressing equilibrium, is, nonetheless, always anchored in
a dialectical relationship or "golden mean" between all
opposites.
••
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Legitimacy of Wants and the Social Schedule
of Satisfaction
What is needed if social order is to reign is that
the mass of men be content with their lot. But what
is needed for them to be content, is not that they
have more or less, but that they are convinced they
have no right to more (Soc:242).
•
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In contrast to the Utilitarian notion that economi-
cally expressed wants are materially based and atomistic
(random), Durkheim's sociological perspective led him to
propose that desires are culturally generated and social-
ly scheduled. Assuming that "life is a complex equilibrium,"
and that "no living being can be happy or even exist un-
less his needs are proportioned to his means"(S:246), Durk-
heim made the crucial suggestion that such desires must be
legitimate if they are to be entertained as candidates for
satisfaction in the social schedule of the ascending scale
of wants. Thus, in moving from his first to his second
schema, we shall retain his philosophy of human finitude,
and the notion of the social schedule, and intensifY the
sociocultural significance of these premises by shifting
the location of insatiability from homo duplex to modern
society and culture. Further, we shall see that these in-
satiable desires are legitimized in the modern ethos of
market capitalism. Because they are legitimized virtues
through the mechanism of the market, the "moral anarchy"
of anomie reigns.
For purposes of comparison, it is clear that the dom-
inant Utilitarian stream of economic theorizing, which con-
stitutes both the historical and logical baseline against
which almost all other alternative schools of economic
thought have reacted, entertained a very specific type of
psychology. Indeed, behind the program of the "philosophic
radicals" and their predecessors (reaching back at least
to Hobbes, Wm. Petty, Locke, Adam Smith, etc.) for moral
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reconstruction of society and man lay an "associationist"
psychology (see especially Halevy, 1955). In the hands of
Bentham and his followers, of course, the associationist
psychology became cast in terms of the famous "hedonistic
calculus" of pain and pleasure. In later economic theory,
still largely rooted in analogous presuppositions concern-
ing man's "innate propensities," the once vibrant ethical
postulates receded farther into the background. However,
the nominalistic emphasis on the inner psychological nature
of economic motivation as the supposed paradigm of ration-
ality itself--essentially an "economizing" type of calcula-
tion of "efficiency" (see K. Polanyi, 1968)--remained sol-
id throughout.
Consider, for example, contemporary post-Marshallian
micro-economic theory. I simply do not find it very enlight-
ening to think that wants, in generic terms, as the basis
of consumer demand, are ultimately rooted in idiosyncratic
individual "tastes." This seemingly empirical, but mislead-
ing, premise implies that individual "tastes," and the un-
derlying "drives," are prime motivational categories, and
thus, the key to consumer demand. But I suggest that "tast-
es" are not prime analytical categories, analogous to tra-
cing a specific need to a specific location in the organism.
Even the most rudimentary sociological perspective suggests
that societies, not isolated individual atoms floating in
the void of the international market, generate personality
structures, mo~ations, desires, self-images, and so on.
For these are primarily sociocultural phenomenological pro-
cesses. In addition, the term "tastes" implies a certain
arbitrariness or pervading "randomness of ends" (see Par-
sons, 1949) concerning the 9rigin and structure of human
desires, which suggests that these are largely incommensur-
able from one person to another. By contrast, a sociocul-
tural view suggests that instead of random, autonomous, and
idiosyncratic "tastes," socially and culturally generated
and directed desires are often fairly standarized. Further,
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by assuming that these supposedly random individual "tast-
es" are physically generated, and thus expressed in terms
of physical goods, the utilitarian economic theorists tend-
ed to encircle themselves in a kind of self-fulfilling tau-
tology--physical wants for physical goods for physical
wants, and so on and so forth.
On the contrary, we must inevitably recognize that
there are a multiplicity of reasons for participating in
economic action. We must recognize that economic wants may
be divided into "needs" which are organically generated,
and thus comparatively fixed in their nature and standard
of satiability, on the one hand, and on the other we see
"desires" which are socioculturally generated, and thus com-
paratively variable in their object and standard of satia-
bility. In this dialectical combination of "needs" and "de-
sires," the first emerging from the organism and the second
from society, there lies the truth of Durkheim's doctrine
of man as homo duplex. Therefore, the fully sociocultural
perspective on economic action suggests that the economy
is the nexus between the material and symbolic spheres of
society. All economic systems have dual functions--the al-
location of both material and symbolic resources. Every
economy is simultaneously engaged in the production and
distribution of goods, services, privileges, and desired
symbols.
Therefore, in Durkheimian and sociological terms,
every society is faced with similar sociocultural and eco-
nomic problems of negotiating a variable ratio , in terms
of available resources and the legitimacy of the schedule
of satisfaction of wants, between organically generated
"needs" (eg. food) and socic;>culturally generated "desires"
(eg. honor o~ the demands of charisma). The dual nature
of economic wants, the simultaneity of economic motivations,
shifts in the legitimacy of wants and in the historical
schedules of satisfaction, these and other crucial factors
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make not only for the great complexity of human economic
action, but for its potential insatiability as well.
Since we have already pursued some of these notions
pertaining to the social schedule of satisfaction (see esp-
ecially part I of Book Two), let us now briefly look at
Durkheim's perception that both wants themselves and their
schedule must be accepted as legitimate if society and eco-
nomy are to work. Since human hearts and minds cannot be
restrained or directed by external, physical forces,
only Durkheimian moral forces, sociocultural forces, are
capable of touching the "awakened human conscience." In
shifting from schema one to schema two, we see that society
not only moralizes egos, but also that culture is the ener-
gizing and directing force of the socially constructed per-
son. Socially constructed and directed "desires" are legit-
imate, those beyond and below are proscribed. This is what
Durkheim tried to say, albeit unsuccessfully, with his ear-
ly notion of man as homo duplex. Therefore, as with Max
Weber, the basic category in Durkheim's doctrine was egit-
imate moral authority.
For the socioeconomic order to work properly, for the
person to be properly motivated and directed, for culture to
regulate and energize "desires," certain ratios of satisfact-
ion, between a person and his station, and between his de-
sires and resources, must be considered more or less legiti-
mate by all •
••• in every society and in all ages there exists
a vague but lively sense of the value of the var-
ious services used in society, and of the values,
too, of th~ things that are the subject of exchange.
Although neither of these factors is regulated by
tariff, there is, however, in every social group a
state of opinion that fixes its normal value at least
roughly. There is an average figure that is consid-
ered as the true price, as the one that expresses
the true value of a thing at a given moment (PECM:209).
Many things contribute, besides scarcity, to the determina-
tion of the "fair price":
I.
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All sorts of causes enter into the way it has evol-
ved: that is, a sense of the true usefulness of things
and services, of the labor they have cost, of the re-
lative ease or difficulty in producing them, tradi-
tions and prejudices of every kind, and so on •.•• This
scale is certainly a real one, and it is the touchstone
by which the equity of exchanges is to be judged (PECM:
k 209-210).saw spo e
Further, we,\that in schema one Durkheiml\as if the social
schedule served to constrain individual desires .
... It is absolutely essential that there be an auth-
ority whose superiority they acknowledge and which
tells them what is right. For an individual committed
only to the pressure of his needs will never admit
that he has reached the extreme limits of his right-
ful portion. If he is not conscious of a force above
him which he respects, which stops him and tells him
with authority that the compensation due him is ful-
filled, then inevitably he will expect as due all that
his needs demand. And since in our hypothesis these
needs are limitless, their exigency is necessarily
without limit (80c:242-3).
But having already set aside Durkheim's hypothesis, based
upon the image of man as homo duplex, that these needs are
inherently insatiable, we see that in schema two the modern
social schedule itself acts to generate and legitimize these
potentially infinite social and cultural desires.
At the base of Durkheim's theory of the social sche-
dule was the notion that economic value is socially, not
individualistically, determined .
... it is not the amount of labor put into a thing
which makes its value; it is the way in which the
value of this thing is assessed by the society, and
this valuation depends, not so much on the amount of
energy expended, as on the useful results it produces,
such as they are felt to be by the collectivity, for
there is a subjective factor there which cannot be
ruled out (PECM:2l6).
In addition, a crucial observation is that the social sche-
dule of price and income changes through history (on all of
this see 8:249-51).
This normal price is, of course, an ideal price onlyi
it very rarely coincides with the real price which
naturally varies according to circumstances; there
is no official price list to apply to every indivi-
dual case. It is only a fixed point, around which
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there must inevitably be many fluctuations; but these
cannot go beyond a certain range in any direction with-
out seeming abnormal. We might even say that the more
societies evolve the more does this structure of val-
ues become stable and regulated and unaffected by any
local conditions or special circumstances, so that
they come to assume an objective form. Nhen every farm
and almost every village had its own market, the price
scale varied according to the locality: each had the
scale and tariff that suited it. These variations left
far more lee-way to a shrewd personal ingenuity and
calculation. This is why bargaining and individual
prices are one of the characteristic features of pet-
ty trading and small scale industry.
The more we advance, on the other hand, the more do
prices come to have an international basis: and this
through the system of stock exchanges and controlled
markets whose action covers a whole continent. Former-
ly, under the system of local markets, there had to
be negotiating and a battle of wits, to know on what
terms an object could be had; today, we only have to
open a well-informed journal. We are becoming increas-
ingly used to the idea that the true price of things
exchanged should be fixed previous to the contract and
be in no way governed by it (PECM:2l0).
Durkheim here provided us with a series of seminal suggest-
ions concerning the evolution of the social schedule and
the delegitimation of traditional ones rooted in the small
scale life of the village. Let us pursue these clues.
Now, in general, for the traditional social schedule to
have brokmdown so irretrievably, and for absolutizing in-
dividualism and legitimate insatiability to have been en-
shrined in its place, there must have been a delegitimiza-
tion of the old norms of tribe and neighborhood which ac-
companied the extension of the international market. Indeed,
delegitimization of old norms and legitimation of new and
unlimited individual aspirations probably went hand in hand.
Again and again, Durkheim emphasized the critical element
of moral legitimacy which underpins shifts in all socioeco-
nomic schadules. Whereas before in history the potential
insatiability of culturally generated desires absolutized
society and tradition, today very different types of de-
sires, precisely because of their moral sanctions, absolu-
tize the individual and the "tradition of the new." W·here-
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as before it was legitimate to desire only as much as one's
father received, and his father before him, today it is le-
gitimate, nay expected, to peg one's hopes for a beginning
salary higher than one's father ever received!
.•• it would be of little use for everyone to re-
cognize the justice of the hierarchy of functions
established by public opinio~ if he did not also
consider the distribution of these functions just.
The workman is not in harmony with his social posi-
tion if he is not convinced that he has his desserts.
If he feels justified in occupying another, what he
has could not satisfy him. So it is not enough for
the average level of needs for each social condition
to be regulated by public opinion, but another, more
precise rule must fix the way in which these condi-
ditions are open to individuals. There is no society
in which such regulation does not exist. It varies
with time and place. Once it regarded birth as the
almost exclusive principle of social classification;
today it recognizes no other inherent inequality than
hereditary fortune and merit (5:250-1).
We may preliminarily conclude, therefore, that the shift to
a stratification system based upon individual achievement
accompanied the breakdown of the traditional, small scale
social schedule and the release of insatiable demands. In
the reversal of the traditional social schedule in terms of
the enthronement of legitimized insatiability and the "cult
of the individual," we see that both sets of suicidal types,
altruisme/fatalisme and anomie/egoisme, demonstrate the ex-
tremes to which societies and cultures can go in absoluti-
zing one or another element of the complex human equation
(see also ME:49). In both cases, Durkheim suggested there
must be a rebalancing of the books, a new and more human
equilibrium, with less tyranny of these warring and destroy-
ing absolutes.
Now, it is not sufficient to explain this reVOlution
in the social schedule as Durkheim was tempted to do in his
first schema merely in terms of the erosion of the tradi-
tional "collective conscience" by the progressive division
of labor. Indeed, in The Division of Labor itself, Durkheim
came very close to the Weberian notions of economic tradi-
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tionalism of archaic societies, and the obstacles that had
to be overcome by certain crucial world-historical break-
throughs.
Indeed, a change of existence, whether it be sudden
or prepared, always brings forth a painful crisis,
for it does violence to acquired instincts which op-
pose it. All the past holds us back, even though the
most beautiful vistas appear before us. It is always
a laborious operation to pull up the roots of habits
that time has fixed and organizedin us .•.• A genera-
tion is not enough to cast aside the work of genera-
tions, to put a new man in the place of the old••.•
Those who find pleasure in regular and persistent
work are still few and far between. For most men, it
is still an insupportable servitude. The idleness of
primitive times has lost its old attractions for them.
These metamorphoses then cost a great deal for a long
time without accomplishing anything. The generations
inaugurating them do not receive the fruits, if there
are any because they come late. They h~ve only the
pain. Consequently, it is not the expedation of great-
er happiness that draws them into such enterprises.
But, in fact, is it true that the happiness of the in-
dividual increases as man advances? Nothing is more
doubtful (DL:241).
As I suggested in part I of this Book, it is most helpful
here to think in terms of the normative preconditions for
such painful breaks with the past, and for breakthroughs
to more powerful future social organizations, especially
when we attempt to explain the emergence of modern societ-
ies, modern personality structures, and modern desires. The
modern economic cosmos is possible, for example, only if
the highly restrictive bonds of social fraternization of
primitive and traditional societies are set aside. The so-
cial bond must be progressively extended to include more
universalistic exchanges. However, as the social bond is
more widely extended, as Tocqueville, Maine, Toennies, and
Weber among classical writers, and Benjamin Nelson (1973a)
among contemporary observers, have noted, the "brotherhood"
or "neighborhood ethic" also becomes increasingly attenua-
ted, and a sort of impersonal "universal otherhood" reigns
in its place. In short, as the social bond is extended,
its intensity lessens.
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Therefore, in order to adequately explain the break-
down of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, we must
simultaneously explain the power of the forces that broke
through this heavy and massively legitimized system of auth-
ority. We must try to account not merely for the release of
the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," as Durkheim's
early doctrine of homo duplex tried to do, but also, and
more importantly, for the stimulation and legitimation of
these new desires. In other words, we should try to explain
the origin and continuing sanction of this modern "revolu-
tion of rising expectations." If we complete the shift from
the analytical axis of absence to the presence of cultural
- ...= ;;;".;;....;;;".;;.,,;;,,;;,.;~
sanctions, may we not then conclude that the generation and
sustenance of such desires, far from being due to the re-
lease of the organic ego from moral control, might itself
be the unanticipated result of a peculiar form of extreme
moral discipline pervasive in the modern world?
••
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The Origin and Continuing Sanction for Our Modern
Revolution of Rising Expectations
•
•
•
•
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•
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In contrast to traditional moral philosophies, the
dominant note of the modern economic ethos has been unlim-
ited aspirations, a veritable "infinity of dreams and de-
sires.'i This utopian image of a cornucopia of plenty is,
of course, the core of the American Dream as it is lived
out today. Clearly, some basic shift must have occurred in
the axis of the modern moral universe for drives for unend-
ing "progress and perfection," daily represented as virtues,
to have been translated into economic action. But where did
these drives and desires corne from? And how have they corne
to be so massively legitimated?
Delegitimation and relegitimation, conflicting moral
challenges and moral claims, the competition of one charisma
against another--surely these are most complex sociocultural
processes. In the second schema, the refusal to acquiesce in
the face of the traditional schedule of satisfaction, and
the moral sanctioning of a new and absolute sphere for the
autonomous individual, and the legitimizing of a "longing
for the infinite," can only have emerged from a long series
of challenges and conflicts between competing systems of
moral authority, of competing rationales for informing and
directing structures of conscience and consciousness. There-
fore, it behooves us now, instead of explaining away these
processes as "mechanically generated", as Durkheim allowed
himself to do in the first schema and in The Division of
Labor, to enter more closely into the nature of these chal-
lenges, and their sometimes ironic outcomes. This story
shall be explored in greater detail in Chapter Ten.
In general, in Suicide Durkheim followed the line of
thought earlier established in The Division of Labor concern-
ing the generation of new needs through history. It is the
progress of civilization itself, Durkheim seemed to say,
which generates new needs.
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Civilization is itself the necessary consequence of
the changes which are produced in the volume and den-
sity of societies. If science, art, and economic act-
ivity develop, it is in accordance with a necessity
which is imposed upon men. It is because there is,
for them, no other way of living in the new condi-
tions in which they have been placed. From the time
that the number of individuals among whom social re-
lations are established begins to increase, they can
maintain themselves only by greater specialization,
harder work, and intensification of their faculties.
From this general stimulation, there inevitably re-
sults a much higher degree of culture ••.• Civiliza-
tion) develops because it cannot fail to develop.
Once effectuated, this development is found to be
generally useful •••• It responds to needs formed at
the same time because they depend on the same causes.
But this is an adjustment after the fact. Yet, we
must notice that the good it renders in this direct-
ion is not a positive enrichment, a growth in our
stock of happiness, but only repairs the losses that
it has itself caused. It is because this suoeracti-
vity of general life fatigues and weakens our nervous
system that it needs reparations proportionate to its
expenditures, that is to say, more varied and complex
satisfactions (DL:336-7).
Thus, we see that Durkheim, involved on one rhetorical
front in an argument against the utilitarians, was not
wholy sanguine about the progressive division of labor.
Yet, as we discovered in Book Two and especially part I
of this Book, Durkheim's thesis was posed on the general
evolutionary level, and largely ignored specific historical
break throughs.
TheJ:efore, Durkheim's early answer in The Division
of Labor that "everything happens mechanically" cannot
really hope to explain this modern explosion of desires.
Now, it is striking for our present purposes that at one
point in this book, Durkheim himself stopped to reflect
upon the complex relations between greater production and
consumption.
A function can become specialized only if this new
specialization corresponds to some need of society.
But all new specialization results in increasing
and improving production •••• Therefore, advance can
be established in permanent form only if individuals
really feel the need of more abundant products, or
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products of better quality .... For it to become a
specialty, however, men had to cease being satis-
fied with what had, until then, satisfied them and
become more exacting. But whence could these new
demands come (DL:272)?
At this point, Durkheim still seemed to think that the feed-
back cycle of the division of social labor itself sufficed
as an answer--namely, that the greater competition that ser-
ved as the initial spur for specialization also led to great-
er stress and fatigue, which thus required greater "repara-
tion" and psychic compensation. Although the wish for mater-
ial progress was not itself an adequate explanation, Durk-
heim seemed to assume that greater demand was itself an out-
growth of the progressive division of labor. Thus, rising
desires were an unanticipated, yet inevitable, outcome of
this basically mechanical social evolutionary process.
They are an effect of the same causes which deter-
mines the progress of the division of labor. We have
just seen that such progress is due to the greater
acuteness of the struggle. But a more violent strug-
gle does not proceed without greater depletion of
forces, and reparation must be proportionate to the
expenditure. That is why the dispensations, until
then sufficient to restore organic equilibrium, are
insufficient from then on. There must be a more abun-
dant and choicer sustenance ...• It is especially the
nervous system that supports all these burdens, for
it must devise ingenious methods to keep them up with
the struggle, to create new specialities, to acclima-
tize them, etc. In general, the more subject to change
the environment is, th~ greater the part intelligence
plays in life, for it alone can have new conditions
of equilibrium continually broken, and yet restore it.
Cerebral life develops then, at the same time as com-
petition becomes keener, and to the same degree. These
advances are observed not only among the elite, but in
all classes of society•••.
Besides, it is not without cause that mental diseases
keep pace with civilization, nor that they rage in ci-
ties rather than in the.country, and in large cities
more than in small ones. Now, a more voluminous ~nd
more delicate brain makes greater demands than a less
refined one. Difficulties and privations the latter
does not even feel painfully disturb the former. For
the same reason, more complex stimulants are needed
to affect this organ agreeably once it is refined, and
there is greater necessity for them, because it has
•
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been developing at the same time. Finally, more than
all the others, needs properly intellectual increase:
rough explanations no longer satisfy more perspica-
cious minds. Fresh insights are needed and science
holds these aspirations together at the same time
that it satisfies them. All these changes are, then,
mechanically produced by necessary causes. If our in-
telligence and sensibility develop and become keener,
it is because we exercise them more, and if we exer-
cise them more, it is because we are for=ed to by the
greater violence of the struggle we have to live
through. That is how, without having desired it, hu-
manity is found apt to receive a more intense and var-
ied culture (DL:272-3).
But Durkheim himself then acknowledged that these sim-
ple predispositions are not only necessary, not sufficient
to explain the advancing desires in modern expanding econo-
mies. Rather, he said that the new desires, especially for
constant novelty, are awakened and satisfied through the
progressive division of labor itself, Durkheim's early deus
ex machina.
If another factor did not intervene, however, this
simple predisposition would not of itself rear the
means for satisfaction, for it constitutes only an
aptitude for enjoyment •••• Simple aptitudes for en-
joyment do not necessarily provoke desire .••• Be-
sides, these indeterminate aspirations can rather
easily deviate from their natural ends and their
normal direction. But, at the very moment when a
man is in position to taste these new enjoyments
and calls for them, even unconsciously, he finds
them within reach, because the division of labor
has developed at the same time, and furnishes them
to him. Without there having been the least pre-es-
tablished harmony, these two orders of fact meet,
simply because they are effects of the same cause
(DL:273-4) .
But surely this is a weak explanation: for how could these
two very different orders of fact simply converge? In the
early stages Weber also relied on weaker explanatory links
such as the most troublesome, poetic, notion of "elective
affinities. "
Here is how the meeting can be conceived. The attract-
ion of novelty would be sufficient to impel man to
taste these pleasures. It naturally follows that the
greater richness and complexity of these stimulants
-------------------------------_ ...- - --
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would cause him to find those with which he had been
content more mediocre. Fe can, besides, adapt him-
self to them mentally before having tried them, and
as, in reality, they correspond to changes in his
constitution he hastens to benefit from them. Exper-
ience thus comes to confirm these presentiments ~ ..
needs which were sleeping awaken, are determined, be-
come aware of themselves, and are organized. This is
not to say that this adjustment may be in all cases
perfect, that each new product due to new advances
in the division of labor always correspond to a real
need of our nature. It is, on the contrary, likely
that rather often needs are contracted only because
one has become accustomed to the object to which they
are related. This object was neither necessary nor
useful, but it has been experienced several times, and
it has been so well enjoyed that it cannot be denied.
Harmonies resulting from quite mechanical causes can
never be anthing but imperfect and proximate, but they
are sufficient to maintain order in general. That is
what happens to the division of labor. The advances
it makes are, not in all cases, but generally, in har-
mony with changes inman, and this is what permits
them to last (DL:274-5).
This was, in essence, Durkheim's mechanical explanation of
the generation of new desires and consumer demand through
the progressive division of labor.
From the production side, Durkheim argued that the
greater efficiency and productivity of labor also gets caught
up in a kind of self-stimulating feedback loop. Indeed, Durk-
heim suggested that this is yet another reason why the pro-
gressive division of labor " .•. is a source of social cohe-
sion, not only because it limits the activity of each, but
also because it increases it" (DL:395) •
••• The same causes that oblige us to specialize more
also oblige us to work more. When the number of com-
petitors becomes greater in society, it also becomes
greater in each particular profession. The struggle
becomes more lively, and, consequently, more efforts
are necessary to sustain it •••• Labor becomes more
continuous as it is more divided•••. In societies
which are exclusively agricultural and pastoral, la-
bor is almost entirely suspended during the season of
bad weather. In Rome, it was interrupted by a multi-
tude of holidays and days of rest.As we go forward,
however, work becomes a permanent occupation, a habit,
and indeed, if this habit is sufficiently strengthened,
a need (DL:393-4).
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Is it legitimate to wonder whether, beyond the structural
and /lmechanical/l causes, there might have been something
special about the moral values of the Middle Ages which
made work into a permanent occupation, perhaps even a need.
We might do well to remember Weber's insight that the monks
and ascetic orders were among the first groups to systema-
tically live out a consciously chosen and rationally regu-
lated vocation. Indeed, when one examines that era, one is
struck by the extraordinarily high estimation in which the
monastics, and later, the scholastic philosophers, were held.
Finally, Durkheim hastened to admonish us, however,
that this constant increase in productive capacity and con-
sumer demand did not, as a net outcome, make us happier.
We did not rationally choose to become vocational ascetics,
to work harder and harder, for that is what we must do in
order to satisfy our insatiable demands.
But, to repeat, we are not happier for that. To be
sure, once these needs are excited, they cannot be
suspended without pain. But our happiness is no great-
er because they are excited. The point at which we
measure the relative intensity of our pleasures is
displaced. A subversion of all gradation results. But
this confusion of classes of pleasures does not im-
ply an increase. Because the environment is no long-
er the same, we have to change, and these changes
have determined others in our manner of being happy,
but changes do not necessarily imply progress (DL:275).
Later, in Suicide, Durkheim made the notion of intra-
societal competition the driving force behind the genera-
tion of new needs more specific. There he suggested that
since the ratio of scheduled rewards is relational--that
is, one want pitted against another, one group or class
against another--relative deprivation may be a key to the
constant escalation of desires. The ever-escalating demands
of favorably situated groups leads others not similarly fa-
vored to resent the formers' advances. Competitionintensi-
fies the struggle. /I ••• The stuggle grows more violent and
painful, both from being less controlled and because compe-
tition is greater. All classes contend among themselves be-
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cause no established classification exists" (S:253).
If the disturbance is profound, it affects even the
principles controlling the distribution of means a-
mong various occupations. Since the relations between
various parts of society are necessarily modified,
the ideas expressing these relations must change.
Some particular class especially favored by the cri-
sis is no longer resigned to its former lot, and, on
the other hand, the example of its greater good for-
tune arouses all sorts of jealou~below and about it.
Appetites, not being controlled by a public opinion,
become disoriented, and no longer recognize the lim-
its proper to them. Besides, they are at the same
time seized by a sort of natural eretheism simply by
the greater intensity of public life. With increased
prosperity, desires increase. At the very moment when
traditional rules have lost their authority, the rich-
er prize offered these appetites stimulates them and
makes them more exigent and impatient of control. The
state of de=egulation or anomie is thus further height-
ened by passions being less disciplined, precisely when
they need more disciplining (S:253).
Now, Durkheim's discovery of relative deprivation as a
potent force fueling the fires of inflation in modern expan-
ding economies is an important insight into the sociocultur-
al forces underlying the upward wage-price spiral. This un-
ending competition of collective egoisms is an independent
variable contributing to the inflation which we now grudg-
ingly accept as the cost of a constantly rising standard of
living. The natural status competition in any society was
intensified and even apotheosized as legitimate norm by the
Utilitarian ethos of the "war of each against all," of "na-
ture red in tooth and claw," of the potent fiction of the
"natural identity of interests," and so forth (see especially
E. Halevy, 1955). What resulted, of course, was a kind of
culturally sanctioned "moral anarchy," a form of legitimate
socio-economic civil war in which each group practiced a
kind of covert extortion against others through the neutral-
izing mechanism of the international market.
And in Socialism, Durkheim spoke in the following terms
of this rather peculiar war of "collective egoisms," this un-
ending sanctioned spiral of status competition and inflation.
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Picture the most productive organization possible,
and a distribution of wealth which assures abundance
to even thehumblest--perhaps such a transformation,
at the very moment it was constituted, would produce
an instant of gratification. But this gratification
could only be temporary. For desires, though calmed
for an instant, will quickly acquire new exigencies.
Unless it is admitted that each individual is equal-
ly compensated ••• there will always be some workers
who will receive more and others less. So it is in-
evitable that at the end of a short time the latter
find their share meager with what goes to the others,
and as a result new desires arise, for all levels of
the social scale. And besides, even apart from any
feeling of envy, excited desires will tend naturally
to keep outrunning their goals, for the very reason
that there will be nothing before them which stops
them. And they will call all the more imperiously for
a new satisfaction, since those already secured will
have given them more strength and vitality (Soc:242).
Thus, the treadmill of modern, progressive existence speeds
up. As we have often discovered to our consternation, it is
often when things are getting better that greater demands
are lodged, that revolutions break forth. When things are
bad, aspirations are scaled down to meet the restricted re-
sources. When things are opened up, instead of banking the
fires, demands are accelerated. Indeed, those who are endem-
ically faced with a marginal subsistence life style come to
be possessed by what one observer (Richard Ball, 1968) has
accurately called "an analgesic subculture."
Therefore, as we observed earlier, the standard rela-
tions in economic theory between scarcity and society need
perhaps to be reversed. Normally, it is assumed that scar-
city is primarily a natural phenomenon~ indeed, some defin-
itions of economic action couched in terms of rationalizing
decisions concerning the efficient utilization of scarce re-
sources incorporate this notion at their very core. But as
Stanley (1968) rightly points out, it is far more likely
that scarcity is socially created. Indeed, I went even fur-
ther than Stanley by suggesting that monopolization and
specialization are two basic ways which every group uses to
increase their share of the social schedule of reward. with
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the former, one attempts to make natural environmental or
infrastructural resources artificially scarce, while with
the latter one attempts to make human capital (skills, know-
ledge) increasingly scarce or diversified. Thus, scarcity
is far~ a social necessity than ~ natural given. Nowhere
is this ironic development more clear than in the ever-as-
cending desires seen in various forms of status competition.
While it is true that all societies entertain agonistic dis-
plays (eg. the "Potlatch" of the Northwest Coast Indians),
nonetheless, it was only with the breakdown of the corpora-
tive structure of society that the modern economy could emer-
ge. Dominick LaCapra has noted this important relationship
betwen socially generated scarcity and "institutionalized
anomie" in modern economies. The gap between expectation
and resources, between one's. previously assigned level of
satisfaction and that of one's neighbor constantly accele-
rates.
the problem of the relation of scarcity to ag-
gression and conflict was basic to Durkheim's notion
of anomie •••• A second type of scarcity was a form
that depended on the cultural definition of scarcity, as
well as on the institutional creation or social con-
ditioning of scarcity effected by the apportionment
of things or social and cultural value and, of cour-
se, of any economic surplus. The problem of social
order and solidarity was concerned with the dialect-
ical relation of these two types of scarcity, for in-
stance, the ability of the second to shape or distort
the first--an ability which in certain ways might in-
crease with the development of science and technology
(1972:167) •
LaCapra rightly sees that there are two types of scarcity--
natural and social. And he saw that Durkheim's notion of a-
nomie concerned the latter1 he further recognized the sub-
stantive irrationality of culturally enforced searcity even
when technological advances "render general affluence possi-
ble, and subsistence marginality unnecessary.
Moreover, LaCapra also sees that this problem of the
generation of new desires, this ever-escalating status com-
petition, mounting feelings of relative deprivation, and
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the specter of culturally generated and socially enforced
scarcity, changes from one historical period to the next.
Definitions of what constitutes legitimate expecta-
tions and need, beyond the requirements of biological
survival, vary according to social type. One of Durk-
heim's contentions was that the relative poverty of
traditional societies was itself often a basis for
the limitation of desires and expectations to a level
at which they could be institutionally satisfied with
available resources. This was the basis for the cor-
relation of poverty, in certain societies, with low
suicide rates. And especially in archaic societies,
the institutional definition of legitimate needs was
often assumed to be consensually accepted by all in-
terested groups (1972:168).
The building up of permanent surpluses, the erosion of the
segmental type of society, the transcendence of the repres-
sive collective conscience, increasing occupational and re-
leased status competition, all led to the modern revolution
of rising expectations. What resulted was the lifting of
the traditional ceiling on legitimate aspirations, and the
modern worship of an "infinity of dreams and desires."
The elementary and reiterateu point of Durkheim's
argument was that anomie, including its institution-
alized variety, made the problem of solidarity and
social order insoluble, because it both maximized
scarcity and eliminated the possibility of recipro-
city in social relations. In a state of society in
which desires were perpetually stimulated, and sta-
tus always in doubt, mutually invasive and aggress-
ive relations were always inevitable. A society which
combined achievement values and anomie faced devasta-
ting problems, for it gave rise to the type of man
who was constrained to be pre-emptively rapacious in
his dealings with others and anxiously uncertain in
his every action •..• In the absence of consensually
accepted norms which defined within flexible limits
an optimal set of compatible alternatives in the
just allocation of resources, any surplus--however
greater it might be in absolute terms--would be psy-
chologically experienced in terms of uncooperative
competition for scarce values (LaCapra,1972:l69-70).
Now, the first time that I heard anyone emphasize
that Durkheim's notion of anomie implied insatiability of de-
sires was Benjamin Nelson's lectures at the Graduate Faculty
of Political and Social Science of the New School for Social
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Research in the school year 1969-70. Like Durkheim, Nelson
proposed that every society is engaged in the production
and distribution of desired values. Every culture is a val-
ue enterprise whose primary resources and net outcomes are
symbols of varied worths. Society constitutes a network of
institutions which produce and allocate an inevitably scar-
ce supply of coveted symbols. Further, Nelson also disting-
uishes between organic needs and socioculturally generated
desires. Relative to desires (not basic subsistence needs),
almost any resource may be considered scarce. Because such
desires are socially created and culturally apportioned,
they may expand indefinitely. In other words, since society
sanctifies an ideal as "sacred," desires for consummation
of these cultural values may become, in effect, insatiable.
At the same time, society may move to protect the sacred-
ness of these values from becoming mere "common currency,"
by making them more scarce. Almost inevitably, we witness
the problem of the allocation of scarce symbolic resources.
Nelson clearly sees that Durkheim's central concern
was with the insatiability of desires, especially in the mo-
dern world. Durkheim saw the seemingly unlimited expansion
of desires through the mechanism of the expansive interna-
tional market. People's expectations rose accordingly, and
if, p~rchance, their hopes were dashed, or if, by some good
fortune, their desires were immediately consummated, then
people tended to see themselves as relatively deprived. The
egalitarianism which Tocqueville anatomized only intensi-
fied this problem. Thus, Nelson concludes, when private own-
ership came about on a massive scale, then people became,
in effect, insat~le, wanting more than they could possibly
have or even use. And the constant moral disequilibrium led
to suicide. Thus, Nelson's insights stand as a bridge be-
tween the first and second schemas.
Finally, Nelson observes that Weber's focus on "ration-
alization" complemented Durkheim's concerns here. For one of
Weber's key analytical concerns was the degree to which so-
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cieties are capable of maximizing the satisfaction of wants
by the scheduled allocation of scarce resources to highly
valued ends by putting premiums on idealized or charismatic
values. This represents yet another convergence between Durk-
heim and Weber significant for our present purposes.
Finally, let us turn to consider what may be regarded
as one of Durkheim's fullest explorations of the origins of
the modern revolution of rising expectations. Strangely,
this statement is not to be found in Suicide. Rather, it
comes indirectly in a review in Socialism of the early nine-
teenth century French-Swiss historian and political economist
Sismondi de Sismondi's explanation of the origins of the mo-
dern socioeconomic order. Although a secondary account, Durk-
heim clearly offered a sympathetic treatment of Sismondi's
insights. Indeed, Sismondi is granted a whole chapter to him-
self in Socialism, second only to Saint-Simon. Originally a
disciple of Adam Smith, Sismondi later moved away as he be-
came more critical and independent. In Socialism we discover
that Sismondi offered us original and striking insights into
the ironic process of the development of market capitalism
which are still relevant to our contemporay travail. In add-
ition, he was also one of the first to understand the theory
which later became known as "marginalism."
Focussing on the question of the supposed self-equili-
brating and beneficent "invisible hand" of Utilitarian dogma,
Sismondi raised many vexing questions. "The modern economic
system surely presents us with a magnificent spectacle, says
Sismondi. Never has the productive capacity of man been car-
ried to such heights" (Soc:l09). But Sismondi was one of the
first political economists to ask: "But do all these appar-
ent signs of prosperity cor:respond to real prosperity" (Soc:
109)? While witnessing the "triumph of things" in the early
nineteenth century, Sismondi concluded that "Man seemed to
be more badly off than before" (Soc:llO). 'iho, in the last
analysis, really benefits from this new found abundance?
Certainly not the workers, says Sismondi, and not even the
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entrepeneurs as a group can be considered wholly blessed by
new competition.
Necessarily limited in number, this group shrinks
every day as a result of the increasing concentra-
tion of commerce and industry. Further, the possi-
bility--always approved--of new inventions, or of
unforeseen rivalries which ruin them, the fear of
bankruptcy aiways on the horizon, especially in in-
dustries which develop rapidly--keep these in a
state of perpetual anxiety and prevent them from
truly enjoying this nstable prosperity (Soc:llO).
Consumers gain a greater volume and variety of material
goods from this "industrial hyperactivity," but while the
gains should good to those who need them most, the masses
generally benefit less. "Thus there would be an increase in
want and misery at the very time a plethora of wealth was
produced, at the very time when there ought to be ... a wide-
spread abundance" (Soc:llO). "This paradox," Durkheim noted,
"rests on the new conditions of economic organization" (Soc:
110), which he then proceeded to explore. It is important to
note not only that Durkheim agreed with Sismondi's analysis,
but that this secondary account was far more extensive than
any provided by Durkheim himself.
Now, at the very heart of Sismondi's critical insight
was the notion of a necessary balance between society and
economy, a viable equilibrium or "golden mean." Sismondi's
entire argument, Durkheim proposed, rested on two proposi-
tions: (a) Collective well-being implies that production and
consumption balance exactly, and (b) The new industrial re-
gime prevents this balance from being established in a regu-
lar manner (Soc:llO). The lack of a viable balance between
production and consumption Sismondi saw as the root of the
unanticipated problems of modern economic expansion. And for
Durkheim, Sismondi's insigh~s provided important historical
checks for his own notion of anomie. Viewing economic action
in a substantively rational manner, Sismondi noted that in
the ideal case a person would produce just as much as needed
for personal consumption (i.e. use value) plus a reasonable
surplus, as a hedge against the future.
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After having provided a supply for use and a fund
for reserve, he will stop, even though he could in-
crease his consummable wealth further, He will pre-
fer to rest than produce things he cannot use. So-
ciety as a whole is precisely like this individual •.•.
After these two sets of wants are provided, anything
more is useless and ceases to have value. To the de-
gree that accumulated wealth exceeds the needs of
consumption, it ceases being wealth. The products of
his labor enrich the worker unless he finds a consum-
mer to buy them. It is the purchaser who makes their
value: therefore, if he is lacking it is nil (Soc:lll).
Then Sismondi criticized the Utilitarian notion of an auto-
matic self-balancing mechanism intervening between production
and consumption, between supply and demand .
••• according to Say, Ricardo, and their followers,
this necessary balance between consumption and pro-
duction is self-establishing, and inevitably, with-
out anyone's trying to concern himself with it, pro-
duction cannot increase without consumption increas-
ing at the same time. Were commodities able to multi-
ply themselves indefinitely, they would always find
markets •••• An increase in commodities will always
increase the pleasure of those who produce more (Soc:
111-112) .
But Sismondi, and Durkheim, of course, questioned the impli-
cit premise that the desire for material goods was poten-
tially infinite. Indeed, Sismondi argued in marginal terms
that there can be no infinite elasticity of consumer demand.
If there is greater surplus available, he argued, people will
first shift from questions of quantity to quality, and then,
when they have had enough, their desires will cease to moti-
vate further.
But, replies Sismondi, this is to attribute to human
needs an elasticity they do not possess. In reality
the clothier does not have a better appetite because
he weaves more fabric •••• There is a limit that comes
from being satisfied, and no one will indefinitely en-
large his reserve of clothing merely because his in-
come increases. What will happen? Instead of demanding
more clothes, he will get better ones. He will give up
those he is accustomed to and demand finer ones ••••
Thus it is necessary that all surpluses balance and
be exchangeable, and in relationship, if they are to
raise consumption accordingly. They no longer serve
one another mutually as markets from the moment they
are increased beyond a certain point. They tend, on
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the contrary, to repel and suppress one another in
order to give way to commodities of new and better
quality--which they call into being. These latter do
not add further to the old but substitute for them.
The farmer who produces more than in the past does
not utilize, in exchange for this surplus, the ex-
cess fabrics which at the same time, the manufact-
urer, by exertion, is able to make. On the contrary,
he leaves the latter without work. He will dispose
manufacturers, by the very pressure he exerts on them
and the prospect of remuneration he offers them, to
change their machinery and replace their surplus by
products of higher price, and in this way equilibrium
will at length reestablish itself (Soc:112-L3).
But this complex reestablishing of equilibrium, Sismondi and
Durkheim noted, between supply and demand, productive effi-
ciency and rising consumer demand, will not emerge automati-
cally and without internal "friction," as it were.
But this transformation is not made ipso facto. It
constitutes a more or less grave crisis since it im-
plies losses, new expenses, and a whole series of
working rearrangements. In fact, it supposes that ex-
cess commodities have remained unused and lost all
value, that the capital engaged in the tools employ-
ed to produce them has been destroyed, that workers
have remained without employment or had to go into
new jobs, that all the losses entailed by the change
of work have been undergone by industry, etc. So we
are already far from the perfect harmony which would
establish itself automatically--according to the Eng-
lish school--between consumption and production (Soc:
113) .
The business cycle, manufacturer retooling and changeover,
cyclical unemployment, retraining, geographical dislocation,
etc., these and more are merely some of the first inventory
of the hidden costs of economic and technological progress.
And certainly these dislocations are not automatically heal-
ed by some beneficent "invisible hand, II automatically reest-
ablishing harmony, a veritable deus ~ machina.
Now, while the classiqal Utilitarian economic moral-
ists were primarily concerned with touting the beneficial
social effects of greater individual production, Sismondi
and Durkheim were more concerned with the unanticipated nega-
tive social consequences of infinitely expanding consumption.
Indeed, Sismondi wondered, in effect, where is this constant-
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ly accelerating demand going to come from? Even the substi-
tution of quality for quantity, 5ismondi argued, will have
increasingly less effect on regenerating demand.
Balance can establish itself in this manner only by
the substitution of luxury enterprises for former
undertakings. But this substitution is not possible
indefinitely, for the need of luxury items is not
itself unlimited. The life of luxury is the life of
leisure •••• 50 the necessities of life constitute in
this way also a limit which cannot be determined pre-
cisely but which always is present. It is not there-
fore true that production can increase indefinitely
while remaining in balance with consumption, for the
latter, at a given state of civilization, cannot rise
above a certain level. The quantity of objects neces-
sary to life has very narrow limits for certain items
and the producer cannot go beyond them with impunity.
When that comes he must himself improve quality--but
even the perfecting of quality itself has limits. The
need for superfluities--like the need for necessites--
has a limit (50c:ll3-ll4).
Again and again, Durkheim, after 5ismondi, emphasized
that there is a certain incommensurability between greater
production and greater consumption--for an increase in the
former does not necessitate a corresponding increase in the
latter. Indeed, while productive capacity may increase in-
definitely, given resources, both 5ismondi and Durkheim de-
clared that consumption is relatively fixed, certainly on
the level of needs, and even demand for luxury goods reach-
es a point of marginality. While this marginal boundary is
not fixed, and may expand with higher standardsof living,
nevertheless, at each point in history societies seek to
establish some kind of workable and reasonable equilibrium
between expanding production, available resources, and con-
sumption.
At each point in history there is a point which pro-
duction cannot pass without disrupting the balance
with consumption, and this disruption cannot occur
without serious disturbances resulting. For either
this useless surplus stays without a buyer--and con-
sequently without value--constituting a kind of caput
mortuum which will decrease as much as the returns
of the producers--or else to sell this excess, the
producers will offer it a low price. But to do so
with the least possible injury, they will be forced
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to lower wages, income to the capital employed,
rents paid, etc. (Soc:114).
Durkheim and Sismondi then asked us to imagine what
would happen if the utopia promised by the Utilitarian re-
formers actually materialized.
Imagine general overproduction, and it will be a
struggle of all against all, a violent, grievous
struggle from which the victors themselves will not
really profit. For in order that production may safe-
ly free itself from its surplus by letting it go cheap,
it must diminish the income of all its associates. But
it is by his income that each regulates his expendi-
tures •.• his consumption. If he lowers one, the other
diminishes. He is therefore at an impasse. One cannot
succeed in artifically elevating the level of consump-
tion in one way except by lowering it in another .••.
One flounders endlessly in a situation without solution
(Soc:114) .
What a powerful epigrammatic description of both the dilem-
mas of the modern economy and anomic desires, and the closed
world of suicide: "One flounders endlessly, helplessly, in a
situation without solution." And, of course, we drown.
These are just a few of the unanticipated consequen-
ces we have discovered on the road to the utilitarians' uto-
pia. Viable relations between society and economy, between
self and culture, are only possible if there is a generative
and meaningful balance between technological expansion of
productive capacity and the more problematic growth of con-
sumer desires. Health, remember, has been defined here as
balance, as resting on the "golden mean." In other words,
health means wholeness, mutual proportion, just as meaning
is the relation of part to whole. Since the intimate and
necessary inner link between expansion of production and
growth of consumer demand has been almost irretrievably
snapped in the modern economic world, we are all caught up
in a constantly expanding technological-economic machine
that no one oan shut off, that no one has control of, that
no one can submit to a substantively rational rule. In short,
we have entrapped ourselves in an ever-tightening "iron
cage,"·fit subjects for a Gothic horror novel. The "moral
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anarchy" of anomie chronic in precisely those liberal sec-
tors of the modern world which have insisted on the great
moral and social benefits of "market capitalism," and its
correlate of constantly accelerating appetites. Ecocide
and suicide are the public and private unanticipated traum-
atic outcomes of this utopian disaster.
Today, it is especially the infinite expansion of the
market, the rationalization of economic and social process,
and the resulting insatiable appetites of this planetary
behemoth, this Frankenstein, which we have built, which
throws everything so fundamentally out of human scale.
The equilibrium between production and consumption--
far from being inevitable--is on the contrary very
unstable and easy to disturb. According to Sismondi,
our new conditions of economic life make this imbal-
ance chronic. Formerly, when the market was very lim-
ited, when it did not extend beyond the village, the
small market town, or the immediate neighborhood,
each producer could make a careful computation of the
needs he had to supply and limit his work accordingly.
But today, when the market has become almost limitless,
this useful check has disappeared. No longer can one
judge precisely the extent of the demand he must sup-
ply. The industrialist, the farmer, believe that they
have infinite markets spread before them and tend to
spread themselves to meet them. These limitless pros-
pects arouse limitIess-ambItIOns, and to satisfy the
appetites thus stirred each produces as much as he can
* (Soc:114-l!».
Thus, rather than the creation of a utopia, Durkheim
and Sismondi argued, the impersonal world-wide "universal
otherhood (Nelson, 1969a)of the Utilitarian moral reformers
bequeathed us a fear-ridden war of collective egoisms, which
leads to ecocide and suicide. Rather than a promised heaven
on earth, both the Utilitarians and their heretical heirs
(that is, the philosophic and critical radicals), have in-
stead willed us a hell on earth, where one is condemned, by
the very structure of society and everyday life, to "floun-
der helplessly, alone, in a situation without sOlution."
Or, to shift the image, we are forced, like Sisyphus, up
yet another ascent of the mountain, to assume another spirit
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crushing burden (see also Weber, 1958a). The treadmill grinds
on, and on and on.
Even to be sure of holding onto an acquired position,
one is often obliged to try to extend it. For, as one
feels himself surrounded by rivals--whom he does not
even know--he always fears that a surplus from a more
or less distant enterprise will be thrown on the mar-
ket he now supplies, and he will be dispossesed from
it. To prevent an invasion one gets ahead of it by him-
self invading and one attacks in order to avoid having
to defend himself. He increases his own production in
order to prevent over-production elsewhere from becom-
ing a threat. It is because individual interests are
discordant and-UnIeashed, without restraint today-,--
~~ community'~ interest in a regulated product-
10n, 1n harmony with the needs of consumption, is lost
SIght of. It is ang~unto death which has imposecr--
itself on those who have engendered this fever, this
hyperactIvity, whICh-exhausts individUals and soCIet-
ies. And this is why the production of wealth, when
it has--as today--no regulation, and no planning, cau-
ses pain and misery instead of abundance *(Soc: 115) .
Durkheim and Sismondi conclude thus their ironic lesson:
It is not true that the struggle of individual inter-
ests promotes the greatest good of all. Just as pros-
perity within a family requires the head to adjust ex-
penditures in proportion to income, so in advancing
the public welfare the sovereign authority must super-
vise and restrain individual interests so as to have
them work for the general good (Soc:115).
Now, assuming that some crucial historical shift oc-
cured to sanction insatiable desires in the form of unend-
ing drives for progress and perfection, we should note that
the constant stimulation of such demand is a cornerstone of
modern expanding economies. We might recall that Keynes's
diagnosis of the underlying ills of the Great Depression
was that the problem lay mainly on the demand side of the
equation. That is, insufficient demand was being generated
to soak up the productive capacity of the constantly accel-
erating economic machine. Hence, the "Great Transformation"
of which Polanyi (1944) spoke so profoundly. Apparently,
the traditionally high levels of demand of the small but
conspicuously consuming elite circles could not sustain the
new economic imperative if their insatiability did not
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--963--
also spread to the masses. (Perhaps the mass production of
images of royalty in egalitarian American played an import-
ant, if subterranean, symbolic role in this transformation).
Clearly, the old middle classes still largely directed by
the Puritan ethos of thrift (low consumption) and hard work
(high production) contributed to the problem, for the eco-
nomic machinery was gearing up to new heights of productive
scale and efficiency, with little expanding markets to ab-
sorb the coming cascade of goods. And just as clearly, the
classes (eg. farmers, other immigrants, etc.) still domina-
ted by a traditional social schedule of satisfaction could
not supply the necessary demand. Thus, as Bensman and Vidich
(1971) have seen, the New American Society created out of
the Depression, the New Deal, and the "Keynesian revolution"
rested on an inversion of the old supply-demand equation.
What we see, then, is a metamorphosisof the Protestant
Ethos from the duty to save to the compulsion to consume.
Given such obstacles to stimulating higher consumer
desires (see especially the cogent article by Parsons, 1934),
the Keynesian revolution in sociocultural terms capitalized
on the latent ethic of "impersonal service directed toward
super-personal ends" while bending it to an entirely-differ-
ent expression than originally intended. I repeat: one of
the hidden meanings of post-Keynesian economic intervention
by the central political authority is that the traditional
relations between supply and demand have been inverted. And,
I submit, just as market capitalism itself could not have
been born without a specific normative underpinning, so too
this inversion of the traditional social schedule of supply
and demand, of the socioeconomic equations between production
and consumption, could not have occurred without another ma-
jor metamorphosis in the cultural underpinnings. If the first
breakthrough described by Weber and Polanyi rested on the
old Protestant Ethos, then the second breakthrough to cen-
tral intervention and amelioration of the plight of the
masses (in order to raise consumption on a mass level) was
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legitimated by a second installment of the Protestant Eth-
os, the liberal ethos of "social service" (see Benton John-
son, 1971, 1975). Indeed, in a curious twist of fate, it
was just this liberal "New Deal" ethos which Mertonian "ano-
mie theory" served (see appendix).
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H. The Moral Legitimation of Absolute Individualism and
Insatiability in Modern Economies: The Utilitarian Ethos
The doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress
has become an article of faith (5:257).
Today the market has become almost limitless •... The
industrialist, the farmer, believe that they have in-
finite markets before them..•• These limitless pros-
pects arouse limitless ambitions (50c:115).
It is because individual interests are discordant and
unleashed, without restraint today, that the communi-
ty's interest in a regulated production, in harmony
with the needs of consumption, is lost sight of. It
is a fight unto death which has imposed itself on those
who engendered this fever, this hyperactivity, which
exhausts individuals and society (50c:115).
We will not succeed in pacifying roused appetites,be-
cause they will acquire new force in the measure they
are appeased. There are no limits possible to th~ir
requirements. To undertake to appease them by satis-
fying them is to hope to fill the vessel of the Danai-
des (50c:93) •
To review: in his first schema, Durkheim portrayed the
the insatiable desires constituting modern anomie as the re-
sult of the release and moral deregulation accompanying the
modern transitional crisis. But we have also discovered
that with the great transformation that accompanied the
birth of market capitalism, a fundamental metamorphosis
from traditional to modern society, the "moral anarchy" of
anomie becomes chronic in the most progressive sectors of
the modern world. Indeed, Durkheim himself acknowledged that
this "longing for the infinite" is "daily represented as a
mark of moral distinction," and that "when men are inoculat-
ed with the precept that their duty is to progress, it is
harder to make them accept resignation, so the number of
malcontented and disquieted is bound to increase." Thus,
the traditional social schedule of satisfaction thaL coun-
seled only the maintenance of one's long-standing standard
of living in an assigned occupation and cultural status
has been chronically upset. Whereas earlier deviations
from the traditional schedule were considered illegitimate,
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today absolute individualism and insatiability are consi-
dered legitimate; regulation of the unencumbered individual
is bad. Or as James Russell Lowell put it in a quintessen-
tial expression: "Not failure but low aim is the only crime."
As we conclude this section on Durkheim's notion of
anomie as culturally sanctioned, let us recall his contrast
between the traditionalism of the social schedule in socie-
ties dominated by a sacrosanct magical collective conscien-
ce, and modern societies which sanction absolute individual-
ism and infinite strivings on a Utilitarian basis. Durkheim
observed that in traditional societies several social insti-
tutions regulated satisfaction of individual desires through
the economic sphere. For example, in medieval and early mo-
dern Europe, various levels of government, religious insti-
tutions, and occupational groups such as guilds restrained
deadly competition, and thus regulated desires in a more cor-
porative direction. However, in modern societies religious
and guild-like groups have lost much of their regulatory po-
wer over economic life. Indeed, in the first phase of mar-
ket capitalism even the government's role assigned by Util-
itarian doctrine was merely to support and stimulate the
market, but not to regulate it or constrain it. As Halevy
(1955) pointed out, the political and economic demands of
the Utilitarians were based upon opposing principles.
For a whole century, economic progress has mainly
consisted in freeing industrial relations from all
regulation. Until very recently, it was the function
of a whole system of moral forces to exert this dis-
cipline. First, the influence of religion was felt
alike by workers and masters, the poor and the rich.
It consoled the former and taught them contentment
with their lot by informing them of the providential
nature of the social order, that the share of each
class was assigned by God himself, and by holding
out the hope for just compensation in a world to
come for the inequalities of this world. It govern-
ed the latter, recalling that worldly interests are
not man's entire lot, that they must be subordinate
to other and higher interests, and that they should
therefore not be pursued without rule or measure.
Temporal power, in turn, restrained the scope of eco-
nomic functions by its supremacy over them and by the
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relatively subordinate role it assigned them. Fin-
ally, within the business world proper, the occupa-
tional groups by regulating salaries, the price of
products, and production itself, indirectly fixed
the average level of income on which needs are part-
ially based by the very force of circumstances (8:255).
But in the modern era no traditional social institu-
tion or cultural norm serves to regulate economically expres-
sed desires. Indeed, not only has therebeen a release from
traditional controls, but more importantly, the anomic insa-
tiability implied in permanent drives for "progress and per-
fection ll have been culturally mandated. Both liberal Utili-
tarians and Marxian socialists alike worship at the altar
of material progress. "The doctrine of the most ruthless and
swift progress has become an article of faith" (8:257). tlJhe-
ther the England of Dickens and Owens, or Russia under Lenin
and 8talin, or China under Mao, industrialization is a trau-
matic experience which alters alrnPst every aspect of society.
Actually, religion has lost much of its power. And
government, instead of regulating economic life, has
become its tool and servant. The most opposite schools,
orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to
reduce government to the role of a more or less pass-
ive intermediary among the various social functions.
The former wish to make it simply the guardian of in-
dividual contracts; the latter leave it the task of
doing the collective bookkeeping, that is, of record-
ing the demands of consumers, transmitting them to pro-
ducers, inventorying the total revenue, and distribu-
ting it according to a fixed formula. But both refuse
it any power to subordinate other social organs to it-
self and to make them converge toward one dominant aim.
On both sides nations are declared to have the single
or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity;
such is the implication of the dogma of economic mater-
ialism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems.
And as these theories merely express the state of opin-
ion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a
means to an end transcending itself, has become the
supreme end of individuals and societies alike (8:255).
Now, the contrast between the ruling rationales of
social organization under the traditional schedule of main-
tenance and the modern apotheosis of well-being is instruct-
ive. As Karl Polanyi (1968) has observed, in tribal or "reci-
procal" economies, the economic system was embedded in the
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ruling rationales of another social institution--namely,
the kinship system. In archaic or "redistributive" econo-
mies, socioeconomic action was largely directed by a coali-
tion of political, military, and religious elites. Now, in
world-historical terms, one of the unique features of mar-
ket capitalism was that, for the first time, the economy
was freed from traditional corporative constraints and from
being bent to non-economic ruling rationales. The "tribal
brotherhood" of traditional society was forever dissolved.
Individualistic and non-traditional Utilitarian rationales,
through the mechanism of the global markets' "invisible
hand," began to dominate all previous cultural rules and
all other social institutions. All aspects of life were
now to be subordinated to the so-called "natural" or "iron
laws" of the self-equilibrating market. The Puritans' deus
absonditus became reincarnated as the deus ex machina of
---
the new international market mechanism. The self-regulating
market itself, in replacing God as a primal rhetorical prin-
ciple (see the work of Kenneth Burke) became the prime in-
strument of mass moral discipline in the modern "disenchant-
ed" age. Thus, since release and control are often ironi-
cally bound to one another, we may catch a glimpse of how
it came to be that the instrument of liberation of the ri-
sing middle classes, and such political parties as the
Whigs and the Federalist-Republicans in the United States,
came to enslave us all.
I cannot emphasize too much the importance of this
great reversal in economic rationales. The individual dis-
placed the collectivity, and insatiability or a legitimized
"infinity of dreams and desires" replaced the resignation
to the traditional social schedule: these elements go togeth-
er. And, I must further emphasize that this double displace-
ment cannot adequately be ascribed to the simple release of
the organic ego from traditional moral discipline, as in
Durkheim's first schema. For this "Brave New World" could
only emerge from the imposition of a new and rather differ-
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ent type of mass moral discipline. Today we are disciplin-
ed to insatiability, to infinite "progress and perfection."
Durkheim himself saw that the Utilitarian moralists enshrin-
ed the self-regulating market as the chief means of imper-
sonal mass social control •
••• the appetites thus excited have become freed of
any limiting authority. By sanctifying them, so to
speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them
above all human law. Their restraint seems like a sort
of sacrilege •••• Ultimately, this liberation of de-
sires has been made worse by the very development of
industry and the almost infinite extension of the mar-
ket. So long as the producer could gain his profits
only in his immediate neighborhood, the restricted a-
mount of possible gain could not overexcite ambition.
Now that he may assume to have almost the entire world
as his customer, how could passions accept their form-
er confinement in the face of such limitless prospects
(S:255-6)?
Today, of course, since to consummate our ever-expand-
ing desires we must worker harder, the ever-expanding imper-
sonal international market mechanism imposes an ever more
resolute discipline on us all. Just as it constantly escal-
ates demands for productive efficiency, and the correspond-
ing specialization and "vocational asceticism" this demands
of each of us, so too the market also demands that we con-
stantly increase our level of consumption, even though we
may not have time to enjoy the fruits of our labor. Indeed,
it has become almost as much a duty to entertain constant-
ly rising aspirations and expectations as it has always been
a duty, at least in American culture, to stand alone as a
hard-working self-reliant Yankee. Certainly, the inflation-
ary spiral we have come to accept as the price of constant
progress presumes constantly accelerating sales and wage
and salary levels. Since the self-regulating market has re-
placed all former ethical principles in working to regulate
and generate desires through individualistic competition,
the infinite expansion of the market implies that infinite
desires must also be sanctioned and constantly regenerated.
Otherwise, we could be charged, a; Merton noted, with a weak-
ness of character--Iack of i'moral stamina."
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--970--
Such is the source of the excitement predominating in
this part of society, and which has thence extended
to other parts. There,the state of crisis and anomie
is constant, and, so to speak, normal. From top to
bottom of the ladder, greed is aroused without know-
ing where to find ultimate foothold. Nothing can calm
it, since its goal is far beyond all it can attain.
Reality seems valueless by comparison with the dreams
of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandon-
ed but so too iE pOEsibility abandoned when it in turn
becomes reality. A thirst for novelties, unfamiliar
pleasures,nameless sensations, all of which lose their
savor once known. Henceforth, one has no strength to
endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and
the sterility of the tumult is apparent, and it is seen
that all these new sensations in their infinite quanti-
ty cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to sup-
port one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing
how to enjoy achieved results without having constant-
ly to replace them with others, finds in them an attach-
ment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the man who
has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived
with his eyes fixed on it, has nothing in the past as
a comfort against the presen~s afflictions, for the
past was nothing to him but a series of hastilyexper-
ienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his ex-
pectation always to find further on the happiness he
had so far missed. Now he is stopped in his tracks;
from now on nothing remains behind or ahead to fix his
gaze upon. Weariness alone is enough to bring disillu-
sionment, for he cannot in the end escape the futili-
!Y of an endless pursuit*(S:256}.
Is this not the essence of our contemporary moral malaise?
When we couple Durkheim's keen phenomenological in-
sight into the ravages of the modern "infinity of dreams
and desires" with the actual historical ethical supports
for market capitalism, especially in the secularization of
Calvinistic ethics in the Anglo Enlightenment led by the
Scottish moral philosophers, the evidence becomes compell-
ing--modern anomie and egoisme are generated by the presen-
ce of still strong ethical and cultural sanctions for abso-
lute individualism and drives for infinite "progress and per-
perfection." The utilitarian moral philosophers, only par-
tially disguised as neutral "political economists," presum-
ed endless striving, as Parsons went to great pains to de-
monstrate in the work of Marshall (1949). The Utilitarians
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apotheosized the chronic imbalance so brilliantly anatomized
by Sismondi and Durkheim. Indeed, Durkheim remarked that
" ... the themes that celebrate the beneficence of unrestric-
ted liberties are apologies for a diseased state" (ME:54).
We are living precisely in one of those critical revolu-
tionary periods when authority is usually weakened
through the loss of traditional discipline--a time that
may easily give rise to a spirit of anarchy. This is
the source of the anarchic passions that, whether con-
sciously or not, are emerging today, not only in the
particular sects bearing the name, but in the very dif-
ferent doctrines that, although opposed on other points,
join in a common aversion to anything smacking of regu-
lation (ME:54) .
••• human conduct •.. loses itself in the void, the emp-
tiness of which is disguised and adorned with the spe-
cious label of the infinite (ME:48).
Further, in Moral Education, while speaking of how his
notion of the necessity of moral discipline and the dangers
of anomic passions seems to "affront a widespread sentiment,"
Durkheim mentioned the leading Utilitarian theorist--Jeremy
Bentham, by name.
to limit, to restrain--this is to deny, to impede
the process of living and thus partially destroy; and
all destruction is evil. If life is good, how can it be
good to bridle it, to constrain it, to impose limits,
that it cannot overcome? •• Does not all constraint, by
definition, do violence to the nature of things? It was
just reasoning that led Bentham to see in law an evil
scarcely tolerable, which could only be reasonably jus-
tified when it was clearly indispensable. However, be-
cause a person's continuing activities involve those of
others, and because in the encounter there is the danger
of conflict, it becomes necessary to specify fair limits
of conduct that must not be transgressed. But such lim-
itation is in itself an abnormal thing. For Bentham,
morality, like law, involved a kind of pathology. Most
of the classical economists were of the same view
(ME: 35-6) .
Indeed, when constraint "is hateful in itself," then
we see the apotheosis of the infinite expansion of the inter-
national market, the infinite expansion of dreams and desires
in a finite world. Clearly, the Utilitarian ethos shifted the
grounds of legitimate moral authority from the group to the
individual, from tradition to culturally sanctioned drives
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for "progress and perfection."
These dispositions are so inbred that society has grown
to accept them and is accustomed to think of them as
normal. It is everlastingly repeated that it is man's na-
ture to be eternally dissatisfied, constantly to advance,
without relief or rest, toward an indefinite goal. The
longing for infinity is daily represented as a mark of
moral distinction (S:257).
Clearly, if this "eternal dissatisfaction" is represented as
"a mark of moral distinction," it cannot be considered as due
simply to the release of the pre-social ego from traditional
moral controls, but rather was and is preached as a new gos-
pel. If the "longing for infinity is daily represented" as
virtuous, then how can we escape the conclusion that anomie
and egoisme are themselves the unanticipated negative results
of extreme moral obligations? Of a peculiar type of modern
moral discipline that leads to self-destruction?
Thus, one is led to enjoin man to develop not a prefer-
ence for balance and moderation, some feeling for moral
limits--and which is only another aspect of the source
of moral authority--but to an altogether contradictory
view, that is, impatience with all restraint and limita-
tion, the desire to encourage unrestrained and infinite
appetites. Man, it seems, is cribbed and confined when
he has not a limitless horizon before him. Doubtless we
know very well that we shall never be in a position to
achieve such a goal: but apparently such a perspective
is essential, since it alone can provide us with a sense
of the fullness of life. From such reasoning derives the
veneration that so many nineteenth-century writers ac-
corded the notion of the infinite. Here we see the lofty
sentiment par excellence, since by means of it man ele-
vates himself beyond all the limits imposed by nature
and liberates himself, at least ideally, from all re-
strictions that might diminish him (ME:35-6).
Thus, we see that Durkheim shifted on his analytical
axes from the notion of absence to presence of cultural sanc-
tions when he recognize that the "notion of the infinite"
was the ideal for Utilitarian and Romantic alike. One might
ambiguously consider that the daily "longing for the infin-
ite" comes only from "unregulated consciences," but, if so,
it must be emphasized that these are new types of self-regu-
lated consciences who, in imposing "vocational asceticism or
mysticism" on themselves, "elevate to a rule the very lack
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of rule from which they suffer." This dual rejection of tra-
ditional moral control and the elevation of the autonomous
individual and his infinite drives for "progress and perfec-
tion" to the center of the moral stage heralds a new type of
conscience, a "New Model Man" for a "Brave New World."
Alas, the "New Man" commits suicide and ecocide. We
have to learn, once again, the wisdom of the ancient moral
philosophy of the "golden mean," for when we push our virtues
to extreme, they invert, ironically, into our characteristic
vices.
In Chapter Ten of this Book, we shall explore the reli-
gious and ethical roots of anomie and egoisme and their re-
spective cultural traditions.
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CHAPTER NINE
EGOISME, THE INFINITY OF DREAMS, AND THE MODERN
ANGUISHED JOURNEY INTO THE INTERIOR
Our very egoisme is in large part a product of society
(5:360).
One cannot develop personality to excess without devel-
oping egotism (DL:239).
Excessive individualism not only results in favoring
the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such
a cause. It not only frees man's inclination to do away
with himself •.. but creates this inclination out of
whole cloth, and thus gives birth to a special suicide
which bears its mark. This must be clearly understood
(5:210) •
Preface. If anomie i.mp1ies an externalized "infinity of de-
sires," egoisme implies an inward turning "infinity of
dreams." Both anomie and egoisme proceed from similar sour-
ces--the abso1utizing of the individual, and the assignment
to him of an infinite task. Both anomie and egoisme are so-
cially carried and culturally sanctioned. However, in the
first case, the abso1utizing of the lone individual and his
infinite task is turned outward against the external world,
while in the second case, the angst of the isolated social
atom is introjected, and ultimately, this "journey into the
interior" and "infinity of dreams" is turned against the
self. Durkheim himself noted:
Two factors of suicide, especially, have a peculiar
affinity for one another: namely, egoisme and anomie.
We know that they are usually two different aspects
of one social state; thus, it is not surprising that
they should be found in the same individual. It is,
indeed, almost inevitable that the egoist should have
some tendency to non-regulation; for since he is de-
tached from society, it has not sufficient hold upon
him to regulate him. If, nevertheless, his desires
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are not usually excited, it is because in his case
the life of the passions languishes, because he is
wholly introverted and not attracted to the world
outside (5:288).
Further, the pathology of lIinfinity sickness ll is mani-
fested in different ways in these two two modern forms of
II moral anarchy."
Anomie partially results from the same state of disag-
gregation from which the egoistic current also springs.
But this individual cause produces different effects,
depending on its point of incidence and whether it in-
fluences active and practical functions, or functions
that are representational. The former it agitates and
exasperates; the latter it disorients and disconcerts.
In both cases, the remedy is the same (5:382).
In psychological terms, anomie affects the II practical and
active functions," and in sociological terms, the business-
man and the industrialist, while egoisme, in psychological
terms, affects the imaginative or IIrepresentativell func-
tions, and is found most clearly among artists, intellect-
uals, and so on. Among other observers, LaCapra has seen
these similarities and differences between anomie and ego-
isme in Durkheim's Suicide.
Egoisme, in the sense of atomistic individualism, ob-
viously had a large area of analytical and empirical
overlapping with individualistic forms of anomie, and
both might be institutionally or ideologically justi-
fied ..•. Anomie referred to a pathology of practical
reason and egoisme to a pathology of theoretical rea-
son .•.• Anomie was related to the II practical,1I appe-
titive, and active faculties: desire, passion and will,
especially the will to power. Egoisme was related to
the imaginative, intellectual, cognitive, and IItheo-
retical ll faculties (1972:165-6).
But Durkheim himself provided us with the consummate
description of the points of convergence and divergence be-
tween these two dominant forms of the ll moral anarchy" emer-
ging from our contemporary '!dis-eases of the infinite. II
Suicides of both types suffer from ••• diseases of
the infinite. But the disease does not assume the
same form in both cases. In one reflective intelli-
gence is affected and immoderately overnourished
[egoisme]; in the other, emotion is over-excited
and freed from all restraint [anomie]. In one,
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thought, by dint of falling back upon itself, has
no object left; in the other, passion, no longer
recognizing bounds, has no goal left. The former
is ~.!!;!. the infi~ity of dreams, the"""'Second in
the 1nf1n1ty of des1res * (5:287).
In both anomie and egoisme, we drown, "floundering helpless-
ly in a situation without solution." Why? Perhaps because
it is religious sanctions which mandate our infinite stri-
vings in a finite world. Later, we shall explore how
our highest aspirations came to encircle us in an "iron
cage. "
Here, let us first look into some of the psychological
characteristics of egoisme as the fourth and final major his-
torical type of suicide. We shall note that egoistic sui-
cides, in contrast to anomie, are passive and apathetic.
Comparing egoisme to altruisme, in the second schema we see
not only the passive/active contrast, but the double opposi-
tion between fundamentallyopposed cultural sanctions rela-
ting the individual to society at the two ends of history.
We shall then consider Durkheim's second thesis that even
"Our egoisme is in large part a product of society." Al-
though the "cult of the moralized person" is coterminous,
in Durkheim's view, with the universalistic or extended
civilizational bond of the modern era, we also discover
that all prime cultural values tend to become absolutized
and thus, almost inevitably deflected from their original
proportions and meanings. Therefore, we see that in modern
society, while the "cult of the individual" and egoistic ten-
sions resulting in suicide are not exactly logically and his-
torically congruent, because of the fundamental principle
just enunicated "the one cannot be stimulated without the
other being enlarged" (5:364). Indeed, "one cannot develop
personality to excess without developing egotism."
Finally, we shall discover that the tensions induced
by the modern "dis-eases of the infinite," and the Romantic
"journey into the interior" and the ethos of angst and an-
guished subjectivity accompanying these, are really only
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the "... deflected or exaggerated forms of a virtue." In-
deed, the cultural sanctioning of "utmost inwardness" and,
thus, of egoisme, results in " ••• creating nothingness
within by creating it without, and thus has nothing left
upon which to reflect but its own misery" (8:279).
A. The Psychology of Egoisme: Passive Introversion and
The Litany of Modern Angst
8adness does not inhere in things .•.• It is a pro-
duct of our own thought (8:280).
Extremely refined nervous systems live in pain, and
end by attaching themselves to it (DL:242-3).
If consciousness constitutes unhappiness for man, it
is only by achieving a morbid development in which,
revolting against its own nature, it poses as an ab-
solute and seeks its purpose in itself (8:280).
In contrast to anomie, which has become enshrined as
" one of the few truly central concepts in sociological
theory" (P3. rsons), egoisme has fallen into sociological dark-
ness. Would it, then, surprise us to learn that Durkheim
thought egoisme actually to be the more chronic problem in
the modern world?
The type of suicide actually the most widespread and
which contributes most to raise the annual total of
voluntary deaths is egoistic suicide. It is charact-
erized by a state of depression and apathy produced
by exaggerated individuation. The individual no long-
er cares to live because he no longer cares enough for
for the only medium which attaches him to reality,
that is to say, for society. Having too keen a feel-
ing for himself and his own value, he wishes to be
his own only goal, and as such an objective cannot
satisfy him, drags out languidly and indiffently an
existence which henceforth seems meaningless to him
(8:356).
Now, egoisme, like fa~alisme, is a passive form of
suicide, in contrast to both anomie and altruisme; an inward
turning pathology in contrast to anomie; and a self-center-
ing and self-destroying "dis-ease of the infinite" in con -
trast to the sacrifice of self for the group seen in primi-
tive altruisme. Thus, the prime psychological characteris-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--978--
tics of egoisme in the second schema include: apathy, pass-
ive introversion, "indolent melancholy," or "disillusioned
sangfroid" (5:293), extreme subjectivity, and a deep depres-
sion or despondency coming from an "infinity of dreams" and
the consequent exhaustion of the imagination and correspond-
ing paralysis of the will. As with all human tensions which
reach a suicidal crescendo, egoisme is simultaneously the
result of both too much and too little. Too little proportion
in one's daily life, too little help and human support--thus,
the individual is either left alone or perhaps even compelled
to isolate himself. On the contrary, with altruisme, the in-
dividual is completely depersonalized and submerged in a so-
cio-cosmic ocean, as it were. Too much, because the overwhel-
ming cultural emphases on the "cult of the individual" and
the corresponding cult of "utmost inwardness" become absolu-
tized. This deflection from mutual proportion in everyday
life and exaggeration of the .significance of only one virtue
over against all the others bidding legitimately for our at-
tention inevitably ends in torturing the person and, ultima-
tely, consuming his soul.l
Therefore, Durkheim gave the name "egoisme" to " ... the
state of the ego living its own life and obeying itself alone"
(5:221).
If we agree to call this state of egoism, in which the
individual ego asserts itself to excess in the face of
the social ego, and at its expense, we may call egoist-
ic the special type of suicide springing from excessive
individualism (5:209).
In contrasting egoisme and altruisme, Durkheim observed that
they are opposed psychological forms. "The egoistic suicide
is characterized by a general depression in the form of a
melancholic languor or Epicurean indifference. Altruistic
suicide, on the contrary, involves an expenditure of energy .
••• Altruisme is an active suicide, contrasting with the de-
pressed suicide" (5:283).
While the egoist is unhappy because he sees nothing
real in the world but the individual, the intemper-
ate altruist's sadness, on the contrary, sorings from
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the individual's seeming wholly unreal to him. One
is deflected from life, because seeing no goal to
which he may attach himself, he feels himself use-
less and purposeless; the other because he has a
goal but one outside this life, which henceforth
seems merely an obstacle to him. Thus, the differ-
ence of the causes reappears in their effects, and
the melancholy of the one is quite different from
that of the other. That of the former [egoisme] con-
sists of a feeling of incurable weariness and sad
depression; it expresses a complete relaxation of
activity, which, unable to find useful employment,
collapses. That of the former [altruisme], on the
contrary, springs from hope; for it depends on the
belief in beautiful perspectives beyond this life.
It even implies enthusiasm and the spur of a faith
eagerly seeking satisfaction, affirming itself by
acts of extreme energy (S:225-26l.
Now, we should remember that altruisme and egoisme
are doubly opposite; their opposing valuational content
served Durkheim as both a significant index of the ruling
cultural rationales and dominant modes of social organiza-
tion of societies at the two -ends of history.
One [altruisme] is related to the crude morality
which disregards everything relating solely to the
individual; the other is closely related to the re-
fined ethics which set human personality on so high
a pedestal that it can no longer be subordinated to
anything. Between the two is all the difference be-
tween primitive peoples and the most civilized na-
tions (S:227).
Both altruisme and egoisme are ethically sanctioned by their
respective cultures at the two poles of sociocultural evolu-
tion. As noted earlier, Durkheim acknowledged however, that
at times we may find some "mixed" forms of egoisme and al-
truisme •
.•• egoisme and altruisme, themselves, contraries
as they are, may combine their influence. At certain
epochs, when disaggregated society can no longer serve
as an objective for individual activities, individuals
or groups will nevertheless be found who, while exper-
iencing the influence of this general condition of ego-
isme, aspire to other things. Feeling, however, that
a passage from one egoistic pleasure to another is a
poor method of escaping themselves, and that fugitive
joys, even though constantly renewed could never quiet
their unrest, they seek some durable object to which
they attach themselves permanently and which shall give
•
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meaning to their lives. Since they are contented
with nothing real, however, they find satisfaction
~nly in creating out of whole cloth~ ideal real-
lty to~ this role. So in thought they create an
imaginary berng-whose slaves they become and to which
they devote themselves the more exclusively the more
they are detached from everything else, themselves
included. To it they assign all the attachment to ex-
istence which they ascribe to themselves, since all
else is valueless in their eyes. So they live a two-
fold existence: individualists so far as the real
world is concerned, they are immoderate altruists in
in everything that concerns this ideal objective.
Both dispositions lead to suicide*(S:289).
Surely this description of the "mixed" possibility of ego-
isme and altruisme aptly characterizes many political and
social reformers today. But Durkheim turns back in history
to offer Stoic philosophy as a prime illustration.
Though the Stoic professes absolute indifference to
everything beyond the range of the individual person-
ality, though he exhorts the individual to be self-
sufficient, he simultaneously assigns the individual
a close dependence on universal reason, and even re-
dU0es him to nothing more than the instrument through
which this reason is realized. He thus combines two
antagonistic conceptions: the most radical moral in-
dividualism and an immoderate pantheism. The suicide
he commits is thus both apathetic like that of the
egoist, and performed as a duty like the altruist.
The former's melancholy and the active energy of the
latter appear in this form of suicide; egoisme here
mingles with mysticism. This same combination also
distinguishes the mysticism characteristic of periods
of decadence, which contrary to appearances, is so
different from that observed among young, formative
peoples. The latter springs from the collective en-
thusiasm which carries individual wills along with
it on its way, from the self-abnegation with which
citizens forget themselves to share in the common
work; the former [egoistic-altruistic mysticism] is
a mere self-conscious egoisme, conscious also of its
own nothingness, striving to surpass itself but suc-
ceeding only in artificiality and in appearance (5:289).
Durkheim's disdain for the modern egoist cloaking himself
in quasi-religious images calls to mind Weber's equally po -
werful refusal to endorse any of the myriad competing thera-,
peutics of his day which counseled "jumping out of one's
skin." Both Durkheim and Weber were moral realists.
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Finally, Durkheim noted that egoisme and anomie may
mix their separate but intimately related types of despair.
But he be neither a complete egoist nor a pure vic-
tim of agitation. In such cases he may play both roles
concurrently. To fill up the gap he feels inside him-
self, he seeks new sensations, he applies, to be sure,
less ardour than the passionate temperament so called,
but he also wearies sooner and this weariness casts
him back upon himself, thus reenforcing his original
mel~ncholy. Inversely, a regulated temperament does
not lack a spark of egoisme; for if one were highly
socialized one would not rebel at every social res-
traint. Only, this spark cannot develop in cases where
the action of anomie is preponderant; for, by casting
its possessor outside himself, it prevents him from
retiring into himself. If anomie is less intense, how-
ever, it may permit egoisme to produce certain charact-
eristic effects. The obstacle, for example, against
which the victim of insatiate desires dashes may cause
him to fall back upon himself in an inner life. Find-
ing there nothing to which he can attach himself, how-
ever, the melancholy inspired by this thought can only
drive him to new self-escape, thus increasing his un-
easiness and discontent. Thus are produced mixed sui-
cides where depression alternates with agitation, dream
with action, transports of desire with reflective sad-
ness (S: 288) .
In exploring some individual forms of egoistic sui-
cide, Durkheim took "Raphael," one of the heroes of the ear-
ly French Romantic writer Lamartine, as an "ideal type."
In our own day, Proust's reveries and other instances of
the "Romantic agony," especially among the Symbolist poets
and other artists of the dark underside would serve just
as well.
One form of suicide .•• has widely developed in our
day: Lamartine's Raphael offers us its ideal type.
Its characteristic is a condition of melancholic
languor which relaxes all the springs of action. Bus-
iness, public affairs, useful work, even domestic du-
ties inspire the person only with indifference and
aversion. He is unwilling to emerge from himself. On
the other han~what is lost in activity is made up
for in thought and inner life. In revulsion from its
surroundings consciousness becomes self-preoccupre~
takes itself as its proper and unique study, and un-
dertakes as its main task self-observation and self-
analysis.lBut ~ this-eitreme-concentration it mere-
!1:. deepens the chasID'""""separating it from the rest of
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of the universe. The moment the individual becomes
so enamore~ of himself, inev~blY he increasingly
detaches h1mself from everyth1ng external and empha-
sizes ~ isolation in which he lives, to the point
of worsh1p * (S:27P-79).
It is interesting to recall here that Rimbaud, that super-
annuated voyager into hell, spoke of himself and his kind
as "littera&ricides."
Self-absorption is not a good method of attaching
one's self to others. All movement is, in a sense,
altruistic in that it is centrifugal and disperses
existence beyond its own limitations. Reflection,
on the other hand, has about it something personal
and egoistic, for it is only possible as a person
becomes detached from the outside world, and re-
treats from it into himself. And reflection is the
the more intense the more complete this retreat.
Action without mixing with people is impossible;
to think, on the contrary, we must cease to have
connection with them in order to consider them ob-
jectively--the more so, in order to think about one-
self. So the man whose sole activity is diverted
to inner meditation becomes insensible to all his
surroundings. If he loves, it is not to give him-
self, to blend in fecund union with another being,
but to meditate on his love. His passions are mere
appearances, being sterile. They are dissipated in
futile imaginings, producing nothing external to
themselves *(5:279). '
Does this passage not perfectly describe, for in-
stance, the fevered false love felt by Kierkegaard, the
arch Romantic lyricist and theologian, for Regina in Fear
and Trembling? Indeed, the distinguished literary and mo-
ral philosopher Kenneth Burke seized upon the brooding
Dane's "dialectical lyric" as " .•• Kierkegaardian dialect-
ic for changing finite species into the currency of the
infinite" (1969:244). Posing first as a scoundrel, then
the "knight of infinite resignation," Kierkegaard, says
Burke, offers us:
••• the currency of the 'infinite, but brought down
to earth like a god incarnate, a spirit that hence-
forth infuses all things with its essence, bathes
all things in its unitary light, subordinating the
disparate facts of the world of contingencies to
one transcendent unitary principle, ironically call-
ed the Absurd. This transformation is also called
•
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a "leap" across the "incommensurable" (1950:245).
As a quintessential representative of moral egoisme, Kieke-
gaard, this "knight of faith," courted "infinite resignation."
He sanctified his own introversion, embraced despair and the
curious hope of the "Absurd," the faith beyond hope, "beyond
belief."
... if this "knight of faith" would court in terms of
the infinite, it follows that he would court eternally,
in perpetual repetition.... But if one would court for-
ever, whereas the object of one's courtship is not only
willing to yield, but even becomes importunate in yield-
ing, then the goodly dialectician must supply resistance
of his own, from within himself, out of his own "inner
check," and by setting up a situation, both emotional
and practical, that would restore the necessary distance.
First, in somewhat of a panic, he would even act like a
"scoundrel" if necessary. For he would do anything to
retain the purity of his motives, being an individualist
of integrity. However, once he had got away from her,
and she had become married to another, since they were
both highly proper he had again the objective situation
necessary to his nature: he could now court here in terms
of eternity, that is, in eternal repetition. The dilemma
was solved. On firm moral and legalistic grounds, their
union was impossible. Hence, he could safely become her
knight again. To gallantly make amends for his affront,
he could psychologistically amend the Bible. Everything
was now in order--and with her marriage as the "objec-
tive correlative" that matched his own subjective "inner
check," he could now court her in terms of the infinite,
the incommensurable, the absurd, the faith that will
somehow bring about the impossible (1950:249-50).
But, not to be fooled by Kierkegaard's brilliant moral dia-
lectics, Burke rightly insists that the former has amended
the justificatory Bible story of Abraham and Issac, for he
" ... starts by putting in a strategic addition to a Biblical
text .... Needing the story to motivate the leap, he himself
puts the leap into the story" (1950:250-1). That is, Kierke-
gaard fabricated his own story to suit his own special psy-
chological needs. Kierkegaard embraced the infinite as his
life-focus, he embraced egoisme as his vocation. On observer
said of him that he has been characterized as "an unregener-
ate romantic who could not abandon the pleasures of the 'un-
happy conscience'" (B. Nelson, 1962c :xiv). rrhis "Master of
Irony," however, "burdened by the compulsion to practice mor-
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dant reflection and double agency" (Nelson, 1962c:xii),
really wished to be whole.
So turbulent a spirit as Kierkegaard's was not to win
the peace he prized without an exhausting civil war a-
gainst his inner demons. To think of himself as an "Ex-
traordinary One" in the religious sense was at once his
temptation and his dread ...• In the end, however, he
forged for himself the fate he craved. Instead of suc-
cumbing to destructive afflictions and excesses as did
a number of others, notably Dostoyevsky and Nietzsche,
he let no day go by without struggling to hold himself
in readiness to be a "witness." He rededicated himself
and his gifts continually to the Life which was for him
the Light, the Truth, and the Way (Nelson, 1962c:xii).
Indeed, if we view Durkheim's ironic insights into the self-
destructive "longing for the infinite" of Romantic moralists
and artists from a Weberian perspective, then Kierkegaard's
own testimony serves to confirm that egoisme flows through
the Romantic Cultural Tradition from the secularized angst
of Lutheranism.
When the infinite requirement is heard and upheld, heard
and upheld in all its infinitude, then grace is offered .
•.• But surely it is not an exaggeration when (in the
interest of grace itself) the requirement of infinity,
the "infinite requirement," is presented infinitely.
Exaggeration occurs only when, in an entirely different
way, the requirement is presented and grace is not even
alluded to (1962:154).
Yes, what then? What happens when "an infinite requirement,"
once religious, now becomes merely cUltural, but is yet pre-
sented as an infinite task, yet "grace is not even alluded
to"? Durkheim gave the fatal answer in Suicide.
To return, Durkheim continued with his counter-argu-
ment, stressing the relational or "intentional" structure of
consciousness .
••• all internal life draws its primary material from
without. All we can think of is objects or our concep-
tions of them. We cannot reflect our own consciousness
in a purely undetermined- state: in this shape it is in-
conceivable. Now, consciousness becomes determined only
when affected by something not itself. Therefore, if it
individualizes beyond a certain point, it separates
itself too radically from other beings. Men or things,
it finds itself unable to communicate with the very
source of its normal nourishment and no longer has any-
thing to which it can apply itself. It creates nothing-
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ness within by creating it without, and has nothing left
upon which to reflect but its own wretched misery (8:279).
The Romantics' inflation of the ego's infinite task leads,
then, to "wretched misery," to morbid melancholy, to self-
destruction.
Its only remaining object of thought is its own inner
nothingness and the resulting melancholy. It becomes
addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of morbid
joy which Lamartine, himself familiar with it, describes
well in the words of his hero: 'the languor of all my
surroundings was in marvellous harmony with my own lan-
guor. It increased this languor in its charm. I plunged
into the depths of melancholy. But it was a lively melan-
coly, full of thoughts, impressions, communings with the
infinite, half-obscurities of my own soul, so that I had
no wish to abandon it. A human disease, but one the
experience of which attracts rather than pains, where
death resembles a voluptuous lapse into the infinite. I
resolved to abandon myself to it wholly henceforth; to
avoid all distracting society and to wrap myself in si-
lence, solitude, and frigidity in the midst of whatever
company I should encounter; my spiritual isolation was
a shroud through which I desired no longer see men, but
only nature and God' (8:280).
However pure the ardent wayfarer's mctives, the result
of his actions is ironic. For instead of empowering us, the
pursuit of "infinite horizons," portrayed insistently as the
truly heroic alternative to the mundane or profane existence
in which most mankind is daily mired, leads inevitably, not
to the consummation of the hero's life-giving vision but
rather to despair and self-destruction.
One cannot long remain so absorbed in contemplation of
emptiness without becoming increasingly attracted to
it. In vain one bestows on it the name of infinity;
this does not change its nature. When one feels such
pleasure in non-existence, one's inclinations can be
completely satisfied only by completely ceasing to ex-
ist. This is the element of truth in the parallelism
Hartmann claims to observe between the development of
consciousness and the weakening of the will to live.
Ideation and movement are reallv two hostile forces,
advancing in inverse direction,-and movement is life.
To think, it is said, is to abstain from action; in
the same degree, therefore, it is to abstain from liv-
ing. This is why the absolute reign of idea cannot be
achieved and especially continue, for this is death.
•
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But this does not mean, as Hartmann believes, that re-
ality itself is intolerable unless veiled by illusion.
Sadness does not inhere in things, it does not reach us
• from the world and through mere contemplation of the
world. It is a product of our own thought. We create it
out of whole cloth; but to create it our thought must be
abnormal. If consciousness sometimes constitutes unhap-
piness for man, it is only by achieving a morbid develop-
ment in which, revolting against its own nature, it poses
• as an absolute and seeks its purpose in itself lS:280).
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
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b. The Main Sociocultural Sites of the Egoistic "Infinity
of Dreams"
The suicidal tendency is great in educated circles lS :168).
A mind that questions everything, unless strong enough to
bear the weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning
itself and being engulfed in doubt lS:282)~
If life is not worth the trouble of being lived, every-
thing becomes a pretext to rid ourselves of it lS:213).
Through his statistical arrays, Durkheim first found
that the following factors were linked in egoismic suicides:
Protestantism, individualism, free inquiry, higher education-
al levels, the liberal professions, and so on. We should al-
ways remember that such concrete social factors served as the
original point of departure for Durkheim's moral concern with
the "infinity sickness" of the modern world.
Durkheim first assumed that these factors were all out-
wardly associated (see Part I, Book Two) because they were
all results of the same root transformation--negatively, the
weakening of traditional beliefs, and positively, through the
sanctioning of the Individual, Reason, and sUbjectivity in
modern culture. This was especially true in terms of liberal
Protestant cUltures, where these virtues bloomed most vigor-
ously. Now, it is striking that one of the leading American
spokesman for liberal Protestantism, Talcott Parsons, has
from the beginning emphasized that egoisme was sanctioned by
Protestant norms (see Appendix). Egoisme, or as Parsons trans-
lates it "institutionalized individualism," which implies the
injunction to gUide oneself by one's own "inner light," re-
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suIted from the historically rooted "social pressure in Pro-
testant norms toward a higher order of individualized reli-
gious responsibility." Indeed, Parsons proposed that Durk-
heim's breakthrough to the discovery of the internalization
of norms in terms of egoistic suicide constituted a solution
to what Parsons had supposed to be Durkheim's original prob-
lem in The Division of Labor--namely, the content and obliga-
tory force of the collective conscience governing contractual
obligations in the modern organic division of labor. Against
the common, but mistaken, notion that the roots of the modern
crisis can be adequately explained simply as the result of
the release of the individual ego from traditional controls
(as in Durkheim's first schema), Parsons, following Weber,
correctly insisted that egoisme, as a culturally sanctioned
form of individualism, could only be fully understood as the
outcome of the secularizing thrusts of Protestantism. This in-
sight represents an important convergence with Weber's work.
Hence, we shall look for the breakthrough to a new system of
moral and spiritual direction, and the internalization of
new and more rigorous forms of self-discipline and life-tasks.
And, as Parsons adds, echoing Rousseau, sometimes this new,
socially enforced freedom may become too great a burden to
bear.
This identification is not, howeve~~~uhidden ironies
for Parsons' own doctrine. For, by ignoring Durkheim's his-
torical and highly critical thrust, Parsons felt little com-
punction in rendering egoisme as a highly virtuous product
of Protestantism. What Durkheim described as "moral anarchy"
and "infinity sickness," Parsons transmutes into moral or
"institutionalized individualism." Hence, Parsons' biased re-
construction gets him into the following bind: if egoisme as
"institutionalized individualism" and its correlate of "organ-
ic solidarity" is tacitly and historically supported by Pro-
testant religious and cultural norms, then how can Parsons ac-
count for the modern "infinity of dreams and desires," the
destructive egocentricity which so disturbed Durkheim? Is
••
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this "moral anarchy" to be considered simply the lapse from
the heroic demands of Protestant norms, or, on the contrary,
as Durkheim's second implicit schema suggests, as the unanti-
cipated consequences of living out these norms? In terms of
his own reconstruction and splitting of schemas one and two
(see Appendix), must not Parsons accordingly admit that the
fundamental sources of egoistic insatiability also find their
origins and continuing sanctions in an exaggeration or de-
flection of Protestant norms? That Protestant norms are the
ultimate source of both the positive aspects of modern "in-
stitutionalized individualism" and drives for "progress and
perfection" and the egoismic and anomic insatiability seen by
Durkheim as underlying the "moral anarchy" and "Ie mal de
l'infini" of the modern world, would most probably prove a
surprising and perhaps even repugnant suggestion to some.
What would Parsons himself say to the inevitable conclusion
that our very Central Value System is itself egoistic and a-
nomic? The very logic of Parsons', Durkheim's, and Weber's
arguments, taken together, leads inevitably to the ironic
conclusion: our virtues become our vices!
Now, Durkheim held it as almost axiomatic that the
higher the intellectual life, the more professionalized and
progressive the standard of living, ~he greater the proba-
bility of being afflicted by "infinity sickness."
The liberal professions, and in a wider sense, the well-
to-do classes, are certainly those with the livliest
taste for knowledge and the most active intellectual life.
[suicide] is undeniably frequent in the higher clas-
ses (5:165).
But, having made the profound link between education and the
extremes of introspection and self-scrutiny that accompany
it, the Enlightenment liberal in Durkheim made him shrink
from equating the apotheosis' of the Individual and Reason
with the modern intellect and modern despair (eg. see 5:162-
4~ see also Part I, Book Two). But even so, Durkheim acknow-
ledged that the exercise of individual reason acts as a fur-
ther solvent of traditional mores and thereby increases the
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need for further education and heightened reflection, in a
sort of self-reinforcing psycho-socio-cultural feedback pro-
cess. Indeed, Durkheim insisted that rather than individual-
ism and learning being the pathological agents, they are, on
the contrary, the only means of remedying European "moral
anarchy."
... we see why as a rule suicide increases with know-
ledge. KnOWledge does not determine this progress. It
is innocent, nothing is more unjust than to accuse it,
and the example of the Jews proves this conclusively.
But these two facts result simultaneously from a single
state which they translate into different forms. Man
seeks to learn and man kills himself because of the loss
of cohesion in his religious society: he does not kill
himself because of his learning .... Far from knowledge
being the source of the evil, it is its remedy, the only
remedy we have (5:168-9).
It is striking that Durkheim drew his main illustra-
tions for egoisme as a suicidal type from intellectuals or
Romantic literature and art. For instance:
... the intellectual and meditative nature of suicides
of this sort is readily explained if we recall that ego-
istic suicide is necessarily accompanied by a high de-
velopment of knowledge and reflective intelligence. In-
deed, it is clear that in a society where consciousness
is morally compelled to extend its field of action, it
is also in more danger of transgressing the normal lim-
its which shelter it from self-destruction. A mind that
questions everything, unless strong enough to bear the
weight of its own ignorance, risks questioning itself,
and being engulfed in doubt. If it cannot discover the
claim to existence of the objects of its questioning--
and it would be miraculous if it so soon succeeded in
solving so many mysteries--it will deny them all reality:
the mere formulation of the problem already implying an
inclination to negative solutions. But, in so doing, it
will become void of all positive content, and finding
nothing which offers it resistance, will launch itself
perforce into the emptiness of inner revery (5:281).
Durkheim emphasized that launching the ego into infinite or-
bit, into the "emptiness of inner revery," serves to dissolve
solid ties to society.
The more the believer doubts, that is, the less he feels
himself a real participant in the religious faith to
which he belongs, and from which he is freeing himself,
the more the family and the community become foreign to
the individual, so much the more does he become a mys-
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tery to himself, unable to excape the exasperating and
agonizing question: to what purpose (S:2l2)?
c. Egoisme as the Ironic Result of the Modern "Cult of
Moral Individualism"
One cannot develop personality to excess without devel-
oping egotism (DL:239).
Individualism is, of course, not necessarily egoism,
but it comes close to it: the one cannot be stimulated
without the other being enlarged. Thus, egoistic suicide
arises lS: j64) •
[Egoisme] is closely associated with the refined ethics
which set human personality on so high a pedestal that
it can no longer be subordinated to anything lS:l27).
The moment the individual becomes so enamored of him-
self, inevitably he detaches himself from everything ex-
ternal and emphasizes the isolation in which he lives,
to the point of worship (S:278).
Every sort of suicide is the exaggerated or deflected
form of a virtue (S:240).
In Durkheim's second schema of suicide, egoisme is
culturally sanctioned in the modern world: it is the ironic
outcome of the modern "cult of the individual." Conversely,
egoisme's first polar opposite--altruisme--is the result of
traditional cultures' "cult of collectivity." Indeed, Durk-
heim observed that if altruisme is cUlturally sanctioned ,~s
:,',
a moral duty, so, too, egoisme is the deflected outcome or
a certain type of moral obligation:
The fact is stressed that the motives of certain al-
truistic suicides reappear in Slightly different forms
as the basis of actions regarded by everyone as moral.
But is egoistic suicide any different? Has not the sen-
timent of individual autonomy its own morality as well
as the opposite sentiment? .. EVery sort of suiCTde is
then merely the exaggerated or deflected form of a vir-
tue * {S:240~
Thus, every society has an ideal of man, which tends to be-
come absolutized over time. This inevitable extension or ex-
aggeration destroys the necessary mutual proportion between
multiple human virtues. Primitive societies thus absolutize
--_._---~~_..---.-._---~- ....--.__.-.------~------------------------------
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devotion to tradition and the group; hence, their suicides
take the form of altruisme and fatalisme. Modern societies,
on the other hand, tend to absolutize the self, and devotion
to the "tradition of the new;" hence, our virtues are
the self-destructive vices of anomie and egoisme. Or, as
Durkheim once said, even the features of our immorality are
features of our morality. LaCapra has seen this inner irony
to the central values of modern culture:
Egoisrne referred .•. to a state in which the principle
of individuation was carried to the extreme of particu-
laristic and self-centered atomistic individualism.
Egoisme in modern societies was an excessive development
of the cardinal emphasis on individual rights and per-
sonal responsibility (1972:157-8).
As Merton observed in his famous essay "Social Struc-
ture and Anomie" (see Appendix), it is the overwhelming em-
phasis on cultural mandates that leads to the exaggeration
or deflection of what had been our highest virtues into our
most vexatious failings. Clearly, it is a generic sociocul-
tural process afflicting all peoples at all times, though in
different degrees. Perhaps what is unique about the modern
syndrome, apart from its specific content, is its relentless
pressure.
Excessive individualism not only results in favoring
the action of suicidogenic causes, but is itself such
a cause. It not only frees man'~ inclination to do away
with himself, but creates this 1nclination out of whole
CIO'th ..•. This must be clearry understood *(8: 210) •
But "what is there in individualism which explains this re-
sult," Durkheim asks? In other places in ~uicide, Durkheim
himself replied that the cult of the individual is morally
sanctioned in the modern world. It is a product of progres-
sive moral evolution, of which Protestantism and Positivism
are the modern culminations.
in societies and environments where the dignity of
the person is the supreme end of conduct, where man is
a God to mankind, the individual is readily inclined to
consider the man in himself as a God and to regard him-
self as the object of his own cult. When morality con-
sists primarily in giving one a very high idea of one's
self, certain combinations of circumstances readily suf-
fice to make man unable to perceive anything above him-
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himself. Individualism is, of course, not necessarily e-
goism, but it comes close to it; the one cannot be stim-
ulated WIthout the other berng-enrarg~Thus, egoist1c
suicide arises ~S:364). ----
A year later, in one of his political writings--"Individual-
ism and the Intellectuals" (1898}--delivered at the height
of the Dreyfus Affair against the Catholic conservative for-
ces, Durkheim reiterated the same theme. This time the ear-
lier connection between Protestantism and extreme, egoistic
individualism becomes clearer, for the following passage was
surrounded by others acknowledging the Christian sanction for
modern individualism (see also Chapter Eight, Book One, and
Chapter Three, Part I of this Book).
The communion of spirits can no longer be based on de-
finite rites and prejudices, since rites and prejudices
are overcome by the course of events. Consequently, noth-
ing remains which men can love and honor in common if
not man himself. That is how man has become a god for
man, and why he can no longer create other gods without
lying to himself. And since each of us incarnates some-
thing of humanity, each individual consciousness con-
tains something divine and thus finds itself marked with
a character which renders it sacred and inviolable to
others. Therein lies all individualism; and that is what
makes it a necessary doctrine (in Bellah, 1973:52).
And in his address "The Determination of Moral Facts" (1906),
Durkheim again acknowledged that the sacredness with which
the human person in the modern world is endowed is socially
and cUlturally created .
••• the human being is becoming the pivot of social con-
science among European peoples and has acquired an in-
comparable value. It is society that has consecrated
him. Man has no innate right to this aura that surrounds
and protects him against sacrilegious trespass. It is
merely the way in which society thinks of him, the high
esteem that it has of him at the moment, projected and
objectified. Thus very far from there being the antago-
nism between the individual and society which is often
claimed, moral individualism, the cult of the individual,
is in fact the product of society itself. It is society
that instituted it and made of man the god whose servant
it is (SP : 52- 3) •
In the same address, in reply to a criticism of this doctrine
by Brunschwig, Durkheim argued:
Society has consecrated the individual and made him
••
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preeminently worthy of respect. His progressive emanci-
pation does not imply a weakening but a transformation
of social bonds. The individual does not tear himself a-
way from society but is joined to it in a new manner,
and this is because society sees him in a new manner and
wishes this change to take place. The individual submits
to society and this submission is the condition of his
liberation (SP:72).
Further, it is significant for our present purposes
that Durkheim's philosophy of the "golden mean" and his no-
tion of the "normality" of deviance led him into the second
schema of suicide. For instance, in The Division of Labor,
Durkheim set up the "virtues to vices" syndrome with this in-
sistence that even the highest ideals of a culture must be
kept in mutual proportion.
Each people has its morality which is determined by the
conditions in which it lives .... But the morality of
each society, taken in of itself, does it not allow
an indefinite development of its charged virtues? Not
at all. To act morally is to do one's duty, and all
duty is limited. It is limited by other duties. One can-
not give oneself too completely to others without aban-
doning oneself. One cannot develop personality to excess
without developing-egotism * (DL:239). --
And in his vibrant defense of the modern equation of the In-
dividual and Reason, Durkheim eKplicitly acknowledged that
one virtue may shade over into a vice by going to extreme.
Without doubt, it can happen that individualism is prac-
ticed in a completely different spirit. Some use it for
their personal ends, as a means of disguising their ego-
ism and of more easily escaping their duties to society
(in Bellah, 1973:49). I
Egoistic tensions of suicidal strength, then, are not due to
the frustration of the naturally insatiable passions of the
organic ego; rather, they are the unanticipated consequences
of the extreme modern religio-cultural emphasis on the "cult
of individualism"and the Romantic cult of "utmost inward-
ness." Almost imperceptibly" one sanction metamorphoses into
another; ironically, what started out as a leading virtue
becomes, through constant elimination and refinement, a lead-
ing vice. When extreme rhetoric or prophetic calls destroy
the human scale, the necessary proportion between virtues,
then the life-giving balance can only be restored through
••
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letting go, through a healing dialectic that restores the
distorted and self-tortured part to a harmonious relation-
ship with the whole. For healing means "making whole."
•
•
•
•
•
d. Egoisme, Modern Angst, and the Romantic Ethos of the
Infinite "Journey into the Interior"
Today neurasthenia is considered a mark of distinction
rather than a mark of weakness. In our refined socie-
ties, enamored of things intellectual, nervous members
constitute almost a nobility (S:18l).
In revulsion from its surroundings, consciousness be-
comes self-preoccupied, takes itself as its proper and
unique study, and undertakes as its main task self-ob-
servation and self-analysis (S:278) .
... the man whose sole activity is diverted to inner
meditation becomes insensible to all his surroundings.
If he loves, it is not to give himself, to blend in fe-
cund union with another being, but to meditate on his
love. His passions are mere appearances, being sterile
(S:279) .
lEgoisme] creates nothingness within by creating it
without, and thus has nothing left upon which to re-
flectbut its own wretched misery (S:279).
[The egotist's] only remaining object of thought is his
own inner nothingness, and the resulting melancholy. He
becomes addicted and abandoned to this with a kind of
morbid joy (S:279).
•
•
•
•
Now, Durkheim's polemical target with egoisme was the
Romantic ethos of anguished subjectivity. Here we see a high
moral calling transmuted into immoderate intellectual and ar-
tistic aspirations; the resulting angst drowns the individual
in an "infinity of dreams." Indeed, the inflation of the ego,
the apotheosis of the artists' "journey into the interior"
(E. Heller, 1968) has been a hallmark of the Romantic Cultur-
al Tradition. In our own day, at least three major poets--
who accepted this heroic plunge, who danced on the edge, who
lived out a kind of cosmic brinksmanship--have taken their
own lives within a few years of each other; I refer to Sylvia
Plath, John Berryman, and Anne Sexton. In an illuminating
study of literature and suicide, The Savage God (1972), A.
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Alvarez noted that spreading out from this dramatic ethos
" the closed world of suicide has penetrated Western cul-
ture like a dye that cannot be washed" (1972:206). Perhaps
this is what Rimbaud, that superannuated explorer of the
self-tormenting hell of the Romantics, meant when he called
himself and his fellow voyagers of the infinite ocean within
litteraturicides. Indeed, because egoisme is willingly em-
braced as an ideal fulfilling one's deepest inner nature, be-
cause it is presented as one of our highest possible callings,
it has become a veritable "vocation," as Alvarez suggests, a-
mong modern Romantic artists and thinkers.
Others have also noted that Durkheim's critical illus-
trations of egoisme were often drawn from the works and lives
of Romantics. LaCapra, for instance, suggests: "Although
Durkheim referred to Chateaubriand, a magnificant anatomy of
anomie--indeed, a myth of the time--was provided by Balzac in
Le Peau de Chagrin" (1972:l66-7). Perhaps the contemporary
observer who has most clearly recognized Durkheim's intellec-
tual debt to the Romantics has been Jack Douglas. He notes,
for example, how" •.. Rimbaud spent his adult life destroy-
ing himself" (1967:357).
Death, especially suicide, was a favorite theme in the
literature of the roma~tic movement. Indeed, the most
important contribution of this literary tradition to
the developing sociology of nineteenth century Europe
was that it helped focus attention on suicide. Largely
because of its treatment in literature, suicide was
seen by the educated public as a fundamental social prob-
lem. Nineteenth century Europeans, especially the French,
were frightened of '1a manie du suicide."
But the literary concern with suicide also provided the
core of certain very important, specific "theoretical"
explanations. Of fundamental importance was the prime
romantic symbol of an isolated, lonely hero of a poetic
(or intellectual bent), who wanders far from human so-
ciety in search of the impossible, and, failing of the
impossible, becomes increasingly melancholy and enamor-
ed of eternity. The idea that self-imposed isolation
produces melancholy and hence, suicide, was hardly nov-
el; indeed, Robert Burton's seventeenth century trea-
tise, The Anatomy of Melancholy, had carefully documen-
ted its classical sources. But this prime symbol of ro-
manticism contained the most unclassical ideas of both
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egoisme and anomie. Indeed, the romantic image of sui-
cide seems to have been so much the mythical model
which the sociologists of suicide had in mind that both
Morselli (1879) and Durkheim (1897) had a strong ten-
dency to treat egoisme and anomie as almost identical.
It is even possible to specify the work of Chateau-
briand, especially as treated by de Boissmont, as the
major source of Durkheim's idea of anomic suicide
(1968:366-67).
Another observer, Cesar Grana, notes how Durkheim
of egoisme reflected the Romantic Ethos of deliberately em-
bracing angst, mordant subjectivity, and suicide.
The Paris "Suicide Club" and other necrophiliac dis-
plays of Bohemia were, of course, linked to the fatu-
ously masochistic side of romanticism. But they remind
us all the same of Lammenais's observation that self-
killing was essentially an act of self-worship, and as
such, was one of the chief signs of modern decay
(1967: 80-81) .
Referring to one of Durkheim's statements (see S:169), Grana
echoes my own discovery of the cultural sanctioning of ego-
isme:
Durkheim's statement~ however, is only part of Durk-
heim's theory of suicide as a product of the moral wa-
tering-down of institutions of modern society. He comes
close to the relationship between suicidal ideas and
the ailments of the modern literati when he points out
that it was precisely the utopian intensity of their
aesthetic and intellectual dreams that led to bitter-
ness and demoralizatibn.••. it is only withlDurkheim's
description of suicide egoiste that we step into the
atmosphere of modern literary motivations*(1967:80-8l) ..
Grana continues, citing George Sand's sardonic estimate of
the Romantic Ethos, which spread from its origins in Germany
in the last half of the .eighteenth century to England about
the turn of the century, to France about a generation later,
and finally to America around the l840's.
For George Sand, looking at the same state of mind,
saw it as the spectacle of the anguish and fatigue
created by a self-centered intellectual ambition
"grown and stretched beyond measure." Durkheim, in
speaking of "vanishing phantasamagorias" and the "ar-
tificial combination of illusory images" suggests that
the tour ironie was also a tour de· force which liter-
ary self-will could in the end sustain. Rationalism
had seen the emancipation of man from faith as a vic-
tory. The Romantics may also have seen faith as de-
~~~~~~~~~~-------------------------
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--997--
fenseless before the analytic mind. But for them the
consequence was self-defeat (1967:213).
Indeed, so complete was the Romantic influence, in this
regard, on Durkheim that in The Division of Labor he made the
mistake of according art and the imagination the special sta-
tus of being free from all constraints, the very message so
often proclaimed by the Romantics themselves. "Art is abso-
lutely refractory to all that resembles obligations, for it
is the domain of liberty" (DL:5I). Thus, on both sides, Durk-
heim allowed himself to be too strongly influenced by the
premises of his polemical opponents. On the one side, he mis-
takenly accepted the Utilitarian apotheosis of individualis-
tic economic competition through the mechanism of the market
(see Chapter One of this Book); while on the other hand he
unfortunately incorporated the opposite pole--namely, the Ro-
mantics' insistence that art and imagination be freed from
all constraint; or as Levi-Strauss once said, be granted the
special status of a "national park, wild and free." Thus, at
certain points, Durkheim was unfortunately tempted to exclude
both economic and artistic activity from the all-important
realm of the moral and the social.
But, as we have discovered, Durkheim also proposed that
art and aesthetic activity must follow the same rule of the
"golden mean" or human proportion between mutual human obli-
gations.
The aesthetic-moral activity seems freed from all con-
trol and limitation because it is not regulated. But,
as a matter of fact, it is narrowly circumscribed by
activity properly moral, for it can surpass a certain
standard only to the detriment of morality •••• When
the place of the imagination in morality is made too
great, obligatory tasks are unnecessarily neglected.
All discipline appears intolerable when one is used to
acting only under rules of one's own making. Too much
idealism and moral elevation often deprives a man of
the taste to fulfill his' daily duties.
In general, the same may be said of all aestheticac-
tivity; it is healthy only if moderated •••• To great
an artistic sensibility is a sickly phenomenon which
cannot become general without danger to society. The
limit beyond which excess begins is, of course, varia-
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ble, according to the people or the social environment
(DL:239-40) •
In conclusion, Durkheim himself alluded to one of the
leading symbols or "collective representations" of the Ro-
mantic ethos of angst and the "journey into the interior"--
namely, Goethe's Faust.
One cannot bring some objective nearer that, by defini-
tion, is infinitely far away. The remaining distance is
always the same, whatever route we take. What could be
more disillusioning than to proceed toward a terminal
point that is nonexistent, since it recedes in the meas-
ure that one advances? Such futile effort is simply
marching in place; it cannot fail to leave behind frus-
tration and discouragement. This is why historical per-
iods like ours, which have known the malady of infinite
aspirations, are necessarily touched with pessimism.
Pessimism always accompanies unlimited aspirations.
Goethe's Faust may be regarded as representing par ex-
cellence this view of the infinite. And it is not with-
out reason that the poet portrayed him as laboring in
continual anguish (ME:40).
In sum, having established from Durkheim's own work that
both anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the
modern world--the first by the Utilitarian Ethos and the
latter by the Romantic Ethos--Iet us now turn, briefly, to
investigate the religious foundations of these modern cul-
tural traditions.
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CHAPTER TEN
ANOMIE AND EGOISME, MODERN CULTURAL TRADITIONS,
AND THE FIRST AND SECOND PROTESTANT ETHOS
Preface. How shall we explain the origins of, and contin-
uing sanctions for, anomie and egoisme in the modern world?
The same insight that led to the second schema of suicide
also leads -us to search for better ways to conceptualize the
mediating contexts in which to anchor anomie and egoisme. As
noted in the Introduction to this dissertation, the notion
of cultural traditions suggests itself as a potent analytical
perspective.
Now, culture is the key to tradition, and religion is
the key to culture. Hence, when we seek the origins, develop-
ment, and continuing sanctions for absolutizing individualism
and legitimized insatiability in the modern world, we look to
the interface between religion and culture. Accordingly, we
shall now ask: what are the prime terms of translation be-
tween modern religions and contemporary culture and psyche,
especially anomie and egoisme? Thus, our Durkheimian problem
becomes a Weberian one--whether, and to what extent, various
ethical sanctions coming from Protestantism have become sedi-
mented at the heart of modern structures of conscience and
consciousness?
Let us review our essential findings so far in this re-
gard. Specifically, in the concluding chapter to Book One
we linked the cultural sanctioning of modern individualism
with two dominant contemporary cultural traditions. In Book
Two, we explored the problematic relations between Protes-
tantism and suicide. In the second part of Book Three which
we have just concluded, we connected anomie and egoisme as
absolutized forms of individualism and legitimized insatia-
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bilities to two dominant modern cultural traditions.
How, then, did anomie and egoisme come to be cultural-
ly sanctioned? That is, having linked the second schema of
suicide to modern cultural traditions, it is now time to
link these latter, in turn, to their originating religious
sanctions. Therefore, we ask: what are the specific moral
and spiritual foundations of the Utilitarian Ethos and the
Romantic Ethos? In both cases, we shall search for ethical
premiums placed by secularizing religious drives on nominal-
ism, atomism, or the absolute immediacy and autonomy of the
individual's experience, and his infinite life-task. Specifi-
cally, we shall now move to link anomie to the secularization
of Calvinism, and egoisme to the secularization of Lutheran-
ism. In sum, we propose the following essential psycho-socio-
cultural-historical linkages. As the active externalization
of absolute individualism and legitimate insatiability, ano-
mie is connected with the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural
Tradition, and this is linked, in turn, with the Calvinistic
ethos of inner-worldly asceticism as its original and contin-
uing source. In addition, as the "infinity of dreams" seen,
for instance, in the modern artist's "journey into the inter-
ior," egoisme is linked with the Romantic-Idealistic Cultural
Tradition, and then, ultimately, with the Lutherans' and
spiritual radicals' ethos of inner-worldly mysticism as its
original and continuing source. Thus, anomie and egoisme
serve as critical anatomies of two halves of the modern soul,
of the ironic outcomes of the first and second Protestant
Ethos.
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A. Cultural Traditions as an Interpretive Perspective
Cultural traditions of more or less complexity may be
found in all societies. This is so because society is an in-
ter-generational as well as an inter-actional process. On the
universal level, a cultural tradition may be most simply de-
fined as an institutionalized series of interpretations. A
cultural tradition is built up out of a "dialogue across the
centuries" (B. Nelson, 1965a). A cultural tradition is a com-
munity of memories and shared aspirations. A cultural tradi-
tion is formed by handing down from generation structures of
conscience and consciousness--of right and wrong, of truth
and error. Thus, a cultural tradition is a moral and cogni-
tive community bound together through time and space by
shared symbols, common values, and fields of meaning.
Cultural traditions are here regarded as the prime his-
torical contexts in which questions of meaning and value,
truth and error, are worked out. Cultural traditions mediate
between us, as moral agents and intellectual subjects situa-
ted in specific "heres and nows" in which we constantly have
to choose and act, and earlier models of compelling moral a-
gency and satisfying intellectual achievement to which we
turn, time and again, for guidance. Cultural traditions may
be regarded as prime symbolic guidance and classificatory
systems which we, the present, share with past generations
and, perhaps, future ones as well.
A fuller, more formal definition might be: a cultural
tradition is a series of temporally linked cultures engaged
in applying analogous and progressive variations on the same
basic inherited and appropriated themes and models to speci-
fic problems within the sphere of their own immediate and
prospective experience. Each group within a common cultural
tradition contributes to relatively persistent and evolving
efforts to developing and making explicit the implications
of inherited norms, and extending analogous applications of
inherited and appropriated models, reinterpreting their ori-
ginal, current, and potential meanings, and reemphasizing
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or devaluing certain elements or logics to fit their own
specific situations, present interests, past histories, and
probable futures.
Since cultural traditions as they are lived through by
their participants serve as crucial symbolic frames of refer-
ence, so, too, thinkers in the human sciences might better
collaborate if we used these lived frames of reference, these
actual evolving "logics in use," as our prime analytical
units, rather than abiding by the standard disciplinary re-
straints of domains and genres, periods, and national socie-
ties. As an integrative interpretive perspective, cultural
traditions cuts across a series of analytically separable di-
mensions, including:
(a) geo-political boundaries--cities, regions, kingdoms, na-
tion-states, empires, etc.;
(b) temporal demarcations such as decades and centuries;
(c) cultural boundaries such as the domains of religion, law,
philosophy, science, literature, language, art, and so on.
Our real challenge here, then, is to more deeply grasp the
embeddedness, the interrelations, the multiple and resonating
links between different groups, cultural spheres, levels of
experience, and historical phases.
Further, cultural traditions act as an intermediary
level of sociocultural complexity between specific societies
and larger civilizational complexes; that is, civilizations
are composed of several related but often competing cultural
traditions. In sum, as basic interpretive units, cultural
traditions cross-cut national boundaries, time-periods, and
cultural spheres, on the one hand, and act as key links be-
tween societies and civilizations on the other.
In analyzing the evolution of cultural traditions, one
cannot hope to trace a simple, straight line of development
from the earliest through the latest phases. Rather, the con-
struction of any cultural tradition is due to an extraordi-
nary interplay of many factors over time to form a cultural
complex. Hence, we should look for various strands, sometimes
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competing, sometimes reinforcing, which converge to have sim-
ilar net effects.
In analyzing the internal structure of cultural tradi-
tions, we focus primarily on the anchors of legitimate moral
and intellectual authority. Proceeding from what we learned
in Book One (see the summary in the first part of Chapter
Eight), we shall assume that structures of conscience--rules
for determining right from wrong, for allocating moral re-
sponsibility--are always and everywhere intimately linked
with structures of consciousness--rules for determining truth
from error, for determining intellectual integrity, and, in
turn, these are linked with the structure and process of col-
lectivities. The logics of moral decision and the moralities
of intellectual judgment are often deeply intertwined. Hence,
we are especially interested in understanding the complex in-
terrelations between religious and ethical systems and other
major cultural forms, societal institutions, and personality
types. Therefore when seeking to understand crucial cultural
transformations, we ask: what are the fundamental shifts in
the collective grounds of legitimate moral and intellectual
authority?
Further, we shall assume that: (a) there are a series
of dynamic tensions energizing and eroding cultural tradi-
tions, and (b) cultural traditions are constituted through
the layering or sedimentation ~f crucial transformations bas-
ed on various resolutions of conflicting polarities. We shall
focus, then, on the cumulative series of struggles and reso-
lutions which constitute and change cultural traditions. In
terms of polarities, we shall look for opposing claims on
the structures of conscience and consciousness. We shall at-
tempt to trace central rhetorical conflicts over the legiti-
mate grounds of moral and intellectual authority. Then, in
terms of transformations, we look to the major resolutions
of these opposing polarities which fundamentally shift the
grounds of conscience and consciousness from one anchor to
another. Such rhetorical struggles are resolved in one direc-
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tion or another at one point in time, thus transforming the
cultural structure. When a cumulative series of tensions
converge or build to an exploding point, there is often a
breakthrough (or breakdown) from one cultural system to ano-
ther. We then see the grounds of legitimate moral and intel-
lectual authority permanently shifted. There is, then, a
fundamental reorientation of the structures of conscience and
consciousness; and a new tradition emerges.
At the center of our hermeneutic or interpretive stra-
tegy are the notions of symbolic equations or transforma-
tions. Interpretation means, first, looking for "what goes
with what" (Burke, 1973:38); that is, a set of symbolic equa-
tions linking diverse levels and spheres together. Second,
interpretation means looking for "from what to what" (Burke.
1973:38); that is, a series of transformations linking dif-
ferent processes and phases together. Hence, we shall search
for the basic series of unifying equational and transforma-
tional processes which constitute and change cultural tradi-
tions.
In analyzing cultural traditions, then, the first task
is to unravel the central series of symbolic equations which
link different spheres and levels of human action together
through the progressive extension of analogies from one set
of experiences to another. Correspondingly, in terms of the
historical axis of traditions, we seek to unravel the com-
plex series of sequential equations or transformation terms
linking diverse historical phenomena with their common ori-
gins. We have, then, two complemeritary interpretive strate-
gies for moving from empirical diversity to conceptual unity.
In sum, this interpretive perspective assumes that:
(l) cultural traditions are long-term symbolic systems
of meaning and value. shared by many generations;
(2) all people are informed--individually and collective-
ly--by cultural traditions (they are universals);
(3) the internal structure of cultural traditions differ
from one society to another (they are variable also);
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(4) cultural traditions are the most important contexts
in which questions concerning meaning and value are
addressed;
(5) the core of cultural traditions centers around moral-
ities and logics, on questions of integrity, belief,
and jUdgment;
(6) cultural symbolic patterns--especia11y the prime mor-
alities of thought and logics of action--are closely
connected to social processes;
(7) there are often internal conflicts in a tradition
over what is right and wrong, true and false, good
and bad, and since such polarities are universal to
human action, conflicting claims based on these po-
larities tend to resurface again and again, today
as in the past;
(8) hence, it is crucial to understand these specific
rhetorical contexts and, thus, the series of dynamic
tensions energizing and changing cultural traditions;
(9) these sociocultural tensions are resolved in one di-
rection or another at various times, and these series
of cultural transformations build up a cUltural tra-
dition;
(10) when a cumulative series of conflicts builds to a
breaking point, there is either an acute cultural
breakdown, or a cultural revolution, a time of break-
through from one symbolic system to another; then we
witness a fundamental reorientation in the structures
of conscience and consciousness--that is, shifts in
the basic legitimate models anchoring morality,
thought, belief, and feeling.
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B. Outline of Four Major Western Cultural Traditions
Each tradition has been defined primarily in terms of
its most distinctive cultural logics. Hence, we shall pre-
liminarily distinguish between polar pairs of dominant West-
ern cultural traditions in terms of basic ethical and epis-
temological oppositions (drawn mainly from Weber's sociology
of religion)--namely, "priests" versus "prophets" (and laity),
on the one hand, and "ascetics" and "mystics" on the other.
Space limitations permit only a schematic outline of these
traditions and their historical development. l
First, the cultural tradition which emerged as dominant
in the formative period of European civilization was the
Catholic tradition. The Catholic Hierocratic-Rational Cultur-
al Tradition was (is) a unique and powerful fusion of Greco-
Roman, Germanic, and Arabic cultural elements with a special
form of JUdaeo-Christianity. The third great phase of this
tradition was coterminous with the emergence of a distinctive
Western civilization from about the eleventh century onward.
Not only did tradition serve as the matrix of European civi-
lization, but it was against this tradition that the three
major modern traditions reacted. Space limitations preclude
"excavation" of th~ Catholic tradition: moreover, our central
concern lies with the modern traditions. In short, anomie and
egoisme pertain to the modern traditions. 2
If we are to comprehend the origins of the modern
world, we should st~ive to understand how the medieval organ-
izational, theological, and ethical syntheses came to seem
problematic to many. Among the critical shifts in the late
medieval-Reformation period are a series of decisive shifts
from "office charisma" and institutional authority to "per-
sonal charisma" (see Weber, 1968) and the "inner light": the
rejection of the medieval triangulated system of conscience,
casuistry, and the cure of souls (eg. see Nelson, 1969a):
the overcoming of invidious dualisms of "Religion" and
"World"in the outlawing of the possibility of "two lives"
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and thus the double standard of moral perfection; the rejec-
tion of scholastic rationalism for skepticism, nominalism,
fideism, and mysticism, and so on.
Here, the tensions between priest and institutionali-
zed "office charisma," and the prophetic, ascetic, and mys-
tic rooted in "personal charisma" became especially acute
during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in Europe. When,
finally, in the Reformation, prophets set aside priests, and
ascetics and mystics felt compelled to live within the world,
a series of momentous cultural changes resulted. For their
powerful religious energies transformed the medieval world.
For example, with his notion of a Christian "calling"
or vocation with the world, Luther broke through the medieval
contrast between clergy and laity by proclaiming the "priest-
hood of all believers." And, whereas the Catholic tradition
had joined faith and reason (through the medium of Greek
philosophy), many reformers demanded that we live by the
truth of revelation alone, and insisted that we are not saved
by the Church, but only through faith in God. The Bible and
St. Paul, not Aristotle or Thomas Aquinas, were to be the
sole guides for human action.
During that time which Huizanga called "the waning of
the middle ages," and what Hadyn termed the "Counter-Renais-
sance," many people were haunted by questions such as: "How
shall I know if I am saved? How do we know anything to be
true? How shall we gain certainty?" Against this background
of crisis, seen in skepticism, fideism, probabilism, fic-
tionalism, etc., certain prophetic figures rose up to pro-
claim new bases for belief and action, new and mighty objec-
tive certainties and inner certitudes. In anchoring certain-
ty in the human subject, such pioneers of early modern cul-
ture as Luther, Calvin, the <spiritual radicals and mystics,
Descartes, Pascal, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, and so on
(whatever their other differences), all carne to anchor moral
and intellectual authority in a deeply interior faith, or
feeling, in the inherent rationality of the human mind--in
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short, in the Self or Subject. Authority became internalized;
the Protestant principle of self-reliance became extended to
all aspects of life. The religion of the lIinner light ll was
raised to center stage. Hence, ethics and knowledge in all
three modern traditions rest on a new and compelling sense
of individual moral agency and intellectual autonomy.
Since Catholicism was allied with the IIcenter ll leg.
see Shils, 1975), a parallel movement was the rising demand
for the autonomy of the peripheries and the secular world.
This movement was seen in the rise of the national monarchies
and their drives for autonomous national churches, the grow-
ing desires of many lay people to live sanctified lives with-
in the world, and the emergence of modern natural science
governed by its own special laws. "This world ll began to free
itself from traditional constraints imposed in the name of
the lI o ther world. II
We shall look, then, to the main sociocultural trans-
formations stemming from three types of Reformations--a Cath-
olic II prophetic" reaction against the dominance of the Catho-
lic Church, and two forms of Protestant asceticism and mysti-
cism working within the world. These drives toward reform and
autonomy took different forms in the different political and
institutional contexts of France, England, and Germany. Hav-
ing a common opponent, and sharing a common anchor in II per -
sonal charisma, II these three drives--the prophetic, ascetic,
and mystic--became differentiated by national context. Thus,
While in Anglo-American society Calvinistic Protestantism
contributed an lIinner-worldly ascetical" cast to secular cul-
ture and personality, and Lutheran, mystical, and pietistic
Protestantism contributed an lIinner-worldly mystical" cast to
German and Romantic culture, in France the anti-clerical
drives for moral, intellectual, and socio-legal reform con-
tributed a "laic ll and "positivist ll cast to the mainlines of
modern French CUlture.
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C. The Franco-Latin "Laic"-Positivist Cultural Tradition
What does an educated, lay Catholic, rising middle
class, committed to living a moral life within the world,
do when it is confronted with a powerful and wayward Church
which is, in turn, allied with a corrupt aristocracy and mon-
archy? Now, the first modern cultural tradition--the "laic"-
positivist cultural tradition--stemmed from a kind of Catho-
lic "prophetism ll or protestantism, especially in France.
This tradition was "laic" because it derived primarily from
the laity, who strove to live a life of high moral standards
within the world. And it became positivist because spokesman
for the educated laity gradually felt compelled to declare
that Individual Reason and Natural Science were the only cer-
tain ways of gaining positive, valid knowledge.
Over against the dominance of the Catholic metaphysical
or "essentialist" tradition, the positivist stream sought to
construct an "existential II conscience and consciousness. A-
gainst the pervasive claims stemming from the "Book of Reve-
lation," whose authoritative interpretation was monopolized
by the Latin hierocracy, they appealed to the "Book of Na-
ture." This latter was also the "work of God's hand," and it
was an open book which could be read by any man who learned
to read its special language, for it was a work written in
numbers (hence, the importance of mathematics in early mod-
ern science).
Whereas the ruling philosophy in the Catholic tradi-
tion had been metaphysical, this new tradition became posi-
tivist--for it denied that ultimate reality is knowable
through human reason. At root, positivism rests on a radical
split between faith and reason. Ironically, the first to in-
stitutionalize this gulf (besides nominalists), were fideist
members of the Church establishment. They separated things
that are knowable only through revelation and faith off from
things of this world that are positively knowable through
the senses and reason in order to safeguard the sacred depos-
it of faith from skeptical attack.
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1010--
However, as tensions deepened, there was a significant
shift as later "laic" reformers came to set aside the impor-
tance and then even the possibility of a metaphysical, other-
worldly half of the dichotomy. Thus, the two worlds were fur-
ther split into two separate truths--reason had little or
nothing to do with faith, while established religion was in-
creasingly put on the defensive by Individual Reason and Nat-
ural Science. Like those who rejected reason for faith and
Scripture alone, then, the positivists--who came to live by
Reason alone--radically split off faith from reason, revela-
tion from nature, this world from the other world.
From the beginning, the central thrust of the Franco
Cultural Tradition was to separate morality from its tradi-
tional nierocratic and metaphysical foundations. Metaphysics
was attacked as tne anchor pin of the legitimacy ot hiero-
cratic control of society and individuals, and as a bUlwark
shielding the waywardness of the incumbents of "office char-
isma." Thus, the French moral and intellectual reformers
were engaged in an epic struggle with the nierocracy over
many centur1es concerning the legitimate foundations of moral
and intellectual decision. Positive science came in later
stages as a prime tool in their struggle to disengage from
traditional claims on man, and as the prime tool by which to
construct a "laic" morality. Remember that an educated laity
had little role to play in the Church, just as the middle
class was blocked by the restrictions of the old feudal-aris-
tocratic regime. Anti-clericalism, as in many hierocratically
dominated cultures, whether from left leg. the philosophes)
or right (eg. Pascal and the Jansensists), fueled the mount-
ing drive for a new "laic" morality. The opposition to the
dominant Catholic CUltural Tradition led tnem to embrace the
following rhetorical series: priests are to metaphysics as
laity is to positivism and science, and as aristocracy and
monarchy is to middle class, and as the Old feudal regime
is to progress, Enlightenment, and the modern world. In sum,
against the wayward incumbents of "office charisma," tne
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French and Latin moral and intellectual reformers raised the
counter-claims of "Individual Conscience"and "Reason" based
on the "personal charisma" of the "inner light" and the
"Book of Nature." The dual insistence on science coupled
with social critique and moral reform was not an anomaly
(eg. with Saint-Simon, Comte, or Durkheim), for it was pre-
cisely this emphatic linkage which lay at the very heart of
the powerful dynamic of the "laic"-positivist cUltural tradi-
tion.
From the late medieval period on, some of the most dy-
namic streams in French culture may seen as part of a growing
tradition of opposition to the dominant tradition. And, al-
though opposed in certain ways, their critique had the con-
verging effect of delegitimizing the ancien regime. For it
was a continuing stream ot evangelical monks and lesser cler-
gy (eg. the satires of Rabelais, d. 1553), disgruntled or
displaced nobleman (eg. the world-weary fideistic skepticism
of Montaigne, d. 1592, the critical relativism of Montes-
quieu, d. 1755, the atheistic materialism of Holbach, the u-
topian positivism of saint-Simon, d. lS25), Calvinists (eg.
the Huguenots, the radical skeptical fideism of Pierre Bayle,
d. 1706), French Catholic Calvinists (eg. the Jansenists, or
the fideistic skepticism of Pascal, d. 1662), rising bour-
geoisie (eg. the dualistic critical rationalism of Descartes,
d. 1650, or many of the Jesuit-educated philosophes of the
Enlightenment, ego Voltaire, d. 1778), who, among others,
fueled this rising tide of cultural opposition, the radical
critique of tradition and all forms ot servitude, and accel-
erated the "laic" drive for moral and intellectual autonomy
and social reconstruction. The successive waves of fideism,
nominalism, skepticism, critical rationalism, positivism,
existentiallsm, Marxism, and so forth, which have washed over
French culture, should be understood in terms of their common
opposition to the Catholic Cultural Tradition.
Perhaps one of the critical factors here was that, un-
like England which enjoyed a peaceful Reformation in the
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the 15~0's and a violent political-social Revolution in the
1640's, and in contrast to Germany which enjoyed a Reforma-
tion in the 1530's but never experienced a comparable socio-
political revolution, France had no successful Reformation,
yet experienced the most violent political-soclal Revolution
in 1789, which, nonetheless, proved to be abortive in sever-
al ways. The deepening split in France between reformist and
monarchic-hierocratic elements was to plague French society,
politics, and culture for centuries after. Indeed, nowhere
else did the oppositions become so deep, so mounting and ir-
revocable as between the monarchic/middle-class, cleric/lay,
metaphysical/positivist factions during the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. And it was because of these historical
alignments that the two series of dichotomies became such
compelling symbolic equations in the minds of reformer and
traditionalist alike.
Main phases in the development of this tradition in-
clude:
(1) the late medieval background: the rise of the new
national monarchies, and their struggle with the Roman papacy
over control of the Church in their realms; the resultlng
"Babylonian Captivity" of the Church at Avignon, the Western
Schism, and the rise of the conciliar movrnent; the establish-
ment of the persistent claims for the "liberties of the Galli-
can Church," all represent crucial background for the Reform-
ation phase in France;
(2) Reformation: the Reformation phase runs basically
from the opening of the Wars of Religion in the mid-sixteenth
century to the Edict of Nantes in 1598 which granted the Hu-
guenots toleration. However, the prolongation of this strug-
gle, and the fact that neither side decisively triumphed un-
til the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685, with the
mass expulsion of the Huguenots, proved decisive for the sub-
sequent history of French society, polity, and culture;
(3) the growing absolutism and centralization of French
government in the monarchy, the suppression of independence
of the regional aristocracy, and the increasing identifica-
tion of the Church with the absolutistic regime (eg. the car-
dinals Richilieu and ~1azarin as prime ministers) was criti-
cal. When coupled with the extraordinary longevity of the
Kings Louis XIII, XIV, and XV l1610-1774), and the suppres-
sion of dissent by the Baroque monarchies, only served to in-
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crease the drlve for reform;
(4) the rise of critical rationalism, especially in the
early seventeenth century, with Descartes and the Cartesians,
which was to constitute the most distinctive secular and ear-
ly modern thrust of French philosophy;
(5) the rise of Jansenism as a rigoristic morality and
philosophy of opposition to the compromises and laxity of the
French Catholic Church, and of the critical rationalism of
Descartes which anchored certainty in Individual Reason, and
opened the way for a mechanistic universe devoid of God. Draw-
ing on the dissatisfaction of upper-middle class lawyers (the
noblesse de robe), the Jansensists, as a type of pietist
French Catholic Calvinism rooted ln Augustine, continued to
have an influence in French culture far out ot proportion to
their small numbers;
(6) the Enlightenment, the great explosion of CUltural
critiques that carne with the generations born in the last dec-
ade of the seventeenth century and the first two decades of
the eighteenth century was the crucial transition to the mod-
ern, "secular" era of French culture. Their drive for moral
and social reform, for a "natural religion" and a "natural
morality," was directed both against the ancien regime and
the Catholic Church of their youth. So great were the conse-
quences of this massive outpouring that these generations
carne to be regarded as representing a crucial phase in the
secularization of European civilization generally;
(7) the French Revolution, with its optimistic prelude,
the engagement of successive class resentments against the
old regime (the aristocracy, middle class, and lower class
in turn took the lead) the unexpected violence, its rapid
passage through many phases, the radLcal moralism of the
Reign of Terror and Virtue, etc., and ultimately, its abor-
tive and unfinished program of social reconstruction which
would remain throughout the nineteenth century;
(8) the Restoration, the Napoleonic Empire, and the Con-
servative Reaction against the excesses of the Revolution of
1789, the resurgence of the Catholic right-wing and the rise
of ultramontanism, and the subsequent alternation in French
political culture between "caesaristic" leaders and laic-
bourgeois Republics;
(9) the rise of Utopian positivism, with Saint-Simon,
Comte, and their fOllowers (akin to the Benthamite Utilitar-
ians in England at about the same time), formulating the un-
finished program of social, intellectual, and moral recon-
struction. Also, we see the emergence of French social sci--
ence outside the academy as the heir to the long tradition
of social criticism, drives for positive reform, Science,
and social organicism (in contrast to the social nominalism
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of the ~nglish reformers);
(10) the rise of nineteenth century literary realism ~eg.
Balzac, d. 1850), literary positivism (eg. Taine, d. 18~3),
and critical rationalism not only in literature and literary
criticism but also in philosophy (eg. Renan, d. 1892), and
the philosophy of science (eg. Duhem, Poincare, d. 1912);
(11) the Third Republic, and its attempt to construct a
"laic" morality (eg. the expulsion of the Jesuits from pnb-
lic education), bourgeois rationalism, the Dreyfus Case,
Zola, and so on;
(12) twentieth century movements, attendant on tne two
world-wars and France's loss of world-position, ego existen-
tialism, Marxism, phenomenology, structuralism, and so on.
Indeed, it seems as if these struggles for moral, social,
and intellectual reform are never completed; as the French
say, "The more things change, the more things stay the same."
Yet, in a number of ways, the French reformers remain-
ed sons and daughters of the tradition against which they so
relentlessly struggled for centuries, especially in their em-
phasis on Reason, natural law, high moral standards, the good
of the whole society, social organicism, and so forth. As was
noted in Chapter Four, this was Durkheim's cultural tradition.
And it was for these and similar other reasons that Durkheim
himself was immune to self-destructive individualisms and an
"infinity of dreams and desires." Especially it was his so-
cial organicism, his positivistic rationalism, his typically
French concern with mesure, proportion, and good order, and
the classical notion of the "golden mean" as the norm for
health and happiness, that led Durkheim to become such an in-
cisive critic of the anomie and egoisme which plagued the
Anglo-American and German-Romantic traditions. For in the
last analysis, Durkheim's Suicide should be seen in terms of
its rhetorical opposition to the heart of two other competing
cultural traditions in the modern world.
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D. The Anglo-American Empiricist-Utilitarian Cultural Tra-
dition
The first fUlly modern tradition is the Empiricist-U-
tilitarian ("ascetic" ) cultural tradition which emerged
primarily in England and then America from at least the sev-
enteenth century onward. The central motifs in this tradi-
tion are individualism (atomism, nominalism) and mechanism.
Empiricism is the central morality of thought; utilitarianism
is the central logic of action. Our thesis, following Max
Weber, is that these cultural logics emerged from the secu-
larization and translation of Calvinistic theology and ethics
into highly dynamic cultural and institutional forms during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England and A-
merica.
Some of the key background events which allowed this
tradition to emerge in England include: the dynastic strug-
gles, English Erasmianism, and the peaceful Reformation of
Henry VIII, the establishment of a national Chruch in the
early sixteenth century, the alternation of Tudor Reforma-
tion and Tudor repression leg. "Bloody Mary"), the growth
of English Calvinism and the stormy Puritan Revolution and
English Civil War during the mid-seventeenth century, and,
after the Restoration, the permanent establishement of Pro-
testant, Parliamentary, and middle-class principles in the
Whig Revolution of 1688, the waning of religious enthusiasm
and displacement of energies into non-political channels in
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the
rise of Methodism in the mid-eighteenth centuries, and so on.
Structurally, it was England's isolation and indepen-
dence from continental Europe, her greater internal unifica-
tion than many other countries, her successful national Re-
formation, the parliamentary system of shared power, a per--
meable class structure which allowed the rising middle class
upward mobility, a state church which gradually granted tol-
eration for many competing Protest.ant denominations, the e-
mergence of new types of voluntary associations {ego the dis-
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senting academies, Royal Society, Lunar Society, etc.), the
inclusionary thrust (begun in the Army during the Civil War
and concluded only in the twentieth century) to include more
citizens in the political process in the continuing democrat-
ic revolution, the market capitalism and scientific-indus-
trial revolutions during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, among other things, which proved crucial for the de-
velopment of this cultural tradition.
Major organizing polarities (variations of center;
periphery tensions) and major phases include the following.
In the first phase, approximately late fifteenth century to
1588, the major organizing polarity was "Court" (including
both Puritan and Anglican in the sixteenth century) versus
"country" (Catholic). The end of this phase came with the
defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588; no longer did interna-
tional Catholicism divide the country. Rather, from this
point on, nationalism superseded religious differences. Thus,
the "Court" party represented the rights of the "periphery,"
that is, a national religion, England, and the crown in the
person especially of Henry VIII versus the continent, Catho-
licism, the Roman papacy, and so on. In the second phase,
roughly 1588 to 1688, that is, during the Stuart period es-
pecially, "Court" versus "Country" meant Puritans versus
Anglican-Conformists. During this period after the defeat of
the Armada, international Catholicism lost its power a~ a
divisive symbolic force, and the Puritan party shifted toward
the "Country" position vis-a-vis the "Court." These two op-
posing forces cut across social classes. During the Civil
War in the 1640's (under Cromwell), the Country party was
victorious over the crown. However, the Puritans failed to
fUlly legitimize their rule, and there was a peaceful Resto-
ration in 1660. However, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 re-
presented the ultimate victory of the Country, Parliamentary,
and Whig principles; thus, this phase ends in lb88.
In the third phase, roughly 1688 to the mid-eighteenth
century, the primary polarity is "Establishment" versus
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"Dissent." During the later Stuart period and under the Han-
overian kings, the Whig oligarchy grew conservative, reached
a common understanding with -the Anglican establishment, and
enforced civil disabilities on religious dissenters. It was
during this period, then, that liberal and radical Calvinist
reformist drives were forced into non-political and non-reli-
gious forms, especially science, economics, and technology.
It is during the latter half of the seventeenth century that
we first see Calvinistic ethics being translated in a massive
and sustained way into secular forms.
In the fourth phase, the main polarities were "Estab-
lishment" versus the emerging "Empiricist-Utilitarian Cul-
tural Tradition;" this phase extended roughly from the middle
of the eighteenth to the early nineteenth century. During
this phase, the alignments solidify--on the one hand, we see
Anglican, Tory, the old landed aristocracy, while on the
other hand, we see Whig, individualism, the Industrial Revo-
lution, Market Capitalism, Utilitarian science and technolo-
gy, and so on. The establishment was overcome, among other
reasons, because they were static, while the other tradition
transformed the economic, social, and cultural structure.
Here, the rise of Methodism played a crucial role in bring-
ing a form of Calvinism to the masses, and in reenergizing
the secularizing thrust of Calvinism which had been running
down and into other channels for the past century.
In the fifth and final (in this schema) phase, the ma-
jor polarities were "Conservative" versus "Liberal;" it runs
from the first reform acts of the early eighteen hundreds
through the early 1900's. Here, we see the reaction against
both irrational traditionalism and the incipient negative
effects of the industrial revolution and market capitalism.
Perhaps one of the most significant changes was the metamor-
phosis of Utilitarian individualism into Benthamite collec-
tivism and state interventionism. The culmination - of this
phase is the transformation of the laissez-faire market so-
ciety into a welfare state in the twentieth century (see al-
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so Karl Polanyi, 1944).
Let us next briefly explore the two dominant lOglCS of
this cultural tradition--empiricism and utilitarianism. Em-
pricism is a form of philosophic individualism, which empha-
sizes immediate experience, experiment, and induction from
direct experience and experiment. It directs the individual
to believe only the demonstrable evidence of one's own sen-
ses, including the innate "common sense." Empiricism rests on
a sensationist and associationist psychology. Empiricism op-
poses both scholasticism and various other forms of rational-
ism, including idealism (eg. Bacon versus late medieval scho-
lasticism and the "Idols of the Mind, and Locke's tabula rasa
versus Descartes' "innate ideas") . .l::mpiricism starts induc-
tively from direct experience; from the part it reasons to a
wider inference, to the whole. English and American culture
has always had a characteristic emphasis on what is plain,
simple, immediate; toward what is directly knowable by the
senses; toward what is practical and useful.
This commitment to individualism, of which empiricist
philosophy is one prime expression, has a series of reinfor-
cing roots deeply embedded in English culture. One may cite
the following symbolic equations for Anglo-American indivi-
dualism:
(1) periphery versus center relations--that fact that
England is an island, faced with a huge, populous Continent,
is one perennial source of the drive for autonomy, both moral
and intellectual. For, in general, the periphery stands for
the rights of the part, while the center necessarily stands
for the interests of the whole. Thus, England was faced suc-
cessively by Rome, the Holy Roman Empire, France, Spain, Ger-
many, and so on.
(2) personal charisma versus office charisma--a pervasive
influence in building Anglo-Saxon culture was the influence
of monastic orders such as the Benedictines and later the
Franciscans. Here we see the inner equation working itself
out between the personal charisma of mysticism and empirical,
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1019--
experimental philosophy (eg. as in the Franciscan monk Roger
Bacon, d. 1292, an early advocate of experimental science).
(3) nominalism versus realism, via moderna versus via an-
tiqua--tor instance, in the fourteenth century Franciscan
monk William of Ockham's logical nominalism (stemming from
his fideism, which denied the necessary interdependence of
existential facts to place them instead in direct dependence
on God) which helped dissolve medieval Thomistic realism.
With Ockham the connection between the periphery and nominal-
ism ("only parts are real") is clearly evident in the link
between his logical thought and nis ethical thought--namely,
his struggle with the nationalists and rigorists against the
hegemony of the international Roman papacy.
(4) Calvinism versus Catholic scholasticism--the radical
individualism stemming from the Protestant principle, Calvin-
istic predestination, and the sects' extension of "inner
light" asceticism and mysticism became secularized and
translated into general culture in the form of Enligtenment
empiricism and other forms of individualism. Ockham's nomi-
nalism lingered at Oxford through Bacon and Hobbes' time;
and when fused with the empiricist residues of "inner light"
Protestantism through John Locke and the "common sense" of
the Scottish philosophers, generated the epistemological
anchors of this cultural tradition.
Nominalism and religious individualism became translat-
ed or secularized during the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies into many different institutional and cultural forms.
For instance, there is a well-recognized connection between
the Calvinist drive toward self-governing congregations and
the English concern with voluntary associations and politi-
cal democratic individualism (eg. see Lindsay, 1947); for
the latter gained their ethical sanction from the former.
While the Puritan foundations (especially in the "Army De-
bates") of Anglo-American democracy and the rights of the
middle class individual are commonly recognized, it should
be noted that empiricism also rests on a similar ethical
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sanctioning of the individual in terms of his "inner light"
--the natural, inherent, "light of reason." Thus, empiricist
epistemology is the natural correlate of democratic indivi-
dualism; they go together, there is a deep inner symbolic
equation and historical transformation linking them.
Other expressions (or "equations") of this same indi-
vidualism include: social contract theories and the notion
of "civil society" (ego as found in Locke, Ferguson, etc.),
liberalism and the economic individualism which is at the
root of free market capitalism (under the notion that "free
markets make free men"), associationist psychology, atomis-
tic ~nd mechanistic Newtonian physics lie. the 'corpuscular
theory"or the billiard ball image of the universe in which
atoms bounce into each other), Dalton's atomic theory in
chemistry, individual competition, natural selection, and
the "survival of the fittest" in Darwinian evolutionary bio-
logy, Social Darwinism, judge-made case law, reductionism in
medicine and science, and so on, which continue ramifying to
this day.
Because of the strong continuing ethical sanction for
absolute individualism and self-reliance, one of the most
deeply embedded Symbolic equations in this tradition is the
insistence on a necessary and natural, inner link between re-
ductionism lie. always reduce higher levels to lower ones,
the complex to the simple, the "nothing but" formula), or me-
thodological nominalism, on the one hand, and the drive for
moral autonomy, individualism, and political liberty on the
other. Hence, organic or holistic or systemic images are con-
demned as totalitarian.
In addition, Utilitarianism is the characteristic moral
philosophy, or logic of action, of this cultural tradition
(its cousin is Pragmatism in America). Utilitarianism is an
impersonal and objective calculus of efficiency; its prime
value is functional rationality. Here, the grounds of ethical
jUdgment become shifted to practical outcomes; whether it
works or not becomes the chief criterion of value. Utilitar-
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ianism shifts questions of value from essential goals and
ultimate ends (substantive rationality) to operating means,
to means-ends efficiency (functional rationality). Notions
of value rooted in tradition, the community, nature, cosmol-
ogy, God, etc., are sacrificed to notions of productivity
and efficiency.
All actions, then, come to be judged by a statistical
collective calcuLus of pain and pleasure, by "cost/benefit"
analysis. The rUling ethical norm then becomes the "greatest
good of the greatest number;" today, we have become an "ac-
tuarial society" in which pUblic decisions have to be ground-
ed in an impersonal trade-off of cost/benefit ratios. In this
way, utilitarianism builds on atomism or individualism, since
the individual is taken as the basic unit and his preferences
are statistically aggregated, and the result projected as the
"common good." This "logic of action" is seen in contemporary
life, for instance, in the method of taxing land in the Uni-
ted States in terms of its so-called "highest and best use,"
which is presumed to be whatever possible function which pro-
duce the most money if sold on the market.
This ethos constitutes the single most crucial step in
what Weber (after the poet Schiller) called the "disenchant-
ment of the world," for the world is no longer something mys-
terious, an "enchanted garden" or the "playground of the
Gods." For God has abandoned the world (deus absconditus),
and thus, the world has fallen merely to the status of some-
thing to be mastered and used to help build the "Kingdom of
God" here on earth.
Now, the linkage between the growth of English liberal-
ism, free market capitalism, the development of Utilitarian
moral and political economic theory, the scientific and tech-
nocultural revolution of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, and the Industrial Revolution and international ex-
tension of the market and the Pax Britannica in the nine-
teenth century, proved to be one of the most powerful and
fateful convergences in world-history. These mUltiple and
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reinforcing revolutions, all stemming from England, represen-
ted the high pressure area of the European world, and swept
all before it as they colonized much of the rest of the
world. Only the Catholic Cultural Tradition, and perhaps the
Franco Cultural Tradition in its revolutionary movements,
have had such a powerful and sustained outward thrust. No
other cUltural tradition in history can claim credit, or ac-
cept blame, for the Industrial Revolution, the international
spread of market capitalism, and colonialism, and, thus, the
change not only of their own way of life, but of every other
society.
It is my thesis here (following Weber) that a number
of key elements in Calvinism (eg. the devaulation of the
world as wholly separate, of nature as completely fallen,
radical religious individualism, predestinarianism, voca-
tional inner-worldly asceticism, the drive to build the King-
dom of God here on earth, etc.), combined in a decisive and
highly dynamic way. In opposition to the priestly and hier-
archical system of both Catholicism and Anglicanism, Calvin-
ism represents the first and foremost expression of an "in-
ner-worldly," "inner-light," vocational asceticism, of the
personal charisma of the monk condemned to live in this world,
but to be neither of or for the world. The drive of the as-
cetic toward systematic and methodical self-discipline, to'-
ward mastery of the flesh and the world to the greater glory
of God is continued and even intensified in the Protestant
ascetic, especially in the Puritan. The "visible saints"
were a "salvation aristocracy," a rigoristic "saving remnan~"
committed, as in the theocracies of Geneva, Massachusetts
Bay, and Cromwell's England, to building a "Godly Common-
wealth," a "New Jerusalem," a "City on the Hill."
When secularized, "inner-worldly asceticism" and the
drive toward impersonal service toward a supra-personal goal
led to the Utilitarian culture. Now, whole it must be ac-
knowledged that these outlooks developed from a number of
sources over a series of generations marked by crucial dis-
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placements and transformations in ethical sanctions, nonethe-
less, one may detect the emergence of a secular impersonal
ethic of service directed toward supra-personal goals couch-
ed in terms of a calculus of efficiency and productivity and
the norm of the "greatest good of the greatest number" as
early as the late seventeenth century lafter religious P en-
thusiasm" waned). Again, one should not try to read back in-
to early reformers what their descendants did with their doc-
trines. Yet, we see such groups as the "moral statisticians"
and the rise of the notion of "political arithmetick" among
individuals in public life such as William Petty (who survey-
ed the confiscated Irish estates for the invading Cromwell,
and against whom Swift directed his satire in "A Modest Pro-
posal"). Utilitarian theory emerged with the strongest pro-
gram in the Anglo-Scottish Enlightenment (eg. in the work of
Hume, Hutcheson, Priestly, Ferguson, Smith, etc., see Hale-
vy, 1955), as central to the attempt to build a "Newtonian
moral science," with its own special laws, whether these be
the "association of ideas," the "law of supply and demand,"
or similar notions. The development of the notion of "civil
society" in which the basis of the social bond was declared
neither to be kinship nor personal allegiance to a patriarch
or king but rather impersonal and individualistic participa-
tion in the ec~nomy. on the one hand, and the notion of a
society organized in terms of the market on the other hand,
went hand in hand. ~1arkets were cornrnOil before then, of course,
but, as both Weber and Polanyi saw, England was the first na-
tion in history to organize itself internally primarily in
terms of a market society, and these "moral scientists" work-
ed out the legitimating and directive theory. The idea of a
society governed by a self-regulating market, free from gov-
ernmental influence, in which prices would be set impersonal-
ly through the "law of supply and demand," was revolutionary,
as was the idea that the market was self-balancing because it
was governed by nature, automatically, as if by an "invisible
hand. "
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It was with doctrines such as these (which, along with
Locke's political theory of 1688, formed the theoretical bas-
is of American society and our Constitution), that we moved
irrevocably from traditional to modern society, from the
"tribal brotherhood to universal otherhood" (Nelson, 1969a).
For ethics became individualized and rationalized, that is,
impersonal and calculating. This tradition was the first in
history to state the moral doctrine that egoisme, regulated
only by the impersonal competition of the marketplace, is
really altruistic because it would inevitably lead to greater
productivity and efficiency, and these, in turn are closely
linked to the common good (eg. see Mandeville's "Fable of
the Bees" in which "private vices become public virtues").
Now, given our interpretive perspective, it is significant
that many of the leading pioneers of the Utilitarian perspec-
tive were Scottish moral philosophers, and that many of these
and the English were either sons of ministers or themselves
"dissenting divines," especially of Presbyterian, Congrega-
tionalist, Quaker, or Unitarian denominations.
Here, the development of a "New Model Man" and the
"New Model Society" (to borrow a phrase from the Puritan
"New Model Army") went hand in hand. And, although he was
largely unaware of it, these transmuted ethical drives can
still be seen in the legal, social, economic, and political
reforms of the "Hermit of Queen's Square Place"--Jeremy Ben-
than, son of dissenters, and the very prototype of an "inner
worldly ascetic" and "philosophical radical" (see Halevy,
1955). John Stuart Mill's touching account of his breakdown
in his Autobiography, and his turn toward romantic poetry is
a most revealing chapter in the later history of this tradi-
tion, for it is the most dramatic instance of a leading
spokesman finding he cannot live within this tradition alone;
the tradition here begins to breakdown from within.
With the turn toward social reform from a Benthamite
liberal perspective, toward socialism and Idealism, Fabian-
ism, and Labor governments in England, and the Social Gospel
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movement in America, we see a metamorphosis in the old Pro-
testant Ethic from prime concern with individual success to
the central concern of contemporary liberal Protestantism--
namely, social service and amelioration of poverty and op-
pression (eg. see Benton Johnson, 1971, 1975).
For our present purposes, it is the absolute indivi-
dualism and "inner-worldly asceticism" of Calvinism as it be-
came secularized in England and America during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries that constitutes the crucial
cultural-historical sanctions for anomie. Here, we see the
displacement of powerful religious energies into secular pur-
suits. Here, see "the unprecedented inner lonliness of the
individual," as Weber remarked. Here, we find that embrace of
an "infinite task"--building the "Kingdom of God" here on
earth;" and thus, we find the vocation of the "monk within
the world." Here, we find that functional rationality which
positively enjoins limitlessness, because there is no goal
in sight (see also LaCapra, 1972). We have discovered, in
short, in secularized Calvinism the necessary cultural sanc-
tions for absolute individualism and a legitimate "infinity
of desires," which are turned against the external world in
economics, science, technology, and so on. Hence, finally,
we have discovered ourselves, and how our central values un-
intentionally metamorphose into our vices.
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E. The Romantic-Idealistic CUltural Tradition
The last major modern tradition to crystallize was the
Romantic-Idealistic ("mystic") Cultural Tradition. Just as
the prime rhetorical opponent of the Catholic Cultural Tradi-
tion was the Franco-Positivist Tradition, so, too, the
sharpest critics of the Anglo-American Utilitarian Cultural
Tradition were found among the Romantics. Emerging first in
Germany in the latter half of the eighteenth century, and
then spreading across Europe and America, the Romantic Tradi-
tion emerged out of the progressive secularization of the
"inner light" fideistic mysticism of the late medieval Ger-
man mystics, and that of the "spiritual radicals" of the late
Reformation period, the inner angst of the Lutheran "faith-
crisis," assorted oriental and gnostic theosophies, neo-Pla-
tonism, and Leibnitzian rationalism, and the later pietistic
cults of inwardness and anguished subjectivity, as these o-
rientations were fused and progressively translated into mod-
ern art, poetry, music, philosophy, the social sciences, and
so on. Although Weber himself never pursued these connec-
tions, clearly "inner-worldly mysticism" is as significant a
force in the modern world as "inner-worldly asceticism." Thus,
we shall focus here on a second, and rather different, "Pro-
testant Ethos."
Now, the political and religious background was deci-
sively different in Germany. First, Germany was not a homo-
geneous, internally unified nation-state like England or
France; rather, Germany was a region of small competing
states in central Europe. There was a continuous oscillation
between the international, universalistic Holy Roman Empire
and the Latin Church, on the one hand, and the small, locali-
zed, particularistic states and principalities on the other,
with little ground as in the nation-states of Western Europe.
Thus, the essential political background conditions were Ger-
man princes competing simultaneously against both the Habs-
burg Empire and the universalistic claims of the Roman Catho-
lic Church.
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As might be expected during this era, the initial key
to these struggles was the conflict between center and peri-
phery. Thus, the key to the outcome of the Reformation in
Germany was the alliance between the Lutheran Reformation
and political regionalism. Lutheranism took on the character
of a national revolt against both Rome and Empire. Luther,
of course, depended for protection on the German princes a-
gainst both Rome and the German peasant uprising. On this
basis, Lutheranism built up a clergy and a territorial
Church system. After Germany fell into prolonged struggle be-
tween Catholic and Protestant states, the Peace of Augsburg
signified a victory for the rights of the princely states by
temporarily resolving the civil strife according to the form-
ula "cuius regio eius religio." Later, the Peace of Westphal-
ia (1648), ending the devastation of the Thirty Years War,
meant a checkmate to the Counter-Reformation in Germany, the
turning aside of the domination of Europe by the empire of
the Catholic Habsburgs, the dissolution of the Holy Roman
Empire in fact if not in name, and the de facto religious
pluralism of Europe as a permanent fact of life. While
France, England, and other Western European powers were cen-
tralizing and consolidating into modern nation-states, Ger-
many remained politically a region of many small competing
states, relatively backward economically, and penetrated by
feudal socio-economic organization.
Now, one cannot hope to trace the institutional his-
tory underlying this cUltural tradition in the same manner
as with the other traditions. For one of the peculiar char-
acteristics of this tradition is the split between culture
and polity, between the "inner" and "outer" world. Indeed,
this stems from the basic Lutheran opposition between "Reli-
gion" and "World," his notion of two truths, and especially
his Pauline handing over of the direction of the external
world to the state. In contrast to Anglo-American Calvinism,
Lutheranism never legitimized a strong, external, collectiv-
ist organizational thrust. Moreover, this Lutheran split 0-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1028--
pened the way for a unique symbiosis in German political
culture--namely, in the most powerful of the emerging Ger-
man states, Prussia, the Hohenzollern rulers were predomi-
nantly Calvinist, while the subjects were predominantly Lu-
theran (see Parsons, 1977:162). One can hardly conceive of
a better fit between religion and politics--namely, disci-
plined, activist, authoritarian, collectivist Calvinist rul-
ers paired with sUbmissive Lutheran sUbjects.
It was against the background of a decisive religious
Reformation coupled with political and economic backwardness
in Germany that we should seek to understand the rise of the
Romantic cultural tradition. For Romanticism first emerged as
a reaction against the progressive trends of the modern world
in society, economics, science, technology, art, and so on.
Indeed, Germany's weak Enlightenment phase was followed al-
most simultaneously by the massive and brilliant Romantic
reaction; here, Herder was a key link. Germany's cultural i-
solation and the central role ot the universities in the rise
of German culture (in contrast to the extra-university roles
of reformers in Britain and France), are also important fac-
tors. Being in revolt against the homogenizing and geometri-
zing rationalism of the Enlightenment, the Romantics natural-
ly reacted against the excesses of the French Revolution and
Napoleon's hegemony over Europe. In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, this symbolic equation between culture and politics led
to an association of German nationalism with cultural ideals
opposed to the rationality of the Enlightenment, and espe-
cially the obsession with utility at the heart of Anglo mar-
ket capitalism. Thus, when Germany acted for almost the first
time as a political unity against Western Europe, German
thinkers and cultural spokesman also set themselves against
Western European Enlightenment thought, a pattern which was
to have fateful consequences for the future of the West.
Clearly, the prehistory of this tradition goes back at
least to the Lutheran Reformation, and even before to the
late medieval mystics such as Eckhart, Suso, Tauler, and
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others (of the Theologica Germanica), to the fideistic mysti-
cism, nominalism, and conciliarism of thinkers such as Cardi-
nal Nicholas of Cusa, to the devotio moderna of the urban
tertiary sects, especially the brotherhoods and sisterhoods
scattered along the Rhine, Flanders, and the Low Countries
such as The Brethren of the Common Life, the Friends of God,
the canons regular, and so on. These religio-cultural streams
accompanied the proliferation of Pauline and Augustinian
structures of conscience in the Lutheran Reformation, espe-
cially in terms of the angst and deep inner anguish of the
paradigmatic Lutheran "faith crisis." Indeed, Luther served
as a key conduit for both the Pauline-Augustinian structures
of feeling and thought and Ockham's and Biel's nominalism
(the via moderna), and for the mysticism of the late medieval
German mystics and the pietistic fideism of the devotio mod-
erna. Indeed, as Panofsky (1957) notes, nominalism and mysti-
cism shared an "elective affinity" (or symbolic equation)
during this period in that both reinforced the primacy of the
experience of the individual. These aspects of the Reforma-
tion prehistory were reinforced by the intellectualistic (of-
ten neo-Platonic) and pietistic mysticism seen in the ethic
of "utmost inwardness" and radical subjectivity of the spir-
itual radicals and men such as Sebastian Franck, Caspar
Schwekenfeld, Sebastian Castellio, Valentin Weigel, and oth-
ers. Weigel has been honored on occasion as the original fa-
ther of German Idealism.
Perhaps one of the most revealing figures, standing as
he did between converging strands of earlier Christian and
Protestant mysticism, and various oriental and neo-Platonic
and gnostic theosophies, was the humble cobbler of Gorlitz--
Jacob Boehme. Living in the last quarter of the sixteenth
and the first quarter of the seventeenth century, Boehme had
ecstatic visions, and was persecuted by the now-staid and
orthodox Lutheran Church authorities. As a transitional fig-
ure in the interlude between the Reformation phase and the
emergence of the dominant secularized cultural tradition
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(like Pascal in France), the shoemaker from Silesia is an
"ideal typical" example of an "inner-worldly mystic."
Approximately a century and a half after the Reforma-
tion, and after Lutheranism had hardened into a state suppor-
ted Church and orthodoxy, the original spirit of the reform-
ers was revitalized by the Pietist renewal led by men such
as Spener, A.H. Francke, Count Zinzendorf, the Moravians,
and a host of other "world-retreating" Protestant sects
which followed. Methodism in England and America several gen-
erations later stemmed directly from the model of the Morav-
ian pietists and brotherhoods, and both forms paved the way
for the "cult of feeling" in Romanticism. Lutheran pietism,
especially, was an important and pervasive background influ-
ence in the orientation of early Romantics such as Hamann and
Herder.
During this same period, this cultural tradition en-
joyed its earliest prime philosophical expression in the work
of Leibnitz, the "German Plato" of his time, the outstanding
polymath of his day, and a thinker given to mystical inclina-
tions and sympathies. Leibnitz delivered the first fundamen-
tal critique of the classical formulation of the Newtonian
atomistic and mechanistic world-view. Further, it is signifi-
cant that he developed the calculus as the same time as New-
ton; however, in assuming that fields and processes were pri-
mary (rather than atoms), he approached the invention of the
calculus from the point of view of the differential, while
Newton worked primarily on the integral calculus (see C. Boy-
er, 1939). But Newton's physics and world-view won the day;
Leibnitz died almost unnoticed, his critique of Newtonian
physics and Locke's Essays almost forgotten. Yet, his out-
look gained final vindication almost three centuries later
when the generation of German thinkers led by Einstein revo-
lutionized classical physics, and substituted a processual,
field theory. It was no surprise that only these thinkers
(rather than the pioneering J.C. Maxwell) were able to draw
upon their cultural tradition for the organic and processual
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premises needed to fundamentally reorient physical theory.
Now, this developing religio-cultural tradition emer-
ged in its first secularized modern phase with the Enlighten-
ment generations of Lessing, Hamann, Herder, and Kant. lt
then exploded in its classical and definitive form of con-
science and consciousness with the succeeding generations
led by Goethe, Fichte, Schiller, Novalis, Savigny, Schopen-
auer, Hegel, Schelling, the Schlegels, the von Hurnboldts, and
so on. It is here that history is portrayed as the "unfolding
of the Absolute Spirit," emphasis is placed on the primacy of
the "Transcendental Ego," that we see the first of many mod-
ern "journeys into the interior" (Heller, 1968 ). Indeed, it
is striking that this massive intellectual and artistic out-
pouring, in many ways even greater than that produced by the
core generations of the French Enlightenment, was so delayed.
Yet, when it finally carne, the German reaction to the progres-
siveand disruptive tendencies of the Franco and Anglo-Scot-
tish cultures was so massive and so rapid, that the Romantic
reaction followed the weak German Enlightenment so closely as
to be almost simultaneous with it rather than sequential. Al-
though senior to Herder and his compatriots, much of Kant's
Idealistic Rationalism may be viewed as a kind of anticipa-
tory reaction against the incipient Romanticism of Herder and
especially Hegel and his later generation.
Now, space has not permitted us here to chart represen-
tative figures of these leading traditions in other societies
than those in which they were firstborn. However, since the
Romantic tradition is the most international, let us look at
the way in which this cultural tradition carne to be detached
from its homeland and carne to cut across modern society. Re-
member that this ability to cross national frontiers is es-
sential to a cUltural tradition (rather than a national in-
tellectual tradition). Dating roughly from the last quarter
of the eighteenth century in Germany, the Romantic movement
(excepting Rousseau) appeared approximately a generation lat-
er in England, another generation still in France, and, then,
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another generation still in America (c. 1840's).
In England, the Romantics' reaction against the cold,
abstract, Utilitarianism expressed in the leading economic,
scientific, and technological streams of the day was prepar-
ed by the rise of Methodism. The intense inwardness and evan-
gelical emotionalism of this--one of the first modern Protes-
tant--mass revivalistic movements helped transform the pre-
dominantly "ascetic" Anglo personal and cultural styles. The
first and most prescient English Romantic was William Blake
(d. 1827), clearly a radical descendant of Protestant "inner
light, inner-worldy mysticism." Blake prophesied against the
incipient Industrial Revolution ("dark satanic mills") and
apotheosized the individual Imagination. Along with others
such as Swedenborg, Blake, with his mixture of mysticism,
pietistic inwardness, ecstatic vision, and radical democrat-
ic individualism, remains one of the most powerful figures in
the background of early English Romanticism.
A step removed from the religious fervor of these early
mystic-Romantics was Wordsworth's spiritual, moral, and es-
thetic intoxication with nature; his lyrical poetry is a kind
of affirmative "inner-worldly nature mysticism." In his early
writings (eg. the "Lyrical Ballads"), Wordsworth attempted to
counter in direct, personal experience of nature the dominant
thrust of Anglo culture--the drive of "instrumental activism"
for mastery of the external world. Moreover, it is no coinci-
dence, that Wordsworth friend, S.T. Coleridge, the first the-
oretician in English Romanticism and one of its finest crit-
ics, drew inspiration from both the German Idealists and from
a common "spiritual technology" of mystics the world over--
namely, psychoactive drugs (eg. in his case, opium). English
Romanticism then exploded in the subsequent generations of
Byron, Keats, Shelley, Ruskin, Morris, and so on; indeed, as
Williams notes, it is striking that the very development of
the term "culture" in the English language stems from the Ro-
mantics reaction against the disintegrating effect of the in-
dustrial and market ~apitalist revolutions on English society
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(see Raymond Williams, 1958).
Similarly, many of the early French Catholic and/or A-
ristocratic Romantics (except Rousseau) such as Chateau-
briand, Lammenais, du Musset, Lamartine, and so forth, also
turned away from the cold, abstract, geometrizing and homo-
genizing rationalism of the En~ightenment to warmly embrace
either a romanticized nature or mankind (the cult of the
"people"). Both alternatives placed great stress on the nat-
ural emotions and sUbjective feelings in opposition to the
strictures of French classicism~ this, in turn, helped bring
certain strands of French Catholicism closer to a Schlier-
machean (or perhaps Pascalian) pietism. Since society, as de-
veloped in French utopian positivism, was a keynote of the
French Romantics, advances made against the rationalistic
metaphysics, on the one hand, and the indulgence in senti-
mentality and emotion served to turn religion into morality,
and thence to identify morality and social norms. This new
ethical religion of society and mankind also retained the so-
cial organicism of earlier Catholic philosophy, which now
rested on a new basis. This fusion of new and old alterna-
tives pointed out a mainstream of French cultural develop-
ment centered around the identification of morale and morals
that was to occupy many of the great public moralists and
early sociologists such as Saint-Simon, Comte, and, above
all, Emile Durkheim. Gradually, as Romanticism metamorphosed
into Realism, and then successively into Symbolism (eg. Bau-
delaire, Rimbaud), Dadaism, and Existentialism, the egoistic
and "demonic" or gnostic, alienated underside of French Ro-
manticism increasingly came to the surface.
Finally, in the "American Renaissance" of literature
and thought, there is the clear influence of Unitarians, U-
niversalists, and Quakers on the American transcendalists
and Romantics of the early and mid-nineteenth century. What
is significant for the cultural historian here is the meta-
morphosis of liberal Calvinism into Romanticism, a path that
had already been blazed by Rousseau. Thus, we see in Emerson
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and Thoreau the metamorphosis of "inner-light, inner-worldly
asceticism" into Romantic "inner-worldly mysticism" focussed
on Nature and Self. Other major figures in this emerging A-
merican branch of the Romantic tradition include Walt Whit-
man, and especially that "Empress of Calvary," the hermit of
Amherst, Miss Emily Dickinson. Although a minor figure in
terms of literature, the life of John Muir (d. 1912) is para-
digmatic here for the historian of cultural traditions. For
Muir, born in Scotland and oppressed by a dour, Puritan
father, moved directly away from the old-line Calvinism of
his youth to inner-worldly Romantic nature mysticism. Indeed,
as founder and first president of the powerful conservation
organization, the Sierra Club, Muir institutionalized a pub-
lic expression of the Romantics' concern for Nature: thus,
he was one who translated the Calvinist drive for service in-
to a new form of stewardship of the earth, one which is para-
digmatic for the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Now, in terms of our special purposes here, it is the
absolute individualism and "inner-worldly mysticism" of Lu-
theranism, fideistic pietism, and the subjective idealism of
the spiritual radicals as these became secularized first in
Germany and then in other countries from the seventeenth
through the nineteenth centuries which provides the required
cultural-historical sanction for Durkheimian egoisme. In the
Romantic cultural tradition, we see the extreme subjectivity,
the inflation of the ego, the fascination with heroic angst,
that is central to egoisme. Here, we find that "infinity of
dreams," the "journey into the interior" which issues in ego-
isme. Here, we discover suicide as a "vocation" among Roman-
tic artists. In short, we discover in secularized Lutheran-
ism the necessary cultural sanctioning for the Romantic ethos
of absolute individualism, anguished subjectivity, and an
"infinity of dreams" which are turned inward against the self,
and which find their foremost expression in modern Romantic
literature, art, music, and philosophy. In sum, in this cul-
tural sanctioning of egoisme, we discover the other half of
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the modern soul.
FOOTNOTES
BOOK THREE
#1, p. 877--In order to perform this task, we need systemat-
ic exegeses of their special sociologies; for instance,
I have prepared an exegesis of the first three chapters
of Weber's Sociology of Religion, unexplored territory
to this day.
#1, 1024--In The Division of Labor, Durkheim had this to say
about the understandingand the "golden mean" in history:
"But understanding is only one of our faculties. It can
increase beyond a certain point only to the detriment of
the practical faculties, disrupting sentiments, beliefs,
customs, with which we live, and such a rupture of equi-
librium cannot take place without troublesome consequen-
ces .•.. At each moment of history and in consequence
of each individual, there is a determined place for clear
ideas, reflected opinions, in short, for science, beyond
which it cannot normally extend" (DL: 238) •
#1, l039--But Durkheim's additional statement that " .. this
abusive exploitation of individualism proves nothing a-
gainst it," fails to catch the true thrust of his own in-
sight into the "exception proving the rule" (as with, for
example, the Jews and higher learning). For'it is not
those who shirk their duties to the modern "infinity of
dreams" and the cult of "utmost inwardness" who are beset
by egoistic tensions and suicide. Rather, it is those who
live out these values to the fullest! The problem is not
with some sinking to the sub-human level of animal drives
or organic egoism, but, rather, of rising to super-human
heights, and then failing. What Durkheim often observed
but could not admit systematically was this crucial pro-
cess of the routinization and deflection of modern char-
isma.
#1, l052--As originally planned, a separate fourth book on
cultural traditions was projected. Yet, this dissertation
had grown so large that it became impossible to include
much of this material. A detailed and systematic introduc-
tion to the methodology of interpreting cultural tradi-
tions has been worked out.
#2, l052--A long paper on the evolution of the Catholic Cul-
tural Tradition is being prepared.
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APPENDIX
WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO ANOMIE?
Synopsis. As is true of all paradigmatic notions, anomie
has become a protean concept, and, therefore, devoid of
specific and profound meaning. And Durkheim's typology has
both distorted and neglected.
In Part I of the following appendix, we shall explore
the vast literature which has grown up around Durkheim's no-
tion of anomie; we shall divide these into various streams
of development. We shall explore, first, the Parsonian
stream which may be considered basically normative, then
the Halbwachian stream which is structural, while the Merton-
ian stream of development mediates b~tween these two in fo-
cussing on the conflict between cultural mandates and struc-
tural opportunities. The Srolian stream reflects these other
streams, especially the Mertonian and Parsonian, in psycho-
logizing anomie. Finally, we shall explore a miscellaneous
category of development.
What Parsons, Halbwachs, Merton, and others did to
Durkheim's anomie, and what others did, in turn, to their
theories, can be understood as a typical illustration of the
breakthrough and subsequent breakdown of central paradigms
used in the "normal science" of any discipline. Perhaps a
hidden law of intellectual and cultural entropy is at work
here--the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit."
In Part II, we shall explore various confusions over
Durkheim's typology of suicide. Despite the paradigmatic
status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide remains un-
derdeveloped and confused in the sociological literature.
While anomie has been applied to theories of deviance and
despair, the other three types have been largely ignored.
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Thus, Durkheim's classic Suicide has experienced a doubly
sad fate--for not only has anomie undergone routine and pro-
gressive distortion, but, at the same time, the rest of his
complementary typology has been routinely ignored and dis-
torted.
Fortunately, over the years several observers have at-
tempted to rescue Durkheim's typology from obscurity. We
shall explore their widely diverging reinterpretations.
These attempts to restore or reinterpret Durkheim's schema
of suicide will be divided into "reductions" and "rescues."
Reductions refer to those reinterpretations which argue that
,
Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced
down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues"
refer to those interpretations which seek to distinguish the
four interrelated types.
We shall first consider several representative reduc-
tions of Durkheim's typology, and then move to consider sev-
eral rescues which serve as a bridge to my second schema of
suicide as developed in Book Three. Our guiding assumptions
here are that any adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's ty-
pology of suicide should: (a) take seriously the reduction-
ists' attempts to elucidate an underlying unity to the four
types, and (b) follow the rescuers in their attempt to elu-
cidate the distinctness of the four types. Hence, we seek
to reconcile this conflict by simultaneously interrelating
the four types, and, at the same time, maintaining their
distinctness. In sum, we seek a coherent unity-in-diversity.
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PART I
A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE MAIN STREAMS OF DEVELOPMENT
OF ANOMIE IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL LITERATURE
Introduction. Anomie: A Protean Concept
All paradigmatic concepts suggest varying degrees of
generality and specificity. For while being comprehensive
and covering the greatest number of cases, they must also
yield specific, testable propositions about concrete situa-
tions, and do so in the most explicit, elegant, and economi-
cal manner possible. It is precisely this dialectical ten-
sion between polarities that constitutes the potency of fun-
damental concepts. However, at the same time, generality and
specificity have their negative Ifflip-sides." For extreme
generality tends to degenerate into diffuseness and amor-
phous ideas, while striving for specificity tends to lead us
into rigid and narrow preconceptions. Therefore, if Ifanomie
constitutes one of the truly central concepts of sociologylf
(Parsons, 1968a), then how has it fared in escaping the twin
conceptual evils of diffuseness and narrowness?
When embarking upon a systematic review of the litera-
ture on anomie, one cannot help but observe that anomie has
become a protean concept. Asked to associate synonyms for a-
nomie, most American sociologists might reply with a long
list, including: normlessness, mal integration, normative
breakdown, social disorganization, social anarchy, sociocul-
tural chaos, social isolation, confusion--personal and norm-
ative, meaninglessness, alienation, social estangement, lack
of opportunity, apathy, despair, extreme passivity, resigna-
tion, and soon and so forth. All of these factors imply the
absence of some crucial social factor.
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Yet, taking only the most common connotation of anomie
as normlessness (an identification most sociologists have
probably embraced through the osmotic medium of textbooks and
introductory courses), one may ask: what does normlessness
mean, precisely? Does it refer to situations where no viable
norms yet exist, a sort of cultural void, or,rather, does it
refer to the breakdown of existing norms? In a perceptive
comment, the psycho-historian Erik Erikson suggested, in con-
trast to Merton, that " ... the breakdown of normless itself
is becoming a problem" (in Merton, 1956:43). What types of
norms are breaking down? What is the scope of the normative
breakdown? Whose norms are breaking down? Everyones? Simul-
taneously? Or is there some standard sequence involved? What
are the key elements in the process of normative breakdown?
What are the causes of this breakdown? Is it primarily or e-
ven exclusively the SLress between cultural mandates and the
lack of structural opportunities (Mertonian malintegration)?
What do we mean by normative breakdown, anyway? Does it mean
weakening, confusion, conflict, diffusion, routinization, or
destruction? Is cultural or value or class conflict roughly
synonymous with normlessness? Is pluralism synonymous with
normlessness? How long do these factors have to last to qual-
ify as normlessness? How does one distinguish between norm-
lessness, deviancy, and moral innovation? The fact that we
could almost indefinitely extend this list of questions re-
veals that anomie-as-normlessness 1S devoid of almost any
specific meaning.
Unfortunately, anomie has become "a word to conjure
with," as Yinger (1964) remarks; it has become a protean con-
cept. As with other paradigmatic notions such as Marx's "a-
lienation" (see J. Horton, 1964) or Weber's "Protestant Eth-
ic," anomie has lost all specific meaning as it has become
stretched to mean almost anything we desire. Anomie has come
to signify almost anything, and therefore, too much, and
therefore, nothing in particular. We shall call this progres-
sive routinization, extension, distortion, and emptying out
I..
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of meaning the "routinization of charisma-on-deposit" (Mc-
Closkey, 1974).
It is significant, however, that the founders of these
fundamental sociological concepts conveyed both specific and
general meanings. Marx, Durkheim, and Weber proposed their
paradigmatic concepts of alienation, anomie and egoisme, and
the Protestant Ethos to explain specific historical reali-
ties relating to the causes of the crisis of modern society.
Yet, at the same time, these specific insights into the caus-
es of crucial transformations carried generic meanings about
man-in-society. In a curious way, the natural history of the
career of these concepts reveals that both the original his-
torical specificity and the generic thrust have been altered
or lost. Each is a paradigm in crisis (Kuhn, 1962).
Reflection on these sad inevitabilities should lead us
to revalue the present tenuous connection between history
and theory in our disciplines. For what the routinization and
distortion of these paradigms reveals is that our own theori-
zing might more closely approximate the potency of these sem-
inal concepts of the founding fathers when we proceed, not
abstractly, formally, or deductively, but, rather, from a
deep and systematic reflection concerning the fundamental pro-
cesses transforming our own lives, considered in comparative
and historical perspective. Indeed, it is only when we both
situate ourselves in our time and within a guiding cultural
tradition that we gain sufficient perspective to build theo-
retical paradigms worth pursuing. It is only an apparent
paradox that universally valid ideas gain their applicabili-
ty by emerging from a comparative analysis of historical phe-
nomena, not from being posited in vacuo.
Truly, anomie has become a protean concept, I~ word to
conjure with," for each of the different streams of develop-
ment of anomie lays claim to legitimate kinship with Durk-
heim's original concepts. Each lay claim to the still-reso-
nant halo of Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit." Yet, as with
religion, it is all too easy to selectively quote "scripture"
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to one's own special purpose. As George Simpson observed:
"What a thinker said and what his too ardent followers say
he meant not uncommonly turn out to be different things"
(1963:1x). Thus, one our additional tasks here will be to
determine the actual degree and depth of continuity between
these various streams of development of anomie and Durkheim's
original ideas.
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CHAPTER ONE
PARSONIAN ANOMIE
Talcott Parsons' analytical discussion of anomie in his
magisterial The Structure of Social Action remains the single
most influential source concerning Durkheim interpretation in
American sociology. Parsons' pioneering analysis is signifi-
cant for our present purposes in at least three other respects.
First, it represented one of the first big theoretical break-
throughs in American sociology, but one which was founded on
European theory. Parsons' rescue of Durkheim, along with the
pioneering efforts of Alpert (1939) and Foskett (1939), help-
ed raise Durkheim's social realism and scientific sociology
to a new and more acceptable light in the eyes of many Ameri-
can sociologists (see R. Hinkle, 1960; Radcliffe-Brown's vis-
it to Chicago was also important, see Nisbet, 1965). Second,
almost all of the subsequent development of the notion of ano-
mie, and many other basic Durkheimian ideas, was filtered
through Parsons and his colleague Robert K.Merton (although
in time, Merton's variant on anomie became more influential).
Finally, Parsons' analysis even today remains the most influ-
ential account which has only recently been effectively chal-
lenged (eg. see Pope, 1973, 1975a; almost all of Giddens'
work) .
Here we shall only briefly review the structure of Par-
sons' argument concerlng anomie, saving exploration in great-
er detail of Parsons' interpretation of the entire typology
of suicide until Part II of this appendix. Now, by focussing
on the "meaningfulness of goals" or "strains in the relation-
al system," Parsons is the prime architect of the normative
stream of development of the idea of anomie. In an absolutely
crucial, yet subtle, shift in meaning, Parsons switched Durk-
heim's constant and over-riding concern with the infinite-
It
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ness of expectations created by cultural goals in modern
society to an abstracted, formalistic concern with the "in-
definiteness" or "lack of clarity" in the normative system.
As is his custom, Parsons starts his reconstruction of
Durkheim's ideas, not in terms of Durkheim's own work or in-
tentions, but wholly within Parsons' own, very different, in-
terpretive framework. Now, in The Structure of Social Action
Parsons was haunted by the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"--
namely, how to modulate the anarchy of egoistic·passions and
generate a stable society. By displacing this concern onto
Durkheim (who was not centrally concerned with it but rather
with his own positivistic dilemma concerning the scientific
foundations of morality and the corresponding synthesis of
traditional polarities to deal with), and by repeatedly in-
sisting that Durkheim's central theoretical problem was the
generic bases of social order and control, Parsons appeared
to find the very answer embedded at the heart of Durkheim's
sociology for which he so desperatedly searched. The solution
to the Hobbesian dilemma which Parsons would have us believe
that he found in Durkheim was this: stable social equilibrium
can only ultimately be based on internalized moral obligation
founded on an over-arching value consensus which is, in turn,
rooted in a religiously grounded "ultimate value system" an-
chored in "non-empirical reality."
In light of his insistent search for the grounds of in-
ternalized moral obligation and a religiously sanctioned val-
ue consensus on which such obligation and moral rules rest,
Parsons first placed great stress upon Durkheim's conception
of egoisme, and then subsequently even greater stress upon a-
nomie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's no-
tion of egoisme, Parsons identifies egoisme with the "higher
order of individualized moral obligation in Protestantism."
In contrast to his negative valuation of altruisme which sub-
ordinates the individual to the collective conscience, Par-
sons renders egoisme virtuous, and not as implying the sac-
rifice of the collective conscience to the individual ego,
but as implying the elevation of the individual's conscience
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in Protestantism to a life-principle of the first order.
But Parsons' virtuous translation of egoisme ignores Durk-
heim's critical views and confuses his first and second sch-
emas (see Books Two and Three). In his 1968 summary, Par-
sons distinguishes between egoisme and altruisme in terms of
self versus collective orientation, which is partly correct,
and between anomie and fatalisme in terms of the absence and
presence of normative regulation. However, such abstract dis-
tinctions confuse Durkheim's intentions, for Parsons takes
egoisme from the second schema as being an expression of cul-
tural values, yet puts a positive coloration on it, and then
reinserted this positive image of egoisme back into Durkheim's
first schema. Further, by deemphasizing Durkheim's crucial
doctrine of human nature, Parsons turned Durkheim's image of
the presence of generic drives in the pre-social individual
ego into a generalized image of the generic absence of social
control.
After discovering egoisme as his first virtuous anchor,
Parsons turned to analyze anomie as the key to his search,
for he now possessed explanations of both the sources of so-
cial stability (internalized moral obligation) and the sour-
ce of the breakdown of effective moral obligations and moti-
vations. Anomie is the key to societal disorder; anomie is
the Hobbesian dilemma. Hence, we may term Parsonian anomie a
normative theory, in contrast to Mertonian anomie, which is
largely a structural theory. As the opposite pole of intern-
alized moral obligation, Parsons considers anomie to express
the lack of normative clarity leading to a generalized norm-
ative breakdown. "[With anomie] .•. the problem is the defini-
teness of expectations" (1968a:316).
Having posited internalized moral obligation (ie. Pro-
testant egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability,
Parsons explained social instability in terms of normative
confusion. In a subtle shift in meaning, Parsons shifted
Durkheimian anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness."
While indefiniteness might sometimes imply infiniteness, one
need hardly be a linguist to decide that lack of clarity is
..
..
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1045--
not synonymous with insatiability. Yet of such tiny mount-
ains, great molehills are made. Whereas Ourkheim was funda-
mentally concerned with the sources of insatiability and
the personal and societal ravages of the "infinity of dreams
and desires," Parsons, for his own special purposes, basi-
cally shifted Ourkheim's meanings by fitting both egoisme
and anomie into his own very different interpretive frame-
work.
In his later summary, Parsons observed:
anomie is that state of a social system which makes
a particular class of members consider exertion for suc-
cess meaningless, not because they lack capacity or op-
portunity to achieve what is wanted, but because they
lack a clear definition of what is desirable. It is a
pathology not of the instrumental but of the collective
normative system (196Ba:316).
But Parsons himself has here shifted the connotations he has
bestowed on anomie. For instead of anomie serving as a synonym
for the chaos of the "Hobbesian dilemma," now Parsons seems to
place greater emphasis on the internalization of clear moral
obligation, and thus anomie has come to carry the additional
meaning, for Parsons, of withdravalof motivation or " a ffect"
or moral support from confusing cultural mandates. In addition,
we ought to note a paradox involved here in Parsons' abstract-
ed quest for generic social theory: although the first line of
the preceding passages couches anomie in terms of the generic
Social System, the next line concerning the refusal to con-
form to dominant achievement values in modern society is sure-
ly largely culture bound. Further, Parsons hinted here at the
distinguishing characteristic between his anomie and Merton's
--for he sees the problem not as lack of opportunity and thus
anomie i~~rimarily a structural problem as with Merton, but
rather it is basically a problem of confusion in the relation-
al system, or the lack of adequate perception of the real sig-
nificance of cultural values and goals.
Can we accept the generalized terms of Parsons' contrast
between anomie and consensus as a valid translation of Ourk-
heim's concerns? One of the most perceptive of contemporary
interpreters of Ourkheim, Anthony Giddens, has criticized Par-
II
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sons on these and other related points.
By abstractly contrasting moral consensus (the exist-
ence of "common values U ) with anomie (the dearth of
such values), Parsons' account blankets out Durkheim's
overriding concern with the distinctions between the
moral and institutional structure of the modern social
order and that found in traditional forms. The problem
of anomie cannot be separated from the effects of the
transformation of the division of labor •..• The polari-
ty is not primarily between the existence of moral con-
sensus and its absence, but between the rigid moral con-
formity of the traditional conscience collective and the
looser, more institutionally complex structure of organ-
ic societies are still in a transitional phase (1972a:42).
Thus, if Parsons wished to construct his own terms for norma-
tive breakdown, okay, but when he claims that his own transla-
tion of anomie fairly and sufficiently represent Durkheim's
meaning, then he must be called to task, for the evidence
proves that such a claim is ill-founded.
Although Parsons' notion of anomie as mal integration in
the "relational system" has filtered into the mainsteam of
American sociology, partly through Merton's translation, most
attention has been focussed on the Mertonian development of
anomie or Srolian anomia, and surprisingly few have subsequent-
ly taken up Parsons' definitions and pursued them. Robin Wil-
liams (1951) a student of Parsons, applied anomie to the Amer-
ican context. In addition, two well known articles interpre-
ting Durkheim's types fall within this same stream of devel-
opment of anomie. Although they take diametrically opposed
positions on the question of whether Durkheim's types can be
distinguished or are reducible, both Barclay Johnson (1965)
and Bruce Dohrenwend (1959) seem to agree that normative inte-
gration or regulation is the key underlying dimension, and
Whitney Pope (1976) largely follows Johnson in this matter.
Whatever the independent validity of his own theory,
by insisting that Durkheim's anomie refers not to insatiable
and (negatively) egoistic drives located either in human na-
ture or culture, but to a pathological lack of clarity in
the normative-relational sector of society (whatever that
means, precisely), Parsons has not only ignored and subverted
Durkheim's central intentions but also got himself into some
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difficult binds of his own (see Chapter Ten, Part II of this
appendix).
In sum, by forcing Durkheim into his framework, Parsons
arrived at a unique combination of egoisme and anomie. From
his own abstracted, ahistorical, normatively oriented frame
of reference, anomie meant confusion or lack of clarity result-
ing from malintegration in the cultural system. In clear con-
trast to Durkheim, Parsons' central concern with anomie is not
with the infiniteness but rather with the indefiniteness of
expectations. In contrast to Mertonian anomie, to which we
shall turn presently, Parsonian anomie is concerned more with
the cultural-relational system than with the structural-instru-
mental system. Only in a highly ambiguous sense can either Par-
sons' or its descendant Mertonian anomie, be identified with
Durkheimian anomie. Further, Parsons' claim to have accurate-
ly interpreted the essence of Durkheim's major ideas, and his
claims to be a legitimate heir of Durkheim's sociological char-
isma must be set aside.
Finally, the development of anomie in American sociology
seemingly all filters through Parsons. The change in the con-
notational "load" of anomie from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton
is a two-step process involving the predelictions of the Mas-
ter and the second-in-command. Parsons acted as a crucial "gate"
through which anomie passed on its way to the oblivion and tri-
vialization of success. If a key founder's ideas often convey
fruitful ambiguity to prove successful, then perhaps one of
the crucial phases in the loss or critical reappropriation of
the founders' "charisma-on-deposit" is accomplished by disci-
ples from other groups, times, and places who fundamentally al-
ter the original meanings to fit their own purposes and prob-
lems. Doubtless, at its best such cross-fertilization between
different groups generates new vitality for both--the first
receives a new continuity and fresh lease on life, while the
second receives both a new point of departure and a surround-
ing aura of legitimacy. Yet, at the same time, something pre-
cious is lost in such exchanges.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE HALBWACHIAN STREAM
The Halbwachian stream of development of Durkheim's
ideas of anomie and egoisme ;centers around the notion of
breakdown of social integration or social isolation. Deri-
ving from Maurice Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide (1930),
this stream focusses on Durkheim's early explicit formula
that the suicide rate is inversely related to the degree of
social integration. Thus thinkers in this stream tend to re-
duce Durkheim's various types down to what they consider the
fundamental type--namely, egoisme. This stream has recently
received it most precise formulation in Gibbs and Martin's
(1964) well-known study Status Integration and Suicide. In
contrast to Parsons who emphasized egoisme as a postive con-
dition of individual normative self-direction, the Halbwach-
ian stream emphasizes egoisme as a breakdown of social rela-
tionships, statuses, and so on.. In cOntrast to both the Par-
sonian and Mertonian streams, the Halbwachian sub-tradition
focusses almost exclusively on structural integration and
the consequences of its weakening, inconsistency, or break~
down. Hence, we witness the emergence of the first three ma-
jor possible permutations of Durkheim's anomie: from one side
comes Parsons' normative thesis concerning the lack of cultur-
al integration, from the other side emerges Halbwach's thesis
concerning the breakdown of social structural integration,
while Merton's thesis mediates between these two possibilities
by focussing on the breakdown of consistent relations between
structure and culture.
Now, Halbwachs' Les Causes du Suicide represents both an
extension and revision of Durkheim's earlier analyses. Hal-
bwachs' statistical analysis generally supports Durkheim's
••
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earlier work. But there are a number of differences. Split
between statistical and social phenomenological approaches,
Halbwacmanalyzed altruistic motives further, and disting-
~ished between self-sacrifice and suicide. In addition, he
placed greater emphasis on psychological intentions and the
suicidal context. But beyond these and other differences per-
haps the greatest divergence between the master and one of
his closest disciples was that Halbwachs, perhaps because of
his drive toward statistical measurability, seized upon Durk-
heim's early formula and reduced all the suicidal types down
to the lack of integration of the individual into a stable
group (see also Jack Gibbs, 1957:94-951 Giddens, 1965:6-71
Jack Douglas, 1967).
In American sociology, one of the most sophisticated stu-
dies extending the Halbwachian thesis is the well-known explor-
ation of the relations between Status Integration and Suicide
(1964) by Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin. Proceeding from demo-
graphic interests like Halbwachs, and from Gibbs' doctoral
dissertation written under the direction of Martin, they took
as their key proposition (ala Halbwachs) Durkheim's first and
only explicit summary that "Suicide varies inversely with the
degree of integration of social groups" (S:208-9). Their pos-
itivistic proclivities lead them to reject much of Durkheim's
own analysis as untestable, yet, taking what they perceive to
be the essence of Durkheim's theory, they postulate a deduct-
ive series of more precise propositions which yielded their
major theorem: "The suicide rate varies inversely with the
degree of status integration in the population."
Since the major virtue of the status integration thesis
is that it can be measured and subjected to systematic test-
ing, it is, perhaps, not unwarranted to surmise that their
chain of deductions is prompted as much by the need to work
through Durkheim1s theories down to a more localized level
which permits the use of demographic statistics as by any ab-
stract desire for greater clarity. Such a development is not
unusual in social science where the exigencies of research
demand alterations in theory, and the empirical cart ends up
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directing the theoretical horse. However, the need to dis-
till, fragment, or reduce significant theories down to their
component parts to better fit or utilize existing data is
generally felt, even though the significance of the theory
changes from a perspective which touches the very depths of
crucial transformations to a theory which is important be-
cause it can be tested. In this vein, the response to Gibbs
and Martin's work appears to have been enthusiastic. In the
relatively short time since it was proposed, a rather large
literature has grown up around it, some of it critical for
various reasons (eg. J. Douglas, 1967; B. Segal, 1969; C.
Bagley, 1972).
In contrast to Durkheim's multiple sociocultural, his~
torical, and philosophical concerns, Gibbs and Martin's ef-
fort appears as a radical truncation, an interest in a sim-
ple proposition amenable to statistical testing rather than
an interest in Durkheim's deeper propositions. Their theory
is an ahistorical, formalistic, demographically inspired ap-
proach. Their theory is different from Durkheim's notions in
that it doesn't even address the problem of the "infinity of
dreams and desires" as the key intervening variable between
social structural breakdown and individual suicide. Their
theory is different from Durkheim's in that it is primarily
microsociological in focussing on status malintegration, and
not societal structures or cultural-historical traditions.
But, in contrast to most contemporary survey research
(eg. utilizing Srolian anomia), Gibbs and Martin's approach
is refreshingly different in that it is at least truly socio-
logical, utilizing objective indices of inconsistent status-
es; it is not mass psychological interviewing masquerading as
sociological research. Another virtue of their exploration
is that in this stream theoretical formulations and empirical
testing are closely intertwined. Finally, their effort is siq-
nificant Decause, by returning directly to the original text
and elucidating its key propositions, their independent ini-
tiative bypassed Parsons and Merton, thus breaking the almost
••
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unquestioned hegemony of the leading structural-functional
theorists' orthodox interpretation of anomie.
Halbwachs' reformulation of Durkheim's work carries ad-
ditional significance here since it is one of the few major
studies in this 'area which undeniably lie in a direct line
of continuity with Durkheim himself. In contrast to Parsons'
reconstruction of Durkheim's ideas (which remaining Durkheim-
ians seem to have ignored), Halbwachs' work was intimately
associated for years with Durkheim. Halbwachs was a key mem-
ber of the circle gathered around ~'Annee sociologique. But
while providing greater balance and extension, what disciples
do with their master's ideas cannot always be accredited.
Halbwachs' reduction and simplification represents another
chapter in the on-going story of the "routinization of char-
isrna-on-deposit" of Durkheim's anomie. In order to "live" be-
yond himself, a founder's ideas must become institutionalized;
yet in that very process they are often disassembled, and the
integralness of vision, and the multiplicity of resonating
levels of meaning which made the original breakthrough so com-
pelling, and which constitutes its revolutionary and lasting
significance, ebb away.
In sum, the Halbwachians (including Gibbs and Martin,
among others), rightly criticized the rampant ambiguity of
many of Durkheim's basic concepts. But rather than attempt
to sort through these complexities, they chose instead to
settle upon simpler, ahistorical, formalizable propositions
promising to yield testable indices. In the sense that they
have returned directly to parts of Durkheim's theory itself,
those working in this stream can lay claim to represent a
legitimate reformulation of an important set of elements in
Durkheim's complex thought. However, because they slight so
much of the complexity, subtlety, and historical, sociocul-
tural, and phenomenological depths of Durkheim's ideas, this
sub-tradition cannot really claim, any more than the other
streams, to represent the legitimate development of Durkheim's
notions concerning suicide, especially anomie.
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CHAPTER THREE
MERTONIAN ANOMIE: STRUCTURAL-CULTURAL MALINTEGRATION
Preface. Since Robert K. Merton's notion of anomie remains
the most widely known contemporary version, I shall assume
intimate knowledge of this essay in the following examina-
tion. First, I shall state my basic objections to Merton's
version of anomie, especially as they relate to Durkheim's.
Next, I shall indicate some of the historical reasons for the
success of Merton's schema. The~ I shall outline some of the
textual difficulties encountered in a full-scale, systematic
exploration of the inner logic and development of Merton's
model. Finally, we shall examine in detail the major theses
of the paradigm.
Now, Merton's version of anomie mediates between Parsons'
purely normative notion and the Halbwachs-Gibbs and Martin
structural focus. Proceeding from the Parsonian notion of
"strain in The Social System," Merton carne to emphasize the
"mal integration of goals and means;" or in other words, con-
flict between cultural mandates and structural opportunities.
Hence, the maladjustment of structural means to cultural goals
lies at the heart of Mertonian anomie. It should be noted,
however, that although Merton seems closer to Durkheim in em-
phasizing the "infiniteness" of the goals counseled by the A-
merican value system, nowhere does Merton fundamentally ques-
tion the legitimacy of these goals themselves. Certainly, he
never portrayed the American success ethic as a sign of the
endemic "moral anarchy" of the modern world as did Durkheim.
Nor would Merton have admitted, it can be surmised, that our
Central Value System is itself anomie! How both Parsons and
Merton were able to sidestep these and other critical implica-
tions of the very paradigm they borrowed forms a fascinating
story, albeit one which we cannot pursue here. l Our main con-
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cern here is with the inner and shifting logic of Merton's
schema, and its relation to Durkheim's original notions.
Now, Dubin (1959), Cloward (1959), and Harary (1966),
among others, have offered extensions and elaborations of
Merton's anomie schema. Mizruchi (1967), Cohen (1965), Thio
(1975), among others, have offered criticisms of Merton's
theorizing and empirical support (see chapters four and five
of this appendix). In addition to these extensions and criti-
cisms, I shall offer the following essential criticisms:
(a) In terms of the legitimacy of the Mertonians' claim
on Durkheim's "charisma-on-deposit," I note that Mer-
ton's anomie diverges from Durkheim's at many points.
Merton is faithful to Durkheim mainly in terms of the
anti-reductionistic polemic, the notion in Division
of Labor that anomie has to do with structural ine-
qualities, and that the dominant modern value system
counsels eternal striving which is destructive. At
other critical points, Merton's version runs directly
counter to Durkheim's;
(b) More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Merton
should have recognized the convergence between his own
theorizing on anomie, Durkheim's second schema in
which anomie and egoisme are culturally sanctioned,
and Weber's historical insights into the Protestant
Ethos. ~fuy Merton did not make these connections re-
mains a great mystery in the history of American so-
ciological theory;
(c) In terms of the internal logic of his schema, Merton's
notion of mal integration of goals and means really con-
~eals three different dimensions: integration, legiti-
macy, and historical position;
(d) In terms of the internal logic of his major category--
innovation--Merton's typology actually contains two
very different propositions applying to different clas-
ses, aspirations, and restraining conditions;
(e) The other categories in Merton's typology rest on ec-
lectic, ad hoc hypotheses, invoked as needed, and un-
supported!by the theory supposedly anchoring the first
two types of responses:
(f) Therefore, not only must Mertonian anomie be sharply
distinguished from Durkheim's and the others, but Mer-
ton's theory should be set aside as a paradigm of Amer-
ican sociological theorizing. Further, the uncertain
fate of Merton's program of anomie serves as a case
study refuting his own program and philosophy of science.
••
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A. Merton'~ Anomie: The Theory and Its Significance
1. The Historical Importance of Merton's Model in American
Sociology
Robert King Merton's now classic essay "Social Struct-
ure and Anomie," first published in 1938, constitutes the or-
iginal source from which most contemporary research and theo-
ry on anomie flows. If we accept the testimony of Talcott Par-
sons that "Anomie has become one of the small number of truly
central concepts of contemporary social science" (1968a:3l6),
then Merton's special theory is surely one of the discipline's
most prestigious and imitated works. As one of the principal
architects of contemporary American sociology, Merton's exten-
sion of of his original essay on anomie, incoporated in his
prestigious and often reprinted Social Theory and Social Struct-
ure, stands almost alone alongside Parsons' "pattern variables"
and The Structure of Social Action as classics of contemporary
sociological theory, comparable to such continental classics
as Durkheim's Suicide and Weber's The Protestant Ethic and
The Spirit of Capitalism.
The significance of Merton's pioneering effort may be in-
terpreted on a number of different levels. In a discipline rent
by contending factions, Merton's theory of anomie and opportun-
ity structures took on the higher function of serving as an ex-
ample, perhaps the prototypical illustration in American socio-
logy, of a unifying paradigm (Kuhn, 1962). When sociologists
wish to display their wares favorably to wider publics or unin-
tiated students, there is often a tendency to choose "Social
Structure and Anomie" as the example of the best of American
sociological theorizing. Thus, Merton's oft-revised essay has
gradually attained an honored status beyond that bestowed on
common sociologYi his model has become a symbol, a true "col-
lective representation" of the sociological enterprise.
The preeminent symbolic status granted Merton's famous
essay provides a clue to understand its larger significance.
For on this level Merton's schema is significant because it
provided
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mid-century sociologists with a dual model: both an explana-
tion, a master hypothesis, a paradigm in the sense of content,
and a manner of theorizing, a stylistic mode, a paradigm of a
paradigm in the sense of a form to be emulated. Those familiar
with Merton's theory of anomie commonly retain two lI a fter-ima-
ges. 1I The first memory is that of content--a specific theory
based on the image of strain in the social system resulting
when opportunity structures restrict access to mandated cul-
tural achievement. The second image retained is that of a cer-
tain style of sociological theorizing which appeared to convey
clarity, consistency, and a degree of logical.elegance and pow-
er previously rare in the discipline. American sociological
theory around mid-century stood desperately in need of cogent-
ly articulated, yet simple, master hypotheses, and Merton's
essay seemed to answer this need. One observer suggests that
the response of American social scientists was "auick and en-
thusiastic, sociology was now new born" (B. Nelson, 1964:138).
In addition, Merton's theory offered remedies to sociolo-
gists on a number of other levels. First, as a theory concern-
ed with normative and structural breakdowns and resulting de-
viancy, it claimed to offer a basic explanation of the critical
social problems confronting an America beset by the Depression
crisis. Since American sociology grew out of pragmatically o-
riented social reform movements, Merton's paradigm not only re-
sonated with these feelings but also seemed to offer a theore-
tical crystallization and justification of efforts toward so-
cial amelioration. Second, as a preeminent example of II middle-
range" theory, Merton's schema served to link the relatively
isolated micro-sociological and pragmatic point of view of A-
merican sociology with the deeper, more abstract and more his-
torical theories of continental sociological theorists, espe-
cially Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. The nascent American so-
ciological tradition with its heavy emphasis on pragmatic so-
cial action and relatively primitive development of theory,
now seemed doubly reborn by its new and seemingly intimate
links with the best of continental sociological theory. All
in all, Merton's schema seemed, both at the time and in re-
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trospect"to constitute a major breakthrough in sociological
theory and practice, and thus a minor revolution in social
scientific thought (Kuhn, 1962).
While affirming its historical significance, can we to-
day grant Merton's theory the same high honor as before? Can
Merton's theory stand up under close critical scrutiny? How
and why did "Social Structure and Anomie" come to be accept-
ed so widely and implicitly as a prototype of sociological
theorizing? Does the structure and logic of Merton's proposi-
tions deserve such fame? Can it be legitimately maintained
that Merton's theory of anowe stands directly in the mainline
of the tradition stemming from Durkheim? And, finally, what
does the development of Mertonian anomie in terms of his own
elaborations, revisions, various extensions by others, criti-
ques, and Merton's responses, empirical applications and test-
ing, reveal about the viability of Merton's own program for
sociological theory and his philosophy of science? We shall
explore these and other related questions in the following
sections on Merton's anomie.
2. Textual Problems in Interpreting Merton's Anomie
Anyone attempting to systematically analyze the internal
structure of Merton's famous paradigm will encounter various
textual problems. The first major problem barring a single
simple interpretation is that one is confronted with numerous
additions and variations on the central theme coming from the
hand of Merton himself. Once one begins to immerse oneself in
these documents one discovers a bewildering plethora of instal-
lments of "Social Structure and Anomie." As Stephen Cole (1975)
remarks, Merton's efforts are better considered as a "research
program" than a single article. Therefore, these documents may
be divided into primary and secondary materials.
First among the primary documents is Merton's original
essay "Social Structure and Anomie" which appeared in 1938 in
the fledgling American Sociological Review. Then comes his
1949 extension and revision of the same article which first ap-
appeared in Merton's equally famous collection of essays So-
•i.
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cial Theory and Social Structure. The third well-know primary
document is Merton's supplementary essay "Continuities in the
Theory of Social Structure and Anomie" which first appeared
in a revised edition of Merton's book in 1957. But even among
primary materials there are additional but lesser known pro-
ductions which should be consulted. In chronological order
they are: transcripts of a talk and discussion on juvenile
delinquency in which Merton participate d in 1955 and which
was published in 1956~ Merton's review in 1959 of criticisms
and extensions by Cloward and Dubin entitled "Social Conform-
ity, Deviation, and Opportunity Structures," and finally his
1964 review essay "Anomie, Anomia, and Social Interaction:
Contexts of Deviant Behavior."
In addition, the following must be listed among secon-
dary materials in Merton's writings which are directly rele-
vant to issues raised here: a short section in Merton's es-
say on "Sociological Theory" in his collected essays Social
Theory and Social Structure summarizing what Merton took to
be the essence of Durkheim's paradigm in Suicide; Merton's
introduction to Part One of the same book; and his lengthy
and often revised essay on "Social Problems and Sociological
Theory," written as an epilogue to the volume on Contemporary
Social Problems (1960, 1966, 1971, 1976) which Merton co-edi-
ted with Robert Nisbet.
Thus any serious investigator is faced not with just one
short article, but rather with at least six primary install-
ments of the same basic theme, and in addition, a number of
secondary materials directly relevant which could be supple-
mented by a host of peripheral references scattered through-
out the rest of nerton's works. Undertaking analysis of Mer-
ton's evolving theory of anomie and social structure is no
simple task. One must be especially sensitive tQ,~different
emphases, corrections, gaps, and shifts in the grounds of
argument.
But the difficulties due to the bewildering assortment
of Merton's writings relating to anomie (which reveal Merton,
appearances to the contrary, as perhaps not the best example
••
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of a systematic theorist but rather as a talented essayist)
carry a redeeming virtue. The evident advantage afforded the
sociological public by Merton's variations on his theme is
that we are here presented with an opportunity of studying
in-depth a central sociological schema as it evolved over
four decades. We can watch, for example, as Merton contin-
ually reworked his essay, attempting to fill in gaps, and
iron out the inconsistencies in response to critics. This
unique opportunity to plumb the inner workings and changes
of Merton's theory of anomie should lead to an important
case-study in the development of theory and the history of
social science, and serve as a test case for various hypo-
theses about the growth of science.
A second problem faced by explorers in these regions
concerns certain evident gaps in Merton's various install-
ments of his theory. Merton himself in his reply (1959:188)
to Cloward and Dubin acknowledged that "blind spots" occa-
sionally plague his attempts at systematic theorizing. Fur-
ther, Cohen observes that a number of the more serious gaps
in the theory of "Social Structure and Anomie" could be reme-
died by borrowing insights and concepts from other parts of
Merton's own writings. In addition to any scholarly obliga-
tions to perform a complete survey, another reason for fam-
iliarity with the rest of Merton's work is to help correct
the misleading impressions inevitably given by close readings
of Merton's schema, since he could have himself corrected
several gaps by simply drawing upon insights from other parts
of his own work. Instead of asserting that Merton did not per-
ceive these crucial factors which might have been omitted from
his famous theory, it is perhaps better to say that Merton did
not perceive them in this present context at least, for what-
ever reason. In any case, such "blind spots" do exist.
A third major problem concerns related inconsistencies
in Merton's schema. Perhaps no intellectual, even those who
propose their work as paradigms of systematic theory, can
flawlessly fashion his work without gaps and internal incon-
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sistencies. Yet this endemic problem is exacerbated by the
relatively non-systematic character of Merton's theorizing,
appearances aside. For as we shall soon discover, l-1erton' s
famous theory contains not one simple proposition but rather
two! Essentially, the first proposition suggests that inord-
inate e~phasis on culturally mandated success goals swamps
out legitimate institutional means of achievement. The second
is the more famous proposition--namely, that differential ac-
cess of different groups to legitimate institutional channels
of upward mobility generates anomie, in the sense of norma-
tive confusion, and leads to deviancy. And the remaining ca-
tegories in Merton's typology are based upon still different,
and often eclectic, series of propositions. The fact that
Merton never systematically distinguished between his two
basic propositions, or recognized that he had introduced ad
hoc hypotheses to cover the rest of the typology complicates
matters further.
Among additional problems facing us here is the curifous
act
that Merton so rarely explicitly defined anomie, nor did he
explicitly review Durkheim's usage. To apologize for Merton's
"under-citation" of Durkheim, as Stephen Cole (1975:187) does,
because Suicide is so well known that it was not necessary is
unacceptable. For it is simply not true that Durkheim's sui-
cide typology was well known to American sociologists when
Merton published in 1938 and 1949 his original and revised
versions of "Social Structure and Anomie." How could it be
since Suicide was not even translated until 1951, and we are
still debating its meaning and significance? The truth of the
matter is that most American sociologists came to view Durk-
heim and anomie through Parsons' and Merton'~ eyes; and Par-
sons' distortion and Merton's undercitation were essential
strategies in this transfer of charisma. At best, Merton ap-
pears to have indirectly derived his first proposition on
innovative deviancy from Durkheim's emphasis on modern drives
for progress and perfection and the discussion of the anomic
division of labor and structured inequalities in The Division
of Labor. The general theoretical framework, howeve~came
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not from Durkheim, but from Parsons'functional theory, with
the constant addition of large doses of Merton's own charact-
eristic insight and style. There are, of course, great dif-
ferences between Durkheim's anomie and Merton's, for the form-
er was not so much interested in cross-pressures or malinte-
gration of the social system as he was concerned with the ra-
vages of absolutizing individualism and insatiability. Parsons
was far more concerned than Durkheim with anomie as confusion
in the relational sector of The Social System. And even Par-
sons rejected U968~317) sole identification of anomie with
Merton's notion of problems with the "instrumental system" of
society and culture.
Hence, if anomie generally has become a protean concept,
then Merton's shifting development of his own theory of ano-
mie is just as difficult to keep in clear and constant focus.
It appears that Merton's schema conveys at once too much or
too little. If his theory rests on the fairly simple thesis
that certain groups' lack of access to structures of opportun-
ity contributes to frustration and perhaps deviance, then it
might prove less troublesome, with certain qualifications. But
surely in that case one need not elaborate an entire typology
and complex theory, nor claim that this schema explains all
sor~of rule-breaking and other behaviors. This is far too
much. On the other hand, if, as Merton has often claimed, his
key proposition is not the specific one about blocked oppor-
tunity but rather the more general, abstract thesis about
malintegration of cultural goals and structural means, then
his schema is far too sketchy to explain all it claims. Even
Merton has acknowledged that his theory is incomplete as a
systematic explanation of all rule-breaking behaviors. Either
way Merton appears in a bind, presenting us with too much or
too little. Perhaps without undue irony we might call this
the bind of the middle-range theorist.
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3. The Mertonians' Claim to Durkheim's Charisma-on-Deposit
Let us briefly consider here the genealogy of anomie and
try to evaluate the claim of the Mertonians to legitimate der-
ivation of their anomie from Durkheim. The first basic fact to
recall is that Merton's theory of malintegration of means and
ends was fundamentally influenced by Parsons' generalized theo-
ry of malintegration in The Social System. In the 1930's, Mer-
ton was a student and then a colleague of Parsons at Harvard.
Parsons had just finished his own classic The Structure of So-
cial Action, and he acknowledged Merton's assistance in review-
ing the manuscript. And now through his interpretation of Durk-
heim and anomie, Parsons influenced another classic--Merton's
"Social Structure and Anomie."
In addition, Merton appears to have derived some influen-
ce directly from Durkheim's work itself. For Merton published
two independent studies on Durkheim in 1934: a critical,analy-
sis of "Durkheim's Division of Labor in Society" (1934a), and
an essay on "Recent French Sociology" (1934b). In retrospect,
Merton appears to have derived more influenqe from Durkheim's
views on the anomic and forced divisioreof labor in The Divi-
-----
sion of Labor than from Durkheim's usage of anomie in Suicide.
Perhaps Merton took his lead here from Durkheim's suggestion
in The Division of Labor that the anomic and for-
ced divisions of labor depends on the elimination of social
inequalities in the distribution and inheritance of occupa-
tional opportunities, and from Durkheim's description in The
Rules of the " ••. cultural conditions which predispose toward
crime and innovation" (Merton, 1938:673,#3). Blenning these
diverse intellectual sources, then, Merton presented a highly
original schema of his own which was destined to become one
of the foundation paradigms of contemporary sociology.
Now, let us briefly consider the claims of Mertonians
to legitimate development of Durkheim's notion of anomie.
While Merton does not explicitly claim this as either his in-
tention or achievement, there are numerous passages in the var-
iousinstallments of his essay which implicitly suggest that
••
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IIthis" was indeed what Durkheim had in mind. In his 1964 re-
view of the present state of anomie research, Merton briefly
traced the history of the concept from Durkheim through him-
self to others. In addition, the appendix to that same vol-
ume, prepared by Merton's then students Stephen Cole and Har-
riet Zuckerman, explicitly linked Durkheim's anomie with Mer~
ton as his successor (see also S. Cole, 1975). The general i-
mCige presented by Merton and his followers in works on social
theory, on anomie and deviance, in textbooks and readers, and
so forth, is an unquestioned confidence that Merton has legi-
timately developed the essence of Durkheim's ideas. In a typi-
cal essay, Richard Cloward claims that his well-known essay:
... represents an attempt to consolidate two major so-
ciological traditions of thought about the problem of
deviant behavior. The first, exemplified by the work of
Emile Durkheim and Robert Merton, may be called the ano-
mie tradition .... The theory of anomie has undergone two
major phases of development. Durkheim first used the con-
cept to explain deviant behavior. He focussed on the way
in which various social conditions lead to "overweening"
ambition," and how, in turn, unlimited aspirations ulti-
mately produce a breakdown in regulatory norms .... ~fuile
Durkheim confined his application of anomie chiefly to
suicide, Merton sought to explain not only suicide but
crime, delin~uency, mental disorder, alcoholism, dr~g ad-
diction, and many other phenomena (1959:164-5).
On the other hand, more than one observer has noted di-
vergence between Durkheim's notion of anomie and Merton's u-
sage of the concept. Cloward's remarks also indicate a grow-
ing sensitivity to some of the important differences between
Durkheim's and Merton's ideas.
Unlike Durkheim, Merton did not consiner man's biologi-
cal nature to be important in explaining deviation; what
Durkheim considered the innate drives of man, such as am-
bition to achieve unattainable objectives, Merton felt
were induced by the social structure (1959: 165).
Here Cloward notes some crucial transitions from Durkheim to
Merton: Durkheim had an image of human nature which was cen-
tral to his theory of anomie but which disappears in Merton's
revision; and whereas Durkheim located in~atiability in the
organic ego, Merton located insatiable ambitions in social pres-
sures.
•
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Merton himself later acknowledged in an off-hand way
that here was a crucial difference between his ideas about
anomie and Durkheim's. In 1968, in a discussion of the pres-
sure on prize winners in science to outstrip their previous
achievements, Merton downgrades the notion that it is " ••.
their own Faustian aspirations [which] are ever-escalating
that keeps eminent scientists at work. 1I Merton admits: "This
process of a socially reinforced rise in aspirations, as dis-
tinct from Durkheim's concept of the lIinsatiability of wants"
is examined" (in Merton, 1973:442, #12) in Merton's 1964 es-
say. And in that 1964 essay Merton remarked:
Social pressures do not easily permit those who have
climbed the rugged mountains of success to remain con-
tent; there is no rest for the weary. In short, it is
not only that their own Faustian aspirations are ever-
escalating, becoming unlimited and insatiable, and so,
even when achieved, landing them no nearer to heaven
(the point Durkheim seized upon). It is also that •..
more and more is expected of these men by others and
this creates its own measure of stress. Less often than
one might believe, is there room for repose at the top
(1964:221).
Thus, we now have Merton's own word that his notion of anomie
as generated by social pressures is different from Durkheim's
where insatiability was generated by the release of the pas-
sions of the organic ego from social constraint in the modern
era. Now, in a sense, in this dissertation we are making a
move similar to Merton's by shifting the location of Durkhei~­
ian insatiability from the organic ego (schema one) to the
very social and cultural structure (schema two) which Merton
so brilliantly anatomized.
Besides this growing acknowledgment from the Mertonian
camp that Merton's anomie is different from Durkheim's, other
observers have also registered their recognition of this im-
portant divergence. Here we cite only a few representative
objections. For instance, in an insightful but highly polem-
ical article, John Horton argued that the critical thrust of
Durkheim's notion of anomie has been lost.
Contemporary definitions of anomie and alienation have
confused. obscured and chanqed the classical meanings
of these concepts. Alienation for Marx and anomie for
••
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Durkheim were metaphors for a radical attack on the dom-
inant institutions and values of industrial society •.••
The politically and essentially conservative content of
his [Merton's] definition is apparent when it is compar-
ed with that of Durkheim. Anomie, defined as a a disjunc-
tion between the success goal and legitimate opportuni-
ties to achieve success, may very well be a socially
structured discontent in American society, yet Merton's
anomie differs from that of Durkheim's in one crucial
respect--in its identification with the very groups and
values which Durkheim saw as the prime source of anomie
in industrial societies. For Durkheim, anomie was endem-
ic in such societies not only because of inequality in
the conditions of competition, but, more importantly, be-
cause self-interested striving ••• had been raised to so-
cial ends. The institutionalization of self-interest meant
the legitimization of anarchy and amorality ..•• To maxi-
mize opportunities for achieving success would in no way
end anomie. Durkheim questioned the very values which Mer-
ton holds constant (1964:283, 294-5).
In an equally tendentious article, Turner and Scott (1965)
offer the ingenious yet unconvincing argument that Mertonian
anomie bears more resemblance to Weber's basic types of social
action than to Durkheim's anomie. "As used by Merton, 'anomi~'
we believe, has little resemblance to Durkheim's concepti rath-
er, Merton's formulation is best understood as a continuation
of Weber's work" (1965:233). "Merton's essay .•• bears scant
relevance to Durkheim" (1965:236). In contrast to Durkheim's
notion of the sudden disharmony of expectations and fulfill-
ment, they argue that Merton's anomie rests on an enduring
condition--the unending pursuit of success. "A fundamental
difference between Merton's and Durkheim's conception of ano-
mie emerges: Merton conceives of anomie as a chronic condition;
Durkheim, as an acute fracturing in the social world" (1965:
234) •
The similarity between Durkheim's long-run conception
of anomie and Merton's conception is superficial~ Durk-
heim pictured long-term changes in social life leaving
individuals unsure of where they stood or how to pro-
ceed, whereas Merton is postulating social actors who
internalize on the one hand values, and on the other,
norms relating to their achievement only to find that
they do not have a matching set (1965:235, #6).
Also in 1965, McClosky and Schaar observed:
Discarding Durkheim's concept of man as a bundle of pas-
sions which can be tamed only by social restraints, he
examines the actual social pressures upon persons to vio-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1065--
late the accepted codes. He retains Durkheim's defini-
tion of relative normlessness in a society, but offers
a revised statement of its causes. Whereas Durkheim held
specifically that anomy was produced by an economic eth-
ic which removed all limits from greed, Merton sees ano-
my as the result of "a breaknown in the cultural struct-
ure, occuring particularly when there is an acute dis-
junction between the cultural norms and goals and the so-
cially structured capacities of the members to act in ac-
cord with them" (1965:15).
In a reflective and useful article, Ephraim Mizruchi
(1967) argues that there are basic differences between Durk-
heim's anomie and Merton's anomie.
A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie sug-
gests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's and
that this difference leads to varying hypotheses. Merton's
conception of anomie is one of a condition in society in
which there is a disjunction between socially mandated
goals and the means by which these goals are pursued ..•.
Durkheim's emphasis, however, in his theory of anomie was
on the unrealizable goals which characterized periods of
prosperity and upward mobility (1967:439-40).
G. Duncan Mitchell, in his Dictionary of Sociologv (1968)
distinguishes the following connotations of anomie:
[Anomie refers to] any state where there are unclear,
conflicting, or unintegrated norms in which the indivi-
dual had no morally significant relations with others or
in which there were no limits set to the attainment of
pleasure •.•• R. Merton uses the term to refer to a state
in which socially prescribed goals and the norms govern-
ing their attainment are incompatible ...• In most attempts
to make anomie measurable (eg. Srole), emphasis is pla-
ced on lack of clarity in goals and norms or upon the ab-
sence of social ties. All such attempts involve a more
restricted use of the concept than Durkheim's which was
related to a philosophical conception of human nature.
Further, it is most significant that in his definitive
intellectual biography of Durkheim, Steven Lukes mentions Mer-
ton's name only once in passing. Lukes' comprehensive biblio-
graphy of writings on Durkheim contains Merton's two 1934 art-
icles, but does not refer to Merton's famous "Social Structure
and Anomie" (Lukes, 1973:608).
Alex Thio (1975) remarks of the difference between Durk-
heim and Merton:
Contrary to many sociologists' belief, Merton's theory
is not a pure reformulation of Durkheim's concept of ano-
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mie. In examining Merton's analysis, one is hard put
to find any genuine resemblance between Merton's and
Durkheim's concepts of anomie. In fact, Merton's con-
cept of anomie is a perversion of Durkheim's; Merton
sees the poor as more likely to suffer from anomie
while Durkheim views the rich as more likely to be
victims of anomie (1975:156).
Concerned with the class bias in theories of deviance (Thio,
1972), he seriously questions Merton's assertion that lower-
class persons are more likely than upper-class persons to suf-
fer from an aspiration-opportunity ,disjunction and therefore
are more subject to greater pressure toward deviation.
Teevan (1975) suggests that we develop different questions
on scales to test for Durkheimian as contrasted with Mertonian
anomie (eg. 1975:169). Simon and Gagnon (1976) observe both
that Merton's anomie differs from Durkheim's, and that the lat-
ters' rested on an image of human nature as inherently insatia-
ble.
It is important to point out that there is, in fact,
only a limited intellectual continuity between the ma-
jority of the modern users of the concept of anomie and
Durkheim. Both Parsons and Merton, who share responsibil-
ity for introducing the idea into American sociology, do
severe violence to the integrity of the original ideas
expressed by Durkheim by selectively abstracting elements
from the original text (1976:358).
That a number have questioned, from various theoretical
and empirical perspectives, the relation of Mertonian anomie
to Durkheimian anomie, and further, that the definitive intel-
lectual biography of Durkheim contains no bibliographical ref-
erence to Merton's essays, should suffice to raise the criti-
cal question of the degree of legitimacy of the claim of Mer-
ton and the structural-functional school to the proper title
of Durkheim's heirs. The problem of ascertaining the legiti-
macy of Merton's claims is exacerbated by a number of other
factors due to Merton himself. First, Merton never explicitly
defined anomie, offering only indirect synonyms such as "mal-
integration," "disjunction," or "cultural chaos," and so on.
Indeed, Merton never explicitly discussed Durkheim's concept
or usage of anomie. Incredibly, Merton never even mentioned
The Division of Labor or Suicide in his essays on anomie!
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In the original 1938 installment of "Social Structure
and Anomie," Merton simply introduced the term "anomie," with-
out explanation or reference to Durkheim's ideas or writings,
or even Parsons' interpretations which were published the pre-
vious year. At this time Merton didn't even use quotation marks
to denote a special or unfamiliar term, but took it for grant-
ed that all understood the intended connotation. Since Durk-
heim's Suicide had not yet been translated, this left most A-
merican sociologists dependent on Parsons' or Merton's secon-
dary accounts and usages. In the later 1949 revision, Merton
added "normlessness" in parentheses as an apparent, but vague,
synonym for what Durkheim called "anomie." Besides these omis-
sions, Merton later added the following curious footnote:
Durkheim's resurrection of the term "anomie" ·which, so
far as I know, first appears in approximately the same
sense in the late sixteenth century, might well become
the object of an investigation by a student interested
in the historical filiation of ideas .... The word "ano-
mie" (or anomy or anomia) has lately come into frequent
use, once it was reintroduced by Durkheim. Why the reS0-
nance in contemporary society (1957:135, #6)?
Coupled with the curious fact that Durkheim's specific usages
of anomie in Suicide were never formally acknowledged, we next
see Merton recommending that someone else undertake a study of
the historical philology of the term "anomie"! Should not Mer-
ton himself have at least aided such an important exploration
by systematically and explicitly relating his version of ano-
mie to the thinker from whom he borrowed it?
In his follow-up essay of 1957, Merton mentioned, for
the first time, what he thinks Durkheim meant by anomie.
As initially developed by Durkheim, the concept of ano-
mie referred-to ~ condition of relative normlessness in
a society or group. Durkheim made it clear that this
concept referred to a property of the social and cultur-
al structure, not to a property of individuals confront-
ing that structure. Nevertheless, as the utility of the
concept for understanding diverse forms of deviant beha-
vior became evident, it was extended to refer to a condi-
tion of individuals rather than of their enviroment (1957:
161) •
Here we see Merton invoking Durkheim's charisma only to put
down the psychological interpretations of anomie. Merton nei-
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ther analyzes Durkheim's ideas, nor spends much time on them.
Doesn't it seem strange that Merton, so careful a historical
scholar, who just recommended a study on the historical seman-
tics of this famous concept of anomie which he borrowed,
should give so little attention himself to Durkheim's real
ideas?
Now, there is one other passage by Merton, buried in an
essay on sociological theory written in 1945, and reprinted in
his Social Theory and Social Structure as "The Bearing of So-
ciological Theory on Empirical Research" in which he attempts
to layout in paradigmatic form the essential model underlying
Durkheim's notion of anomie. As far as I have been able to de-
termine, this passage represents Merton's most explicit and
systematic statement of his interpretation of the" meaning of
Durkheim's schemas.
To exhibit the relations of empirical generalizations to
theory, and to set forth the functions of theory, it may
be useful to examine a familiar case in which such gener-
alizations were incorporated into a body of substantive
theory. Thus, it has long been established as a statisti-
cal uniformity that in a variety of populations, Catho-
lics had a lower suicide rate than Protestants. In this
form, the uniformities posed a theoretical problem. It
merely constituted an empirical regularity which would
become significant for theory only if it could be derived
from a set of other propositions, a task which Durkheim
set for himself. If we restate his theoretic analysis in
formal fashion, the paradigm of his theoretic analysis be-
becomes clear:
(1) Social cohesion provides psychic support to group
members subjected to acute stress and anxieties~
(2) Suicide rates are functions of unrelieved anxieties
and stresses to which persons are subjected~
(3) Catholics have greater social cohesion than Protest-
ants~
(4) Therefore, lower suicide rates should be anticipated
among Catholics than among Protestants (1957:92-3).
Even though the theory outlined here is offered only as an il-
lustration, it is interesting to compare its "thinness" with
the rich and multi-layered exegesis which we have set out in
Books One, Two, and Three in this dissertation. Here, Merton's
. . . thata ..10gJ.c .. J.S sJ.mply" structural condJ. tJ.on favors and represses a
psychological condition. One could question the usefulness· of
••
•
•
•
•
I.
•
•
•
•
---1069--
such a simple model~ in any case, it should be clear that
Merton's brief reconstruction of the logic underlying Durk-
heim's schemas in Suicide bears little resemblance to the
actual logics-in-use. Even the image of greater or less
structural integration, seized upon mainly by the Halbwach-
ian stream, represents a radical truncation of Durkheim's
theses. One could question, in addition, the tacit
notion that Catholics and Protestants are universally sub-
jected to the same stresses and unrelieved anxieties~ that
Durkheim started out puzzling over certain statistical regu-
larities in suicide rates, and then constructed a theory to
fit them, and so on.
Even the image projected by Merton that his theory re-
presents the epitome of a social structural theory, like
Durkheim's, is partially misleading. For Merton's anomie is
a crucial stage in the social psychologization of anomie. Al-
though his basic paradigm includes all three basic elements--
culture, social structure, and personality--Merton's central
concern has often been with the boundaries between social
structure and personality (see B. Nelson, 1972b). Although
Merton claims to be following in Durkheim's footsteps in of-
fering a social structural explanation of deviance, he seem-
ed to irretrievably gravitate toward his own natural level of
interest--the abstracted micro-level latent functional theory
of status and role. It is not surprising, therefore, that
post-Mertonian anomie (see the following chapters) has shift-
ed even farther down the theoretical scale, and has gradual-
ly become synonymous with a subjective psychological condi-
tion of individuals. The additional irony in this untoward
development is that Merton is generally less concerned with
subjective psychological and phenomenological notions than
he is with latent structural functions for individuals. Mer-
ton himself noted this shift in levels in anomie theory and -
research:
•.. as the utility of the concept for understanding di-
verse forms of deviant behavior became evident, it was
extended to refer to a condition of individuals rather
~han of their environment. This psychological concep~
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tion of anomie has been simultaneously formulated by
R.M. MacIver and David Riesman .•.• "Anomy is a state
of mind in which the individual's sense of social co-
hesion--the mainspring of his morale--is broken or fa-
tally weakened" [MacIver] ...• But the psychological
concept is nevertheless a counterpart of the sociologi-
cal concept of anomie, and not a substitute for it
(1957:161-2).
(See also the following section on Merton's responses to
criticism and extensions of anomie). Merton then continues:
An effort has been made to catch up the psychological
and sociological concepts in a distinction between "sim-
ple" and "acute" anomie [ego S. deGrazia]. Simple ano-
mie refers to a state of confusion in a group of socie-
ty which is subject to conflict between value-systems,
resulting in some degree of uneasiness and a sense of
separation from the group: acute anomie, to the
deterioration and, at the extreme, the disintegration
of value systems, which result in marked anxieties. This
has the merit of terminologically ear-marking the often
stated but sometimes neglected fact that, like other
conditions of society, anomie differs in degree and per-
haps in kind (1957:163).
Teevan (1975h noting this distinction, proposed that we de-
velop scales to test for an individual's perception of his
own anomie, as contrasted with his perception of the anomie
of the larger society. The curious fact about this is that
Merton has done, perhaps, more than any other thinker to ad~
vance the social psychologization of anomie.
Although certain diffuse relations can be discerned be-
ween Durkheim's anomie and Merton's anomie, Merton fundamen-
tally shifts the ground of argument. Mertonian anomie leads
not only to different hypotheses than found in Durkheim's
work, but in a number of significant ways fundamentally re-
verses Durkheim's meanings, and stands in direct contradict-
ion to Durkheim's theory. This is seen most clearly in terms
of Merton and Durkheim's differing views on the relations be-
tween anomie and poverty. Whereas Durkheim considered pover-
ty as protection against anomie and suicide because it res-
trained insatiable ambitions, Merton proposes that anomie as
blocked aspirations on the part of the lower classes leads
to deviance. One considers poverty protection against ano-
mic strivings, the other considers poverty and blocked aspir-
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ations to be the cause of anomie! 8pecifi~ally, Durkheim al-
ways conceived of anomie as implying egoism and insatiabili-
ty, whatever its causes. The opposite of anomie in Durkheim's
typology was fatalisme"':'-a type of traditional passive resig-
nation to one's assigned fate. In other words, ~ contempo-
rary sociologists have come to use the term anomie to refer
to the precisely opposite condition which Durkheim labelled
fatalisme. Characteristically, Durkheim considered poverty
to be protection against anomie--that is, against the insa-
tiable ambitions of the drives for "progress and perfection."
Mizruchi especially, (see also Thio, 1975, among others) has
observed this glaring difference between .Durkheim and Merton
as,they conceptualized the relations between anomie, aspira-
tibn, poverty, and suicide.
According to Durkheim, poverty is a restraining force
in relation to anomie. It is the lifting of limitations
on aspirations which reflects Durkheim's major concern
with anomie rather than the utilization of illegitimate
means for the achievement of given ends (1967 :440 ) .
Comparing the "infinity of dreams and desires" of progres-
sive classes with the lesser aspirations of lower classes,
Durkheim himself proposed:
Poverty protects against suicide because it is a res-
traintin itself. No matter how one acts, desires have
to depend upon resourc~s to some extent ... So the less
one has the less he is tempted to extend the range of
his needs indefinitely. Lack of power, compelling mod-
eration, accustoms men to it, while nothing excites en-
vy if no one has superfluity. Wealth, on the other
hand, by the power it bestows, deceives us into belie-
ving that we depend upon ourselves only. Reducing the
resi~tance we encounter from objects, it ~uggests the
possibility of unlimited success against them. The less
limited one feels, the more intolerable all limitation
appears. Not without reason, therefore, have so many
religions dwelt on the advantages and moral value of
poverty. It is actually the best school for teaching
self-restraint. Forcing us to constant self-discipline,
it prepares us to accept collective discipline with e-
quanimity, while wealth, exalting the individual, may
always arouse the spirit of rebellion which is the very
source of immorality. This, of course, is no reason why
humanity should not improve its material condition. But
though the moral'danger.involved in every growth of pros-
perit~ is not.izremediable, it should not be forgotten
, (8:254).
-- ~
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In sum, even though Merton starts out at roughly the same
place as Durkheim--namely, emphasizing the insatiability of
the dominant cultural values--his development of the notion
of anomie quickly diverges from Durkheimls. Merton rarely
questions the moral legitimacy of these values, as did Durk-
heim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber.
Both Durkheim and Weber took up highly critical stances to-
ward the very values which Merton appears to have taken for
granted. Merton accepts these goals as givens, and then shifts
attention from ends to means, from cultural values to struct-
tural opportunities. In a phrase, what is anomie to Durkheim,
and an "iron cage" to Max Weber, signifies the normal moral
consensus to Merton!
Thus, we must not fail to notice that the force of Mer-
tonls essay derives as much from the historical background
as from the abstracted typology. For ~erton emphasizes
that cultural goals may grow so overwhelming that their force
swamps out the restraining action of legitimate means of a-
chievement, resulting in his type of anomic innovation. The
historically specific application of this drama of mal integra-
tion is, of course, American society and culture, where the
content of our cultural goals (ie. the American Dream) convey
such an exaggerated and inordinate emphasis on the individual
"cult of success." Remember that Durkheim was concerned with
this cult of the individual and the corresponding cult of "pro-
gress and perfection:1 and Merton begins where Durkheim ends.
Yet it seems that Merton implicitly accepts the egoism and in-
satiability inherent in the standard American value system.
He gives us a "Social Structure and Anomie," and a Social Theo-
~ and Social Structure, but what we also desperately need is
a Cultural Theory and Cultural Structure building on Durkheim
and Weber. Nowhere does Merton indicate the possibility that
these dominant cultural values and goals may be illegitimate
in themselves. The only possibility presented by Merton is le-
gitimate goals vis-a-vis legitimate and non-legitimate means.
Yet the deeper question of the moral legitimacy of the domi-
nantgoals of the modern world was precisely the problem over
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which Durkheim and Weber agonized. In Merton's world, as in
Parsons', however, it seems that since whatever cultural goals
are given are legitimate almost by functional definition, lit~
tIe can go wrong with that society as long as the means to
those ends are also legitimate and approved, and the goals
retain their clarity and compellingness. The pathology of ano-
mie for Merton represents problems of social mechanics and not,
as with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central cul-
tural goals and basic institutions of the modern world.
Hence, we witness the narrowness of Merton's social psy-
chological framework in contrast to the scope of the progeni-
tors of the ideas with which he worked. For Durkheim and We-
ber argued both from inside a deeply historical and compara-
tive sociocultural framework, and from the perspective of a
view of human nature. The ultimate force of Durkheim's Suicide
and Weber's Protestant Ethic ... theses rest on their percep-
tions of the destructive modern psycho-socio-cultural demands
made upon human nature. Using these tacit, ernbended images of
human nature as their anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot
stand up alone under an "infinity of dreams and desires" (sui-
cide and ecocide being the inevitable result), while Weber ar-
gued that attempts by self-proclaimed "visible saints" to mas-
ter world, self, and society for God's glory and to build His
Kingdom here on earth, now, binds all of us in an inexorably
tightening "iron cage." Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the
very hearts and souls of modern men.
What Merton did to Durkheim's anomie, and then what oth-
er sociologists have done in turn to Merton's anomie can per-
haps be best described as a rather typical illustration of
the general process characterizing the breakthrough and subse-
quent breakdown of central paradigms used in the "normal sci-
ence" of any discipline. In sum, the critical historical
shifts in the routinization and trivialization of the "charis-
ma on deposit" represented by Durkheim's anomie in the con-
text of American sociological theory carne in two main phases.
First, we see a shift from a macro level sociocultural histor-
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ical and comparative analysis and critique to a micro ahis-
torical social psychological level of analysis. Second, we
witness a shift away from a fundamental critique of the very
social and cultural foundations of the modern world to a re-
medial, ameliorist perspective in sociology and in the poli-
tics of the welfare state.
For these and other reasons found herein, it is my jud-
gment that there are compelling reasons for rejecting claims
~sociating the names of Merton or Parsons or the structural-
functional school as the legitimate heirs of Durkheimian ano-
mie and Durkheimian sociology.
4. Merton'~ Theory of Malintegration of Goals and Means in
The Context of American Society and Utilitarian Culture
In the first part of "Social Structure and Anomie," aft-
er announcing his program of discovering social pressures to-
ward deviance, Merton sets out his central theme of the mal-
integration of culturally mandated goals and operating insti-
tutional means. Although Merton offered us an elaborate typo-
logy, it is interesting to note that his first real concern
was not with abstracted possibilities but with the specific
pressures put upon individuals in the context of American so-
ciety. These pressures to achieve individual success become
so absolutized that eventually some may be tempted to use any
technically efficient means to achieve the culturally manda-
ted end. Here Merton thought he had detected a key flaw, a
"fault ll in the social system--a structurally induced pressure
toward the erosion of legitimate operating norms, and a re-
lapse into purely individualistic and Utilitarian-pragmatic
moralities of thought and logics of action. In other words,
when the "strain" between cultural and structural systems be-
come~too great, some individuals lapse back into the egoisms
and insatiabilities of the Hobbesian state of nature.
One of the problems facing such an interpretive perspect-
ive may be that such a situation represents not so much a gen-
eric possibility (for one must entertain a Utilitarian image
of man in that case), asC; situation historically most preva-
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lent in Anglo-American society. Despite its appealing reason-
ableness, surely such a proposition is misleading as an ex-
planation of social action, anomie and deviance in a society
where Utilitarian or Pragmatic "moralities of thought and lo-
gics of action" are dominant in the fi~st place.
To say that cultural goals and institutionalized norms
operate jointly to shape prevailing practices is not to
say that they bear a constant relation to one another.
The cultural emphasis placed upon certain goals varies
independently of the degree of emphasis upon institu-
tionalized means. There may develop a very heavy, at
times a virtually exclusive, stress upon the value of
particular goals, involving comparatively little con-
cern with the institutionally prescribed means of stri-
ving toward these goals. The limiting case of this type
is reached when the range of alternative procedures is
governed only by technical rather than by institutional
norms. Any and all procedures which promise attainment
of the all-important goal would be permitted in this hy-
pothetical polar case. This constitutes one type of rnal-
integrated culture (1957:l33).
Of course, Merton's first pole of cultural-structural malin-
tegration representing the purely personal and pragmatic pur-
suit of success can be seen as a translation of the "Hobbesian
problem" into the context of American society. But there's a
twist involved here apparently unperceived by Merton and oth-
ers; for Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or absence of
restraining norms in the context of the Puritan rebellion and
the English Civil tolar, while Herton's anomic context is the
consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms.
Now, Merton assumes that, in his abstractly defined so-
ciety, the generic "normal" case is that goals and means are
well integrated. He further assumes that if the operating means
come to be seen solely in terms of self-interested calculations
of technical efficiency that this constitutes one type of so-
ciocultural malintegration. Then what shall we say of our own
society, where the dominant values are themselves utilitarian,
Pragmatic, and individualist? By Merton's definition, it would
seem that this state of "malintegration" would be both "normal"
and "abnormal." How could this be? This inconsistency· means,
in turn, either that Merton's abstracted theoretical assump-
tions are incorrect, or his empirical reflections mis]ea~ing.
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But this apparent inconsistency raises a paradoxical ques-
tion: are certain types of rnalintegration in certain socie-
ties to be considered "normal"? Remember, Durkheim used the
idea of anomie as he agonized over the "moral anarchy" of
the modern world, a type of anarchy which he saw as "chronic."
Can certain types of anarchy be normal?
It is important to recognize that Merton's focus on the
extraordinary emphasis placed upon success goals in American
society directly corresponds to Durkheim's concern with the
modern drives for "progress and perfection" which are "daily
represented as virtues," and which lead to the "infinity of
dreams and desires" lying at the heart of the chronic "moral
anarchy" plaguing the modern world. However, it is signifi-
cant that Merton nowhere explicitly draws the connection. For
instance, after the preceding passage, Merton refers not to
Durkheim but to Andre Siegfried.
Contemporary American culture has been said to tend in
this direction (see Andre Siegfried, America Comes of
Age). The alleged (?) extreme emphasis on goals of mone-
tary success and material prosperity leads to dominant
concern with technological and social instruments design-
ed to produce the desired result, inasmuch as institu-
tional controls become of secondary importance. In such
a situation, innovation flourishes as the range of means
employed is broadened .••• There occurs the paradoxical
emergence of "materialists" from an "idealistic" orient-
ation. Cf. Durkheim's analysis of the cultural conditions
which predispose toward crime and innovation, both of
which are aimed toward efficiency, not moral norms ...•
See Les Regles .•• (1938:673, #3).
Besides noting that this passage was deleted in the revision,
we are led to wonder why Merton would use double emphasis to
question Siegfried's (and others) description of the American
drive for success by using the word "alleged" (as if it signi-
fied the accusation of a crime, not yet proven, about which
Merton wishes to retain innocence until overwhelming evidence
established guilt), and then add a question mark after it.
Is not the very crux of Merton's own thesis also that Ameri-
cans put such overwhelming emphasis on individual success that
the legitimate avenues of achievement are ever-widened and
sanctions attenuated?
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In addition, we should not fail to notice that Merton
admits into the discussion an important historical insight
into American society, properly coming from Weber, when he
speaks of the "paradoxical emergence of 'individualists'
from an 'idealistic' orientation." Recognition of this his-
torical paradox underlying the foundations of American mo-
rality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of the his-
torical origins and constitutive processes of Durkheim's ano-
mie and egoisme, as they relate to Weber's Protestant Ethic
thesis. Even Merton himself tacitly suggests that this domi-
nant pragmatic attitude of functional rationality, seemingly
devoid of visible ethical foundation, could have had its ori-
gin in a deeply idealistic orientation demanding absolute
individualism, vocational inner-worldly asceticism, insatia-
ble or unending drives for progress and perfection in this
world, and the active, consensual mastery of the natural
givenness of world, self, and society for God's glory; in
short, the basic elements of the Protestant ethos. The reso-
nances in these passages with Weber's themes are certainly
striking. For Merton has just defined a state of sociocul-
tural mal integration which is synonymous with a culture do-
minated by Utilitarian logics and cultural operating ration-
ales! Merton himself had just finished his Weberian analysis
of the Utilitarian culture of early modern English science
(1936, 1972). Yet, as with Durkheim, Merton nowhere explicit-
ly linked his insights in this regard to Weber's. It is most
surprising, due either to conceptual "blind spots" or ideolo-
gical defensiveness, that both Merton and Parsons, though
close at many points, somehow neglected or refused to connect
Durkheim's explanation of anomie and egoisme as proceeding
from modern sanctions for "progress and perfection" with the
never-ending functional rationalization of the world describ-
ed and explained by Weber.
•
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5. The Underlying Schematic Structure of Merton'~ Typology
After indicating the pragmatic, individualist pole of
sociocultural malintegration, Merton outlines the opposite
pole which he terms "ritualism."
A second polar type is found in groups where activities
originally conceived as instrumental are transmuted in-
to ends in themselves. The original purposes are forgot-
ten and ritualistic adherence to institutionally prescri-
bed conduct becomes virtually obsessive. Stability is
largely ensured while change is flouted. The range of
alternative behaviors is severely limited. There devel-
ops a tradition bound, sacred society characterized by
neophobia. The occupational psychosis of the bureaucrat
is a case in point (1938:673).
Now, what Merton has done here is to begin to outline the un-
derlying schemas of cultural and institutional integration.
At the polar extremes of these continuUms we find: (a) Mer-
ton's first type of anomie where the ends are strong and the
means weak, (b) ritualism, where the ends are weak and the
means strong. Merton's first implicit continuum also suggests
a mid-point where the integration of means and'ends are at an
optimum level of integration. Since Merton's typology proba-
bly evolved through a series of elaboration of these dichoto-
mies, it is possible that he was so intrigued by the logical
appearance of the final product that he neglected to mention
the original points of departure or the process of develop-
ment. Merton's first continuum of integration may be schema-
tically represented in the following manner:
•
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Figure 7:
Merton's
Initial
Schema
Integration of
optimum
high/low balance
. (eg. anomie)
Ends and Means
low/high
Ceg. ritualism)
•
•
In short, there are at least three positions in Merton's ini~
tial theoretical formulation: (a) the optimum point of integra-
tion (ie~ "conformity"), (b) the pole where ends predominate
over means (ie. the first type of anomie in innovative devian-
cl1, (c) the opposite pole (ritualism" where means overcome ends).
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Actually, even this far into Merton's emerging typology
things are more complex. For Merton's paradigm rests on two
other implicit continuums--o'ne abstracted and one historical.
The second hidden dimension is nbt primarily concerned with
technical questions and integration but with moral perceptions·
and legitimacy. At the center of this continuum of sociocul-
tural legitimacy is again the mid-point or optimum locus of
high legitimacy of both cultural goals and institutional
means. At one extreme we discover a situation of low legiti-
macy of means (eg. "retreatism"); at the other pole we find
low legitimacy of existing institutional means (what Merton
later called the "nonconforming idealist" ·(1971:829-31), or
if both means and ends are rejected we see "rebellion." Re-
casting the graphic presentation, Merton's underlying schemas
may be represented in the following manner (see Figure 8--
Merton's full schema; see also Harary, 1966).
Finally, the third major implicit continuum in Merton's
schema concerns the fundamentally opposed attitudes of modal
societies at the two ends of history toward change and the
"corrigibility" of social reality and social problems. In var-
ious installments of his later essay on "Social Problems and
Sociological Theory" (eg. 1971), Merton explicitly distinguish-
ed between "fatalist" and "activist" societies. In cross-cut-
• • • • • • • • • • •
Figure 8: Merton's Full Schema
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ting the two dimensions just outlined, ritualism refers not
only to the state of mal integration where operating means
and institutional norms predominate over cultural goals, but
also to the type of traditional society deeply entrenched in
that thick "cake of custom" of which anthropologists used to
speak. And innovation refers not just to an abstracted con-
tinuum of integration but also to societies which actively
intervene in their lives and try to possess their own histor-
ies and direct their own fates. And this, in turn, implies
that the cont'inuum of legitimacy refers also to the attitudes
of "rightness" and "wrongness" toward stability, rational in-
novation, and change among different societies at different
ends of societal evolution. Of course, behind these implicit
distinctions lay not only Durkheim's distinctions between
"mechanical" and "organic societies," but also Weber's evolu-
tionary dichotomy between traditional social orders dominated
by custom and magical-ritual stereotyping, on the one hand,
and modern rational, innovative social orders on. the other.
In sum, it is important to recognize that Merton's typology
of adaptations rests on these three underlying continuums:
integration, legitimacy, and historical type.
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B. Merton's First~ of Anomie
1. Extreme Emphasis on Success Attenuates the Legitimacy of
Institutional Channels (Upper and Middle Class Deviancy)
The source of the original pathology underlying Merton's
first type of anomie is, of course, the insatiable drives de-
manded for individual success by the cultural goals themselves.
However, after establishing this foundation, Merton takes the
origin of this cultural pathology for granted, and shifts main
focus to its secondary consequences--namely, the inaccessibil-
ity of institutional means to given ends.
Of the type of societies which result from independent
variation of cultural goals and institutionalized means,
we shall be primarily concerned with the first--a society
in which there is an exceptionally strong emphasis upon
specific goals without a corresponding emphasis upon in-
stitutional procedures (1957:134).
Then Merton qualified this important initial insight.
No society lacks norms governing conduct. But societies
do differ in the degree to which the folkways, mores and
institutional controls are effectively integrated with
the goals which stand high in the hierarchy of cultural
values (1957:134).
Emotional convictions may cluster about the complex of
socially acclaimed ends, meanwhile shifting their support
from the culturally defined implementation of these ends
.... Certain aspects of the social structure may genera-
te countermores and anti-social behavior precisely because
of differential emphases on goals and regulations. In the
extreme case, the latter may be so vitiated by the goals
emphasis that the range of behavior is limited only by
considerations of technical expediency. The sole signifi-
cant question then becomes: which available means is most
efficient in netting the socially approved value? The
technically most feasible procedure, whether legitimate
or not, is preferred to the institutionally prescribed
conduct. As this process continues, the integration of
the society becomes tenuous and anomie ensues (1938:674).
Now, Merton's important suggestion that extreme emphasis
on cultural goals of success may lead over time to the emer-
gence of purely Utilitarian mores concerning the achievement
of individual success is apparently in his mind one of the key
connecting links between his first and second propositions
concerning anomie and innovative deviancy. But, as we shall
see, this common link cannot be left to obscure a series of
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hidden presumptions--for example, that lower class deviants
actually perceive and act out their dilemmas in pragmatic
terms, or that there are not critical class differences in
these two types of anomic deviancy. We are primarily inter-
ested in this section in upper and middle class deviancy,
where the extreme emphasis on individual success attenuates
the legitimacy of iristitutional channels of achievement.
It is interesting that Merton follows up the preceding
passage with this footnote:
In this connection, one may see the relevance of Elton
Mayo's paraphrase of the title of Tawney's well-known
book. "Actually the problem is not that of the sickness
of an acquisitive society; it is the acquisitiveness of
a sick society" (Human Problems of an Industrial Society,
1933). Mayo deals with the process through which wealth
comes to be a symbol of social achievement. He sees this
as arising from a state of anomie. We are considering
the unintegrated monetary success goal as an element in
producing anomie. A complete analysis would involve both
phases of this system of interdependent variables (1938:
674, is).
Here Durkheim's anomie/ is introduced through Mayo. Correspon-
dingly, Merton appears to recognize that the original pathol-
ogy lay with the overweening desires generated by the cultur-
al goals themselves. Yet, beyond a few such references and
hints in the various versions of SS&A, Merton never returned
to complete his suggested analysis of both variables. This
omission leaves a large gap in the development of American
sociological theory, especially as it relates to the applica-
tion of Durkheim's anomie and Weber's Protestant Ethos to
the American scene.
Now, ambiguity is as rampant in Merton's discussion of
anomie as in Durkheim's. For Merton slides back and forth be-
tween two different propositions about different classes and
deviancy without sufficiently differentiating between them.
On the one hand, we see Merton in his 1957 "Continuities ..• "
essay repeating his essential and general idea of anomie:
Anomie is conceived as a breakdown in the cultural
structure, occuring particularly when there is an a-
cute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals
and the socially structured capacities of members of
the group to act in accord with them. In this concep-
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tion, cultural values may help to produce behavior
which is at odds with the mandates of the values them-
selves. On this view, the social structure strains the
cultural values .••. The social structure acts as a bar-
rier or as an open door to the acting out of the cul-
tural mandates. When the cultural and the social struct-
ure are malintegrated, the first calling for behavior
and attitudes which the second precludes, there is a
strain toward the breakdown of the norms or normlessness
*(1957:162-3).
But is it not equally true to say that the extreme cultural
values strain the institutional structure? That extreme cul-
tural emphasis on individual success goals attenuates the le-
gitimacy of institutional channels? This is what happens to
upper and upper-middle classes who are under great pressure
to succeed at any cost; certainly, these groups are not dis-
advantaged or "locked out." On the other hand, in the same
"Continuities ... " essay, we see that Merton still was not
clearly discriminating between the various shades and meanings
of anomie.
It will be remembered that we have considered the em-
phasis on monetary success as one dominant theme in
American culture, and have traced the strains which it
differentially imposes upon those variously located in
the social structure. This was not to say, of course,
as was repeatedly indicated, that the disjunction be-
tween cultural goals and institutionally legitimate
means derives only from this extreme goal emphasis.
The theory holds that any extreme emphasis upon achieve-
ment--whether this be scientific productivity, accumu-
lation of personal wealth, or, by a small stretch of
the imagination, the conquests of a Don Juan--attenuate
conformity to the institutional norms governing beha-
vior designed to achieve the particular form of "suc-
cess," especially among those who are socially disad-
vantaged in the competitive race. It is the conflict
between the cultural goals and the availability of us-
ing institutional means, whatever the character of the
goals, which produces a strain toward anomie (1957:166).
It seems redundant to speak, as Merton does in his last sen-
tence, of a "strain toward anomie," for anomie has been de-
fined by Merton himself as the condition of sociocultural
strain. More importantly, Merton hits upon both of his propo-
sitions concerning anomie and innovative deviancy in the im-
mediately preceding sentence where he speaks of extreme em-
phasis on cultural success goals attenuating conformity to
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legitimate means as the general case, which is then applied
specifically to the lack of structural access on the part of
disadvantaged groups. In the first case, which constitutes
the original core of Merton's thesis, the cultural goals them-
selves are the cause of conflict and are pathological in their
extremity. In the second situation, the independent cause is
the lack of structural access. Thus, although in Merton's own
mind the two cases may proceed from the same general over-ar-
ching thesis of malintegration and strain, in actual fact the
two are so different, both structurally and phenomenologically,
that it is inconsistent to lump them together. For the key se-
quences in the two cases are reversed: In the first type of a-
nomie, cultural values strain the social and personality struc-
~res, while in the second type of anomie the social structure
strains the cultural structure. Surely no beginning student in
a methodology class would confuse independent and dependent
variables in this manner, unless the schema was inherently am-
biguous, even to its creator.
Let us next briefly explore the first type of anomie in
which extreme emphasis on individual success swamps out the
legitimacy of institutional channels, a type of adaptation
found primarily in upper and middle classes.
2. Moral Alchemies and the American Cult of Success
Merton discusses the power of images of the "cult of suc-
cess" in the American Dream without central reference to Web-
er's ideas. It is significant to note that, although Merton's
description of the American ethos corresponds closely
with the standard connotation of the Protestant Ethic "(ego
hard work, personal achievement, money, success, etc.), no-
where does Merton refer to Weber's theses, their popular de-
formations, or their potential meaning for his discussion.
Rather, Merton here explores American culture as one polar
type of social-cultural malintegration where there is high
emphasis on goals coupled with low emphasis on legitimate in-
stitutional means.
Although the 1938 paper proceeds directly from introduct-
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ory reflections into Merton's typology, the revised version
spends much more time exploring these culturally sanctioned
drives for progress and success. We start here from the short
passage in the original edition (which doesn't appear to be
paraphrased in the revision, one of the notable exceptions).
The extreme emphasis upon the accumulation of wealth
as a symbol of success in our society militates against
the completely effective control of institutionally re-
gulated modes of acquiring a fortune. Fraud, corruption,
vice, crime, in short, the entire catalogue of proscrib-
ed behavior, becomes increasingly common when the empha-
sis on the culturally induced success goal becomes
divorced from a coordinated institutional emphasis
(1938 :675-76) .
Then Merton briefly reintroduces his original polemical intent
and also his Parsonian background.
This observation is of crucial theoretical importance
in examining the doctrine that anti-social behavior
most frequently derives from biological drives break-
ing through restraints imposed by society. The differ-
ence is one between a strictly utilitarian interpreta-
tion which conceives man's ends as random and an analy-
sis which finds these ends deriving from the basic val-
ues of the culture (1938:676).
In contrast to the biological and psychological reductions a-
gainst which he polemicized, Merton's seemingly paradoxical
thesis of the social generation of anti-social behavior was
much more sophisticated and complex. We should note, however,
the inherent difficulties in conceiving the former type as
purely Utilitarian, and the latter as cultural, as i.f these
were necessarily opposed; for American culture is Utilitar-
ian, individualist, Pragmatic.
Merton's revision, interestingly enough, recaptures some
of Durkheim's original emphases on egoistic insatiability.
Contemporary American culture appears to approximate
the polar type in which great emphasis upon certain
success goals occurs without equivalent emphasis upon
institutional means •••• Money has been consecrated as
a value in itself, over and above its expenditure for
articles of consumption, or its use for the enhance-
ment of power .••. Moreover, in the American Dream there
is no final stopping point. The measure of "monetary
success" is conveniently indefinite and relative. At
each income level ••. Americans want just about twenty-
five percent more (but of course this "just a little bit
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more" continues to operate once it is obtained). In this
flux of shifting standards, there is no stable restinq
point, or rather, it is the point which manages always
to be "just ahead." An observer of a community [Holly-
wood] in which annual salaries in six figures are not
uncommon, reports the anguished words of one victim of
the American Dream. "In this town, I'm socially snubbed
because I only get a thou'sand a week. That hurts" (1957:
136) •
This insightful passage literally calls out for quotes from
Durkheim (see Books Two and Three). However, Merton's comments
are directed mainly to "relative deprivation" which was a sub-
sidiary phenomenon to Durkheim. But Merton does offer incisive
comments on these matters--where the lack of a reasonable or
fixed standard for satiability and expectation lead one to for-
get whatever one really needs for a comfortable margin of sur-
vival, and instead helps generates that "restlessness amidst
prosperity" of which Tocqueville spoke so insightfully. Merton
focusses on status competition where, especially without the
aid of accepted traditional signs and symbols, even the achiev-
ement of success sours in one's mouth as one continues to mea-
sure one's happiness not by what goals one has won nor by what
one possesses, but rather only by what others have and you
lack. Using Durkheim's conception of the social schedule, and
coupled with a minimum inventory of the dimensions of relative
deprivation, these insights posse$great potential for a so-
ciologically rooted explanation of inflation. The tragedy im-
plicit, of course, in this never-ending cycle of other-direct-
edness, self-doubt, envy, monopoly, etc., is the simple fact
that nothing can be imagined which, when achieved, gives true
satisfaction. For no matter how much one gains, one can always
feel deprived relative to the fortunes of others.
Merton's lengthy excursus into the cultural socialization
of Americans into an "infinity of dreams and desires" is most
welcome, and leads me to wonder again why: (a) these observa-
tions were not linked to Durkheim's anomie as insatiability,
and (b) these elements seem to fade in and out of Merton's an-
alysis. For instance, the following passage comes from the re-
vised version:
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To say that the goal of monetary success is entrenched
in American culture is only to say that Americans are
bombarded on every side by precepts which affirm the
right, or often, the duty of retaining the goal even in
the face of repeated frustration. Prestigeful represen-
tatives o~the society reinforce the cultural emphasis.
The family, the school, and the workplace--the major a-
gencies shaping the personality structure and goal form-
ation of Americans--join to provide the intensive disci-
plining required if an individual is to retain intact ~
goal that remains elusively beyond reach, if he is to be
motivated by the promise of a gratification-whIc~iS-not
redeemed*(1957:136-7). -- - -----
These insightful observations reveal that Merton, especially
in his later revisions, recaptured some of the tone of Durk-
heim's profound anatomies of modern culture. However, even
here, Merton's focus seems to be different, for his main thrust
concerns the discipline needed to retain intact impossibly ac-
celerating goals. One of the functions of the central social-
izing agencies of American society, Merton adds, is purely in-
spirational--to continue to callout to us to "hold fast" to
the cultural goals of unlimited success forevermore for Every-
man, "even in the face of repeated frustration. II And as we
shall see, if any acknowledge the limitations of reality, we
are then faced with what Merton, with a touch of genius, once
called "moral alchemies. II
Surely Merton's emphasis on the inspirational function
of American culture in calling out to us to hold fast to the
American Dream, even when evidence demands that such a reali-
ty demeaning image be set aside, echoes Durkheim's main themes.
Yet, if we accept the importance of Merton's insights here,
doesn't the real significance of his theme differ from its com-
mon presentation in American sociology? For Merton's first pro-
position concerning innovative deviance and anomie is implicit-
ly related to Durkheim's anguished analyses. Mertonian anomie
rests, then, not so much on the abstracted disjunction between
institutional means and cultural goals as on the unique vaga-
ries of the American social and cultural structure in which
the cultural goals of unlimited success for all are so over-
whelmingly exaggerated and endlessly reiterated that this in-
ordinate emphasis swamps out the legitimacy of the normal in-
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stitutional channels of achieving success. This internal con-
tradiction is exacerbated by the peculiar fact that these cul-
turally sanctioned goals are continually reemphasized: per-
haps most strongly at the very moments when frustration im-
pedes the achievements of large segments of the society.
Hence, a peculiar form of culturally sanctioned "moral amne-
sia" is constantly invoked. Observers from Tocqueville on have
commented on the Americans lack of a past: in his important
study The American Adam, R.W.B. Lewis calls us a "one genera-
tion people." Contrary to common opinion, then, the original
pathological source of anomie even in Merton's version lies
not with the vagaries of inadequate social structuring (and,
therefore, not at root a question of social mechanics and so-
cietal engineering), but rather with the inordinate and pas-
sionate and insatiable and idealistic totalism of American
cultural goals in themselves.
Merton goes on to consider some prototypical carriers
of the "American Dream," thereby uncovering the ideology be-
hind the inspirational functions of "business class culture."
Central to this process of disciplining people to main-
tain their unfulfilled aspirations are the central pro-
totypes of success, the living documents testifying that
the American Dream can be realized if one but has the
requisite abilities (1957:137).
Then quoting from a prominent business magazine, Merton offers
the following examples and his own sociological translation of
their latent, inspirational functions.
"You have to be born to those jobs, buddy, or else have
a good pull."
Here is a heretical opinion, possibly born of continued
frustration, which rejects the worth of retaining an ap-
parently unrealizable goal, and, moreover, questions the
legitimacy of a social structure which provides differen-
tial access to this goal (1957:137).
"That's an old sedative to ambition."
The counterattack, explicitly asserting the cultural val-
ue of retaining one's aspirations intact, of not losing
"ambition" (1957:137).
So far, Merton has analyzed two sides of the same coin--doubts
about the "worth of retaining an unrealizable goal," and the
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1090--
reassurance that one must "keep the faith" even in the face
of chronic doubt and perpetual frustration. One wonders if
American society has not embedded here within itself a myth
or archetype similar to the myth of Sisyphus, yet without re-
cognizing the implicit tragedy of a life condemned to etern-
al willing, effort, energy expended, and so forth, which yet,
by its own inner nature, can only end in eternal frustration.
It's as if we took over the joke, but forgot the punch liIi.e.
Merton continues:
"Before listening to its seduction, ask these men:"
A clear statement of the function to be served by the
ensuing list of "successes." These men are living tes-
timony that the social structure is such as to permit
these aspirations to be achieved, if one is worthy.
Failure to reach these goals testifies only to one's
own personal shortcomings. Aggression provoked by fail-
ure should therefore be directed inward and not outward,
. against oneself and not against a social structure which
provides free and equal access to opportunity (1957:137).
Here Merton explores a series of crucial insights into the
therapeutic logics of our peculiar "moral alchemies" which,
in the case of individual and seemingly isolated failure,
serve to deflect criticism away from society and culture and
back onto the individual himself, who is then encouraged to
internalize the guilt at his own failure to reach the contem-
porary American state of perfection.
This leads naturally to the subsidiary theme that suc-
cess or failure are results wholly of personal quali-
ties; that he who fails has only himself to blame, for
the corollary to the. concept of the self-made man is
the self-unmade man •••• Failure represents a double de-
feat: the manifest defeat of remaining far behind in
the race for success and the implicit defeat of not ha-
ving the capacities and moral stamina needed for success
* (1957:168).
What beautiful phrases--the "self-unmade man" and "moral sta-
mina"! Not only has Merton reminded us of the disciplinary
and inspirational functions of our socializing agencies, but
he also reminds us that the American Dream of unlimited suc-
cess for all is itself predicated on an ethical base--namely,
whether one demonstrates that one is morally worthy of suc-
cess in this land. Weakness in required character traits, or
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unusual or long-term delictions from duty, bring down that
disapprobation normally evoked by real and symbolic viola-
tions of what Durkheim called the "collective conscience."
Merton points to the critical modes in which such in-
dividual failure is dealt with--since success is predicated
upon intense, unending desire, effort, personal worthiness
and sincerity, then failure must be due either to lack of
will power or some other inherent ethical flaw in one's char-
acter. Consequently, since failure is internalized, on top of
the tension generated by the constant acceleration of demands
upon one's time, energy, will, and strength of character--
in short, upon one's 'moral stamina"--there looms the ever-
present free-floating anxiety that if one lets up one's fail-
ure is then publicly defined as one's own. The alternative
possibility is seldom presented to the imagination that the
goals in themselves are wrong, or inhuman, or impossible, or
destructive; not even that the opportunities for success were
lacking as Merton argues. The only conclusion possible is
that one lost desire or nerve. In Merton's own terminology,
these embedded dysfunctions of the American Dream are displa-
ced from the society back onto the individual himself, who
is then forced to accept his lonely guilt for his failure.
Remember that success comes only if one is "worthy," as Mer-·
ton emphasizes. For as many have learned to their double sor-
row, the hazards of unemployment in American society are not
merely economic; rather, the more devastating aspects of the
experience are psychic 4nd social strain. One loses self-re-
spect, and then defines and accepts oneself as a failure: and
then in another turn of this vicious cycle of moral alchemy,
one is defined and treated as a failure by one's peers. One
recurrent question: why is Weber's thesis that modern econo-
mic culture has an ethical foundation not mentioned here?
Merton next outlines three success typologies.
I. All may properly have the same lofty ambitions, for
however lowly the starting point, true talent can reach
the very heights. Aspirations must be retained intact.
II. Whatever the present results of one's strivings, the
future is large with promise; for the common man may yet
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become a king. Gratifications may seem forever deferred,
but they will finally be realized as one's enterprise be-
comes the "biggest of its kind."
III ••.• No matter what one's present situation, messen-
ger boy or clerk, one's gaze should be fixed at the top
(1957:l38) .
The first success prototype suggests the legitimacy of unlim-
ited aspirations for all. Such an "infinity of dreams and de-
sires" is culturally sanctioned, not merely as possibilities,
but as moral duties. By contrast, in the past most societies
governed themselves with a traditional social schedule of
satisfaction (see Books Two and Three) in which one's own in-
dividual level of satiability was largely dependent upon a re-
latively stable standard assigned to one's group on the basis
of their social status and cultural honor. The second success
prototype enjoins each person to reject precisely these tra-
ditional valuations of one's worth by ascribed social status-
es, and beckons him on to unlimited individual achievement,
regardless of the past or his native group. Moreover, not on-
ly must every individual, without exception, actively reject
the traditional standard of satiation ascribed to the status
of his inherited group, but each must keep on striving with-
out cease, for this ethos positively excludes any set stan-
dard of satiation for the future. This. is remarkably close to
Durkheimian anomie. Further, since one must be self-reliant
to achieve these successes in a competitive society, one must
also make it on his own. This emphasis on individual unique-
ness and progress and perfection is further testified to by
the reassurance given a person by being proclaimed "Number
One" in any field of endeavor. Competitive sports clearly ex-
press these drives--to be a world-record breaker, to do what
no man has done before, to be the champion, always achieving
new heights of perfection and glory. Such drives toward uni-
queness, progress and perfection through extreme specializa-
tion are certainly one expression of what Spengler (1922)
called "Faustian man."
Merton's illustrations point up another key element in
the American attitude toward time. If one must forever strive,
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yet forever wait, forever defer gratification, then one's
goal never comes closer, and hope becomes its own counter-
feit. When American culture issues inspirational calls and
exhortations for us to have faith in faith, to hope in hope,
is this not really a mask for some deeply embedded sense of
hopelessness, of final estrangement? In this case, hope be-
comes a desperation virtue, an "emergency virtue" as William
Lynch (1966) has called it. Such counterfeiting of hope re-
veals a deeply rooted ambivalence toward time and process in
our culture. Time, especially in terms of generic, natural
processes such as our life-sequences, is not generally per-
ceived as inherently generative, as leading to fulfillment
by its own inner nature. Perhaps some of the obscenity of
death in American society can be understood in this light,
for it is my conviction that people do not fear too much real-
ity, as the poet says. Rather, we fear too much unreality,
especially at the most real times in our lives; we do not fear
death as much as we fear the prospect of dying in the Ameri-
can way--that is, alone, isolated, exhausted, with an unfin-
ished life-project that no one can ever complete. Our atti-
tude toward the future is endless willing and endless waiting.
Our attitude toward the past is amnesia. We cannot wait, we
cannot remember. We believe that life is constituted through
will and imagination, but we cannot will the real, the finite,
nor can we imagine a point at which we would find true satis-
faction. Consequently, this sense of constant, endless, rest-
less, aimless urgency about our lives and the future, coupled
with the amnesiac's sense of floating in an isolated instant,
the American Adam as the American atom, unrelated to any other
phase in time, paradoxically entraps us into the endless and
repetitious patterns of the past, our national neurosis. For
Lynch reminds us that a culture's primal attitudes in conflict
with human nature may inform neurosis.
The other side of this "gnostic" failure of the imagina-
tion to imagine the humanly possible is seen in our apocalyp-
tic drives to leap out of time. Our culture is now saturated
with myriad forms of instant gratification--instant food, in-
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stant photographs, instant sex, instant salvation, instant
destruction, instant everything and anything at the push of
a button. Since we are primarily a pragmatic, progressive
people, we do not see the dialectic involved between these
two polarities of time and natural process. For if we did
we might come to recognize that domination by the endless
and the instantaneous are actually only two sides of the
gnostic coin.
Merton mentions another facet of similar themes in the
symbolism of royalty in an egalitarian culture.
The symbolism of the commoner rising to the estate of
economic royalty is woven deep in the texture of the A-
merican culture pattern, finding what is perhaps its ul-
timate expression in the words of one who knew whereof
he spoke, Andrew Carnegie: "Be a king in your dreams.
Say to yourself: 'My place is at the top' " (1957:138).
Merton's parade of cultural exhortations reveals again the re-
lentlessemphasis ori these images of striving and success.
Yet, is it not also paradoxical that in our supposedly egali-
tarian society, our culture is so permeated with almost ri-
tual obeisance for high station that even common goods, pla-
ces, foods, etc., cloak themselves in images of royalty? What
other nation has so intimately bound these contraries togeth-
er, and undertaken to elect an emperor every four years? Per-
haps we should count this among those small revenges of his-
tory that the heirs of those who overthrew hierocratic and
aristocratic feudal social organization in the west should
also be the ones to find themselves furtively substituting·
new aristocracies of wealth, new meritocracies of brains,
new celebrities as national heroes, new litanies of visible
saints, and the ones to mass produce images of royalty!
Merton continues:
Coupled with this positive emphasis upon the obligation
to maintain lofty goals is a correlative emphasis upon
the penalizing of those who draw in their ambitions. A-
mericans are admonished "not to be a a quitter," for in
the dictionary of American culture, as in the lexicon of
youth, "there is no such word as fail." The cultural man-
ifesto is clear: one must not quit, must not cease stri-
ving: must not lessen his goals, for "not failure, but
low aim is crime" (1957:138-9).
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Personality warps induced by the peculiar twists of these
moral alchemies should be seen in their cultural and histor-
ical specificity, and as representing the inverse of most
traditional economic motivations. James Russell Lowell's fa-
mous aphorism, in perfectly capturing our dilemma, demon-
strates that at bottom, an individual's failure to achieve
in any sphere reveals an ethical failure, a failure of mor-
al stamina, and thus, moral character. A cultural system in
which the real crime is to entertain balanced aspirations,
and the real virtue to be possessed by an "infinity of dreams
and desires," and never to falter from that high, exalted
and difficult path to perfection, and never to yield to anx-
iety or give in to doubt, frustration, or exhaustion--surely
such ~ unique, powerful, and destructive system of values has
tacit ethical foundations. Are we not justified in asking~
if American and modern economic and status strivings repre-
sent secularized translations of a religiously sanctioned
moral system and "civil religion," then why didn't Merton,
like the Weber he knew so well, explore or even refer to
the historical, sociocultural foundations of these pervasive
and powerful ethical demands? That Merton did not turn in
this direction, but rather in an abstracted micro-social psy-
chological direction by looking at individual adaptations to
anomie, serves as a key to the rest of our story on Merton's
anomie.
Returning to the text, Merton summarizes thus far:
Thus the culture enjoins acceptance of three cultural
axioms: first, all should strive for the same lofty
goals since these are open to everyone: second, present
seeming failure is but a way station to ultimate suc-
cess: and third, genuine failure consists only in the
lessening or withdrawal of ambition (1957:139).
In sociological paraphrase, these axioms represent,
first, the deflection of criticism of the social struct-
ure onto one's self among those so situated in the so-
ciety that they do not have full and equal access to op-
portunity: second, the preservation of a structure of so-
cial power by having individuals in the lower social stra-
ta identify themselves, not with their compeers, but with
those at the top (whom they will ultimately join): third,
providing pressures for conformity with the cultural dic-
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tates of unslackened ambition for those who fail to
conform (1957:139).
As in the later sections on anomie and poverty, here we see
Merton tacitly using Marx and the notion of internal contra-
dictions (eg. see Gouldner, 1970) to "pry open" Durkheim's
anomie in the context of American society. Surely Merton's
observations here stand as one of the more insightful ana-
tomies of the dilemmas generated by our cultural logics and
curious "moral alchemies."
3. Upper and Middle Class Deviancy: Pragmatism, Achievement,
and Legality
While exploring his logically derived category of "inno-
vative deviancy," Merton switches from his first to his se-
cond proposition concerning anomie. Much of the revised ver-
sion on "innovation" is concerned with the effect of the A-
merican ethic of success in attenuating leqitimate institu-
tional channels of achievement. The crucial shift from the
first to the second theory comes when Merton begins to consi-
der the case of lower-class individuals who are chronically
blocked in their institutional access to achievement of cul-
tural goals. Perhaps this ambiguous combination was due to
an embedded flaw in Merton's mode of formal theorizing, in
which he began with logically derived, abstracted and empty
categories, and then attempted to fit diverse empirical cases
into these formal, conceptual pigeonholes.
Now, it is certain that upper and middle class business
and legal "shenanigans" are just as much deviations from the
formal legal codes as lower-class "criminality." However, the
sociologist must take additional factors into account--name-
ly, that the perception and "labelling" of these different
types of deviance of different classes are treated very dif-
ferently in our culture, and even by the legal apparatus it-
self. As Merton made clear with the quote from Charles Dick-
ens, our social perception of upper and middle class deviance
is that of respectful indulgence for the successful cheat. On
the other hand, the social perception of the dominant middle
.-------------~----~-~- - ~----- -~~----- ------- -~
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class majority is that the "criminality" of the lower-classes
constitutes a potentially dangerous threat to the established
order, to the social and economic virtues, especially those
regarding the legitimate means of "getting ahead."
Merton restated the basic problem of the first type of
upper-class deviancy with characteristic cogence:
Great cultural emphasis upon the success goal invites
this mode of adaptation through the use of institution-
ally proscribed but often effective means of attaining
at least the simulacrum of success-wealth and power.
This response occurs when the individual has assimila-
ted cultural emphasis upon the goal without equally in-
ternalizing the institutional norms governing ways and
means for its attainment •••• From the standpoint of so-
ciology, the question arises which features of our so-
cial structure predispose toward this type of adapta~
tion, thus producing greater frequencies of deviant be-
havior in one social stratum than in another (1957:l4l)?
We should note, however, that the "induced" pressure toward
"innovative deviancy" is not, in the first place, structural-
ly generated. Rather, the primary cause is the inordinate cul-
tural emphasis on individual success~ it is more that the cul-
tural structure strains the social structure than vice versa.
Like many functional theorists, Merton here is a causal theo-
rist in search of an effect. His basic question becomes re-
phrased in this fashion: Given a cultural system which coun-
sels absolute individualism, unending drives for progress and
perfection, and unlimited individual success, what differen-
tial features of social structuring predispose different so-
cial strata toward different modes and possibilities of act-
ing out these overwhelming cultural mandates?
Merton starts at the top of the socioeconomic ladder and
works his way down. His second thesis--that lack of opportun-
ity of disadvantaged strata to legitim~te institutional access
to channels of upward social mobility generates deviancy--is
found only toward the end of this section.
On the top economic levels, the pressure toward innova-
tion not infrequently erases the distinction between bus-
iness-like strivings this side of the mores and sharp
practices beyond the mores. As Veblen observed, "It is
not easy in any given case, indeed it at times impossible
until the courts have spoken, to say whether it is an in-
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stance of praiseworthy salesmanship or a penitentiary
offense (1957:141).
Illustrating his theme with choice satirical quotes, Merton
explores his first sub-category of upper-class "innovative
deviancy""':"-namely, . the "cheat." The "cheat" is one who pub-
licly accepts the goals, while covertly indulging in purely
pragmatic considerations concerning observance of the "rules
of the game." As Huizanga rtoted in his famous book on the
play'element in culture (1955), precisely because of his pub-
lic acquiesence and the private nature of his deviance, the
"cheat" is always treated more indulgently than the" spoil-
sport" or "rebel."
The history of the great American fortunes is threaded
with strains toward inptitutionally dubious innovation
as is attested to manY!\:ributes to the Robber Barons.
The reluctant admiration expressed privately, and not
seldom publicly, of these ."shrewd, smart, and success-
ful" men is a product of a cultural structure in which
the sacrosanct goal virtually consecrates the means
. (1957:141-2).
Thus, in his first type of anomie, Merton suggests that
the cultural mandates are so extreme in themselves as to bor-
der on pathology. In effect, it is culturally legitimate to
desire success so much that institutional norms may be con-
veniently set aside in actual practice. In America its "OK"
if drives toward overweening cultural goals override legit-
imate institutional restraints. Dicken's caricature of our
conflicting values reveals this situation perfectly: "
and he is utterly dishonorable, debased, and profligate? Yes
sir. In the name of wonder, then,what is his merit? l.vell
sir, he isa smart man" (1957:142). Ambrose Bierce adds:
"The American public will be plundered as long as the Ameri-
can character ... is tolerant of successful knaves" (Merton,
1957:143). In a very real sense, then, such types of upper
and middle class deviancy arehardly deviancy at all~ rather
these simply are American values "writ large." Being a prag-
matic people, devoted to individual success and unlimited hor-
izons, we can hardly condemn too much those among us who fol-
low out our most sacred precepts more enthusias~ically than
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the rest; at most, we might consider this a case of more or
less "pathological overconformity" as Parsons and Merton some-
where later suggest.
Extreme individualism, Pragmatic or Utilitarian ethics,
success at any cost--some theorists might wish to term this
a sign of malintegration of "goals and means." However, we
should not forget that Durkheim considered this a sign of the
"moral anarchy" plaguing the modern world. But here the para-
dox begins. For, as noted earlier, if this anomie is ~ sign
of malintegration or "moral anarchy," it is one which is root-
ed deeply in our traditional values. This type of anomie is
not simply due to the release of the ego from all previous
constraints, but rather is itself coneructed and constantly
reinforced by our most precious cultural sanctions. The reluc-
tant admiration we grant to such rogues, cheats, and other as-
sorted "connivers" comes from the fact that we value their
over-enthusiasm more than we condemn their more or less momen-
tary lapse from legal consciousness. The conflicting values
here are not simply the success ethic and the respect for le-
gal order; rather, the conflict is really between laws as in-
stitutional norms and the American emphasis on Pragmatism as
our basic operating logic. If it works, why be concerned with
legal niceties, with outworn mores? Indeed, since pragmatic
individualism is itself one of our prime norms of "right con-
duct," when our conscience is thus formed, how else can our
consciousness be directed?
After this consideration of strains imposed upon upper
and middle class strata by the tremendous pressure of the A-
merican success ethic, Merton turned to his second thesis
concerning other strata. Here, the concern is mostly with the
"locked out status" of the American lower class, especially
ethnic minorities. But these two empirical cases of "innova-
tive deviancy" are socio-logically incompatible. Merton's
key underlying distinction between manifest and latent func-
tions glosses over some of these differences. For it is pre-
cisely the different definitions, "labels," and differential
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societal responses between upper and lower class "deviancy"
that mark their incompatibility. Phenomenologically, they
are very different cases. Structurally, they represent dif-
ferent cases also, for the problem with the first is that
the institutional restraints are too weak, but too strong
in the second case. Can we really hope to understand the
usurpation of power and "criminal" conduct that led to 'Water-
gate" and the resignation of a President of the United States
in disgrace by including it in the same category as the ghet-
to youth who steals to support his narcotic habit? Upper
class deviations from institutional norms (eg. price fixing,
cartels, monopolies, white-collar crime, etc.) are seldom
branded as "criminal" in the same way that highly visible
crimes against persons (eg. armed robbery), even though the
number of people affected and the total amount extorted may
be many times greater in the first instance than in the se-
cond.
Let us now turn to consider Merton's typology, and his
second case of anomic deviancy.
Now, as Merton prepares for the transition from the
theoretical to the typological parts of his work, we should
notice a number of basic shifts in the level and focus of
his argument. One basic shift is from the pathology of cul-
tural goals to inadequacies of social structure. A second
shift is from the historical-cultural level down to the so-
cial psychological level. Merton poses the key questions as
he came to perceive them in these terms:
... contemporary American culture continues to be char-
acterized by a heavy emphasis on wealth as a basic sym-
bol of success, without a corresponding emphasis upon
the legitimate avenues on which to march toward this
goal. How do individuals living in this cultural con-
text respond? And do our observations bear upon the doc-
trine that deviant behavior typically derives from bio-
logical impulses breaking through the restraintsimposed
by culture? What, in short, are the consequences for the
behavior of people variously situated in a social struct-
ure of a culture in which the emphasis on dominant suc-
cess goals has become increasingly separated from an e-
quivalent emphasis on institutionalized procedures for
seeking these goals (1957:l39)?
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Now, as we have discovered, there is an inherent ambiguity
concerning the case of high-emphasis on goals and low empha-
sis on operating means. For it contains both of Merton's two
separate propositions about anomie: (a) that extreme emphasis
on success goals leads to an attenuation of legitimate insti-
tutional means, and (b) where the goals are universally accep-
ted but the means of achievement are differentially distribu-
ted, individual deviance depends upon the social structural
situation. In Merton's first type of anomie and innovative
deviancy, the independent variable is culture, while in the
second type it is social structure. If deviance, albeit of
different types, is the dependent variable, then what is ano-
mie? Is it the cause or the result of the conflict or the de-
viance? Indeed, when reading through Merton's typology one
may easily find oneself wondering whether anomie leads to in-
novation and rebellion, for instance, or whether innovation
and rebellion leads to anomie? Again, is anomie the cause or
the result, or neither? In addition, if Merton's anomie rests
on the functionalists' notion of a mal integration between the
social and cultural systems, then why would Merton maintain
at one point that "In groups where the primary emphasis shifts
to institutional means, "the outcome is normally a type of ri-
tualism rather than anomie" (1957:136, #8)? I thought both ex-
tremes--innovation where the ends are strong and the means
weak and ritualism where the ends are weak and the operating
means strong--represented anomie malintegration. Further, on
what grounds does Merton gratuitously presume that similar
success values are shared by all? Should we not be careful
not to mistake universalistic "logics" with universal accep-
tance of them? If in Merton's second case of anomie he consi-
ders the differential distribution of access to institutional
means, should he not then also consider the differential dis-
tribution of values? These and other related questions shall
occupy "u~ in the next section.
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C. Merton's Second~ of Anomie
1. The Typology of Individual Adaptations to Malintegration
In the second section of his famous essay, Merton turns
to analyze typical modes of individual adaptations to var-
ious strains in their sociocultural situation. Here we shall
explore only the first two main modes~ of course, Merton's
concern centered on innovative deviancy. This category com-
bines both of Merton's types of anomie.. In regard to the oth-
er logically derived possibilities, Merton does not generally
regard "conformity" as problematic, and it is unclear what
systematic theory lies behind the last three types (see also
Turner and Scott, 1965:234, #3).
Turning from these culture patterns, we now examine
types of adaptation by individuals within the culture
bearing society. Though our focus is still the cultural
and social genesis of varying rates and types of deviant
behavior, our perspective shifts from the plane of pat-
terns of cultural values to the plane of types of adap-
tation to these values among those occupying different
positions in the social structure (1957:139).
Merton then proceeds to diagram out five logically poss-
ible permutations concerning the acceptance or rejection of
legitimate cultural goals and institutional means. Conformi-
ty represents acceptance of both cultural goals and institu-
tionalized means. Merton considers conformity to be the modal
response in all groups. Innovation represents acceptance of
goals but rejection of existing legitimate means (and the sub-
stitution of illegitimate means). Ritualism, in terms of his
later typology, refers to the rejection of legitimate goals
but the acceptance of operating means (implying not only the
displacement of original goais, but also their replacement
by means, "means becomes ends"). Retreatism implies the re-
jection of both goals and means (although it is not made
clear how one then exists in a vacuum~ surely again something
else must be at least partially substituted). And finally,
rebellion represents "rejection of prevailing values and sub-
stitution of new ones" for both goals and means. As my paren-
thetical additions suggest, however, Merton's typology is not
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wholly consistent. For each case implies not only the reject-
ion of one or both elements, but also at least partial sub-
stitution of new elements. The same rationale that first ap-
pears clearly in the case of rebellion would also apply to
the other categories. Merton adds this footnote on rebellion:
This fifth alternative is on a plane clearly different
from that of the others. It represents a transitional
response seeking to institutionalize new goals and new
procedures to be shared by other members of the socie-
ty. It thus refers to efforts to change the existing
cultural and social structure rather than to accomo-
date efforts within this structure (1957:140, #13).
It is simply not clear to me how Merton purports to differen-
tiate so neatly between change and internal accomodations:
for don't efforts at accomodation that reject either or both
cultural goals and institutional means and thereby substitute
new elements also constitute indirect efforts to change the
"existing cultural and social structure"? How could it be oth-
erwise? If his theory rests, in turn, on the fine distinction
between imputation of conscious motives or not, then it be-
comes more tenuous. Even with the intentional difference,
isn't the functional result, the very factor Merton thinks
important, similar? In short, isn't Merton's starting point,
his logical abstract typology, internally inconsistent as
outlined?
When Merton reiterates his thesis, does he recognize,
for instance, not only the difference between his first and
second anomie, but the real possibility that differential
distribution may apply to goals as well as to means? That it
may be the upper and upper-middle classes which are the prime
carriers of Pragmatic and individualist cultural logics which
are then differentially followed by members of other classes?
.•. It is a primary assumption of our typology that
these responses occur with different frequency within
various sub-groups in our society precisely because
members of these groups are differentially subject to
cultural stimulation and restraints (1957:140, #12).
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2. Adaptation!: Conformity
Merton begins his typological analysis with conformity.
Although at first it appears that he considers conformity to
be the general modal response in all groups, and therefore
unproblematic by definition, in some later related writings
Merton considerably revises his earlier simplified analysis
of conformity. Yet, it is interesting to note that as Merton
continued to revise his earlier and simple view of conformity
in favor of a more inflected approach, much of the certainty
of the original formulation began to fade. For not only, by
implication, are the other categories equally complex and yet
equally simplified in the original formulation, but also the
base category of conformity itself has ramified and become ca-
pable of multiple interpretations and expressions. Hence, the
very category which, by its seeming straightforward simplici-
ty, anchored the rest of the typology, has become less obvious
and less certain in the very process of refinement.
As I suggested before, Merton's original assumption that
conformity is relatively unproblematic is perhaps understand-
able from the way in which he goes about theorizing. Most lik-
ely derived from Parsons' abstracted idealization of "The So-
cial System;' Merton proceeds deductively to elaborate a sche-
ma based upon logical permutations, and assuming perfect in-
tegration as the basic anchor. Now, this curious procedure
of functionalist theorists differs little from economists who
have traditionally started from a series of arbitrary and
normative premises, such as perfectly competitive markets,
rationality and optimization, and so on. Perhaps Merton's la-
ter revisions of some of these assumptions (eg. consensus),
is attributable to his growing independence of his teacher
Parsons over the years. For example, although many continue
to charge Merton (eg. 1971:795-7) with that brand of function-
alism which had made an abstract value consensus a key postu-
late, evei since at least his essay on "Manifest and Latent
Functions" (1949), Merton had tak~care to avoid such a dub-
ious thesis.
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Here Merton describes conformity as the prototypical
case of sociocultural integration.
To the extent that a society is stable, adaptation type
I--conformity to both cultural goals and institutional-
ized means--is themost common and widely diffused. Were
this not so, the stability and continuity of the society
could not be maintained. The mesh of expectancies consti-
tuting every social order is sustained by the modal be-
havior of its members representing conformity to the es-
tablished, though perhaps secularly changing, culture
patterns. It is, in fact, only because behavior is typi-
cally oriented toward the basic values of the society
that we may speak of a human aggregate as comprising a
society. Unless there is a deposit of values shared by
interacting individuals, there exist social relations,
if the disorderly interactions may be so called, but no
society.... Since our primary interest centers on the
sources of deviant behavior, and since we have briefly
examined the mechanisms making for conformity as the mo-
dal response in American society, little more need be
said regarding this type of adapation, at this point
(1957:141).
Although in both his original and revised editions, Mer-
ton spends little time on conformity but rather takes it for
granted, in his subsequent essays related to anomie and devi-
ance, Merton began to admit that conformity might be more pro-
blematic than he had previously acknowledged. For example in
his 1957 "Continuities" essay, Merton explicitly responded to
criticism from Herbert Hyman and others by admitting that one
should not presume that universalistic goals are universally
accepted. "It is a matter for inquiry, not a matter of suppo-
sition, to find out how widely the values under examination
have been assimilated" (1957:170). Merton qualifies his form-
er presumptions in this way:
••• It becomes essential to state this assumption more
clearly by qualifying it; the analysis assumes that some
individuals in the lower economic and social strata act-
ually adopt the success goal. For after all, the analy-
sis holds not that all or most members of the lower stra-
ta are subject to pressure toward non-conformist behav-
ior of the various kinds set out in the typology of a-
daptation, but only that more of them are subject to
this pressure than those in the higher strata •..• De-
viant behavior is still the subsidiary pattern and con-
formity the modal pattern. It is therefore sufficient
that a sizable minority of those in the lower strata as-
similate this goal for them to be differentially subject
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to this pressure as a result of their relatively small-
er opportunities to achieve monetary success (1957:l7l).
If this sounds like special pleading, perhaps it is. To main-
tain his position, Merton is forced here to perform some fan-
cy footwork. First, Merton does not yet appear to recognize
that his idea of anomie really contains two separate proposi-
tions; else he would not have claimed again that some members
of lower strata are differentially subject to anomie more
than members of higher strata. In that case he would have to
admit that they are differentially subject to different
strains. Second, whereas before he boldly claimed that all
are subject to the same disjunction which differentially af-
fects lower strata because of their weaker structural posi-
tion, Merton is now forced to backtrack and suggest instead
that more membersof the lower class are subject to anomie
than members of the upper classes. If we extend our question-
ing here to Merton's tacit assumption still underlying his
revision--namely, that different strata share the same aspi-
rations (see Mizruchi especially, 1967), then Merton would
be forced to do even more backtracking. But as far as I can
tell, Merton has never answered in print Mizruchi's criti-
cisms.
Further, it is not correct to unqualifiedly identify
Merton's "conformity" with the assumption of "value consenus"
so often characteristic of functionalist thought. For as ear-
ly as 1949 in his lead essay on codification of functional
theory "Manifest and Latent Functions" in Social Theory and
Social Structure, Merton explicitly disavows the notion of
a clear consensus. And as late as 1971 (eg. 796-7), Merton
again defends himself with copious quotation from his own
work against this persistent charge. Yet, as Gouldner once
remarked of the difference between Parsons' theoretical and
historical writings, i~s as if two separate sets of books
were being kept. It is certainly correct to say that earlier,
while still under Parsons' spell, Merton did indeed, espe-
cially in "Social Structure and Anomie," tacitly presume an
abstracted value consensus as the corollary of conformity.
r----------------------------- - ---- ----.
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Yet, in some of his later related essays, especially while
responding to criticism, Merton himself questions these very
assumptions. Merton is probably right in contending that:
•.. it is difficult to see the basis for imputing the
notion of a "consensual society" to functional analy-
sis. It is as though an intellectual stereotype had ta-
ken charge, as though it were mandatory for a function-
al orientation to social problems to adopt the assump-
tion of full consensus, and so need look no further to
learn whether this is really so (1971:796).
Yet, even so, once again the irony of this recent disclaimer
should not escape us, for despite some of his own best efforts
over the years, Merton himself had aided and abetted over the
same period this wide-spread confusion.
We ought also to consider some further implications of
Merton I s original assumption of the unproblematic nature o-f
conformity, especially in the political vein. In his introduc-
tion to Part Two of Social Theory and Social Structure, Mer-
ton indicated a number of new concerns. Implicitly responding
to criticism, Merton rises to defend his theory against poss-
ible misunderstandings. For instance, instead of implying a
society governed by consensus of values, Merton took care to
point out, as he did again in 1971, that consensus is often
variable and that one must specifY the "degree of support
of particular institutions" by particular groups. This qual-
ification includes an additional factor--namely, power as a
key element in maintaining social control. By implication,
then, members of groups who have not shared the dominant cul-
tural values yet have been held relatively in check by power
and social control, to these people whose deviation has al-
ways been labelled "criminality," Merton now extends the poss-
ibility that this may simply represent a case of a different
type of "innovation." "It may therefore be misleading to des-
cribe non-conformity with particular institutions merely as
deviant behavior; it may represent instead the beginning of
a new alternative pattern with its own distinctive claims to
moral validity" (1957:122).
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Thus, in extensively revising his earlier, over-simple
stance regarding conformity as a modal response, Merton has
evidently arrived at a much more complex and subtly inflect-
ed position. This progressive development parallels Merton's
growing sophistication over the years in the elaboration, for
instance, of the concepts of social organization and devian-
cy. Yet, the paradox previously mentioned should not be allow-
ed to escape us, for as Merton has progressively refined his
conceptions of conformity (and thus deviance), he has unwit-
tingly made at least two things clear: (a) the most question-
able and critical transition in his functional thought is
that between the manifest and latent levels of functions,
and (b) the seeming clarity and logically elegant appearance
of his earlier schemas in "SS&A," which anchored the rest of
the typology by its simplistic certainty, has by its own ram-
ification betrayed the self-evident obviousness of the rest
of the typology by contrast. In short, without an unproblem-
atic notion of conformity, the rest of the typology becomes
also more problematic.
Finally, in comparing Merton's assumptions about con-
formity to the dominant American value system and success eth-
ic with ,)urkheim' s and Weber's ideas, we should remember these
facts. Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not
that they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that
the "infinity of dreams and desires" flowed directly from
the culturally sanctioned drives for "progress and perfect-
ion." They were, therefore, "chronic," and, in a sense, the
"normal" forms of the "moral anarchy" reigning in the modern
era. Further, who can forget the anguished tones with which
Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without spirit,
sensualists without heart! this nullity imagines that it has
achieved a level of civilization never before achieved" (1958a:
182). Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted con-
formity to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as
Merton often did. In short, bOth Durkheim and Weber directed
their most critical shafts at the very values which Merton
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appears to have taken for granted. Are these pioneers really
to be considered the progenitors of that "arid functionalism"
which claims them for its own?
Finally, we should recall that Merton himself had just
finished exploring some of the pathologies permeating the do-
minant "American Dream" value system. Surely conformity to
social or cultural pathologies is itself pathological! Besides
personality pathologies induced by our "moral alchemies" in
those who are unsuccessful, conformity to those eternally
expanding dreams and ever-accelerating desires and demands re-
presen~an even greater moral pathology on the part of those
who are successful. Such a sorry state of human affairs is not
to be so easily accepted as "normal" as Merton did, but rather
cries out in its historical uniqueness, power, and inversion
of human values as a fact to be explained. Remember that Durk-
heim proposed that poverty serves as protection against anomie
and suicide. And in one of those grim paradoxes of modern his-
tory, it is precisely those of us who are the most successful
who are also the ones most beset by the "infinity of dreams
and desires," and therefore the most anxiety ridden and driven
and most prone to various moral, spiritual, and existential
maladies largely unrelated to deprivation or oppression.
Strangely, Merton managed to invert the real thrust of Durk-
heim and Weber's most profound paradigms--for what is com-
paratively normal to Merton was anomie to Durkheim and an
"iron cage" to Weber!
3. Differential Responses to Mal!nt~gration: The Case of
Structurally Blocked Strata
Now, the typological discussion in Merton's original
essay contained little material on upper or middle class "de-
viant innovation." Rather, it was primarily concerned with
the blocked mobility of the lower class, and the supposition
that this structural blockage would result in their turn to
crime, organized vice, and other assorted forms of highly vi-
sible, traditional "deviance." Much more material on upper
class deviancy appears in the 1949 revision. Perhaps it was
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not surprising that Chicago of the 1930's should have provid-
ed Merton with a number of his illustrations (eg. Capone, or-
ganized vice, etc.). In terms of his main theme, Merton notes:
But whatever the differential rates of deviant behav-
ior in the several social strata, and we know from many
sources that the official crime statistics showing uni-
formly higher rates in the lower strata are far from com-
plete or reliable, it appears from our analysis that the
greatest pressures toward deviation are exerted upon the
lower strata. Cases in point permit us to determine the
sociological mechanisms involved in producing these pres-
sures. Several researches have shown that specialized
areas of vice and crime constitute a "normal" response to
to a situation where the cultural emphasis upon pecuniary
success has been absorbed, but where there is little ac-
cess to conventional and legitimate means for becoming
successful. The occupational opportunities of people in
these areas are largely confined to manual labor and the
lesser white collar jobs. Given the American stigmatiza-
tion of manual labor, which has been found to hold rather
uniformly in all social classes, and the absence of real-
istic opportunities for advancement beyond this level, the
result is a marked tendency toward deviant behavior. The
status of unskilled labor and the consequent lower income
cannot readily compete in terms of established standards
of worth with the promises of power and high income from
organized vice, rackets, and crime (1957:144-5).
I suggest part of Merton's basic theses are sound--name-
ly, that "anti-social behavior" is socially produced, and that
"internal contradictions" beset American and other social sys-
tems. However, not only did Merton bring these two factors to-
gether in a certain way, he also implied other postulates
which we have taken care to elucidate here. Especially ques-
tionable among the flaws in Mel"ton' s theory are the lack of
recognition of the pragmatism of the basic American value sys-
tem itself, and the tacit assumption, as Cohen (1965) pointed
out, that those who find themselves structurally blocked will
react pragmatically and rationally. Merton restates his ideas:
For our purposes, this situation involves two important
features. First, such antisocial behavior is in a sense
"called forth" by certain conventional values of the cul-
ture and by the class structure involving differential
access to the approved opportunities for legitimate, pres-
tige bearing pursuit of the culture goals. The lack of
high integration between the means and ends elements of
the cultural pattern and the particular class structure
combine to favor a heightened frequency of antisocial
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conduct in such groups. The second consideration is of
equal signficance. Recourse to the first of the alterna-
tive responses, legitimate effort, is limited by the fact
that actual advance toward desired success goals through
conventional channels is, despite our persisting open-
class ideology, relatively rare and difficult for those
handicapped by little formal education and few economic
resources (1938:679).
The attentive reader will observe that Merton's earlier re-
flections on the American dilemma--the gap between our indivi-
dualistic, achievement oriented goal of unlimited success for
all and the grim historical realities of ethnicity, religion,
region, and class--were a good deal more critical. For exam-
ple, the following footnote was deleted save for the first
sentence in the 1949 revision.
The shifting historical role of this ideology is a pro-
fitable subject for exploration. The "office-boy-to-pres-
ident" stereotype was once in approximate accord with the
facts. Such vertical mobility was probably more common
then than now, when the class structure is more rigid.
The ideology largely persists, however, possibly because
it still performs a useful function for maintaining the
status quo. For insofar as it is accepted by the "masses,"
it constitutes a useful sop for those who might rebel a-
gainst the entire structure, were this consoling hope re-
moved. This ideology now serves to lessen the probability
of Adaptation V (rebellion). In short, the role of this
notion has changed from that of an approximately valid
empirical theorem to that of ideology, in Mannheim's
sense (1938:679, *15).
One can only speculate on the tacit political undercurrents
flowing beneath Merton's efforts that led him to soften his
critique of American society in the decade following the Great
Depression. In any case, in tl.is early passage one can detect
Merton's tacit usage of Marxian perspective to "pry open" Durk-
heimian anomie in the context of American society and its in-
ternal contradictions and deflections of revolutionary possi-
bilities.
Merton next indicates how, from his own special perspect-
ive, similar pressures to succeed exert different strains on
different social strata. This passage marks one of the crucial
transition points between Merton's first and second theses on
anomie and innovative deviancy.
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The dominant pressure of group standards of success is,
therefore, on the gradual attenuation of legitimate, but
by and large ineffective, strivings and the increasing
use of illegitimate, but more or less effective, exped-
ients of vice and crime. The cultural demands made on
persons in this situation are incompatible (1938:679).
Here both upper and lower class deviancy are beset by Parson-
ian (normative) cross-pressures, for both are tacitly encour-
aged to elevate purely pragmatic considerations over legiti-
mate norms. However, the actual historical situation from which
which Merton generalized is really rather different than the
schematic picture painted here by Merton. First, as we have
noted, our cultural values are themselves Pragmatic. Second,
Mertonian anomie results not merely from incompatible norma-
tive demands, but primarily from the overwhelming emphasis
placed by the culture on individual success. In other words,
this social pathology is due not merely to normative conflicts
--internal contradictions in the Marxian sense--but rather to
the incredible and distortive power of the dominant values in
themselves. At root, then, the problem is Weberian and Durk-
heimian, not Marxian. For as Durkheim observed, our vices are
merely the. "exaggerated or deflected forms of our virtues."
Again, note that both the first and second types of innovative
deviancy proceed from the very same cultural pathology, for
whereas upper class individuals find their culturally manda-
ted insatiable desires swamping out legitimate and merely
bothersome institutional channels, the lower class, in a very
different structural situation, finds themselves faced not
with institutional norms too weak to restrain their insatia-
ble desire~ but, rather with structures too closed to them.
They do not enjoy full access to the institutional structures
of upward mobility in the first place.
Merton continues, unaware that his description of innova-
tive deviancy has given rise to two very different analyses
of structural responses to the same cultural values. Merton's
typology has often been touted as the very paradigm of socio-
logical analysis; but, once again, why should the cultural
goals themselves remain unexamined?
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On the one hand, they are asked to orient their con-
duct toward the prospect of accumulating wealth, and
on the other, they are largely denied effective oppor-
tunities to do so institutionally. The consequences of
such structural inconsistency are psycho-pathological
personality, and/or anti-social conduct, and/or revolu-
tionary activities. The equilibrium between culturally
designated means and ends becomes highly unstable with
the progressive emphasis on attaining the prestige-la-
den ends by any means·whatsoever. Within this context,
Capone represents the triumph of amoral intelligence
over morally prescribed "failure," when the channels
of vertical mobility are closed or narrowed in a socie-
ty which places a high premium on economic affluence
and social ascent for all its members (1938:679-80).
In short, normative cross-pressures resulting from structural
inconsistencies generate personality problems, anti-social
conduct, and perhaps even revolutionary activities! Surely
an ambitious theory! One can readily understand how Merton's
elegant schema and underlying proposition became the very
paradigm of sociolgical theorizing, especially over against
models from other disciplines and fields. But, given these
sociocultural tensions, wouldn't the ascendancy of the domi-
nant standard American value system itself represent the tri-
umph of "amoral intelligence"--in terms of our Pragmatic and
Utilitarian cultural logics--seen especially in terms of eco-
nomic and technological activity? Shouldn't Merton also have
briefly explored how these particular cultural logics came
to dominance? But perhaps this might have led to two uncom-
fortable conclusions. First, it might have revealed that even
"universalistic" values are not universally shared, that they
have "particularistic" origins, and perhaps even special con-
tinuing sociocultural "carriers." Certainly, they are parti-
cularistically applied in practice, though perhaps less so in
1970's in America than in the 1930's and 1940's when Merton
first wrote. This recognition might have led Merton to more
carefully distinguish between "universalism" in values and
"universalism" in belief and practice. Indeed, Merton seemed
to assume that lower classes do internalize upper and middle
class aspirations~ but as he later noted, this must be empir-
ically demonstrated, not presumed. Second, had Merton explor-
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ed these historical questions of the sociocultural bases of
competing systems of legitimate moral and intellectual auth-
ority, he might have run directly counter to Weber's theses.
For while Merton here assumes a structurally induced pres-
sure toward utilitarian or pragmatic (on the generic level,
and £hus spelled with a little "un and ~pll) attitudes and
behavior, Weber suggested the emergence of these very same
cultural operating logics (on the specific historical level,
and thus capitalized), not from some abstracted notion of
"strain in The Social System,1I but rather from the seculari-
zation of lIinner-worldly ascetic ll Protestantism. Remember,
if the dominant American values are themselves Pragmatic and
counsel individualistic and insatiable ambition, then in Mer-
ton's framework, this state of II malintegration ll would be II nor-
mal ll ! In other words, our Central Value System is itself ano-
mic! I believe this to be an inevitable conclusion, given
both the inner logic and sociocultural history implied in
Durkheim's and Merton's versions of anomie (and given Par-
sons' rendering of egoisme). Indeed, the recognition emer-
ging from our detailed examination of Merton's theses con-
stitutes a compelling foundation for the second schema of
anomie as generated by our dominant cultural system (see
Book Three). In short, these recognitions include: (a) insa-
tiable ambition is counseled and sanctioned by our value sys-
tem, and (b) historically, our value system derives from the
secularization of ascetic Protestantism.
Merton continues expanding his main theme in a series
of succinct and insightful passages that made his essays clas-
sics.
other phases of the social structure besides the ex-
treme emphasis on pecuniary success must be considered
if we are to understand the social sources of anti-so-
cial behavior. A high frequency of deviate behavior is
not generated simply by IIlack of opportunityll or by this
exaggerated pecuniary emphasis. A comparatively rigidi-
fied class structure, a feudalistic or caste order, may
limit such opportunities far beyond the point which ob-
tains in our society today. It is only when a system of
cultural values extols, virtually above all else, certain
common symbols of success for the entire population at
. large while its social structure rigorously restricts or
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completely eliminates access to approved modes of acquir-
ing these symbols for a considerable part of the same PbP-
ulation, that antisocial behavior ensues on-a considera Ie
scale. In other words, our egalitarian ideology denies by
implication the existence of noncompeting groups and in-
dividuals in the pursuit of pecuniary success. The same
body of success symbols is held to be desirable for all.
These goals are held to transcend class lines, not to be
bounded by them, yet the actual social organization is
such that there exist class differentials in the accessi-
bility of these common success symbols~ Frustration and
thwarted aspiration lead to the search for avenues of es-
cape from a culturally induced intolerable situation; or
unrelieved ambition may eventuate in illicit attempts to
acquire the dominant values. The American stress on pecun-
iary success and ambitiousness for all thus invites exag-
gerated anxities, hostilities, neuroses, and anti-social
behavior (1938:680).
Again, Merton's theses here rest on the notion of "internal
contradictions" or "strain in The Social System." Surely Mer-
ton has performed valuable service in exploring the cross-
pressures exerted upon individuals of different strata by com-
peting values of Pragmatism, success, law and order, and so
on. Further, Merton incisively observes that our egalitarian
ethos compounds the tensions by implicitly denying that actual
differences in equality of opportunity exist. Such a "moral al-
chemy" deflects criticism away from the societal structure,
and back onto the lone individual who internalizes these val-
ues, but meets with a contradictory reality. Such failure is
then explained away by these "moral alchemies" which transmute
'base" failure into new cultural gold. If, indeed, as American
culture proclaims, every man may become a king, then the fail-
ure of any individual, even a deprived one from the lower clas-
ses, to achieve part of whole of the American dream is forced
back upon the individual himself as wholly his fault, and
hence individualized in terms of his lack of character or
ethical virtue. Surely such "moral alchemies" have tacit,
deeply embedded ethical bases.
In his own way, Merton is debunking the actualization
of the dream, and not the dream itself. Indeed, few men have
typified the dreamt of rapid upward mobilit~~t~nMerton him-
self, who skyrocketed from a Philadelphia immigrant slum to
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the pinnacle of American academia in a few short decades
(see M. Hunt, 1961). In his own way, Merton was calling us
to make the dream real for all. Although Merton began, with
Durkheim, by emphasizing the content of the success ethic,
especially its insatiability and egoism, he turned instead
to another perspective. Merton's real point is that our suc-
cess goals are universalized, but the means for achievement
are not. The momentous historical breakthrough to an egali-
tarian, achievement ethos slights the historical fact that
the instrumental means, the institutional channels, of achiev-
ement are still so often differentially distributed. In
short, Mertonian anomie rests on the disjunction between
universalistic goals and particularized structural opportun-
ities.
However, this means that Merton, in turn, accepts these
same universalistic goals as givens, and thus shifts atten-
tion away from the question of the legitimacy of these goals
to the problems of the structured inequality confronting low-
er strata. Hence, Mertonian anomie raises essentially a dis-
tribution problem--how to open up the doors to let more in.
It is a problem in social engineering for a liberal society.
But Durkheim, on the other hand, meant anomie to refer to the
content of these goals, as counseling an "infinity of dreams
and desires." To Durkheim, anomie referred to the constitu-
tive foundations of the whole social and cultural structure,
not merely to a few peripheral classes. To Durkheim, anomie
and egoisme were most rampant precisely among the more pro-
gressive, not the backward, sectors of society. As Lynch(
(1966:45) suggests, " ... an ideal that seems to be commanded
and that is also hopeless" can be the source of cultural, so-
cial, and personal pathology. I repeat: for Durkheim, these
"ideals" of unending "progress and perfection," "daily repre-
sented as virtues," are impossible and destructive for all,
not just a few.
Further, in his original essay, Merton took pains to
point out that this state of anomie mal integration does not
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simply result from blocked opportunities of oppressed strata
alone. Nor does Mertonian anomie, in the American historical
context, refer~a simple inconsistency between cultural goals
and structural means. Rather, Mertonian anomie actually refers
primarily to our own type of society dominated by extreme em-
phasis on values of individual achievement and success for all,
contrasted with the historical realities of structured inequal-
ity. Although pitched abstractly on the formal level, Merton
himself carne very close to the core of his thesis which could
also serve as a epigrammatic summary for the present disserta-
tion: " •.. a cardinal American virtue, "ambition," promotes a
cardinal American vice, "deviant behavior" (1957:146).
4. Anomie, Poverty, and Crime
Merton then turned to explore the relations between ano-
mie, crime, and poverty. He began by rejecting simple, linear
correlations between crime and poverty. Rather, he proposed
that anomie acts as a crucial intervening variable between
these two social phenomena.
This theoretical analysis may go far toward explaining
the varying correlations between crime and poverty. Po-
verty is not an isolated variable. It is one in a com-
plex of interdependent social and cultural variables.
When viewed in such a context, it represents quite dif-
ferent states of affairs. Poverty as such, and conse-
quent limitation of opportunity, are not sufficient to
induce a conspicuously high rate of criminal behavior.
Even the often mentioned "poverty in the midst of plen-
ty" will not necessarily lead to this result. Only in-
sofar as poverty and associated disadvantages in compe-
te~ion for cultural values approved for all members of
the society is linked with the assimilation of a cultur-
al emphasis on monetary accumulation as a symbol of suc-
cess is anti-social conduct a "normal" outcome •.•• It is
only when the full configuration is considered, poverty,
limited opportunity and a commonly shared system of suc-
cess symbols, that we can explain the higher association
between poverty and crime in our society than in others
where rigidified class structure is coupled with differ-
ential class symbols of achievement (1938:680-81).
Now, among others, Ephraim Mizruchi has noted a discrep-
ancy between Durkheim's and Merton's ideas on anomie and pover-
ty. M~z~uchi questions whether various classes share the same
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aspirations as Merton presumes.
The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its focus
is on means rather than on ends, assumes relatively un-
iform aspirations across the class structure, and a
greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower class-
es. This theory, however, largely ignores observations
made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, among
others, regarding the relatively low levels of aspira-
tion which characterizes those at the lowest level of
the class structure, and it ignores certain qualitative
differences within and between the classes (1967: 441).
The question Mizruchi raises here concerns not consensus, but
differential aspirations. Are the same goals shared by all
classes? As we discovered earlier in the section on "Conform-
ity" as the modal response, in.his 1957 "Continuities" essay
Merton showed himself sensitive to criticism by Herbert Hyman
and others that " ... clearly Merton's analysis assumes that.
the cultural goal is in actuality internalized by lower class
individuals." There we saw that Merton (eg. 1957:171) respond-
ed with the weak claim that, in terms of absolute numbersra-
ther than the percentages that social scientists prefer, more
of the lower classes are differentially subject to these cross-
pressures than upper classes.
In essence, Mizruchi, Hyman, and others have posed a
critical problem for Merton's schema: are, in fact, the domi-
nant cultural aspirations and achievement goals, especially
insatiable individual aspiration underlain by ethical sanc-
tions, uniformly internalized among all sectors of the popula-
tion? Or, on the contrary, do different sectors and classes,
especially traditional, national, and ethnic minorities or
even regional minorities, have relatively different kinds or
lower levels of goals and aspirations? According to Merton's
premises, one would expect that some of the lower classes
would inculcate the dominant aspirations, and the more they
find themselves structurally blocked, the more they would
pragmatically turn to "innovative deviancy" to get what they
had been ?romised but had been denied by structured inequali-
ty. On the contrary, however, much empirical evidence shows
that traditionally backward or oppressed strata simply do not
share upper or even middle class expectations; rather, they
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are often permeated with what one observer brilliantly call-
ed an "analgesic subc~lture" (Richard Ball, 1968). As Weber
noted with his concept of "traditionalism" (and Merton with
his notion of "fatalistic" versus "activistic" societies,
1971), here the major emphasis is on maintaining one's tradi-
tional level of subsistence, security, conservatism, low risk-
taking, and various means of escape and/or masochism. It is
an entirely different ethical world-view than the one which
counsels pragmatic and calculated revolt of "getting back"
or "getting on."
Merton's problem here stemmed from his unwarranted pre-
sumption that universalistic achievement values are universal-
ly embraced; in effect, that the Protestant Ethos is the norm
for the whole population. He assumed "relatively uniform as-
pirations across the class structure." But we are perhaps more
justified in presuming that rather different values, aspira-
tions, level of expectations, and so forth are identified with
different ethnic, national, or socioreligious groups. Hence,
Merton's original presumption that universalistic values were
particularistically structured in practice needs to be taken
back one step further--namely, that to a great extent, our
universalistic values are themselves particularistic--that is,
not only differentially distributed but perhaps even emerging
from powerfully situated cultural minorities (eg. the New Eng-
land Puritans and their descendants). In other words, not only
are structures of opportunity differentially distributed, but
the culture of aspiration and values are also differentially
distributed and emerge from special groups.
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5. Merton Versus Durkheim and Weber
Why didn't Merton directly examine Durkheim's ideas on
anomie? Why did Merton (and Parsons) slight certain critical
features in Durkhei~'s work? Why didn't Merton relate his own
analyses of the American success ethic to Weber's theses? And
most importantly, why didn't Merton connect Weber's theses to
Durkheim's? More than any other, besides Parsons perhaps, Mer-
ton should have recognized some links between his own theori-
zing on anomie, Durkheim's insights into the modern cultural
sanctioning of anomie and egoisme, and Weber's historical in~
sights into the Protestant Ethos. The fact that Merton did
not make these connections constitutes a mystery problem in
the history of American sociological theory. Let us now brief-
ly consider some of the reasons why we might have expected
such an explicit convergence on Merton's part, and some con-
jectures why this revolutionary synthesis was not forthcom-
ing.
First, let us consider Merton's background and his in-
terests at the time he wrote "Social Structure and Anomie."
Now, Merton had certainly been thoroughly exposed to what some
thought were striking and significant convergences in Durk-
heim's and Weber's thought. As a student and then colleague,
Merton was sensitized to these possibilities by the leading
theorist of this persuasion, Talcott Parsons. Moreover, Mer-
ton himself was reworking themes borrowed from Durkheim and
Weber at the same time. In the same year in which his famous
"Social Structure and Anomie" was published (1938), Merton
published his less famous, but equally important, doctoral
dissertation Science, Technology, and Society in Seventeenth
Century England, in which he brilliantly applied Weber's the-
ses to the development and legitimation of early modern Util-
itarian science and technology in seventeenth century, post-
Puritan Revolution England. Thus, the youthful Merton provi-
ded us with profound reworkings of both Weber'~ and Durkheim'~
theses in the same year, applying Weber's theses on the rela-
tionship between the Protestant Ethos and the development of
••
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science and technology in England, and applying Durkheim's
theses on anomie to American culture and internal contradict-
ions in American society. Surely these simultaneous interests
with the support of the Parsonian framework might have led us
to expect a similar striking convergence between Durkheim and
Weber in Merton's subsequent work on anomie in American socie-
ty. Yet none was forthcoming. Why?
Let us further consider the curious fact that although
Merton's discussion of the "cult of success" in American cul-
ture corresponds closely with the standard connotation of the
Protestant Ethos, Merton nowhere refers to Weber's work on
this subject, even though it was central to Merton's own
themes. If Merton himself detected the moral sanctions under-
lying the deformations caused by the extreme individualism
and insatiability of aspirations of the American Dream, why
didn't he refer to Weberian themes? It is interesting to note
that at least two observers, noting that Merton's notion of
anomie, like Weber's analyses of the spirit of the modern era,
rests on the cultural pervasiveness of unending pursuit of
success, went so far as to propose that "Merton's anomie the"';
sis is not a development of Durkheim's treatment of anomie,
but a restatement, considerably simplified, of Weber's analy-
sis of the Protestant Ethic" (Turner and Scott, 1965:240).
It is even more strange that when Merton finally did
cite Weber in his articles relating to anomie, it served
mainly to obfuscate the real and potential significance of
the latter's insights for the former's exploration of the
pathologies of American culture. When Merton cited Weber, it
was not to indicate the relevance of the "Protestant Ethic"
to Merton's own discussion of the American ethos of indivi-
dual success, nor to link Weber's theses to Durkheim's. Ra-
ther, he cites Weber, amazingly enough, in a negative way;
This heavy accent of financial success is, of course,
not peculiar to Americans. Max Weber's analytical and
long-standing observation is still much in point: the
impulse to acquisition, pursuit of gain, of money, of
the greatest possible amount of money has in itself no-
thing to do with capitalism (and in the present instance
nothing to do specifically with the American culture).
••
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This impulse exists and has existed among waiters,
physicians, coachmen, artists, prostitutes, dishon-
est officials, soldiers, nobles, crusaders, gamblers,
and beggars. One may say that it has been common to
all sorts and conditions of men at all times and in
all countries of the earth (1957:167).
However, contrary to the thrust of this reference, what Weber
was trying to do in the passage Merton cited from Weber1s "Au-
thor1s Introduction ll to his unfinished collected works in the
sociology of religion (see, for example, Benjamin Nelson,1975~
and in the second chapter on "The Spirit of Capitalism" in The
Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism, was to set aside
precisely such misleading identifications of traditional eco-
nomic motivations with the peculiarly modern type of function-
al rationality and this-worldly vocational asceticism practi-
ced especially by the Calvinistic branches of Protestantism.
Merton1s use of this quote and his parenthetical insertion to
the effect that the traditional economic impulse of greed is
so universally applicable that the specific ethos of American
culture needs no special explanation is misleading in the ex-
treme. One wonders why Merton did it. For the real thrust of
Weber1s theses is precisely the opposite of what Merton inti-
mates here.
Finally, we may note that Merton admitted into his dis-
cussion an important historical insight, properly corning from
Weber, when he spoke of the "paradoxical emergence of lindivi-
dualists l from an lidealistic l orientation." Recognition of
this historical paradox underlying the foundations of American
morality and culture is crucial to the unraveling of Durkheim1s
anomie and egoisme, especially as they relate to Weber1s para-
llel Protestant Ethos theses. Even Merton himself tacitly ack-
nowledged that this dominant Pragmatic attitude of functional
rationality, seemingly devoid of visible ethical consideration,
could have had its origins and continuing sanction in a deeply
idealistic orientation demanding absolute individualism, voca-
tional inner-worldly asceticism, insatiable or unending drives
for progress and perfection in this world, and the active, con-
sensual mastery of the natural givenness of world, self, and
••
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society for God's glory; in short, the basic elements of the
Protestant Ethos. Although the resonances in much of Merton's
description of the American cult of individual success with
Weber's historical insights are striking, as with Durkheim,
Merton simply neglected to link his work on anomie with Weber.
I suggest that we view Merton's simultaneous tacit rhe-
torical incorporation of Weber's ideas and his failure to ex-
plicitly explore the potential significance of Weber ian themes,
especially as they converged with Durkheim's critiques, on two
levels: (a) the analytical-methodological level, and (b) the
substantive cultural-historical level. As Merton veered away,
from the cultural historical level down to the social psycho~
logical level of analysis, he blunted (whether consciously or
unconsciously) the critical edge of Durkheim's and Weber's the-
ses as they applied to American culture and modern society in
general. First, although Merton had already demonstrated his
virtuosity as a historian of science and culture in applying
Weber's ideas to the development of seventeenth century Eng-
lish science and technology, Merton did not follow through
with further path-breaking work on that level. Rather, he turn-
ed instead to the micro, ahistorical level of abstracted so-
cial psychological analysis. In this perspective, Merton's
work takes an added dimension in the history of American so-
ciology, since as a scholar capable of numerous levels of ana-
lysis, Merton turned toward the one most preferred by the im-
plicit nominalism of American sociologists. Comparing Merton's
later work with Weber's "periods," Benjamin Nelson observes:
There have been some moves of a comparable sort in the
work of Merton, but these have only been hints. His
thrust has been different; instead of moving out to-
ward the comparative historical sociology of sociocul-
tural process, he has tended to develop an ever more
keen concentration in the areas or the boundaries of
the sociological psychology of social and cultural pro-
cess. For Merton this dissertation may be said to repre-
sent the high point of his efforts in historical socio-
logy rather than a point of departure .••• To the great
loss of instruction and research in our country-~in my
view--the several strains of his dissertation tended to
draw apart during the years after his dissertation .••.
We witness a thrust toward the frames of reference which
••
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came to serve as the formats of highly institutionalized
theoretical and empirical work mainly in the sphere of a
sophisticated sociological social psychology oriented to
non-temporal horizons (1972b:229-30).
Nelson then suggests that Merton's impact on American sociolo-
gical theory stems largely from the essay we are considering
here, which seemed to offer a workable paradigm, a theory in
the "middle range" suitable to the particular cultural and so-
cial environment of American theory •
••• It was Merton's seminal paper "Social Structure and
Anomie," published in the same year as the dissertation,
which was to set the pattern for the "normal science" in
departments of sociology at great American universities,
and which became the "launching pad" for a great number
of American doctoral dissertations and research mono-
graphs. This was the study which was to become the model
of the so-called structural-functional analysis in the
manner now regularly ascribed to Durkheim...• The road
Merton was to take was to become the high road of Ameri-
can sociology and the one he was to visit only occasion-
ally was to undergo very great neglect (1972b:231).
Of course, my hope in the present dissertation is to partly
remedy that "very great neglect."
Now, we have repeatedly noted that Merton rarely ques-
tions the moral legitimacy of the dominant values as did Durk-
heim, nor did he explore their specific origins as did Weber.
Both Durkheim and Weber took .up highly critical stances toward
the very values which Merton appears to have taken for granted.
Durkheim's deep concern over anomie and egoisme was not that
they were isolated deviant phenomena, but rather that these
"infinity·of dreams and desires" flowed directly from our cul-
turally sanct.ioned drives for "progress and perfection." They
were, in a real sense, "chronic," the "normal" forms of our
"moral anarchy." Further, who can forget the anguished tones
with which Weber closed his famous essay: "Specialists without
spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that
it has achieved a level of civilization never before achieved."
Surely neither of these founding fathers accepted conformity
to dominant modern values to be as unproblematic as Merton so
often seemed to do. Remember that Durkheim proposed that pover-
ty serves as protection against anomie and suicide. Strangely,
••
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Merton managed to invert the real critical thrust of Durk-
heim's and Weber's most profound paradigms of the modern
world--for what is relatively normal to Merton was anomie to
Durkheim, and an lIiron cage ll to Weber!
Hence, we see that the pathology of anomie for Merton
represents at root a problem of social mechanics and not, as
• with Durkheim and Weber, the pathology of the central value
systems of the modern world. Here we discover the relative
•
•
•
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narrowness of Merton's emerging social psychological frame-
work in contrast to the scope of the progenitors' ideas with
which he worked. For Durkheim and Weber argued from both with-
in a deeply informed historical and comparative sociocultural
analytical framework, and from a moral perspective on human na-
ture. The ultimate force of Durkheim's Suicide and Weber's Pro-
testant Ethic ... theses rest on their perceptions of the des-
tructive impact of modern psycho-socio-cultural demands upon
human nature. Proceeding from these tacit, embedded images of
human nature as anchors, Durkheim argued that man cannot stand
up alone under an lIinfinity of dreams and desires ll (suicide and
ecocide being the result), while Weber argued that attempts by
self -proclaimed "visible saints ll to master world, self, and
society for God's glory and to build His Kingdom on earth binds
all of us irretrievably in an inexorably tightening lIiron cage. II
Surely Durkheim and Weber touched the very hearts and souls of
modern men.
Finally, I suggest that if Merton had explicitly linked
his theses to those of Weber, he might have had to face some
revealing difficulties. If, for instance, our culture is per~
meated by Utilitarian-Pragmatic, and individualist rationales
in the first place, then why do we need the abstracted notion
of sociocultural malintegration and "strain in The Social Sys-
tem ll to explain this situation after the fact? If anomie is a
sign of malintegration or IImora l anarchy, II it is one which is
deeply rooted in our traditional values. For such anomie is
due not simply to the release of the ego from all previous con-
straints, but rather is itself constructed and constantly re-
inforced by our most central values. Further, Merton's view of
••
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anomie innovation--representing the purely individualistic
Pragmatic pursuit of success--can in one sense be seen as a
translation of the Hobbesian problem into the context of Amer-
ican society. But Hobbes' concern was with the breakdown or
absence of restraining norms in the context of the Puritan Re-
bellion and English Civil War, while Merton's anomie context
is the consequence of stable, overwhelmingly strong norms.
Hence, if our situation is ~nomic and Hobbesian, it is because
our values themselves are the ones which lead (perhaps ironi-
cally) to anomie and Hobbesian outcomes. We thus reach again,
from a different point of approach, the troublesome conclusion
that our state of malintegration, of "moral anarchy," is norm-
al.
Indeed, had Merton turned to explore the historical and
continuing moral sanctions of our sociocultural values he might
have run directly counter to Weber's theses. For whereas Mer-
ton assumed a structurally induced pressure toward Utilitarian
or Pragmatic attitudes and behaviors, Weber's theses suggest
the emergence of these very same cultural operating logics from
the secularization of inner-worldly ascetic Protestantism.
Hence, the inescapable conclusion--if the dominant American
values are themselves Pragmatic and counsel individualistic
and insatiable ambition, then, again, in Merton's own frame-
work, this state of malintegration would be normal. Our Cen-
tral Value System is itself anomie! Coming at it from a slight-
ly different angle, since Weber's theses suggest the derivation
of our main cultural sanctions for individual achievement and
drives for success, progress and perfection from the Protest-
ant Ethos, had Merton explicitly admitted Weber's theses into
his schema it would have suggested, ,especially in terms of his
first proposition concerning anomie deviancy, that our dominant
cultural values are themselves the source of anomie and social
pathology! For, in sum, (a) insatiable ambition is counseled
and sanctioned by our values, and (b) our central value system
is a translation and secularization of ascetic Protestantism.
Surely as with Parsons, to acknowledge that our Central Value
System is itself anomie would have been unacceptable.
••
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CRAPTER FOUR
MERTONIAN ANOMIE: EXTENSIONS
Preface. The basic outlines of Merton's famous essay have
entertained the attentions of various theorists in extending
his typology. Marshall Clinard (1964:23) noted major addi-
tions and reformulations of Merton's theory by Parsons, Rob-
ert Dubin, Richard Cloward, and Albert Cohen. We shall ex-
plore the contributions by the first three here, with the ad-
dition of Frank Harary's extension, while leaving Cohen's i-
deas to the next chapter on critiques of Mertonian anomie.
Each of these extensions builds on Merton's basic premises
and typology, and consists largely either of further and more
explicit sub-divisions of categories, or of the addition of
new categories.
A. Parsons' Extension
In the magnum opus of his abstracted social theory, The
Social System (chapter seven, 1951), Talcott Parsons reformu-
lates Merton's schema by incorporating it as "a very import-
ant special case" (1951:258) in a more generalized theory of
deviance and social control. Parsons' usage of Merton's sche-
ma is rather interesting in the history of contempora socio-
logical theory in that Parsons here adopts, so to speak, one
of his own grandchildren. Parsons' anomie rests here, as it
did over a decade before when he originally inspired Merton's
theory, on the notion of the malintegration in the socio-cul-
tural "relational" system. Strain in these "interactive sys-
tems" generates pressures for deviance and change, a theme
Merton himself returned to in his 1957 "Continuities" essay.
Let us first very briefly recall the thrust of Parsons'
original interpretation of the meaning of anomie. Haunted by
the "Hobbesian dilemma," Parsons seized upon Durkheim's ano-
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mie as a social structural and cultural explanation of the
breakdown of social order. However, Parsons deftly shifted
the crucial thrust of Durkheim's anomie from the "infinity
of dreams and desires" to the lack of definiteness of social
expectations and moral obligations, a subtle but tremendous-
ly significant shift in meaning. Parsons thus translated Durk-
heim's profound concern about the infiniteness of expectations
into the lack of definiteness or clarity of expectations,
which leads to malintegration and, ultimately, to disintegra-
tion of The Social System. As Parsons puts it, in his version
"anomie represents a pathology not of the instrumental but of
the collective normative system" (1968a:3l6).
Since Parsons' intention here is to go beyo~d Merton by
generalizing an elaborate functional theory of deviance and
social control, Parsons' account contains much more than the
reformulation of Merton's anomie schema. Parsons is concerned
with major areas such as: psychological needs and dispositions,
social expectations, social interaction, strains in interaction,
motivations, ambivalency, frustration, anxiety, etc. as res-
ponses to strain; expressions or types of deviance, variance
in clarity and definiteness of norms and sanctions, pragmatic
situational factors in the genesis of deviance, role conflicts
and the social patterning of deviant behavior, problems of
claims to legitimacy, opportunity structures, mechanisms of
social con~rol, structured strains and social change, etc.
However, here we shall be concerned mainly with his reformu-
lated typology of modes of. deviant orientation.
Parsons, like Merton, begins by assuming the most cri-
tical factor--namely, conformity and normative consensus. Par-
sons then sets out to consider the "other side of the coin,
the processes by which resistances to conformity with social
expectations develop" (1951:249). In general terms, Parsons
takes conformity to be relatively unproblematic, and roughly
synonyrno~with social integration, and deviance as synonymous
with disturbances or "strains" in the social interactional e-
quilibrium. Parsons accords the image of 'strain" a key role
in the genesis of deviance for he views these disruptive
••
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"strains" as resulting from ambiguities, conflicts, or break-
downs in social expectations. Hence, "strains" are disturban-
ces, or forms of localized "social friction" disrupting the
"normal flow" of social interaction. As Smelser remarks:
The concept of strain is not identical with the concept
of deviance; it constitutes one of the main responses
giving rise to deviant responses .••• As the phrase "from
whatever source" indicates, Parsons is not initially con-
cerned with the origin or disequilibrium or strain ••..
The main idea is that strain on the system of interaction
frustrates expectations (1971:27).
However, as Smelser, a former student and colleague of
Parsons, indica~es, even this absolutely crucial concept of
Parsons is not without its own ambiguity.
Strain is not a single variable but a system of varia-
bles--conditions that give rise to strain, strain it-
self, and mechanisms to reduce strain. Furthermore,
strain gives rise to a number of responses, only one
of which is deviant behavior •••• Further refinement of
the model would require a systematic classification of
the types of sources of strain, the means of reducing
strain, and the alternate responses to strain and an in-
dication of the conditions under which strain would give
rise to deviance and not another kind of response (1971:
28) •
A tall order indeed! Although Smelser suggests the minimum re-
quirements for specifying systematically the meanings and types
of strains, he perhaps misses the key point that Parsons' no-
tion of strain may never be fully specified, since it, like al-
most all key concepts, rests on a metaphor, here a mechanical
metaphor, whose very fruitfulness for extension from the natur-
al to the social sciences depends on its latent ambiguity. If
we were able to restrict this connotation to a precise and de-
limited denotation, Parsons' effort might prove impossible.
Noting that deviance may be defined in two ways by refer-
ring either to the individual or the patterns of social inter-
action, Parsons begins his typology by starting with the poss-
ible directions of deviant motivation itself. As Clinard has
usefully summarized this position: "Parsons attempts to char-
acterize types of motivational responses in terms of active
and passive orientations, alienative or conformative need dis-
positions within the motivational structure, and the relation
••
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of the person to social objects and to normative patterns"
(1964~24). Parsons' typology rests on a series of dichoto-
mous polarities: active/passive, positive (conformity)/nega-
tive (alienative) action, persons/norms, dominative/submiss-
ive. Thus, out of such polar orientations Parsons constructs
a complex table containing e.ight major "directions of deviant
behavior" (see figure 9).
Figure 9: AUI1VITY PASSIVITY
•
•
•
Parsons' Table of
Deviant Behavior
O>nformalivc
Dominance
Alienative
Dominance
Compulsive Performance
. Compulsive Acquiescence
Orienlalion
focus on focus on focus on Focus onSocial Nonns Social NormsObjects Objects
Compulsive Perfcclionistic·
Submission ObservanceDominance Enforce- (MerIon's
ment rilualism)
. Rebelliousness Withdrawal
Aggressive- Compulsive
ness toward' lncorrigi· Independ· EvasionSocialOb- bility
jccts ence
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While Parsons' typology and his. theory of deviant be-.
. .
ha~or are extraordinarily complex, a number of preliminary
conclusions relative to our present concerns may be sketched.
First, whoever wishes to construct a systematic theory of de-
viance and social control should at least attempt to decipher
Parsons' elaborate scheme since it represents one of the most
complete analytical statements on deviance from the functional
school. Whatever its limitations, these derive largely from
the more general analytical framework, and not the specific
analysis alone. Second, Parsons' claim that his reformulation
is congruent with Merton's more famous typology is contestable.
As Smelser observes:
The cases of "equilibrated condition" and "conformity,"
"compulsive acquiescence" and "ritualism," and "with-
drawal"and "retreatism" appear to be reldtivelv .straight-
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forward instances of logical parallelism, and justify
Parsons' claim. The cases of "compulsive performance"
and II innovation II as well as IIrebelliousness ll and II re -
bellion ll are more questionable (1971:32).
Coining new labels for old realities, one wonders why Parsons
would advance this claim. Perhaps the 1I1a tent function ll of
Parsons' claim is to share in some of the reflected glory of
Merton's famous schema, for as we have discovered, although
Parsons may have originally inspired Merton's anomie, his own
interpretation remained more obscure.
Further, despite its apparent comprehensiveness, Parsons'
theory of deviance and social control is both logically and em-
pirically incomplete. Such incompleteness should be viewed not
as merely a localized flaw but rather as a generic problem in
Parsons' mode of theorizing. In this regard, Smelser remarks
that Parsons' analyses cannot directly be derived from his ba-
sic propositions, and instead rests on a whole series of tacit
judgments; a major failing in one who claims the mantle of sys-
tematic theory.
Why was only one of several possible nonderived psycho-
logical reactions to strain on the interaction system
chosen as a primary dimension for the classification of
directions of deviance? .• Parsons' derivations leave
unanswered the question as to why these two types of in-
dividual reactions to institutionalized role expectations,
rather than others, were chosen as the basic for the theo-
retical classifications of deviant tendencies (Smel;er,
1971:33).
In addition, Smelser rightly characterizes Parsons' implied
Illogical ordering as very loose ll and permeated by II ••• a kind
of openness or indeterminacy with respect to specific outcomes ll
(1971:33). Also, Smelser catches the type of analysis with
which Parsons is centrally concerned, its virtues and failings,
in the following way:
••• The type of propositions emerging from Parsons' ana-
lysis is that of a general class of independent variables
(eg. several types of strain) and causally linked to a
general class of dependent variables (eg. several types
deviance). Because of this looseness of theoretical
structure, it is not possible to relate a specific type
of strain (eg. role conflict) to a specific deviant ten-
dency (eg. compulsive conformity) (1971:33).
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If, after reading this insightful critique by one of
Parsons own circle, we ask ourselves: what then are the vir-
tues of such analysis? Its supposed virtues might include:
(a) a clear conception of generic elements, yet these cannot
be adequately determined in a wholly deductive fashion; (b)
its level of analysis which we have discovered has more to
do with the abstracted claim'of universality than with com-
plexity of subject; (c) its formal and systematic character
which yet seems both logically and empirically incomplete.
Is it too much, then, to surmise that the claimed virtues of
this mode of analysis also conceal its vices?
Finally, we are led to wonder once again about anomie
as a protean concept here yielding yet another different set
of typologies. While some might view this situation as illus-
trating the cumulativeness of social scientific knowledge, I
merely ask: are all these variant typologies really derived
from Durkheim's? Are they really compatible with one another?
Are they empirically grounded? Or significant? Or even neces-
sary? What ever happened to anomie?
B. Robert Dubin's Typology
Apparently, Robert Dubin experienced something like an
explosion of interest in abstracted, formal theory in the late
1950's vis-a-vis Parsons and Merton. For in 1959 Dubin publish-
ed an extensive reformulation of Merton's typology of deviance
in his essay "Deviant Behavior and Social Structure: Continui-
ties in Social Theory," and in 1960 he published an extensive
analy~ical critique and reformulation of Parsons' paradigm of
social action in his article "Parsons' Actor: Continuities in
Social Theory." Dubin's twin forays into "Continuities in So-
cial Theory'seemed a challenge to these two leaders of Ameri-
can sociological theory, and, in a singular privilege accord-
ed few peers, both Parsons and Merton apparently felt constrain-
ed to respond to Dubin's challenge. This interchange brought
forth Parsons' important "Pattern Variables Revisited: A Res-
ponse.to Robert Dubin," and a response from Merton which we
shall briefly examine here.
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Dubin's sympathetic, yet ambivalent, analysis is signi-
ficant for our present purposes in a number of ways: while
formally laudatory, it also offers a number of telling criti-
cisms; while accepting much of Merton's basic theme, it is
much more circumspect and precise; and while on one level, Du-
bin's extension of Merton's typology is a compliment, on ano-
ther level it unwittingly serves to reveal the absurdity of
empty, a priori typologizing. The beginning and conclusion
of Dubin's paper are most interesting. Dubins begins by pro-
posing that "A complete theoretical model must specify the
[empirical] outcomes." In his conclusion, Dubin reiterates
this initial thesis, and then explicitly states that both his
and Merton's typologies represent " •.• only part theories de-
scribing predictable states; they are not ~ theory of deviant
behavior" (1959:162). Dubin is generally more careful than Mer-
ton to indicate the specific nature and limitations of his
theory; he repeatedly (and correctly) emphasizes that his and
Merton's contributions lie merely with the more or less soph-
isticated elaboration of a descriptive typology of deviant
possibilities .
•.• our effort is to explore the range of outcomes of
behavior called deviant, not to propound a theory of
deviance •••. This is not a theory of how deviant beha-
vior occurs, nor why it occurs. It is simply a descrip-
tive typology of the range of mutually exclusive types
of non-conforming behavior ••.. These typologies are only
part theo~ies. Theoretical models of deviant behavior
which explain why and how such behavior occurs remain
to be constructed (1959:162,163,164).
Dubin's programmatic theses here are important because they
corroborate my interpretation of the internal validity and
potency of Merton's famous schema. In my judgment, Dubin is
certainly correct in delimiting the thrust of these typologi-
cal efforts as basically descriptive and not explanatory; it
brings to mind Homan's charge that Parsons' work is more taxo-
nomic than propositional. Such a conclusion runs directly coun-
ter to Merton's claim to have put forward a major theory which
explains deviance.
Dubin also pointed out that Merton's schema did not spe-
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cify any laws of interaction, hence ignoring the crucial so-
cial' interactional processes between people and statuses.
Finally, Dubin also rightly characterizes Merton's theory
as basically pitched at the social psychological level, not
at the social structural level which it initially proclaims.
Now, the main body of Dubin's article is caught up in
elaborating an extension of Merton's typology. Building on
Merton's major categories, Dubin also distinguishes bet~een
institutional norms and means, and between actual behavior
and orientation to values. By repeatedly subdividing the new
'and old categories, Dubin finally arrives at a list of four-
teen main types of deviant adaptations, although he notes that
there actually may exist twenty-seven possible modes of adap-
tation (see figure 10).
•
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Figure 10:
Dubin's Typology of
Deviant Adaptations
Mode of Allathment t<>-
Type of Deviant Cultural Irntitution"aJ
Adaptation GoalJ Nonns Means
nehavioral Innovation
In~titlltionat Invention + ±" ±
Normative Invention + ± +
Operalin,:: Invention + + ±
Value InllOvation
Intellectual Invention ± + +
"OrJ:anhation Invention ~ ~ +
Social Movement ± + ±
lIr.haviornl Ritualism
Levellinl-; of Aspirations + +
Institutional Moralist +
Ors;anir.ation Automaton +
Value Ritualism
DemagoJ;ue +
Normative Opportunist + +
Means Opportunist + +
Retreatism
Rebellion" ± ± ±
+=acceplance
-=rejection
'±=rejectlon and substitution (active rejection)
•
•
•
Dubin's extension and reformulation are valuable in
that they introduce greater consistency, rigor, and clarity
into Merton's schema. Yet, what started out to be a valuable
addi tion to Merton ',s theory ends up unwittingly in self-paro-
dy. What can we do with such an overwrought monster of a typo-
logical system such as this? .If Merton's general schema was
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demonstrably incomplete, at least its simplistic clarity al-
lowed us to grasp it and attempt to apply it. But Dubin's ty-
pology overwhelms us with a vacuous series of permutations.
Paradoxically, instead of a clear and definite step forward,
Dubin's typology signifies the reductio ad absurdum of form-
alistic, empty, abstracted theorizing. Such hair-splitting
can be elaborated ad infinitum et nauseam.
One should always know when to stop, but apparently Du-
bin's challenge to typological jousting got the better of Mer-
ton, and he responded. I now merely direct the reader's atten-
tion to the tone of Merton's response (1959), and ask that it
be compared with Parsons' response to Dubin's other challenge.
While Dubin's analytical critique stimulated Parsons to an im-
portant revision of one of his doctrines, by contrast Merton's
response gives one a feeling of intellectual pique. No import-
ant revision of his theory was forthcoming~ we should not miss
the irony in this, for it was Merton who always held for the
cumulativeness and codification of theory, and here it was
Parsons and Dubin who advanced in fraternal argument while
Merton and Dubin merely quarrelled. While at one point he
favorably comments on Dubin's contribution, Merton seemingly
takes affront at Dubin's intrusion into what had previously
been Merton's own private domain.
C. Richard Cloward's Contribution
Richard Cloward, one of Merton's own students, is cred-
ited by Merton with initiating a new phase in the theory of
anomie and opportunity structures. To Merton's schema, Cloward
adds the hitherto unspecified, yet strategic, variable of "dif-
ferentials in availability of illegitimate means." In his well
known article "Illegitimate Means, Anomie, and Deviant Beha-
vior" (1959), appearing in the same journal issue as Dubin's
reformulation and Merton's response, Cloward explicitly pro-
poses his new "variable" as the key link between divergent
theoretical interpretations of deviance. Cloward set out to
"consolidate the two major sociological traditions of thought
••
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about the problem of deviant behavior"--namely, the anomie
stream and the "differential association" and "cultural trans-
mission" tradition exemplified by Sutherland. In these terms,
Cloward proposes his "strategic new variable" as constituting
Phase III of the "anomie tradition."
Cloward questions Merton's tacit assumption that ..... il-
legitimate means are freely available," and observes:
•.. the notion that innovating behavior may result
from unfulfilled aspirations and imperfect socializa-
tion with respect to conventional norms implies that
illegitimate means are freely available, as if the in-
dividual, having decided that "you can't make it legi-
timately," then simply turns to illegitimate means which
are readily at hand whatever his position in the social
structure (1959:167).
Cloward then correctly notes that since Merton's anomie theory
already explicitly recognizes the differential distribution of
legitimate means of achievement, it should also now recognize,
by simple extension, differentials in access to illegitimate
means. (Merton's original "blind spot" is instructive).
By adding this strategically important, but overlooked
variable, Cloward both modulates some of the simplistic ration-
alism and gaps of Merton's original formulation, and begins to
tie in with the more empirically grounded theories of Suther-
land and his school. In this regard, Cloward observes that
Merton's theses about "strains in the sociocultural system"
are inadequate explanations of the actual genesis of deviant
processes, ie. " ... motivations or pressures toward devian-
ce do not fully account for deviant behavior." Instead', Clow-
ard proposes as intervening variables both "learning struct-
ures" and "opportunity structures" which provide the link with
Sutherland's "differential association" tradition.
Further, Cloward's account is valuable in that it begins
to specify more fully the "circumstances under which various
modes of deviant behavior arise." For example, in terms of
"retreatism," Cloward differs from Merton in that he views
this deviant adaptation as a "double failure." Cloward notes
that in Merton's view a "crucial element encouraging retreat-
ism is internalized constraint concerning the use of illegiti-
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mate means. But this element need not be present" (1959:175).
Merton apparently assumed that such prohibitions were e~sen­
tial, since in their absence, the logic of his schema would
compel him to predict that innovating behavior would result.
But the assumption that the individual uninhibited in the
use of illegitimate means becomes an innovator presupposes
that successful innovation is only a matter of rational moti-
vation, frustrated by the initial lack of proper outlets.
Once the concept of differentials in access to illegit-
imate means is introduced, however, it becomes clear
that retreatism is possible even in the absence of in-
ternalized prohibitions •••• retreatist adaptations may
arise ••. among those who are failures in both worlds,
conventional and illegitimate alike (1959:175).
Now, Merton responded most favorably to his student
Cloward's extension of the theory of anomie and opportunity
structures, and its linkage with the other major school on
interpreting deviancy at that time. In a short series of cru-
cial admissions, Merton accepts Cloward's reformulation of
the "social distribution of pressures for deviant behavior."
As Cloward now shows, this assumes by default that ac-
cess to deviant or illegitimate means for reaching a
valued goal is uniformly available. He corrects this
unwitting and, it appears, untrue assumption by dealing
with socially patterned differences of access in learn-
ing how to perform particular kinds of deviant roles
and of access to opportunity for carrying them out ••.•
Pressures for deviant behavior are construed as a func-
tion of access to both legitimate and illegitimate op-
portunity structures (1959:188).
Second, Merton accepts Cloward's point in terms of the "so-
cial distribution of vulnerability to pressures for deviant
behavior." Merton admits that even his later suggestions about
variance in socialization say little about the conditions pre-
disposing individual toward one or another mode of adaptation.
Pressures for deviant behavior are one thing; actual
rates of deviant behavior, quite another. I made a
slight and insufficient effort to distinguish the two
and to bridge the gap by distinguishing socially gen-
erated pressures for deviance from vulnerability to
these processes. Socially patterned differences in the
content and processes of socialization were said to af-
fect vulnerability to pressure for one or another type
of deviant behavior •••• But, as Cloward shows, this-rs-
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at best no more than a bare beginning. It is necessary
to identify other sociological variables that intervene
between structurally induced pressure for deviant beha-
vior and actual rates of such behavior (1959:188).
Finally, Merton accepts Cloward's refocus on the problem of
the sequence and process of taking up one deviant role or ano-
ther.
Toward the close of his paper, Cloward begins to devel-
op an idea that is practically unnoticed in my own work,
is implicit in Dubin's paper, and is greatly advanced in
forthcoming articles by Cloward and Lloyd Ohlin. This is
the concept of patterned sequences of deviant roles, and
of the conditions of social structure making for one or
another sequence •••• I did not see the problem that Clow-
ard brings into focus: that it should be" possible to
work out the conditions making for patterned sequences
of deviant behavior •••• Cloward moves beyond [my] occa-
sional remarks, poses the problem of deviant adaptations,
and suggests processes making for one or another sequence.
His observations on "double failure"--in both legitimate
and illegitimate endeavors--as a prelude to retreatism
afford one example (1959:189).
, h h ' "·admiss_ions d h' ubI' ub'Even W1t t ese grac10usiby Merton an 1S p 1C S S1-
dy of Cloward's reformulation, this new phase of anomie theory
has not been without criticism. As Clinard notes, Cloward and
Ohlin's theory (up to 1964) has been criticized for being:
(1) largely culture-bound, and restricted to the ethnic
and minority situation existing in large urban areas
in the U.s. today;
(2) not stating clearly the success goal aspirations of
slum boys, except the economic and educational goals;
(3) assuming that such goals are appreciated in all seg-
ments of society;
(4) barely recognizing the extensive violations of ethi-
cal and legal norms in the general adult society a-
mong all classes (Clinard, 1964:30).
Finally, Short et al (1965) have observed that their data
--
on gangs in Chicago, to which the Merton-Cloward-Ohlin theory
should apply, does not support some of these theories. They
conclude: "The logic of the theory clearly presumes that per-
ceptions of opportunities precede involvement in delinquency,
while our data reflect perceptions 'after the fact'" (1965:66).
But perhaps just as important is their opening observation.
They note that the way in which this new theory of delinquency
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and opportunity structures has been so uncritically and wide-
ly embraced as to almost constitute a reigning ideology in
the field of juvenile delinquency during the 1960's.
Not since the advent of psychoanalysis has a theory had
such impact in institutionalized deliquency control as
the theory, explicit or implied, in Delinquency and QE-
portunity. Given the impetus of major foundation and
federal support, the theory has been extensively adop-
ted as a rationale for action programs in many areas of
the country •. There is some danger that, like psychoana-
lysis, "opportunity structure theory" may be rationali-
zed and elaborated and extensively as to discourage, if
not render impossible, empirical testing, pragmatic val-
idation, or demonstration of worth by any other criter-
ion of "good theory" (1965: 56) •
In sum, we see the public subsidy and ideological role of Mer-
ton's anomie schema given extended life,·a second wind, in the
work of his students.
D. Frank Harary's Contribution
Consider the unique and unsung contribution of Frank
Harary (1966). Proceeding from Merton's original schema, then
touching base next on Dubin's explosion of types, and finally
Parsons' mode of analysis and typology, Harary manages to make
a distinct contribution to these mushrooming typologies which
seems, at the same time, a superb satire. Harary's paper is a
rare phenomenon in scholarly writing: a paper which is at once
short but concise and sufficient, and while making a serious
contribution, it yet inverts itself in quiet satire.
Harary's only slightly-tongue-in-cheek article observes
that Merton's usage of notation in his schema is ambiguous.
Harary then proposes that adequate use of notation here should
indicate valences in the attitudes of the individual--namely,
indifference, rejection, interest, and so forth. By introdu-
cing "0" as a symbol for indifference, Harary expands Merton's
original five element schema into nine separate categories,
which if one accepts the simple logic of positive, negative,
and neutral attitudes, seems to constitute the minimum accep-
table typology in the Mertonian vein. Finally, Harary adds two
more possible attitudes--ambivalence and rejection with replace-
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ment; thus generating twenty-five theoretically possible per-
mutations of attitudes toward goals and means. This inventory
contains such descriptive terms as: "Vegetation, Ritualism,
Retreatism, Confusion, Beatnikism, Indolence, Wishism, Innova-
tion, Fetishism, Mobility, Preacherism, Developmentism, Demag-
oguery, Democracy, and Rebellion"!
Can it still be maintained that Merton's classic typolo-
gy and its more logically consistent expressions represent an
extremely useful way of correlating many otherwise unrelated
concepts? At the beginning of his paper, Harary quotes Morton
Hunt, the New Yorker profiler of Merton, on the initial impact
on sociologists of Merton's elegant and seemingly all-inclusive
schema.
Chilly and unprepossessing though the chart may look,
it was truly a thing of beauty to Merton and many other
sociologists, bringing into one readily comprehensible
taxonomy such seemingly unrelated deviant personalities
as Cubists and alcoholics, lone-wolf ineventors and re-
ligious martyrs, executives and beggars, card-carrying
communists and members of the Society of Cincinnati
(1961: 58-9) .
Of course, if Merton's little schema really possesses such won-
derful, semi-magical powers, one need not stop here. For any
sociologist with the least spark of imagination could conceive
of even more possibilities! Just think, for example, how won-
derful it might be to pull together Merton's typology, with
all its various extensions and revisions by luminaries such as
Parsons, Dubin, Cloward, Harary, among others, and with each
thinker adding his own unique contribution, into one grand theo-
retical typology encompassing every possible permutation of at-
titude and behavior! If one stirs into the pot the almost whol-
ly neglected element of a time or historical dimension, then
the possibilities grow absolutely staggering. But perhaps some
lowly soul might rudely pierce our day dream with the coarse
aphorism of computer programmers: "Garbage in, garbage out"l
Such a mind-boggling exercise is absurd in almost everyone's
eyes, except those who engage in them, for such intellectual
activities may be rightly regarded as themselves deviations
from a simple modicum of common sense. At which point the end-
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less and une1ightening elaboration of logically conceivable
permutations becomes absurd cannot be decided here, yet we
may echo Ockham's rule here: stick close to experience first,
and never multiply typologies needlessly!
Harary's successful attempt to bring some all-too-rare
comic relief to this typological logorrhea serves as one in-
structive end to a stream of thought. Finely wrought refuta-
tions such as that by Cary-Lundberg (1959) are another. Sa-
tire, critique, and proportionless exhaustion mark the col-
lapse of intellectual traditions.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CRITIQUES OF MERTON'S THEORY OF ANOMIE
Preface. In his response to Dubin and Cloward's papers in
the same issue, Merton (1959) attempted to distinguish be-
tween amendments, revisions, and criticisms that simply ex-
tend "incomplete theories" from evidence and critiques that
demonstrate a theory fundamentally mistaken. Counting his
own theory of anomie in the former rather than latter cate-
gory, Merton also indicates his own attitude toward his own
theory and the development of theory. Finally, Merton gracious-
ly assents to what, as an elder statesman of contemporary Amer-
ican sociological theory, Durkheim once poetically called the.
"slow usury of time." Merton's statement here is noteworthy
both for its propositions as well as his characteristic co-
gence.
They [papers by Dubin and Cloward) exemplify one way in
which a theory develops through successive approxima-
tions. A set of ideas serves, for a time, as a more or
less useful guide for an investigation of an array of
problems. As inquiry proceeds along these lines, it un-
covers a gap in the theory: the set of ideas is found
to be not discriminating enough to deal with aspects of
phenomena to which it should in principle apply. In some
cases, it is proposed to fill the gap by further differ-
entiation of concepts and propositions that are consis-
tent with the earlier theory, which is regarded as de-
monstrably incomplete rather than fundamentally mista-
ken. In other cases, the new conceptions put in question
some of the assumptions underlying the earlier theory
which is then replaced rather than revised. The papers
by Dubin and Cloward are evidently of the first type,
providing basic extensions, rather than a replacement,
of the sociological ideas under review. Not the least
merit of contributions such as theirs is that they keep
us from behaving like sociological barnacles, clinging
desperately to the theories we have learned in our youth,
or that we may have helped develop at any age (1959:177).
Now, we may ask: after reviewing existing extensions,
and detailed criticism, can Merton's theory be justifiably as-
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signed to the first category as Merton himself claims, or
will these compounding series of revisions and criticisms
corne to reveal his theory of anomie as fundamentally mista-
ken? And, how many times may a theorist amend and revise his
theory before it loses its distinctive and originally signi-
ficant configuration? Finally, at what point are we forced
to relegate one of the paradigmatic theories of contemporary
sociology from category one to category two?
A. Specific Criticisms
By their very nature, a number of the extensions of Mer-
ton's theory and typology conveyed specific criticisms of am-
biguities, gaps, or other more or less serious limitations in
Merton's theory. Dubin's, Cloward's, and Harary's contribu-
tions of this type, and it must be remembered that each basi-
cally accepted the validity of Merton's essential framework
and intentions. Parsons' claim, for instance, that Merton's
theory was really only a "very important special case" of his
own more general theory of deviance and social control carried
no explicit criticism, only a rather severe restriction of the
potential scope of Merton's paradigm. While it is known that
Merton himself intended his schema to explain more than juve-
nile delinquency, Parsons' claim, as befits the relations be-
tween these two theorists, has apparently never been contest-
ed in print by Merton (eg. 1959:177, #1). Hence, we are left
to 'conclude that, either by default or tacit concurral, Merton
acceded to Parsons' claim.
Some of Dubin's criticisms of Merton's schema are tanta-
mount in a different way to Parsons' more imperial claims. Du-
bin argued that Merton's theory and typologies (and his
own) were largely descriptive, not explanatory. They were only
part-theories, which did riot specify empirical outcomes. In
addition, Dubin observes that Merton's theory does not specify
any laws or principles of social interaction processes, espe-
cially over time. Of course, these preliminary critiques are
damaging to Merton's central thesis which purports to offer
an explanation of the social structural pressures for non-con-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1144--
forming behaviors.
But perhaps the most significant criticism, for our pre-
sent purposes, proffered by Dubin concerns the real level at
which Merton pitched his analysis. While purporting to provide
a social structural explanation of the causes of deviance, Mer-
ton's descriptive typology is actually focussed on the social
psychological level of the motivations of separate individuals.
Merton, in fact, pitches his discussion at two levels.
He presents a typology of deviant behavior using an im-
plicit set of social psychological laws. He also consi-
ders a variety of instances in which imperatives are
created the consequences of which are deviant behavior.
The latter sociological analysis, although brilliantly
set forth, remains wholly descriptive. When Merton com-
bines the two levels of analysis, the linkage becomes a
social psychological one. For the mechanisms by which
persons or groups, subject to structural imperatives,
make decisions in favor of deviant courses of conduct
are social psychological. This is the only legitimate
interpretation of the plusses and minuses in Merton's
tables and my own (1959:162).
Dubin's criticisms of Merton echo my criticism of Parsons,
and we shall encounter a similar criticism of Merton from Al-
bert Cohen.
While Cloward's contribution, which Merton hailed as sig-
nalling a new era in anomie research, constitutes merely an ad-
dition of a key "strategic variable" ignored or tacitly assum-
ed by Merton, and Harary's witty and refreshing satire initial-
ly pointed out ambiguities involved even in Merton's use of no-
tation, Ephraim Mizruchi offered no major or minor revision of
Merton's typology, yet his specific criticism drives to the
heart of some of Merton's implicit basic assumptions. Mizruchi
notes that in the key factor of individual aspiration, Durk-
heim's anomie and Merton's anomie sharply diverge (see also
A. Thio, 1975). Merton apparently assumes that universalistic
achievement values are universally adhered to and aspired to
by all classes, while Durkheim considered poverty as protection
against suicide because it restrained the insatiable "disease
of the infinite" which was the endemic dis-ease of the middle
and professional classes •
••• the emphasis in his [Durkheim's] theory of anomie
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was on the unrealizable goals which characterize per-
iods of prosperity and upward mobility. The greatest
effect of anomie was experienced not by those in pover-
ty but by the more affluent in society. According to
Durkheim poverty is a restraining force in relation to
anomie. It is the lifting of limitations on aspiration
which reflects Durkheim's major concern with anomie ra-
ther than the utililization of illegitimate means for
the attainment of given ends •••• The Merton theory, at
least in part since its focus is on means rather than
ends, assumes relatively uniform aspirations across the
class structure and a greater impact of anomie on the
relatively lower classes. This theory, however, largely
ignores observations made not only by Durkheim but by
Veblen and Marx, among others, regarding the relatively
low levels of aspiration which characterizes those at
the lowest levels of the class structure, and it ignores
certain qualitative differences within and between the
classes (1967 :440).
Alex Thio (1975) also seriously questions Merton's idea that
lower-class persons are more likely than upper-class persons
to suffer from an aspiration-opportunity disjunction, and are
therefore subject to greater pressure toward deviation. In-
stead, following Durkheim, Thio suggests that the higher clas-
ses are more prone to this anomicdisjunction. "Merton's theo-
ry is seriously flawed by its over-simplification of the rela-
tionship between social class, on the one hand, and aspiration
opportunity disjunction and deviant behavior on the other"
(1975: 153) .
Although Mizruchi's conclusion is cautiously understated,
the thrust of his intention is clear. He requests a thorough
revision of our estimates of the various forms of anomie theo-
ry, as this dissertation attempts.
our analysis clearly suggests that:
(a) more clarity regarding the differences between Mer-
ton's and Durkheim's concepts of anomie would be de-
sirable;
(b) our conception of lower-class social processes may
well require overhauling, and
(c) although Merton's tneory does, at given points in the
social structure, provide insight and understanding of
these processes, contemporary sociology needs a con-
tinued assessment of the theory's strengths and weak-
nesses in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:
446) •
Mizruchi's points are well-taken. It is surprising that few
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~ve perceived the need for such a complete reevaluation. Ap-
parently, the lingering prestige of Merton and his classic
theory retarded such a searching inquiry.
Finally, Mizruchi's last paragraph is worth quoting in
this regard because it tacitly testifies to these prob1ematics
of the almost unquestioned prestige of Merton's theory of ano-
mie.
Must we assume that only one theory is necessary to ex-
plain a given set of phenomena, for example, deviant be-
havior? Can a field afford several theories which may be
utilized in attempting to understand diverse aspects of
the same general phenomena? It is our position that so-
ciology can and should direct itself to developing para-
llel theories in given content areas rather than mono-
rrtnic ones. Thus, the immediate theoretical problem is
not simply a matter of middle range as against highly
generalized theories ••.. The current state of sociology
can well tolerate both Merton's and Durkheim's theories
of anomie so long as we maintain a proper perspective in
relation to each (1967:446).
Mizruchi's observations suggest some of the problems faced by
theories, at least until the 1970's (see S. Cole, 1975), compe-
ting with anomie theory which, if not "monolithic" in content
and empirical validation, seemed through the 1950's and 1960's
to be almost monolithic in its unquestioned acceptance and re-
putation. As with Parsons' self-serving and misleading recon-
struction of Durkheim, which has unfo~tunate1y constituted al-
most a reigning orthodoxy for years in Durkheim interpretation,
Merton's theories of anomie seem to have sometimes been grant-
ed the almost magical quality of possessing numerous lives and
resistance to attack or contradiction. Short et a1 (1965) fear-
--
ed the same uncritical embrace of Cloward and Ohlin. And this
unhealthy situation raises another question (which we cannot
take time to answer here): how is it possible for certain theo-
ries and theorists to attain such enormous prestige that their
ideas, detached from their point of origin and freed of the
lowly need for empirical validation, come to constitute images
or symbols almost exempt from scientific review?
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B. Albert Cohen'~ General Critique
More damaging than the criticism of either Dubin or Miz-
ruchi is the general critique of Merton's theory of anomie by
Albert Cohen. Cohen's observations in 1965 cut to the very
heart of Merton's perspective, and Merton himself felt obliged
to respond. Cohen's critique takes on additional significance
in that he represents a link between the two main traditions
of deviancy theory (up through the 1960's)--name1y, the milieu
and differential association school (with roots at Chicago and
Indiana) and the Harvard-Columbia structural-functional school.
Whereas Cloward attempted to ~rgue for a partial theoretical
convergence between the two, much of Cohen's work in this area
represents an actual working link.
Cohen's paper is worth examing in some detail. Although
initially friendly and laudatory, Cohen launches immediately
into some telling criticisms. Clearly, he is ambivalent toward
Mertonian anomie, perhaps because of his strategic position as
a meditator between these two different theoretical schools.
Cohen's first substantive observations begins with a footnote
expressing his intentions in his article and containing import-
ant insights into the relative lack of development of anomie
theory.
I am not here concerned with empirical applications and
tests of anomie theory .... In view of the sustained in-
terest in anomie theory, its enozmous influence, and
its numerous applications, it is worth noting and wonder-
ing about the relatively slow and fitful growth of the
substantive theory itself (1965:5).
Cohen then begins blazing away with a charge that rocks the
foundations of Merton's famous theory. Cohen charges that there
is a hiatus, a divergence, between Merton's levels of analysis.
On the formal and explicit level, his theory is seen as the
very prototype of sociological (ie. social structural) theori-
zing, while Merton's actual descriptions and typology are
pitched at the micro, social psychological interactional and
motivational level. Cohen also charges that Merton's formula-
tion really contains atomistic and individualistic biases.
Merton's theory has the reputation of being the preemi-
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ment sociological theory of deviant behavior .... The
theory is radically sociological. And, yet, as far as
the level and explicit structure of Merton's first form-
ulation is concerned, it is, in certain respects, atom-
istic and individualistic. Within the framework of goals,
norms, and opportunities, the process of deviance was
conceptualized as though each individual ••. were in a
box by himself. He has internalized goals and norms,
regulatory rules; he assesses the opportunity structure;
he experiences strain; and he selects one or another mode
of adaptation. The bearing of other's experience--their
strains, their conformity and deviance, their success and
their fai1ure--on ego's strain and consequent adaptations
is comparatively neglected •••• In the original version of
his theory, each person seems to work out his solution by
himself, as though it did not matter what other people
were doing {1965:5,6,7).
Actually, in addition to Cohen's charge that Merton's theory
is atomistic and individualistic, there lies concealed in Co-
hen's critique another insight into Merton's hidden presuppo-
sitions. These series of charges are that in Merton's schema
the isolated individual acts rationally and pragmatically, as
if he were a scientist armed with reliable knowledge and cool-
ly surveying his options in an attempt to optimize returns o-
ver constraints, in response to his predicament. The allusions
here are intentional, for indeed, such tacit premises do echo
the "economic man" of classical Utilitarian economic theory.
As an illustration of his contentions, Cohen critically
examines Merton's key concept of strain (see also Smelser,
1971). Although he does not see "strain" as a metaphor, Cohen
cuts to the core of the inadequacy of the Parsonian-Mertonian
image of strain. In contrast to the mechanical metaphors of
equilibrium and strain, Cohen correctly observes that the so-
cial perceptions of individuals engaging in deviant behavior,
especially in terms of relative deprivation, should be key
elements in any theory of social strain.
One thing that is clear is that the level of goal attain-
ment that will seem just and reasonable to concrete act-
ors, and therefore the sufficiency of available means,
will be relative to the attainments of others who serve
as reference objects. Level of aspiration is not a fixed
quantum, taken from the culture and swallowed whole, to
lodge, unchanged, within our psyches. The sense of pro-
portionality between effort and reward is not determined
by the objective returns of effort alone (1965:6).
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In addition to his criticism of the absence in Merton's
schema of reference to the social phenomenology of perceptions
and moral processes, Cohen also observes that Merton's theory
is permeated with a certain discontinuity.:
To say that anomie theory suffers from the assumption
of discontinuity is to imply that it treats the deviant
act as though it were an abrupt change of state, a leap
from a state of strain or anomie to a state of deviance
•••. The dominant bias in American sociology has been to-
ward forrnulatingtheory in terms of variables that de-
scribe initial states, on the one hand, rather than in
terms of processes whereby acts and complex structures.
of action are built, elaborated, and transformed (1965:
8-9) .
And, finally, if we supplement these characteristics with the
abstracted, deductive, formalistic quality of Merton's theori-
zing, we can recognize the essential congruence of this theo-
retical perspective with other expressions of the Anglo Cul-
tural Tradition (see BookThre~, especially classical Utili-
tarian economic theory (see for example, Merton1934a, in Nis-
bet, 1965: 111). Atomism, mechanism, Pragmatism or Utilitar-
ianism, and deductive formalism are all intimately related
root logics underlying diverse expressions of this cultural
tradition, whether it be sociological or economic theory,
psychology, medical or legal theory, biology or physical theo-
ry, and so on. If Merton's theory is so evidently empirically
and theoretically inadequate, it stems as much from the mis-
taken perspective t~ken over from this cultural tradition as
from the complexities of deviant processes themselves.
Cohen's insistence on the importance of phenomenologi-
cal processes in social interaction, in contrast to Merton's
tacit atomistic image of "every individual in a box by him-
self," is significant for our present purposes. If one consi-
ders, for instance, what is involved in the social phenomeno-
logy of relative deprivation, one must assign central import-
ance to mutual perceptions of legitimacy, virtue, resources,
etc. through timeJ all processes which cannot be approached
directly from either a Pragmatic individualistic action schema,
or from a mechanical image of society. Cohen offers a series
of insightful suggestions into the social phenomenology of in-
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vidious comparisons of moral virtue, a topic one might expect
to be important for Merton's theory, but one which was cur-
iously ignored by him. Cohen asks: " ... what strains does de-
viance on the part of others create for the virtuous?" (1965:
6). While I cannot here review all of these suggestive obser-
vations, it should be noted that Cohen, along with a few oth-
ers such as Kai Erikson (eg. 1962, 1966) and Joseph Gusfield
(eg. 1963, 1967) during the 1960's, seems to have recognized
a key factor missing from many theories of deviance prior to
the emergence of labelling theory--namely,the social pheno-
menology of perceptions, images, symbols, and moral processes.
To remedy the more blatant inadequacies of anomie theory, Co-
hen suggests marriage not only with reference group theory,
but also with the theory of relative deprivation, symbolic
interactionism, role theory, self-identity theory, and so on;
in short, a wholesale reconstruction relegating the structural-
functional contribution to a relatively minor role. Especially
significant here is Cohen's repeated insistence on the social
and symbolic rather than the individual and pragmatic-mechan-
ical nature of deviance.
Much of what we call deviant behavior arises as a way
of dealing with this disjunction [between goals and
means]. As anomie theory has been formally stated, this
is where it seems to apply. But much deviant behavior
cannot readily be formulated in these terms at all.
Some of it, for example, is directly expressive of the
roles. A tough and bellicose posture, the use of ob-
scene language, participation in illicit sexual acti-
vity, the immoderate consumption of alcohol, the delib-
erate flouting of legality and authority, a generalized
disrespect for the sacred symbols of the "square world"
... all of these may have the primary function of af-
firming, in the language of gesture and deed, that one
is a certain kind of person. The message-symbol rela-
tionship, or that of claim and evidence, seems to fit
this behavior better than the means-ends relationship
(1965:12-13) .
I entirely agree with Cohen's suggestion that deviant process-
es may be better comprehended from the point of view of both
the participants and society as symbolic and expressive action,
rather than merely pragmatically motivated self-interested
functional behavior (see also Mary Douglas, 1966). Such a view
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has the evident merit of emphasizing precisely the key socio-
cultural dimension of perceptions, images, symbols, messages,
rhetoric; reactions, legitimacy, power, authority, and so on.
Rather than a psychological and individualistic theory mas-
querading as a structural interpretation, what is needed is
an explicit focus on both the structural and symbolic-cultur-
al aspects of deviancy as symbolic violations and symbolic
processes. Durkheim, of course, knew this, but Merton forgot
apparently (see Book One).
Finally, Cohen notes a curious but instructive fact a-
bout Merton's mode of theorizing: a number of the inadequacies
which he has pointed out could be remedied from a careful
search through Merton's own writings. Like Thio (1975:148),
. Cohen remarks upon the slighting of reference group theory
in Merton's discussions of anomie:
The student of Merton will recognize that some of these
points are suggested or even developed at some length
here and there in Merton's own writing. Merton is, of
course, one of the chief architects of reference group
theory, and in his chapter on "Continuities in the Theo-
ry of Reference Groups and Social Structure," he has a
section entitled "Nonconformity as a Type of Reference
Group Behavior." There he recognizes the problems that
one actor's deviance creates for others, and he expli-
citly calls attention to Ranulf's treatment of disinter-
ested moral indignation as a way of dealing with this
problem. In "Continuities in the Theory of Social Struct-
ure and Anomie" he describes how the deviance of some in-
creases the others vulnerability to deviance. In short,
my characterization of the earliest version of "Social
Structure and Anomie" as "atomistic and individualistic"
would be a gross misrepresentation if it were applied
to the total corpus of Merton's own writings on deviance.
He has not, however, developed the role of comparison
processes in the determination of strain or considered
it explicitly in the context of anomie theory. And, in
general, Merton does not identify the complexities and
subtleties of the concept of strain asa problem area
in their own right (1965:7).
One may ask however: whose responsibility is it to draw togeth-
er all of the relevant insights to a particular area--the theo-
rist himself or his audience? And, can it be legitimately main-
tained that scattered, peripheral, or "cosmetic" statements al-
ter the fundamental propositions and structure of a theory?
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Surely, if Merton purports to provide us with a systematic,
though partial, theory of deviance and anomie, then the re-
sponsibility is his, and not his students' or his audience's
to provide us with a coherent and systematic statement. Clear-
ly, Merton is not a systematic theorist in the same vein as
Parsons. Rather, Merton's favorite genre appears to be the
essay, which accounts for his incisiveness, insightfulness,
felicitous phrasing, and the relatively unsystematic nature
of his writings.
C. Merton'~ Response to Cohen
In 1964, Merton felt compelled to respond and perhaps
deflect Cohen's criticism which had first been made at a so-
ciological convention in 1963. Merton prefaces his remarks
by noting:
••• I consider that part of this [Cohen's] paper con-
tains sound observations which have in fact been taken
into account in the theory of SS&A and that another part
contains important contributions which have not been ex-
plicitly stated in the theory but which can be incorpor-
ated in it. Cohen's paper is directed toward the core
of the theory and promises to extend it considerably,
should its implications be followed up (1964:231).
Merton's introductory footnote is noteworthy for a number of
reasons here: he recognizes that Cohen's criticisms touch the
heart of his theory offfiomie, and he attempts to deflect the
damaging thrust of Cohen's critique by (a) maintaining that
much of Cohen's critique is unnecessary since what is criti-
cized as lacking is really already contained in Merton's ex-
isting theory, and (b) the other part of Cohen's criticisms
can be easily accomodated within the existing outlines of a-
nomie theory without radical shift or internal breakdown. How-
ever, Merton should perhaps be more careful than to so easily
admit Cohen's critique strikes at the core of his theory, and
then to suggest that Cohen's other arguments be incorporated
and extended within anomie theory itself, since such a casual
attitude toward an ambivalent critic like Cohen might well· un-
happily surprise Merton. (Perhaps· these are some potential
dangers and ironies of intellectual public relations in trying
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to play down the significance of criticism, by admitting it
and then attempting to co-opt it, but then later being torn a-
part from within). Merton does not seem to publicly perceive
the full and potentially dangerous implications of Cohen's
critique, for if, indeed, one did follow out the thrust of
Cohen's key criticisms, not only would Merton's anomie theory
begin to fall apart, but structural-functional theory itself
might prove impossible! Again, how often and how deeply may
a theorist, in response to criticism and extension, amend and
revise his theory before it ceases to represent a coherent and
distinctive theory? How many ad hoc concessions to criticisms
and empirical reality maya theorist make before the unique
and distinctive outlines fade, and his theory becomesan amor-
phous and shifting grab-bag of insight, principle, anecdote,
ad hoc revision, and so on? Does this represent the so-called
"cumulativeness" of social scientific theory, or its negation?
Now, although Merton outlines two possibilities concern-
ing Cohen's critique, he does not attempt to evaluate Cohen's
contributions which might significantly extend anomie theory.
Rather, Merton merely responds to Cohen's first set in a cri~
tique of the critique in which he attempts to refute Cohen's
charge that his anomie theory is "atomistic, individualistic,
discontinuous," and lacks any reference to social interaction-
al processes, by citing allusions in his previous work which
purportedly show that Cohen is attacking a straw man. Merton
begins by dividing his own work on anomie and deviance into
early and later periods, and then suggests that Cohen's criti-
cisms a?ply mainly to the first rather than the second phase.
The early formulation of the theory of SS&A amply jus-
tifies this criticism. In that formulation, my princi-
pal concern was to develop a systematic way of thinking
about the seeming paradox that the structure of society
and culture, ordinarily thought of as operating to pro-
duce patterned behavior in rough accord with social norms
could, under designated conditions, operate to produce
deviant behavior (both aberrant and nonconforming). In
retrospect, it seems evident that this theoretical task
usurped my attention in the early paper. As a result, I
did not examine processes of social interaction between
members of collectivities that affect changes in the ex-
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tent of anomie and responses to anomie through one
or another form of deviant behavior (1964:231-2).
Next, Merton argues that although Cohen's criticisms
are appropriate to the early phase of his anomie theory, in
his later revisions he claims that he did indeed take into
account these crucial variables. Yet, Merton's claims is dis-
ingenuous.
It was only in later formulations of the theory that
individual responses to anomie began to be linked with
processes of social interaction. There, it was explicit-
ly stated that the changing liklihoods of individuals
engaging in deviant behavior, either separately or col-
laboratively, is conceived to bea function of changing
rates of anomie in the social system and that these
changing rates in turn are a result of patterns of in-
teraction among members of a collectivity (1964:232).
But what is the nature of the later evidence which Merton now
encourages us to accept as clear testimony that Cohen's criti-
cisms are not justified when applied to later formulations?
In order to see that this part of Cohen's cogent criti-
cism has already been incorporated in the theory of
SS&A, it is necessary to quote rather than to paraphrase
earlier formulations in print. Paraphrase might mistaken-
ly suggest that it was necessary to improvise an ad hoc
patchwork to meet this criticism once it had beenlffiade
(1964:232).
But to prove his assertions taken in his own defense, and to
exonerate himself from Cohen's changes, Merton proceeds to
quote extensively from verbal remarks mad~ in response to ques-
tions and criticism contrasting psychiatric and sociological
approaches to deviance made at a conference on juvenile delin-
quency in 1955! (See the edited proceedings by H. Witmer and
R. Kotinsky, 1956:37-38). Surely, however, this is a compara-
tively weak defense on Merton's part--that a few years before,
at a conference on juvenile delinquency, Merton made some oc-
casional remarks alluding to social interaction, which were
subsequently published in an obscure and largely inaccessible
government publication! In the hierarchy of evidential canons
of scholarly hermeneutics, statements published by the author
himself are to be given more credence than reported verbal re-
marks transcribed from open discussions, as must statements
directly related to the subject in dispute rather than peri-
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pheral or off-hand allusions, as must statements published
in disciplinary (ie. sociological) literature rather than in
obscure or non-disciplinary publications. Yet, in each of
these instances, Merton is left to defend himself with the
weaker sets of evidence.
Having considered the nature of the majority of Merton's
main exhibits, we shall now consider the substance of his at-
tempted self-exoneration. Merton observes that after the ver-
bal remarks made at the conference in 1955, he began to ex-
plicitly consider the importance of social interactional pro-
cesses.
After this first allusion to the interplay between ano-
mie and deviant behavior, it became clear to me that the
theory implicitly contained the notion of differences in
the degree of vulnerability to anomic strains in the so-
cial system. That is why, in the next extension of SS&A,
I tried to explicitly link up the conception of social
interaction among members of a collectivity marked by a
substantial initial degree of anomie with the conception
of vUlnerability (1964:233-34).
Merton's tactic here is worth noting: although initially he ad-
mits that Cohe~'s criticism is well-taken, he then shifts his
ground by claiming that reference to social interactional pro-
cesses was not really missing after all. Instead, it was act-
ually latent in it from the beginning, and all one need 40 is
bring into stronger relief that which was already implicitly
contained. Such a rhetorical tactic has the evident value of
claiming that the concept of social interaction can really be
easily accomodated through the existing concept of vulnerabil-
ity, and thus wholly within the existing framework of anomie
theory itself. Although Merton then claims that the reason he
next quotes extensively from his 1957 "Continuities" revision
is to 'retain the "lines of continuity" with the remarks pub-
lished the year before, perhaps a latent function was to help
buttress his case to extricate himself from Cohen's charges.
What is the actual substance of Merton's claim to have
first tacitly, and then explicitly and systematically, consi-
dered the range and type of social interactional processes re-
quested by Cohen? Quoting two paragraphs (eg. 1957:179-80)
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from his revision, and proceeding also from his concept of
"patterned differentials" in response to exposure to anomic
strains (eg. "vulnerability"), Merton claims that the vul-
nerability of one person, if it leads to successful deviancy,
is then imitated by another and another, in a sort of mechan-
ical or social chain-reaction process.
These long extracts must make it clear that there is
nothing "integral to the theory" of SS&A--the quoted
phrase is Cohen's--which requires it to be atomistic
and individualistic, without regard to social inter-
action between members of a collectivity .•.• On the
contrary: the theory does not conceive of anomie as
the result of this or that individual proving to be
vulnerable to straining for what he happens to regard
as success. For anomie is a condition of the social
environment, not of the isolated self .••.
To make this component of the theory of SS&A emphati-
cally plain, something that is evidently needed in of
the counter-impression left with even so perceptive a
sociolo~icalcritic as Albert Cohen, I repeat in thin
outline that the social process making for anomie is
conceived as follows: the men most vulnerable to the
stresses resulting from contradictions between their
socially induced aspirations and poor access to the op-
portunity structure are the first to become alienated.
Some of them turn to established alternatives (Cloward's
illegitimate opportunity structure) that both violate
the abandoned norms and prove effective in achieving
their immediate objectives. A few others actually inno-
vate for themselves to develop new alternatives. These
successful rogues--as measured by the criteria in their
significant reference groups--become prototypes for oth-
ers in their environment who, initially less vulnerable
and less alienated, now no longer keep to the rules
they once regarded as legitimate. This, in turn, cre-
ates a more acutely anomic context for still others in
local social system. In this way, anomie, anomia, and
mounting rates of deviant behavior become mutually re-
inforcing unless counteracting mechanisms of social
control are called into play (1964:234, 235).
This sounds like the sociological equivalent of the domino
theory. Merton's reconstituted view still seems as atomistic
and mechanical as the dynamical theory of gases, for it seems
as if successful deviancy exerts some relatively fatal form
of social gravity by pulling others out of their normal social
"orbits" and leading them into "eccentric" deviations. Or,
from another perspective, it seems that we are to assume here
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vulnerability to anomie (what an ill-defined concept), if
supplemented by social imitation (taking us back to the nine-
teenth century social psychologists, ego Tarde.and Le Bon),
can lead to contagious social diseases! But even with such
defenses, Merton ignores the central thrust of Cohen's criti-
que, for although he postulates interaction as imitation, he
almost completely ignores how, in actual fact, all the complex
social processes underlying deviancies tend to compound each
other. Why are imitation and gravitational attraction better
suited to explain the complex moral phenomenologies and sym-
bolic cultural processes than properly phenomenological cat-
egories? I see little gained, and much lost by Merton's vocab-
ulary. Further, does Merton really expect us to accept these
few relatively isolated and peripheral statements as signifi-
cantly altering the basic presuppositions of his famous theo~
ry? If so, then should not Merton have also directly altered
the presuppositions themselves? If Merton himself admits that
Cohen's critique cuts to the very heart of his theory, then
are we to judge Merton's defense adequate when he neither al-
ters his theory nor extends it by incorporating Cohen's sug-
gestions, all the while attempting to exonerate himself by
sending us off to read occasional verbal remarks.made at some
obscure conference or statements buried deep in later revi-
sions?
In addition, Merton introduces at least three new ele-
ments in his summary: "alienation," "significant reference
groups," and "counteracting mechanisms of social control."
Merton's protestations notwithstanding, just as Parsons' ela-
borate inventories of interactional processes (1951:chapter
7) on deviance Ultimately rest on the reductive notions of
psycho-biological needs and drives for tension-reduction, so
Merton's reconstruction of his own theory, even when he at-
tempts to squarely meet the issue, ultimately rests ona
rough analogy of deviance with a type of social gravity pul-
ling people out of their normal "orbits." In the end, Merton's
theory remains atomistic and mechanistic. Although he refers
now to legitimacy, for instance, how can one adequately hope
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to approach this problem without reference to people's actual
perceptions, to images held by various groups, to their logics
in use, to their participation in symbolic and moral process-
es, and so on? Therefore, not only do Cohen's explicit criti-
cisms stand, but they now loom larger than before, for this
episode reveals that even when Merton was directly confronted
with a critical challenge, invisible but powerful leading
strings pulled him back to his culturally derived orientationS
and premises.
Let us briefly consider the following series of paradox-
ical conclusions concerning the essential nature of Merton's
theory and framework. Although initially social structural in
point of departure, Merton's actual focus in "Social Structure
and Anomie" becomes social psychological. But although his real
focal level is social psychological (eg. individual adaptations
to strain), i~s not really micro sociological in the sense of
accounting adequately for social psychological interactional
processes, and thus leaves a vast gulf between the social and
the individual factors. And, although it is social psychologi-
cal in focus it is not so in content, for Merton's theory as-
sumes individual perceptions and Pragmatic motivations and at-
titudes, yet says little about perceptual, social, or moral
phenomenological processes. Therefore, we are forced by these
curious series of internal contradictions to the sad conclu-
sion that Merton's paradoxes reveal deep inconsistencues embed-
ded at the very foundation of his theoretical position.
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CHAPTER SIX
SROLIAN ANOMIA
Leo Srole's anomia scale has become as widely known
and used as Merton's notion of anomie, and, indeed, there
is a constant tendency to conflate the two. Srole's thesis
is similar to the tradition carried on by Gibbs and Martin
in that it focusses on the breakdown of social integration,
and attempts to derive measurable indices for it. Yet,
Srole's anomia differs from all the other conceptions in
that it looks at this central variable of the lack of so-
cial integration from the individual's own psychological
viewpoint. Srolian anomia represents a "psychologization" of
~ fundamental sociological concept.
Shifting from what he termed the "molar" (sociological)
level down to the "molecular" or micro (psychological) level,
Srole explicitly set out to construct a scale to test what he
considered to be the essence of Durkheim's anomie--namely,
"inter-personal alienation." However, Srole did not explicit-
ly derive his specific propositions from Durkheim's notions
of anomie, nor did he explicitly set out to test the validi-
ty of Durkheim's ideas. Rather, Srolian anomia emerged on
"piggy back," since this scale was first developed as an ad-
junct to some "diversionary items" in research primarily de-
signed to study authoritarianism and prejudice. Srole himself
reports: "These diversionary items afforded a 'hitch-hike'
opportunity to test hypotheses centering on Durkheim's con-
cept of anomie" (1956:7l0).
Failing to explicitly cite Durkheim's writings, Srole
referred to other writers to justify his conclusion that Durk-
heim's different types of suicide could be reduced to one com-
mon element. "In the writer's view, 'self-to-others aliena-
tion' may be regarded as the common element in Durkheim's
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conceptualization of anomie, egoism, altruism, and fatalism
as different but overlapping forms of suicide"(1956: 712).
But, as we have unhappily discovered, this type of approach
in which the total framework and subtlety of Durkheim's ar-
gument is simply ignored is unfortunately the rule rather
than the exception. The ambiguity of Durkheim's concepts has
led many secondary observers to arbitrarily decree that "this
is really what Durkheim had in mind," or else to throw up·
their hands, and propose that Durkheim's different types of
suicide "really" are one and the same in any case, so why bo-
ther with tedious exegesis?
Proceeding partly from MacIver's and Lasswell's psycho-
logized notions of anomie, Srole postulated a series of sub-
jective attitudes representing "interpersonal alienation."
Srole's hypothesis for these "diversionary, hitch-hike" items
to his larger study on authoritarianism arid prejudice was that:
" ... social malintegration, or anomia, in individuals is asso-
ciated with a rejective orientation toward out-groups in gen-
eral and toward minority groups in particular"(1956:7l2).
Yet, identifying anomia with Parsonian-Mertonian "malintegra-
tion" in general is not sufficient, for this concept is itself
fuzzy. Certainly, it should not be assumed to be clear and
sel£-evident in its meaning and implications~ Thus, at the
crucial point of translating Durkheim's ideas into a .testa-
ble index, Srole waffled, and fell back on Parsonian and Mer-
tonian metaphor.
Now, as many observers have noted, Srole's anomia scale
seems to have indiscriminately lumped together a number of di-
verse synonyms of anomie such as alienation, meaninglessness,
apathy, anonymity, isolation, powerlessness, etc.; and in the
last analysis, Srole's scale seems virtually indistinguishable
from a generalized feeling of apathetic resignation or despair
(see also Gwynn Nettler, 1965:763). Teevan suggests:
Too many sociologists have reified the Srole scale. It
has ~everal faults in form and sever~l in content. Per-
haps the biggest shortcoming it exhibits is that it does
not measure anomia as discussed either by Durkheim or by
Merton. It measures neither alienation from norms, nor
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lack of means to achieve goals, but instead a mixture
of powerlessness and other forms of alienation (1975:
165-6) •
One of the scale's major faults is that the items are so am-
biguous. On one reading, the first two elements of Srole's
scale refer roughly to social environmental perception, while
the last three items correspond to self-perceptions (at least
this is what appears to have been intended by Srole's explana-
tory preface to each item, see 1956:7l2-l~. Yet, other read-
ings are possible: Dubin (1959:158) suggests that Srole's
first item deals with an institutional norm, while the last
four pertain to cultural goals. Teevan remarks:
Ideally, there should be two separate measures of an
individual's perception of his own anomia and his per-
ception of the anomia of others. Unfortunately, the two
have been confused. Srole's scale purports to measure
the individual's perception of his own social psycholo-
gical anomia. Instead, it measures the individual's per-
ception of others' anomia .••. It measures the ind1vi-
dual's perception of the "average man's," and not his
own anomia. Examination of the scale reveals that ques-
tions one and three have the average man as their ref-
erent, questions two and five, and question four, an
unknown referent.
Thus, the Srole scale asks for the individual's percep-
tions of the anomia of others, and not for his percep-
tions of his own anomia. This may lead to confusion
since sociologists have designated the individual who
scores highly on the scale, who perceives the average
man to be anomie, as the anomie individual himself.
There would be no confusion if the respondent sees him-
self as the average man or if he projects his personal
feeling to others around him. If, however, these condi-
tions do not obtain, then one errors in assuming that
the Srole battery measures ••• the individual's percep-
tion of his own anomia (1975:162).
Teevan's objections are well-taken, and we now see that Srole's
scale really is predicated on the individual's projection of
himself or herself into the mold of that hypothetical type--
the "average man." And as Teevan notes, "the average man is
generally perceived as more anomie than the individual him-
self." Teevan goes on to suggest that we develop different
questions to distinguish between an individual's perception
of his own anomie, and an individual's perception of the ano-
mia of the larger society.
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
. --1162--
Further criticisms of Srole's scale come from Lenski
and Leggett (1960) and L. Carr (1971) who argue that the lo-
wer class may appear to be more anomie than they really are
due to a deference effect, or the acquiescence to "yes" ans-
wers posed by middle class interviewers. McClosky and Schaar
question Srole's sampling in his original research:
Srole's 1951 paper ••. and his 1956 paper on anomy
rested upon a sample of 401 native-born, white, Christ-
ian residents of Springfield, Mass., all of whom lived
within walking distance of transit lines and rode the
bus four or more times per week. This seems a curious
sample with which to test an anomy scale or to assess
the relations between anomy and various other factors
--unless one has a powerful theoretical conviction that
anomies tend to congregate on Springfield buses. To our
knowledge, Srole has never questioned the appropriate-
ness of that sample. Nor has he challenged the samples
used in numerous other studies that have employed the
Srole anomie scale (1965:765-66).
And, in terms of the methodology of scaling, C. Miller and
E. Butler question the unidimensionality of underlying items
of Srole's scale, and conclude: "Gradations of the Guttman
scale type would appear to be contra-indicated, and polariza-
tion would appear to be more appropriate" (1966:405). Doubt-
less, there are other problems; but the irony of these con-
clusions shall not be lost on a perceptive observer. For it
is precisely these various shades of meaning which such scales
claim it is their virtue to determine in the first place!
Yet, here Srole only succeeded in confusing the various shades
and grades of meaning, and thus sacrificed conceptual preci-
sion and theoretical significance for the appearance of statis-
tical accuracy.
Srole appears to have been influenced in his efforts
from a number of different sources. First, from his teacher
and colleague at The University of Chicago, W. Lloyd Warner
(see R. Hinkle, 1960:288-89), Srole derived an admiration for
Durkheim's ideas from the perspective of British-influenced
social anthropology. Now, although it would appear evident
that Srole was influenced in some manner or another by Durk-
heim, it is hard to detect in his famous article these pre-
cise relations. It appears that the content of Durkheim's in-
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fluence tended to exerted a generalized concern affecting
Srole's 1=-sychiatric predelictions. For example, Srole con-
cludes his paper by offering his new research method as a
scientific instrument which he hoped might help to alleviate
the dangers of social disintegration •
... there appears to be a trend among social scientists
toward convergence of interest in the phenomena of so-
cial integration. Equipped with the advances of the past
decade in theory and research technology, this trend
gives promise of accelerating the scientific attack,
powerfully and single-handedly launched by Emile Durk-
heim more than a half-century ago, on one of the most
pervasive and potentially dangerous aspects of Western
society, namely, the deterioration in the social and
moral ties that bind, sustain, and free us (1956:716).
Yet, although Srole obviously shares with Durkheim a deep con-
cern over these problems, we find a paucity of references to
Durkheim's work on these subjects. Although Srole drops Durk-
heim's name several times, like Merton, he never specifically
quotes Durkheim. Nor does Srole, amazinq as it might seem in
retrospect, even refer to any of Durkheim'~works! If Srole,
like Merton's undercitation, simply presumed that Durkheim's
ideas were simple, clear, and understood by all in their ori-
ginal meanings, he made a fatal mistake.
A second source of Srole's anomia appears to have been
derived from the American structural-functional theorists'
concern with "malintegration" and the problematics of social
integration. Srole tells us at the beginning of his 1956 paper
that he " ••• felt the need of theoretical developments center-
ing on the concept of 'social integration.'" Then Srole cites
various sociologists including Robin Williams, Parsons and
Shils, W. Landecker, R.C. Angell, and Merton. Given the subse-
quent prestige of Srole's efforts deriving from the structural-
functionalists' perspective on social integration, even Merton
himself was pleased to report: "I can only take chauvinistic
pleasure in Srole's report that he developed his scale of ano-
mia in 1950, when he was a member of the Bureau of Applied So-
cial Research as Columbia University" (1964:227,#5).
Third, Srole's own unique contribution was the meshing
of these anthropological and sociological outlooks with his
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own psychiatric emphasis on the components and conditions of
mental health. Srole's own career predelictions toward a so-
cial psychiatric approach to social and individual problems,
which generated the subjective anomia scale, appears to have
been the right instrument in the right place at the right
time in meeting the needs of many American social scientists
for some research tool with which to test for anomie. At once
congruent with the basic biases of American sociologists to-
ward a micro-social psychological level of focus, and of the
milieu and social problems approaches, Srole appeared to be
eminently successful in providing survey methodologists with
their required scale instrument to measure aggregated anomic
perceptions.
Srole's attempt to scale out anomic responses for sur-
vey questionaires can be seen as a key methodological break-
through in the research administration of this concept. Ap-
parently joined in one single and concise instrument were di-
verse ideas ranging from Durkheim to Parsons to Merton to Mac-
Iver to Srole himself. This meant that the continental tradi-
tion of social theory was now extended beyond Parsons' and
Merton's general theorizing, and implicitly joined with the
other dominant strain of American sociology--namely, the prag-
matic-reformist-nominalist concern with empirical social re-
search. Anomia now constituted one of the few visible and
testable fusions of continental theory, grand theory, middle
range theory, social reformist theory and the efficient proce-
dures of mass social research. Quite an accomplishment for
only five short items!
Now, although many have noticed (eg. Merton, 1964:227-
28) that Srole's anomia scale is basically psychological, few
have explicitly recognized the ramifications of the usage of
this scale and other survey tools of the same nature as mass
psychological interviewing devices. This largely unheralded
but powerfully driven development signals an important shift
in the central focus of fundamental sociological ideas down
to the psychological level. l~ether this be explained as a re-
sult of the need to develop measurable indices, or as a natu-
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ral reversion of ideas in the American context back to our
nominalistic roots (eg. see R. Hinkle, 1960), the unhappy
fact remains that too much of the content and method of con-
temporary sociological research has become far more psycholo-
gical than sociocultural. In this case, perhaps the single
most famous sociological concept, which has so often been
heralded as the first massive and irrefutable demonstration
of the "autonomy of social facts," is not even sociological
anymore!
The contradictions underlying Srolian anomia constitute
another important chapter in our ironic history of a classic
sociological idea. What happened to Durkheim's ideas, espe-
cially at the hand of his admirer Leo Srole, and, in turn,
how other sociologists have utilized these various ideas, can
perhaps best be understood as an another instance of the more
general process characterizing the translation, reappropria-
tion, fragmentation, and progressive trivialization of the
paradigms central to the "normal science" of any discipline.
This entropic process is abundantly illustrated in Miller and
Butler's flippant statement: "While the theoreticians debated
among themselves as to what anomie might be, several research-
ers constructed questionaire items in an effort to measure it"
(1966:400). In short, their cavalier and casual remark reveals
the basic feelings of too many of the "puzzle solving normal
scientists" in sociology who seem to be saying: its no good
unless we can formalize a theory and test it statistically;
and any scale is better than no scale at all, even if it means
that we have little idea about the content or validity of the
concept we are testing (see McCloskey, 1974,1976a)!
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CROSS-OVERS BETWEEN SROLIAN ANOMIA AND MERTONIAN ANOMIE
Preface. We have already noted that Srole developed his scale
of anomia while working at the Bureau of Applied Social Re-
search at Columbia University. And Merton (1964:228, #6) re-
ports that it was not until after April 1956 that Srole e,·en
began using the term "anomia" instead of the Mertonian and
Durkheim "anomie." Now, some might consider the cross-over
between the two best-known developments of anomie theory to
constitute definite and visible progress in sociology--namely,
the cumulativeness of theory interrelated with empirical re-
search. Yet, the perspective which emerges from detailed exa-
mination is that each of these streams of development of ano-
mie represents fundamentally different positions, and that
each of these streams represents an entropic degeneration and
fragmentation of Durkheim's original ideas. It would be a du-
bious proposition to attempt to maintain that these cross-
overs signify important sociological progress. Let us briefly
review some of the empirical applications of Mertonian anomie,
and consider some of the relations between these two streams.
A. Stephen Cole'~ Defense of Mertonian Anomie
Now, it is interesting to note that the problematic re-
lations between Merton's theoretical developments and empiri-
cal testing of his notion of anomie have called forth two de-
fenses of Merton from within his circle, and Stephen Cole was
involved in both. In 1964, Cole produced along with Harriet
Zuckerman, a long bibiliography of work on anomie theory. And
in 1975, in the Merton festschrift, The Idea of Social Struct-
ure (L. Coser, ed.), Cole returned again to the same prob~em
with more sophisticated analytical and statistical techniques.
Let us examine each of these defenses of the fate of
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anomie at the hands of empirical researchers.
In Clinard's volume Anomie and Deviant Behavior (1964),
there is included a summary table inventorying empirical and
theoretical studies on anomie since Durkheim compiled by Mer-
ton's students Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman. Merton pre-
faced the table by linking his own notion of anomie with Durk-
heim's, and then added these remarks:
••• just as there was little concerted attention given
the matter after Durkheim first introduced it, so there
was a considerable interval after the later 1930's be-
fore anomie research became a focus of empirical and
theoretical attention •••• The accompanying tabulation
shows ••. that there was a gap of some fifteen years be-
fore there emerged a substantial (though still limited)
concentration on the subject (1964:216).
Merton includes the following figures for the number of empir-
ical studies reported on anomie in these five year intervals:
1940-50:3; 1950-54:7; 1955-59:25; 1960-64:39. It would appear
at first glance that empirical research in anomie theory was
a burgeoning industry at that time. Now, although Merton does
not explicitly state it, we are led to implici~ assume that
most or all of these studies have to do with a clearly formu-
lated conception of anomie, especially Durkheim's anomie and
Merton's extension. However, a closer look at the items in
Stephen Cole and Harriet Zuckerman's inventory on which Mer-
ton's totals are based reveals several curious findings. First,
although the inventory appears very impressive at first glance
(extending over forty pages and from 1897 to 1964), one dis-
covers upon closer examination that only certain items are
designated as "explicit testing or extensive application of
Merton's theory of social structure and anomie." Of the total
of eighty-seven different studies listed, only fifteen are
starred by Cole and Zuckerman as explicitly working with Mer-
ton's notion of anomie. Approximately twenty others are based
upon Srole's scale of anomia. In short, the clear majority of
studies cited are not directly concerned with contemporary
theoretical formulations of anomie. 1
Of the fifteen studies specifically designated by Cole
and Zuckerman in 1964 as related to, or in some way testing,
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Mertonian anomie, many of the earlier studies cited appear to
come from authors who were Merton's own students, colleagues,
or acquaintances. Two articles remain unpublished. In at least
five of the studies (Riley and Flowerman, 1951, Rosenthal,
1954, E. Barber, 1955, R. Coser, 1958, R. Cloward, 1956), Mer-
ton's SS&A paradigm appears either as an afterthought, or as
an appendage serving as an ex post facto interpretive device
for impressionistic evidence. In no way can such studies be
legitimately cited as demonstrative evidence. Only Hyman (1953),
Lander (1954), Glaser and Rice (1959), Mizruchi (1960), Stinch-
combe (1960), and Rhoades (1964) appear to be based on more
carefully drawn data. Of these, Mizruchi and Rhoades both uti-
lized Srole's anomia scale to test Mertonian anomie (a trouble-
some procedure which even Merton rejects, see the following
section). Glaser and Rice (1959) merely invoke Merton's theo-
ry at the end as a possible complement to Sutherland's differ-
ential association theory. Hyman (1953), as we have seen, is
critical of some of Merton's crucial assumptions, and Lander's
work was criticized by Merton himself (later by Bordua, 1958,
R. Child, 1964, R. Gordon, 1967). Thus, while the empirical
literature concerning Mertonian anomie appeared in 1964 to be
truly voluminous, upon closer examination the inventory per-
formed under Merton's own supervision appears to have been
greatly inflated. Indeed, it is hard to point to even a couple
of studies at that time which conclusively verified the empir-
ical validity of Merton's notion of anomie. As we shall see
in the following section, this paucity of good research great-
ly bothered Merton himself in 1964.
Eleven years later, for the Merton festschrift volume
The Idea of Social Structure, Stephen Cole went much deeper
into the empirical fate of Merton's theory of anomie by treat-
ing it~ case-study in the growth of scientific knowledge. Ra-
ther than simply compiling an index as in 1964, Cole now sub-
mitted the use of Merton's anomie theory in the sociological
literature to sophisticated statistical and theoretical analy-
ses. Let us explore this latest defense from the Merton camp.
Cole offers us a.summary of the frequency with which
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Merton was cited for the periods 1950-54, 1955-59, 1960-64,
1965-69, 1970-73, as an index to his influence on the socio-
logy of deviance. According to Cole's findings, Merton was
ranked first or second in all periods but the last, when his
prominence declined precipitously (to number 12). Cole's 1975
sample was drawn from four leading sociological journals, and
tabulated only citations to different authors, not number of
citations of the same author of different works. Thus, if an
author received ten citations, it means he was cited by ten
different people. Although Cole claims this was done simply
" ••. to prevent a few authors who might heavily cite a parti-
cular person from tipping the results" (1975:189), it should
be noted that this unusual way of indexing citations worked
to tip the scales in Merton's favor. Again, as in the over-
long bibliography in 1964, Merton's collaborators tended to
inflate these tables. Even Cole himself felt it necessary to
justify this unusual procedure:
It should be noted that this procedure does differ
from that normally employed, in which each distinct
reference to an author's work would count as a cita-
tion. For example, when we looked at the distribu-
tion of citaLions done in the typical fashion, Short
rather than Merton received the most citations for
this perLOd (1950-73). This is because Short was fre-
quently cited for four or more articles within a sing-
le article, whereas Merton was usually cited for one
or two contributions * (1975:217, #36).
Now, the results of Cole's factor analysis of ~1erton's
prominence in each period are also interesting. During the per-
iod, 1950-54 for instance, Cole observes that:
•.• Merton was an intellectual isolate in the field of
deviance as then constituted.••• Although Merton was
the second most frequently cited sociologist in the
period, his work had not yet made a major impact on
the field. He was cited by people who were still pri-
marily doing the type of work done by Sutherland and
Sellin [differential association) .... Although by this
time Merton had established himself as a prestigious
theoretician, the theory of SS&A had very little im-
pact on deviance research in the four leading sociolo-
gical journals (1975:195,196).
It should be noted that this was the curious situation more
than a decade after Merton's article "Social Structure and A-
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nomie" was first published; Merton himself (1964) was disturb-
ed by this'tle1ayed utilization." Cole suggests (1975:205-6)
that it was the 1949 revision of "Social Structure and Anomie"
in Merton's collected essays Social Theory and Social Struct-
ure which really gained prominence. To explain this lag, and
the apparent rise of Mertonian anomie in the 1950's, Cole sug-
gests that it was not until this period that Ph.D.'s trained
in structural-functional theory spread out across the country.
Of the citations in 1955-59 period, one-third referred
to Merton's work other than SS&A. Three used SS&A to legiti-
mate and support the ideas of the authors, and two others sim-
ply refer to it as part of the relevant literature. Of the re-
maining third, Cloward and Ohlin's work (1960) was a theoret-
ical revision and extension of Mertonian anomie, and not an
empirical test, while Powell (1958) and Dohrenwend (1959) at-
tempted to define and develop the concept of anomie indepen-
dently. The remaining study, Glaser and Rice (1959), used
SS&A as an ex post facto interpretive device, invoking Mer-
ton's theory only at the end as a possible complement, as
noted earlier, to differential association theory. Cole claims:
In the second period anomie theory had emerged as a
distinctive orientation to the study of deviance. The
theory of SS&A was further developed and extended, but
at least in the four major journals there were still
relatively few empirical studies aimed at testing it
or in which it was used as an interpretive device (1975:
197) •
During the periods 1960-64 and 1965-69;- in which anomie
theory emerged as a major factor and then the dominant per-
spective in deviancy studies, the breakdowns are similar. And
during the 1970-73 period, the labelling-interactionist ap-
proach displaced anomie as the dominant perspective in devian-
cy theory in terms of citations. Now, it interesting to note
that during the whole period 1950-73, Cole (1975:228) notes
that forty-two percent of the articles cited Merton in a cere-
monial fashion only to legitimate the work of the author. And
while there were twenty-one articles which used SS&A as an ex
post facto interpretive"device to make sense of certain empir-
ical findings, Cole (1975:211) found only nine articles re-
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port research designed to empirically test a part of SS&A or
a derivative theory. Of these nine, at least two (Mizruchi,
1960, and Rhoades, 1964) used Srole's anomia scale, four
(Spergel, 1963, Landis and Scarpitti, 1965, Short, Rivera,
and Tennyson, 1965, and Voss, 1966) really test Cloward-ah-
lin's theory and Cohen's derivative theory rather than direct-
ly testing Merton's. One study (Wilson, 1971) used Srole's
scale, tested some of Lander's (1954) assumptions, and came
up with results contradictory to SS&A, and some striking find-
ings on the sub-cultural norms of ghettos. Another study
(Reiss and Rhodes, 1959) yielded indeterminate results,
while only one study (William Rushing 1971) attempted a di-
rect test of SS&A with results consistent with Merton's theo-
ry. Since Rushing's study is one of a precious few which could
be cited as empirically confirming Merton's theory, let us
briefly review it.
Rushing's article is cogent both in its criticism of
existing usage of Mertonian anomie and its own theoretical
formulations. Therefore, Rushing constructed his own scale of
anomie, which appears, however, to suffer from several of the
flaws which Teevan (1975), among others, pointed out for
Srole's scale. Actually, Rushing (1971:859-60) explicitly set
out to test psychological alienltion from norms, rather than
to test anomie as a societal state; whereas Merton's theory,
as he has repeatedly declared (eg. 1957, 1964), pertains pri-
marily to anomie as a societal state rather than a psychologi-
cal condition. Noting that "class differences in goals is not
the crucial datum," Rushing suggests that it is rather, as Mer-
ton himself says, whether " ... disjunction between goals and
opportunity among lower class strata [occurs with greater fre-
quency] than among the more advantaged upper-class strata,"
and "if so, whether such disjunction is associated with norm-
lessness" (1971:862).
Although his " ... results consistently support Merton's
hypothesis about the dynamics of normlessness in the lower
class" (1971:864), Rushing also contends that " ... it is not
blocked opportunity per se that is important, but the way
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blocked opportunity is interpreted, and such interpretations
will differ depending on one's cultural background" (1971:
866). Indeed, Rushing's conclusion that "cultural interpreta-
tion is a significant intervening variable in the relation-
ship between aspirations and blocked perceived opportunity"
(1971:870) reinforces my earlier criticism of the cu1ture-
boundedness of Merton's theory.
In sum, out of the huge 1964 bibliography and the 1975
citation analysis, Cole is only able to come up with one or
a few valid empirical studies validating Merton's theory of
anomie, and even these are often equivocal confirmations. This
is hardly overwhelming empirical evidence for so famous a theo-
ry. If this troubles the reader, it should also be noted that
this embarassing lag between the popular acclaim for his theo-
ry and empirical support also rankled Merton himself, as we
shall discover in the following section.
Against this troubling background, Cole tries two differ-
ent rhetorical tactics to salvage Merton's theory of anomie.
On the one hand, he claims that interest in Merton's theory
continues unabated and that it has merely shifted in theoret-
ical significance from one research area to another. On the
other hand, from the perspective of the contemporary philoso-
phy of science, Cole suggests that anomie theory has declined
not because of lack of hard empirical evidence to support it,
but rather from an external shift in the sociological communi-
ty's focal interest. Let us consider these rhetorical defenses
in turn.
First, in the face of the apparent precipitous decline
in citation of Merton during the 1970-73 period, Cole tries
to salvage Merton's theory in this way.
••• SS&A has declined in significance in the last per-
iod. Yet there is a good deal of evidence that SS&A re-
mains a very important theory •••• When, for example, we
look up citations to Merton's work on deviance in the
1973 volume of The Social Science Citation Index, we
see that in this one year it has been cited approximate-
ly sixty times •••• Consider some additional evidence on
the continued interest in SS&A. This article has been
reprinted many times and the rate at which it has been
reprinted has increased in recent years rather than de-
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clined. The theory has been discussed in scores of in-
troductory textbooks and continues to be discussed in
virtually all the introductory texts published in the
last few years. The theory is frequently discussed in
both American and European symposiums on deviance. In
short, the theory has anything but disappeared (1975:
201) •
What Cole refers to here, of course, is the "halo effect"
or "lag" in the reputation of a theory which has had its day
and faded. While thinkers and researchers on the cutting edge
of the discipline no longer pursue this theory, other publics,
less well-informed, to whom sociologists wish to present their
intellectual wares, are still regaled with its cogence and
significance. The theory dies in the journals, only to gain a
second lease on life in introductory textbooks.
Cole attempts to salvage the importance of this "second
lease on life" for Merton's theory of social structure and ano-
mie by distinguishing different phases in the life of any
great theory.
How can we explain the decline in citations to SS&A in
the four leading journals at the same time that the theo-
ry continues to received heavy attention in other places?
Perhaps we must think of the various stages that a theo-
ry goes through from the time that it is presented until
the time that it is either abandoned or obliterated
through incorporation. When SS&A was first published it
may have experienced delayed utilization; later, it be-
came the leading theory guiding work at the research
front in deviance. Now its significance at the research
front of other areas may be increasing, and as an exem-
plar or pardigm of sociological theory, it may continue
to be reprinted in anthologies and cited in introductory
texts for years to come. In short, we must not asssume
that the life of a theory is unidimensional. A full un-
derstanding of the role played by a theory would consider
the full range of uses a theory is put to and the stages
through which it progresses (1975:201).
It is interesting to see this admission from the Merton camp
which reinforces my earlier suggestion that the reasons Mer-
ton's theory gained such prominence had more to do with its
symbolic and ideological function than its logic or empirical
validity. Old theories never die, they just just lodge in
textbooks like barnaoles.
Further, Cole attempts to deflect the lack of empirical
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verification of l·1erton' s anomie theory and its relative de-
cline in terms of external shifts in the sociological commun-
ity's commitments. Now, Cole claims that the empirical evi-
dence critical of Merton's theory could have been deflected
had Merton made a crucial shift in one of his assumptions.
What can we conclude from the studies that have act-
ively attempted to test the theory? There was certain-
ly as much evidence in support of SS&A and derivative
theories as in opposition. The strongest negative evi-
dence confronting SS&A are the several studies finding
no differences in rates of deviant behavior between lo-
wer class and middle class people. By the time the
1949 revision of SS&A was published, Merton was aware
that actual rates of deviant behavior may be considera-
bly higher in the middle classes than official crime
statistics indicated••.• At this time, Merton had to
decide whether he should see anomie as characterizing
the entire society and thus creating high rates of de-
viance in the society as a whole, or as being unevenly
distributed, with the lower class being more exposed
than the middle class. He opted for the latter choice.
If he had chosen the other alternative, most of the
criticism would have been avoided (1975:2l2).
Cole then suggests that the decline in influence of Mer-
ton's theory is due more to shifts in the external "sociologi-
cal framework" rather than to contradictory empirical evi-
dence.
It is easier to explain the decline of utilization of
SS&A from what I should like to call the "sociological
framework." From this point of view, the acceptance or
rejection of a theory is not primarily dependent on em-
pirical evidence. It is dependent on the way the theo-
ry fits in with the other interests of the community of
scientists and the ability of the theory to fulfill what
might be called its "functional requirements." First,
what evidence is there in this case that the acceptance
or rejection of a theory is not dependent on empirical
evide~ce? I have shown that at least in the four major
journals, there were few attempts to directly test the
theory, and that there were even fewer attempts that
claimed to find evidence contradicting the theory (1975:
2l2) •
Finally, proceeding from the contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence, Cole concludes with the striking admission that the real
function of theories such as SS&A is to act as a research pro-
gram providing orientations and problems for the discipline.
It is thus a paradigm not in the sense of an achievement to
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be imitated, but as a source of potentially fruitful ways of
thinking about certain problems.
Before I began this research, I believed that SS&A
had been difficult to test because it had not been
put forth in a precise enough manner to operationa-
lize the key components. I believed that it would be
possible to state the theory in a more precise way,
and that a definitive empirical test would then be
possible. I, of course, no longer believe this would
be either possible or desirable. SS&A is an approach
to studying a wide range of behavior that stimulated
much theoretical thought and a good deal of empirical
research. The range of empirical phenomena for which
SS&A is relevant is too wide for a definitive test to
have been performed. Besides, theories that provide
puzzles are not rejected in the face of negative em-
pirical evidence unless an alternate theory is present
and deemed superior. And, in fact, the utilization of
SS&A may be declining, not because it has been empiri-
cally proven false, but because we have exhausted most
of the puzzles that it provided. Labelling theory is
currently the major source of puzzles for deviance re-
searchers (1975:213).
This acknowledgment is, of course, a chastening experience
for the partisans of Mertonian theory, not only in terms of
his anomie theory but also in terms of his more general philo-
sophy of scientific progress and his program of consolidation
and codification of theory.
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B. Merton's Program for Empirical Research into SS&A
Merton himself noticed with chagrin both the paucity
of empirical studies concerned with his famous paradigm, and
their generally distressing qualities. For instance, in his
1957 "Continuities •.. " essay, Merton carefully termed Bernard
Lander's 1954 study using census tract data "a symptomatic
advance."
For just as the mere availability of official statis-
tics constrained Durkheim to employ such rough, indi-
rect and highly provisional measures of anomie as oc-
cupational status, marital status, and family disinte-
gration, so the fortuity that census tracts in Balti-
more include data on delinquency, racial composition,
and house ownership, led Lander to use these as a
rough, indirect, and highly provisional measure of a-
nomie. Pragmatic considerations of this sort are no
suitable alternative to theoretically derived indica-
tors of the concept. Turnover in residence may be an
indirect measure of the rate of breakdown in establish-
ed social relationships, but it is evident that the
measure would be substantially improved if provision
were made to obtain data directly on rates of disrupt-
ed social relationships .•.• just as the scales of the
subjective aspects of anomie must be further improved,
so must scales of its objective aspects. The utilili-
zation of social book-keeping data is only a pragmati-
cally enforced and interim substitute (1957:l65-66).
In the 1960's, Merton's concern increased about the
lack of methodological precision involved in anomie and de-
viant behavior studies. Merton explained this gap in develop-
ment " ... between theory and E1ystematic empirical research"
by relying on the principle that " •.. sociological theory
tends to outrun the inevitably slower pace of systematic em-
pirical research in sociology" (1964:240). Of course, such
justification of the gap between theory and research stems
from the tacit presumption that these really are separable
activities; hence, it is inevitable that the theorists will
always move ahead of the plodding researchers. The result-
ing lacuna means that theorists are allowed, nay encouraged,
to continue to spin out their typologies on one side, while
on the other the empirical survey researchers are encourag-
ed to continue to gather data· regardless of what it meansin
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practice. Ironically, it was precisely this potentially fatal
spli t which Merton's own call for "theories of the middle
range" was itself supposed to mediate. Indeed, Merton himself
(eg. 1964:215) tells us that his theory of anomie is a prime
example of a "middle range theory." Yet, here .in the case of
his single most famous theory, Merton is forced to admit that
adequate empirical testing still awaits us after almost thir-
ty years (after almost forty years if you count Cole's 1975
tabulation)! And, we should remember that Merton himself never
undertook such an empirical confirmation of his theoretical
schema. And although Merton wrote well-known treatises on
liThe Bearing of Sociological Theory on Empirical Research" and
on liThe Bearing of Empirical Research on Sociological Theory,"
in terms of his own anomie theory, Merton himself never under-
took to provide us with a paradigmatic study intimately inter-
twining the two sides of the scientific process. Thus, des-
pite his preachments, Merton has continued to aid and abet this
this unfortunate lacuna still plaguing contemporary sociology.
One of the few thinkers who could have, and should have, exem-
plified the conciliation of theory and research, not as sepa-
rate roles but as mutually reciprocal phases of the same pro-
cess of intellectual inquiry, did not do so. And thus, Robert
Merton must be judged responsible, certainly more than his stu-
dents, for the lack of empirical confirmation of his own theo-
ry of anomie and opportunity.
Now, Merton asserts that the general principle of "em-
pirical research lag" is the reason for the gap between his
development of anomie theory and its empirical confirmation.
And he admits that his own theory has proven surprisingly re-
sistant to rigorous testing and application, which would seem
anomalous in the case of one who has made it much of his
life's work to tell other members of the profession how they
ought to better conduct their intellectual affairs ("do as I
say,not as I do"). Merton observes of this general process:
very rough approximations to the requirements of
the theory are developed and these, in the nature of
the case, prove indecisive. At times, empirical inves-
tigators find themselves compelled to make such extreme
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compromises in their collection and analysis of data
that what starts out as an effort to institute a de-
manding test of a theoretical idea ends, as the Cole-
Zuckerman inventory of research on anomie periodically
suggests, by being so loose an approximation to the
theory as to be wholly inconclusive. There is not a
single empirical investigation of anomie and dev1ant
behavior that has succeeded in mounting ~ research de-
sign that systematically, rather than impressionisti-
cally and qualitatively, includes-srmultaneous analy-
sis of collectivity, subgroup, and individual attri-
bUteS-in relation to deviant behaVior along the lines
set ou~in the preceding pages * (1964:240).
The gap Merton so poignantly points out leads me to wonder out
loud: in the case of anomie theory, who is to blame for this
serious lacuna between the development of theory and empirical
testing? The theorist or the researchers or both? While Mer-
ton's statements appear to explain this oft-lamented gap in
terms of some postulated necessary gap between the sophisti-
cated theorists the compromising difficulties encountered by
the empirical researcher, perhaps the latent function of Mer-
ton's self-justification here is to displace the burden of
responsibility for failure onto the data gatherers. Although
Merton attempts to alleviate their imputed guilt by grounding
their inadequacies in the very nature of their role, Merton
seldom assumes that the basic problem might lie instead with
the theorists' own procedures and assumptions. It is not sur-
prising that Merton fails to recognize, even in the face of
discomforting evidence drawn by his own colleagues, that per-
haps the root problem underlying this endemic lacuna between
the proposal of theoretically viable propositions and empiri-
cal confirmations stems originally from the sterile stance
of the structural-functional theorists that theories can and
should be elaborated in vacuo, deductively, abstractly, ahis-
torically, genericall~without inunersion irt~~muddy actual."
Perhaps one can even detect here a hint of the age old con-
flicts between the spirit and the world; why else would these
theorists confidently consider their splendid yet sterile
theoretical isolation so high a calling? It may seem ironic
that we should make these claims against Merton who, in turn,
"cut the umbilical cord" by advancing them against Parsons
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in 1947 (see Merton 1949, and "On Sociological Theories of
the Middle Range"), but so be it.
Always possessed of a sensitive ear for innuendoes, Mer-
ton explicitly disclaims any feeling of exasperation or pique
against the less endowed empirical researchers who have so
consistently failed to fulfill and support his grand theoret-
ical vision.
All this may sound as though it were an attack on em-
pirical research into anomie and deviant behavior, and
a defense of theory bearing on this subject. But ...
this would be to miss the point entirely. This is no
evaluative, let alone invidious observation on the com-
parative merits of theory and research on anomie. It
lays a claim, instead, to being a detached, objective
observation of a discrepancy in the pace at which theo-
retical formulations are being developed and the neces-
sarily slower pace at which systematic empirical re-
search is mounted .... It is this gap between the char-
acter of current theories and the character of much of
the current research that explains the difficulty of
decisively confirming, modifying, or rejecting one or
another aspect of the contemporary theory of deviant
behavior (1964:241-2).
We should not here miss the curious yet characteristic ploy
through which the supposed "value-freeness" of functional theo-
ry yet carries with it such invidious or moral overtones at
the very time it explicitly denies this intention. Also, while
Merton pointedly reflects on the "only natural" superiority of
the "character of current theories" vis-a-vis "current re-
search," almost any inquirer in these areas knows matters are
rarely so simple. Again, I propose that the gap which Merton
rightly laments is due not so much to any "natural law" of the
inferiority of research to theory, but rather to the nature
of the specific type of theorizing favored by Merton.
Although his last statement ignores that other major
theories of deviant behavior than his own carry substantial
empirical support, it should be recognized that Merton was
trying sincerely here to act as his own best critic. Earlier
in the 1950's, Merton had called for the reconciliation of
his own objective structural conception of anomie with the
subjective anomia scale developed by Srole.
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Growing out of the conception of both subjective and
objective components of anomie is the further evident
requirement that research on the sources and conse-
quences of anomie deal simultaneously with the inter-
action of the two types of components .••• This means
that the behavior of "anomic" and "eunomic" indivi-
duals within groups having a designated degree of ob-
jective anomie would be systematically compared, just
as the behavior of individuals of the same type could
be examined in groups with varying degrees of anomie.
This kind of research plainly constitutes the next
step forward in the study of anomie (1957:166).
Now, clearly Merton's attempts to clarify his own schema, to
criticize existing research, and to suggest guidelines and en-
courage further empirical investigation into his own theory
represent laudable activities, and also constitute an extra-
ordinarily interesting case study in the history of the devel-
opment of a very significant concept in sociology. Few other
sociological concepts have enjoyed such continuous elaboration,
refinement, extension, critique, and rebuttal by a major fig-
ure such as Merton for nearly four decades.
Almost thirty years after his original publication of
"Social Structure and Anomie," how did Merton come to specifi-
cally suggest that empirical testing of his paradigm in sys-
tematically designed research be carried out? The structure
and argument of Merton's outline for research is very signi-
ficant for the unraveling of our story of the "routinization
of charisma-on-deposit." In his 1964 essay "Anomie, Anomia,
and Social Interaction," Merton proffers a number of reveal-
ing suggestions. First, urging cognizance of the crucial, yet
complementar~differences between his own social structural
notion of anomie and the more psychologized subjective con-
cept of Srole's anomia, and eschewing critical examination
of the technical adequacy of Srole's scale, Merton begins
with the following significant admission: "Curiously enough,
the advance represented by Srole's preliminary scale design-
ed to measure anomia--a condition of the individual--seems to
have had an adverse effect on systematic studies of anomie--
a condition of the social system" (1964:228). Merton here im-
plies that although he systematically introduced the idea of
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anomie (" ••• simply a matter of drawing out some of the im-
plications of Durkheim's work, 1964:215) into American socio-
logy through his famous SS&A paradigm, his concepts lay unap-
plied on a larger scale for almost thirty years, and when
Srole's scale came to be widely known, Srolian anomie super-
seded Mertonian anomie in research studies. This is, in my
judgment, an accurate historical reflection. While too many
sociologists indiscriminately lump together Durkheirn's anomie
(and egoisme) with Mertonian anomie and it, in turn, with
Srolian anomia, Merton attempted to draw definite distinctions.
In 1964 Merton appears to lament the fact that Srole, who pro-
posed only a simple scale to measure anomia, has taken over
the lead in anomie-anomia research, while Merton himself, who
offered a complex and changing theoretical typology, now lags
behind.
Merton's specific suggestions as of 1964 for concrete
research to "bridge the theory-research gap" and to lead to a
resolution of Srolian anomia and Mertonian anomie are as fol-
lows. We ought to note that as Merton attempts to reconcile
the subjective and objective views of anomie, he appears to
make crucial concessions to the other ("complementary") side,
and gets ensnared in a fundamental methodological error. Mer-
ton's program for resolution begins thus:
It seems not to have been widely recognized--if we are
tojudge from the appended inventory of research on the
subject--that by adopting well-known procedures of ana-
lysis, the measures of anomia for the individual can
be adapted to serve as a measure of anomie for the so-
cial system. By doing so, composite studies that simul-
taneously examine the behavior of individuals, with sim-
ilar degrees of anomia, within differing social con-
texts of anomie, would enable us to deal with theoreti-
cal problems that have remained on the periphery of
systematic research.
••• both the logic and substance of analysis which have
been known for sometime have yet to be comprehensively
applied to the study of anomia, anomie, and deviant be-
havior (1964:228; 230, #8).
Merton proceeds to outline three successively more sophisti-
cated phases of inquiry into these areas. In Phase I, Merton
makes the crucial proposal that anomie as a social structural
condition can be measured by aggregating the individuals' sub-
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~ctive feelings of anomia, which then could be used to differ-
entiate between the comparative rates of deviance between ano-
mics and non-anomics. While Phase I may be considered his con-
cession to Srolian anomia, Phase II may be considered Merton's
conciliatory response to Albert Cohen's (1965) criticism of
Merton's theory as "atomistic." Thus, Phase II specifically fo-
cusses on "Rates of Social Interaction Between Anomics and Non-
Anomics in Collectivities Differing in Degrees of Anomie."
Phase III pulls Phases I and II together by studying the "Rates
of Deviant Behavior Among Anomics Within Collectivities Differ-
ing in Degree of Anomie" (1964:237). Lastly, to cope with the
processual dimension, Merton suggests a panel analysis also.
Now, my criticism here is directed not so much to the
specific design of these phases as to Merton's underlying me-
thodological assumptions. First, clearly the lead in formula-
ting anomie had passed from his hands. Indeed, this outline re-
presents an inversion of the theoretical sequence so success-
fully employed earlier; whereas formerly he had begun deduct-
ively and proceeded from the macro-systemic generic level of
analysis down to the micro-empirical level, now Merton, in at-
tempting rapprochement with the rapidly developing empirical
stream of work which threatened to outstrip his own, proceeds
inductively from the micro to the macro levels. Such an acqui-
escence on Merton's part gives credence to the approach of
many researchers who hope to construct meaningful inductive-
ly generated theories of masses of data. Indeed, Merton him-
self (196B:15l)comes perilously close to suggesting that "em-
pirical generalizations" generate their own higher-order theo-
ry. However, as many phiksophers of science (eg. the classic
by N. Campbell, 1920; and contemporary thinkers such as T.S.
Kuhn, 1970, N.R. Hanson, 1~58, K. Popper, 1968, Lakatos &
Musgrave, eds. 1970) have shown, the problem of scientific
discovery is not so much a matter of "inductive generaliza-
tion" as "abductive inference," of theory-finding. Far too
often this inadequate conception of the intimate relations
between insight and evidence.has been reinforced bv the praq-
matic bias of American so~ial scientists.
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Another fundamental methodological problem implicit in
Merton's formulation has to do with the unwarranted move from
one level of analysis to another, with the expansion and con-
traction of scientific theories. If the "ecological fallacy"
(eg. see Robinson, 1950) suggests that from demographic-ecolo-
gical data one may determine the c~aracteristics of indivi-
duals living in an area, then Merton's suggestion similarly
contains the invalid assumption that one can simply aggregate
individual attitudes as an accurate index of social structural
and cultural conditions. By proferring Srole's anomia scale of
individual feelings as the basis for aggregating subjective
"self and others" perceptions as accurate statistical indices
of objective social structures, Herton succumbs to the unwar-
ranted presumption that aggregated subjective attitudes of in-
dividuals accurately represent objective social structural
conditions. Since the ecological fallacy works both ways, Mer-
ton here, along with many others, is guilty of the flipside:
the unwarranted expansion of scientific constructs from one
diverse level to the next. Such a mistaken, yet widespread,
practice sterns, perhaps, from the almost universal psycholo-
gization of key sociological concepts in mass-survey research.
Far too much survey research masquerading as sociology is
really only mass psychological interviewing unjustifiably pro-
jected onto the societal level. Indeed, one of the virtues of
Merton's functionalism had always been that it distinguished
between structural and psychological levels, especially con-
cerning anomie, and between perceived and unperceived condi-
tions. Yet, here Merton has succumbed to the erroneous con-
clusion that Srole's anomia can be plugged in to measure ob-
jective anomie. Merton is not alone in this fallacious en-
deavor, for it is one of the most widespread procedures in
contemporary sociological survey research, and indeed, here
has the cited sanction of Lazarsfeld himself.
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C. Research Cross-Overs Between Mertonian Anomie and Srolian
Anomia
A number of research studies concerning anomie h~used
Srole's scale to test Merton's propositions. These cross-overs
between Srolian anomia and Mertonian anomie appear to have re-
sulted from the lack of measurable indices for Mertonian ano-
mie, and thus, when Srole's scale appeared, empirical method-
ologists wedded to mass survey techniques embraced it without
sufficient critical analysis. This literature is far too large
(and repetitive) to discuss at length here; some of the better
known examples of this cross-over include D. Meierand W. Bell's
'~omia and Differential Access to the Achievement of Life
Goals" (1959), L. Rhodes' "Anomia, Aspiration, and Status"
(1964), Ephraim Mizruchi's "Social Structure and Anomia in a
Small City" (1960), R. Wilson "Anomie in the Ghetto" (1971),
and so on. While some of these studies have yielded at least
partial confirmations of Merton's theses, many of them recog-
nize confusion over the meaning of anomie and admit inconsis-
tent research findings.
Let us take Mizruchi's research as an illustrative
study. This research is especially important for our present
interests because Mizruchi consciously sets out to test what
he conceives to be the common elements of Durkheimian and Mer-
tonian anomie by using Srole's scale of anomia. Noting that
the lower classes studied have lower social participation
scores and higher anomia scores, Mizruchi pointedly observes:
" •.. [th:!data] does not provide a full test of Merton's theo-
ry since we have assumed that the respondents have similar
life goals. Merton himself makes this assumption" (1960:655).
In a subsequent exchange of letters, Lorna Mui and Mizruchi
disagreed over the validity and meaning of Mizruchi's work.
Mizruchi then explicitly states:
Merton's theory, as I see it, is essentially derived
from Durkheim' s proposition that "to aspire to \that is
unattainable" reflects extreme pathological conditions
in a social system. Thus Merton's theory must be viewed
within a Durkheimian framework •••• Both Durkheim and
Merton view anomie ••• as chronic states for industrial
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societies, though Durkheim stressed acute anomie in
order to clarify, by contrast, what he had in mind.
In the case of American society, Merton takes the
Durkheimian position that for certain segments of
the population, aspiring to what is, for them, unat-
tainable, anomie is greater than for other segments
of the population. Thus Merton's contribution is to
be found in his application of the Durkheimian scheme
and his typology of patterned reactions to structured
strain. My own study, is consequently, a partial reas-
sessment of Durkheim's theory in American society
(1961:277).
Mizruchi began, then, by closely identifying Mertonian and
Durkheimian anomie. Not only do these streams converge in his
studies, but they also begin to gradually diverge again as
Mizruchi begins to test various key assumptions Merton made,
and as he reflects on his own findings. Hence, Mizruchi's
work represents the high point in empirical terms of the fu-
sion of Durkheimian anomie with Merton's schema and Srolian
anomia, and also, simultaneously, one of the most significant
points at which they began to be distinguished again.
Mizruchi characterizes his early efforts in the follow-
ing manner: liThe level of generality remains Durkheimian and
in my study the Srole scale is particularly useful since it
was designed from a Durkheimian point of view" (1961:277).
Then Mizruchi, still identifying Mertonian and Durkheimian
anomie, makes the following relevant observations:
It is precisely the affluent society which breeds ano-
mie--this was Durkheim's point. Affluence creates a
thirst for more and more wants beyond the reasonable
possibility of attainment. I'm afraid that Lorna Mui
has completely misinterpreted Durkheim, and as a con-
sequence, ~erton as well ..•. My current study sug-
gests that there are three sub-types of anomie which
must be taken into account in assessing the Durkheim-
Merton theory: (1) boundlessness, which represents
Durkheim's notions regarding the lack of limits to as-
pirations in a social system; (2) bondlessness, which
suggests Merton's lack of tie between norms and goals;
(3) normlessness, the process of breakdown or norma-
tive systems. Boundlessness seems to occur primarily
in the middle classes in American society and bond-
lessness appears to be characteristic of the lower
classes. Normlessness would appear to characterize
the marked changes occuring in the old upper classes
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whose normative systems are being subjected to strain
and breakdown (1961:277).
The last distinction is particularly interesting: one wonders
whether, and to what extent, Parsons'concern with anomie as a
withdrawalof affect from dominant norms or as lack of norma-
tive clarity might speak for the ~strain" of these upper clas-
ses of which Mizruchi speaks. In any case, Mizruchi's useful
distinctions illustrate that he is both closer to Durkheim in
a number of respects, and closer than Merton to contemporary
changes in the social structure.
By 1967, these careful distinctions which Mizruchi had
begun to draw between the various shades and grades of meaning
between Durkheimian and Mertonian anomie began to culminate in
a much sharper series of distinctions betweeen these notions
which would lead to their severance.
A careful examination of Merton's concept of anomie
suggests that his emphasis is different from Durkheim's
and that this difference leads to varying hypotheses .
... The Mertonian theory, at least in part since its
focus is on means rather than ends, assumes relatively
uniform aspirations across the class structure and a
greater impact of anomie on the relatively lower clas-
ses. The theory, however, largely ignores observations
made not only by Durkheim but by Veblen and Marx, a-
mong others, regarding the relatively low levels of as-
piration which characterizes those at the lowest levels
of the class structure, and it ignores certain qualita-
tive differences within and between classes (1967:439-
441) .
In contrast to Merton's implicit but central assumption that
all classes and sectors share the same values and goals, Miz-
ruchi, as noted earlier, proposes that "retreatism" and the
subsequent withdrawalof motivation and affect from cultural
mandates does not adequately explain the long-standing con-
servatism of lower classes.
... we hold that aspirational conservatism represents
both an adaptation to a social condition in which there
is a discrepancy between the goals of the larger socie-
ty, ie. "success," and the limited means available as
well as a more chronic condition characteristic of many
societies rather than "retreatism" in relation to the
American Dream (1967:446).
Finally, Mizruchi suggests that, in the future, re-
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searchers attempt to draw more careful distinctions between
the various types of anomie which they might wish to empiri-
cally test (see also Teevan, 1975).
Our analysis clearly suggests that:
(1) more clarity regarding the differences between Mer-
ton's and Durkheim's concepts would be desirable;
(2) our conception of lower class social process may
well require over-hauling;
(3) although Merton's theory does, at given points in
the social structure, provide insight and understanding
of these processes, contemporary sociology needs a con-
tinued assessment of the theory's strengths and weakness-
es in juxtaposition to Durkheim's theory (1967:446).
Hence, in terms of our wider story, Mizruchi is one of the
few empirical researchers who have consciously set out to re-
late Merton's anomie to Durkheimian anomie using Srole's ano-
mia scale. Yet upon reflection on inconsistent findings, Miz-
ruchi has gradually pulled back from any facile identification
of these diverse approaches to anomie. His conceptual and re-
search itinerary, and his frank and cogent reflections, con-
stitute a fascinating case study on the vicissitudes of at-
tempting to cross-over these three separate streams of devel-
opment of anomie. Rather than constituting definite progress
in sociological theory, these studies reveal the sterility of
the philosophy of science championed by Merton for thirty
years. Although unwilling as of 1967 to wholly reject Merton's
claims, Mizruchi clearly delivered a body-blow to one of Mer-
ton's tacit assumptions, distinguished clearly betweeen the
Durkheimian and Mertonian notions of anomie, and cautioned
greater care in formulating theory and research tests in these
these areas. Mizruchi's work here is significant, then, be-
cause it represents the end point in empirical terms of the
unquestioned fusion of Durkheim's anomie, Merton's anomie,
and Srolian anomia.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
MISCELLANEOUS DEVELOPMENTS OF ANOMIE
Preface. Alongside the more clearly demarcated streams of
development of anomie, there has emerged a more diffuse and
less systematically refined series of efforts. These miscel-
laneous developments often lack a clear and coherent theoret-
ical perspective; also, since so few have been sufficiently
pursued and elaborated, they cannot really be said to now
constitute distinct and important streams of development. As
this literature too is very large, we shall consider here on-
ly some of the more distinctive theoretical and empirical
studies which formulate or test a new or different notion of
anomie; and further, we shall try to focus primarily on stu-
dies which are not examined elsewhere in the dissertation.
First, let us consider the construction of several new scales
of anomie; second, we shall explore some new theoretical form-
ulations of the meaning of anomie.
A. New Scales and Empirical Research
In a short article, Dwight Dean and Jon Reeves (1962)
consciously claim to set out to test " ... whether Durkheim's
hypothesis that Protestants exhibit a higher degree of anomie
than Catholics can be sustained" (1962:208-9). Ignoring the
differences between egoisme and anomie, and the crucial fact
that Durkheim identified Protestants with egoisme and not a-
nomie, Dean and Reeves set out to test their hypotheses by
using their own "normlessness" scale. Like Sro1e's scale,
Dean and Reeves use their "normlessness" scale in "hitch-
hike" fashion as indirect indices of other concerns, notably
alienation. Also like Srole, Dean and Reeves never bothered
to attempt to relate their notions of anomie to Durkheim's
work. And as with Srole's scale, it is hard to tell exactly
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which analytical level is being probed, and whom the refer-
ents are. Like Srole's scale, the Dean and Reeve's scale ques-
tions are inherently ambiguous. These items are:
(1) The end often justifies the means.
(2) People's ideas change so much that I wonder if we'll
ever have anything to depend on.
(3) Everything is relative and there just aren't any de-
finite rules to live by.
(4) I often wonder what the meaning of life really is.
(5) The only thing that one can be sure of today Ls that
he can be sure of nothing.
(6) With so many religions abroad, one doesn't really
mow which one to believe (1962:210).
Because there is no conceptualization offered here it is hard
to know what the authors intended to test by these items; what
we appear to find is a hodge-podge including rule-breaking and
the absence of set or absolute norms, relativism, meaningless-
ness, pluralism and value-conflict, etc. Are each of these di-
mensions synonymous with anomie, or taken all together? As Tee-
van (1975) noted of Srole's scale of anomia, Dean and Reeves'
scale depends upon projections of the individual into the
shoes of the "average man," and also of the individual's
own feelings. Again, is anomie here conceived of as an indivi-
dual psychological problem, or a societal condition?
Eschewing such questions, Dean and Reeves conclude that
their evidence shows that "Durkheim's keen observation of long
ago gains empirical validation" (1962:212). Since the theoret-
ical formulation is vague, the scale multi-dimensional and am-
biguous, and mistakenly connects Durkheim's notions of anomie
rather than egoisme with Protestantism--for these and other
reasons--we can hardly follow Dean and Reeves in either their
empirical conclusion or testing instrument.
Unfortunately, two other researchers--Lee and Clyde
(1974) followed Dean and Reeves's scale and their empirical
hypotheses. On the level of contemporary standards of "normal
~cience" in the sociology of religion, Lee and Clyde's paper
suggests at least three interesting propositions:
(1) "Normlessness" varies inversely with "religiosity;"
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(2) Religious identification (eg. Protestant, Catholic),
in contrast to Durkheim and others, is not signifi-
cantly related to "normlessness; II
(3) In their study, "normlessness" was more strongly cor-
related with "religiosity" than with socioeconomic
status.
However, Carr and Hauser (1976) came up with findings which
conflict with the notion that anomie was inversely related
to religiosity. But there are so many conceptual problems in
Lee and Clyde's work that it is a moot question what the theo-
retical significance of their empirical findings might be.
McCloskey (1974) offers a detailed analysis and rebuttal of
their position which applies to many others of the same genre.
McClosky and Schaar (1965) explicitly set out to con-
struct a scale by which to test for the psychological dimen-
sions of anomie. They offer a much fuller conceptualization
than either Srole or Dean and Reeves. McClosky and Schaar pro-
pose to:
conceptualize anomy as a state of mind, a cluster
of attitudes, beliefs, and feelings in the minds of in-
dividuals. Specifically, it is the feeling that the
world and oneself are adrift, wandering, lacking in
clear rules and stable moorings. The anomie feels lit-
erally de-moralized; for him, the norms governing beha-
vior are-weak, ambiguous, and remote. He lives in a
normative "low pressure" area, a turbulent region of
weak and fitful currents of moral meaning. The core of
the concept is the feeling of moral emptiness (1965:19).
Further, McClosky and Schaar are sensitive to the difficulties
of projecting individual feelings onto the "average man" and
calling the aggregated results an index to the anomie of the
larger society •
••. the leap from the subjective feelings expressed by
individuals to statements about objective social condi-
tions is a perilous one. What people believe about a so-
ciety mayor may not be an accurate reflection of its
nature: perceptions and feelings are never a literal
copy of what is "out there" but are always powerfully
shaped by the needs, motives, attitudes, and abilities
of the observer. Hence, we can never confidently assume
that because some people feel anomie the society is ano-
mie. Moreover, even if one could establish that some .
members of a society report strong anomie sentiments,
one could label the society anomie only after systemat-
ically comparing that society with others (1965:18-19).
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Then McClosky and Schaar propose their basic thesis:
that such anomic feelings are learned, especially by those
in the lower classes, the outsiders, ethnic minority groups,
and so on .
•.• whatever interferes with learning the norms of a so-
ciety tends to increase anomic feelings among iGmem-
bers •.•• In short, whatever interferes with one's abil-
ity to learn a community's norms, or weakens one's so-
cialization into its central patterns of belief, must
be considered among the determinants of anomy (1965:20).
Specifically, McClosky and Schaar focus on three types of fact-
ors which may impair effective learning norms.
The personal factors that impair learning and socializa-
tion may be divided into three categories: (1) Cognitive
factors that influence one's ability to learn and under-
stand; (2) Emotional factors that tend to lower one's
ability to perceive reality correctly; (3) Substantive
beliefs and attitudes that interfere with successful com-
munication-and interaction (1965:21).
To test for these three complexes, these researchers construct
the following nine-item scale:
(1) With everything so uncertain these days, it almost
seems as though anything could happen.
(2) What is lacking in the world today is the old kind of
friendship that lasted for a lifetime.
(3) With everything in such a state of disorder, its hard
for a person to know where he stands from one day to
the next.
(4) Everything changes so quickly these days that I often
have trouble deciding which are the right rules to
follow.
(5) I often feel that many things our parents stood for
are just going to ruin before our very eyes.
(6) The trouble with the world today is that most people
really don't believe in anything.
(7) I often feel awkward and out of place.
(8) People were better off in the old days when everyone
knew just how he was expected to act.
(9) It seems to me that other people find it easier to
decide what is right than I do (1965:23).
However, even though McClosky and Schaar attempt to con-
ceptualize more fully their notion of psychological anomie, un-
fortunately their scale is prone to~~~me flaws as many others.
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First, it is unclear why they would wish to identify their
notions and scale with anomie, for these bear little rela-
tionto Durkheim's ideas. Their formulation is probably clo-
ser to the Parsonian stream, with its premises of normative
confusion, lack of definiteness of norms, breakdown in the
relational system of society and culture, and so on. Second,
as noted with Srole's scale and Dean and Reeves's scale (see
Teevan 1975), the present scale mixes analytical levels and
prime referents--for example, items five, seven, and nine
ask for the individual's own feelings, while the other items
ask him to project his own attitudes onto the larger society.
Also, their legitimation of their scale items is tautologous
--for they simply define as anomic who scores high in re -
~onse to their items, whereas it is these items which set
out to find out what anomie is in the first place. One can
hardly object to their scale, given such a premise, that it
does not really test anomie at all, for anomie is, by defin-
ition, what the scale tests. However, close examination re-
veals that this scale, too, appears to be a grab-bag of differ-
ent concepts and psychological and sociocultural conditions.
Apparently included here are: general uncertainty, lack of
social ties, unpredictability coming from rapid social change,
loss of continiuity with the past, a deflation of tradition-
al values, relativism and pluralism, loss of normative clar-
ity from generation to generation, and so on. Rushing sug-
gests that this normlessness scale " •.. appears to refer more
to unpredictability and meaninglessness and to the effects of
normlessness •.• than to normlessness itself" (1971:860).
McClosky and Schaar themselves sum up their scatter-gun ap-
proach to defining the so-called "anomic mentality" in these
terms:
The items express the feelings that people today lack
firm convictions and standards, that it is difficult
to tell right from wrong in our complex and disorder-
ly world, that the traditional values which gave mean-
ing to the individual and order to society have lost
their force, and that the social ties which once bound
men together have dissolved (1965:24).
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Nettler (1965:763) questions the validity (meaning) of their
scale of anomy, and suggests that their scale, like Srole's,
may actually measure a sort of generalized despair. Curiously,
McClosky and Schaar (1965:767) agree with Nettler. But if
their scale actually measures generalized despair, then why
not simply call their scale a measure of individual project-
ion of a generalized feeling of despair rather than anomie?
I hardly find it acceptable to add yet another confusing syn-
onym for anomie. Why don't researchers simply make up their
own terms for their own ideas, be bold and straight about it,
rather than trying to cash in on the still resonant "charis-
ma-on-deposit" of the founding fathers (see McCloskey, 1974)?
Critical of the Srole, Dean and Reeves, and McClosky-
Schaar scales, William Rushing (1971) set out to construct
his own scale of psychological alienation or an individual's
feeling of generalized normlessness. Items in Rushing's scale
include the following:
(1) Is a person justified in doing almost anything if
the reward is high enough?
(2) Some people say you have to do things that are wrong
in order to get ahead in the world today. What do
you think?
(3) Would you say that the main reason people obey the
law is the punishment that comes if they are caught?
(4) Some people say that to be a success it is usually
necessary to be dishonest. Do you think this is true?
(5) In your opinion, is the honest life the best regard-
less of the hardships it may cause?
(6) In your opinion, should people obey the law no matter
how much it interferes with their personal ambitions?
(1971:861) .
Though there is a certain degree of redundancy, Rushing's
scale has at least two advantages over related scales of norm-
lessness. Except for item one which asks for projection into
the shoes of an abstract "person," Rushing's scale specifical-
ly asks for the individual's (you, your) attitudes. Second,
since Rushing's items are theoretically grounded in the Merton-
ian notion of anomie, they consistently attempt to test an in-
dividual's feeling of the pervasiveness of deviations from a
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generalized normative order, especially in terms of the per-
ceived propensity to use illegitimate means to pragmatically
further one's own self-interest. Indeed, Rushing expressly
indicates that his scale is close in content to Han's (1968)
scale of "illegitimate expediency." Therefore, in this regard,
Rushing's scale of normlessness is better suited than Srole's
anomia scale as a test for Mertonian anomie.
However, Rushing's scale neglects to address the two
major premises of Merton's theory--namely, whether people
feel our culture places a great emphasis on individual achiev-
ement and success for everyone and whether the means of a-
chievement are differentially distributed. Furthermore, as
noted earlier, one of Rushing's more significant findings
is that the crucial factor is not so much the posited Merton-
ian disjunction between goals and means as the cultural inter-
pretations given to blocked opportunity. Hence, any new scale
should include this factor as a crucial component.
Finally, let us consider some of the empirical studies
of Warren Breed who has shed new light on one of Durkheim's
forgotten types--namely, fatalisme, the opposite of anomie.
Breed's 1963 study relates Durkheim's idea of "de-classifica-
tion" in anomie suicide to the "downward mobility" of the sta-
tus "skidder." Then, in his 1970 study, Breed extends Durk-
heim's ideas on "fatalisme" and oppressive regulation to Ne-
groes and American Indians. Breed's reappropriation of "fatal-
isme" as a type of suicide is valuable for two reasons. First,
since so many contemporary formulations of anomie are almost
indistinguishable from what Durkheim meant by "fatalisme,"
Breed helps us to differentiate, once again, Durkheimian ano-
mie from its opposite. Second, in applying "fatalisme" to a
number of cases, Breed demonstrates its empirical and theoret-
ical relevance in contemporary society. He remarks, for in-
stance, that the " ... suicide among young, low class single
Negro males is frequently fatalistic suicide" (1970:162).
Surely, it is a sad commentary on the history of sociology
that Durkheim's central notion of anomie had become so fuzzed
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that, until Breed, it had become inverted into its opposite!
B. New Theoretical Formulations of Anomie
Since Durkheim1s work is so central to sociology, and
since anomie is so central a sociological concept, a review
of various secondary observers I and thinkers I accounts and
concepts might potentially include almost every introductory
textbook and history of sociological thought, we obviously
cannot attempt such a review here. Nor shall we even detail
usages or passing references to anomie by luminaries such as
MacIver (1950), Lasswell (1952), Wolin, (1960), Riesman et al
(1950), Nisbet (1966), Coser (1971), and so on and so forth.
However, since Sebastian de Grazia makes anomie the central
superstructure of his suggestive study (1948) on the modern
political community, we shall briefly explore his treatment
of anomie here.
De Grazia1s notions are of importance to our present
interests for a number of reasons. First, his formulation is
an independent one, derived directly from Durkheim himself,"
instead of being filtered through Parsons I and Merton1s inter-
pretations. Also, it is an application of Durkheim1s notions
to the field of political science. Further, when de Grazia
~does quote Durkheim (eg. 1948:3-5, 99-100), he recognizes to
a certain extent that insatiability played a crucial role in
Durkheim I s perspective (eg. 1948: 4) . Moreover, completely on
his own, de Grazia comes close to recognizing the crucial
step necessary for moving from riurkheim1s first to his second
notions of anomie (see Books Two and Three). Specifically, de
Grazia questions Durkheimls tacit assumptjon that insatiable
desires are innate, and insightfully suggests instead that
they are learned.
When Durkheim spoke of the ill effects of "illimitable
desires," he failed to realize that the establishment
of illimitable desires in man is itself the result of
a well-developed system of beliefs. It is not the nat-
ural result of man1s freedom from" all restraining rules
or norms of behavior. Far from being natural to man,
it took a long time to groom him for the mere idea of
illimitable acquisition. To be the very model of the
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indefatigable entrepeneur it was necessary that a man
drink in activism with his porridge or count among his
ancestors a person who, with Cotton Mather, read a lit-
tle of Calvin each night "to sweeten his mouth" (1948:
72) •
This insight is especially important for our present purposes
because this passage comes directly at the end of a chapter
devoted by de Grazia to the tension exerted on modern men by
the Protestant Ethos! In short, de Grazia sees that Durkheim-
ian anomic insatiability is--yes, a morbid condition--but al-
so one that is learned, and not innate; it is the result of
specific historical types of cultural conditioning (see Book
Three). Finally, given this background, although de
Grazia cites crucial passages from Durkheim's Suicide illus~
trating primarily anomie as insatiability or the "infinity of
desires" alongside de Tocqueville's pregnant observations on
American society (eg. 1948:99-100), somehow de Grazia fails
to draw the conclusion that Durkheimian anomie is culturally
sanctioned in American culture.
Perhaps what held de Grazia back was his loose, even
metaphorical, "catch-all" definition of anomie as a conflict
in values and belief systems. He suggests that Durkheim's no-
tion essentially implied a breakdown in common, binding, sat-
isfying belief systems: " .•. as the disintegrated system of
a society that possesses no body of common values or morals
which effectively govern conduct" (1948:xii). IIFor him [Durk-
heim], anomie was most often the disordered condition of a
society that possessed a weak conscience collective •.. the
ensemble of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens
of the same community" (1948:4-5). Specifically, de Grazia
suggests that II ••• anomie as Durkheim conceived it in the
subjective sense had three characteristics: a painful uneasi-
ness or anxiety, a feeling of separation from the group or
isolation from ~oup standards, a feeling of pointlessness
or that no certain goals exist" (1948:5). Now, while de Gra-
zia's conception of anomie is primarily subjective, in con-
trast to Durkheim and Merton's which are primarily societal,
his distinction between simple and acute anomie is valuable
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in that it indicates that anomie, whether societal or sub-
jective, may differ in degree; that it is not an all-or-noth-
ing condition (see also Merton, 1957:163). However, in the
last analysis, de Grazia's loose usage of anomie as almost
synonymous with the ills and tensions of the modern world
render it less usable as a concept than our analysis; it is
too generalized a concept, lacking the specificity we gave
anomie here in Book Three.
Marvin Olsen (1965) claims to have discovered that Durk-
heim used the notion of anomie in two different ways in The
Division of Labor and in Suicide. Basically, Olsen says that
in the first book anomie referred to inadequate functional
integration, while in the latter anomie referred to inade-
quate normative integration.
..• anomie, as Durkheim first conceived it in The Div-
ision of Labor in Society, might be defined as-a-con-
dition of inadequate procedural rules to regulate com-
plementary relationships among the speCIalized and-rn-
terdependent parts of a complex social system. In Sui-
cide, Durkheim makes extensive use of the concept of
anomie, but gives it a different meaning. He begins
with the assumption that man's social and emotional
needs are unlimited, as compared with physical needs,
which are automatically regulated by the body ••••
Under stable social conditions, the collective con-
science defines and orders social relationships. As
societies become more complex and dynamic however, so-
cial controls weaken, and men are led to aspire to
goals which are extremely difficult or impossible to
obtain. These pressures for "infinite" or "receding"
goals then generate additional stresses within the
normative order .••. In sum, anomie, as Durkheirn des-
cribed it in Suicide, might be defined as a condition
of inadequate moral norms to guide and control the act-
ions of people and groups in the interests of the so-
cial system (1965:40-1).
Now, Olsen is undoubtedly on to something important here; one
need only note that many secondary reformulations (see Part II
of this appendix) of Durkheim's suicide schema revolve around
precisely the problem of reconciling the structural-functional
and normative dimensions. And, to a certain extent, Olsen is
justified (see Books Two and Three) in characterizing the ear-
ly and later notions of anomie in two different ways.
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Two significant differences are noticeable between
Durkheim's early and later uses of anomie. First, in
The Division of Labor, anomie refers to inadequate pro-
cedural rules:for interaction, whereas in Suicide it
means inadequate moral norms for social control. In one
case the emphasis is on functional expediency, while in
the other case the concern is for social responsibility .
• • •• The discussion of organic solidaritv in The Divi-·
sion of Labor is concerned with functional integration,
whereas Suicide is directed toward normative integra-
tion. Anomic division of labor therefore refers to inad-
equate functional relationships among specialized parts
of a social system, while anomic suicide is the result
of an inadequate normative order in society (1965:41-2).
Finally, to distinguish between the two different connotations
of anomie, Olsen (1965:43) suggests that the term "discordance"
be used to" refer to a relative state of inadequate proce-
dural rules for maintaining functional relationships."
While on one level Olsen's distinctions are well taken,
on a deeper level Olsen misses the "nuclear structure" of Durk-
heim's thought. I went to great lengths in Book One to layout
the continuity and in-depth structure of Durkheim's thought
which cut across all his works. And in Book Two I connected
Durkheim's first schema of suicide with his notions of the
anomic division of labor. tVhile Olsen sees, on the simple top-
ographical exegetical level, the apparent differences between
Durkheim's use of anomie in 1893 and his use of anomie in 1897,
because his analysis has no depth, he neglects to see the deep-
er connections between the two notions. Nor can he make wider
sense of the difference he has discovered. In short, Olsen has
stumbled on to something important here, but he doesn't quite
know what it is, or its significance.
Although he does not cite Olsen, a similar thesis can be
found in Stephen Marks's lengthy review (1974) of Durkheim's
changing theory of anomie. Like Olsen, Marks appears to detect
certain differences in Durkheim's theory of anomie as it devel-
oped through his career. Like Olsen, Marks is on to something
here--a sympathetic reading might dispose us to grant that he
has discovered a potentially troublesome hiatus between Durk-
heim's micro and macrosociologica1 approaches to resolving the
problem of anomie and the "moral anarchy" of the modern world.
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One might abstract Marks's argument as follows.
A hiatus between Durkheim's micro and macrosociological
analyses of anomie has been discovered. Focusing on Durk-
heim's program to "engineer the crisis of anomie out of
existence" (1974:330), this paper shows that Durkheim
attempted successively four different solutions. The key
to each solution concerns what structural base generates
what kind and level of normative consensus. On the micro-
level, Durkheim first tried the occupational solution.
The problem of anomie was then shifted to the macrolevel,
where the "bold problem that Durkheim ••• now set for
himself" (1974:338) was how to generate a "macro-nomos,"
"a societal self-consciousness." On the macrosocietal le-
vel, Durkheim explored two indirect "gate-keeper" solu-
tions in terms of normative mediation by political and
educational elites. Finally, Durkheim suggests the direct
macro societal solution of charismatic mass movements.
Ultimately, however, all these theoretical solutions to
the problem of anomie failed on their own terms. It is
concluded that Durkheim's attempts were doomed to fail-
ure, in any case, since anomie inevitably characterizes
any large group (see McCloskey, 197~.
While there are many valuable things about Marks's argument
on the topographic exegetical level, his analysis is beset by
many problems. As with so many others who dare to tread in
these treacherous regions, Marks's account simply has little
notion of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's thought. Spe-
cifically, this means that Marks slights: (a) Durkheim's cru-
cial doctrine of the inherent egotism and insatiability of
the presocialized individual; (b) Durkheim's central explana-
tory model linking superstructural (cultural) collectively
representational processes to substructural social morpholog-
ical processes; (c) Durkheim's genetic-evolutionary perspect-
ive, especially his notion of the primitive sacral complex;
(d) Durkheim's developing concern with civilizational proces-
ses; (e) Durkheim's central concern, on the world-historical
level, with universalizing, autonomizing, and rationalizing
inter-cultural processes. If one attempts to address any part
of Durkheim's sociology, especially his notion of anomie, with-
out reference to these and other crucial anchors of his system,
one runs the risk of seriously distorting the true meaning
and significance of anomie. This is precisely the limitation
of all topographic exegeses (on all of this see McCloskey,
1976a).
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Yinger (1964), like de Grazia, makes a valuable attempt
to distinguish between different degrees of anomie. Yinger es-
pecially tries to differentiate between cultural pluralism
and anomie. Yinger raises some good questions:
What is the opposite of an anomic situation? Is it a
completely stable society where everyone agrees on both
goals and appropriate means? If so, it is quite unimagi-
nable in the modern world, where social change is chron-
ic, diverse ethnic and religious groups live within the
same society, and individual choice and freedom are rank-
ed high as values. Anomie is a variable that can range
from little to much (1964:159).
Are heterogeneous and pluralistic societies by definition
anomic {1964:159?
No, Yinger answers, and then suggests a criterion for this im-
portant jUdgment.
A person strongly committed to his own values and thor-
oughly awaIe of the extent of value disagreement is like-
ly to declare that society is dissolving in chaos, that
anomie is upon us. But if anomie is not an individual
moral term but a concept referring to the operations of
a group, we need some way of distinguishing anomic value
disagreements from what I call pluralistic value disa-
greements. If the disagreement does not disrupt the work-
ings of the society--the interactions of members that
require the fufillment of shared expectations--it is
pluralistic, not anomic (1964:160).
Utilizing Merton's (ego 1964) "social imitation hypothe-
sis," Yinger proposes a "cyclic test of anomie": " ... value
disagreements that tend to spread through the social system
are anomic; those that have no tendency to spiral are plura-
listic" (1964:161). Then Yinger distinguishes between four re-
lated types: cultural unity, cultural pluralism, subcultural
anomie, and full anomie, in terms of the criteria of whether
value disagreements are present, whether value disagreements
disrupt interaction, and whether value disagreements are cum-
ulative (1964:162).
This quasi-scale is meant to suggest a range from a
situation in which normative agreement is high and
governs most interactions to one in which normative
agreement is low, and because of that very fact, tends
to fall ever lower. In situation one interactions are
effectively governed by the system of shared expecta-
tions. In situation two (pluralism), there are some val-
ue disagreements, but these are accepted as legitimate
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or desirable, at least they are tolerated .••• Situation
three (subcultural anomie) represents the beginning of
anomie--a situation in which value disagreements dis-
rupt the pattern of mutual expectations; the differen-
ces make a difference ••.• [we see] a "demoralization"--
the lack of widely shared norms to control the inter-
action. In situation four (full anomie), demoralization
has gone farther. Value confusion now characterizes not
only interactions among individuals, but the inner lives
of many individuals as well (1964:161-2).
If one accepts the Parsonian-Mertonian frames in which Yinger
works here, these are, of course, valuable refinements of the
full range of anomie possibilities.
Especially in terms of race relations during the 1960's,
Yinger saw an unmistakable trend of increasingly anomie social
interaction, a spreading spiral of ungoverned rel~tions. " ..•
there has been a great increase in anomie, both in the sense
of normlessness (disagreement on norms in an interacting group)
and in the sense of the use of illegitimate means in the pur-
suit of culturally learned goals (1964:163). Further, noting
that "Modern societies are made up of various combinations of
the four normative situations discussed, with the two middle
areas--pluralism and subcultural anomie--often of great im-
portance" (1964:168), Yinger goes on to emphasize:
•.• the complexity of modern societies. They are neith-
er "riddled with anomie," nor likely in the foreseeable
future to eliminate it. If one starts from a strongly
ideological position, he is likely to mistake pluralism
for anomie: since so ~any people do not behave accord-
ing to my norms, there is normlessness. In a heterogen-
eous society it is not .easy, as Robin Williams says, to
distinguish deviation from the norms from (1) subcultur-
al variation; (2) a permissible alternative interpreta-
tion of general norms, or (3) patterned evasions of "he-
roic" norms that are so corrunon that the evasions them-
selves are normative (1964:163).
Again, these are valuable distinctions; far too many scales
of anomie are really only self-fulfilling prophecies--since
the investigator defines the self and society as normless,
they then discover widespread and pervasive projections of
anomie! Or, if people do not agree with my norms, the socie-
ty is going to hell in a handbasket. Clearly, neither of
these projections are acceptable as indicators of sociocul-
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tural anomie. Yinger's distinctions would prove helpful in
clearing up the loose theoretical formulations and project-
ions of anomie by liberal-radical thinkers on the larger so-
ciety, and might also help researchers better test exactly
what they set out to explore.
Finally, Yinger, who works largely with a Parsonian-
Mertonian "functionalist" framework, tends at a few points
to recapture some of Durkheim's original emphases. For in-
stance, when he turns to consider the rising anomie during
the 1960's, Yinger speaks of the rising level of aspirations
in these terms:
I think there can be little doubt that the urbanization
of American society, the increase in education, the dif-
fusion of media of communication, the enormous visibil-
ity of goods and services available, among other influ-
ences, have raised the levels of expectations enormous-
ly. Opportunity structures have probably not kept pace
with opportunities envisaged--the very essence of ano-
mie as Merton sees it (1964:164).
However, Yinger fails to consider whether such an opportuni-
ty-aspiration disjunction is not inherent in American socie-
ty--for Durkheim's notion of anomie is that aspirations al-
ways outstrip reality, because they are inherently limitless.
If so, American culture is permeated with acute Durkheimian
anomie (of the second variety).
In the mid-1970's, two other thinkers raised this prob-
lem in a slightly different way. Simon and Gagnon (1976) sug-
gest that, in contrast to Merton's notions of an "anomie of
deprivation caused by scarcity," we see today an "anomie of
affluence." Whereas Merton emphasized lack of access to struct-
tural means of achieving cultural success goals, Simon and
Gagnon emphasize that ease of access to means of success tri-
vializes achievement, it depreciates the "currency." Address-
ing themselves especially to the loss of support for the stan-
dard American Dream of individual success among upper-middle
and middle-class youth during the 1960's and '70's, Simon
and Gagnon see a t1demystification of success": t1 N'here success
is hard to get it is worth a lot, where it is easy, it becomes
worthless." "In such a situation, the problematic nature of
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the means that plays such a crucial part in Merton's formu-
lation tends to lose much of its significance" (1976:369).
In contrast to Merton's typology of adaptations and much of
deviance research which had traditionally focussed on non-
conforming outsiders and lower-classes, Simon and Gagnon ob-
serve that "It is the largely neglected and largely unexplain-
ed deviance of those in the higher economic and educational
strata" (1976:369) which is to be explored under the title
of the "anomia of affluence." To be fair to Merton, however,
it should be noted that he has explored the related problem
of the "anomie of success" in 1964 and elsewhere. In any
case, Simon and Gagnon's contribution to understanding the
sociocultural situation in which the commitment to goals,
to the prime cultural values themselves becomes problematic
(instead of the less critical Mertonian notion of lessened
commitment to operating institutional means) is a welcome
one. Perhaps we might surmise, as is suggested in Book Four,
that the withdrawalof affect from the dominant success goals
and"American Dream"ideology during the cultural revolution
of the 1960's and '70's had something more to do with the
rejection of the anomie--the embedded egoism and insatiabil-
ity of American culture. Although Simon and Gagnon did recog-
nize that Durkheim's notion of anomie referred to insatiabil-
ity, they neglect to link the rejection of the endless, ex-
hausting, and destructive American drive for individual suc-
cess with the ravages of Durkheimian anomie.
Finally, let us consider the ambitious attempt of Elwin
Powell (1958) to redefine the meaning of anomie in terms of
occupation, status, and suicide. Freely mixing sociological,
psychological, and psychoanalytic perspectives, Powell propo-
ses that the common denominator of the different elements of
Durkheim's typology and the different definitions of anomie
is "meaninglessness." Proceeding from what he takes to be
Durkheim's and Merton's discussions, Powell contends: "t'lhen
the ends of action become contradictory, inaccessible, or in-
significant, a condition of anomie arises. Characterized by a
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general loss of orientation and accompanied by feelings of
"emptiness" and apathy, anomie can be simply conceived of as
meaninglessness" (1958:132).
Powell then constructs a V-shaped scale to describe sui-
cides based upon occupational status. Powell terms the lower
extreme "anomie as dissociation"--the skidders, men in retreat
from the world, and "desocialized personalities"--devoid of a
coherent conceptual structure, impotent to act, and so forth.
At the upper end with the professional-managerial groups, Pow-
ell distinguishes "anomie as envelopment." In contrast to the
other end (type V) where "anomie seems to be associated with
a fragmentation of the conceptual" and (quoting Durkheim) re-
sults from "society's insufficient presence in th~ individual,"
in this type the "se1f is almost completely enveloped by the
success ideology and presents the paradox of what might be
called institutionalized anomie, ie. meaninglessness arising
from normative regulation itself." Here Powell comes close to
the transition from Durkheim's first to second schema of sui-
cide with his notion of an "institutionalized anomie" among
professional-managerial types in business and the liberal
professions. Because the "whole of life" for these upper-mid-
dle class occupational groups "revolves around drives for
success, it wholly permeates the individual who thus has no
life 0f his own." Yet, while insightful in a number of ways,
Powell concludes in contrast to Durkheim that:
The source of anomie is not the destruction of ends or
the quest for infinitely receding goals, but the inabil-
ity of the self to reconstruct its own ends from the
raw materials (concepts) presented to it by the culture.
Living by the unexamined directives of the culture, the
person has the sense of being totally controlled by for-
ces outside himself. Hence, he feels he is not really
living at all (1958:139).
Powell then summarizes his ambitious reconstruction of Durk-
heim's theory of anomie, and his own V-shaped continuum of
dissociation and envelopment in these terms:
As opposite poles of a continuum, two forms of anomie
can be discerned: the one results from the self's dis-
sociation from, the other, its envelopment by, the con-
ceptual system of the culture. Both render the indivi-
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dual impotent and thus give rise to self-contempt
whicr. in extreme cases eventuates in suicide (1958: 139) •
Now, while Powell's article contains useful insights,
and approaches both Durkheim's notions of anomie at certain
points and our second schema, his claim that the essencp. of
Durkheim's theory is "meaninglessness" is itself almost mean-
ingless, for it is without any demonstration beyond bald as-
sertion. Indeed, Powell's interesting but highly arbitary re-
definition of anomie seems somewhat like a sponge soaking up
any and all available meanings of anome, egoisme, alienation,
and the like. Once again, anomie reveals its nature as a pro-
tean concept.
In a little known but excellent rejoinder to Powell's
proposals, Cary-Lundberg (1959) raised a series of questions
with a degree of insight and historical precision rarely seen
in these matters. Her perspicacious response to Powell's fuzz-
ing of Durkheimian anomie can be taken as a valuable critique
of the dispersive tendencies of the miscellaneous stream of
development of anomie. First, Cary-Lundberg asks whether Pow-
ell's rather arbitrary declaration that the essence of Durk-
heim's anomie is "meaninglessness" is true to Durkheim's u-
sage and intentions.
Durkheim's major concern in Le Suicide is with a socie-
ty as a collectivity, with the state of its ordre col-
lectif and its conscience collective. To describe Eu-
rope's collective consciousness pre-1900, Durkheim used
the term malaise. A sickness, not economic, but moral,
he said, afflicts France and the West because all pre-
viously existing cadres have either broken down or been
worn away by time. Thus: social disorganization; dis-
carded and discredited norms; a flat unwillingness to
accept in any form a checkrein on pleasures, appetites,
production, or prosperity .•.. In de-controlled societies
"suffering" from anomie, he said, large numbers of men
are driven to suicide by frustration at the collapse of
exaggerated hopes, by exasperation at the failure of
excessive ambitions, by rage over being balked in any
pursuit ••••
Anomie ••• can by no scientific canon be "simply con-
ceived as meaninglessness" (1959:250,251).
She concludes her excellent short response by soliciting "Mr.
Powell's reexamination of his primary source •.• his findings
••
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do not require him to redefine anomie. On the contrary, they
require Durkheim's type of refined analysis and penetrating
insight" (1959:252). Powell's reply, in turn, rests simply
on his weak assertion that he is working in the spirit of
Durkheim rather than from his explicit works!
It often happens that, as a stream of thought begins
to diffuse and confuse the original paradigm, an incisive
commentator will bring the intellectual exhaustion to pUblic
light. The various criticisms of Merton's anomie, Mizruchi's
questioning of the relations between Mertonian and Durkheimi-
an anomie, and Cary-Lundberg's incisive rebuttal to Powell's
arbitrary claims, illustrate this possibility. At such times,
two basic options seem open: either disregard the original
conception and boldly strike out on one's own, without mak-
ing any self-legitimating claims, or stop the facile and mis-
leading identifications of different streams of thought and
try to recapture the fullness of the pioneer's ideas.
••
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PART II
CONFUSIONS OVER DURKHEIM'S TYPOLOGY OF SUICIDE
Introduction. Despite the almost universally acclaimed para-
digmatic status of Suicide, Durkheim's typology of suicide re-
mains largely undeveloped and confused in the sociological
literature. While social scientists have lavished attention on
anomie, with diverse results, the complementary types of ego-
isme, altruisme, and fatalisme continue to languis~ in socio-
logical darkness. If Durkheim himself, for instance, insisted
that egoisme was responsible for more suicides in the modern
world than anomie, how has it been possible for sociologists
to either consistently ignore egoisme or to collapse it into
anomie? In turn, how has it been possible, even for historical
•
sociologists and ethnographers, to ignore the historical and
cultural implications of altruisme and fatalisme? Of Durkheim's
four types, only one--anomie--really survives; what accounts
for this radical truncation of his profound and complex theo-
ries? Is this truncation and distortion an outcome unique to
the reception of Durkheim's doctrines? Or, on the other hand,
can we begin to see here the outlines of a generic sociolcul-
tural process (see McCloskey, 1974)?
Several other observers of the curious fate of Durk-
heim's typology have noted this characteristic process. For
instance, although over fifteen years ago Dohrenwend noted
" ..• a tendency to overlook the conditions labelled by the
companion concepts of egoism and altruism, and the footnoted
stepchild, fatalism, has all but been ignored" (1959:466), the
balance between these equally important types has yet to be
fully redressed. Giddens (1966:277) observed: "Durkheim's
types of egoistic and anomic suicide .•. have not been devel-
oped by later sociologists as a typology." Over a decade after
••
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Dohrenwend's initial statement of concern, A.R. Mawson echoed
both Dohrenwend and Giddens: "The relations between Durkheirri's
concepts of anomie and egoisme have been virtually ignored in
the substantial body of literature on social pathology" (1970:
298) .
Now; the mystery surrounding the virtual disappearance
of three~quarters of Durkheim's typology of suicide is deepen-
ed by the curious fact that anomie--the one type developed by
sociologists--has been mostly applied to theories of deviance
and despair, while sociologists concerned with understanding
suicide have largely ignored both egoisme and anomie by trans-
lating them into some standard sociological euphemism such as
social disintegration, normlessness, alienation, and so forth.
And it is unfortunate that Durkheim's typology of suicide has
had little impact on historical or philosophically minded so-
ciologists concerned with historical processes and the origins
and dilemmas of the modern and post-modern worlds. Giddens ob-
serves in this regard:
Sociologists s~udying suicide have tended to reject
the concept of anomie as either being indistinguish-
able from egoisme, or as having little explanatory.
reference to suicide. Writers concerned with other
forms of deviant behavior, on the o~her hand, have
made anomie the mainspring of a general theory ....
There seems to be little logic in the uneven uSe which
has been made of these concepts~ (1966:277).---
Durkheim's fate here has been cleverly summed up by one obser-
ver: "Clearly our estimate of Durkheim is more reverential
than referential. Presently it is less appreciation than pat-
terned evasion" (C. Parker Wolf, 1966:723). As I indlcated ear-
lier (see Book Three), Durkheim's classic Suicide has exper-
ienced a doubly sad fate, for not only has anomie--his most fa-
mous concept--undergone routine and progressive distortion--
but at the same time the rest of Durkheim's complementary ty-
pology has also been routinely ignored, and thus relegated to
sociological darkness.
Fortunately, over the years several observers have at~
tempted to rescue Durkheim'stypology from obscurity. We shall
now briefly explore their widely diverging reinterpretations.
••
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Attempts to restore Durkheim's schema to the center stage of
sociological thought can be roughly classified into two differ-
ent types--what I shall term "reductions" and "rescues." By
the former I refer to those reinterpretations which argue that
Durkheim's four separate types can be legitimately reduced
down to one common denominator. On the contrary, "rescues" re-
fer to those interpretations which seek to restGre the full
measure of distinction to the four interrelated types of sui-
cide. Of course, we cannot here review all the various descrip-
tive summaries or recapitulations of Durkheim's typology in
the secondary literature: rather, we shall be concerned only
with those who argue a distinctive reduction or rescue of the
four types.
Underlying these conflicting discussions is the recogni-
tion, of course, that the structure and meaning of Durkheim's
typology of suicide is not self-evidently clear, that it may
often be ambiguous, and in process of development. Precisely
because the schemas are obscure, they require careful inter-
pretation. Something lost, something hidden--it is to the re-
covery of such meanings that we sharpen our hermeneutical
tools.
Let us turn first to consider several reductions of
Durkheim's typology, and then, finally, consider several res-
cues of the distinctness of all four types which serve as a
bridge to our own second schema of suicide as developed in
Book Three. Our guiding assumptions here are that any
adequate reconstruction of Durkheim's typology of suicide must:
(a) take seriously the reductionists' attempts to elucidate an
underlying unity to the four types, and (b) follow the rescuers
in their attempt to elucidate the distinctness of the four
types. Hence, we seek to reconcile this conflict by simultan-
eously interrelating the four types, yet maintaining their dis-
tinctness. We seek here a coherent unity-in-diversity (see
also Part I, Book Three).
•
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CHAPTER NINE
• REDUCTIONS
A. Poggi and The Four-Fold Table
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Following Parsons' emphasis on normative regulation,
Gianfranco Poggi (1972) suggests that social cohesion is
really dependent upon normative regulation. Although citing
neither Barclay Johnson (1965) nor Bruce Dohrenwend (1959),
Poggi attempts to demonstrate his theses by showing that Durk-
heim's typology cannot be adequately conceptualized in terms
of a standard four-fold table.
Although poggi has a point in revealing the essential
links between social structural integration and normative reg-
ulation, in attempting to argue his thesis, Poggi--as with the
other reductionists--goes to the other extreme by insisting
that there is no significant difference between these variables,
and thus between egoisme and anomie. And, of course, like the
others, Poggi neglects to ask whether the variables of social
cohesion and normative regulation are sufficient to adequately
conceptualize the full complexity of Durkheim's types.
The distinctions between cohesion and regulation, like
that between mechanical and organic solidarity, may be'
one on which Durkheim places more weight than its ana-
lytical tenability warrants. In particular, his inter-
pretation of the differential suicide rates of various
religious groups implicitly suggests that in his own
view a society's cohesion depends on the extent to which
which individuals are made the subject of norms, and
is thus a product of regulation. The fact that in one
passage his distinction between "egoistic" and "anomic"
suicide is linked to that between cohesion and regula-
tion ••• is not decisive for two reasons. In the first
place, the distinction between egoistic and anomic sui-
cide can be alternatively construed in terms of differ-
ent types of norms. In the second place, Durkheim's own
attempts ·to base the distinction on that between cohe-
sion and regulation is intrinsically faulty. This can
••
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best be seen from a longish footnote [S:279] in which·
Durkheim insists that cohesion and regulation should
be treated as mutually independent variables but fails
to establish his case (1972:200).
While Poggi's argument, as with the other reductionists, is
valuable~~hat it attempts to establish a deeper, underlying
coherence to Durkheim's typology, Poggi seems so consumed by
the search for normative themes in Durkheim's doctrines that
he is also willing, like the other reductionists, to simply
set aside or contradict Durkheim's own statements when they
run counter to their theses. This, then, is the virtue and
vice of the reductionists: while, on the one hand, they will
lead us to articulate the interrelation of all four types in
terms of some underlying unity, they will, on the other hand,
lead us to ignore or swamp out crucial differences between
the various types. Instead of generating an articulated sche-
ma, the reductionists lead us to one irreducible common de-
nominator, a radical reduction to one category.
To demonstrate his contention that underlying Durkheim's
typology is the single, fundamental continuum of normative reg-
ulation, Poggi attempts to categorize Durkheim's schema in
terms of a simple, standard four-fold table. Failure to do so,
Poggi holds, implies the rejection of all attempts to maintain
the distinctness of Durkheim's types.
But there is no way of constructing such a table with
Durkheim's pretended independent variables as its two
coordinates and his four types of suicide as its cells;
that is, no "property space" comprising the four types
will result from actually treating his two variables
as independent and crossing them (1972:201).
As might be expected, however, Poggi neglects to inquire whe-
ther: (a) there are any other adequate ways of schematically
conceptualizing Durkheim's types in a coherent structure; (b)
there is any inherent necessity in conceptualizing Durkheim's
types exclusively in terms of a simple four-fold table; (c)
and if not, whether this still disqualifies Durkheim's own ex-
plicit statements to the contrary.
Since he fails to pursue such alternative formulations,
Poggi concludes:
••
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Cohesion and regulation [can be] juxtaposed, but they
cannot be "crossed," either because they are not inde-
pendent of one another or because they belong to dif-
ferent levels of conceptualization. I have already sug-
gested that Durkheim's own treatment assumes the depen-
dence of cohesion on regulation in spite of his claims
to the contrary. At any rate, Durkheirn's repeated dis-
cussions of the nature of society, the concept of so-
cial fact, and on morals unequivocally indicate that
in his thought normative regulation has no rival as the
central and critical component of society (1972:201-2).
Again, Poggi's claim is valuable in that it directs our atten-
tion to the pervasiveness of normative themes in Durkheim's
notion of social control~ however, Poggi's argument is no more
acceptable than many of the translations of anomie since, it
too,. ignores much of the underlying "nuclear structure" of
Durkheim's thought. How can one speak, for instance, of the
need for "normative regulation" unless one knows what Durkheim
thought needed controlling--namely, the insatiable passions of
the pre-socialized "ego? Not including this factor in any dis-
cussion of Durkheim's theory of normative regulation is a
basic failure. Further, even given his two central variables . _
of social cohesion and normative regulation, poggi neglects
to explore Barclay Johnson's interesting attempt to schemati-
cally present just these two factors in terms of high and low
positions, or Anthony Giddens' helpful attempt to present ano-
mie and egoisme as representing two low positions on two con-
tinuums of integration, social and normative. For these and
other reasons, Poggi's curious exercise demonstrates little,
except the limitations of four-fold tables as standard inter-
pretive devices, and the binds interpreters get themselves in-
to by slighting whole portions of the very doctrine which
they hope to understand.
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B. Barclay Johnson'~ Reduction
In one of the more interesting and independent analyses
of Durkheim's types, Barclay Johnson alleges that all four
types can be reduced down to one basic underlying dimension--
integration or regulation. However, in order to reduce the
distinctness of Durkheim's types down to one homogeneous, com-
mon denominator, Johnson i~ forced to do great violence not
only to Durkheim's crucial doctrines of human nature and his
image of the direction of historical development, but also to
much evidence in Durkheim's own statements opposing such a re-
duction. One thing is certainly clear, however, from such an
attack as Johnson's--any adequate theory of suicide, even if
based upon their essential distinctiveness, must follow in-
terpreters such as Halbwachs, Gibbs and Martin, Johnson and
others in so far as they attempt to establish common founda-
tions for egoisme and anomie.
Johnson begins well enough by identifying from the
first part of Durkheim's work two key "independent variables"
--namely, social integration and social regulation (eg. see
also Smelser, 1976: 90). Then Johnson characterizes these as
continuums, with high, low and medium possibilities. Next, he
matrices these possibilities--anomie, fatalisme, egoisme, and
altruisme--as low and high locations on these continuums of
regulation and integration, respectively. As long as one ig-
nores Durkheim's inherent dichotomizing tendencies, and his
doctrines of human nature and history, Johnson's analysis ap-
pears to be a useful schematic summary of common observa-
tions. Indeed, at least one observer of Durkheim who maintains
that Durkheim's types can be distinguished, Anthony Giddens,
bases his schema of Durkheim's typology on essentially the
same schema of continuums of social structural integration
and normative regulation (1966).
Then Johnson begins his own series of reductions by
first eliminating altruisme and fatalisme from serious consi-
deration. Johnson contends: "Under Durkheim's own premises,
he cannot legitimately study altruistic and fatalistic groups"
••
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(1965:879) because reliable statistics are not available for
primitive societies! And thus what began as an attempt to re-
store Durkheim's original schema to fuller significance now
turns into the one of the most extreme and questionable re-
ductions attempted. By abstracting Durkheim's thought and ig-
noring the historical underpinnings of the typology of sui-
cide, Johnson presumes that Durkheim's notions of fatalisme
and altruisme are largely suppositionary. "Altruisme should
be excluded from Durkheim's theory, then, because, with the
single exception of the army, all the cases he cites either
lack evidence or are not explained in purely social terms ll
(1965:881) •
After attempting to justify thus his unfounded slight-
ing of the entire pre-modern half of Durkheim's schema, John-
son then attempts to extend his reformulation by citing the
discovery of a II serious flaw in the theory," and thus seeming
to justify his collapse of anomie and egoisme down to one com-
mon denominator. liTo overcome this 'flaw, egoisme and anomie
should be equated, for integration and regulation are in truth
one dimension, rather than two ll (1965:881). Johnson insists
that, since the suicide rate depends on two social variables,
integration and regulation, II ••• even to predict a group's rel-
ative rate requires that one locate each group on both dimen-
sions at once" (1965:882). Now, we have ourselves (eg. see
Part I, Book Three) pointed out some fundamental flaws in
Durkheim's theory, especially as they relate to his applica-
tion of his doctrine of homo duplex to cases of suicide; the
question here is whether Johnson has identified a real flaw
or simply confused further an already ambiguous situation.
How can one equate integration and regulation unless you
know what each specifically implies? And, what role does Durk-
heim's doctrine of homo duplex play in relation to these two
notions of social integration and normative regulation? These
questions must be answered by the reductionists.
Then Johnson offers a series of reasons justifying his
claim that egoisme and anomie are not merely related but iden-
tical.
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Suicide contains a number of reasons for concluding
that egoisme and anomie are merely two different names
for the same thing. First, if anomie and egoisme can
be equated, so that integration and regulation are
really only one dimension, then one need only know
which of the two will have the higher suicide rate.
Thus, equating egoisme and anomie resolves the flaw
I have found in Durkheim's theory and makes his pre-
dictions determinate (1965:882).
Rather than attempt, through systematic exegesis and compari-
son of Durkheim's foundational theory with one of his special
sociologies, to elucidate and sort through the various com-
plexities and ambiguities of Durkheim's doctrine, reduction-
ists such as Johnson wade in with sledge hammers, pound the
typologies into a homogeneous pulp, and emerge triumphantly
with a single common denominator! Small matter, really, that
in the process one simply contradicts the pioneer thinkers'
own testimony. For his second reason, Johnson argues that
since anomie and egoisme usually occur together, they are
more or less identical. Johnson's special dispensation to ig-
nore crucial parts of Durkheim's theory, and to reconstruct
other parts solely in terms of his own special logics, allows
him to go so far as to propose that " •.. not only do the two
coincide empirically, but there is not even a conceptual dis-
tinction between them ll (1965:883).
Johnson then attempts to argue, from a very incomplete
exegesis of Durkheim's work, that " ..• Durkheim's very defin-
itions of the terms make egoisme and anomie identical ll (1965:
883). He continues:
But it remains to be shown that the two conditions
are conceptually identical. Such a conclusion can be
defended on the grounds that when Durkheim creates
what purports to be a separate concept, anomie, from
one aspect of egoisme, he contradicts one of his own
principles. His definitions of mechanical and organic
solidarity in The Division of Labor, and of egoisme in
Suicide, seem to derive from-the working principle that
several dimensions coinciding empirically should be re-
garded as one conceptually. Each end of a such a multi-
faceted dimension is then assigned a single name, and
treated as a single concept. According to Durkheim's
own practice, then a legitimate definition of anomie
must encompass not only the absence of social regula-
tion but the other two aspects of egoisme as well. Ano-
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mie and egoisme are thus identical conceptually as
well as empirically (1965:884).
While one cannot fault the attempt to point out internal in-
consistencies in an argument, we can hardly follow Johnson
here in his curious slighting of evidence in Durkheim's own
work contrary to Johnson's claims. Johnson repeatedly ignores
counter evidence and invokes tacit and questionable "princi-
ples" purportedly derived from the text itself. The violence
that secondary interpreters sometimes wreak on "sacred texts"
is nowhere seen so clearly as here, for Johnson simply outlaws
Durkheim's own explicit distinctions between egoisme and ano-
mie, especially in the section on "Individual Forms of Suicide."
Again, Johnson's fourth argument relies on the same spe-
cious type of claim.
My fourth argument for equating the two conditions is
that he fails in this attempt ...• If the morphological
types depend logically on the aetiological types, there
can only be as many of the former as there are of the
latter. In short, if egoisme and anomie are identical
social conditions, they cannot have distinguishable psy-
chological manifestations (1965:884).
But Johnson simply ignores that it is he, not Durkheim, who has
"established" the fact that "egoisme and anomie are identical
social conditions," and therefore must be morphologically as
well as aetiologically identical. What an arrogant way to in-
terpret a text--to consistently and repeatedly ignore not only
the author's doctrines but his explicit statements, to revise
the stated theories by engaging in purely imposed "internal
logical checks," instead of first attempting to discover and
make systematic and explicit the "logics-in-use" in the origin-
al theory, and finally, when faced with incontrovertible evi-
dence from the text itself, to appeal to the specious authori-
ty of the "conclusions" which one has already "established"
solely by oneself!
Interestingly, Johnson then considers and rejects Par-
sons' discovery of an important distinction between egoisme
and anomie .
... Parsons' claim is an ill-founded one. His position
is that Durkheim implicitly linked anomie with the
strength of the common conscience, and egoisme with its
••
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content. Anomie is present where common sentiments
and social regulation are weak, whereas egoisme oc-
curs where a common sentiment places a high value on
the individual. I have no quarrel with Parsons' view
of anomie, but I must challenge his interpretation
of egoisme (1965:885).
How Johnson treats this discordant suggestion (see the succeed-
ing chapter) is most interesting, for here one interpreter sum-
marily dismisses the important insights of Parsons into one of
Durkheim's most profound break throughs.
Parsons derives this interpretation largely from Durk-
heim's discussion of Protestantism. Durkheim says Pro-
testants are ruled by a "spirit of free inquiry." Par-
sons contends that this spirit is a shared sentiment
maintained by the religious authority of the Protest-
ant church. But, on the contrary, Durkheim asserts that
it is a breakdown of collective sentiments which has
led Protestants to pursue truth independently of any
social authority. Protestant society is weak and poorly
integrated. This absence of integration, and of the
shared sentiments accompanying it, forces individuals
to find purpose and meanings for their lives independ-
ently (1965:885).
But Johnson does not here sufficiently emphasize, in contrast
to Parsons, Durkheim's highly critical attitude toward egoisme;
further, in order to refute Parsons' virtuous image of egoisme
as sanctioned by Protestant individualism, he falls back on the
weak link in Durkheim's evolutionary argument. Although Johnson
is prone to invoke many logical checks, he fails here to cri-
tically review Durkheim's generalized doctrine of the emergence
of individualism through the progressive division of labor (see
Book One). Not only is this not a sufficient explanation of
the historical process, but, as Parsons observed, there is much
evidence in Durkheim's work itself to support the notion of
egoisme as culturally sanctioned.
But Johnson next turns to deal summarily with this cri-
tical evidence in Suicide itself.
Occasionally, Durkheim contradicts his usual view of
egoisme and his cult of personality, and his confusions
help to account for Parsons' misunderstanding. At sev-
eral points he speaks as if the cult of personality pre-
vailed in his time, as if it is upon it that "all our
morality rested." But this notion contradicts other,
more powerful lines in his thought. If a strong common
respect for the individual existed in Durkheim's time,
••
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then his whole analysis of modern egoisme (and, since
it is indistinguishable from egoisme, of anomie as well)
must be considered invalid. The common conscience in a
given society cannot be simultaneously strong and weak
. (1965: 885) •
Johnson was on to something important here--he almost recog-
nizes the foundations of Durkheim's second schema, that anomie
and egoisme are culturally sanctioned in the modern world. But
Johnson rejects these transitional possibilities as a "hope-
less muddle," and thus again misses important clues to the
breakthrough to Durkheim's second theory.
Nonetheless, if the cult of personality and egoism co-
exist empirically, they must somehow be reconciled theo-
retically. Durkheim toys with the position that the two
are somehow compatible, so that egoism is "associated
with" respect for individuality in civilized nations .•••
Since Parsons equates the cult of personality with ego-
isme, he may well have relied heavily on this passage.
But it is a hopeless muddle, an attempt to reconcile two
irreconcilable views of the modern world, and thus hard-
ly a suitable proof text for the Parsonian view (1965:
836) •
Hence, we witness once again how difficult basic conceptual
breakthroughs can be--for here one of the leading contemporary
interpreters of Durkheim's suicide typology, when led by Par-
sons, one of the seminal mcdern interpreters of Durkheim, to
the very brink of discovery of Durkheim's second theory, in-
stead turns around, throws up his hands in dismay, and casti-
gates the outlines of Durkheim's second schema~sa "hopeless
muddle"! I merely now note that what Barclay Johnson retreat-
ed from as a "hopeless muddle," viewed in terms more faithful
to the complexities of Durkheim's own thought, constitutes
the foundations of the linkage of such basic paradigms of ano-
mie, egoisme, and the Protestant Ethos.
Instead of sorting through the various levels of Durk-
heim's meanings, Johnson, though rightly noting many ambigui-
ties permeating Durkheim's work, nonetheless wrongly concludes
that this fruitful ambiguity must be set aside and the most
severe and simplest kind of reductions embraced. Johnson is
like a sociological Puritan, reducing the complex deposit
of faith, tradition, and symbol down to the barest essentials.
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Durkheim's confusion must be acknowledged. But the
evidence strongly suggests that his primary view is
that egoisme implies not a strong common sentiment
of respect for the individual, but rather the weak-
ness of the common conscience. Since this weakness,
and the resulting absence of social regulation, is
also defined as anomie, I conclude once again that
egoisme and anomie are identical (1965:886).
Once again, Johnson was on to something important here--for
he realizes, as we do (see the section on Parsons in the suc-
ceeding chapter), that Parsons has taken only one of Durk-
heim's explanations of the origins of egoisme. In our recon-
struction, we suggest that Parsons took over egoisme from
the second schema, and tried, unsuccessfully, to insert it
into the first schema of suicide. But Johnson's drive to
reduce, rather than elucidate, the complexities of Durkheim's
thought, leads him to ignore this important possibility. Fin-
ally, Johnson neglects to even cite the wholly contrary asser-
tions of Bruce Dohrenwend (1959).
Although he begins well, and offers several valuable in-
sights, by pursuing so relentlessly his theses Barclay Johnson
not only reduces the diversity and rich meaning of Durkheim's
typology, but also manages to set aside contrary evidence from
Durkheim himself as "confusing" and a "hopeless muddle," while
also ignoring counter-evidence from other secondary interpre-
ters. While Johnson turned away from the complexities and am-
biguities of Durkheim's thought, and reduced his types down to
one common denominator, other interpreters seized upon the po-
tentialities of Durkheim's profound theses, and moved boldly
ahead to forge new perspectives.
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C. Whitney Pope and Social Integration
One of the more sophisticated reductions of Durkheim's
typology of suicide can be found in Whitney Pope's recent
book, Durkheim'~ Suicide: A Classic Analyzed" (1976). Pope is
a follower of Barclay Johnson: "I accept Johnson's equation
of integration with regulation, but reject the rationale un-
derlying the elimination of altruisme (and fatalisme)" (1976:
46). Pope treats social integration as the key to suicide; he
emphasizes social structure and social interaction. In taking
"mechanical solidarity" as his essential model, Pope drops
out the evolutionary dimension, and collapses all down to so-
cial integration. Pope asserts that: " .•. Durkheim shifted a-
way from The Division of Labor'~ two types of solidarity mod-
el, and toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the me-
chanical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to prim-
itive but also to modern societies" (1976:37). Pope even goes
so far as to reverse Durkheim's theses: " ..• egoistic and a-
nomic suicide do not result from lack of organic solidarity,
but precisely from lack of mechanical solidarity" (1976:37).
In one sense, Pope's analysis is a welcome reexamina-
tion of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. His exploration is
good in that it recognizes the complexity of Durkheim's thes-
es, and insofar as it proposes a more complex, multivalent
sequential theory of suicidal processes. Specifically, Pope's
attempt is valuable in that he attempts to link Durkheim's no-
tions of social morphological and interactional processes to
his theory of sociocultural processes, and these, in turn, to
Durkheim's theses on suicide. Pope's theory is preeminently
a theory of intervening processes. The question remains, how-
ever, whether or not Pope's articulation of these intervening
processes is justified and compelling.
The essential flaws in Pope's effort include: (a) he
doesn't provide an in-depth exegesis of the underlying "nu-
clear structure" of all of Durkheim's work; hence, he has no
deeper structure in which to locate his literal exegesis of
Suicide; (b) Pope ignores Durkheim's crucial doctrine of man
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as homo duplex; (c) he also fails to place Durkheim's sui-
cide typology in an evolutionary context. I must insist, on
the contrary, that if there is no insatiability and egoism,
and no transforming historical process, there can be no ano-
mie and egoisme! Perhaps the most telling flaw in Pope's ar-
gument is his unfounded equation of "mechanical solidarity"
with an abstracted notion of social interaction. Unfortunate-
ly, Pope's attempt emerges as a yet another abstract, ahis-
torical reduction of Durkheim's schemas of suicide. Instead
of enriching Durkheim's seminal insights, Pope leaves us with
flatter, less interesting heritage.
Now, in his reconstruction of the typology, Pope in-
sists on: la) focussing almost exclusively on in~egration
and regulation (as if they were somehow key code words by
which to unlock the secrets of Durkheim's schemas), and (b)
conceptualizing the four types as if they had to be opposite
poles on these two continua. In both instances, he is
misled by occasional or summary comments of Durkheim. For
example, in the first case, it is more essential to eluci-
date Durkheim's actual "logics-in-use" rather than to seize
upon these two terms as if there were magic keys. Pope's
failure to compare and contrast a systematic exegesis of the
"nuclear structure" of all of Durkheim's work with a system-
atic "literal" exegesis of Suicide bars access to these ac-
tual shifting "logics-in-use." Hence, Pope's exegesis remains
on the outside of the "hermeneutical circle;" his interpreta-
tion remains on the surface.
In the second case, there is no innate necessity to
conceive of Durkheim's types as if they had to be opposite
poles on the ends of an integration and regulation contin-
uum. For these continua really do not emerge from a syste-
matic exegesis of the actual interpretive "logics-in-use"
through which Durkheim built up his typology from The Divi-
sion of Labor through his lectures on Moral Education and
Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Socialism, and Suicide.
Specifically, Pope argues:
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The first of Durkheim's two major explanatory variables
was integration. Two types of suicide represent opposite
ends of the integration continuum. One type is egoistic.
Rates of interaction in egoistic groups are low; beliefs,
values, traditions, and sentiments are not common to all
members. Consequently, they reciprocally enfeeble one a-
nother as they come into conflict. Collective life dimi-
shes, and individual interests assert themselves ..•.
Just as weak integration leads to high suicide rates, so
also does strong integration. With the individual com-
pletely absorped into and controlled by the group, his
individuality, so slightly developed, cannot be highly
valued (1976:12).
Thus, on the integration continuum, Pope portrays egoismeas
low integration and altruisme as high integration. In addi-
tion:
Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and
named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence
of social change resulting in a dimunition of social reg-
ulation •... Durkheim recognized that just as egoisme and
altruisme represent opposite ends of a single continuum,
so logically there should be an opposite end of anomie
on the regulation continuum (fatalisme) (1976:12-13).
Pope then connects these two continua with what he
takes to be "the underlying logical structure" of t.he theory.
Implicit in the derivation of Durkheim's typology of
suicide is the underlying logical structure of the
theory. Durkheim postulated identical relations be-
tween each of two independent variables--integration
and regulation--and suicide. When either is high or
low, the suicide rate is high; when either is moderate,
the rate is low. Changes in rates are proportional to
changes in the strength of these two variables. The
high and low points of each are named--egoisme and al-
truisme (integration) and anomie and fatalisme (regula-
tion)--and identified as the causes of suicide. The
theory, then, proposes that suicide rates are low at
some point along the integration and regulation con-
tinua, increasing in proportion to the distance from
those points (1976:14).
Yet, at various points Pope acknowledges that his sche-
ma is a secondary construction, and imposed on the material.
Suicide conveys the impression that Durkheim was only
vaguely and intemittently conscious of the underlying
logical structure of his theory. Only twice did he note
that when either integration or regulation is moderate,
suicide rates are low (1976:14).
Pope then admits that his schema is interpretive--that is,
••
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he attempts " ••• to make explicit what is left implicit in
Suicide itself;" but, how can we hope to accurately eluci-
date the implicit underlying structure of Durkheim's theses
here without performing a comprehensive and systematic exege-
sis of the underlying substantive structure informing all of
Durkheim's works?
Because he never explicitly worked with the total con-
figuration (Suicide identifies only one or two steps at
a time), the figure (4.1) entails some reconstruction
(1976: 31).
Again, Pope acknowledges that he has imposed his conceptual-
ization on Durkheim's Suicide •
••. it should be remembered that Durkheim did not typi-
cally think of his theory as diagrammed in figure 5.1.
Thus, he did not always take into account that in cros-
sing the mid-point of the integration continuum, the re-
lationship between integration and suicide changes from
negative (egoisms) to positive (al truisme) (1976: 210, #5) •
In sum, Pope insists on imposing on Durkheim's material an
abstract, ahistorical continuum, and insists on taking inte-
gration and regulation as code words; then, he reduces norma-
tive regulation down to structural integration; and finally,
he reduces this down to social interaction which is mistaken-
ly equated with "mechanical solidarity." When, at the end of
his book, Pope claims to have thereby resolved the 'central
ambiguity" of Suicide--the relationship between anomie and
egoisme, integration and regulation--"without cost," we can
hardly agree wlth him. For his reduction has been achieved,
as with Barclay Johnson's, only through a certain sort of
textual violence which shrinks and flattens this seminal
text. Our task today is to reappropriate our heritage, our
informing cultural traditions, not to flatten and reduce
them.
In terms of his first continuum of integration, while
faced with the ambiguous relation of egoism to religion and
belief systems, Pope chose to take Durkheim's early causal
model at face value, and thus, to collapse the cultural to
the structural level.
The strength of collective beliefs varies inversely
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with free inquiry. Strength of collective beliefs is
the independent variable, and each dimunition of its
strength results in a concomitant increase in free in-
quiry and individuality. But to speak of the strength
of collective beliefs is really to speak of the vitali-
ty, cohesion, or integration of society itself. The more
integrated a society is, the more it controls the behav-
ior of its members, protecting them from suicide ••••
Durkheim's explanation emphasizes the strength of collec-
tive beliefs and, hence, the level of integration in a
society determines, and varies inversely with, the
strength of free inquiry (moral individualism, or simply
individuality) (1976:16).
But Pope apparently did not realize that to Durkheim, moral
individualism was the opposite of egoistic individuality.
In addition, Pope (eg. 1976:19-20) fails to distinguish Durk-
heim's notion of individuation in The Division of Labor from
later developments, especially the crucial insight that mor-
al individualism is not simply a product of individuation
and differentiation, but, rather, that it must be culturally
constructed (see Chapter Eight, Book One).
In terms of integration in familial society, Pope
sounds some of his essential themes:
••. the number of people determines the amount of inter-
action, which determines the number of reacting conscious-
nesses, which determine the number of consciousnesses re-
acting in common and sharing collective sentiments, which
determines the degree of social integration (1976:17).
Although the level of integration is explained in terms of
the strength of cOllective sentiments, Pope attempts to an-
chor this, in turn, in degrees of social interaction without
recognizing the full extent of Durkheim's notions of social
morphological processes in evolution (see Chapter Four, Book
One), and Durkheim' s "law of moral mechanic s" (see Part I I,
Book Two).
Pope then offers his own synthetic theory of social in-
tegration. Here he acknowledges, again, that " ••• what is
missing is Durkheim's own synthesis ••• A synthesis is not
readily apparent" (1976:22). Pope's model, though complex,
centers around a strong/weak social interaction process.
Rate of interaction is central because it determines
the number of consciousnesses acting and reacting in
••
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common to each other and to collective sentiments, which
in turn determines the strength of the latter .... The
strength of the collective factor--here collective senti-
ments--and that of the individual factor--vary inversely.
The strength of collective sentiments determines the de-
gree of social integration (1976:22).
Pope here takes Durkheim's early simplistic opposition of
society to the individual as the key, and sees it as an ei-
ther/or proposition. Yet, Pope also sees that cUltural fac-
tors~-"collectiverepresentations"ahd "sentiments"--arecru-
cial, as we documented·in Chapter Four of Book One, and in
Book Three on the autonomization of "collective representa-
tions."
The higher the rate of interaction, the greater the fu-
sion of individual consciences into collective represen-
tations and, consequently, the stronger the latter. Durk-
heim here explained why both integration and regulation
vary inversely with interaction, which is decisive not
only as the process through which the "essential" social
component (collective representations, sentiments) is
created. but also as the determinant of the social fac-
tors' strength (1976:191).
And,of course, Pope's focus on social interaction is central
in Durkheim, as we saw in Book One. "Interaction is identi-
fied as the process through which emergent realities are cre-
ated" (1976:195). Yet, somehow, even though Pope perceives
certain key elements, his reductionistic drive leads him to
a certain type of positivistic stringing together of hypo-
theses. For instance:
... the rate of interaction determines the strength of
collective sentiments which, in turn,determines the de-
gree of social integration. Degree of integration deter~
mines the degree to which the individual finds meanings
in this life, which determines the social suicide rate
(1976:25).
This flattening drive yields, then, summary propositions such
as the idea that Durkheim's central empirical generalization
was:
... rate of interaction is proportional to numbers, in-
tegration is proportional to rate of interaction, and
suicide rates are inversely related to interaction
. (1976:77).
Yet, the drive for common denominators simply obscures cru-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1226--
cial principles in Durkheim's work; and the restringing of
causal connections leads to a very different model than that
which we discovered in Suicide.
To turn this into a theory of suicide requires adding
the following linkages: the strength of social integra-
tion determines the extent to which individuals act in
service of social interests, which determines the de-
gree to which they find meaning in life, which in turn
determines the social suicide rate. In sum, the theory
of egoisme as a theory of suicide holds that the higher
the rate of social interaction, the stronger collective
sentiments; the stronger collective sentiments, the
stronger social integration; the stronger social integra-
tion, the more individuals act in service of social in-
terests; the more individuals act in service of social
interests, the more meaning they find in life and the
lower the social suicide rate (1976:23).
But Pope then runs into trouble defining altruisme--
why should higher social integration lead to higher suicide
rates? Is it a case, perhaps, of too much meaning in life?
No, Pope claims that altruisme places too little meaning on
continued individual existence. "High levels of social inte-
gration lead to lack of meaning in individual existence,
which in turn leads to high suicide rates" (1976:23). But
this is sheer nonsense. However, it is not this existential
flaw which is most glaring in Pope's claim here; rather, it
is the failure to fully understand what "mechanical solidar-
ity" implies to Durkheim.
Pope then sets out to synthesize the two opposite sets
of suicide on the integration continua --namely, egoisme and
altruisme.
Given that egoisme refers to low, and altruisme to high,
levels of integration, it should be possible to inte-
grate the two theoretical statements. Both treat rate of
interaction as causally linked to level of social inte-
gration. However, the two linkages are somp.what differ-
ent. The theory of egoisme speaks of the number of con-
sciousnesses reacting in common as a determinant of the
strength of collective sentiments. In contrast, the the-
ory of altruisme states that high rates of interaction
enable strict social control, thereby insuring highly de-
veloped common group life and minimum individual diver-
gences. Hence, it becomes possible to integrate the the-
ory of altruisme and egoisme. The rate of interaction de-
termines the strength of collective sentiments, or, in
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different terms, the extensiveness of common life. The
strength of collective sentiments, in turn, determines
the strength of social integration. The similarities
underlying certain differences in terminology and causal
linkages are such that the theories of egoisme and al-
truisme may be synt~esized into a single theory of in-
tegration. The egoist commits sui.cide because his exis-
tence fails to fulfill his need to find meaning in life~
the altruist because he attaches little meaning to his
continued physical existence. Lack of meaning is deci-
sive in both cases (1976:23-4).
But underlying Pope's synthetic effort here is an unaccepta-
ble proposition. Can it really be the case that altruistic
suicide is a result of a lack of meaning in continued physi-
cal existence? Or, rather, is it because the individual is
so penetrated by collective rationales that, if necessary,
he will sacrifice himself for the group? Pope entirely misses
the point (see Books Two and Three) that in using altruism as
an index to mechanical solidarity, Durkheim pointed to a so-
ciocultural and evolutionary situation in which the sacro-
magical collective conscience pervades the individual's nas-
cent conscience and bends it almost completely to collec-
tive duties and traditional obligations. It is ludicrous to
suggest here, as Pop~ does, that altruisme is due to anything
but the presence of extremely strong cultural sanctions for
self-abnegation.
Pope's collapse of egoisme and altruisme down to an
abstract continuum of integration obscures these and other
important differences. It is not high social integration
which is the opposite of suicide~ for in mechanical solidar-
ity, dominated by a sacral complex (see Book One), altruisme
itself results from strong collective sentiments, high social
control and interaction, from high solidarity. Thus, Pope's
simplistic interactional-integration model suffers from the
outset.
Number of people determines the rate of social inter-
action, which in turn determines the strength of collec-
tive sentiments .... The strength of collective sentiments
determines the degree of social integration, which in
turn determines the degree to which the individual finds
meaning in life, which determines the social suicide rate
(1976:25).
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1228--
Now, Pope does identify (see his figure 4.1) the psy-
chological correlates of anomie and egoisme which Durkheim
associated in Suicide, but it is hard to pull these together
as Pope does. For, in reality, these belong to two different
schemas.
Altruistic suicide contrasts with egoistic in being more
active and passionate, and with anomie in that the source
of the "inspiring passion" is external, coming from soci-
ety •••• When related to the earlier distinctions between
egoisme and anomie, these contrasts raise questions. Cur-
iously; Durkheim attributed to altruistic suicide two
characteristics--activity and strong emotions--that had
previously been reserved for anomic (as opposed to egois-
tic) suicide. This attribution shows why the distinction
between egoisme and anomie cannot be equated with that
between integration and regulation generally.
Suicide successfully identifies several differences be-
tween anomie and egoisme. The difficulty is that the so-
ciological difference between them as causes of suicide
is never elucidated. In terms of key variables, Durkheim
drew his distinctions at the level of intervening, rather
than independent, variables .••. It is the sociological
distinction between integration and:regulation that Durk-
heim never identified. Suicide's failure in this regard
is an indication that the distinction between the two bas-
ic independent variables in his theory, and hence between
egoisme and anomie, is uncertain at best * (1976:33).
However, Pope's real insight here leads him, like Johnson, on
a relentless drive to reduce the apparent differences between
anomie and egoisme, rather than to provide a clearer and deep-
er articulation. If Pope had not insisted on conceptualizing
the suicide schemas in terms of. those code words--integration
and regulation--many of his problems would vanish. For in-
stance, he rightly observes that these two types are intimate-
ly related (eg. S:288). But, while it is true that egoisme and
altruisme share common foundations, Pope slights the real pos-
sibility that they may be still be distinguished as different
expressions of a common cultural source. Instead he collapses
their differences: "If egoisme and anomie have the same cause,
if they are aspects of the same social state, then, by defini-
tion, they are identical" (1976:45). "Suicide makes a strong
case for the identity of egoisme and anomie" (1976:45-6).
This is the very hallmark of the reductionistic thrust.
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In his program to reduce the regulation continuum to
social integration, Pope claims that:
.•• both integration and regulation may be linked to
either loss of meaning or to a means-needs equilibrium.
The unsuccessful nature of existing attempts to dis-
tinguish between egoisme and anomie, Durkheim's own
failure in this regard (especially in contrast with the
many indications in Suicide that anomie and egoisme are
essentially the same), the similarity of Durkheim's em-
pirical examples, his failure to control for either in
analyzing the relationship between the other and suicide,
and the possibility of coupling the links between sui-
cide and other major independent variables with those
of the other strongly argue for the essential similarity
of integration and regulation (1976:48).
Pope then adds the fOllowing caveat:
Of course, demonstrating the overlap between integration
and regulation does not necessarily rule out the possi-
bility that they are in some measure distinct. However,
to be viable, any identification of a distinction between
the two must be accompanied by a demonstration that the
distinction is comparable in theoretical importance to
their overlap, which lies at the core of Durkheim's the-
ory (1976 :48) •
I contend I have met these requirements in Book Three. By con-
trast, what is to be gained, and what is lost, from Pope's re-
duction? While he would probably answer: "a unified theory,"
it is clear that this is possible on other grounds, as we have
shown, one that maintains a unity-in-diversity. Why does Pope
insist on a radical reduction as the only way to resolve the
real ambiguities in Durkheim's work? Whyisitnot more desira-
ble, as a matter of course, to discern both a fundamental un-
ity and also a real diversity?
Pope's reductionistic drive leads him to make utterly
gratuitous assumptions; for instance, that the real function
of Durkheim's anomie theory is to protect the schema from
falsification. When faced with ambiguity, the reductionist
flattens the powerful, though unclear, portions, and then
raises up tiny molehills where no problem exists.
Durkheim's theory contains one pervasive ambiguity re-
sulting from the fuzziness of the integration-regulation
distinction. Since these are Durkheim's central indepen-
dent variables, ambiguity therefore exists at the core
of the theory. Indeed, the overlap between the theory of
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egoisme and that of anomie is virtually complete. Inclu-
ding the latter makes Durkheim's theory of suicide far
more difficult to falsify; however, it adds no more ex-
planatory power. Consequently, there is a strong case
for equating egoisme and anomie and, hence, integration
and regulation; thus resolving the most problematic as-
pect of Durkheim's theory without cost (1976:201) .
••. the real function of the theory of anomie is to pro-
tect the overall theoretical statement from falsifica-
tion (1976:56).
Pope then offers the following summaries of his theo-
retical reconstruction of the schemas of suicide .
.•• in seeking the starting points of his causal chain,
my obvious choice is to focus primarily on the theory
of integration .... Rate of interaction occupies a central
place in Durkheim's causal chain. This rate, in turn, is
determined by the numbers of mutually accessible people
in a given group or area which, in turn, is a func~ion
of society's morphological structure. The rate determines
the strength of collective sentiments, which determines
the degree of integration-regulation.
To turn this statement into a theory of suicide requires
including links between the level of integration-regula-
tion and social suicide rates. The stronger collective
sentiments are, the higher the degree of restraint exer-
cised by the group over individual needs and the more
nearly means are proportioned to needs (theory of ano-
mie) or, alternately, the greater the meaning in life
(theory of egoisme) and the lower the suicide rate. This,
then, is Durkheim's theory of egoisme-anomie as a theory
of suicide (1976:58).
Perhaps what underlies Pope's collapse of regulation (cultur-
al and normative forces) to integration-interaction is a cer-
tain bias toward social structure as a causal anchor. Pope
then contrasts this first schema with altruisme.
In contrast to this theory, which postulates an inverse
correlation between level of social control and suicide,
that of altruisme postulates a positive relationship.
Otherwise, the variables and their mutual relations are
the same, with one exception--the variable linking degree
of social control to suicide. In the case of egoisme-ano-
mie, means-needs equilibrium and meaning in life can be
seen as alternative links between level of social control
and suicide, while in the case of altruisme the former is
ruled out.
Clearly, the high level of social control in altruisme
insures the restrained individual passions and modest
needs that preclude the development of a means-need dis-
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equilibrium. Here it is a matter of the relative lack of
meaning in continued physical existence per se, because
meaning resides either in adhering to social dictates or
in achieving union with some goal beyond this life. When
"meaning in life" is defined as including these possibil-
ities, it constitutes the link between degree of social
control and the social suicide rate. Through degree of
social control, the relationship between variables are
the same as for the theory of egoisme-anomie (1976:S8).
Again, there is much of value in passages such as these: and
insofar as Pope makes distinctions such as those of above,
he helps to establish the cornmon foundations of the suicidal
types.
Pope summaries the overall theoretical structure of
his argument in· these terms:
The final relationships are as follows: the higher the
degree of social control, the less meaning is attached
to continued life per se, and the higher the social sui-
cide rate. Alternatively, the lower the degree of social
control, the more meaning is attached to continued life
per se, the less willing the individual is to part with
it, and the lower the social suicide rate. The complete
theory of suicide is produced by joining the theory of
egoisme-anomie with that of altruisme:
(1) the morphological structure of society determines
(2) the number of people in a given group or area, which
determines
(3) rate of social interaction, which determines
(4) strength of collective sentiments, which determines
(S) level of integration-regulation (social control),
which determines
(6) means-needs proportionality (meaning in life) (theory
of egoisme-anomie), and meaning attached to continued
existence (theory of altruisme), which together de-
termines the
(7) the social suicide rate (1976:60).
•
•
•
Having outlined and summarized Pope's theoretical re-
construction of Durkheim's typology of suicide, let us now
briefly review Pope's retreat from the second schema as we
have outlined it in Book Three. At various points Pope, like
others, perceived certain ambiguities in Durkheim's complex
treatment of suicide: however, Pope retreated from the second
schema just as he reduced normative regulation to structural
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integration. Let us here document those recognitions which
converge with mine, and then how Whitney Pope turned away
from the implications toward a very different schema.
For example, in his discussion of the relations be-
tweenegoisme and religion (1976:15-16), Pope sees that Durk-
heim emphasized the role of religious beliefs and ideas, e-
ven though Durkheim's early mechanical model of one-way
causality from structure to culture limited him. Then, in
terms of the relation betw.een egoisme and suicide~ Pope ob-
serves:
From Durkheim's perspective, however, this explanation
is less than satisfactory; even though the suicide rate
is a function of level of social integration, the sui-
cidal thrust is conceptualized as in opposition to so-
cial forces and as originating with the individual. It
may be stretching the point here to maintain that su~
cide is socially caused. Thus, it is not surprising to
find Durkheim [8:210] characterizing the above reasons
as "purely secondary" before going on to expl~in that
excessive individualism, itself the creation of the op-
eration of strictly social factors, creates the inclin-
ation to suicide "out of whole cloth"*(1976:l8).
Yet, Pope cannot grasp why Durkheim conceived of the suicidal
thrust in egoisme as opposed to social forces, because he has
no idea of Durkheim's doctrine of the insatiable passions of
the pre-social ego.
In terms of anomie in our second schema, Pope observes
that modern moral anarchy is culturally sanctioned:
Observin~characteristically, that belief systems reflect
an underlying social reality, Durkheim also noted that in
modern society, the anarchic state is elevated to a vir-
tue: "The longing for infinity is daily represented as a
mark of moral distinction" (1976:27).
Yet, Pope didn't know what to do with this insight.
In terms of his first characterization of anomie, Pope
comes closer to Durkheim's central ideas.
Durkheim introduced a second variable, regulation, and
named low regulation "anomie." Anomie is the consequence
of social change resulting in a dimunition of social reg-
ulation •..• Freed of social control, passions and appe-
tites are subject to no restraint, since only the collec-
tive moral authority of a group can perform this func-
tion. People's desires quickly outstrip their means. The
result is frustration, exasperation, and weariness lead-
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ing to high suicide rates (1976:12).
Thus, Pope did recognize the problem central to Durkheim--
the release of the individual from social control, and the
deregulation of desires. Pope even conceptualizes this in
terms of a means-needs imbalance.
The crucial consideration is whether man's means are ade-
quate for the fulfillment of his needs. Where means are
proportional to needs, Durkheim said that they exist in a
state of equilibrium; where the former are inadequate to
fulfill the latter, they exist in a state of disequili-
brium. These needs are not given by man'~ biological,
psychological, or individual nature. Rather, they are so-
cial products that vary from one social contextto the-
next. Particular goals, desires, passions, or appetites
for comforts may become translated into needs. Durkheim
used needs in a very broad sense to include all of these
things, and he spoke of needs, ends, and goals, or the
persons, appetites, and desires that can turn a want into
a need*(1976:25).
All of this is, of course, very close to schema number two.
Pope even notes that, to Durkheim, these needs are insatia-
ble.
Human needs are boundless and insatiable; consequently,
unless restrained they represent a constant threat to
individual happiness [S:246-8J. Far from serving to sa-
tiate the individual, satisfaction of needs serves only
to stimulate further needs. Thus, the sine qua non for
equilibrium between means and needs is some force that
limits man's desires. Since the needs in question are
are moral, society alone can provide the required re-
straint, because it is the only superior moral power
whose authority the individual accepts (1976:25).
This is straight from Durkheim; yet, again, one wonders why
are
human needs are boundless? And why, if Durkheim considered
(in his first schema) these insatiable desires to be the
very hallmark of anomie a-morality, then why does Pope say
that "these needs are moral"? How can they be both anomie
(amoral) and moral at the same time? But Pope sees no signi-
ficance to these problems and contradictions; these sub-
tleties simply drop from view in his reduction.
Pope elaborates this point, but simply fails to relate
it to Durkheim's doctrine of homo duplex.
Durkheim's explanation is based on three assumptions.
First, the happiness of man is to be explained not as
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1234--
a function of property or wealth, but rather of the de-
gree to which their means are proportional to their
needs. Second, the needs of man are not sUbject to any
inherent limitation. Finally, society is the only power
that can restrain these otherwise boundless goals and
thereby create the equilibrium between means and needs
upon which man's happiness depends (1976:26).
Pope fails to question Durkheim's underlying image of human
nature here; indeed, his neglect of this problem is so com-
plete that homo duplex doesn't even appear in his index!
Pope's blindness in this regard is matched by his
truncation of Durkheim1s theory of authority and social con-
trol. While we went to great lengths in Book One to uncover
Durkheim1s developing theory of social, cUltural, and pheno-
menological processes, Pope suggests:
Though his basic purpose was to explain how society
develops, shapes, and controls the individual, Durkheim
never clarified how social control occurs. He lS:3l8-l9,
335] conceptualized the relationship between society and
the non-social individual as one of forces in opposition.
In these terms, the more powerful society is as a system
of forces, the better able it is to control the opposing
force represented by the unsocialized individual
(1976:194; 195).
Thus, not only does Pope slight Durkheim1s absolutely cru-
cial doctrine of man as homo duplex, thus missing the source
of insatiability, he also ignores the developing notion of
social control and internalized moral authority to be found
in such works as Moral Education and The Elementary Forms.
In terms of altruisme, Pope sees two loci for this type
--namely, primitive society and the modern military; and he
notes (1976:21) that the military represents an evolutionary
survival in the modern world. Yet, his abstractness leads hi~
like so many others, to simply drop out the absolutely criti-
cal historical dimension to Durkheim1s schemas of suicide.
This is a basic failing.
Further, Pope sees that altruisme is culturally sanc-
tioned, he fails to make this a central principle, and foc-
usses instead on high social interaction. His basic mistake
here is not to recognize that Durkheim used altruisme as an
index to mechanical solidarity. He ignores the cultural com-
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ponents of traditional societies; he underplays the role of
values. Instead, Pope emphasizes the high integration and
interaction found in mechanical solidarity.
More or less every society outside of modern Europe and
its offshoots-~anything from preliterate tribes to the
great world-civilizations of China, Japan, and India--
is classified as primitive .••. Durkheim stressed that
primitive societies are small, compact, and undifferen-
tiated. In these terms the prototypical primitive socie-
ty is a small, preliterate tribe. But if small size,
compactness, and undifferentiated social structure are
hallmarks of primitive society, then China, Japan, and
India do not qualify (1976:103).
Of course these societies wouldn't qualify if one looked
merely at size and differentiation as the key criter~ of
"mechanical solidarity." But, as with so many others, Pope
misses the crucial element here--namely, that in all these
societies there was no decisive break with the collectivis-
tic and traditional structures of conscience and conscious-
ness, no break with "Consciousness Type I."
This persistent slighting of the role of cultural fac-
tors in evolution leads to Pope's disagreement with Parsons
(see also Part I, Book Three). Underlying this opposition,
as we have discovered, is a disagreement concerning the re-
lative weight of structural versus cultural factors in hu-
man society. Now, Pope observes that: "Parsons argued that
integration refers to the content of the collective con-
science; regulation to its strength" (1976:34). Pope then
accepts Parsons' discussion of regulation, but criticizes
Parsons' interpretation of Durkheim's notion of integration
--that is, of egoisme as cUlturally sanctioned (the second
schema). Pope also criticizes Parsons' treatment of altruis-
tic suicide.
Parsons and Durkheim agreed that in the case of altru-
isme, the individual is subordinate to the group. Accord-
ing to Parsons, though, the important factor is not
strength of integration, but rather the content of val-
ues. In fact, this is not the case, as Durkheim himself
LS:220-1) made clear. Parsons simply ignored a pervasive
theme in Durkheim: the content of belief and value sys-
tems is a derived phenomenon in that it reflects the un-
derlying social reality .••• High levels of integration
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cause "feeble individuation." SUbtracting what is cen-
tral for Durkheim (strong integration), and omitting
reference to low valuation of individuality (as reflec-
ting the existing social reality), leaves Parsons with
value content. Parsons maintained that value content
was crucial, even though Durkheim made it clear that the
value content upon which Parsons focussed--low valua-
tion of the individual--is caused by the very factor,
high levels of integration, whose importance Parsons
denied (1976:34-5)!
But Pope is simply wrong here in baldly equating high inte-
gration with low individuation; even Durkheim himself shifted
away from such a simplistic schema. For the value content of
mechanical solidarity--pantheism, a sacro-magical collective
consciousness--is the key to the strength of traditional so-
cial and cultural structures; in other words, ultimately,
high social integration depends on these cultural factors.
But, here again, the Bendix-Pope axis linesup against Parsons.
POp€ gets into further trouble when he suggests:
... Durkheim shifted away from The Division of Labor's
two types of solidarity (mechanical and organic) and -
toward increasingly exclusive reliance upon the mechan-
ical model (which in Suicide is applied not only to prim-
itive but also to modern society) (1976:37).
This claim is simply mistaken (see Book One). Indeed, his mis-
understanding of mechanical solidarity, his equating it simply
with high integration and interaction, and his slighting of
Durkheim's evolutionary perspectives reveals that Pope simply
does not fully comprehend the "nuclear structure" informing
Durkheim's life-work. Indeed, he goes so far as to claim:
"Egoistic and anomic suicide do not result from lack of organ-
ic solidarity but precisely from lack of mechanical solidari-
ty" (1976:37). But this is only possible if Pope is right in
baldly equating integration with mechanical solidarity. Yet,
Pope's ahistorical reduction collapses the distinction between
traditional and modern forms of solidarity.
Durkheim's famous proposal to heighten levels of soli-
darity in modern society spoke not of developing indivi-
duality, heightening complementary differences, encoura-
ging functional interdependence, or grouping individuals
according to differences, but rather of integration pro-
duced through commonalities. The lack of solidarity in
modern society is to be rectified through massive infu-
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1237--
sions of mechanical (not organic) solidarity! In refer-
ring to the development of individuality and differen-
tiation, even in the mechanical altruistic setting, Par-
sons read elements of Durkheim's Division of Labor's or-
ganic model into mechanical solidarity. Altogether, Par-
sons reversed the shift in emphasis in comparing Division
with Suicide (1976:37).
But, once again, Pope is factually mistaken (see Book Two);
for Durkheim did indeed speak of functional interdependence
and a differentiated autonomy as the foundations of organic
solidarity. Pope's reductionistic drive leads him here to do
great violence to the texts.
And although there are problems with Parsons' treat-
ment of egoisme, Pope is wrong in criticizing Parsons' in-
terpretation of altruisme.
Parsons wanted to show that in the altruistic' setting, in
individuality and differences can coexist with high lev-
els of integration. However, central to Durkheim's theo-
retical structure is the notion that the social factor
(identified in terms of extent of commonalities, strength
of the collective conscience, or strength of social in-
tegration) varies inversely with individuality. Thus,
Parsons' failure to cite any passages supporting his in-
terpretation is not suprising, for it runs counter to
Durkheim's basic theoretical perspective (1976:37).
But, again, Pope is miBtaken (see Chapter Eight, Book One).
Thus, Pope misconstrues both altruisme from the first sche-
ma, and Parsons' insights into egoisme in the second schema.
Egoisme is the second point at which Parsons attempted
to discern value content as the decisive variable .•••
Even if Parsons' acccount of Protestant-Catholic differ-
ences were acceptable, his identification of value con-
tent as the key factor in egoisme is not (1976:38-9).
But Pope fails to criticize Durkheim's mechanical model of
causality here; and, for these and other reasons, shrinks a-
way from Parsons' real insight that egoisme, as a form of
absolute individualism, is culturally sanctioned in the mod-
ern world.
Indeed, the notion that the person is culturally con-
structed, especially Durkheim's apotheosis of the "cult of
man" in the modern era, gives Pope trouble.
Durkheim's general position was that the strength of
the collective conscience and of individuality vary in-
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versely. But what is the relationship when the collec-
tive conscience stresses the value, dignity, and impor-
tance of man generally and the individual in particular?
The stronger such shared sentiments, the stronger the
collective conscience; but also, presumably, the greater
the development of individuality. Durkheim first strug-
gled with this dilemma in Division of Labor. He acknow-
ledged that the cult of dignity, baSfcally a shared be-
lief in the value and dignity of man and his individual-
ity, is growing stronger, not weaker. To accept this as
an increasingly important source of social solidarity is
inconsistent with his conclusion that "all social links
which result from likeness progressively slacken" as me-
chanical solidarity is increasingly undercut and replac-
ed by organic solidarity during the course of social e-
VOlution. Durkheim [DL:171-2] resolved this dilemma by
denying that this shared belief represents a bond of so-
cial solidarity. Since a basic premise of his theory as-
serts that shared beliefs constitute bonds of social
solidarity, it is hard to avoid concluding that this re-
presents an ad hoc assertion designed to resolve an other-
wise intractable theoretical dilemma (1976:40).
But we cannot follow Pope in concluding that Durkheim's no-
tion of the emergence of the individual person through his-
tory (see Chapter Eight, Book One) is merely an ad hoc and
tangential hypothesis; rather, we see it as central to the
substantive and historical structure of all of Durkheim's
work. By abstractly contrasting shared belief (traditional
society) with absence of shared belief (modern society),
Pope misses the crucial fact that the cult of moral indivi-
dualism is the modern religion of the self; that extreme in-
dividualism is a result of shared beliefs .
••. insofar as he explained the "completely exceptional
place in the collective conscience" of this cult, he did
so by appealing to the content of this shared belief,
which turns the will toward the individual rather than
social ends. However, since Durkheim did not elsewhere
treat the content of beliefs as relevant to their soli-
darity producing qualities, this appeal must, as before,
be judged to be ad hoc (1976:40).
Thus, even when Pope does stumble on Durkheim's second sche-
ma, he tosses it away; he is simply mistaken in claiming
that Durkheim never treated beliefs as producing solidarity.
Indeed, we have seen that the autonomization of culture and
the modern cult of the morally autonomous individual person
are two central themes in all of Durkheim's work. And appar-
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ently Pope entertains here some hidden bias against norma-
tive or cultural explanations, preferring instead to anchor
everything in social structure.
Pope continues Struggling with the cultural sanction-
ing of modern individualism, and yet refusing to allow him-
self to enter into the implications of the second schema.
In Suicide Durkheimcontinued to struggle with the prob-
lems posed by the cult of man. In particular, he eviden-
ced uncertainty as to whether the cult of man leads to
egoistic suicide through its stress on individualism.
At one point [S:330], he denied that the cult is associa-
ted with egoistic suicide, thus reasserting his premise
that shared sentiments constitute a fundamental bond of
solidarity .••. As in The Division of Labor (but contrary
to his own formulation earlier in SUicide), Durkheim held
that a shared sentiment, presumably because its content
stresses the value and dignity of the individual, does
not represent a social bond but, on the contrary, encour-
ages individualism and egoistic suicide (1976:41).
Again and again, Pope shies away from the cultural anchor-
ing of the suicide schemas.
The underlying theoretical paradox takes somewhat dif-
ferent forms in different contexts. In The Division of
Labor the question is whether an increasingly important
component of the collective conscience can be seen as
an increasingly important element in modern organic so-
ciety. In Suicide the question is whether a sharmbelief
which emphasizes the importance of the individual leads
to individuality and egoistic suicide. The underlying
dilemma, however, is the same in both cases: Does a shar-
ed belief that stresses the value of the indiVIdUal ----
Strengthen~ial sOlidarrty (as dO-other shared belief~
or does it, because of its emphasis on the individual,
actually weaken social solidarity * 11976:4l)?
Yes, that is the question precisely, finally. Can there be
a culture of the self, a cultural sanctioning of the moral
anarchy of anomie and egoisme? I believe there is such a
sanctioning in modern cUlture, and this is the foundation of
the second schema. -
But Pope, once again, turns away from his real insight
into this second possibility.
Granting the existence of the dilemma and recognizing
that at one point in Suicide Durkheim denied that a
shared sentiment represents a social bond (thereby im-
plicitly acknowledging the importance of value content),
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one must also acknowledge that this statement appears
late in his book, long after his primary development of
the contrast between egoisme and anomie. Furthermore,
the point is unrelated to any of the distinctions he
drew between integration and regulation, and is never
directly employed to explain variation in social sui-
cide rates. Clearly this reference cannot be read back
into Durkheim's systematic contrasts between more and
less integrated groups in religious, domestic, and po-
litical societies; it is thus an unconvincing foundation
upon which to reinterpret integration in terms of value
content. Indeed, overall Parsons' attempt to distinguish
between regulation and integration is based on such an
array of pervasive misrepresentations that it may be un-
hesitatingly rejected (l976:4l).
It is, of course, for others to finally judge who has misre-
presented Durkheim, and slighted important elements. Let it
now simply be recorded that Whitney Pope, author .of a full
book-length study of Durkheim's classic Suicide, perceived
many of the same ambiguities and problems as I, glimpsed the
outlines of the second schema, but turned away.
I I
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CHAPTER TEN
RESCUES
A. Parsons
Preface. Since Durkheim's Suicide was not translated until
1951, Talcott Parsons'exploration in his classic The Struct-
ure of Social Action provided for many years the most exten-
sive secondary treatment of Durkheim's typology of suicide.
Parsons' pioneering analysis remains to this day one of the
most influential accounts, constituting almost a ruling ortho-
doxy which has only recently been effectively challenged (see
especially Giddens, 1970,1971a,b,c, 1972a,b, 1976~ Pope, 1973,
1975a). Besides the systematic explication in The Structure,
Parsons added a 1960 article "Durkhei~'s Contribution to the
Theory of the Integration of the Social System," and his review
of Durkheim's life and work in the 1968 Encyclopedia of theSo~
cial Sciences.
In essence, Parsons reconstructs Durkheim's typology of
suicide in terms of his own notions concerning the strength and
content of The Central Value System (or conscience collective).
Parsons distinguished between the presence (eg. altruisme and
egoisme) of normative consensus, and its absence (anomie) . Then
he proceeds to distinguish between the orientation of the shared
values--if the collectivity takes precedence, then altruisme re-
sults~ if the individual, then egoisme results. Parsons recon-
struction of Durkheim's typology is schematically represented
in figure 11 (see also Lazarsfeld and Barton, 1951:176-7).
•I,·
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Figure 11: Parsons' Interpretation of Durkheim's Typology
of Suicide
•
•
•
•
•
•
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Content
of Norms
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Apart from abstracting and translating Durkheim into his own
terms, Parsons' schema is asymmetdcal, and ignores one whole
category--namely, fatalisme. But Parsons must be given his due,
for he has insisted on retaining the distinctness of three out
of four of Durkheim's basic types.
1. Parsons on Egoisme and Altruisme
At the outset, we shoul~~at~tartling fact: Parsons stands
almost alone among American sociologists who have paid close at-
tention to Durkheim's concept of egoisme. For over thirty years,
Parsons has steadfastly insisted on interpreting Durkheim 1 s con-
cept of egoisme in a virtuous light, as religiously sanctioned
"institutionalized individualism" (eg. 1968a~17). In his search
for the source of internalized moral obligation and a religious-
ly sanctioned value consensus on which such obligation rests,
Parsons first places great emphasis on Durkheim's conception of
egoisme, and then even greater stress on the significance of ano-
mie. Ignoring the highly critical thrust of Durkheim's descrip-
tion of egoisme, Parsons takes it to refer to what he himself
holds most dear--namely, the "higher order of individualized
moral obligation in Protestantism." Opposed to his elevation of
Protestant egoisme to a principle of the first order, is Parsons'
negative valuation of altruisme, which subordinates the indivi-
dual to the archaic, fused, collective conscience which Parsons,
in turn, identifies with Catholicism as a survival in the mo-
dern world.
In both cases, Parsons interprets egoisme and altruisme
as proceeding from the presence of religio-cultural sanctions.
However questionable other aspects of his interpretation of
Durkheim's typology, Parsons stands almost alone among contemp-
orary social theorists in recognizing Durkheim's breakthrough
to his second schema of suicide (see Book Three). Of course,
I differ from Parsons in his positive valuation of egoisme, and
cannot follow his confusion of Durkheim's first and second sche-
mas. Moreover, by deemphasizing Durkheim's image of historical
process and doctrine of human nature, Parsons turns Durkheim's
first image of the presence of generic drives in the pre-social
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ego into the misleading image of the generic absence of social
control (lithe Hobbesian dilemma ll ). Parsons' abstracted search
for the generic elements of social order and control hardly mir-
rors Durkheim's highly inflected philosophical, moral, and his-
torical concerns (see Book One).
Parsons' tortuous but brilliant account of Durkheim's types
is predicated upon his own special thesis regarding certain
fundamental shifts in Durkheim's theoretical development. Par-
sons places great weight on Durkheim's breakthrough in Suicide
in his own proposed sequence of Durkheim's developmental phases.
Here, Parsons sees Durkheim as transcending his supposed pre-
vious difficulties in separating the collective conscience from
organic solidarity, and in postulating only external, physical
constraint, instead of internalized motivations and obligations.
Parsons later summarizes his theses in these terms:
in The Division of Labor Durkheim had much to say about
the role of institutIOnalized norms, but little about the
character of the motivation underlying commitment to values
and conformity with norms ...• In Suicide, however, and in
his work on the sociology of education, he took two import-
ant steps beyond this position .... The first is his discov-
ery and partial development of the idea of the internaliza-
tion of values and norms. The second is the discrimination
he makes, with special reference to the problem of the na-
ture of modern lIindividualism, II between the two ranges of
variation. One of these concerns types of institutionalized
value-norm complexes, and is exemplified by the distinction
between egoisme and altruisme. The other concerns the types
of relation that the individual can have to whatever norms
and values are institutionalized. Here the distinction be-
tween egoisme and anomie is crucial~ it is parallel to that
between altruisme and fatalisme (196~:14l-2).
In locating his underlying schema in terms of Durkheim's devel-
opment, Parsons thus appears to gain deeper validation for his
central thesis that the fundamental source of social order and
control can only be ultimately found in certain types of social-
ly enforced self-discipline which penetrates to the heart of
the personality structure~ in short; in the "internalization of
moral authority.1I In religious terms, with latent Weberian over-
tones, Parsons conceives this to be also the prime difference
between Catholicism and traditional cultural structures and the
rigors of the collectivized self-discipline characteristic of
ascetic Protestantism.
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a. The Significance of Egoisme and Protestantism
Parsons anchors his favorable notion of egoisme in an e-
qually favorable valuation of Protestant "moral individualism."
Not unsurprisingly, Parsons appears to discover here the very
factor for which he searches so relentlessly--namely, that sta-
ble equilibrium and social order can only be based in the long
run upon internalized moral obligation founded upon a religious-
ly sanctioned over-arching abstracted value consensus. Now,
Parsons interprets Durkheim's linking of egoistic suicide with
Protestantism to mean that Durkheim had thereby broken through
his previous identification of the conscience collective with
primitive mechanical solidarity. Thus, Parsons would have us
suppose that Durkheim only gradually came to see ~hat even mo-
dern "moral (ort'institutionalized") individualism" must also
enjoy normative support and deeply embedded religious and cul-
tural sanctions.
Since Durkheim himself ostensibly described his first di-
chotomous set--egoisme versus altruisme--as high and low types
of social integration Parsons sums up these possibilities as
three positions on a continuum of social structural integration:
There is an optimum intensity of group attachment which
the Catholic with a large family comes close to. Too
strong an attachment, an increase far beyond the opti-
mum, leads to an increase (the army rate), as does too
weak an attachment (the Protestant rate) (1949:331, #3).
However, Parsons proceeds to his crucial contention by noting
that, as Durkheim himself observed, the actual historical rea-
son why Protestants seemed to be more egoistic is not simply be-
cause they weren't sufficiently structurally integrated into
groups, but rather that their "egoisme" was instead itself the
result of a certain type of group pressure, indeed of a new
type of collectively sanctioned "individual conscience." Unlike
other interpreters, Parsons critically compares Durkheim's des-
cription of altruisme and egoisme with the latter's rather dif-
ferent explanation of their root causes. Parsons explores this
gap between Durkheim's descriptive and explanatory levels by
comparing the way in which Durkheim first described egoisme and
altruisme as opposites on a continuum of social integration,
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with the different picture emerging from the central historical
rationales in which both egoisme and altruisme were presented
as resulting from the presence of culturally sanctioned moral
obligations.
Egoisme seems to exist as a factor in suicide so far as
people are freed from group control, while altruisme ex-
ists so£ar as the group control- i-s excessively- strong ....
This leaves the relation of egoisme to anomie unclear ...•
(1949:331) •
Now, Parsons identifies one of Durkheim's shift in ration-
ales when he considers the relation between religion and sui-
cide rates.
.•• The striking fact is that the rate for Protestants
is much higher than for Catholics ..•. The explanation
lies, according to Durkheim, in the Protestant attitude
toward individual freedom in religious matters. The Cath-
olic precisely in so far as he is faithful has laid down
for him a system of beliefs and practices which his mem-
bership in the church prescribes for him. He has no initia-
tive in the matter~ all responsibility belongs to the chur-
ch as an organization. The very state of his soul and chan-
ces of salvation depend on his faithful adherence to these
prescriptions. The case of the Protestant .•• is very dif-
ferent. He is himself the ultimate judge of religious truth
and the rightness of conduct deduced from it. The church is
in a very different relation to him (1949:331-2).
In historical and doctrinal terms, then, Parsons correctly ob-
served, as did Durkheim, that the actual reason Protestants
are less structurally integrated is not simply that they were
released from moral control because of the weaker, more decen-
tralized character of Protestant churches, but rathe~A~~otest­
ant norms themselves force the individual to be self-reliant
and autonomous.
It is in the relation of the individual to the organized
religious group that Durkheim sees the decisive difference.
In one sense the difference consists in that the Catholic
is subjected to a group authority from which the Protest-
ant is exempt. But ••• the essential point is that the
Protestant's freedom from group control is not-opEional.
In so far as he is a Protestant he must assume this res-
ponsibility and exercise his freedom. He cannot devolve
it on a church. The obligation to exercise religious free-
dom in this sense is a fundamental feature of protestant-
ism as a religious movement * (1949:332).
Hence, Parsons intimates that traditional Catholicism, for
instance, corresponds to the submission of the individual con-
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science in mechanical solidarity, while Protestantism corres-
ponds to the new type of "institutionalized individualism" ap-
propriate to modern societies. In contrast to the hierarchical
submission of the individual to the church in Catholicism:
A Protestant is free of these types of control. But he
is not free to choose whether or not to accept such con-
trols ...• The obligation to accept such responsibility
is legitimized by the common values of the Protestant
group and is translated into norms governing behavior.
(l960a:147) •
It is a remarkable interpretation, both in itself and be-
cause it converges with the theme developed a few years
later by Max Weber concerning the importance of the Pro-
testant ethic in modern society. There is also ••• an
echo of Rousseau, in that Durkheim seemed to be citing
an instance of the famous paradoxical formula about a man
being "forced to be free," adding that this enforced free-
dom may become too hard to bear (l968a: 316). .
Parsons interprets this as the critical point at which Durkheim
was obliged to shift the grounds of his first argument by recog-
nizing the cultural-historical rootedness of Protestant values.
Now both altruisme and egoisme are seen to proceed from the pre-
sence of cultural sanctionsi the difference between the two is
merely in the direction of individual duty. Altruisme, proper
to mechanical solidarity, requires the individual to submerge
himself in the fused, primitive collective conscience, and in-
cludes the demand to sacrifice oneself for one's group. On the
other hand, egoisme, in Parsons' version, implies the religious-
ly sanctioned injunction to guide oneself by one's own inner-
light, even in the face of conflicting social or traditional
claims, and proceeds from the historically rooted "social pres-
sure in Protestant norms toward a higher order of individualized
religious responsibility."
Parsons also proposes that this new perception of egoisme
as generated by the presence of religio-cultural rationales con-
stituted a solution of what he supposed to be Durkheim's origin-
al problem in The Division of Labor--namely, the content and ob-
ligatory force of the collective conscience in the modern organ-
ic division of labor. Against the common, but misleading, notion
(embraced by R.H. Tawney, 1926 for example) that the roots of
of the modern world can be adequately explained as due simply to
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the release of the individual from traditional controls, Par-
sons correctly emphasizes, following Max Weber, the absolutely
crucial fact that Protestant individualism as egoisme cannot
be historically considered the result of either structural or
normative breakdown. Rather, both egoisrne and the most distinct-
i ve features of the modern world as the "Protestant Era" (Till-
- icn, 1948), are due to the secularizing thrusts of this religio-
cultural system. Durkheim's first causal explanation--social
morphological differentiation and individuation--simply will
not suffice as a full and sufficient explanation of either the
emergence of Protestantism or modern individualism (see Books
One, Two, and Three). This point is critical to emphasize, for
even as late as 1965 an observer such as Barclay Johnson could
attempt to counter Parsons' interpretation of egoisme with Durk-
heim's weak evolutionary model suggesting that Protestantism is
itself a result of the progressive breakdown of traditional col-
lective sentiments due to the ubiquitous effects of the division
of labor. Parsons insists, on the contrary, that this comes:
close to a manifestation of the collective conscience.
For religious freedom is a basic ethical value common to
all Protestants. In so~ar as a man is Protestant he is-
Sllbjected to ~ socra~ ~ group-pressure. But the result is
a very different relation to the religious group as an or-
ganized entity from that of the Catholic. He is under pres-
sure to be independent, to take his own reIrgIOus responsf-
bIIrt~ while the Catholic rs-llnder pressure to submit him-
self to the authority of the church * (1949:332).
Thus, contrary to almost all other theories of anomie and ego-
isme as caused by the absence of social structural or normative
integration, Parsons, in embracing half of Durkheim's second
theory, correctly argues that the great historical significance
of Protestantism, in this respect, is precisely that it shifted
the main source of normative control and directive from the col-
lectivity to the individual, from external constraint to intern-
alized self-discipline. With this historical insight into the
religio-cultural foundations of individualism and egoisme, Par-
sons clearly forges a potentially profound link to another fam-
ous interpretation of the significance of Protestantism in the
modern world. Weber, of course, also recognized the importance
of the various ascetic Protestant sects (eg. Weber, 1946, 1958~
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1968; see also Benton Johnson, 1971, and Stephen Berger, 1971)
in exerting the unrelenting social pressures needed to incul-
cate a new level of intensity of self-discipline and drives
for moral perfection within the world. Surely it is one of the
great mysteries of contemporary sociological theory that no
one has yet attempted to systematically and historically explore
~- -
the significance of Durkheim's second notion of egoisme as gen-
erated by the presence of ethicoreligious values with Weber's
theses, which also rested on the perception of the ironic and
even tragic outcomes of the Protestant resolve to construct new
self-disciplined, rationally integrated. perfection seeking char-
acter structures (but see Book Three) .
In exploring this striking convergence between Durkheim's
critical notion of the "pathologies" and "moral anarchy" of the
"infinity sickness" of the modern world, and ~'Veber' s notion of
once visible saints leaving us all in an "iron cage," we must
differ ,of course, with Parsons in regard to a number of cru-
cial omissions and distortions in his account. While agreeing
that in Durkheim's second schema egoisme is as much an institu-
tionalized norm as altruisme, nevertheless, we must note that
Parsons generally slights Durkheim'scrucial doctrine of human
nature (although occasionally recognizing its centrality, ego
see 1949:384). This omission creates a potentially disruptive
hiatus in Parsons' own schema which we shall soon explore.
Further, there is little or no mention of Durkheim's notion
of the "infinity of dreams and desires," of the individual path-
ological forms of suicide, insufficient recognition
of moral condemnation involved in Durkheim's discussion, or
the fact that Durkheim considered egoistic suicide the most pre-
valent chronic form of "moral anarchy" afflicting the modern·
world. How can Parsons expect us to follow him in his wholly
laudatory valuation of egoisme, in direct contrast to Durkheim's
critique? Isn'!. it strange that what is "moral anarchy" to
Durkheim is "moral, institutionalized individualism" to Parsons?
Parsons later argued for redress in the balance of attention
given to anomie and egoisme. However, by 1968, Parsons' perspec-
tive altered somewhat, for in responding to more prevalent
••
e·
I.
!
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1250--
notions than his own, he confused matters further by loosely
identifying egoisme and alienation.
b. Parsons on Altruisme
Parsons observes that the key to altruistic suicide is
that collective norms so penetrate the individual that his own
nascent conscience is so little individuated that he considers
self-sacrifice for the group a moral duty. Parsons thus correct-
ly perceives that the key elements distinguishing altruisme
from egoisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as simply high
and low positions on a continuum of social integration. Rather,
the difference is cultural: between collective norms which de-
mand that the collective conscience take precedence over the
individual (altruisme) versus collective norms which demand
that the individual conscience take precedence over any tradi-
tional claims of the collective conscience: in short, between
collectivistic and individualistic cultural norms. Parsons ob-
serves that altruistic suicide:
..• involves a group attachment of great strength such
that in comparison with claims made upon the individual
fulfillment of the obligations laid upon him by the group,
his own interests, even in life itself, become secondary.
This leads to a generally small valuation of individual
life, so that he will part with it on relatively small pro-
vocation; on the other hand, it leads to a direct social
mandate to suicide (1949:328).
There is, however, besides the cultural differences in
dominant rationales concerning the obligation of the individual
to society and self, another crucial difference between altruis-
me and egoisme implicit in Durkheim's schema--namely, the his-
torical differences between primitive, mechanically integrated
societies and modern nations prior to the full institutionaliza-
tion of organic solidarity. By spending most of his analysis on
the army, Parsons fails to sufficiently emphasize this crucial
historical dimension. The elimination of Durkheim's evolution-
ary framework from Parsons' account (see Book One) is, however,
understandable since Parsons had earlier decreed that Durkheim .
was most basically concerned with the abstract problem of so-
l
cial order and control, with I'social statics" rather than "dy-
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namics." Parsons partially perceives Durkheim's underlying
time dimension, but characteristically transmutes it into an
abstracted theoretical proposition!
It seems clear that the altruistic factor in suicide is,
for Durkheim, on essentially the same theoretical plane
as mechanical solidarity. It is a manifestation of the
conscience collective by group pressure at the expense
- oftne claims of individuality. But even here there is
a slight shift of emphasis. It is no longer similarity
which is the central point, but subordination of indivi-
duality to the group .••• Already Durkheim is moving away
from the identification of the problem of "solidarity"
with that of the social structure. Altruistic suicide is
a manifestation of the collective conscience which is
strong in the sense of subordinating individual to group
interests, and which has a particular content of low val-
uation of individual life relative to group values (1949:
330) •
Thus, to the cultural dimension involving the differing ration-
ales governing the direction of individual moral obligation, we
must add Durkheim's crucial historical dimension by locating
these two types in social and cultural structures at the two
ends of history.
2. Parsons' Anomie as the "Hobbesian Dilemma"
After discovering egoisme (ala Protestant virtue) as his
first anchor, Parsons seizes upon anomie as the key to his
sea~ch .
:tor the resolutJ.on of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma"--
what he conceives as the generic problem of individual anarchy,
social control, and the foundations of lasting social order.
Anomie in these terms becomes absolutely central to Parsons'
argument. Having discovered with egoisme and altruisme the uni-
versal requirement of the internalization of norms (or the solu-
tion to the sources of social instability in self-disciplining
moral obligation), Parsons next turns to anomie as solving the
problem of the source of the breakdown of social order in gen-
eral, not only in terms of the absence of effective, internal-
ized obligation, but also the sources of normative confusion.
Parsons supposes Durkheim's second and decisive breakthrough
to have come with the latter's recognition of the central im-
portance of the 'bontents of motivation with his notion of ano-
mie." Anomie holds the key to social disorder; or more precise-
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ly, anomie is the Hobbesian dilemma.
In his 1968 encyclopedia essay, Parsons proposes that
"anomie has becomeol\~f the few truly central concepts of con-
temporary social science" (l968a: 316). But whose version of
anomie does this mean? Durkheim's, Halbwach's, Parsons' own,
Merton's, Srole's, countless other installments? If anomie
has become a paradigmatic concept, then I suggest that this
has largely come about through not only Parsons' efforts, but
the intellectual charisma claimed, usurped, and popularized
by Merton and later Srole. Indeed, it is questionable whether
most sociologists really know what Durkheim's notions of ano-
mie imply (or those of Parsons' either, for that matter). Fur-
ther, how close is Parsons' version of anomie to Durkheim's,
and hence, which meaning of anomie should hereafter be consi-
dered "truly central" to sociological theory?
The key to Parsons' own version of anomie rests upon ano-
ther dichotomy--the presence versus the absence of effective,
legitimate, internalized norms. To Parsons, anomie implies the
absence of norms, or more specifically, the absence of clearly
defined norms, goals, values, etc. Essentially, Parsons' no-
tion of anomie connotes ambiguity, confusion, or lack of mean-
ingfulness resulting from the breakjown of the intimate rela-
tions between the cultural and psychological components of The
General System of Action. In Parsonian anomie, the "relational
system becomes confused," or in later Parsonian terms, "malin-
tegrated."
As the opposite of clearly perceived and effectively intern-
alized moral obligations, Parsons views anomie as the lack of
clarity leading to a normative breakdown.
Anomie is best interpreted in terms of Durkheim's Carte-
sian frame of reference. The observer as actor is natural-
ly concerned with the definiteness of the reality with
which he is confronted •••• The problem is the definiteness
of expectations ••• (1968a:3l6).
Having posited internalized moral obligation (ala Protestant
egoisme) as the prerequisite for societal stability, Parsons
proceeds to explain disorder in terms of the lack of "defini-
teness of expectations." In ~ subtle, yet absolutely cruci'al,
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shift in meaning, Parsons switches Durkheim's connotation of
anomie from "infiniteness" to "indefiniteness." In this way
Durkheim's profound and critical notion of "moral anarchy" and
"infinity sickness" plaguing the modern or "Protestant era" be-
comes transmuted and routinized into mere personal confusion
or a feeling of lostness because of changing or unclear cultur-
al mandates.
As always, Parsons presumes that Durkheim was led to the
logic of these conclusions and a crucial breakthrough in his
own theoretical schema by yet another empirical confrontation
with Utilitarian theory•.
Durkheim was led to make his study of suicide by a para-
dox: according to utilitarian theory, a rising standard
of living should bring about a general increase in "hap-
piness;" however, concomitant with the certain rise in
the standard of living in Western countries, there was a
marked rise in the suicide rate. Why is it that as people
become happier, more of them killed themselves l196~142)?
This was clearly an anomaly from the point of view of util-
itarian theory, and stimulated Durkheim to a major, if not
complete, theoretical reconstruction in Suicide (1968~3l5).
.•. the decisive breakthrough in solving the paradox came
about with his working out of the concept of anomie(i960a:
143) .
Parsons, as always, overestimates the degree to which Durkheim
developed his own ideas in polemical opposition to the Anglo
Utilitarians; conversely, he overlooks the degree to which Durk-
heim was engaged in polemics with several opposing cultural tra-
ditions. Surely neither statistics nor a purely intellectual
squabble with an opposing school suffices to explain Durkheim's
intentions in writing Suicide. But, to be sure, any adequate ex-
planation of Durkheim's shifts in his typologies of suicide
should rest on a clear conception of both Durkheim's multiple
polemical critiques of opposing cultural traditions, and his
own core commitments to his own cultural tradition.
Starting with Durkheim's statistics demonstrating that a-
nomic suicides are related both to commercial prosperity and
depressions, Parsons begins to add his own series of connota-
tions to Durkheim's description of anomie. Parsons says that
the source of these startling facts is "due to the same order
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of causes."
That cause Durkheim finds in the fact that in both cases
large numbers of people are thrown with relative sudden-
ness out of adjustment with certain important features of
their social environment. In depression, expectations re-
lative to the standard of living, with all that implies,
are disturbed on a large scale. In unusual prosperity, on
the other hand, things which had seemed altogether outside
the range of possibility become for many people realities.
At both extremes the relations between means and ends, be-
tween effort and attainment, is upset. The result is a
sense of confusion, a loss of orientation. People no long-
er have the sense that they are "getting anywhere ll (1949:
335) •
Parsons exegesis is incomplete, only partially accurate. His
off-hand rendering of Durkheim's crucial notion of the Social
Schedule--with "all that impliesll--leaves out the central in-
tervening steps in Durkheim's argument (see Book Two and Three).
The reason that people are IIthrown out of adjustment ll is that
the Social Schedule of expectation is upset, chronically in
the modern world. And "people no longer feel that they are get-
ting anywhere ll not because their goals lack clarity or defini-
teness, but rather because of the infiniteness of their desires.
Parsons is correct in the following passage to note that happi-
ness is dependent on lI a clear definition of ends,1I but a clear
definition of infinite goals is devastating.
Durkheim's analysis goes far deeper. The sense of confu-
sion and frustration in depression seems not so difficult
to understand, but why is the reaction to unusual prosper-
ity not increased satisfaction all around, as any utili-
tarian point of view would take for granted? Because, Durk-
heim says, a sense of security, of progress toward ends
depends not only on adequate command over means, but on
clear definition of the ends themselves (1949:335).
Parsons series of associations may be summed up thus: normative
clarity is to value consensus as normative confusion is to ano-
mie and anarchy.
Although Parsons occasionally mentions Durkheim's central
concern with anomie and egoisme--namely, insatiability and the
"infinity of dreams and desiresll--he hardly gives it comparable
significance (eg. 1949:335-6). Now, one of the most basic shifts
in the grounds of Durkheim's argument concerns the location of
the motive force of egoisme and anomie--insatiability. Durkheim
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himself began abstractly by anchoring insatiable desires and
egotism in the organic half of homo duplex (see Books One and
Three); in this he was undoubtedly influenced, as Parsons ob-
serves, by the similar, though virtuous, images of man held
by the Anglo Utilitarians. But, as Durkheim confronted the
specific historical origins of egoisme and anomie, especially
in terms of the empirical evidence regarding Protestantism and
suicides in commerce, industry, the professions, etc., he was
forced to recognize, as Parsons partly did with egoisme, that
anomie along with egoisme emerged from modern ethical sanctions
pushed to extreme. Since every form of suicide lIis merely the
exaggerated or deflected form of a virtue, II anomie and egoisme
corne from our II virtues becoming vices. II
How does Parsons respond to the implications of Durkheim's
developing argument as outlined in Books Two and Three of this
dissertation? First, he does note that the central tenet of
Durkheim's economic sociology--the Social Schedule of the dis-
tribution of reward through the occupational system--has ano-
ther key facet--legitimacy.
This discipline which is indispensable to the personal
sense of attainment, and thus to happiness, is not impo-
sed by the individual himself. It is imposed by society.
For it to serve this function, the discipline cannot be
mere coercion. Men cannot be happy in the acceptance of
limitations simply imposed by force; they must recognize
them to be "just," the discipline must carry moral author-
ity. It takes the form, then, of socially given moral
norms by which ends of action are defined. If anything
happens to break down the discipline of these norms, the
result is personal disequilibrium, which results in var-
ious forms of personal breakdown, in extreme instances,
suicide .... For each class in society there is always a
socially approved standard of living--which is relatively
definite. To live on such a scale is a normal legitimate
expectation. Both depression below it and elevation above
it necessitate what Durkheim calls a II moral re-education,1I
which cannot be accomplished quickly and easily, if at all
(1949: 336).
In breaking through to his second schema, Durkheim, like Par-
sons with his notion of "institutionalized individualism," be-
gan to see that; through the Social Schedule, these religious-
ly sanctioned egoistic and insatiable desires are culturally
legitimized and economically expressed.
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In structural-functional terms, Parsons considers ano-
mie to represent a pathological state of "malintegration."
The cultural and psychological components of The Social Sys-
tem are "out of alignment," inducing "strain" in the indivi-
dual.
An individual does not commit suicide primarily because
he lacks the "means" to accomplish his goals, but be-
cause his goals cannot be meaningfully integrated with
the expectations which have been institutionalized in
values and norms. The factors responsible for this mal-
integration may be social, cultural, or psychological in
any combination, but the common point of strain concerns
the meaningfulness of situations and of alternatives of
action •••• it is the relational system, not the indivi-
dual, whichlneeds-straightening out *(1960a:2~
••• "anomie" may be considered that state of a social sys-
tem which makes a particular class of members. consider ex-
ertion for success meaningless, not because they lack ca-
pacity or opportunity to achieve what is wanted, but be-
cause they lack a clear definition of what is desirable.
It is ~ pathology not of the instrumental system but of
the collective normative system * (1968a :316).
At root, Parsons' notions of "malintegration" and "strain" rest
on mechanistic metaphors (see Smelser, 1971). Here we see Par-
sons taking pains to distance his idea of anomie from Merton's
--for anomie is "a pathology, not of the instrumental system,
but of the collective normative system." While Durkheim empha-
sized egoism and insatiability, and Parsons emphasized norma-
tive confusion, Merton saw anomie as the lack of structural ac-
cess to culturally approved goals. Although linked in certain
ways, these fundamental shifts in the nature and origin of ano-
mie from one pioneer sociologist to the next reveals a basic
sociocultural process--the "routinization of charisma-on-depos-
it" (see McCloskey, 1974). Before proposing a detailed criti-
que of Parsons' translation of anomie, let us consider the oth-
er anchor of his interpretation--namely, his argument concern-
ing the importance of anomie in Durkheim's methodological break-
through.
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3. Parsons on Durkheim'~Methodological Breakthroughs in Rela-
tion to His Theories of Social Control and Suicide
If Parsons fundamental thesis on Durkheim is that the
latter was centrally concerned with the theoretical problem
of social order, then at the heart of this assertion is Par-
sons' own notion of social control. To Parsons, social order,
integration, constraint, obligation~ control and so on seemed
inextricably interrelated. Beyond the dubiousness of Parsons'
"creative" interpretation of Durkheim's core commitments, it
is surely misleading to identify Durkheim's central concerns
with the shifting historical sources of legitimate moral auth-
ority too closely with the abstract heading of social control.
The questions of the source and nature of legitimate moral au-
thority, on the one hand, and power and social control are
very different, though related, issues.
As always, Parsons asks us to see Durkheim as developing
his own central methodological postulates and procedures primar-
ily in polemical response to Utilitarian theory. In the back-
ground, of course, lies Parsons' insistence on the centrality
of the so-called "Hobbesian dilemma," for if men are by na-
ture egoistic and insatiable,
and bound only by passing
interests, then how is the "war of all against all" to be mo-
derated? Since Parsons starts from this premise, and then for-
ces Durkheim's theories into the mode of critical response to
these dilemmas, one would hardly expect that Durkheim would
fail to yield Parsons the very answer for which he so insist-
ently searched.
According to Parsons, since Durkheim's central concern
was to clarify the theoretical bases of social order and con-
straining control over against Hobbesian anarchy, Durkheim lo-
gically took up a position opposite to the Utilitarians at al-
most every point. Durkheim'~ sociologistic positivism, with its
doctrine of "social facts," countered the Utilitarian claims
of the subjectivity, spontaneity, and randomness of individual
wants with the ideas of externality, constraint, and the no-
tion of the sacred as the foundation of social and moral order
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(eg. 1949:461). Parsons assumes that Durkheim's claim that
"social facts" should be regarded as "things" represents the
first phase, that of "naturalistic causation," in Durkheim's
evolving methodological position. This is seen, for example,
in Durkheim's theory that the causes of the division of social
labor are social morphological (which Parsons and others after
him mistakenly termed "biological"). The next factors critical
to Durkheim's methodological breakthroughs, Parsons maintains,
came with: (a) the synthesis argument, (b) the idea that socie-
ty is also a "psychic entity," and (c) the specification of the
"social factor" in terms of the concepts of the conscience col-
lective and representations collective (see also Pope, 1973).
According to Parsons, Durkheim's next important shift was
away from naturalistic causation to concern with legal sanctions
(eg. 1949:463). The decisive breakthrough, Parsons informs us,
came with Durkheim's analysis of egoisme and anomie in Suicide,
and his ideas in Moral Education (eg. 1949:463) .
.•. in terms of the great dichotomy of this study, the
social factor becomes a normative, value factor, not one
of heredity and environment ..•. Durkheim's sociologism has
turned out to be fatal to his positivism (1949:464).
Parsons summarizes his assertions on the phases in Durkheim's
developing methodology thus far:
..• in following out the problem of social control Durk-
heim has progressed through the conception of control as
subjection to naturalistic causation and then avoidance
of sanctions, to laying primary emphasis on the "subject-
ive" sense of moral obligation. The element of constraint
persists, with a changed meaning, in the sense of obliga-
tion (1949:385).
Since Parsons' account of Durkheim's methodological break-
throughs and his supposed developing theory of social control
are intimately related, let us note some limitations in Parsons'
account. First, Durkheim was not centrally concerned with the
"Hobbesian dilemma" (see the works by Giddens); it did not
haunt him as it did Parsons. Perhaps Parsons' insistence on
this problem is more understandable as a projection of inner
difficulties of his own cultural tradition. For Durkheim's own
central methodological problem, stemming from the problematics
of his own cultural tradition, was to construct a science of
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morality to replace the old cultural regime. Second, Durk-
heim did not develop his own methodology simply in categori-
cal response to the inadequacies of Anglo Utilitarian theory.
As he makes clear in The Rules, in the essay "Individual and
Collective Representations," in The Elementary Forms and other
places, Durkheim opposed key elements of both Utilitarian and
Idealistic theory. When we add his critique of metaphysics and
the Catholic cultural tradition, it is clear that Durkheim po-
lemicized on three different fronts simultaneously (see Book
Three). In these terms, Durkheim's central problem was to re-
solve the antinomies between these opposing cultural tradi-
tions, while still remaining true to his own cultural histori-
cal mission (see Chapter One, Book One). Parsons' peculiar de-
finition of positivism ignores the very French flavor of monern
positivism; Pope (1973) unfortunately follows Parsons here,
when he erroneously concludes that Durkheim was never a positi-
vist. Third, Durkheim simply did not undergo the major revolu-
tionary stages outlined by Parsons. Pope is certainly correct
in rejecting this part of Parsons' argument. As we discovered
in Book One, Durkheim's emphasis on social morphological dif-
ferentiation was a life-long concern in his causal model. Par-
sons' mistaken thesis that Durkheim's central causal anchor of
social morphological process represented a theoretical dead-
end after The Division of Labor has begun to dissolve. Schnore
(1958) was one of the first to point out the centrality of
social morphological processes in Durkheim's causal model. Al-
so, Robert Bellah (1959) recognized the importance of social
morphological differentiation as a key evolutionary process.
By 1960, Parsons had begun to waver from the firmness of his
earlier judgment. Thus, while the question of the ratio of
continuity to discontinuity in any major thinkers' development
is important, Parsons' interpretation was mistakenly predica-
ted on the image of a radical discontinuity in Durkheim's in-
tellectual career. Here Parsons' basic mistake, deriving from
his earlier theses, was to split the two halves of Durkheim's
causal model by assigning social morphology to the early "ra-
dically positivistic" Durkheim, and "collective representations"
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to the later "idealistic" Durkheim. Yet, even Parsons himself,
as Pope emphasized (1975a), now acknowledges that he " ... may
have overdone the periodizing of Durkheim's intellectual devel-
opment" (1975a:106), and agrees instead with Bellah (1973:xiii,
xxiii, xix), that there is "an impressive continuity" in Durk-
heim's intellectual career.
Fourth, Parsons' notion of a third phase where Durkheim
broke through to the conception of the internalization of moral
obligations is similarly invalidated. On the contrary, as Pope
(1973, 1975a) has rightly insisted, Durkheim assumed the intern-
alization of moral obligation from the very beginning. Even
Parsons (1975a:107) now agrees. For Durkheim was centrally con-
cerned from the very beginning, as his book reviews (eg. see
Giddens, 1970), and many passages in The Division of Labor and
its appendices testify, with the internalized contents of the
individual conscience in relation to the external contents of
the collective conscience. Again, Parsons' basic problem here
was the mistaken portrayal of the "early" Durkheim as a crude
or radical positivist who acknowledged only "external" enviro-
mental factors such as "population pressure." In sum, Parsons'
conjoined theses in this regard must be set aside, namely:
(a) Durkheim was centrally concerned with "social statics"
and not "dynamics" and historical change;
(b) Durkheim was centrally concerned with the "Hobbesian
dilemma"--that is, the search for the generic bases of
social order and control (or alternately the "Integra-
tion of The Social System"):
(c) Durkheim's rhetorical animus was directed primarily a-
gainst the Anglo Utilitarians;
(d) Durkheim's central causal anchor (social morphological
processes), which formed the basic theorem of his
school, represented a theoretical dead-end and Durk-
heim never returned to it after The Division of Labor;
-- --
(e) The development of Durkheim's thought passed through
at least four distinct phases, in which he broke with
positiviism, and moved toward idealism and voluntarism.
(f) Durkheim moved from originally identifying all non-so-
ciologistic explanations of social action with "indiv-
idualistic" theories toward a central focus on the sub-
jective point of view.
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Parsons' own special intentions are revealed again as he
explores the significance of Durkheim's notion of anomie for
his methodology, especially as it relates to the problem of
social order and control. Parsons proposes that the extreme
limit of anomie:
.•. is the state of pure individualism (correlative with
"disorganization of personality") which is for Durkheim
as for Hobbes--the "war of all against all." Coordinate
with and opposite to (as a polar antithesis) the state
of anomie is that of "perfect integration" which implies
two things--that the body of norms governing conduct in
a community forms a consistent system (this aspect of in-
tegration significantly enough Durkheim scarcely takes
notice of at all) and that its control over the indivi-
dual is actually effective--it gets itself obeyed (1949:
377) •
Here Parsons is faced with a number of difficulties. First,
what Parsons refers to as the extreme limit of "pure indivi-
dualism" is closer to what Durkheim meant by his first notion
of egoisme. This notion was influenced by the utilitarians' i-
mage of human nature; Durkheim simply inverted the negative
valuation of natural egoism and duty-bound insatiability. But
by accepting the image of human nature from his polemical op-
ponents which located the destructive passions of egoism and
insatiability in the pre-social or organic ego, Durkheim unwit-
tingly got himself in a most unfortunate bind for a sociologist
(see Books One and Three). And Parsons slights Durkheim's deri-
vation of dark forces from the pre-social level, perhaps be-
cause Parsons himself shares this darkly negative image of hu-
man nature. Further, Parsons unwittingly identi-
fies the "polar (antithetical) opposite of anomie" as "per-
fect integration" with fatalisme, which has always been
considered the opposite of anomie. But Parsons has rightly
referred to "suicide fataliste" as "the situation where the
pressure of the conscience collective is excessive" (1949:336).
Unfortunately, this mis-identification pulls into the same or-
bit the state of "perfect integration," value consensus, and
the "mechanically integrated" collective conscience seen in
primitive fatalistic suicides (see Books Two and Three)! Per-
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haps Parsons' way out of this Comtean vision is, as later
passages suggest, to view altruisme and fatalisme as possi-
ble cases of II pathological overconformity.1I
Parsons further fleshes out his assertions concerning
the meaning of anomie and egoisme in the context of Durkheim's
methodological development by simultaneously rooting these
assertions in another parallel theoretical change--name1y, the
shift in the connotations of constraint in Durkheim's theory
of moral obligation. At first, Parsons suggests, Durkheim us-
ed almost any external objective factor to counter the indiv-
idual's natural egoism and insatiability. However, Durkheim la-
ter shifted to recognition of the critical importance of moral
rules which, in his final phase, were seen as internalized in
terms of ethical duty.
In regard to the nature and source of socially effective
constraint in Durkheim's early stages, Parsons asks: IIWhat is
their source and what is the nature of the social force which
constrains (1949:381)? Durkheim's next big breakthrough, ac-
cording to Parsons, came with the notion of anomie--represen-
ting the absence of effective internalized moral obligations.
However, as his early reviews and the suppressed introduction
to The Division of Labor, which Simpson reprinted as an appen-
dix, demonstrates, Durkheim was centrally concerned with the
internalization of moral obligation based on respect for tran-
scending moral authority from the very beginning of his career.
This fact, in turn, casts more doubt on Parsons' interpreta-
tion of Durkheim's supposed acceptance of the Utilitarian di-
lemma, his supposed phases, and his supposed II radica1 break
with positivism ll (see also Pope, 1973).
There [with anomie] he was led to take another great
step, the implications of which bring him to the.next
great phase of his development. ~ to this point he has
always thought in terms of the utilitarian dilemma--from
the subjective point of view action must be explained in
terms of individual ends or wants (which to the utilitar-
ian are concrete wants) ••.• Durkheim has hitherto accep-
ted this so that it has simply gone wIthout saying that,
SInce he rejee:ES theli'ti1itarianso1ution, his sociar-
factor has to fit into the category of condItIons.
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Now he makes the far-reaching empirical observation that
since individual wants are in principle unlimited, it is
an essential condition of both social stability and in-
dividual happiness that they should be regulated in terms
of norms. But here the norms do not, as the rules of con-
.tract, merely regulate "externally," but enter directly
into the constitution of the actors ends themselves*(1949:
381) .
As is his custom, Parsons portrays Durkheim as a sort of in-
verted mirror of Utilitarianism--of course, ''it simply went
without saying" that if the Utilitarians said up, Durkheim
said down, the Utilitarians left, Durkheim right, and so on.
But this portrait of Durkheim, bordering on caricature, ser-
iously underestimates, as noted earlier, the uniquely French
and personal sources of Durkheim's thought. More troublesome
is Parsons tacit acceptance of Durkheim's first philosophical
doctrine of the dualism of human nature--here expressed as
the idea that "individual wants are in principle unlimited."
Curiously, Parsons terms this an "empirical observation!" But
in what sense? On the contrary, I would suggest that as men
are defined in these terms and placed under powerful sanctions
to act out these definitions, then and only then wil] they
come to act and see themselves in this way. In this case, the
sources of this powerful image is a powerfully situated cul-
tural group; by no means can human nature be blamed (see Book
Three). The fact that historically different cultures endow
different styles of life with entirely different images of
perfection, and hence social sanctions, demonstrates that ego-
ism and insatiability are not accurately projected as generic
afflictions on the human species. In sum, Durkheim's key anti-
nomy, to Parsons, was the ahistorical dichotomy: individual
anarchy/moral discipline. In turn, we can also recognize how
Parsons transmuted Durkheim's dualism into a dichotomy between
self-disciplined, Protestant individualism versus the confusion
of anomie (or perhaps the lapse from Protestant norms).
However, Parsons' contorted translation of Durkheim's
conceptions into his own schema raises another deeper problem
for Parsons. If, as he maintains, norms do not merely "regu-
late externally," but rather enter intimately and "directly
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into the constitution of the ends themselves, " then Parsons
is faced with two additional difficult problems. If, in his
own terms, norms work primarily in negative fashion by re -
straining the natural passions of the egoistic and insatiable
organic ego, then how do norms also work primarily in a pos-
itive fashion to generate desires and mobilize thought and
action? Further, if norms do enter positively into the con-
stitution of desires and ends in themselves, does not Par-
sons have to consider the possibility, developed in Durkheim's
second schema of suicide (see Book Three), that insatiabili-
ty and egoisme are not natural but socioculturally generated?
Indeed, I now pose the same questions to Parsons as were
directed against Durkheim's first schema and its underlying
image of man as homo duplex: on what grounds do you assume
that the "individual" is naturally "amoral," or that human na-
ture is inherently egoistic and insatiable? Is this a moral
or philosophical doctrine, or an empirical comparative-his-
torical observation? How is this image of the most signifi-
cant drives of human action to be reconciled with the suppo-
sed internalization of cultural images of perfection in mo-
dern socialization processes? Now, Parsons readily admits
that "the normal concrete individual is a morally disciplin-
ed personality." If this is the normal empirical case, then
what abnormal case is Parsons talking about? Where, in point
of fact, can we find one of these naturally "amoral" indivi-
duals? aistorically, it should be remembered that Hobbes re-
ferred to the Puritans and the aftermath of the English Civil
War, whose descendants Parsons tenaciously defends; but this
irony has escaped almost everyone). Isn't this image of egois-
tic and insatiable man a pre-social, philosophical notion of
the pessimistic moral theorists? If so, then isn't egoism and
insatiability, when historically observed, due as much to so-
cialized cultural values, as to human nature? (See Book Three).
As Parsons continues to sort through the different mean-
ings Durkheim bestowed upon anomie, the individual, the histor-
ical emergence of the person, the social morphological necess-
ity of the modern "cult of individualism," and so on, it be-
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comes clear that while Durkheim derived, in the main, his
central notion of "moral individualism" from the progressive
division of labor, Parsons emphatically rejects this and i-
dentifies "moral individualism" and the internalization of
moral obligations and authority with egoisme and Protestant-
ism. By doing so he mixes up the two sens$of egoisme as the
egoism of human nature and as the "cult of the individual."
But if one does not accept Parsons' theses, Durkheim's first
schema, and the Utilitarians' (and Romantics') image of human
nature as inherently egoistic and insatiable, but rather fol-
lows the more fully sociological and empirical-historical po-
sition implied in Durkheim's second schema (see Book Three),
and views egoisme and anomie as culturally sanctioned "drives
for progress and perfection" and as the "infinity of dreams
and desires," and, in turn, acknowledges Parsons' embrace of
this second sense of anomie as socially "institutionalized
individualism," then isn't it legitimate to similiarly con-
clude that egoisme may be derived from culturally sanctioned
"moral individualism" of an extreme type, chronically gone to
excess? And that insatiabilit~ too, may be derived from extreme
cultural sanctions? In short, if Parsons wishes to claim "mo-
ral individualism" as a Protestant contribution, must he not
also assume responsibility thereby for the culturally sanction-
ed drives for modern egoism and insatiability which Durkheim
so profoundly attacked as symptomatic of the "moral anarchy"
of the modern world?
Let us look again to Parson~ own testimony on the matter:
On the one hand, there is the element of chaotic, undis-
ciplined impulse and desire--the "individual" element in
Durkheim's sense~ on the other, the normative rule; in
order that the whole conception of normative control may
make sense these two elements must be kept radically apart
in principle. For unless in "individual desires" there
were this inherently chaotic, "centrifugal" quality, the
need for control would not be present at all. Moreover,
it is important to note that the analysis is couched in
terms of the subjective point of view of the actor. It is
a question of the relation of his desires, his subjective
impulses or ends, to certain disciplining controlling fac-
tors. Without the dichotomy of the two sets of factors,
Durkheim's whore-critique of-UtIIrtarIanrS:m falls to the
ground * TI949:377-8}. -----
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In rediscovering Durkheim's doctrine of the dualism of human
nature (see Books One and Three), Parsons now correctly ob-
serves that without this crucial tension, Durkheim's origin-
al position becomes less tenable. Indeed, as we have seen,
the breakdown of this dichotomy paves the way for the emer-
gence of the second schema of suicide. Parsons thus comes to
translate Durkheim's early dichotomy of insatiable appetites/
moral rules (see Lukes, 1973; Book One) into his own terms,
first in the Hobbesian sense of anarchy/social order, and
then later into the functionalistic jargon of mal integration/
integration and equilibrium.
Durkheim's dichotomy rested, of course, on an extremely
negative image of human nature. In contrast to the unprece-
dented ethical inversion of the relations between egoism and
social responsibility in Utilitarian theory, Durkheim reject-
ed the liberal economists' presumption that unbridled indivi-
dualism, regulated only by the competition of the marketplace,
would inevitably lead to the improvement of the commonweal
(eg. Mandeville's "private vices, public virtues"). Further,
if Durkheim's "whole critique of Utilitarianism" is in danger
of "falling to the ground," it can only be because the his-
torical evidence as well socialization process reveals that
it is sociologically inadmissible to base social science on
biological or moral doctrines of human nature. For all such
images are philosophically derived, and are based on the rhe-
torical fiction of a lone, pre-social individual ego. If Durk-
heim did indeed make the breakthrough to the second theory of
anomie and egoisme as culturally sanctioned, then, while on
a superficial level Durkheim's "whole critique" may fall to
the ground, on a deeper cultural-historical level, Durkheim
discovered a profound insight into the fundamental rationales
of modern society, personality, culture, and historical pro-
cess. Significantly, Durkheim's breakthrough converges with
Weber's historical-cultural investigations into the re1igio-
cultural foundations of the modern world (see Books Three and
Four) .
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4. Critical Summary
Let us briefly review some key points in Durkheim's argu-
ment which Parsons misconstrues.
(a) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is
incornplete--for it ignores fatalisme.
(b) Parsons' reconstructed schema of Durkheim's typology is
asymmeUical--for it contrasts two categories (egoisme and
altruisme) with one (anomie ).
(c) By consistently abstracting Durkheim's argument, Parsons
misses Durkheim's doctrine of historical-evolutionary pro-
cess. I submit that Durkheim was always centrally concerned
with the broad evolutionary processes of social differentia-
tion and individuation (see Book One). The transition from
simple to complex societies, and the individual's changing
position within that great historical transformation, form-
ed one of Durkheim's central axes of thought. This neglect
means that Parsons, like so many after him, simply failed
to sufficiently recognize the historical rootedness of Durk-
heim's typology of suicide.
(d) As a consequence, while Parsons does note that the differ-
ence between egoisme and altruisme is cultural, he fails to
emphasize that it is also primarily historical--namely, the
distinction between two dominant modes of solidarity at the
two ends of history. This same failure of Parsons applies
to the distinction between modern anomie and that sort of
fatalistic resignation to one's collectively assigned tra-
ditional fate in primitive societies.
(e) Further, Parsons ignores Durkheim's processual-historical
theory of the emergence of the autonomous individual which
accompanies the progressive division of labor (see Book
One). Perhaps Parsons ignores this crucial point because
he searched for justification that egoisme, positively re-
garded as IImoral or institutionalized individualism,1I should
be viewed not as inevitable or mechanically produced in so-
ciocultural evolution, but rather that this special type
of individualism is a praiseworthy product of Protestant
values. Such an assertion is opposed, of course, both to
II mechanical solidarityll of traditional societies and to
hierocratic Catholicism, and to Durkheim's central histor-
ical proposition concerning individuation and social mor-
phological differentiation.
(f) As a further consequence of his slighting of Durkheim's pro-
cpssual framework, Parsons neglects to emphasize that the
mudern world is, in Durkheim's estimate, in a IIcritical"
transitionary stage. Hence, anomie and egoisme are due to
the moral disturbances prior to the full institutionaliza-
tion of 1I0rganic solidarity." Egoisme and anomie are not
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due to the generic absence of social constraint, as Par-
sons implies by inserting the "Hobbesian dilemma" every-
where into Durkheim's thought. Rather, they are symptoma-
tic of the abnormal forms of the division of labor in the
"critical" contemporary transitional phase of societal e-
vOlution (see, for example, Giddens, 1972a:42).
(g) Parsons slights Durkheim' s charges that the state of mo-
dern "critical" economies and societies, in their transi-
tional stage, are permeated by a "chronic moral anarchy."
Parsons generally underplays Durkheim's highly critical
account of anomie and egoisme, just as he later underplay-
ed Weber's critical attitude toward the moral foundations
of the modern world.
(h) By ignoring Durkheim's historical and critical thrust,
Parsons feels little compunction in rendering egoisme as
a highly virtuous product of Protestantism. What Durkheim
described as '''moral anarchy" and "infinity sickness," Par-
sons transmutes into "moral" or "institutionalized indivi-
dualism." One can only guess at the influence of Parsons
own cultural tradition on this laudatory identification.
However, Parsons' reconstruction gets him here into a num-
ber of serious binds involving his own interpretation, and
in dealing with Durkheim's critique of modern economy and
society. Perhaps Parsons became entangled in this double
resistance against the main critical thrusts of Durkheim's
analysis because Parsons sees the modern "contractual soli-
darity" not as anomic, but rather that these "non-contract-
ual elements in contract" are themselves underlain by norms.
Since egoisme as "institutionalized individualism" may be
taken as derived from Protestantism, so perhaps are the
normative foundations of "contractual solidarity" and the
modern socio-economic order similarly derived from ascetic
Protestant norms (eg. see volume two of The Structure of
Social Action on Weber). In light of Parsons own background,
(some one once called Parsons' doctrines "sublimated asce-
tic Protestantism"), it is not hard to understand Parsons'
underlying rhetorical interest in these issues. Curiously,
however, Parsons later charged others with ignoring the
significance of the religious background of Durkheim's ego-
isme: "Largely for ideological reasons, this basic insight
is still far from being assimilated into the thinking of
social scientists" (1960a:147). But whose ideology is at
work here?
While mistaken in underestimating Durkheim's theses
concerning differentiation and individuation, Parsons is
indeed correct, in my estimate, in detecting certain limi-
tations in Durkheim's overly generalized developmental scre-
mas. Although seemingly abstracted, Parsons here seems to
think in terms of specific preconditions for breakthroughs
from one fundamental evolutionary level to the next; a help-
ful premise I believe. Perhaps Parsons was tacitly playing
off Weber's methodology and theses on individualism and
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Protestantism against Durkheim's ideas. However, again,
this puts Parsons in the extremely difficult position of
dealing with the implications of Durkheim's (and Weber's)
critique of modern society and culture. If egoisme as
"institutionalized individualism" and its correlate "con-
tractual solidarity" are both tacitly and historically sup-
ported by Protestant religio-cultural norms, then how can
Parsons account for the modern egocentricity and insatia-
bility with which Durkheim and Weber were so agonizingly
concerned? In terms of his own reconstruction and split-
ting of Durkheim's schemas, mus~ not Parsons admit that
the fundamental sources of modern egoistic insatiability
also find their origins and continuing sanctions in Pro-
testant norms? That Protestantism is the proximate source
of both the positive aspects of "institutionalized indivi-
dualism" and the drives for "progress and perfection" which
Parsons (and perhaps many of us) hold dear, and the egoism
and insatiability seen by Durkheim as underlying the "moral
anarchy" of the modern world, would most probably prove an
unacceptable admission on Parsons' part. Yet f not only are
the historical, cultural, and psychological links there,
but the very logic of his own and Durkheim's argument leads
inevitably to this conclusion: our virtues, gone to extreme,
become our vices! --- ---- --
(i) Further, Parsons ignores much evidence in Suicide that not
only egoisme but anomie as well are both supported by dom-
inant modern cultural sanctions. Durkheim repeatedly links
egoisme and anomie, and suggests that both are the result
of the "entire morality of progress and perfection," and
"the longing for the infinite, daily represented as vir-
tue." Yet Parsons conveniently ignores the powerful impli-
cations of recognizing that all four suicidal types are,
in the last analysis, supported by central cultural sanc-
tions. Although Parsons was in a good position to discover
Durkheim's breakthrough to the second theory of anomie and
egoisme as generated by the presence of cultural sanctions,
Parsons' own cultural predelications stopped him short.
Indeed, such a recognition of the historical and cul-
tural rootedness of all four types, when coupled with the
unforeseen implications of identifying egoisme with Protest-
ant virtue explored above, would prove fatal to Parsons'
assertion about the great importance of Durkheim's break-
through to The Theory of The Integration of The Social Sys-
tem. For Parsons might find it difficult to accept the in-
evitable conclusion that the very factors for which he so
desperately searched in Durkheim's work--namely, the in-
ternalization of moral obligation and religious values as
the foundation of the "voluntaristic" theory of action--
are also simultaneously the source of the disorder and a-
nomie so relentlessly criticized by Durkheim (eg. see La-
Capra, 1972:162,169,178). What would Parsons say to the
inevitable conclusion that our modern Central Value System
is itself anomic? Or racked by Durkheimian anomie?
••
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
--1270--
(j) By following Durkheim only half-way, Parsons mixes up
Durkheim's first and second schemas. While Durkheim's
first schema was predicated on the image of the absence
of effective social constraint over the passions of the
pre-social individual in the modern era prior to the full
institutionalization of organic solidarity (see Book Two),
and his second schema was based on the image of the pre-
sence of cultural sanctions for autonomy and drives for
"progress and perfection," Parsons leads us to mix up
these separate possibilities by including egoisme (posi-
tively construed) from Durkheim's second implicit schema
with a truncated version of anomie from the first schema.
(k) As critical an omission as Parsons' ignoring of Durkheim's
view of historical process was Parsons' slighting of Durk-
heim's doctrine of human nature. By abstracting Durkheim's
concerns as focussed on the theoretical problem of social
order, Parsons managed to miss both the crucial historical
dimension to Durkheim's thought (which he only later ack-
nowledged through his protege Robert Bellah, -1959), and
Durkheim's image of human nature. Both are critical to any
adequate interpretation of Durkheim's typology of suicide.
(1) In consequence, Parsons seriously underemphasizes not only
the source of the disruptive elements in egoisme and anomie,
but most importantly, the nature of these inordinate pas-
sions and desires. Durkheim's central concern in analyzing
the origins and nature of the "moral anarchy" plaguing the
world was with egoism (in its negative aspects), and with
ravages of insatiability wrought by these driven and isola-
ted egos. Given his early dichotomy of moral rules and sen-
sual appetites, it is clear that Durkheim's central concern
was ~ith the "infinity of dreams and desires." Parsons ex-
plains the resulting social instability (or anomie) in terms
of the "lack of definiteness of expectations." But in an
absolutely crucial shift in meaning, Parsons changes Durk-
heim's connotation of anomie from "infiniteness" to "inde-
finiteness." But lack of normative clarity is simply not
synonymous with insatiability.
(m) By ignoring Durkheim's crucial doctrine of the inherent
egoism and passionate insatiability of human nature (in
the first schema, culture in the second schema), Parsons'
schematic distinction between the presence (egoisme and
altruisme) versuS the absence of norms (anomie) simply
falls to the ground. For, in contrast to Parsons, Durk-
heim's problem was not the generic absence of social con-
trol. His distinction was rather between that type of cul-
turally sanctioned social solidarity in which the inher-
ent passions of human nature are directed solely collect-
ive ends, and the modern type of "critical" transitional
period in which no effective social force acts to constrain
these naturally insatiable and egoistic passions. And if
one completes the journey started by Parsons and follows
Durkheim to his second implicit schema by locating egoism
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and insatiability in modern culture rather than in human
nature, then Parsons' schema becomes not only mistaken
and incomplete but historically irrelevant as well.
(n) As always, Parsons mistakenly presumes that Durkheim de-
veloped his theories, especially concerning suicide, in
exclusive and categorical response to the Anglo Utilitar-
ians. But Durkheim's second typology of suicide cannot
adequately be understood apart from either multiple polem-
ics against opposing cultural traditions, or his core cul-
tural commitments to the Franco-Positivist ("la ic") Cultur-
al Tradition (see Book Three) .
(0) Parsons' rendering of anomie as simply the confusion re-
sulting from declassification neglects key intervening var-
iables of great general significance in Durkheim's argument.
Contrary to Parsons, the deregulation of anomie, to Durk-
heim, is merely the releasing and sustaining condition of
the "diseases of the infi»ite." An especially critical var-
iable which Parsons1g~~~~~~elyenough in view of his inter-
est in the sociological foundations of economic theory and
action, is Durkheim's important notion of The Social Sche-
dule. Further, Parsons ahistorical abstraction of Durkheim's
methodological framework leads him to also ignore the cru-
cial historical differences in the content and mode of en-
forcement of the Social Schedule at the two ends of history.
(p) Accordingly, Parsons fails to sUfficiently emphasize the
critical fact concerning the Social Schedule governing the
distribution of socioeconomic rewards of the two societal
types at the two ends of history--namely, legitimacy. If
Parsons had linked his correct recognition that both modern
egoisme and traditional altruisme were sanctioned as legit-
imate by dominant cultural values, with Durkheim's notion
of the importance of The Social Schedule at both ends of
history, then he too might have broken through to recogni-
tion of Durkheim's second implicit schema in which all four
types of suicide are sanctioned as legitimate, though ex-
treme, expressions of dominant cultural values. In turn,
with his Weberian-inspired insights into the origins and
development of dominant modern cultural traditions, Par-
sons might have then profitably explored the legitimizing
foundations of egoisme and anomie in the modern world.
(q) Parsons fundamentally misconstrues the importance of anomie
and egoisme in Durkheim's methodological development, since
the elements Parsons separates out and assigns to differ-
ent phases do not represent distinct stages. Rather, they
were all bound up together from the beginning. In turn,
Parsons' caricaturing of the early Durkheim as a crude ma-
terialistic positivist, and his equally mistaken interpre-
tation of the later Durkheim as a curiously inconsistent
idealist, not only distort Durkheim's thought, but unfor-
tunately directed attention away from some of Durkheim's
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really crucial breakthroughs. As we saw in Book Three,
these include his growing social realism, his breakthrough
to the second theory of anomie and egoisme, his break-
through to the notion of civilizational process, his his-
torical work on the evolution of education in France which
attributed an independent causality to cultural-historical
factors, and so on.
(r) Finally, Parsons' solution to the very dilemma which so
haunted him that he constantly foisted it off on Durkheim
is largely fictitious. For Parsons came to posit the very
elements which are lacking in the first place. If, indeed,
the absence of a value consensus is the cause of the so-
called "Hobbesian problem," then Parsons cannot hope to
solve this dilemma simply by postulating the existence, the
the generic presence of internalized moral obligation.
Even more damaging, Parsons prescinds from the histor-
ical situation which originally generated the "Hobbesian
dilemma"--namely, the Puritan Revolution and the English
Civil War of the seventeenth century. The same type of as-
cetic Protestantism which Parsons virtuously identifies
with egoisme was also the prime historical cultural source
of the anarchy of egoism and anomie in the actual context
of the real Hobbesian dilemma! Further, the Utilitarian lib-
erals' economic doctrine was also a later outgrowth of the
same Protestantism which Parsons defends, and which Durkheim
attacked as anomic!
But, true to his own cultural tradition, Parsons did
not trouble himself with the disturbing implications of his
doctrines and those which he appropriated for his own pur-
poses.
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B. Dohrenwend and Fatalisme
One of the leading analyses contending that the dis-
tinctness of Durkheim's types should be maintained is Bruce
Dohrenwend's article "Egoism, Altruism, Anomie, and Fatalism:
A Conceptual Analysis of Durkheim's Types" (1959). As widely
cited as Barclay Johnson's paper, Dohrenwend takes a posi-
tion diammetrically opposed to the reductions favored by
Johnson. Dohrenwend follows in the Parsonian stream of norm-
ative development of Durkheim's theses. Specifically, Dohren-
wend accepts Parsons' distinctions between the strength and
content of norms. However, Dohrenwend tries to find a set of
distinctions for the category which Parsons neglected--fatal-
isme. Dohrenwend thus distinguishes between fatalisme and the
other types in terms of the regulatory source of norms.
Now, we should note again the dangers inherent in set-
ting aside crucial theses in the original works, and transla-
ting the remaining portions into one's own special vocabu-
lary, theoretical structure, and one's own special preoccupa-
tions. For instance, Dohrenwend contends that Durkheim's im-
age of human nature can be profitably detached from his ty-
pology of suicide: " .•• moralizing about 'the state of human
nature' influences Durkheim's descriptions of the norm states
at many points: it serves for the most part as an obstacle to
the analysis of these states" (1959:468). Although purporting
to provide an accurate interpretation of Durkheim's types,
DOhrenwend,too, feels little compunction in simply excising,
without the detailed exegesis and exploration we undertook
here in Books One and Three, one of the critical anchors of
Durkheim's theory. "The focus of this paper, then, is on the
norm-states themselves as distinct from their relation to i-
deas about basic human nature" (1959:469). However, how can
one really grasp Durkheim's notions without understanding
the central emphasis he placed on the insatiable passions of
the organic ego? I must insist: no egoism and no insatiabili-
ty, and no historical process, no typology of suicide!
Taking his clues from Durkheim's assertion that "egoisme
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and altruism are opposites, as are anomie and fatalism" (1959:
470), Dohrenwend sets out, as with so many others, to deter-
mine in precisely what sense these types are distinguishable
as opposites. "The assumption here is that each type can be
differentiated from every other in terms of its polar opposite-
ness to each of the other types on at least one major dimen-
sion" (1959:470).
Now, Dohrenwend takes his lead more from Parsons than
Durkheim; this can be seen not only in terms of his abstract-
ed normative emphasis, but also in his initial formulation of
the first two dimensions of Durkheim's types .
••. one is the presence versus the absence of social
norms, distinguishing both altruism and egoism from
anomie; the other is the collectivistic versus the
individualistic content of norms, which distinguishes
altruism from egoism (1959:471).
Here we encounter again the asymmetry of Parsons' typology.
However, Dohrenwend moves to elaborate an additional compari-
son allowing us to further distinguish between all four types.
Hence, he focusses on the sources of effective legitimate so-
cial control or normative regulation--whether it derives pri-
marily from external or internal controls.
According to this interpretation, there is implicit in
Durkheim's types a distinction between two main sources
of normative regulation: one stemming from rules which
have been internalized by individuals ••. , the other
from rules applied from a source of external authority
(1959:472).
Supposedly taking his lead from altruisme, Dohrenwend
then attempts to add another dimension to the Parsonian class-
ification which will take care of that "neglected stepchild"
--fatalisme. This effort is summed up Dohrenwend this way:
The four types can be differentiated each from every
other, and in terms of oppositeness on at least one
of three major dimensions: the existence of norms,
their content, and their effective source of regula-
tory power. Both egoism and altruism are characteri-
zed by the existence of effective, internalized rules,
but the content of the rules is individualistic in the
first case and collectivistic in the second. Fatalism
stands in strong contrast to egoism and altruism, for
its effective source is an authority external to the
social aggregate; nevertheless, all three types involve
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rules which are binding on the overt behavior of in-
dividuals. Anomie, however, appears to be a type a-
part, as it is marked by the absence of norms alto-
gether (1959:472).
Hynes (1975:93) offers a schematic representation of Dohren-
wend's typology.
Now, Dohrenwend's reconstructed typology retains many
of the same flaws as Parsons'--including abstracted ahistor-
icalness, neglect of the insatiability and egoism of human
nature, and in this case, anomie is left floating in socio-
logical space as a purely negative category. l{hile his inclu-
sion of fatalisrnein the typology is important, not only is
Dohrenwend's Parsonian classification assymmetrical, but it
might have benefited from the application of the active/pas-
sive dichotomy (one of Parsons' favorites) to the problem of
interpreting fatalisme. In contrast to Dohrenwend, I must in-
sist that fatalisme cannot be adequately conceptualized as
merely the result of external regulation, for Durkheim's no-
tion of archaic society, followed by Parsons' positing of the
generic need for internalized moral obligation, presumes
that individuals are permeated with the dominant norms. No,
fatalisme as well as altruisme in both of Durkheim's schemas
is sanctioned by dominant cultural values, and in Parsons'
schema this includes as well. Surely we can find more viable
alternatives than "jerry-rigging" already inadequate schemas.
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C. Neyer, Mawson, Cresswell
Here we shall briefly explore the suggestions of three
observers who, while not offering coherent typologies, none-
theless argue for the distinctness of Durkheim's types. In
1960, in a footnote Joseph Neyer sums up Durkheim's general
schema of suicide in this way:
... altruism=too much self-transcendence; egoism=not
enough self-transcendence; fatalism=too much regula-
tion; anomie=not enough regulation. In Durkheim's mor-
al terms, altruism and egoisme are concerned with the
good, while fatalism and anomie are concerned with
duty. Self-transcendence corresponds to the action of
society as immanent; regulation corresponds to the
action of society as transcendent (1960:66-7, #48).
While suggestive (eg. Hynes, 1975:l00,notes the similarity
to his own typology), as expressed Neyer's distinctions are
stated in so compressed a form that it is difficult to know
exactly what they imply. Are these distinctions classifiable
in a graphic schema, or de they designate a series of dis-
tinctions? Besides the cumbersome terminology (eg. transcen-
dence/immanence), it is not clear to me to what extent Neyer's
rough typology is grounded in the basic structure of Durk-
heim's thought. While intriguing, I confess I am at a loss
to know what to do with this suggestive typology.
In a valuable review and critique of the literature
on anomie and social pathology, A.R. Mawson (1970) argues
for the importance of retaining the distinction between ego-
ism and anomie. Essentially, as Lukes summarizes, Mawson
argues that egoism and anomie represent different kinds of
normlessness: " .•. egoism is the breakdown of social attach-
ments constituting the breakdown of the self; anomie is the
breakdown of constraining legal and moral norms" (Lukes,
1973:207, #67). Mawson proposes:
First, had Durkheim pursued and attempted to clarify
his distinction between the two concepts, he would
have been forced to reexamine the presuppositions
upon which his sociology had been based. Secopdly,
despite the difficulties in Durkheim's theor~hich
the concepts of anomie and egoism play a crucial part,
a distinction between them still has to be drawn which
in fact retains some of their original meaning. All
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contemporary studies of anomie have neglected the
distinction between anomie and egoisme with the re-
sult that social conditions, psychological states,
and processes which are entirely different from one
another have been assimilated (1970:298).
Mawson notes also the underlying importance of Durkheim's
negative view of human nature as inherently egoistic and in-
satiable. And Mawson distinguishe& between anomie and egoisme
in terms of their externalizing/internalizing, passions/intel-
lect modes of expression •
..• if a weakening external control over the passions
is the distinguishing feature of anomie, deregulation
of the intellect as a result of isolation from group
activity is the differentia specifica of the second
pathological state: egoism. Durkheim thus postulates
a distinction between man's intellect and his passions
(1970: 30l-2) .
But Mawson proposes that II ••• analysis of anomie and
egoism leads to a paradox, the solution of which necessitates
the abandonment of his theory and the assumptions on which it
had been based" (1970:30l). Specifically, Mawson, like so many
others, is puzzled by Durkheim's distinction between attach-
ment and regulation in regard to egoism and anomie. Noting
(1970:303) several apparent contradictions in Durkheim's de-
velopment of these distinctions, Mawson contends that he has
discovered a paradox: " ••. which Durkheim assiduously avoid-
ed, for perhaps he realized intuitively that his entire theo-
retical structure would have been called into question if he
had tried to solve it systematically" (1970: 304). Like Marks
and myself, then, Mawson claims to have discovered a basic
hiatus in Durkheim's developing theory of anomie. But Maw-
son's discussion is opaque sometimes, and doesn't appear to
have a clear sense of the "nuclear structure" of Durkheim's
thought. Like so many others, too, Mawson makes too much of
Durkheim's notion of "externality" as a criterion of social
facts; hence, he claims that the notion of external regula-
tion denied the possibility of sccial participation and the
internalization of norms. Mawson concludes that:
The crucial difference between anomie and egoism
is that egoism is defined as the psychological isola-
tion of individuals from groups, whereas individuals
••
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in a state of anomie, where legal and moral rules
have ceased to have sanctioning power, are not iso-
lated psychologically from each other (1970:306).
But I suggest that Mawson has not fully understood Durkheim's
notion of normative and symbolic process, nor his notion of
the construction and emergence of the person through history.
Thus, when Mawson opposes rules to meanings in Durkheim's
thought, he does something which Durkheim doesn't really do.
Once again, Mawson, like Barclay Johnson and others, is on
to something important here, but itisn~quite what he thinks
it is. I must disagree, therefore, with Mawson's rather opaque
conclusion:
For in reconciling the notion of regulation with that
of attachment by juxtaposing an analysis of norms with
that of psychological isolation we arrived at a social
psychology in which the intimate relation between norms
and the self implied a set of presuppositions which
were fundamentally opposed to those with which Durkheim
began (1970:307).
Finally, Cresswell (1972), while not having a real grasp
of the underlying structure of Durkheim's thought, nor of the
complexities and ambiguities of his suicide schemas, offers
some observations which have value. First, he raises some in-
teresting questions regarding the meaning of the various no-
tions of social integration (eg. 1972:139). Second, he ob-
ves that Durkheim's sociological theory of suicide rested on
a moral and philosophical position (eg. 1972:137-8). Finally,
in attempting to articulate the relations between Durkheim's
types, Cresswell includes the historical dimension of primi-
tive and modern societies as an integral part of his typology.
••
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D. Anthony Giddens' Work
One of the most perceptive of recent interpreters of
Durkheim, Anthony Giddens, has come closer than many others
to identifying some of the essential elements of an adequate
reinterpretation of Durkheim's first typology of suicide. Not
only has Giddens generated, over the last decade or so, some
of the better work on the sociology of suicide, but he also
enjoys the distinction of having produced some of the finest
exegetical and interpretive work on Durkheim. It is hardly
surprising that Giddens would come closer than others before
him, for he has put close exegesis of texts first, and thus
more often remained faithful to what Durkheim really said and
meant. Unfortunately, Giddens largely stopped at the exegeti-
cal level, and did not proceed to a systematic, in-depth ex-
ploration of Durkheim's paradigmatic or "nuclear structure."
As a result, Giddens' generally excellent insights into Durk-
heim's schema of suicide remain scattered, and are not brought
to bear on a whole scale reconstruction of Durkheim's typology.
Let us now briefly explore some of Giddens' excellent and
thought provoking exegeses, which can often be used as a sum-
mary starting point for understanding Durkheim's first schema.
Giddens stands, for instance, with those who would res-
cue the distinctness of Durkheim's different types of suicide.
Yet he also tries to interrelate them, and in the process
provides some important insight into Durkheim's second notion
of egoisme.
Durkheim's discussion of the differences between ego-
istic and anomic suicide is not always unambiguous, and
this has caused some commentators to suppose that the
two types in fact, cannot ... be meaningfully disting-
uished [ego Barclay Johnson]. Careful reading of Durk-
heim's account against the broader backdrop of The Di-
vision of Labor however, makes this position difficult
to maintain. Egoistic suicide is clearly linked to the
growth of the "cult of the indIVidual" in contemporary
societies.-protestantIsm is the religioUS forerunner and
primary source of modern morar-individualism, which has-
in other areas of social life become wholly secularized.
Egoistic suicide-is thus an affront to the growth of the
"cult of the personality." ~here man is a God to mankind
a certaln growth in egoisme is unavoidable." ''Individual-
••
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ism is undoubtedly not egoisme, but it comes close to
it; the one cannot be stimulated without further spread-
ing the other. Thus egoistic suicide arises."
Anomic suicide, on the other hand, derives from the lack
of moral regulation particularly characteristic of major
sectors of modern industry. [Footnote: Durkheim holds that
a certain amount of anomie is a necessary element in so-
cieties committed to progressive change. "Every morality
of improvement and progress thus presupposes a certain le-
vel of anomie".] ... Egoistic and anomic suicide are never-
theless closely related to one another, especially on the
level of. the individual suicide. "It is, indeed, almost in-
evitable that the egoist should have some tendency to de-
regulation; for since he is detached from society, it has
not sufficient hold upon him to regulate him*(197la:B4-5).
In addition, Giddens' account is valuable in that he in-
sists on the historical framework of Durkheim's typology. Ano-
mie and egoisme are specific to the modern socioeconomic order,
while altruisme and fatalisme are rooted in primitive or archa-
ic society.
Suicide in traditional societies takes ~ different form
than the egoistic and anomic types: this is directly tra-
ceable to the characteristics of social organization, spe-
cified in The Division of Labor, whereby such societies
differ from the modern form. In one category of suicides
found in traditional societies, it is a duty for an indi-
vidual, when placed in certain circumstances, to kill him-
self. A person kills himself because he has an obligation
to do so .... Both kinds of altruistic suicide rest upon
the existence of a strong collective conscience, which so
dominates the actions of an individual that he will sacri-
fice his life in furtherance of a collective value (197la:
85) •
Indeed, Giddens goes on to i~sist that anomie and egoisme can-
not be understood apart from this macro-evolutionary framework.
Therefore, all those versions of anomie that portray it in ab-
stracted and formal terms are in that measure misleading.
If there is a basic opposition in all of Durkheim's works,
it is not that of social inteqration (normative control)
versus social disintegration (lack of normative regulation
or anomie), but, as with virtually all leading social think-
ers 0 f t.i s time, that of "traditional" versus "modern" so-
ciety with all the profound transformations which this lat-
ter distinction implies. It does nbt seem to have been gen-
erally appreciated that there is necessarily an historical
dimension to Durkheim's treatment of anomie~ this is inte-
gral to the very conception of "socially generated need,"
but is also important in regard to the second aspect of
anomie, that of provision for wants.
••
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In the traditional social order, human faculties and
needs are kept to a low level, and therefore are read-
ily provided for. The dominance of the conscience col-
lective plays a role in each of these respects: on the
one hand, by restricting the development o~ "individua-
tion"--the liberation of the individual personality--
and, on the other hand, by setting strict limits to what
may legitimately be striven for by an individual in any
given social position. The process of evolution away from
traditionalism both increases the level of individuation
and at the same time undermines the fixed moral boundar-
ies characteristic of previous ages. It is these twin de-
velopments which create the important theoretical problem
which Durkheim seeks to resolve in terms of his analysis
of the emergence of moral individualism (1971b:216).
Here Giddens clearly recognizes that needs are socially gener-
ated, and the provision for these wants are historically deter-
mined. Giddens implicitly recognizes the importance of Durk-
heim's notion of the crucial historical differences in the So-
cial Schedule at the two ends of history. Hence, ,~iddens pro-
vides here a valuable entree to Durkheim's second schema which
rests on historical dif~erences in the generation and regula-
tion of desires.
Further, Giddens rightly insists that "anomie is specific
to the modern order." Therefore, anomie, according to Durkheim
and Giddens after him, is not to be viewed primarily as a gen-
eric problem, applicable in equal degree to all societies, but
rather is primarily a problem characteristic of the modern
transitional crisis.
Anomie, therefore,isa phenomenon specific to the modern
order (as is indexed by the documentation of the growth
of anomic suicide in Suicide)~ it is to be understood in
relation to individuation and moral individualism. Al-
though Durkheim concedes that a "certain level of anomie"
is inevitable in modern society, which is committed to
rapid and continuous change, anomie as pathology is to
be traced to the temporarily inadequate development of
moral individualism. The upsurge of anomie found in the
contemporary age is mainly centered in economic life,
which has broken away from the confines of tradition, but
has not yet been sufficiently penetrated by the new moral-
ity of individualism (1971b:216).
It is only through acceptance of the moral regulation
which makes social life possible that man is able to reap
the benefits which society offers him. The ~ailure to in-
ject the historical element into Durkheim's analysis of
this issue has led many critics to suppose that his views
••
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represent a thinly veiled rationale for authoritarian
political doctrine. But it is, in fact, central to Durk-
heim's thesis that all forms of moral regulation are not
identical. In other words, "regulation" (society, social
constraint) cannot simply be juxtaposed in an abstract
and universal sense with "lack of regulation" (anomie)
(1971a:117) •
All those who would enter the lists in debate over the true
meaning and historical significance of anomie would do well
to heed Giddens' words here; it would save much confusion, and
allow us to progress faster.
The notions of both egoisme and anomie must be understood
within the scope of the general conception of the develop-
ment of society presented in The Division of Labor. Seen
in this context, egoisme and anomie are not simply func-
tional problems facing all types of society in equivalent
degree: they are stimulated by the-very morar-individual-
ism which is the outcome of socIal evolution. The dilem-
mas facing~he modern form of society, Durkheim maintains,
are not to be resolved through a reversion to the autocra-
tic discipline found in traditional societies, but only
through the moral consolidation of the differentiated di-
vision of, labor, which demands quite different forms of
authority from those characteristic of earlier types of
society * (1971a:118).
Now, in terms of anomie specifically, Giddens clearly re-
cognizes that Durkheim's concept ambiguously combines both the
notion of goals and the potential for satisfaction. And Gid-
dens rightly pinpoints this ambiguity as a.source of confusion
in interpreting what Durkheim "really meant" or "should have
meant."
according to the theory of anomie, moral obligation
not only sets limits to human action, but also focussses
it and gives it a defined objective (1971b:219) .
... In Durkheim's formulation, the concept [of anomie]
involves two components, which tend to be assimilated in
his own use of it. One of these refers to the degree to
which human action is provided with definitive objectives;
the other concerns how far these ends are realizable. The
distinction is fundamental, yet Durkheim glosses over it
.... The fact that Durkheim failed to utilize the distinct-
ion between the two aspects of anomie is a source of the
most basic flaws in his sociology. As most recent litera-
ture employing the concept of anomie demonstrates, the con-
cept takes on quite divergent theoretical applications ac-
cording to which aspect is emphasized. If anomie is taken
to refer mainly to "norrnlessness"--the first aspect of a-
nomie--then it tends to support a standpoint emphasizing
••
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the dimensions of "meaning/lack of meaning" in individual
conduct. The end result is ... a position which ... treats
social conflict as "pathological," ie. which links con-
flict to "deviance" produced by "imperfect socialization."
If the other aspect is emphasized, it tends to lead to a
conception of "normative strain" rather than "normless-
ness." Here the objective of conduct may be quite clear
to the actor, and there is not the strong overtone of ir-
rationality which appears to characterize the conduct of
the individual where the first aspect is stressed. The im-
portance of this conception is that it allows a much great-
er scope for conceptualizing conflicts deriving from divi-
sions of interest in society. Durkheim undoubtedly minimi-
zes the significance of this form of conflict in his wri-
tings ....
There are two respects in which a given objective is not
"realizable." One is that there exists barriers in the so-
ciety which prevents its realization (eg. Mertonian anomie)
.... But there is another sense in which an objective has
no limits: the insatiable appetite (1971b:225).
Giddens is thus led to the next step in the process of
breakthrough to the second schema--namely, that goals are un-
realizable because of the insatiable appetites of the organic
ego. Giddens then brings up the crucial possibility that ano-
mic suicides may be ultimately generated by sociocultural fac-
tors--namely, moral and religious obliqations.
He [Durkheim] fails to consider the theoretical possibil-
ity that moral obligations themselves may be "factual"
elements in the horizon of the acting individual ....
While Durkheim accepts that there are varying degrees of
attachment to moral norms, he has no place for this in
his theoretical analysis of the nature of moral obliga-
tion (1971b:226).
But, of course, I disagree with Giddens' conclusion here, for
it is precisely my thesis that Durkheim did indeed suggest at
many points that moral obligations were not merely "factual"
1 t · th h' f . d' . d 1 but. .e emen s ln e orlzons 0 ln lVl ua s,~ motlvatlng ones as
well. Durkheim did come to perceive egoisme and anomie as the
result, not simply of the generic absence of moral discipline,
but as the result of the historical presence of a very strong
type of internalized moral discipline. Certainly this is the
conclusion which Max Weber's work urges upon the reader inter-
ested in the relations between Protestant norms and sanctions
and the tensions which may issue at their extreme in suicide.
But Giddens, perhaps more than anyone else since Parsons and
••
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Merton thirty years earlier, should have recognized these
crucial historical sociocultural linkages, and thus broken
through.to the second schema of suicide. Giddens, after al~
is an erudite intellectual historian who wrote, among other
things, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory which was speci-
fically devoted to comparing and contrasting the social theo-
ries of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber. Yet, although he cogently
criticized the reigning Parsonian orthodoxy, Giddens also
failed to breakthrough to the second schema. Even though he
was close at many points to discovery of the inner links be-
tween these two famous paradigms, the "abductive" reorganiza-
tion (eg. N.R. Hanson, 1958; T. Huff, 1975) never came. We
must, therefore, go beyond Giddens' helpful exegeses, and
those of Lukes (1973), to an in-depth exploration and recon-
struction of Durkheim's basic theses on suicide (see Books
Two and Three).
We might also note that Giddens has a keen recognition
that Durkheim engaged in multiple polemics against opposing
cultural traditions--especially against the Anglo Utilitar-
ians and the German Romantic-Idealists. However, Giddens' in-
sight is incomplete here, too, for he does not sufficiently
emphasize that Durkheim's prime historical opponent was--as
with all French positivists--the Catholic Hierocratic Meta-
physical Cultural Tradition (see Book Four). Nor does Gid-
dens sufficiently refine or emphasize Durkheim's own deep
roots and the dilemmas inherent in the Franco Positivist
("laic") Cultural Tradition. Most importantly here, Giddens
fails to connect these deeply rooted polemics against oppo-
sing cultural traditions to Durkheim's typology of suicide.
In addition, Giddens' account is valuable because it
links anomie and egoisme in the modern transitional crisis
with Durkheim's structural-social morphological theses, seen
in evoluti.onary perspective. Also, Giddens has good insight
into Durkheim's notion of the emergence of "moral individual-
ism" and the person through history (see Book One). However,
these insights await reconstruction as in Books Two and Three.
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E. Eugene Hynes: Suicide and Homo Duplex
Eugene Hynes's linkage of Durkheim's notion of homo
duplex to his typology of suicide must be counted as one of
the most important steps forward in the reconstruction of
Durkheim's schemas of suicide in particular, and his thought
in general. Hynes's breakthrough came because he recognized
the centrality of the notion of homo duplex in all of Durk-
heim's thought, and moved to link it to the typology of sui-
cide. He argues: " ... the major influence on Durkheim in his
formulation of the different causes and types of suicide was
his conception of the nature of man and the need for author-
ity " (1975:88). Indeed, Hynes goes so far as to argue that
" Durkheim's suicide typology derived from his homo duplex
concept" (1975:98). Incorporating Durkheim's view of man as
double into the suicide typology, Hynes brings us very close
to the first adequate reformulation of the Durkheim's initial
schema of suicide (see Book Two of the ~resent dissertation).
After Hynes explicitly pointed out the intimate and necessary
connection between homo duplex and Durkheim's suicide typolo-
gy, there is no longer any excuse for this crucial factor
to be ignored again in the sociological literature.
Focussing on socialization process (instead of the So-
cial Schedules in societies at the two ends of history), Hynes
seeks to answer the questions which I have repeatedly posed to
the reductionists: Why did Durkheim use the two analytical di-
mensions of "integration" and "regulation"? Why not others?
And why did he keep these dimensions distinct? (See Hynes,
1975:88). Because he includes the notion of man as double,
Hynes, for the first time (see also McCloskey, 1974, 1976a )
provides an adequate answer. He argues that the need for dual
attachment to society and the view of man as double imply one
another.
For the individual to be "socialized" ... (I) the insa-
tiable, selfish drives associated with the animal part
of his nature must be repressed or checked, and (2) he
must be directed to some minimal extent toward social
ends, ie. a part of his personality must be made social
(1975:89) .
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Hynes (1975:89) graphically presents these relationships in
the following manner (see figure 12) :
Socialization
of Homo Duplex Quantity Involved Suicidal Type
1. Repression of drives (a) too much Fatalisme
• (regulation) (b) too little Anomie
2. Direction towards (a) too much Altruisme
social ends
. (b) too little Egoisme(integration)
•
•
•
The major shortcoming of Hynes's valuable typology is
that it neglects to include the crucial evolutionary frame-
work of Durkheim's suicide typology. This historical dimen-
sion can be factored in, however; the historical type of so-
ciety and the drives of homo d~plex then become the two main
classificatory criteria (see figure 13):
Socialization of Homo Duplex
•
•
Mechanical·
Solidarity
Modern
Transitional
Crisis
Repression
too much--too little
Fatalisme
Anomie
Integration
too much--too little
, Altruisme
Egoisme
•
•
•
However, the resulting schema reveals again how Durkheim ta-
citly compared and contrasted traditional types of suicide
with modern ones, for there are four empty cells here--there
are no possibilities suggested where there is too little so-
. cial control of homo duplex in traditional society, or too
much control of the organic ego in modern society.
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FOOTNOTES
#1, p. 1099--I originally prepared a much longer version of
the critical reviews of both Parsons and Merton's
treatment of Durkheim and anomie, especially as these
impacted on the development of American sociology.
#1, l2l3--The studies specifically cited here by Cole and
Zuckerman can be found in their appendix to the volume
edited by Clinard (1964).
#1, l2l6--The studies specifically cited in the present regard
may be found in Cole's (1975) bibliography.
••
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